Opposition Brief — Harlow Hutchinson, Petitioner v. Louisiana
Supreme Court briefNov 4, 2019
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No. 19-5693
In the Supreme Court of the United States
HARLOW HUTCHINSON,
Petitioner
vs.
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA,
Respondent
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE LOUISIANA THIRD CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEAL
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
JEFF LANDRY
Attorney General
ELIZABETH BAKER MURRILL
Solicitor General
MICHELLE WARD GHETTI
Deputy Solicitor General,
Counsel of Record*
Louisiana Department of Justice
1885 N. Third St.
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 326-6028
KEITH STUTES
15th Judicial District Attorney
CELESTE WHITE
Assistant District Attorney
100 South State Street #215
Abbeville, LA 70510
(337) 898-4320
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether this Court should overrule Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), and
hold that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, as incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees State criminal defendants the right to a
unanimous jury verdict.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED................................................................................................. ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.............................................................................................. iii
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY .................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................... 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ........................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 7
I.
PETITIONER HAS NO STANDING TO COMPLAIN ABOUT NON-UNANIMOUS
JURY VERDICTS .......................................................................................................... 7
II. A GENERIC REFERENCE TO MULTIPLE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRESERVE A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM ............................... 8
A. Constitutional Issues Cannot Be Smuggled into Court ..................................... 8
B. Petitioner is Foreclosed from Raising an Equal Protection Claim .................. 11
III. THE LONGSTANDING RULE THAT THIS COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER CLAIMS
THAT WERE NOT PRESSED IN THE STATE COURTS BELOW CREATES A
WEIGHTY PRESUMPTION AGAINST REVIEW .............................................................. 12
IV. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOUISIANA CIRCUIT COURT WAS CORRECT ........................ 15
A. Apodaca Was Decided Correctly and Should Not Be Overruled ..................... 16
B. The Sixth Amendment Does Not Require Unanimity. .................................... 18
C. A Unanimous Jury Verdict is Not Fundamental to Ordered Liberty ............. 19
D. Louisiana’s Non-Unanimous Jury Verdict Rule Is Not the Product of
Racial Animus.................................................................................................... 21
V. LOUISIANA HAS ALREADY CHANGED ITS JURY VERDICT LAWS TO PROVIDE
FOR UNANIMOUS VERDICTS IN ALL CASES ............................................................... 22
VI. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT HOLD DEFENDANT’S PETITION PENDING THIS
COURT’S DECISION IN RAMOS V. LOUISIANA, NO. 18-5924. ...................................... 23
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 23
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) ............................................................. passim
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) ....................................................................... 15
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) ....................................... 4, 9
Barbour v. Louisiana, 562 U.S. 1217 (2011) ............................................................... 16
Baumberger v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 392 (2017) ......................................................... 16
Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp.
of California, Inc., 522 U.S. 192 (1997) .................................................................... 12
Blackburn v. Thomas, 450 U.S. 953 (1981) ................................................................. 15
Bowen v. Oregon, 558 U.S. 815 (2009) ......................................................................... 16
Broad v. Sealaska Corp. 85 F.3d 422 ............................................................................ 3
Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) .................................................................... 15
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) ..................................................................... 15
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973)....................................................................... 15
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978)................................................................................. 15
District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne,
557 U.S. 52 (2009) ..................................................................................................... 22
Dove v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1279 (2018) .................................................................... 16
Evangelisto Ramos v. Louisiana, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) ................................... passim
Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) ........................................................ 16
Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 (1982) .................................................................. 4, 14
Herrera v. Oregon, 562 U.S. 1135 (2011) ..................................................................... 16
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) ...................................................................... 15
Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) .................................... 14
iii
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp.,
510 U.S. 27 (1993) ................................................................................................. 4, 10
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal.,
493 U.S. 378 (1990) ................................................................................................... 14
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999) ................................................................ 13
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)................... 17
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) ...................................................................... 7
Louisiana v. Hankton, 135 S.Ct. 195 (2014) ............................................................... 16
Louisiana v. Miller, 568 U.S. 1157 (2013) ................................................................... 16
Louisiana v. Webb, 135 S.Ct. 1719 (2015) ................................................................... 16
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976) ........................................................... 15
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010) .............................................. 16
McElveen v. Louisiana, 568 U.S. 1163 (2013) ............................................................. 16
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) ........................................................... 15
Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973) ........................................................................ 15
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) ....................................................................... 14
Mincey v. Vannoy, 138 S.Ct. 394 (2017) ...................................................................... 16
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ................................................ 14
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) ................................................................. 16
Rubens v. Louisiana, 568 U.S. 1236 (2013) ................................................................. 13
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) ........................................................................ 16
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) ...................................................... 16
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
426
U.S. 26 (1976) .............................................................................................................. 8
Sims v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1592 (2018) ................................................................... 16
