Respondents Brief — Facebook, Inc., Petitioner v. Noah Duguid, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 4, 2020

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No. 19-511

In the Supreme Court of the United States

FACEBOOK, INC., PETITIONER

NOAH DUGUID, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS RESPONDENT

SUPPORTING PETITIONER

JEFFREY B. WALL

Acting Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

SOPAN JOSHI

Senior Counsel to the

Assistant Attorney General

JONATHAN Y. ELLIS

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

MARK B. STERN

MICHAEL S. RAAB

LINDSEY POWELL

CASEN B. ROSS

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,

Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394, generally prohibits

the use of an “automatic telephone dialing system”

to place a call to “any telephone number assigned to

a * * * cellular telephone service.” 47 U.S.C.

227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The Act defines “automatic telephone

dialing system” as “equipment which has the capacity—

(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called,

using a random or sequential number generator; and

(B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1). The question presented is as follows:

Whether Section 227(a)(1)’s definition of “automatic

telephone dialing system” encompasses a device that has

the capacity to store and automatically dial telephone

numbers, even if the device does not “us[e] a random or

sequential number generator.”

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below .............................................................................. 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1

Statutory provisions involved ...................................................... 2

Statement ...................................................................................... 2

A. Statutory and regulatory background ............................ 2

B. The present controversy................................................... 7

Summary of argument ............................................................... 10

Argument:

Under the TCPA, a device is an “automatic

telephone dialing system” only if it has the capacity

to use a random or sequential number generator to

store or produce telephone numbers ........................... 14

A. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as

limited to devices that have the capacity to use a

random or sequential number generator...................... 15

B. The differences between the TCPA’s prohibitions

and the predecessor state laws on which the TCPA

was based support petitioner’s reading of Section

227(a)(1)(A) ...................................................................... 25

C. The TCPA’s regulatory history provides no sound

reason for the Court to reject the most natural

reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A) ...................................... 29

D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject

the most natural interpretation of Section

227(a)(1)(A) ...................................................................... 32

Conclusion ................................................................................... 35

Appendix — Statutory provision ............................................ 1a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir.

2018) ................................................................6, 31, 32, 33, 34

(III)

Cases—Continued:

Page

Allan v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance

Agency, 968 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2020) .............. 18, 20, 21, 34

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335

(2020) .................................................................................... 21

Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants,

Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020) ......................................... 4, 9, 22

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) .......... 4

Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc., 955 F.3d 279

(2d Cir. 2020) ..................................................... 22, 29, 30, 34

Fort Stewart Sch. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.,

495 U.S. 641 (1990).............................................................. 21

Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624 (2012) ...... 21

Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458

(7th Cir. 2020), pending for cert. pending,

No. 20-209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ................................... 17, 19

Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co.,

948 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2020) ....................... 17, 19, 20, 32

Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,

543 U.S. 335 (2005).............................................................. 15

Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) ................................ 31

Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041

(9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 1289

(2019) ........................................................................... passim

Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368

(2012) ............................................................................ 4, 5, 25

Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.,

139 S. Ct. 873 (2019) ........................................................... 21

Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., LP,

140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020) ......................................................... 28

United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) ................... 15, 16

Constitution and statutes:

Page

U.S. Const. Amend. I ...................................................... 7, 8, 9

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74,

Tit. III, § 301, 129 Stat. 588 ......................................... 22, 31

Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064

(47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.):

47 U.S.C. 154(i) .................................................................. 5

Tit. II, 47 U.S.C. 201 et seq. .............................................. 3

47 U.S.C. 201(b) ................................................................. 5

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,

Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394:

§ 2(1), 105 Stat. 2394 ......................................................... 2

§ 2(1)-(4), 105 Stat. 2394.................................................... 2

§ 2(3), 105 Stat. 2394 ......................................................... 2

§ 2(7), 105 Stat. 2394 ....................................................... 25

§ 2(10), 105 Stat. 2394 ....................................................... 3

§ 3(a), 105 Stat. 2395 ......................................................... 3

§ 3(a), 105 Stat. 2395-2396 ................................................ 4

§ 3(a), 105 Stat. 2396 ......................................................... 4

47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1)............................ 2, 4, 14, 15, 24, 34, 1a

47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1)(A) ............................................ passim

47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1)(B) ......................................... 33, 34, 1a

47 U.S.C. 227(a)(4)..................................................... 24, 2a

47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A) ............................................ passim

47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) .............................. 14, 24, 3a

47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) ............................... 8, 22, 32, 3a

47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(B) ................................... 28, 31, 34, 3a

47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(D) ................................................. 4, 5a

47 U.S.C. 227(b)(2) ...................................................... 5, 5a

47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B) ............................................. 23, 10a

47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(A)-(B) ........................................ 4, 10a

47 U.S.C. 227(c)(3) ............................................. 11, 24, 14a

Statutes—Continued:

Page

47 U.S.C. 227(f )(1) ................................................... 29, 27a

47 U.S.C. 227(g)(1) .................................................... 4, 28a

47 U.S.C. 227(g)(3) .................................................... 5, 29a

28 U.S.C. 2403(a) ..................................................................... 7

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2919.A (1986) ............................. 26

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-63-204(a)(1) (1981) ............................... 26

Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2871 (West 1980)........................ 26, 27

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-311(1) (West 1988) ................. 26

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570c(a) (West 1990) .......................... 26

D.C. Code § 34-1701(a)(1) (1991) .......................................... 26

Fla. Stat. § 501.059(7)(a) (1991) ............................................ 26

Ga. Code Ann. § 46-5-23(a)(1) (1990) ................................... 26

815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 305/5(a) (1991) ...................................... 26

