Petition for Writ of Certiorari — D. B., Petitioner v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Supreme Court briefMay 16, 2019

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NO.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE INTEREST OF D.B. AND G.B. CHILDREN

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORIARI

To The Court of Appeals of Texas

Second District

Sua-CiTiOLL8.

i'. l. 1.: !.:•

MAY 1 6 2019

ON APPEAL FROM CAUSE NO: 02-18-00015-CV

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

PETITION FOR WRIT FOR CERTIORARI

BEFORE JUDGMENT

DENLEY ANN BISHOP

306 N. 12th STREET.

DUNCAN, OK 73533

TELEPHONE (580) 606-9873

PRO-SE

KIRBY WALLACE

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

401W. Belknap, St.

CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC

FT. Worth, TX 76102

6 Everest Street, #3085

Cambirf,gfiBe3&f&

OCT 1 6 2019

SUPREMECnimT^uv

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Texas district court violated the Petitioner’s Federal Civil Rights

under Section 1983 by discriminating against the Petitioner’s Religious Freedom and

violating the Petitioner’s Constitutional Religious Freedoms. Did the court violate the

First Amendment, the Texas Constitution and equal protection clause under the

Fourteenth Amendment regarding Civil Right since they terminated the Petitioners

Parental Rights due to her religion. Does the state have a right to terminate parental

rights for one reason, the parents are Christians? Does this violate the Federal

Constitutionally protected rights of freedom of religion to raise children in the religion

of Christianity without the fear of government interference? Did the government

overstep its boundaries when it terminated parental rights due to religious beliefs?

Whether the Texas district court violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

The State of Texas violated the Petitioner’s rights by prohibiting her free exercise of

religion. This court must review this case to restore the compelling interest test as set

forth in Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.

205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion

is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose

religious exercise is substantially burdened by government. This is an ongoing debate

now as there is a current case now at the Supreme Court level trying to overturn the

RFRA in the United States Supreme Court in October of 2019.

Did the state violate the petitioner’s due process rights by committing fraud on the

court by suppressing evidence to the district court and appeals court so her children

would not be returned to Oklahoma?

Whether the Texas district court erred in terminating the parental rights of

Oklahoma residents, without the permission of the state of Oklahoma. In violation of

the UCCJEA law, violating Federal Jurisdictional issues where two separate states

Oklahoma and Texas have argued over jurisdiction. Whether the district court erred

by violating the Petitioner’s Constitutional Fourteenth Due Process Right, a Federal

right, by denying her the right to have her case heard in Oklahoma where the judge

was going to return custody of her children to her.

Whether the Texas district court violated the Federal law in regard to ICWA, (Indian

Child Welfare Act) by refusing to contact the Native American Nation. Is the new

order denying the Cherokee tribe’s motion to dismiss overturning ICWA and effects

this case at par.

Whether the Texas district court violated the Petitioner’s due process rights according

to the Fourteenth Amendment terminating the parents’ rights due to homeschooling.

Did the court violate the parents’ first amendment religious freedom by terminating

parental rights due to homeschooling for religious reasons, in conflict with the United

States case Yoder vs. Wisconsin 406 U.S. 205. Did the court violate the Texas law

that made it illegal on May 7,2019 to terminate parental rights due to homeschooling?

Did the state violate the Due Process Clause by denying court-appointed counsel to

an indigent pro-se parent facing termination of her parental rights without applying the

due process analysis mandated by the Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social

Services, then denying the indigent person a right to appellate review of the legal

sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination because the court suppressed

evidence intentionally so the case would not be returned to Oklahoma. Did the state

violate the law by fraudulently withholding evidence from the appeals court, and when

the abatement hearing was ordered by the appeals court they argued she was denied

appellate review of the issues because she was an indigent person who did not know

how to preserve them because the attorney and the judge intentionally withheld them

so the case would not be reversed and remanded to the Oklahoma court?

Does a state providing court-appointed counsel to indigent parents facing

termination of their parental rights in State court and deny the petitioner her rights

under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and.in violation of

the court’s decision In the Interest of P.M. a Child No. 15-0171? Did this violate

Section 107.013(a)(1) that states the court must appoint and attorney through the

exhaustion of appeals under Section 107.016(2)(B) which includes all proceedings in

this Court? Did the court deny the petitioner’s Due Process Right to court-appointed

counsel after they discharged the court appointed attorney after he committed fraud

on the court and suppressed evidence from the court? Whether the district court and

Texas Supreme court erred by not appointing the Petitioner an attorney after the

attorney was dismissed after unethical and illegal conduct violating the Sixth

Amendment's requirements for the right to counsel are made obligatory upon the

States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335. P. 386

U. S. 742. According to the law a court appointed attorney is mandated by law in a

termination of parental rights case.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

This is a sensitive case since it involves two children, the Fort Worth Court

of Appeals used initials instead of real names to protect the identity of the

children. Their names are in the trial court docket. The Texas Supreme Court

protected the names too.

Petitioner is Denley Bishop, D.B. and G.B., natural mother, Respondents

are as follows:

cc: Mark T. Zuniga

Office of General Counsel

Texas Dept, of Family and Protective Services

2401 Ridgepoint Dr., Bldg. H-2, MC:Y-956

Austin, TX 78754

Vicki L. Foster

4500 Mercantile Plaza, Ste. 300

Fort Worth, TX 76137

James D. Saint

Texas Dept. Family and Protective Services

1200 E. Copeland Rd., Ste. 400

Arlington, TX 76011-4937

Emma Guzman Ramon

Attorney at Law

4214 N. I-35

Denton, TX 76207

SHANE FRANKLIN BISHOP

306 N 12™ STREET

DUNCAN OK 73533

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented........

Parties to the Proceeding,

iii

Table of Contents

Table of Authorities

,vi

Opinions and Orders Below,

Jurisdiction.......... ........................... ....... ...................

Constitutional Provisions and Statute Involved

Statement of the Case

Reasons for Granting the Writ,

II.

III.

IV.

,...2

•4

This Case Raises an Important Issue of Federal Constitutional law

regarding termination of parental rights due to religious faith and

conflicts with Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972)

This Case Raises an Important and Serious Issue Regarding Fraud on the

Court. And, How Fraud on the Court Violates the Parents’ Due Process

Rights According to the Fourteenth Amendment, by Intentionally

Suppressing Evidence.

This Case Raises an Issue with the Violation of the UCCJEA Law,

Violating Federal Jurisdictional issues where Two Separate States

Oklahoma and Texas have Argued over Jurisdiction. Whether the Court

erred by violating the Petitioner’s Constitutional Fourteenth Due

Process Right, a Federal right, by Denying her the Right to have her Case

heard in Oklahoma Where the Judge was Returning her Children.

This Case Raises an Important Issue Regarding ICWA and a Violation of

25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) ("ICWA”), and Conflicts with the Case from this Court

Mississippi Band of Choctow v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. (1989)

This Case Raises an Important Issue of Federal Constitutional Law, and

the Texas Decisions Conflict with the Reasoning Underlying this Court’s

Decisions in Lassiter and in In the Interest of P.M. a Child No. 150171......................................................................................................................................... .................

A. Ms. Bishop's Parental Rights are Fundamental...........................................

B. Termination of Parental Rights Implicates State Action.............................

C. Texas Denied Ms. Bishop Due Process by Erroneous Deprivation of Her Rights

Without Any Precautions............................................................ .............

VI.

