Opposition Brief — Julian Alejandro Mendez, Petitioner v. California

No. 19-5933

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JULIAN ALEJANDRO MENDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

XAVIER BECERRA

Attorney General of California

MICHAEL J. MONGAN

Solicitor General

LANCE E. WIN'l'ERS

Chief Assistant Attorney General

JOSHUA A. KLEIN

Deputy Solicitor General

HOLLY D. WILKENS

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

CHRISTINE Y. FRIEDMAN*

Deputy Attorney General

600 West Broadway, Suite 1800

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 738-9050

Christine. Friedman@doj.ca. gov

*Counsel for Record

1

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Constitution requires that a California jury that has already

found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

committed first degree murder and that the murder involved special

circumstances that render the crime eligible for the death penalty must also,

in order to render a verdict of death, unanimously find beyond a reasonable

doubt the specific aggravating factors that will be weighed against mitigating

factors in arriving at a judgment of death.

11

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

California Supreme Court:

People v. Mendez, No. S129501, judgment entered July 1, 2019 (this case

below).

In re Julian Alejandro Mendez on Habeas Corpus, California Supreme

Court, No. S255647 (pending).

Riverside County Superior Court:

People v. Mendez, No. RIF09811, judgment entered November 19, 2004

(this case below).

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Statement ........................................................................................................ 1

Argument ......................................................................................................... 3

Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 11

lV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Apprendi v. New Jersey

530 U.S. 466 (2000) ........................................................................................ 6

Becerrada v. California

No. 17-5287, cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 242 (2017) ............................................ 3

Blacksher v. California

No. 11-7741, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1209 (2012) ........................................... 3

Boyce v. California

No. 14-7581, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1428 (2015) ......................................... 3

Bramit v. California

No. 09-6735, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1031 (2009) ........................................... 3

Brooks v. California

No. 17-6237, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 516 (2017) ........................................... 3

Case v. California

No. 18-7457, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1342 (2019) ......................................... 3

Cook v. California

No. 07-5690, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 976 (2007) ............................................. 3

Cunningham v. California

No. 15-7177, cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 989 (2016) ............................................ 3

DeBose v. California

No. 14-6617, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 760 (2014) ........................................... 3

Harrison v. California

No. 05-5232, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 890 (2005) ............................................. 3

Henriquez v. California

No. 18-5375, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 261 (2018) ........................................... 3

Huggins v. California

No. 06-6060, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 998 (2006) ............................................. 3

Hurst v. Florida

136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) .................................................................................. 6, 7

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

Hurst v. State

202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) ....................................................................... 10, 11

Jackson v. California

No. 16-7744, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1440 (2017) ......................................... 3

Johnson v. California

No. 15-7509, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1206 (2016) ......................................... 3

Jones v. United States

526 U.S. 227 (1999) ........................................................................................ 7

Kansas v. Carr

136 S. Ct. 633 (2016) ........................................................................ 7, 8, 9, 10

Landry v. California

No. 16-9001, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 79 (2017) ............................................. 3

Lucas v. California

No. 14-9137, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2384 (2015) ......................................... 3

Mickel v. California

No. 16-7840, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2214 (2017) ......................................... 3

Morgan v. California

No. 07 -9024, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1286 (2008) ........................................... 3

Penunuri v. California

No. 18-6262, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 644 (2018) ........................................... 3

People v. Brown

46 Cal. 3d 432 (1988) ..................................................................................... 8

People v. Gonzales

52 Cal. 4th 254 (2011) ................................................................................... 5

People v. Moon

37 Cal. 4th 1 (2005) ....................................................................................... 7

People v. Prince

40 Cal. 4th 1179 (2007) ................................................................................. 6

People v. Romero

62 Cal. 4th 1 (2015) ....................................................................................... 5

Vl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

Prieto v. California

No. 03-6422, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1008 (2003) ........................................... 4

Rangel v. California

No. 16-5912, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 623 (2017) ........................................... 3

Rauf v. State

145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) ......................................................................... 9, 10

Ring v. Arizona

536 U. s. 584 (2002) .................................................................................... 6, 7

Smith v. California

No. 03-6862, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1163 (2004) ........................................... 4