Ind. Code § 24-5-14-1 (1988) ................................................ 26

Iowa Code § 476.57.1 (1991).................................................. 26

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-670(a)(5) (1991) ............................. 26, 27

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:810.B(1) (1991) ............................. 26

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1498.1.A (Supp. 1990) .................... 26

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159, § 19B (1986) ................................ 26

Minn. Stat. § 325E.26.2 (Supp. 1987) ................................... 26

Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-451 (1989) ................................. 26, 27

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 597.814 (1989) ........................................... 26

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-E:1.I (1989) .............................. 26

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 75-30(c) (West 1979) ....................... 26

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-p (McKinney 1988) ............. 26, 27

Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 752.10 (1991) ................................... 26, 27

Or. Rev. Stat. § 759.290(3)(a) (1989) .................................... 26

52 Pa. Code § 63.1 (1988) ...................................................... 26

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-35-26(b) (1987)..................................... 26

VII

Statutes—Continued:

Page

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-446(A) (1991) .................................. 26

S.D. Codified Laws § 37-30-23 (1991) .................................. 26

Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-1501(b)(1) (1990) ......................... 26

16 Tex. Admin. Code § 23.32(a) (1986) ................................ 26

Utah Code Ann. § 13-25-1(1) (West 1990) ........................... 26

Wash. Rev. Code § 80.36.400(1)(a) (1987) ........................... 26

Miscellaneous:

William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Law:

A Primer on How to Read Statutes and the

Constitution (2016) ............................................................. 16

Federal Communications Commission:

Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone

Consumer Protection Act of 1991, In re:

7 FCC Rcd 8752 (1992) ............................................... 5, 30

10 FCC Rcd 12,391 (1995) .......................................... 5, 30

18 FCC Rcd 14,014 (2003) .................................. 4, 5, 6, 30

23 FCC Rcd 559 (2008) ............................................... 6, 30

27 FCC Rcd 15,391 (2012) .......................................... 6, 30

30 FCC Rcd 7961 (2015) ................................. 6, 30, 31, 32

Noble Systems Corp., Comments on FCC’s

Request for Comments on the Interpretation

of the TCPA (Oct. 16, 2018) FCC DA 18-493 .... 19, 20

Public Notice: Consumer and Governmental

Affairs Bureau Seeks Comment on Interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection

Act in Light of the D.C. Circuit’s ACA International Decision, 33 FCC Rcd 4864 (2018) ............. 6

VIII

Miscellaneous—Continued:

Page

Public Notice: Consumer and Governmental

Affairs Bureau Seeks Further Comment on

Interpretation of the Telephone Consumer

Protection Act in Light of the Ninth Circuit’s

Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC Decision,

33 FCC Rcd 9429 (2018).............................................. 7

H.R. Rep. No. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)....... 2, 3, 25

S. Rep. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) ........... 2, 3, 25

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) ............. 15, 16, 21

2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland

Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th ed. 2014) ...... 16

Telemarketing/Privacy Issues: Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of

the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,

102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) ................................................. 3

The Chicago Manual of Style (17th ed. 2017) .................. 16

U.S. Patent:

No. 3,860,765 (issued Jan. 14, 1975)............................... 20

No. 3,943,289 (issued Mar. 9, 1976) ............................... 19

No. 4,160,125 (issued July 3, 1979) ................................ 20

No. 4,188,510 (issued Feb. 12, 1980) .............................. 19

No. 4,741,028 (issued Apr. 26, 1988) ........................ 19, 20

No. 4,922,520 (issued May 1, 1990) ................................ 19

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 19-511

FACEBOOK, INC., PETITIONER

NOAH DUGUID, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS RESPONDENT

SUPPORTING PETITIONER

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-20)

is reported at 926 F.3d 1146. The orders of the district

court (Pet. App. 23-38, 39-52) are not published in the

Federal Supplement but are available at 2016 WL

1169365 and 2017 WL 635117.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

June 13, 2019. A petition for rehearing was denied on

August 22, 2019 (Pet. App. 21-22). The petition for a

writ of certiorari was filed on October 17, 2019, and was

granted limited to the second question presented on

July 9, 2020. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28

U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 227(a)(1) of Title 47 of the United States

Code provides:

The term “automatic telephone dialing system” means

equipment which has the capacity—

(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to

be called, using a random or sequential number

generator; and

(B) to dial such numbers.

47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1).

Other pertinent statutory provisions are reproduced

in an appendix to this brief. App., infra, 1a-34a.

STATEMENT

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

1. By the 1990s, “use of the telephone to market

goods and services” had become “pervasive,” Telephone

Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), Pub. L. No.

102-243, § 2(1), 105 Stat. 2394. “More than 300,000 solicitors [were] call[ing] more than 18,000,000 Americans

every day.” § 2(3), 105 Stat. 2394. In making those calls,

a growing number of telemarketers were using equipment that could “automatically dial a telephone number

and deliver to the called party an artificial or prerecorded voice message.” S. Rep. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st

Sess. 2 (1991) (Senate Report); see H.R. Rep. No. 317,

102d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1991) (House Report) (describing the use of “automatic dialing systems”).

Telemarketing offered businesses a cost-effective

way to “broaden their markets.” House Report 6; see

TCPA § 2(1)-(4), 105 Stat. 2394 (describing “the increased use of cost-effective telemarketing techniques”

in generating $435 billion in sales in 1990, “a more than

four-fold increase since 1984”). But many who received

such calls found them “to be a nuisance and an invasion

of privacy,” “regardless of the content or the initiator of

the message.” TCPA § 2(10), 105 Stat. 2394. And the

use of automated systems to dial randomly or sequentially generated telephone numbers could tie up the

phone lines of emergency and other public-service organizations, raising serious public-safety issues, as well

as impose unwanted and unintended costs on paging

and cellular telephone services. See Senate Report 2;

House Report 10; Telemarketing/Privacy Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and

Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 112-114 (1991) (statement

of Michael J. Frawley, President, Gold Coast Paging).