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) .................................................................... 15
State v. Fleury, 2001–0871 (La. 10/16/01), 799 So.2d 468. ................................... 12, 13
iv
State v. Hatton, 2007-2377 (La. 7/1/078), 985 So.2d 709 ...................................... 12, 13
State v. Rubens, 2010-1114 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/30/11), 83 So.3d 30 .......................... 13
State v. Schoening, 2000–0903, p. 3 (La. 10/17/00), 770 So.2d 762 ...................... 12, 13
State v. Webb, 2013-0146 (La. App. 4th Cir. 01/30/14), 133 So.3d 258 ...................... 21
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) ....................................................................... 5, 9
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) .................................................................... 15
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) ...................................................................... 17
U.S. v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881 ........................................................................................... 3
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) ............................................................ 16
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). ............................................................ 7, 8
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) .......................................................................... 16
Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307 (2011) ........................................................................ 14
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ........................................................................ 7, 8
Webb v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1719 (2015) .................................................................. 21
Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016) ............................................................ 16
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990). ............................................................. 7, 8
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) ................................................................ 18, 19
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) ............................................................. 10
v
Statutes
La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 841 ...................................................................................... 12
La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 782 ........................................................................................ 1
Louisiana Constitution article I, § 17(A) ....................................................................... 1
Louisiana Rev. Stat. 14:28.1 .......................................................................................... 2
U.S. Const. amend. 5 ................................................................................................ 9, 11
U.S. Const. amend. 6 ............................................................................................ passim
U.S. Const. amend. 8 .......................................................................................... 9, 16, 17
U.S. Const. amend. 14 .................................................................................... 5, 9, 11, 16
Other Authorities
Ethan J. Lieb, A Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision Rules in Democratic
Countries, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 629, 642 (2008) .................................................... 20
Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in 1
Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 367, 412 (1907) ........................... 19
S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, D. Himmelfarb, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 463 (10th Ed. 2013)........................................................................ 10
Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”:
Juries and Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62-SPG Law & Contemp.
Probs. 7, 36 (1999) ..................................................................................................... 20
Rules
Supreme Court Rule 14.1 ............................................................................................. 10
Supreme Court Rule 14.4 ............................................................................................... 9
vi
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The text of the statute that existed at the time of Mr. Hutchinson’s trial is
correctly stated in the petition; however, Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
article 782 now provides, in pertinent part:
A case for an offense committed prior to January 1, 2019, in which
punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried by
a jury composed of twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to render
a verdict. A case for an offense committed on or after January 1, 2019,
in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor
shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur
to render a verdict.
Louisiana Constitution article I, § 17(A) that existed at the time of the trial
provides, in pertinent part:
A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried
before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a
verdict. A case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at
hard labor shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom
must concur to render a verdict. A case in which the punishment may
be confinement at hard labor or confinement without hard labor for more
than six months shall be tried before a jury of six persons, all of whom
must concur to render a verdict.
That article was also amended and currently reads, in pertinent part:
A case for an offense committed prior to January 1, 2019, in which
the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be
tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to
render a verdict. A case for an offense committed on or after January
1, 2019, in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard
labor shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must
concur to render a verdict.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Facts of the Crime. Petitioner plotted and planned for over six months to
1 Pet’r. Appx. 4a-9a, 18a.
1
have his wife, a woman he had known since she was fifteen and to whom he had been
married for almost twenty-five years, silently murdered with a crossbow as she
returned from church. The man he asked to do this was his best friend, a man he had
known since they were seven years old and who had been in the couple’s wedding.
His plan was to take the proceeds from his wife’s life insurance policy and travel to
the Ukraine to see a woman he had been communicating with on the internet. After
that, he planned to buy a yacht. Fortunately for Petitioner’s wife, the friend contacted
the police instead. Unfortunately for Petitioner, a good bit of the plotting and
planning was recorded by audio or video taping.
Procedural Background. Petitioner was charged with solicitation for
murder, a violation of Louisiana Rev. Stat. 14:28.1, punishable at hard labor. Prior
to trial, he made no complaint about Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury verdict laws
nor did he proffer a unanimous jury instruction or object to the non-unanimous jury
instruction. After trial, he was convicted of solicitation for murder. The jury was
polled but the record does not reflect the verdict count.2 No objection was made at the
time the verdict was rendered. No post-verdict motions were filed. Petitioner was
sentenced to seventeen years without benefit of probation or parole.
Petitioner appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and filed both
counselled and pro se briefs.3 His counselled brief did not raise the issue of non-
2 Petitioner alleges in his petition that he was convicted by a non-unanimous jury and cites his own
allegation reflected in the appellate court decision. He offers no evidence of the verdict and the
appellate court found there was no evidence of a non-unanimous verdict.
3 Petitioner only mentions a pro se argument but Petitioner was represented by counsel on appeal. He
filed a pro se brief in addition to his counsel’s brief. His counsel did not object to a non-unanimous
verdict.
2
unanimous jury verdicts. In his pro se brief, Petitioner alleged as error that the “Trial
Court erred in not deeming acquittal or mistrial.” His entire argument was
Polling of the jury after the guilty verdict revealed the decision was not
unanimous. U.S. v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881. The Sixth Amendment4
guarantees the defendant the right to a unanimous verdict. And Broad
v. Sealaska Corp. 85 F.3d 422, the “Supremacy Clause”, preempts state
law by provision implication, or conflict between federal and state law.