The Texas Courts' Decision to Let Stand a Stautory Scheme Granting CourtAppointed Counsel Violating the Equal Protection Clause and Conflicts with the

VII.

Holdings of Seven Other State Supreme Courts.

The Texas Court Decision Violated the Equal Protection Clause and Conflicts with

the Holdings of Four Other State Supreme Courts.....................................

Conclusion

Appendix A- In re D.B. and G.B., Denial of Motion for Rehearing (Tex. May 15,2019)

Appendix B- In re D.B. and G.B., Denial of Petition for Review ( Nov. 16,2018)

Appendix C- In re D. B. and G.B., (Tex. App-Fort Worth 2018, pet. Denied)..............

Appendix D- In re D.B. and G.B., Order of Termination (235th Dist. Court, Cooke County, Texas

Dec. 22, 2017)

Table of Authorities

CASES

Alcorta v. Texas, 355 US 28

Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107(1966)

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660(1983)

Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet,

512 U.S. 687(1994).................................... ............. .'.............

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)....................................

Dumont vs. Lyon case nu. 17-cv-13080 United States Court Michigan, ACLU Civil Rights

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)...............................................

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)...........................................................

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)

E.T., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida and DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND

FAMILIES, Appellees.

No. 4D04-1450.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)

In re Adoption of K.L.P. 763 N.E. 2d 741(111.2002)

In re C.M.C, 273 S.W. 3d 862

(Tex. App-Houston[ist Dist] 2008, no pet)

In re D.S.P., 210 S.W. 3d 776

(Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 2006, no pet)

vii

In re E.S.S., 131 S.W. 3d 632

(Tex. App- Ft. Worth 2004, no pet.)......................................................................

In re Jay, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App 1983).................... ..........................

In re S.A.J.B. 679 N.W. 2d 645

(Iowa 2004).............................................................................. •..................

In the Matter of K.L.J.,

813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991)

Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).....................................................

Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)..............................................

Monroe County DHS v. Luis R., 2009 WI App 109,320 Wis. 2d 652: Indian Child Welfare

Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (“ICWA”)

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S, 393 (Supreme Court of the United States

127 S. Ct. 2618(2007)

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)

Tinker v Des Moines independent School, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)393U. S. 503 (1969)

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)

CONSTITUTIONS & STATUTES

U.S. CONST, amend XIV.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. io2.oo3(a)(i2)(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008)

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 107.013 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008)

viii

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN io7.o2i(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008)

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN i6i.oo3(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008)

MISCELLANEOUS

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULTIONS

NEW TEXAS LAWS REGARDING FAMILY CODE OF HOMESCHOOLING,

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CPS REMOVAL OF CHILDREN

US CONSTITION FIRST ADMENDMENT RIGHT; Seventh Amendment;

SECTION 1983 FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

UCCJEA ACT Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ICWA INDIAN CHILD

WELFARE ACT

CONSTITUTIONS & STATUTES

U.S. CONST, amen. XIV....................................................................

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN io2.oo3(a)(i2)(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008)

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN 107.013 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008)

UCCJEA

ICWA

FREEDOM OF RELGION FIRST ADMENDMENT

42 SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Denley Bishop respectfully submits this petition for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The Texas Supreme Court’s orders refusing discretionary review (App. infra, at la, 2a) are

unreported. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas (App., infra, at

3a) is reported. The judgment entered by the Tarrant County District Court (App., infra, at 10a) is

unreported.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas filed its opinion on March 6, 2018.

The Texas Supreme Court denied a timely petition for discretionary review on November 16,

2018, and denied a timely petition for rehearing on February 1, 2019. This Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a).

Because this petition challenges the constitutionality of a Texas statue affecting the

public interest, the terms of 28 U.S.C. 2403(b) may apply and this petition therefore is being

served on the Attorney General of Texas as required by Rule 29.4(c) of this Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUE

INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:

All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 107.013 of the Texas Family Code provides in pertinent part:

In a suit filed by a governmental entity in which termination of the parent/child

relationship is requested, the court shall appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the interest

of... an indigent parent of the child who responds in opposition to the termination... . The district

court did not analyze the factors governing entitlement to court-appointed counsel set out by this

Court in Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319(1976).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case presents issues surrounding indigent parents in Texas and other states facing

termination of their parental rights. The ongoing debate with this Court’s decision in Lassiter v.

Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) Texas guarantees counsel during a termination of a

parental rights case.

Statutory Background. In Texas, the State and certain private may file actions

seeking termination of parental rights. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN 102.003(a)(12),

161,003(Vemon 2002 & Supp. 2008). After Lassiter, Texas guaranteed courtappointed counsel by statute to all indigent parents facing termination actions.

Factual Background and Trial Court Proceedings. D.B. was bom on September

26, 2009. G.B. was bom on March 20,2010. The Department of Protective and Regulatory

Services removed D.B. and G.B. from the custody of her mother, when the mother went to a

women’s shelter in Texas for one night since the one in Oklahoma needed to make room for

the oldest child who suffered from autism, they were all supposed to return to Oklahoma the

next night according to Oklahoma child protection services. The state of Texas child welfare

office said that the only reason they removed the children was because they are Christians

and a bible verse that was said to their worker. The incident was in Oklahoma and the arrest

of the husband was in Oklahoma. The respondent contacted the police department in

Gainesville, TX and the division supervisor said that they did not have jurisdiction since the

incident and the arrest was in another state. He said Texas has no jurisdiction. The alleged

perpetrator’s residence was Oklahoma too. The adjudication hearing was in Cooke County

Texas and the attorney for the petitioner Brady Howell told the petitioner that he told the

judge that they were from Oklahoma and did file the appropriate motions to have the case

transferred back to Oklahoma, but the judge denied it. The petitioner found out several

months later after an investigation that he lied he never even told the judge. The respondent

contacted the legal counsel on July 13,2017 and he said filed a motion to dismiss based on

jurisdictional issue but, he never filed a jurisdictional motion he said. The judge in

Oklahoma was never contacted at this time either. Both parents live in Oklahoma too. Both

parents were living in Oklahoma also at the time. According to the CPS intake chart a CPS

intake should have never been accepted. The legal jurisdiction of the case is the initial home

state.

The Petitioner had filed a divorce case prior to the state of Texas removing the children and

the state of Oklahoma had an open CPS case too at the time. The Respondent is asking the

state of Oklahoma to respectfully return the children to the correct state jurisdiction.

3. Court of Appeals Proceedings. Ms. Bishop appealed to the Fort Worth Court of

Appeals, arguing the termination judgement was erroneous, there was a lack of

jurisdiction for the judge to terminate their parental rights and there was intentional

fraud on the court by the lawyers who suppressed evidence to the judge about the

state of Oklahoma requesting they return the children to Oklahoma. They also

suppressed evidence about the Cherokee tribe in Oklahoma who requested a

continuance before the termination hearing. The tribe was not contacted by the social

workers in Texas intentionally.