To address those concerns, Congress enacted the TCPA

as a new section of Title II of the Communications Act of

1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1070 (47 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).

Among other measures, the TCPA imposes various

“restrictions on the use of automated telephone equipment.” § 3(a), 105 Stat. 2395 (capitalization omitted). One

of those restrictions prohibits “any person within the

United States” from “mak[ing] any call (other than a call

made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded

voice” (i) “to any emergency telephone line”; (ii) “to the

telephone line of any guest room or patient room” of a

healthcare facility; or (iii) “to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or * * * any service for

which the called party is charged for the call, unless such

call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed

by the United States.” 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A); see TCPA

§ 3(a), 105 Stat. 2395-2396. That prohibition is referred to

here as the “automated-call restriction.” 1

For purposes of the TCPA, the term “automatic telephone dialing system” is defined as “equipment which

has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number

generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C.

227(a)(1). The Federal Communications Commission

(FCC or Commission) has construed the term “call” in

the automated-call restriction to encompass both voice

calls and text messages. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd 14,014, 14,115 (2003) (2003

TCPA Order); see also Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2344 n.1 (2020)

(plurality opinion) (recognizing that construction);

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 667 (2016)

(“A text message to a cellular telephone, it is undisputed, qualifies as a ‘call’ within the compass of [the

automated-call restriction].”) (citation omitted).

The TCPA authorizes private plaintiffs to sue to enjoin violations of the automated-call restriction and to

recover the plaintiffs’ “actual monetary loss” or $500 for

each violation, “whichever is greater.” 47 U.S.C.

227(b)(3)(A)-(B). The TCPA also “authorizes States to

bring civil actions to enjoin prohibited practices and to

recover damages on their residents’ behalf.” Mims v.

Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 371 (2012); see 47

U.S.C. 227(g)(1). The FCC “must be notified of such

A neighboring provision bans the use of “an automatic telephone

dialing system in such a way that two or more telephone lines of a

multi-line business are engaged simultaneously.” 47 U.S.C.

227(b)(1)(D); see TCPA § 3(a), 105 Stat. 2396.

suits and may intervene in them.” Mims, 565 U.S. at

371; see 47 U.S.C. 227(g)(3).

2. The FCC is charged with administering the

TCPA. See 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 201(b); 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(2).

Since the TCPA’s enactment, the agency has interpreted the statute’s definition of an “automatic telephone dialing system”—sometimes referred to as an

autodialer—on several occasions.

Throughout the 1990s, the FCC took the view that a

device is an autodialer under the TCPA only if it randomly or sequentially generates telephone numbers to

be called. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,

7 FCC Rcd 8752, 8773, 8776 (1992) (1992 TCPA Order);

In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 10 FCC Rcd

12,391, 12,400-12,401 (1995) (1995 TCPA Order). The

FCC determined, for example, that functions like

“speed dialing” and “call forwarding” were not regulated by the automated-call restriction “because the

numbers called are not generated in a random or sequential fashion.” 1992 TCPA Order 8776.

By 2003, however, “the telemarketing industry

ha[d] undergone significant changes in the technologies

and methods used to contact consumers.” 2003 TCPA

Order 14,017. Among other developments, the growing

prevalence of “predictive dialers” presented new regulatory challenges. Id. at 14,090. Those devices generally

“store[d] pre-programmed numbers or receive[d] numbers from a computer database and then dial[ed] those

numbers in a manner that maximize[d] efficiencies for

call centers.” Ibid. “[I]n most cases, telemarketers program[med] the numbers to be called into the equipment,

and the dialer call[ed] them at a rate to ensure that

when a consumer answer[ed] the phone, a sales person

[wa]s available to take the call.” Id. at 14,091.

The Commission concluded that predictive dialers

qualified as autodialers under the TCPA, regardless

whether they had the capacity to randomly or sequentially generate telephone numbers. It reasoned that a

contrary determination would undermine Congress’s

purpose of addressing the “increasing number of automated and prerecorded calls to certain categories of

numbers.” 2003 TCPA Order 14,092; see id. at 14,093.

The Commission reaffirmed that conclusion in 2008,

2012, and 2015. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of

1991, 23 FCC Rcd 559, 566-567 (2008) (2008 TCPA Order); In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 27 FCC

Rcd 15,391, 15,392 n.5 (2012) (2012 TCPA Order); In re

Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone

Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd 7961,

7971-7973 (2015) (2015 TCPA Order).

In 2018, the D.C. Circuit set aside the FCC’s 2015

TCPA Order in relevant part. See ACA Int’l v. FCC,

885 F.3d 687, 701-703. Finding the order to be internally inconsistent in some respects, the court held that

the Commission had failed to provide “ ‘meaningful

guidance’ to affected parties * * * on whether their

equipment is subject to the statute’s autodialer restrictions.” Id. at 701 (citation omitted). Since then, the

FCC has twice sought comment on the question presented here. See Public Notice: Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau Seeks Comment on Interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in

Light of the D.C. Circuit’s ACA International Decision,

33 FCC Rcd 4864, 4865-4866 (2018); Public Notice: Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau Seeks Further Comment on Interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in Light of the Ninth Circuit’s

Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC Decision, 33 FCC

Rcd 9429, 9429 (2018). But the Commission has not yet

issued an order resolving the question.