State v. Whitfield

107 S.W. 3d 253 (Mo. 2003) ......................................................................... 10

Taylor v. California

No. 10-6299, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1013 (2010) ........................................... 3

Thompson v. California

No. 17-5069, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 201 (2017) ........................................... 3

Tuilaepa v. California

512 U. s. 967 (1994) ........................................................................................ 6

Wall v. California

No. 17-9525, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 187 (2018) ........................................... 3

Woodward v. Alabama

134 S. Ct. 405 (2013) .................................................................................... 10

Zant v. Stephens

462 U .s. 862 (1983) .................................................................................... 6, 7

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

STATUTES

Delaware Code

Title 11, § 4209(c)(3), (d)(l) ......................................................................... 10

California Penal Code

§ 186.22(b)(l) .................................................................................................. 2

§ 187 ............................................................................................................... 1

§ 190(a) ........................................................................................................... 4

§§ 190.1-190.9 ................................................................................................ 4

§ 190.2(a) .................................................................................................... 4, 6

§ l90.2(a)(3) ................................................................................................... 1

§ 190.2(a)(10) .................................................................................................. 1

§ 190.2(a)(l 7) .................................................................................................. 1

§ 190.3 ...................................................................................................... 5, 10

§ 190.4 ............................................................................................................ 4

§ 190.4(a), (b) .................................................................................................. 4

§ 12022(a)(l) ................................................................................................... 2

§ 12022.53(d) & (e) ......................................................................................... 2

Florida Statutes

§ 921.141(3) ................ ;................................................................................... 7

§ 921.141(5) .................................................................................................... 7

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution

V Amendment ................................................................................................ 3

VI Amendment ........................................................................................... 3, 6

XIV Amendment ........................................................................................ 3, 6

1

STATEMENT

1. On February 4, 2000, petitioner Julian Mendez shot and killed Michael

Faria after Faria claimed allegiance to a rival gang. Pet. App. A 1-2, 12; 6 RT

801-802. 1 Mendez then took Jessica Salazar, who had witnessed the crime, to

a remote area and killed her by shooting her in the head. Pet. App. A 2-3.

The State charged Mendez with the murder of Faria and alleged as a

special circumstance that Mendez committed multiple murders. 1 CT 29-30;

see Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 190.2(a)(3). The State also charged Mendez with

the murder of Salazar and alleged as special circumstances that Mendez

committed multiple murders, that the murder was committed to prevent

Salazar's testimony in a criminal proceeding, and that the murder was

committed during the commission of a kidnapping. 1 CT 30-32; see Cal. Penal

Code §§ 187, 190.2(a)(10), 190.2(a)(l 7).2

At the trial's guilt phase, the jm·y convicted Mendez of the first degree

murders of Faria and Salazar. 8 CT 2232, 2237. The jury found true the

multiple murder special circumstances as well as the special circumstance that

1 "RT" refers to the Reporter's Transcript.

"CT" refers to the trial court Clerk's

Transcript.

2 The kidnapping special circumstance was later struck by the court. 8 CT

2314.

2

Salazar was murdered to prevent her from testifying in a criminal proceeding.

8 CT 2235, 2240, 2241.3

At the trial's penalty phase, the jurors were instructed that, in deciding

whether Mendez would be punished by death or life in prison without parole,

they were to "consider, take into account and be guided by" various aggravating

and mitigating circumstances that might apply; that the "weighing of

aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical

counting of factors"; that they were "free to assign whatever moral or

sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors";

and that to "return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that

the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the

mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead oflife without parole."

8 CT 2296; 27 RT 3338-3339. The jury returned verdicts of death. Pet. App. A

3.

2.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and death

sentence. Pet. App. A 1, 20. As relevant here, the court rejected Mendez's

claim that California's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because

the jury is not required, before reaching a death verdict, to find beyond a

3 The jury also found true firearm enhancement allegations and gang

allegations. 8 CT 2233, 2234, 2236, 2238, 2239, 2242; see Cal. Penal Code

§§ 12022(a)(l), 186.22(b)(l), 12022.53(d) & (e).