In my case, those previous cases together should have rendered the
verdict as acquittal or at least as mistrial (sic). Appellant’s Original ProSe Supplemental Brief.
The Third Circuit noted that, although the record reflected that the jury had
been polled, it did not reflect the results of the polling. Accordingly, Petitioner was
unable to prove that he had been convicted by a non-unanimous jury. In dicta, the
court found that even if he had, the verdict was valid under both federal and state
law. Pet’r. Appx. 18a.
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review without opinion. Pet’r. Appx. 19a.
Petitioner now requests review by this Court, raising only a Sixth Amendment
incorporation claim.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
Even if this Court determines that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity
to convict in criminal jury trials in the States, this petition should be denied for two
procedural reasons. First, there is no evidence that Petitioner was convicted by a nonunanimous jury verdict and, thus, he has no standing to complain about the law.
There is no reason to hold it pending this Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana
because the Court’s decision cannot aid Petitioner—whatever the result.
4 U.S. Const. amend. 6.
3
Second, the sole issue raised in the petition was not raised at trial and is
procedurally barred. Petitioner should not be allowed to resurrect this claim at this
late juncture. Because there is an adequate and independent state-law basis for
upholding his conviction, the Court should not hold his petition for this Court’s
decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (No. 18-5924). See Hathorn v.
Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262–63 (1982).
Additionally, Petitioner’s writ application presents no question and makes no
argument. The purported “Question Presented” lists three constitutional provisions
but never explains which constitutional right in those provisions applies to him or
how those provisions generate a question for this Court to resolve. In other words, he
does not actually pose any question at all.
It is the Petitioner’s duty to present a question for this Court to consider for
review. And this Court has repeatedly disapproved of a petitioner “smuggling
additional questions into a case” that were not presented in his petition. Izumi
Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 32 (1993). And
yet, that is precisely what he attempts to do by incorporating any possible viable
question with a vague citation to certain constitutional amendments. Many books
line the shelves of law school libraries on each one of the amendments he has listed,
and reams of law review articles exist on related questions. His question is so broad
that it amounts to no question at all, leaving the specifics as guesswork for the State
and this Court. Consequently, the Petition presents only a vague appeal to general
constitutional principles. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 77 (1988).
4
Put simply, “[a] generic reference to the Fourteenth Amendment5 is not sufficient to
preserve a constitutional claim based on an unidentified provision of the Bill of
Rights.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 407 n. 9 (1988).
Further obfuscating his claim, he presents no legal argument to support or
narrow his petition. In his Reasons for Granting the Writ, he states, in two
paragraphs, nothing more than the fact that this Court has granted a petition for a
writ of certiorari in Evangelisto Ramos v. Louisiana, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019), and, “for
the reasons stated in that petition, as well as reasons stated in similar petitions filed
over the last 45 years,” Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) should be “reexamin[ed] and disavow[ed].” Louisiana submits that such a generalized grievance
insufficiently presents even the issue presented in Ramos.
Then, with neither argument or supporting evidence, he asserts, “Given the
racial origins of the non-unanimous jury provision, full incorporation by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a unanimous jury is
required” and “[t]his Court should overrule Apodaca’s idiosyncratic and incorrect
holding and apply the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity guarantee to the states.”
Petitioner appears to conflate the Sixth Amendment claim addressed in Apodaca with
an equal protection claim. Moreover, he neither asserts nor briefs an equal protection
claim.
That said, the Louisiana appellate courts were correct in upholding this
verdict. First, the appellate court held that he had no standing to complain because
5 U.S. Const. amend. 14.
5
he couldn’t prove that he was convicted by a non-unanimous verdict. Secondly, even
if Petitioner had been able to prove a non-unanimous jury verdict, such a verdict was
constitutional. The appellate court relied upon this Court’s precedent, as did the
people of Louisiana in enacting the jury verdict law in place at the time of Petitioner’s
conviction. That precedent, including Apodaca v. Oregon, was decided correctly.
Nowhere in the Constitution, including Article III and the Sixth Amendment, is a
unanimous jury verdict required. In fact, the Framers of the Constitution considered
such a provision and purposefully left it out. Thus, neither the text of the
Constitution, including the Sixth Amendment, nor its history, provide for a right to a
unanimous jury verdict.
Furthermore, such a right is not fundamental to ordered liberty and has never
been found to be essential to due process. Additionally, the vast majority of other
countries who use juries—including England, from whom we inherited the concept of
a jury trial—do not provide for unanimous jury verdicts.
The jury trial provisions under which Petitioner was tried were adopted by the
people in 1973, after a Constitutional Convention, in which the Delegates specifically
relied on this Court’s precedent but nevertheless increased the required vote to 10-2
to convict. The 1974 Constitution was voted on by the people, as was the new 2018
provision adopting unanimity for convictions of crimes committed after January 1,
2019. Thus, any change the Court might wish to actuate has already been realized—
and without the collateral consequences a ruling by this Court might cause.
6
ARGUMENT
I.