B. The Present Controversy

1. Respondent Noah Duguid brought this putative

class action against petitioner, the operator of a popular

social-media service, alleging violations of the TCPA’s

automated-call restriction. J.A. 30-50. Duguid asserts

that, although he has never created an account with petitioner, petitioner sent him multiple text messages

stating that his account had been accessed by an unrecognized device or web browser. J.A. 33-40. Duguid alleges that petitioner used an automatic telephone dialing system to send those text messages, in violation of

the TCPA’s restriction on making automated calls to

cell phones. J.A. 40-43, 48-49. He seeks statutory damages and injunctive relief. J.A. 50.

Petitioner moved to dismiss Duguid’s initial complaint. Petitioner argued that Duguid had not plausibly

alleged that petitioner had used an automatic telephone

dialing system to send the text messages, D. Ct. Doc.

24, at 7-12 (May 18, 2015), and that the messages fell

within the exception for calls made for emergency purposes, id. at 12-15. Petitioner further contended that

subjecting it to liability for the messages would violate

the First Amendment. Id. at 15-18. The United States

intervened to defend the constitutionality of the TCPA.

D. Ct. Doc. 43, at 1 (Dec. 11, 2015); see 28 U.S.C. 2403(a).

The district court granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss, holding that Duguid had not adequately alleged

that petitioner had used an automatic telephone dialing

system to send the text messages. Pet. App. 23-38.

Duguid filed an amended complaint, J.A. 30-50, and petitioner again moved to dismiss, arguing that Duguid

still had not adequately alleged that petitioner had used

an automatic telephone dialing system, D. Ct. Doc. 65,

at 9-18 (May 26, 2016). Petitioner also argued that the

exception for calls “made solely to collect a debt owed

to or guaranteed by the United States,” 47 U.S.C.

227(b)(1)(A)(iii), rendered the restriction impermissibly

content-based, in violation of the First Amendment.

D. Ct. Doc. 65, at 20-24.

The district court dismissed the amended complaint

with prejudice. Pet. App. 39-52. The court agreed with

petitioner that Duguid had still “failed to plausibly allege the use of an [automatic telephone dialing system].” Id. at 46. The court held that Duguid’s allegations suggested a “direct targeting” of his cell-phone

number that would be “inconsistent with the sort of random or sequential number generation required for an

[automatic telephone dialing system].” Id. at 47 (citation omitted). Having found the amended complaint deficient on statutory grounds, the court did not address

petitioner’s First Amendment challenge. Id. at 51.

2. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for

further proceedings. Pet. App. 1-20.

The court of appeals concluded that Duguid’s allegations plausibly suggested that petitioner had sent him

text messages using an automatic telephone dialing

system. Pet. App. 6-9. Relying on its prior decision in

Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041 (9th

Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 1289 (2019), the

court held that “the adverbial phrase ‘using a random

or sequential number generator’ ” in the TCPA’s definition of “automatic telephone dialing system” “modifies

only the verb ‘to produce,’ and not the preceding verb,

‘to store.’ ” Pet. App. 6 (quoting Marks, 904 F.3d at

1052). The court thus took the view that a device can

qualify as an automatic telephone dialing system as long

as it has “the capacity to ‘store numbers to be called’

and ‘to dial such numbers automatically.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Marks, 904 F.3d at 1053). The court found that

Duguid’s “nonconclusory allegations plausibly suggest

that [petitioner’s] equipment falls within th[at] definition.” Id. at 7. And the court declined to adopt petitioner’s suggestion that, in order to avoid covering

“ubiquitous devices” like consumer smartphones that

can also “store numbers and * * * dial those numbers

automatically,” the court should narrow the definition

of “automatic telephone dialing system” that it had previously adopted in Marks. Ibid.; see id. at 7-9.

The court of appeals rejected petitioner’s contention

that the text messages at issue fell within the TCPA’s

exception for calls made for emergency purposes. Pet.

App. 9-10. The court also held that petitioner’s First

Amendment challenge did not provide a basis for dismissing Duguid’s complaint. Id. at 10-18. The court

concluded that the government-debt exception to the

automated-call restriction violated the First Amendment, but that the exception should be severed from the

rest of the TCPA, leaving the automated-call restriction

in place. Id. at 19. 2

3. The court of appeals denied rehearing en banc

without noted dissent. Pet. App. 21-22.

This Court’s subsequent decision in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., supra, adopted the same resolution of both the First Amendment and severability questions.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. Under the TCPA, an “automatic telephone dialing

system” must, inter alia, have the capacity “to store or

produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” 47 U.S.C.

227(a)(1)(A). Various features of that language indicate

that the participial phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies both of the verbs

“store” and “produce.” When a modifying phrase appears at the end of a list, the phrase typically modifies

each item within the list rather than only the last item.

The fact that the phrase “using a random or sequential

number generator” is set off by a comma reinforces that

inference. And the interposition of the phrase “telephone numbers to be called” between the verbs and the

modifying phrase confirms that reading, since that

phrase is the direct object of both “store” and “produce,” and it would be odd to construe the modifying

phrase to reach back over that shared object to modify

only one of the two verbs that shares it.

The court below relied on its prior holding in Marks

v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.

2018), cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 1289 (2019), that the

phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” in Section 227(a)(1)(A) modifies only the verb “produce.” The Marks court viewed it as anomalous to describe a number generator as “stor[ing]” numbers. But

at the time Congress enacted the TCPA, some automated

dialing devices used a random or sequential number

generator to identify numbers for contemporaneous dialing, while other devices used such a generator to compile a list of numbers that could be dialed at a later time.

To eliminate any doubt that both sorts of devices were

covered, the Congress that drafted Section 227(a)(1)(A)

may well have used the term “produce” to describe the

first type and “store” to describe the second.