3

reasonable doubt that an aggravating factor has been proved and that

aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. Id. at 20 ..

ARGUMENT

Mendez argues that California's capital-sentencing scheme violates his

right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and

his right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, because state law

does not require the penalty-phase jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

an aggravating factor exists.

Pet. 4-9. This Court has repeatedly denied

review in cases presenting the same or similar questions, and there is no

reason for a different result here. 4

See, e.g., Case v. California, No. 18-7457, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1342 (2019);

Penunuri v. California, No. 18-6262, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 644 (2018);

Henriquez v. California, No. 18-5375, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 261 (2018); Wall

v. California, No. 17-9525, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 187 (2018); Brooks v.

California, No. 17-6237, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 516 (2017); Becerrada v.

California, No. 17-5287, cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 242 (2017); Thompson v.

California, No. 17-5069, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 201 (2017); Landry v.

California, No. 16-9001, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 79 (2017); Mickel v. California,

No. 16-7840, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2214 (2017); Jackson v. California, No. 1677 44, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1440 (2017); Rangel v. California, No. 16-5912,

cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 623 (2017); Johnson v. California, No. 15-7509, cert.

denied, 136 S. Ct. 1206 (2016); Cunningham v. California, No. 15-7177, cert

denied, 136 S. Ct. 989 (2016); Lucas u. California, No. 14-9137, cert. denied,

135 S. Ct. 2384 (2015); Boyce u. California, No. 14-7581, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.

1428 (2015); DeBose u. California, No. 14-6617, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 760

(2014); Blacksher u. California, No. 11-7741, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1209 (2012);

Taylor v. California, No. 10-6299, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1013 (2010); Bramit v.

California, No. 09-6735, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1031 (2009); Morgan v.

California, No. 07-9024, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1286 (2008); Cook v. California,

No. 07-5690, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 976 (2007); Huggins v. California, No. 066060, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 998 (2006); Harrison v. California, No. 05-5232,

4

4

1. A California death sentence depends on a two-stage process prescribed

by California Penal Code Sections 190.1 through 190.9. The first stage, the

guilt phase, involves determining whether the defendant committed firstdegree murder. That crime carries three potential penalties under California

law: a prison term of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole, a prison

term of life without the possibility of parole, or death. Cal. Penal Code

§ 190(a). The penalties of death or life without parole may be imposed only if

one or more statutorily enumerated special circumstances "has been found

under Section 190.4 to be true." Id. § 190.2(a). The defendant is entitled to a

jury determination of such a special circumstance, and the jury's finding of a

special circumstance must be made unanimously and beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id. § 190.4(a), (b). During the guilt phase of Mendez's trial, the jury

found Mendez guilty of two first-degree murders and found to be true the

multiple murder special circumstances and the special circumstance that

Mendez murdered Salazar to prevent her from testifying in a criminal

proceeding. 8 CT 2232, 2235, 2237, 2240, 2241. The guilt-phase findings were

made unanimously, under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

8 CT

2130, 2149, 2150, 2168.

cert. denied, 546 U.S. 890 (2005); Smith v. California, No. 03-6862, cert. denied,

540 U.S. 1163 (2004); Prieto v. California, No. 03-6422, cert. denied, 540 U.S.

1008 (2003).

5

The second stage of California's death penalty trial process, the penalty

phase, proceeds under California Penal Code Section 190.3.

During the

penalty phase, the jury hears evidence which it is allowed to consider "as to

any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including but

not limited to" certain specified topics.

Cal. Penal Code § 190.3.

"In

determining the penalty," the jury must "take into account any" of a list of

specified factors "if relevant"-including "[a]ny . .. circumstance which

extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the

crime." Id. With the exception of prior unadjudicated violent criminal activity

and prior felony convictions, the jury need not agree unanimously on the

existence of a particular aggravating circumstance, or find the existence of

such a circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.

See People u. Romero,

62 Cal. 4th 1, 56 (2015); People v. Gonzales, 52 Cal. 4th 254, 328 (2011). If the

jury "concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating

circumstances," then it "shall impose a sentence of death." Cal. Penal Code

§ 190.3.