Ms. Bishop complained of her lack of counsel and it was ignored by the district court

and the appeals court. The reason she was not able to raise the issue to be persevered

was due to the fraud committed on the court by both lawyers. She reached out to the

District Attorney Ed Zulinski and he told her not to worry there was no jurisdiction

for them to have this case it is an Oklahoma case. The lack of counsel by Ms. Bishop

was what caused her to lose custody of her children. The trial court worked with the

lawyer and suppressed evidence to the appeals court. The Texas state law requires

court appointed counsel during the termination of a parental rights case. This Court,

the United States Supreme Court has ruled that parents are entitled to court appointed

attorneys in termination of parental rights cases. The district court did not analyze the

factors governing entitlement to court-appointed counsel set out by this Court in

Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319(1976). And, the level of integrity and ethical

behavior by a court appointed attorney is the same as a private attorney. Just because

the attorney was appointed by the judge does not mean that they have a right to break

the law.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case presents two important questions of Federal constitutional law concerning the

State’s handling of parental-rights termination cases. To terminate the parental rights of a parent

due to their religious belief is a violation of the Constitution and the Federal Civil Rights law.

Attorneys in Texas say this is happening more and more to Christian families. For some reason

the pastor’s families are being targeted. There is a desperate need among the Christian

community to stop this. This is an excellent reason to grant this review. Also, there is clearly

also of issues that appear to red flags that the parents in this case where taken advantage of.

There was clearly fraud on the court by suppression of evidence, so the Petitioner would lose

custody of her children intentionally. There was clear malice against the mother in the court

room and her religious beliefs that should never happen to anyone. The judge told her that she

thinks that she is a “so called-Christian.” A century ago, this Court held that the Due Process

Clause protects the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children.” Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Since, this case the courts have enabled protections for

parents facing termination of their parental rights . The courts have held that the child-parent

relationship is one of the most important relationships that is entitled to certain constitutional

protections. Any time the state interferes to separate families the court must review such cases

since they are the most important cases in the family law court system. The cases that break the

bond of a mother to children is at the heart of many family lawyers and the family law judges

find these cases very sensitive since the child and the family will most likely be traumatized the

rest of their life due to the termination of this relationship. See e.g. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.

645, 651 (1972). In the Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) the court found that the

state cannot remove children for their religious beliefs. The court found that the state

overstepped its bounds by infringing on the parent’s religious beliefs. In many cases the United

States Supreme court has upheld the crucial relationship between a child and his mother.

Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,255 (1978); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) These

cases relating to the special relationship between a mother and child relate to the protection of

liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment and due process of the right of a parent to raise

their own children without the fear of state intervention to break up their families. See Santosky

v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774 (1982) Some courts have found that children are a blessing from

the Lord and these are God-given rights that the courts do not have the right to take away, they

believe that only God can do that. The petitioner sees her rights to raise her own children as a

fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution and a blessing given to her by God

that the state does not have a right to intervene in. See Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57, 91

(2000) If the higher court argues for separation of church and state this is the one time the

petitioner would agree. The state should not interfere in what God has given to a mother as a

blessing, children. This is clearly a time where separate of church and state should be adhered to.

The first question this case presents is whether the State’s cumulative denial of multiple

procedural issues were a deviation from the Due Process Rights that are so grievous that to

ignore them is to agree with a great perversion ofjustice, in this case and future cases and how

appointment of counsel throughout the entire termination of the parental rights proceedings is

required by Texas state law. The Eldridge case from this Court shows how a lack of

appointment of counsel can affect the case. This issue can affect how the preservation of error

rules can be affected by the appointment of counsel who intentionally withheld evidence from

the court, so the issue would not be addressed at the appeals court. The question of whether the

issues where preserved was not equal to the issues being withheld by the attorney intentionally

so the petitioner would lose her children. The lack of appointment of an attorney who would

amend the brief and include the evidence that was key to having the case returned to Oklahoma,

denied the mother serious justice and served to cause her to lose custody of her children forever.

These actions by the attorney and the judge are very serious. Keeping the family together is

supposed to be the goal of the state but when the state acts so fraudulently as this state has there

is no question that something has gone terribly wrong in the justice system. The only way for

these parents to get justice since the appeals court and the district court have perverted justice

against them and that is for this higher court to intervene into the fraud that has been committed

in the state of Texas.

The second question this case presents is whether the state is entitled to terminate

parental rights due to the parent’s religious beliefs and whether this interferes in the religious

freedom and the Constitutional rights of the First Amendment'that states that “Congress shall

make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof: or

abridging the freedom of speech. The fact that the only reason that the state removed the

children was due to the mother being a Christian and a bible verse, clearly prohibits the free

exercise of religious freedom with this family, and possibly abridges the freedom of speech. The

state of Texas said that they found the mother to have odd Christian beliefs and that is why they

removed the children. In the hearing the attorney Vicki Foster testified that the state was

concerned about the mother being a Christian and the social worker answered “Yes, they were

concerned that the mother was a Christian and that is why they removed the children.” In the

Yoder v. Wisconsin Case the court found that the state can not infringe on the religious liberties

of the parents no matter if the state found their beliefs odd and peculiar. There was no testimony

in the court that the mother’s Christian beliefs were harmful to the children at all. The only thing

4. Texas Supreme Court Proceedings

Ms. Bishop immediately filed a Petition for Review at the Texas Supreme Court once

the appeals court ignored her pleas for justice when her court appointed attorney

committed fraud on the court. On November 16, 2018 the Texas Supreme Court

finally discharged this attorney only after his plan to deceive the court was finished at

the appeals level. Ms. Bishop filed a pro-se Petition for Review and a Motion to .

Appoint counsel to file an amended brief that would tell the truth about what had

happen. According to the Texas Supreme Court a parent is entitled to court appointed

counsel through out the entire proceeding all the way to the disposition of the case.

They ruled that the parent is entitled to competent counsel through the Texas

Supreme court level. The Texas Supreme Court denied her motion for appointment

of counsel before her hearing was over, this was in conflict with a case in their court.

THIS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF FEDERAL

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION

AND HOW PARENTS SHOULD BE FREE TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN

■ IN THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEF WITHOUT THE FEAR OF STATE

INTERVENTION. PARENTS SHOULD BE FREE FROM STATE

RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION BY THE STATE AND FREE FROM

FEAR THAT THE STATE WILL TERMINATE THEIR RIGHTS FOR ONE

REASON THEIR FAITH CONFLICTING WITH YODER VS. WISCONSIN

406 U.S. 205 (1972). THIS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT FEDERAL

CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUE OF DISCRIMATION AGAINST RELIGIOUS

BELIEFS AND VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE

FOURTEENTH ADMENDMENT REGARDING CIVIL RIGHTS

VIOLALTIONS INVOLVING SECTION 1983 ACTIONS WITH A

GOVERNMENT AGENCY. AND IT CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURTS

CASE REGARDING 42 U.S.C. 1983, SUTER V. ARTIST M. 503 U.S. 347

(1992).

Analysis of religious freedom begins with this Court’s case Wisconsin v.

Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The state can not infringe on the religious faith

of the parents and violated the Constitutional rights of the parents’ when it

removed the children for one reason their religion. If a state worker says that

the only reason for removal is their religious beliefs then the case is clearly a

Civil Rights violation under Section 1983.

A. In this case the Petitioner was told that the only reason that her children

were removed is because she is a Christian and a bible verse that was told

to the social worker, Tamika Teamer. In the Wisconsin v. Yoder case the

state removed the children from the parents due to their religion. But, this

Court found this unconstitutional. This Court found the parents’

fundamental right to freedom of religion was determined to outweigh the

state’s interest in educating its children. The state cannot remove children

for the parents being a Christian, this is a violation of freedom of religion.

Amendment I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; freedom of speech.

Texas Constitution; art.I, § 6 “All men have an indefeasible right to

worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences. This

precedent case, the first case of removal due to religion. Wisconsin v.