The Marks court also relied in part on a structural inference that it drew from the consent and governmentdebt exceptions to the automated-call restriction. The

court believed that a device incorporating a random

or sequential number generator could not feasibly be

used to make calls falling within those exceptions. The

court concluded that Congress would not have enacted

the exceptions unless it intended the definition of

“automatic telephone dialing system” to sweep more

broadly. That reasoning is unsound. The automatedcall restriction applies not only to calls for which an

“automatic telephone dialing system” is used, but also

to calls using an “artificial or prerecorded voice.” Because calls to deliver prerecorded-voice messages unquestionably can fall within the consent and government-debt exceptions, adopting the most natural construction of Section 227(b)(1)(A) would not render those

exceptions superfluous.

The Marks court’s reliance on 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)

and 227(c)(3) was similarly misplaced. Construing Section 227(a)(1)(A) to require the use of a random or sequential number would not render any language within

those two provisions superfluous or unworkable.

B. When Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991, it did

not write on a blank slate, but legislated against the

backdrop of numerous state laws that already regulated

the use of automated devices for telemarketing. Of the

state laws in effect at that time, at least 25 encompassed

automated equipment that did not utilize a random or

sequential number generator. Congress departed from

those state-law models, however, in its definition of “au-

tomatic telephone dialing system.” Congress’s rejection of available state-law language that would have

unambiguously achieved the result that Duguid advocates reinforces the most natural reading of Section

227(a)(1)(A)’s text.

The TCPA’s automated-call restriction differs from

its state-law predecessors in another respect as well.

Most of the prior state laws applied only if a specified

type of dialing technology was used and the system

could deliver a message using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The TCPA’s automated-call restriction,

by contrast, applies to calls made using either an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. Because the TCPA restricts prerecordedvoice calls to cell phones regardless of the dialing technology used, Congress could adopt a comparatively narrow definition of “automatic telephone dialing system,”

while still covering a broader range of calls than most

of the antecedent state laws had covered.

C. The FCC’s prior interpretations of Section

227(a)(1)(A) provide no sound reason for rejecting the

most natural reading of the statutory text. The Second

Circuit has suggested that the FCC has consistently

adopted the interpretation that Duguid now advocates.

But in the early years of the TCPA, the Commission

construed Section 227(a)(1)(A) to require the use of a

random or sequential number generator. And while the

agency adopted a broader interpretation of that provision beginning in 2003, the FCC’s most recent iteration

of that view (in an order issued in 2015) was vacated by

the D.C. Circuit, and the Commission has not yet completed its reconsideration of the question presented

here. There is consequently no current FCC interpretation to which a court could potentially defer.

The Ninth Circuit in Marks suggested that, by adding the government-debt exception in 2015 without disapproving the FCC’s then-extant interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A), Congress conveyed its “tacit approval” of that interpretation. 904 F.3d at 1052. But

the 2015 law that added the government-debt exception

neither amended nor reenacted Section 227(a)(1)(A)

itself; the legislative history of that amendment did not

discuss the autodialer definition; and the relevant FCC

interpretation was then under review (and ultimately

was vacated) by the D.C. Circuit. There is consequently

no sound reason to infer congressional approval of that

interpretation.

D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject

the most natural reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)’s text.

Particularly because the automated-call restriction was

intended to discourage the use of random or sequential

number generators, the present near-obsolescence of

those devices is better viewed as evidence of the TCPA’s

success than of its failure. If those number generators

have been replaced with devices that fall outside the

TCPA’s definition of “automatic telephone dialing system,” but that cause equivalent aggravation to consumers, Congress is the appropriate body to address that

problem.

Adopting Duguid’s expansive view of Section

227(a)(1)(A), moreover, would give rise to a potential argument that an ordinary smartphone is an “automatic

telephone dialing system.” To be sure, the practical effect of a ruling for Duguid could be ameliorated by giving other TCPA provisions a narrow construction. But

the most natural reading of Section 227(b)(1)(A) already

accomplishes that result.

ARGUMENT

UNDER THE TCPA, A DEVICE IS AN “AUTOMATIC

TELEPHONE DIALING SYSTEM” ONLY IF IT HAS

THE CAPACITY TO USE A RANDOM OR SEQUENTIAL

NUMBER GENERATOR TO STORE OR PRODUCE

TELEPHONE NUMBERS

The TCPA generally prohibits the use of any “automatic telephone dialing system” to make calls to emergency telephone lines, to guest and patient rooms at

healthcare facilities, and to paging or cellular telephone

services. 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). An “automatic

telephone dialing system” is “equipment which has the

capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to

be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1).

The question presented here is whether that definition

encompasses any equipment that has the capacity to

store telephone numbers and automatically dial them

(even if a “random or sequential number generator” is

not used to store the numbers), or whether the capacity

to use a number generator is a required feature of all

automatic telephone dialing systems.

In answering that question, the Court can begin and

end with the statutory text. As a matter of basic grammar, the phrase “using a random or sequential number

generator” in Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read to modify

both “store” and “produce.” No countervailing textual

indicator provides a sound reason to depart from that

reading. And no other indicia of statutory meaning suggest that the Court should adopt anything other than

the most natural reading of the definition contained in

Section 227(a)(1)(A). The TCPA’s autodialer definition

is thus best understood to encompass only those devices

that have the capacity to use a random or sequential

number generator.

should be reversed.