If it "determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the

aggravating circumstances," then it "shall impose a sentence of confinement in

state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole." Id.

2. Mendez contends that he could not be constitutionally sentenced to

death unless the jury during the penalty phase unanimously found beyond a

reasonable doubt that a particular aggravating factor existed. Pet. 5-9. That

is incorrect.

6

Mendez primarily relies (Pet. 5-6) on the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rule that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

(2002) (applying rule to Arizona death penalty). But under California law, once

a jury finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has

committed first-degree murder with a special circumstance, the maximum

potential penalty prescribed by statute is death.

See People v. Prince,

40 Cal. 4th 1179, 1297-1298 (2007); see generally Tuilaepa v. California,

512 U.S. 967, 975 (1994) (a California defendant becomes "eligible for the death

penalty when the jury finds him guilty of first-degree murder and finds one of

the § 190.2 special circumstances true"). The jury's determination that at least

one of the special circumstances in California Penal Code section 190.2(a) is

present is part of how California fulfills the "constitutionally necessary

function" of "circumscrib[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death

penalty."

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).

Because the

determination is made by the jury under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt

standard, California's death penalty system meets the requirements of

Apprendi and Ring.5

5

Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), is not to the contrary. Under the

7

The jury's subsequent consideration of aggravating and mitigating

factors at the penalty phase fulfills a different function: that of providing an

"individualized determination ... at the selection stage" of who among the

eligible defendants deserves the death penalty. Zant, 462 U.S. at 879; see

People v. Moon, 37 Cal. 4th 1, 40 (2005) ("The penalty jury's principal task is

the moral endeavor of deciding whether the death sentence should be imposed

on a defendant who has already been determined to be 'death eligible' as a

result of the findings and verdict reached at the guilt phase.").

Such a

determination involves a choice between a greater or lesser authorized

penalty-not any increase in the maximum potential penalty. See Jones v.

United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999).

Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016), effectively forecloses Mendez's

argument (Pet. 4-9) that determinations concerning the existence of

Florida system considered in Hurst, a defendant convicted of first-degree

murder was not "eligible for death," 136 S. Ct. 622, unless the judge further

determined that an enumerated "aggravating circumstanceO exist[ed]," Fla.

Stat. § 921.141(3). The judge was thus tasked with making the "'findings upon

which the sentence of death [was] based,"' 136 S. Ct. at 622 (quoting Fla. Stat.

§ 921.141(3))-determinations that were essentially questions of fact, see Fla.

Stat. § 921.141(5) (listing aggravating circumstances, such as whether the

crime was committed with a purpose of pecuniary gain). Florida's system thus

suffered from the same constitutional flaw that Arizona's had in Ring: "The

maximum punishment" a defendant could receive without judge-made findings

"was life in prison without parole," and the judge "increased" that punishment

"based on [the judge's] own factfinding." Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 621. In contrast,

under California's system, the jury's finding that a special circumstance exists

beyond a reasonable doubt is what makes the defendant eligible for the death

penalty.

8

aggravating factors at the penalty-selection phase must be made beyond a

reasonable doubt. As Carr reasoned, it is possible to apply a standard of proof

to the "'eligibility phase"' of a capital sentencing proceeding, "because that is a

purely factual determination." Id. at 642. In contrast, it is doubtful whether

it would even be "possible to apply a standard of proof to the mitigating-factor

determination (the

so-called 'selection phase' of a capital-sentencing

proceeding)," because "[w]hether mitigation exists ... is largely a judgment call

(or perhaps a value call): what one juror might consider mitigating another

might not."

Id.; see, e.g., People v. Brown, 46 Cal. 3d 432, 456 (1988)

(California's sentencing factor regarding "'[t]he age of the defendant at the time

of the crime"' may be either a mitigating or an aggravating factor in the same

case: The defendant may argue for age-based mitigation, and the prosecutor

may argue for aggravation because the defendant was "'old enough to know

better"').