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 “the state’s interest does not outweigh religious

freedom.” They asked if religion was a concern to the state. The witness

cannot speculate to everyone’s religious beliefs. The Petitioner testifies to

her Christian faith. Foster questions taking her children to church. The

attorney uses religion to discredit testimony, violating TRE 610. The

Judge questions this.

In Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.

158 the Establishment Clause mandates a separation between church and

state. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.624 states the parents have

religious rights, as against preponderant sentiment and assertion of state

power voicing it (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510.) In re S.A.P, “the

department required religious counseling with their minister” 169 S.W.3d 685.

. In re P.S., the department requested marriage classes 766 S.W2d 833. “The

law cannot burden one's free exercise rights, the beliefs avowed are not only

religious in nature, but also sincerely held.” Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d

1521. “No human authority ought, to interfere with the rights of conscience

in matters of religion,” Marshall, 925 S.W.2d at 677; In the case Pleasant

Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85. The Petitioner was convicted by the

pastor’s counsel. If social worker did not agree, that does not give her the

right to remove her children. Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421 states the

government must be neutral on religion. The state of Texas wrongfully

interfered in the religious freedom of the parents and their family and severed

the bond of the family due to their religious faith. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

U.S. 602: “they violated the Establishment Clause, excessive entanglement

between a religion and the state.” The Petitioner testifies about marriage.

They question religious convictions. The removal was about a bible verse.

The Petitioner says the worker called her “one of them,” they refused to let

her go on. Religious issues concerned the department. The judge makes the

comment, “a so-called Christian”. TRE 610: evidence based on religious

beliefs is inadmissible.

B. The state cannot discriminate against the parent’s religious beliefs.. The

state of Texas said that they removed the children for one reason they are

Christians and a bible verse, this is clearly a Civil Rights Violation under

Section 1983. And, it is a Civil Rights Section 1983 violation that states

that no person should be harmed due to their race or religion. To deny a

parent of their parental rights due their religious beliefs is a violation of

Federal Civil Rights Law under Section 1983 and is clearly

discriminatory. This case conflicts with this courts case, SUTER V.

ARTIST M. 503 U.S. 347 (1992), in regards to 42 U.S.C. 1983. There are

specific safeguards that are enacted so the state will be refunded by the

Federal government for adoption assistance and if state discriminated

against the parent’s they could be in violation of these mandates by the

Federal Government and may be responsible to the Federal Government to

refund the money they received by the Federal Government. There are

also requirements by the Federal Government that must be met by the state

before they can receive money from the Federal Government for

assistance. One of which, is that they may not take money for children

from another state without the permission of the other state and they must

return the children to the home state. Another, is that they have to make

every effort to reunify the family. The state of Texas did absolutely

nothing to reunify this family according to the counselor, Pam Greene

from First Baptist Dallas, Texas.

C. A review of this case is necessary to insure protection against

governmental interference into religious freedom, and to insure no

discrimination under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Everson v. Board of Education, government cannot

interfere into religion. U.S. Const, amends. I, XIV: state and federal

constitutions embody a fundamental commitment to religious liberty

“Constitution requires vigilance lest courts overstep jurisdictional bounds”

Heckman v. Williamson County 369 S.W.3d 137. The Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth amendment is violated. In Dymont vs. Lyon the

ACLU argued that the state discriminated against the parent’s beliefs. The

Equal Protection Clause is important to Civil Rights. No governmental

agency can discriminate based on religion. Cornell Law School says,

“Equal protection forces a state to govern impartially-not draw distinctions

between individuals solely on difference that are irrelevant to legitimate

governmental objective.” ('www.law.comell.edu')

II.

THIS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF WHETHER THE

STATE OF TEXAS VIOLATED THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

REFORMATION ACT? DID THE STATE OF TEXAS SUBSTANTIALLY

BURDEN THE PETITIONER’S FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION BY

REMOVING HER CHILDREN FOR ONE REASON, BECAUSE SHE IS A

CHRISTIAN AND A BIBLE VERSE? AND, IT IS OF INTEREST TO

THIS COURT SINCE THERE IS PENDING CASES TRYING TO

OVERTURN THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REFORMATION ACT IN

THIS COURT NOW.

Analysis of religious freedom in this court beings with Sherbert v. Vemer, 374

U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to

guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is

substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose

religious exercise is substantially burdened by government. In Sherbert v.

Vemer the Court set forth the constitutional exemption model', under which

sincere religious objectors had a presumptive constitutional right to an

exemption because of the Free Exercise clause. The court reaffirmed this

position in the 1972 case, Wisconsin v. Yoder. The RFRA states that the

government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even

if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. A person whose

religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this law may assert that

violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate

relief against a government. The United States Supreme Court is now hearing

cases that are trying to overturn the RFRA. The Petitioner would argue not to

do that since it is imperative to keep religious liberties so things similar to

what has happened to this mother and children will not happen again. This

case maybe similar to the most current hot topic at this Court’s level. The

most high-profile federal case that relied on RFRA was the 2014 case Burwell

v. Hobby Lobby Stores, a challenge to the Affordable Cafe Act’s Health and

Human Services (HHS) contraceptive mandate that required all for-profit

companies to cover abortion-inducing drugs—even against the religious

objections of these businesses’ owners. The Court found that the HHS

mandate violated RFRA because it imposed a substantial burden (i.e., if the

companies refused to violate their beliefs, they would face severe economic

consequences). The government also failed to satisfy RFRA’s least restrictivemeans standard, since the government could assume the cost of providing the

four contraceptives to women unable to obtain coverage due to their

employers’ religious objections.

III.

THIS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF FEDERAL LAW

•

WHETHER FRAUD ON THE COURT, THE MOST SERIOUS ABUSE

COMMITTED BY THE ATTORNEY AND JUDGE IS A VIOLATION OF

FEDERAL LAW?

Analysis of fraud on the court begins with this Court’s case Bulloch v. United

States, 763 F. 2d 115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985). This fraud is directed to the

judicial machinery, the court or a member is corrupted or influence by a judge

who has not performed their judicial functions. The impartial functions of the

court have been directly corrupted. This case conflicts with the case Bulloch

v. United States in this Court.

This case includes fraud on the court defined by “Unconscionable”

schemes to deceive or make misrepresentations through the court

system. Fraud on the court only involves court officials, officers of the

court, the judge and the court-appointed attorneys. The result of fraud

on the court is that the judgement will need to be voided by another

court official most likely in another venue. The 7th Circuit Court of

Appeals to “embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to,

defile the court itself, or is perpetrated by the attorneys or judges so

that the judicial operations will not be able to function in an impartial

maimer and will prohibit cases from being adjudicated fairly and

honestly. See Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968) According to the

Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512 the 7th Circuit determined that a

decision that was made by fraud upon the court is not in essence a

decision at all and will never be final.” Therefore, there is a concern

upon this Court that this order that is under review has never become

final. Fraud upon the court makes the order void and constitutes that

the entire proceeding is of no effect on the parties. See The People of

the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229

(1934)

Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259

(1929) Anytime an officer of the court intentionally misrepresents

information or intentionally withholds information to deceive the court

fraud will stops all issues upon the court and nullifies the order. Skelly

Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill. App. 79, 86 N.E., 2d

875 Under Federal law when an attorney or judge has committed fraud

on the court the orders are void and have no effect on the parties.