The court of appeals’ judgment

A. The Text Of Section 227(a)(1)(A) Is Best Read As

Limited To Devices That Have The Capacity To Use A

Random Or Sequential Number Generator

1. Basic rules of grammar indicate that the capacity

to use a random or sequential number generator is a required feature of all “automatic telephone dialing system[s],” 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1), within the meaning of the

TCPA. When a modifying phrase appears “at the end

of a single, integrated list,” it is most naturally read to

modify each antecedent. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 344 n.4 (2005); see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 147 (2012) (“When there is

a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all

nouns or verbs in a series, a * * * postpositive modifier

normally applies to the entire series.”). So, for example,

“the natural construction” of a statutory provision establishing a punishment for a felon “who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce” is that the phrase “in commerce or affecting

commerce” modifies not just “transport,” but also “receives” and “possesses.” United States v. Bass, 404

U.S. 336, 337, 339 (1971) (citations omitted); see id. at

337-340. And in a statement about “[i]nstitutions or societies that are charitable in nature,” “the institutions

as well as the societies must be charitable.” Scalia &

Garner 148 (emphasis omitted). In the same way, the

phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” in the clause “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number

generator,” 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1)(A), is best read to modify

both “produce” and “store.”

Congress’s use of a comma to offset the modifying

participial phrase in Section 227(a)(1)(A) reinforces that

conclusion. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 340 n.6 (noting that

“commas at the end of series can avoid ambiguity” as to

whether a postpositive modifier applies to all antecedents). As leading treatises on statutory construction

agree, a drafter’s use of a comma to set off a postpositive modifying phrase indicates an intent for that

phrase to apply equally to all preceding elements. See

William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Law: A Primer

on How to Read Statutes and the Constitution 67-68

(2016) (“A qualifying phrase separated from antecedents by a comma is evidence that the qualifier is supposed to apply to all the antecedents instead of only to

the immediately preceding one.”) (citation omitted); 2A

Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:33, at 499-500 (7th

ed. 2014) (“A qualifying phrase separated from antecedents by a comma is evidence that the qualifier is supposed to apply to all the antecedents instead of only to

the immediately preceding one.”); Scalia & Garner 161

(“Punctuation in a legal text * * * will often determine

whether a modifying phrase or clause applies to all that

preceded it or only to a part.”).

Finally, the interposition of the phrase “telephone

numbers to be called” between the verbs and the modifying phrase further confirms this reading. See 47

U.S.C. 227(a)(1)(A) (“to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number

generator”) (emphasis added). As transitive verbs,

“store” and “produce” each require an object to express

a complete thought. See The Chicago Manual of Style

¶ 5.96 (17th ed. 2017). It is undisputed in this case that

both verbs accept the direct object “telephone numbers

to be called.” See Duguid Br. in Opp. 28. “When two

conjoined verbs (‘to store or produce’) share a direct object (‘telephone numbers to be called’), a modifier following that object (‘using a random or sequential number

generator’) customarily modifies both verbs.” Glasser v.

Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 948 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th

Cir. 2020). Neither the court of appeals nor Duguid has

identified any rule of grammar suggesting, or any other

sound reason to conclude, that “using a random or sequential number generator” should be read to reach back

over that shared direct object to modify only one of the

two verbs that shares it. See Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs.,

Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 2020) (describing such

“splic[ing]” and “reorder[ing]” as “a significant judicial

rewrite”), petition for cert. pending, No. 20-209 (filed

Aug. 17, 2020).

In the absence of a comma, the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” might be understood to modify “to be called,” rather than “store or produce.” See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 467-468 (considering

and rejecting this interpretation). On that reading, the

phrase would describe a means of calling, rather than a

means of storing or producing—i.e., an autodialer

would be a device with the capacity to store or produce

numbers that would later be called “using a random or

sequential number generator.” See id. at 467. But the

comma between “called” and the modifying phrase precludes that reading. See p. 16, supra. No court of appeals has adopted that interpretation; Duguid has not

endorsed it; and nothing in the record below suggests

that the device petitioner used to send the offending

texts had the capacity to use a random or sequential

generator to make the calls at issue here.

2. In Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d

1041 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 1289

(2019), the court of appeals concluded that the phrase

“using a random or sequential number generator” modifies only “produce,” and not “store.” Id. at 1052. Finding the text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) ambiguous, the court

concluded that the “structure and context of the TCPA”

indicate that Congress intended to regulate “equipment

that made automatic calls from lists of recipients,”

in addition to those devices that dialed blocks of sequential or randomly generated numbers. Id. at 1051. The

Marks court thus “read § 227(a)(1) to provide that

the term automatic telephone dialing system means

equipment which has the capacity—(1) to store numbers to be called or (2) to produce numbers to be called,

using a random or sequential number generator.” Id.

at 1052. The court below treated that holding as dispositive. See Pet. App. 6. The Marks court’s reasoning is

unpersuasive.

a. As to the text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) itself, the

court of appeals focused on the purported oddity of

“stor[ing]” telephone numbers “using a random or sequential number generator.” As the court put it, “a

number generator is not a storage device.” Marks, 904

F.3d at 1050; see Allan v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ.

Assistance Agency, 968 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 2020)

(“[I]t is hard to see how a number generator could be

used to ‘store’ telephone numbers.”) (citation omitted;

brackets in original). Because the primary function of

a number generator is to produce numbers, the court of

appeals concluded that Section 227(a)(1)(A) “is not susceptible to a straightforward interpretation based on

the plain language alone.” Marks, 904 F.3d at 1051.

Even courts that have adopted petitioner’s reading

of Section 227(a)(1)(A) have viewed this observation as

having some force. See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 464;

Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1307. There is no grave anomaly,

however, in the idea that a random or sequential number generator could be used either to “store * * * telephone numbers to be called” or to “produce” such numbers. Congress may well have had in mind two slightly

different types of automated dialing technology. One

would use a random or sequential number generator to

identify numbers for contemporaneous dialing. The

other would use a random or sequential number generator to compile a list of numbers that could be dialed at

a later time. The word “produce” could naturally be

used to describe the first scenario, and the word “store”

to describe the second.