PETITIONER HAS NO STANDING TO COMPLAIN ABOUT NON-UNANIMOUS
JURY VERDICTS
As the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals observed, “[a]lthough defense
counsel requested polling of the jury, neither the transcript nor the minutes reflect
the results of said polling. Accordingly, Defendant cannot prove that he was convicted
by a less than unanimous jury verdict.” Thus, Petitioner has no standing to bring his
complaint to this Court.
It is well established that “before a federal court can consider the merits of a
legal claim, the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish
the requisite standing to sue.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990).
Pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, this Court only has
jurisdiction over “cases and controversies” and the doctrine of standing serves to
identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial
process. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471–476 (1982). To establish an Article III case
or controversy, Petitioner must clearly demonstrate that he has suffered an “injury
in fact.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475. This he cannot do. His injury must be concrete,
distinct, and palpable, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), and the alleged
harm must be actual or imminent. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–102 (1983).
Once again, Petitioner has suffered no injury much less one that is concrete, distinct,
palpable, actual, or imminent.
Further, Petitioner must be able to show that his injury is likely to be redressed
7
by a favorable decision. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Valley Forge, supra, 454 U.S. at 472. Petitioner wants this Court
to hold his petition until it decides Ramos v. Louisiana and then dispose of it as
appropriate in light of that decision. But, even if the decision in Ramos is that nonunanimous juries are unconstitutional, it provides no relief to Petitioner because he
cannot prove he was convicted by a non-unanimous jury. Thus, his alleged injury, a
conviction, will not be redressed by a favorable decision in Ramos.
Finally, Petitioner must clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to
satisfy these Art. III standing requirements. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155. Although he
states in his Petition that he was found guilty by a non-unanimous jury verdict, his
only “proof” of that is his own self-serving statement in his pro se brief to the
Louisiana appellate court. See Pet. p. 7, fn. 1. In Louisiana, as elsewhere, an appellate
court must render judgment upon the record. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2164. Such “court
has no authority to consider on appeal facts referred to in appellate briefs if those
facts are not in the record on appeal.” In re Succession of Badeaux, 08-1085, pp. 5-6
(La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/09), 12 So. 3d 348, 352, writ denied, 09-822 (La. 5/29/09), 9 So. 3d
166. Thus, Petitioner has set forth no fact sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing
requirement. This Court “is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing
otherwise deficient allegations of standing.” See Warth, 422 U.S. at 508, 518.
II.
A GENERIC REFERENCE TO MULTIPLE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRESERVE A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
A. Constitutional Issues Cannot Be Smuggled into Court
In his Question Presented, Petitioner claims that he is “constitutionally
8
entitled to a unanimous jury under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”
There are five separate constitutional rights set forth in the Fifth Amendment; at
least eight different constitutional rights set forth in the Sixth Amendment; and at
least twelve separate constitutional rights set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Petitioner specifies none of them.
To further muddle the matter, he contends, in only two paragraphs, that this
Court has granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in Evangelisto Ramos v. Louisiana
and that, “for the reasons stated in that petition, as well as reasons stated in similar
petitions filed over the last 45 years,” Apodaca v. Oregon should be “re-examin[ed] and
disavow[ed]” because the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict and “full
incorporation is an established principle on which the Court itself has relied for
several decades.” Then, with absolutely no argument or supporting evidence, asserts,
“Given the racial origins of the non-unanimous jury provision, full incorporation by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a unanimous
jury is required.”
A vague appeal to constitutional principles does not preserve constitutional
claims. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 77 (1988) (noting, for
example, that the petition in the lower court did not identify the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment as the source of the claim). In particular, “[a]
generic reference to the Fourteenth Amendment is insufficient to preserve a
constitutional claim based on an unidentified provision of the Bill of Rights.” Taylor
v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 407 n. 9 (1988). Furthermore, Supreme Court Rule 14.4
9
provides that “[t]he failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, brevity, and
clarity whatever is essential to ready and adequate understanding of the points
requiring consideration is sufficient reason for the Court to deny the petition.”
Regarding the Question Presented, as noted in the treatise, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE, “it is not enough to ask whether, in light of stated circumstances, the
petitioner’s constitutional or statutory rights were violated.” The precise provision of
the Constitution must be cited. See S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, D.
Himmelfarb, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 463 (10th Ed. 2013).
Finally, Supreme Court Rule 14.1 addresses a comparable problem. The fact
that Petitioner may have mentioned an issue in the body of his petition does not bring
it before the Court. As this Court has noted, “Rule 14.1(a) requires that a subsidiary
question be fairly included in the question presented for [the Court’s] review.” Izumi,
510 U.S. at 31-32 & n.5. In Yee v. City of Escondido, the Court also discussed the two
important purposes for the Rule that aptly apply to the initial petition as well:
First, it provides the respondent with notice of the grounds upon which
the petitioner is seeking certiorari and enables the respondent to
sharpen the arguments as to why certiorari should not be granted. Were
[the Court] routinely to consider questions beyond those raised in the
petition, the respondent would lack any opportunity in advance of
litigation on the merits to argue that such questions are not worthy of
review. Where, as is not unusual, the decision below involves issues on
which the petitioner does not seek certiorari, the respondent would face
the formidable task of opposing certiorari on every issue the Court might
conceivably find present in the case. By forcing the petitioner to choose
his questions at the outset, Rule 14.1(a) relieves the respondent of the
expense of unnecessary litigation on the merits and the burden of
opposing certiorari on unpresented questions.