This case includes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

regarding procedural due process. “No State should deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws. The erroneous deprivation of that interest under the chosen

procedure could be evaluated by this Court as fraud on the court denies

the Petitioner the right to due process of law. “A basic aspect of the

duty of government to follow a fair process of law in making a ruling

when it acts to deprive a person of their possessions or rights.” The

Petitioner was deprived or her rights to parent her children due to the

fraudulent actions of the court. The Petitioner has a right to and

impartial tribunal according to the Fourteenth Amendment and her due ,

process rights. The petitioner is entitled to fair and honest treatment

from the court and her attorney. Anything less would violate her

Constitutional rights of due process and her right to honest services

from her attorney and the judge. See Enron. This Supreme Court

ruled that section of the 1988 federal fraud statue made it a crime to

deprive others “of the intangible right of honest services” Jefferey

Skilling the CEO of Enron, was guilty of committing fraud. The

Justice Department finds that fraud on the court grants the prospect of

reversals on cases. These pleadings are requesting that judges vacate

cases or reopen cases where fraud was committed. Fraud on the court

is rare and when it is discovered it upon the court to deal with it

immediately. Serious injustice by the government employees and the

court denies the petitioner the right to a fair trial and the right for

justice to prevail. The United States Supreme court is now apprised of

these cases and able to settle them swiftly. See Sierra Pacific v U.S.

The court can now undo the injustice done by the departments of the

government. “The United States wins its point whenever justice is

done its citizens in the courts.” Under Rule 60(d)(3) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure the courts can set aside a judgement for fraud

on the court.” Question before the court is whether the court can set

aside a fraudulent judgement after the trial court made an order. And,

the court found that they can. The second issue was whether the

district court judge should recuse himself. This was similar to the case

at hand since there were four motion for recusal for this judge that

worked with the attorney to cover evidence of Oklahoma jurisdiction

to the higher court.

IV.

THIS CASE RASISES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF FEDERAL LAW

REGARDING INTERSTATE APPLICATION OF UCCJEA IN

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHT CASES AND A LACK OF

JURISDICTION FOR CASES IN STATES WHERE NEITHER PARENT

EVER LIVED. THIS CASE IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE COURT’S

CASE MAY V. ANDERSON 345 U.S. 528. THE COURT MUST RESOLVE

CONFLICTING ISSUES REGARDING STATE COURTS AND

JURISDICTION. THIS CASE RAISES THE ISSUE OF WHETHER

STATES ARE USING TPR TO DIVERT UCCJEA. TPR STATUE MAY

NOT BE USED TO CIRCUMVENT UCCJEA. THIS CASE ALSO RAISES

AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF WHETHER THE PARTIES CAN RAISE

JURISDICITONAL ISSUES AT THE APPEALLATE LEVEL

CONFLICTING WITH THE SAME STATE OF TEXAS CASE IN THE

INTEREST OF J.T.R AND H.M.R, MINOR CHILDREN NO. 13-17-00676CV (2018) & STATE V. WEBBER, 190 N.C. APP. 649, 650, 660 S.E.2D

621, 622 (2008). WHETHER A COURT LACKING JURISDICTION

VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH

ADMENDMENT AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE COURT CASE

PENNOYER, 95 U.S. at 731.

Analysis of UCCJEA on the court begins with this Court’s case Bulloch v.

United States, 763 F. 2d 115,1121 (10th Cir. 1985) and MAY V.

ANDERSON 345 U.S. 528. The improper initiation of proceedings and

compliance with UCCJEA is the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction

Enforcement Act and it requires that all state conform to it, the violation of

this law raises a Federal law issue in relation to states adhering to the rights of

the home state to hear matters of their own residents. And, any deviations

from this law can not be made by deceit or fraud. A TPR case should not be

used to circumvent UCCJEA. A state cannot refuse to return children to a

home state just because they believe the state will return the children to the

mother. The court must determine it would have jurisdiction to make a child

custody determination. UCCJEA defines “child custody proceeding” to

include proceeding to terminate parental rights.” The court can only have

jurisdiction to modify a child-custody determination if it is the home state or

the home state waives jurisdiction. But, the judge took it upon herself not to

contact the other state. The petitioner was told the judge was intentionally

ignoring the judge in Oklahoma. This is clear proof that they were using TPR

to circumvent UCCJEA. Another state’s arm does not reach into the practices

of another states judicial system. UCCJEA is a Federal law concern when

states violate matters of the home state and the Federal Parental Kidnapping

Prevention Act law may take effect if the state is intentionally trying to

circumvent the judicial system of the home state. If a state is refusing to

comply with UCCJEA or the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act the

Federal law may apply, especially with exclusive continuing jurisdiction of

Oklahoma, to prevent the illegal acts of other states. The Full Faith and Credit

clause of the U.S. Constitution applies to child custody. This case conflicts

SCDSS v. Tran, 418 S.C. 308, 792 S.E. 2d 254 (Ct. App. 2016) where Court

of Appeals vacated the family court’ s termination of parental rights order,

finding the state had failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction under

UCCJEA and Pennoyer v Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724, 5 Otto 714, 24 L.Ed. 565.

MAY V. ANDERSON 345 U.S. 528 the mother filed a habeas corpus

proceeding requesting the return of her children to the home State and holding

the custody order from the other state of no effect. The courts in one state do

not have jurisdiction over parents of another state to terminate their rights. See

Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 731. In Pennoyer the Supreme Court found that a

judgement of a court lacking jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.

A. This case includes a lack ofjurisdiction according to UCCJEA. In re

Van Kooten, 126 N.C. App. 764, 771, 487 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1997) In

re Malone, 129 N.C., App. 338, 498 S.E.2d 836 (1998) Osborn v.

Adoption Center of Choice, 2003 UT 15, 70 P. 3d 58 In re Leonard, 77

N.C. App. 439, 441, 335 S.E.2d 73, 74 (1985) In re D.D.J., 177 N.C.

App. 441,442-43, 628 S.E. 2d 808, 810 (2006) Rodriguez v.

Rodriguez, 211 N.C. App 267, 270, 710 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2011). The

district judge tried to argue during the abatement hearing that

jurisdiction was not raised during the hearing-. First, this is not true it

was initially hidden by fraud from the attorneys when the petitioner’s

attorney lied to her telling her that they just went into the hearing room

and the judge denied jurisdiction of Oklahoma and she is forced to

sign a case plan. When after pulling all the transcripts it was

discovered that the attorney lied. The judge never knew at that hearing

she discovered this after an Oklahoma social worker called during a

hearing seven months later. They also told the father he was not

allowed to file a motion to have the children returned to Oklahoma on

day one of the hearings. Furthermore, the judge is wrong when she

stated during the abatement hearing that attorney suppressed evidence

about Oklahoma because it was not raised earlier. The issue of

jurisdiction can be raised at any time even during the Appeals process.

State v. Webber, 190 N.C. App. .649, 650, 660 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2008).

In the Webber case the court stated, “It is well-established that the

issue of a court’s jurisdiction over a matter may be raised at any time,

even for the first time on appeal by a court sua sponte.” The court went

on to state that jurisdiction can be raised at any time during the case.