Indeed, at the time the TCPA was passed, available

autodialing devices operated in each of those ways. See

Noble Systems Corp., Comments on FCC’s Request for

Comments on the Interpretation of the TCPA, 14–15

(Oct. 16, 2018) FCC DA 18-493 (Noble Systems Comments) (discussing U.S. Patent No. 4,741,028 (issued

Apr. 26, 1988)). Some patents issued before the TCPA’s

enactment describe devices that had the capacity to

generate numbers randomly or sequentially for immediate dialing. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,922,520 (issued May 1, 1990); U.S. Patent No. 4,188,510 (issued

Feb. 12, 1980); U.S. Patent No. 3,943,289 (issued Mar.

9, 1976). Others describe devices that had the capacity

to generate numbers randomly or sequentially and

store them for dialing at a later time. See, e.g., Patent

No. 4,741,028; U.S. Patent No. 4,160,125 (issued July 3,

1979); U.S. Patent No. 3,860,765 (issued Jan. 14, 1975). 3

Section 227(a)(1)(A) can therefore reasonably be understood as “occup[ying] the waterfront, covering devices that randomly or sequentially generated telephone

numbers and dialed those numbers, or stored them for

later dialing.” Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1307. To be sure,

even in the second scenario, a plaintiff could plausibly

argue that the number generator had been used to “produce” the numbers to be called, in the sense that use of

the generator to produce the numbers was a necessary

step along the way to ultimately dialing them. See Allan, 968 F.3d at 573 (“Common sense suggests that any

number that is stored using a number-generator is also

produced by the same number-generator.”) (citation

omitted). On that view, the express statutory reference

to “stor[ing]” numbers would be superfluous. See ibid.

But the defendant might counter that a device “produce[s] telephone numbers to be called” only if the

production occurs at the time of calling, and that the

intervening storage step had broken the causal chain.

Eliminating that potential ambiguity would be a sufficient reason to include the word “store” in Section

227(a)(1)(A).

Even if “store” and “produce” in this context do little

independent work, construing Section 227(a)(1)(A) to

contain that minimal surplusage is more natural than

In addition, some automated dialing systems stored randomly or

sequentially generated numbers that had already been dialed in order to avoid repeat calls to those numbers. See Noble Systems

Comments 13 (discussing Patent No. 4,741,028). Upon randomly

generating new numbers, the device would check the new numbers

against previously dialed numbers, so that only numbers that had

not been called previously would be called. Ibid.

the alternative interpretation. “Sometimes the better

overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.” Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct.

873, 881 (2019). This Court has previously recognized

that Congress sometimes uses redundant language in

an effort to comprehensively regulate a technical field.

See, e.g., Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624,

635 (2012) (recognizing that certain statutory terms “all

mean the same thing”). Such “a belt and suspenders

approach” is compatible with the scheme here. Atlantic

Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335, 1350 n.5

(2020); see Fort Stewart Sch. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 646 (1990) (recognizing that

Congress might employ “technically unnecessary” language “out of an abundance of caution”); Scalia & Garner 176-177 (“Sometimes drafters do repeat themselves

and do include words that add nothing of substance.”).

b. As to the structure of the TCPA, the court of appeals placed significant weight on the exceptions to the

automated-call restriction. See Marks, 904 F.3d at

1051. Section 227(b)(1)(A), for example, excludes from

the automated-call restriction calls “made with the

prior express consent of the called party.” 47 U.S.C.

227(b)(1)(A). The Marks court inferred from that exception that Congress must have contemplated that an

autodialer could be configured “to call selected numbers.” 904 F.3d at 1051; see Allan, 968 F.3d at 574-575.

The court observed that, “[t]o take advantage of this

permitted use, an autodialer would have to dial from a

list of phone numbers of persons who had consented to

such calls, rather than merely dialing a block of random

or sequential numbers.” Marks, 904 F.3d at 1051.

The Marks court drew a similar inference from the

ill-fated government-debt exception. That provision,

enacted in 2015, created an exception for automated

calls to cell phones “made solely to collect a debt owed

to or guaranteed by the United States.” 47 U.S.C.

227(b)(1)(A)(iii); see Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (Bipartisan Budget Act), Pub. L. No. 114-74, Tit. III § 301,

129 Stat. 588. Last Term, the Court in Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335

(2020), declared that provision unconstitutional. See

p. 9 n. 2, supra. In the court of appeals’ view, “this debt

collection exception demonstrates that equipment that

dials from a list of individuals who owe a debt to the

United States is still an [autodialer] but is exempted

from the TCPA’s strictures.” Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052.

The Second Circuit similarly reasoned that “the only

way this exception makes sense is if an [autodialer]

can make calls or texts using a human-generated list

of phone numbers.” Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc.,

955 F.3d 279, 285 (2020). That structural inference is

unsound.

The most fundamental problem with the court of appeals’ reasoning is that the underlying restriction on

calls made to cell phones applies not only to calls made

using an “automatic telephone dialing system,” but also

to calls made using “an artificial or prerecorded voice.”