Second, Rule 14.1(a) assists the Court in selecting the cases in which
certiorari will be granted. . . . Were [it] routinely to entertain questions
10
not presented in the petition for certiorari, . . . parties who feared an
inability to prevail on the question presented would be encouraged to fill
their limited briefing space and argument time with discussion of issues
other than the one on which certiorari was granted. Rule 14.1(a) forces
the parties to focus on the questions the Court has viewed as
particularly important, thus enabling [it] to make efficient use of [its]
resources. 503 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1992).
Although the Court generally expresses concern with the “smuggling” problem
after certiorari, the problem begins with vague questions presented in the petition
itself. Petitioner has not clearly stated his constitutional claim. Broadly and
generically referencing constitutional provisions without identifying the specific
rights guaranteed therein, in addition to violating this Court’s rules, sets up a
situation where Petitioner can “smuggle” in all sorts of “disguised” claims.
Furthermore, it leaves Respondent with the “formidable task of opposing certiorari
on every issue the Court might conceivably find present” in the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
B. Petitioner is Foreclosed from Raising an Equal Protection Claim
Although Petitioner alleges that Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury laws have
“racial origins,” he does so in the context of incorporating the Sixth Amendment into
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements. If Petitioner sufficiently
preserved a Sixth Amendment claim, he certainly has not done so with an equal
protection claim.6 A general reference to the Fourteenth Amendment in the Question
Presented cannot suffice. Petitioner’s reasons for granting the petition include only
re-examination of Apodaca v. Oregon. The words “equal protection” are mentioned
6 Nor was an equal protection argument raised at any stage of the proceedings in state court.
11
nowhere in the petition. Thus, Petitioner waived this claim. An argument withheld
from the petition has been waived and will not be considered when made for the first
time in briefing the merits. Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund
v. Ferbar Corp. of California, Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 205 (1997). Thus, this issue does not
merit review by the Court.
III.
THE LONGSTANDING RULE THAT THIS COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER CLAIMS
THAT WERE NOT PRESSED IN THE STATE COURTS BELOW CREATES A
WEIGHTY PRESUMPTION AGAINST REVIEW
It is well-settled in Louisiana that the party challenging the constitutionality
of any provision of law bears the burden of proving it is unconstitutional at trial. State
v. Fleury, 2001–0871 (La. 10/16/01), 799 So.2d 468, 472. In fact, a constitutional
challenge may not be considered by an appellate court unless it was raised in the trial
court by specifically pleading the grounds for the challenge and particularizing the
basis of unconstitutionality. See State v. Hatton, 07-2377 (La. 7/1/078), 985 So.2d 709,
718-19; State v. Schoening, 2000–0903, p. 3 (La. 10/17/00), 770 So.2d 762, 764. This
law is based upon two premises:
First, Louisiana law generally requires that “[a]n irregularity or error cannot
be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.” La.
Code Crim. Proc. art. 841. “It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order
of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires
the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds
therefor.” Id (emphasis added).
More specifically, an objection to a claimed improper jury instruction is
12
procedurally required in order to raise the issue on appeal. See State v. Rubens, 20101114 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/30/11), 83 So.3d 30, writ denied 2012-0399 (La. 10/12/12), 99
So.3d 37, cert. denied Rubens v. Louisiana, 568 U.S. 1236 (2013). The purpose of this
rule is to allow a trial court to consider the argument and make a correction at the
time of the error. It also serves to create a full record on the issue raised for
subsequent reviewing courts. Federal law also provides that a party may not assign
error to a jury instruction if he fails to object before the jury retires or to “state
distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of that objection.”
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 387-88 (1999) (citing Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. Art.
30). Petitioner did not object to the jury instruction.
Second, an objection to the constitutionality of a state law requires an even
higher burden. The purpose of this rule is “to afford interested parties sufficient time
to brief and prepare arguments defending the constitutionality of the challenged
statute.” Hatton, 985 So.2d at 719 (citing Schoening, 770 So.2d at 764). Knowing with
specificity what constitutional provisions are allegedly being violated gives the
opposing parties the opportunity to fully brief and argue the facts and law
surrounding the issue and “provides the trial court with thoughtful and complete
arguments relating to the issue of constitutionality and furnishes reviewing courts
with an adequate record upon which to consider the constitutionality of the
statute.” Id. This basic principle dictates that the party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute must cite to the specific provisions of the constitution
that prohibits the action. Id. at 720 (citing Fleury, 799 So.2d at 472 (“It is elementary
13
that he who urges the unconstitutionality of a law must especially plead its
unconstitutionality and show specifically wherein it is unconstitutional. . . .”)).