Also, in the Rodriguez v. Rodriguez case the state determined only a

certain state will have jurisdiction to enter orders regarding custody

according to UCCJEA and that can be raised at any time. In re D.D.J.,

177 N.C. App. 441,442-43,628 S.E., 2d 808, 810 (2006) the court

determined that three sets of circumstances in which a court has

jurisdiction to hear a petition to terminate parental rights and they were

not met so the higher court vacated the termination order. They did not

have legal custody of the children to terminate their rights. The proper

action is to vacate cases for a lack of jurisdiction. See In re Leonard 77

N.C. App. 439 (N.C., Ct. App. 1985) In the re Marriage of Leonard,

175 Cal. Rptr. At 908 the home state of the child has jurisdiction to

adjudicate the status of a child.

If there is another state that has jurisdiction and there were custody

orders from that state, the judge is required to communicate with the

judge in that state. They must enter an order withdrawing jurisdiction.

See In re the termination of Parental Rights to Clayton J.I., Appeal No.

2009AP2354, Wisconsin. Section 63-15-336 of the code states “A

court of the state which has been asked to make a child custody

determination under this section, upon being informed of a court state

have jurisdiction of these children must irhmediately communicate

with the other court.” See S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Tran 418 S.C.

308, 792 S.E. 2d 254 (Ct. App. 2016) In this case at par the Petitioner

was told that the judge was intentionally ignoring the Oklahoma judge.

And, on the transcript of the hearing it was noted that the judge was

aware of Oklahoma jurisdiction when Oklahoma DHS called her.

There was an open case in Oklahoma and the judge never contacted

the judge. The attorney withheld it from the Appeals Court. This case

conflicts with the recent case, 2018 In re J.T.R and H.M.R “the court

was without jurisdiction, a final termination order that another court

did not relinquish jurisdiction .. .Texas is without jurisdiction.”

Tex.Fam.Code 11.51 Saavedra v Schmidt 96 S.W.3d 533. The court

dismissed the termination of the parental rights case since the state of

Texas did not have jurisdiction the home state had jurisdiction and the

state of Texas did not confer upon that state for permission. UCCJEA

precludes the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the termination

case. Section 152.001-.317 addressed conflicting interstate child

custody orders, and home state jurisdiction to terminate parental rights.

According to UCCJEA states: “The UCCJEA vests "exclusive [and]

continuing jurisdiction" for child custody litigation in the courts of the

child's "home state," which is defined as the state where the child has

lived with a parent for six consecutive months prior to the

commencement of the proceeding (or since birth for children younger

than six months). If the child has not lived in any state for at least six

months, then a court in a state that has (1) "significant connections"

with the child and at least one parent and (2) "substantial evidence

concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal

relationships" may assume child-custody jurisdiction. If more than one

state has "significant connections" and "substantial evidence...", the

courts of those states must communicate and determine which state has

the most significant connections to the child. A court which has made

a child-custody determination consistent with UCCJEA has exclusive,

continuing jurisdiction over the determination until either (1) that court

determines that neither the child, the child's parents, nor any person

acting as a parent has a significant connection with the State that made

the original order and that substantial evidence is no longer available

in the State concerning the child's care, protection, training, and

personal relationships, or (2) that court or a court of another State

determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as

a parent do not reside in the State that initially made the child custody

order.” Abderholden v Morizot states “Texas Family Code

. 11.53(a)(3)(B) confers emergency jurisdiction. In Hache 451 A.2d 975

the state has a limited period. The court exceeded its authority when it

made a permanent modification order. “An order is void when there is

no jurisdiction.” Urbish v. 127th Jud. Dist. Ct., 708 S.W.2d 429, O.G.,

P.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839. A judgment is void when the court

had no jurisdiction, or no capacity to act as a court. Mapco, Inc. v.

Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700 The issues of sufficiency of evidence and

children’s best interest finding is mute. In the case In re J.T.R and

H.M.R the Texas Appeals court found that the prior custody orders of

the other state gave an even greater standing of the other state

regarding jurisdiction. The state of Oklahoma had already had custody

orders regarding these children before the petition was filed by Texas.

See S.W., v. Duncan 2001 OK 39, 24 P.ed 846. The court found that

temporary custody orders issued by the Oklahoma court were pursuant

to the continuing jurisdiction of that court.

B. A court that does not have jurisdiction to enter custody orders nor

terminate the parental rights of parents violates the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. See PENNOYER, 95 U.S. at 731 The

petitioner’s due process rights were violated by the Texas court

circumventing the Oklahoma court where she could have had the

chance of the Oklahoma court returning her children. This is an issue

of Federal law and is important to the ongoing fairness for the courts

when it is necessary for the Federal law and Constitutional law to be

applied to rectify the situation. In Pennoyer the United States

Supreme Court found that the court violated the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment since the court lacked jurisdiction to make

a ruling.

THIS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE REGARDING ICWA A

VIOLATION OF 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (“ICWA”), THE INDIAN CHILD

WELFARE ACT AND CONFLICTS WITH THE CASE FROM THIS

COURT MISSISSIPPI BAND of CHOCTOW INDIANS v. HOLYFIELD,

490 U.S. (1989) THIS CASE RAISES AN ISSUE REGARDING WHETHER

ICWA HAS BEEN OVERTURNED IN TEXAS.

Analysis of ICWA states that state must notify the tribe of where the children

are from. The state of Texas refused to do this and is now trying to overturn

ICWA in Northern Texas, it was struck down in Texas as unconstitutional,

claiming it is discriminatory to non-Native Americans. See Brackeen v. Zinke

Civil Action No 4:17-cv-00868-0

The state of Texas also refused to notify the tribe and the Bureau of Indian

Affairs regarding this case. ICWA requires that the social workers notify the

tribe. The district attorney in Texas stated that he knew the children were

Cherokee and they did not notify the tribe. But, the judge again did not care

and violated Federal ICWA requirement. This case conflicts with the case in

this Court Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. (1989).

Where the courts found that the Native American Tribe has jurisdiction over

the case not the state. And, when the parents went to meet with child welfare

in Tahlequah Oklahoma the director told them that they just went and got

children out of foster care for years in North Texas. According to the law the

tribe can intervene in matters regarding child custody years later after the state

puts the children in foster care. “Monroe County DHS v. Luis R., 2009 WI

App 109, 320 Wis. 2d 652: Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)

(“ICWA”)’s applicability is not limited to physical custody and therefore

applies to a TPR initiated after the client has resided in a foster home for three

years. The Federal jurisdiction of the tribe supersedes the jurisdiction of the

state court. This is not discriminatory, but it is Federal law and must be

adhered to the state. The state of Texas cannot take it upon themselves to do

what they want.

VI.

A. The state of Texas ruled that the law violated the 10th Amendment’s

federalism, “anti-commandeering” principle established by this court. The

Texas judge found that ICWA unequivocally dictated a policy by the

Federal government. The Cherokee tribe intervened in hopes of keeping

the children in their tribe. The attorneys for the tribe filed Motions to

Dismiss the adoption in Texas. The Texas judge denied it. Two other

Federal courts have used this argument Pennsylvania and California. In

the Brackeen v. Zinke Civil Action No 4:17-cv-00868-0 case the state of

Texas determined that they do not agree with the Federal law and are not

' going to obey it. This is going to muddy the waters regarding the US

Supreme court, Federal law and ICWA.

THIS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW IN REGARD TO THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TERMINATING PARENTS’ RIGHTS

DUE TO HOMESCHOOLING AND IN CONFLICT WITH YODER VS.

WISCONSIN 406 U.S. 205. THIS CONFLICTS WITH THE TEXAS

FAMILY LAW CODE THAT MADE IT ILLEGAL TO TERMINATE

PARENTAL RIGHTS DUE TO HOMESCHOOLING, MAY 7, 2017.