Mendez additionally argued below that the Constitution requires a jury

finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances

outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See Appellant's Opening Br. 321-324,

People v. Mendez, No. 8129501 (Cal. S. Ct.). That argument, which Mendez

does not reassert here, is likewise incorrect. In Carr, this Court observed that

"the ultimate question of whether mitigating circumstances outweigh

aggravating circumstances is mostly a question of mercy," and "[i]t would mean

nothing ... to ten the jury that the defendants must deserve mercy beyond a

9

reasonable doubt." 136 S. Ct. at 642. That reasoning leaves no room for the

argument that such an instruction is required under the Constitution. See also

pp. 6-7, supra (explaining that the jury's consideration of aggravating and

mitigating factors at the penalty phase does not increase the penalty for a

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum).

3.

Mendez asserts that the supreme courts of several States have

determined that the trier of fact must find factors in aggravation beyond a

reasonable doubt before imposing a sentence of death. Pet. 9. Mendez does

not, however, identify any specific cases. The cases that are commonly cited in

support of Mendez's argument concern capital sentencing schemes that differ

in fundamental ways from California's.

In the Delaware Supreme Court's fractured decision in Rauf v. State,

145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016), the various opinions hold that a determination as to

the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating factors in the application of

Delaware's death penalty must be made beyond a reasonable doubt.

See

145 A.3d at 434 (per curiam); id. at 481-482 (Strine, J., concurring); id. at 487

(Holland, J., concurring); but see id. at 487 (Valihura, J., dissenting). The

rationale of those opinions is not clear, and they notably fail to cite or discuss

this Court's reasoning on the issue in Carr. In any event, the most notable

. feature of the Delaware law invalidated in Rauf was that the jury's choice

between a life sentence and death was completely advisory: The judge could

impose a sentence of death even if all jurors recommended against it, as long

10

as the jury had unanimously found the existence of a single aggravating factor.

See Del. Code tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3), (d)(l); Rauf, 145 A.3d at 457 (Strine, J.,

concurring) (under Delaware law the judge "has the final say in deciding

whether a capital defendant is sentenced to death and need not give any

particular weight to the jury's view"). Under California law, the death penalty

may be imposed only if the jury has unanimously voted for death. See Cal

Penal Code § 190.3. It is by no means clear from the opinions in Rauf that the

Delaware Supreme Court would have reached the same result if it had been

analyzing California's quite different statute.6

In Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 57 (Fla. 2016), the Florida Supreme Court

held that a death sentence under Florida law may not be constitutionally

imposed unless the jury "unanimously and expressly find[s] all the aggravating

factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously find[s] that

6 Similar distinctions undercut any reliance on the opinion dissenting from the

denial of certiorari in Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 410-411 (2013),

and on State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W. 3d 253 (Mo. 2003). Pet. 17-18. The statutes

at issue in Woodward and Whitfield allowed a judge to impose the death

penalty even where the jurors voted against it. See Woodward, 134 S. Ct. at

406, 410-412 (jury's decision as to whether the defendant should be executed

was merely an "advisory verdict"); Whitfield, 107 S.W. 3d at 261-262 (judge

imposed death sentence after jurors voted 11-1 for life imprisonment). The

Woodward dissent suggests that a trial judge's view should not replace that of

the jury-not that the death penalty may not be imposed without the jury

finding beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh

mitigating factors. 134 S. Ct. at 410-411. And to whatever extent Whitfield

held that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard should apply to aggravating

and mitigating factors, that ruling has been superseded by this Court's

analysis in Carr.

11

the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death, unanimously find[s]

that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and

unanimously recommend[s] a sentence of death." 202 So. 3d at 57. By its own

terms, the decision does not recognize a right to a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt

determination of anything other the existence of aggravating factors-the

Florida-law equivalent of the special circumstances that a California jury

already finds beyond a reasonable doubt under California law when

determining eligibility for a death sentence. The Florida Supreme Court's

decision in Hurst thus provides no reason for further review.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

XAVIER BECERRA

Attorney General of California

MICHAEL J . MONGAN

Solicitor General

LANCE E . WINTERS

Chief Assistant Attorney General

JOSHUA A. KLEIN

Deputy Solicitor General

HOLLY D. WILKENS

Su

eputy Attorney General

CHRISTINE Y. FRIEDMAN

Deputy Attorney General

October 3, 2019