Petitioner
has
not
identified
anywhere
in
the
record
where
the
constitutionality of the unanimity rule was specially pleaded or the basis of it
particularized. He did not complain of the jury instruction prior to trial, when it was
given, during deliberations, at any time before the jury was dismissed, or even in
post-trial pleadings. The State had no reasonable notice or opportunity at trial to
present evidence, brief, or make argument on his purported claim. He has waived
that claim and cannot resurrect it now.
Failure to comply with a state procedural rule may constitute an independent
and adequate state ground barring its review of a federal question. Hathorn, 457 U.S.
at 262–63 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 512, n.7 (1978); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 n.4 (1964)). When a state court refuses to rule on
the merits of a claim in light of a neutral state rule, the Court acts with “utmost
caution” before deciding that the state court is obligated to entertain the claim.
Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990). “[F]ederal law takes
the state courts as it finds them.” Id. (quotation omitted). This rule is “bottomed
deeply in belief in the importance of state control of State judicial procedure.” Id. This
Court has acknowledged that States have great latitude to establish the structure
and jurisdiction of their own courts. Id.; see also Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316
(2011); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 398
(1990).
14
As the state appellate court found on direct review, Petitioner has no standing
to raise this constitutional claim since he did not prove that he was convicted by a
non-unanimous jury. Additionally, he did not object to the jury verdict at trial or,
effectively, even on appeal. For these reasons, the Court’s decision in Ramos cannot
aid Hutchinson—whatever the result. Thus, the Court should not hold this case for
its decision in Ramos and should deny the writ.
IV.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOUISIANA CIRCUIT COURT WAS CORRECT
Of course, the true basis of the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals’
decision was that, simply, Petitioner could not prove that he was convicted by a nonunanimous jury. In dicta, though, the Court relied on nearly fifty years of this Court’s
jurisprudence upon which Louisiana Courts have faithfully relied.7 The Louisiana
Supreme Court has recognized that this Court has cited or discussed the Apodaca
opinion not less than nineteen times since its issuance.8 On each of these occasions,
7 Indeed, Louisiana expressly relied on Apodaca in 1974 when it readopted its rule and revised the
minimum vote to 10-2. See Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts, Vol. 7, pp. 1184-1189 (La. Constitutional Convention Records Commission 1977).
Bertrand, 6 So. 3d at 742. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 169 (1973) (Marshall,
dissenting)(neither Apodaca, Johnson nor Williams squarely presented the Court with the problem of
defining the meaning of jury trial in a federal context.); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 49 (1973);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular
composition; ‘a jury will come to such a (commonsense) judgment as long as it consists of a group of
laymen representative of a cross section of the community who have the duty and the opportunity to
deliberate . . . on the question of a defendant's guilt.’); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 625
(1976) (the jury's verdict need not be unanimous; what is important is that the verdict reflect the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978); Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37 (1978) (when jeopardy attaches); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 136 (1979)
(noting that in Apodaca, it had upheld a state statute providing for 10 out of 12 verdicts and that there
was no difference between those juries required to act unanimously and those permitted to act by votes
of 10 to 2 and that unanimity did not materially contribute to the exercise of the jury's judgment or as
a necessary condition to a jury representing a fair cross section of the community); Brown v. Louisiana,
447 U.S. 323, 331 (1980) (10-to-2 vote in state trial does not violate the Constitution); Blackburn v.
Thomas, 450 U.S. 953, 955 (1981); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 482, fn 26 (1984) (Stevens,
concurring); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 511 (1990) (Stevens, dissenting) (we have permitted
nonunanimous verdicts); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 468 (1990) (Scalia, dissenting) (we
8
15
the Court considered that Apodaca’s holding as to non-unanimous jury verdicts
represents well-settled law. There have also been dozens of cases, some as recently
as last year, where this Court has denied certiorari review on this issue further
evidencing that non-unanimous jury verdicts did not violate the United States
Constitution.9 For the same reasons the State presents in its brief on the merits in
Ramos, the State appellate court was not wrong.
A. Apodaca Was Decided Correctly and Should Not Be Overruled
There is no reason to overrule Apodaca. As the Court recently explained, “even
in constitutional cases, a departure from precedent demands special justification.”
Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (cleaned up). Apodaca was not
a summary affirmance that was decided without briefing and argument. Whether or
not it has “questionable precedential value,” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S.
44, 66 (1996), it warrants respect.
The doctrine of stare decisis is about “maintaining settled law” or abandoning
have approved verdicts by less than a unanimous jury.); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630 (1991)
(the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments do not require a unanimous jury in state cases);
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 8 (1994); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511, n. 2 (1995) (jury
unanimity is not constitutionally required); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 384–85 (2007) (Souter,
dissenting) (the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury otherwise relies on history for details, and the
practical instincts of judges and legislators for implementation in the courts.); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, n. 14 (2010) (noting the Court had held that the Sixth Amendment does
not require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials); see also, 561 U.S. at 867–68 (Stevens,
dissenting) (noting the Court had resisted a uniform approach to the Sixth Amendment's criminal jury
guarantee, demanding 12–member panels and unanimous verdicts in federal trials, yet not in state
trials.); Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1275 (2016) (Thomas, dissenting) (the Court's jury
unanimity rule is, undoubtedly, “procedural”); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682, 687 (2019).