Analysis of the improper application of the law regarding terminating

parental rights due to homeschooling begins with this Court’s case

Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

A. In May of 2017 the State of Texas revised the Texas Family Code due

to this case and made it illegal to terminate parental rights due to

homeschooling according to the new Family Code Section 262.002.

The department questions homeschooling over and over and used it to

terminate their parental rights. The Petitioner’s attorney never

objected. It is illegal to terminate rights due to homeschooling.

Homeschooling is a parent’s right. Foster states homeschooling is

grounds for removal. However, the children were in school for the

entire time from the removal to the termination hearing so it was not

pertinent. TRE 403: It is not relevant; the children are in school. The

Tutts: “Christian Couple Fights CPS-Homeschooled Children; children

traumatized after foster care.” The Petitioner’s children have been

traumatized. The department accuses the Petitioner of keeping D.B.

out of school, it is proven false.

VII.

THIS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF FEDERAL

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND THE TEXAS DECISIONS CONFLICT

WITH THE REASONING UNDERLYING THIS COURT’S DECISIONS IN

LASSITER.

Analysis of the right to counsel in a termination action begins with this

Court’s decision in Lassiter that the Due Process Clause does not require

appointment of counsel for the trial court must use the analysis in Mathews,

424 U.S. at 355, that must be weighed against the presumption that there is

Lassiter, 452 at 27, Ms. Bishop lost her child without the benefit of this

analysis.

A. Ms. Bishop’s Parental Rights Are Fundamental.

The Due Process Clause includes a substantive component that “provides

greater fortification against government intervention with her parental

fundamental rights and liberty interest.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521

U.S. 702,.720 (1997). The greatest liberty and blessing given by God is

seen by the court for the care, custody and control of their own children.

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993). The liberty interest is the

foremost constitutional right given to a parent to protect their God given

blessing. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.

B. Termination Of Parental Rights Implicates State Action.

The court sought to terminate Ms. Bishop’s parental rights out of malice.

The state involvement in the adoption process has been fraudulent. MLB

519 U.S. at 125 termination of parental rights cases describes the State’s

destruction of the family unit and the parent seeks to be spared from the

State’s devasting actions and trauma that is put on all family members for

one reason their religion. All parental relationships are severed forever and

permantly. Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 580. In re Adoption of

K.L.P., 763 N.E., 2d 741, 751 this case was a conspiracy case of the state

of Texas to deny the parent a lawyer, making them able to easily terminate

the mother’s rights.

C. By Removing Too Many Safeguards Against Erromous Deprivation,

Texas Denied Ms. Bishop Due Process.

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) risk that procedures will result

in erroneous decisions. Lassister, 452 U.S. at 27.

Ms. Bishop was adjudged indigent but was not appointed an attorney.

MLB and Rinaldi v. Yeager 384 U.S. 305, 310. (1966) The Sixth

Amendment's requirements for the right to counsel are made obligatory

upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright,

372 U. S. 335. P. 386 U. S. 742. According to the law a court appointed

attorney is mandated by law in a termination of parental rights case.

According to the Southern Methodist University Law School Parental

Rights Clinic, Dallas Texas: “The right to one’s family is a core institution

in our country and a vital interest in our society that ‘undeniably warrants

deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’ The

right of a parent has long been considered "essential to the orderly pursuit

of happiness by free men," a fundamental liberty interest that "occupies a

unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality of family life as the

focus for personal meaning and responsibility." Thus, the termination of

parental rights is a "unique kind of deprivation" and a proceeding in which

the parent, at the very least, must have the right to be heard. "The right to

be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend

the right to be heard by counsel."( Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399

(1923). The case at par is a First Amendment and Freedom of Religion

case just like Meyer v. Nebraska case, liberty guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment and exceeds the power of the State. P. 262 U. S.

399. Since, this case deals with Religious Freedom, First Amendment

right to practice religious faith as a parent and a violation of the equal

protection clause then it is apparent that the court grant an appointment of

counsel since this case is very important to the religious freedom of

parents to raise their children without the fear of state intervention. The

Lassiter v. Department of Social Services case, “a wise public policy ...

may require that higher standards be adopted than those minimally

tolerable under the Constitution” and that “informed opinion has clearly

come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of

appointed counsel not only in parental termination proceedings, but in

dependency and neglect proceedings as well.” (Lassiter v. Department of

Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) There is a state right of due process in

termination case for appointment of legal counsel and a statutory rights

Tex. Fam. Code §§ 107.013, 161.003: Section 107.013(a) of the Texas

Family Code provides that “[i]n a suit filed by a 1 governmental entity ...

in which termination of the parent-child relationship ... is requested, the

court shall appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the interests of... an

indigent parent. University of Michigan Law School Parental Rights

Clinics (PROFESSOR VIVEK SANKARAN UNIVERSITY OF

MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL CHILD ADVOCACY LAW CLINIC)

10. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a discrimination of

rich and poor is against the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and

severely denies due process rights to the poor. Extending this reason, it is

even more severing to terminate a parent’s rights just because their court

appointed attorney refused to represent them sufficiently. It is unfair to

deny justice simply because the person is poor. The United States

Supreme Court 372 U.S. 353 held there has been a discrimination between

rich and poor:

Held: Where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of

right were decided without benefit of counsel in a state criminal case,

there has been a discrimination between the rich and the poor which

violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 372 U. S. 353-358” In a

California State court, petitioners were tried jointly, convicted of 13

felonies, and sentenced to imprisonment. Exercising their only right to

appeal as of right, they appealed to an intermediate Court of Appeals, and,

being indigent, applied to it for appointment of counsel to assist them on

appeal. In accordance with a state rule of criminal procedure, that court

made an ex parte examination of the record, determined that appointment

of counsel for petitioners would not be "of advantage to the defendant or

helpful to the appellate court," and denied appointment of counsel. Their

appeal was heard without assistance of counsel, and their convictions were

affirmed. The State Supreme Court denied a discretionary review.

Held: Where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of

right were decided without benefit of counsel in a state criminal case,

there has been a discrimination between the rich and the poor which

violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 372 U. S. 353-358.

If the Petitioner is not appointed counsel it could affect the claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. In re N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223 (Nev. 2005)

This could in effect cause a domino effect for cases for parents that are not

adequately represented by counsel just because they are poor. A parent

should not be punished and loose custody of their children simple because

they are poor. This is in conflict of the judgements of the Senate in

Austin, TX when they reformed the CPS law and family code to make it

now illegal to terminate rights due to economic conditions of the parents.