See, e.g., Sims v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1592 (2018); Dove v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1279 (2018);
Baumberger v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 392 (2017); Mincey v. Vannoy, 138 S.Ct. 394 (2017); Barbour v.
Louisiana, 562 U.S. 1217 (2011); Louisiana v. Webb, 135 S.Ct. 1719 (2015); Louisiana v. Hankton, 135
S.Ct. 195 (2014); Louisiana v. Miller, 568 U.S. 1157 (2013); McElveen v. Louisiana, 568 U.S. 1163
(2013); Herrera v. Oregon, 562 U.S. 1135 (2011); Bowen v. Oregon, 558 U.S. 815 (2009).
9
16
it for a different legal rule. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 899 (2007). Here, the “settled law” is the prevailing rule that States may
allow criminal convictions based on jury verdicts that are not unanimous. Accord
Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 134 n* (Alito, J., dissenting). Unlike the excessive fines clause of
the Eighth Amendment only recently held to apply to the States in Timbs v. Indiana,
139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019), the constitutionality of non-unanimous jury verdicts in
state trials has been the rule since the Founding and has been explicit in this Court’s
precedent for nearly 50 years. It has been relied on by Louisiana, in enacting its
constitution and its statutes, as well as in interpretations of that constitution and
those statutes, for fifty years. It should take a special justification, such as a showing
of demonstrable error, to reverse course at this point.
Overturning Apodaca, moreover, would lead to significant practical problems
and would unsettle related areas of jury trial law. The lower courts are already
receiving a crush of petitions for relief seeking to apply a mandatory unanimity rule
retroactively to long-final convictions of very serious crimes in Louisiana and Oregon.
And, given that unanimity and a 12-person jury share similar historical and commonlaw roots, this Court should be prepared to reconsider the constitutionality of lessthan-12-person juries if it endorses a revisionist approach to the Sixth Amendment.
At least 40 States allow juries smaller than 12 in some types of criminal cases. In
short, overturning Apodaca has little to recommend it but could have serious negative
consequences for both the criminal justice system and this Court’s jurisprudence.
Louisiana courts have been correct in relying on stare decisis in their interpretation
17
and application of Apodaca.
B. The Sixth Amendment Does Not Require Unanimity.
In his Reasons for Granting the Petition, Petitioner states that the Sixth
Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant. Although a number
of this Court’s opinions reference a federal requirement of unanimity, all do so in
dicta and based on an assumption. None have critically considered the history of jury
unanimity in this country.
Not “every feature of the jury as it existed at common law—whether incidental
or essential to that institution—was necessarily included in the Constitution
wherever that document referred to a ‘jury.’” Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 91
(1970). In holding that the Sixth Amendment did not implicitly adopt the commonlaw rule mandating twelve jurors, this Court rejected “the easy assumption . . . that
if a given feature existed in a jury at common law in 1789, then it was necessarily
preserved in the Constitution.” Id. at 92. Thus, the proper starting point to determine
whether the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts is not the English
common law, but the U.S. Constitution’s text. Neither Article III nor the Sixth
Amendment—the two provisions of the Constitution that address juries in criminal
cases—mentions a unanimity requirement. That omission is telling because those
provisions do expressly mention other attributes of the jury system. For example,
Article III requires that a jury trial take place in the “state where the said crimes
shall have been committed,” and the Sixth Amendment further restricts the location
of the trial to the “State and district” where the crime occurred.
18
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Sixth Amendment eliminates any
doubt that the omission of a unanimity requirement was intentional. Madison’s
original draft of the Sixth Amendment expressly guaranteed a jury trial that included
“the requisite of unanimity” and the “other accustomed requisites” of the jury. Id. at
94. But the Senate rejected that proposal and the Conference Committee adopted a
modified proposal—minus any mention of unanimity or “other accustomed
requisites”—that ultimately became the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 95-96. Those
omissions are especially notable given that State constitutions at the time—drafted
by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution—took a variety of approaches to the jury
right. Some expressly required unanimity; some expressly incorporated the English
common law; and others merely preserved an unadorned right to a “jury trial.” Id. at
98 n. 45 (quoting Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies,
in 1 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 367, 412 (1907)). In short, the
Apodaca plurality, and, therefore, the Louisiana Third Circuit, correctly applied
settled law in concluding that the Sixth Amendment does not mandate unanimity.
C. A Unanimous Jury Verdict is Not Fundamental to Ordered
Liberty
Unanimity is also not fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty. The core
purpose of a jury trial “obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his
accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community
participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determination
of guilt or innocence.” Williams, 399 U.S. at 100; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. at145, 156 (1968) (“Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of
19
his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”).
But unanimity is not essential to those core purposes. Regardless of whether
the jury’s final vote is 12-0, 11-1, or 10-2, no defendant can be convicted and deprived
of his liberty until a body of his peers has independently reviewed the evidence
against him and found him guilty. Indeed, recognizing that unanimity is not essential
to the purposes underlying the jury right, a large majority of countries that provide
for jury trials do not require unanimity, including several (such as England and
Ireland) that share common-law roots. In fact, “among the class of countries that
embraces the jury, the unanimous decision rule for guilt and acquittal generally
enforced by the American system is very much an anomaly.” Ethan J. Lieb, A
Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision Rules in Democratic Countries, 5 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 629, 642 (2008). Instead, “more relaxed majoritarian and super-majoritarian
rules clearly dominate the global jury system landscape.” Id. at 642. Notably, English
law no longer requires juries to render verdicts unanimously. It adopted nonunanimity over fifty years ago—at about the same time that this Court upheld
Oregon and Louisiana’s decision to do so. “In England . . . the requirement of a
unanimous verdict was dropped in 1967 by the Criminal Justice Act, which permitted
verdicts of ten to two.” Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little
Parliament”: Juries and Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62-SPG Law &
Contemp. Probs. 7, 36 (1999).
20
D. Louisiana’s Non-Unanimous Jury Verdict Rule Is Not the Product
of Racial Animus.
Petitioner suggests that Louisiana’s jury verdict law has “racial origins,”
although he does not ground that claim in the equal protection clause. He also did not
raise that claim in the trial court; thus there is no evidence in the record of the origins
of this provision.
More importantly, Defendant was not tried pursuant to the original nonunanimous verdict provision; he was tried under a provision in the 1974 Constitution
and the companion jury trial article in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Records from
the 1973 Constitutional Convention show that racial animus was not a motivation.10
As the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found, “[t]he revision of a less-thanunanimous jury requirement in the 1974 Constitution [from a vote of 9 jurors to a
vote of 10] was not by routine incorporation of the previous Constitution’s provisions;
the new article was the subject of a fair amount of debate.” Hankton, 122 So. 3d at
1038; see also State v. Webb, 2013-0146 (La. App. 4th Cir. 01/30/14), 133 So. 3d 258,
286-87, writ denied sub nom, 2014-0436 (La. 10/03/14); 149 So. 3d 793, cert. denied,
Webb v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1719 (2015). The purpose was judicial efficiency. There
was no mention of race at any time during the Convention, whether in the Bill of
Rights Committee—where the provision originated—or on the floor. Rep. Alphonse
Jackson, Jr., charter member of the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus and
10 The official records and transcripts from the 1973 Constitutional Convention can be accessed online
at http://house.louisiana.gov/cc73/. The discussions of the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections is
particularly relevant and is found in Vol. 10 of the Records.
21
chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee, would surely have objected.11 As stated in
Rep. Jackson’s obituary, the 1974 Constitution “became a blueprint for equal
opportunity, fair labor relations, expanded voter participation and greater
protections for the individual.”12
V.
LOUISIANA HAS ALREADY CHANGED ITS JURY VERDICT LAWS TO PROVIDE
FOR UNANIMOUS VERDICTS IN ALL CASES
Petitioner ignores the important fact that Louisiana in 2018 changed its laws
on jury verdicts unanimous jury verdicts in all felony trials for crimes committed after
January 1, 2019.
This Court has been hesitant to “suddenly constitutionalize” an issue via the
Due Process Clause when “[t]he elected governments of the States are actively
confronting” it, as in Louisiana and Oregon. District Attorney’s Office for Third
Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72-73 (2009). Petitioner offers no compelling
reason to short-circuit this robust democratic process. The legislative resolution of
this long-debated policy issue provides a clear date for implementation of a new
system that avoid possible negative collateral consequences.
There is no need for, nor is there any benefit in, this Court now “suddenly
constitutionalizing” this issue when Louisiana’s elected government has already
11 See Official Records of the 1973 Constitutional Convention. Id.; see also Rep. Jackson’s obituary at
https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/shreveporttimes/obituary.aspx?n=AlphonseJackson,%20Jr.&pid=
173611514&fhid=12384 (last visited February 28, 2019) (“As Chairman of the Committee on Bill of
Rights and Elections at the Convention, he worked with other delegates to craft the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974. It became a blueprint for equal opportunity, fair labor relations, expanded voter
participation and greater protections for the individual. This constitution has been called the most
significant achievement in Louisiana's history during the twentieth century.”)
12 Id.
22
actively confronted it.
VI.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT HOLD DEFENDANT’S PETITION PENDING THIS
COURT’S DECISION IN RAMOS V. LOUISIANA, NO. 18-5924.
Hutchinson asks this Court to hold his petition pending its decision in Ramos
v. Louisiana which was argued October 7, 2019. However, for all of the above reasons,
the Court’s decision in Ramos cannot aid Petitioner—whatever the result. Thus, the
Court should not hold this case for its decision in Ramos and should deny the writ.
CONCLUSION
The State of Louisiana respectfully submits that the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
/s/ Michelle W. Ghetti
_________________________________________
JEFF LANDRY
Attorney General
ELIZABETH BAKER MURRILL
Solicitor General
MICHELLE WARD GHETTI*
Deputy Solicitor General,
*Counsel of Record
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
KEITH STUTES
15th Judicial District Attorney
CELESTE WHITE
Assistant District Attorney
23
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.