The Texas Supreme Court has found that the Supreme court must

direct the court to reappoint another attorney in a termination of a parental

rights case according to Section 107.016(2)(C). The attorney must remain

on a termination of parental rights case until the case is fully disposed of

or a new counsel must be appointed according to Section 107.013(e) adds

that “[a] parent who the court has determined is indigent for purposes of

this section is presumed to remain indigent for the duration of the suit and

any subsequent appeal” absent changed circumstances. Section 107.016(2)

provides that appointed counsel continues to serve in that capacity until

the earliest of: (A) the date the suit affecting the parent-child relationship

is dismissed; (B) the date all appeals in relation to any final order

terminating parental rights are exhausted or waived; or (C) the date the

attorney is relieved of the attorney’s duties or replaced by another attorney

after a finding of good cause is rendered by the court on the record, the

Supreme Court must direct the court to appoint court appointed counsel in

termination of parental rights cases. In the Interest of P.M. a Child No. 150171, the Texas Supreme Court found “Section 107.013(a) of the Texas

Family Code provides that “[i]n a suit filed by a 1 governmental entity ...

in which termination of the parent-child relationship ... is requested, the

court shall appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the interests of... an

indigent parent .(See Appendix A) In the Interest of P.M. a Child No 150171 the Texas Supreme Court found: “But we have indicated generally,

in other contexts, that exhaustion of appeals includes review sought in this

Court. A few statutes appear to take the same view. We see no reason to

depart from that view here. To the contrary, the right to counsel is as 6

important in petitioning this Court for review, and in our considering the

issues, as in appealing to the court of appeals. Accordingly, we hold that

the right to counsel under Section 107.013(a)(1) through the exhaustion of

appeals under Section 107.016(2)(B) includes all proceedings in this

Court.

12. The Second District Court of Appeals may have errored by not

allowing the attorney to withdraw and reappointing counsel earlier, if

there is fraud on the court the court is mandated to appoint a new attorney

immediately. The Texas Supreme Court ruled in In the Interest of P.M. a

Child: “Courts have a duty to see that withdrawal of counsel will not result

in foreseeable prejudice to the client. If a court of appeals allows an

attorney to withdraw, it must provide for the appointment of new the filing

of a petition for review. Once appointed by the trial court, counsel should

be permitted to withdraw only for good cause and on appropriate terms

and conditions.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 10 And, according to Texas Rules

of Appellate procedure the courts must dismiss this attorney see TEX. R.

APP. P. 6.5

The attorney intentionally withheld evidence from the brief so the

Petitioner case would not be reversed and remanded to Oklahoma. That

was unethical of the attorney since all he had to do was to include the

information that the Petitioner requested, and he refused. If the court

appointed counsel filed a brief that does not meet the merits of the case

under law. the Petitioner may be granted another attorney and the right to

resubmit another corrected brief that was not intentionally insufficient.

See Case 386 U.S. 738 (1967) filing an appellate brief meeting the

standards set in Anders v. California, and the standards set forth for the

brief in Anders v. California has not been met in the case at par. (See

Appendix C) Basically in the Anders v. California case the court held that

this poor Petitioner had received subpax assistance from the court

appointed attorney who also told him he had no case and the Court ruled

that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated. The

court ruled:

“Counsel, appointed by a California appellate court on petitioner's motion

to prosecute the appeal of his felony conviction, concluded after studying

the record and consulting with petitioner that there was no merit to the

appeal, and so advised the court. He also advised it that petitioner wished

to file a brief in his behalf. Petitioner's request for another attorney was

denied. He then filed a brief pro se and a reply brief to the State's

response. The appellate court, after examining the record, affirmed the

conviction. Six years later, petitioner, seeking to reopen his case on the

ground that he had been deprived of the right to counsel on his appeal,

filed in the appellate court an application for habeas corpus, which the

court denied the same day. The court stated that it had again reviewed the

record and determined the appeal to be "without merit" (but failed to say

whether it was frivolous or not), and that the procedure here followed the

California system for handling indigents' appeals approved by that State's

Supreme Court as meeting the requirements of Douglas v. California, 372

U. S. 353. Claiming, inter alia, that the judge and prosecutor had

erroneously commented on his failure to testify, petitioner filed with the

State Supreme Court an application for habeas corpus, which that court

denied without giving any reason for its decision.

Held: The failure to grant this indigent petitioner seeking initial review of

his conviction the services of an advocate, as contrasted with an amicus

curiae, which would have been available to an appellant with financial

means, violated petitioner's rights to fair procedure and equality under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 386 U. S. 741-745.”

The Sixth Amendment's requirements for the right to counsel are made

obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v.

Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335. P. 386 U. S. 742.

The Texas Supreme Court found that if the attorney was allowed to

withdraw then the court must reappoint another attorney, in this case In

the Interest of P.M. a Child: the filing of a petition for review. Once

appointed by the trial court, counsel should be permitted to withdraw only

for good cause and on appropriate terms and conditions. Mere

dissatisfaction of counsel or client with each other is not good cause. Nor

is counsel’s belief that the client has no grounds to seek further review

from the court of appeals’ decision. Counsel’s obligation to the client may

still be satisfied by filing an appellate brief meeting the standards set in

Anders v. California, and its progeny. In light of our holding, however, an

Anders motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals, in the absence

of additional grounds for withdrawal, may be premature. Courts have a

duty to see that withdrawal of counsel will not result in foreseeable

prejudice to the client. If a court of appeals allows an attorney to

withdraw, it must provide for the appointment of new the filing of a

petition for review. Once appointed by the trial court, counsel should be

permitted to withdraw only for good cause and on appropriate terms and

conditions.”

VIII.

THE TEXAS COURTS’ DECISION TO LET STAND A STAUTORY

SCHEDME GRANTING COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL TO VIOLATES

THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND CONFLICTS WITH THE

HOLDINGS OF FOUR OTHER STATE SUPREME COURTS.

A. There could be a more serious issue here. If the Petitioner requested

the attorney to be removed due to fraud on the court and intentionally

withholding evidence from the court to divert the outcome of the case

and the district court judge ignored the fraud there maybe a conspiracy

of justice issue. And, the District court was advised of the fraud and

stated in their opinion that they ignored it, they stated they filed all

papers from the Petitioner and disregarded it, even the motion

notifying them of fraud. Examples of fraud on the court include:

• Fraud in the service of court summons (such as withholding a court

summons from a party)

•

Corruption or influence of a court member or official

•

Judicial fraud

• Intentionally failing to inform the parties of necessary appointments or

requirements, in efforts to obstruct the judicial process

• “Unconscionable” schemes to deceive or make misrepresentations through

the court system

As, stated earlier the Second District Court of Appeals may have errored by

not allowing the attorney to withdraw and reappointing counsel earlier, if

there is fraud on the court the court is mandated to appoint a new counsel. The

Equal Protection Clause forbids Texas from making a substantial procedural

deviations. The state must grant competent and ethical legal counsel to the

parent. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) In re Adoption of K.L.P 763

N.E. 2d 741 (2002) The court appointed attorney cannot intentionally lie to

the parent to deceive them to cause them to lose custody of their children

forever. In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W., 2d 645 (Iowa 2004) There are serious

problems regarding sufficient legal counsel for parents facing termination of

parental rights cases. Matter of Adoption of K.A.S. 499 N.W. 2d 558 (N.D.

1993) Insufficient legal counsel would be a reason for review of a termination

of a parental rights case. Zockert v Fanning, 800 P. 2d 773 (Or. 1990) Loving

v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,11 (1967)

CONCLUSION

Based on the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, and

this Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 and

Suter v. Artist M. 503 U.S. 347 (1992) and the writ of certiorari should be

granted. And, the court should review insufficient counsel due to fraud on the

court, Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319(1976), Enron Case, Bulloch v.

United States, 763 F. 2d 115,1121 (10th Cir. 1985) and Skelly Oil Co. v.

Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill. App. 79, 86 N.E., 2d 875. Also, based on

UCCJEA and ICWA issues the court must grant the writ of certiorari in hopes

of keeping state jurisdictional laws and ICWA issues uniform in all states.

Respectfully submitted,

DENLEY BISHOP

306 N. 12th Street

Duncan, Oklahoma 73533

(580) 606-9873

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.