47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A). An artificial or prerecorded

voice unquestionably can be used to make calls to which

the recipient has consented, or calls made to collect

government-backed debts. Under petitioner’s interpretation of the statute, the consent and government-debt

exceptions therefore would have meaningful work to do,

whether or not those exceptions would ever apply to calls

made using an automatic telephone dialing system. 4

The court of appeals’ partial-superfluity argument

rests on the implicit premise that, if Congress had

intended petitioner’s proposed reading of Section

227(a)(1)(A), and had believed that an “automatic telephone dialing system” so defined would never be used

to make calls falling within the consent and governmentdebt exceptions, it would have made those exceptions

applicable only to the “artificial or prerecorded voice”

prong of the underlying automated-call restriction. But

drafting the statute that way could well have obscured

rather than clarified Congress’s intent. A court construing that hypothetical statute might note Congress’s

careful effort to prohibit autodialed calls even when consented to or made to collect government-backed debts

and conclude that Congress would not have undertaken

that effort unless an autodialer might otherwise actually be used for those purposes. And in an attempt to

make Congress’s choice to prohibit such calls meaning-

The structural inference drawn by the court of appeals is flawed

in other respects as well. Even using a random or sequential number generator, an autodialed call might be placed by happenstance

to an individual who had previously consented to receive calls from

that source. Regardless of the calling party’s intentions, Congress

could reasonably conclude that the called party in that circumstance

should not be entitled to up to $1500 in statutory “damages” for receiving the consented-to call. See 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B) (awarding

“actual monetary loss” or $500, “whichever is greater,” for each violation, which may be trebled for willful or knowing violations). And

because the government-debt exception was not added to the statute until 2015, it sheds no meaningful light on the intent of the Congress that defined the term “automatic telephone dialing system” in

1991.

ful, the court might strain to read the autodialer definition to cover devices with that capability—the opposite

of what the hypothetical Congress intended.

c. The Ninth Circuit has also suggested that two

other TCPA provisions “indicate Congress’s understanding that an [autodialer] was not limited to dialing

wholly random or sequential blocks of numbers, but

could be configured to dial a curated list.” Marks, 904

F.3d at 1051 n.7 (citing 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) and

(c)(3)). Neither provision supports the court’s interpretation of Section 227(a)(1).

Section 227(c)(3) authorizes the FCC to compile a database of residential telephone subscribers “who object

to receiving telephone solicitations,” and to “prohibit

any person from making or transmitting a telephone solicitation” to any number included in that database. 47

U.S.C. 227(c)(3); see 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(4) (defining “telephone solicitation” as “the initiation of a telephone call

or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase

or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services”). The Commission’s authority under that provision is not limited to autodialed calls. And the provision

does not even mention autodialers, much less speak to

whether those devices must have the capacity to use a

random or sequential number generator.

The other provision, Section 227(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), is

the automated-call restriction, which prohibits using an

“automatic telephone dialing system” (or an artificial or

prerecorded voice) to place a call to (i) emergency telephone lines; (ii) guest and patient rooms at healthcare

facilities; or (iii) paging or cellular telephone services.

47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). The court in Marks observed that, “to comply with such restrictions,” a tele-

marketer could in theory configure an “automatic telephone dialing system” (as the court construed the term)

to “dial a list of permitted numbers.” 904 F.3d at 1051

n.7. But the court recognized that a telemarketer using

an autodialer could also comply by “block[ing] prohibited numbers when calling a sequence of random or sequential numbers.” Ibid. The former means of compliance would not use a random or sequential number generator, but the latter would. Congress’s inclusion of

prohibited categories of telephone numbers thus says

nothing about the question presented here.

B. The Differences Between The TCPA’s Prohibitions

And The Predecessor State Laws On Which The TCPA

Was Based Support Petitioner’s Reading Of Section

227(a)(1)(A)

Congress did not write on a blank slate when it enacted the TCPA. Rather, Congress acted against the

backdrop of numerous preexisting state laws that regulated automated telemarketing and the use of autodialers. See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368,

371 (2012). When the TCPA was enacted, Congress

noted that “[o]ver half the States” had already adopted

laws “restricting various uses of the telephone for

marketing.” TCPA § 2(7), 105 Stat. 2394. It expressed

concern that telemarketers could “evade the[se] prohibitions through interstate operations,” which were

considered beyond the States’ power to regulate. Ibid.;

see Mims, 565 U.S. at 372-373. In enacting the TCPA,

Congress sought “to supplement [existing] restrictions

on intrastate calls.” Senate Report 3; see House Report

9-10.

The majority of state-law restrictions on automated

telemarketing in effect at the time applied only if a specified type of automatic dialing technology was used and

the system was capable of delivering a message using

an artificial or prerecorded voice. 5 And of the state laws

in effect at the time, at least 25 covered equipment that

automatically dialed phone numbers, without regard to

whether the numbers called were randomly or sequentially generated or drawn from a preexisting list. 6

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2919.A (1986); Ark. Code Ann.

§ 5-63-204(a)(1) (1981); Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2871 (West 1980);

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-311(1) (West 1988); Conn. Gen. Stat.

§ 52-570c(a) (West 1990); Ga. Code Ann. § 46-5-23(a)(1) (1990);

815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 305/5(a) (1991); Ind. Code § 24-5-14-1 (1988);

Iowa Code § 476.57.1 (1991); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:810.B(1)

(1991); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1498.1.A (Supp. 1990); Mass. Gen.

Laws. ch. 159, § 19B (1986); Minn. Stat. § 325E.26.2 (Supp. 1987);

Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-451 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 597.814 (1989);

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-E:1.I (1989); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law

§ 399-p (McKinney 1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 75-30(c) (West

1979); Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 752.10 (1991); Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 759.290(3)(a) (1989); 52 Pa. Code § 63.1 (1988); R.I. Gen. Laws

§ 11-35-26(b) (1987); S.D. Codified Laws § 37-30-23 (1991); Tenn.

Code Ann. § 47-18-1501(b)(1) (1990); 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 23.32(a)

(1986); Utah Code Ann. § 13-25-1(1) (West 1990); Wash. Rev. Code

§ 80.36.400(1)(a) (1987).

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2919.A (1986); Ark. Code Ann.

§ 5-63-204(a)(1) (1981); Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2871 (West 1980);

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-311(1) (West 1988); Conn. Gen. Stat.

§ 52-570c(a) (West 1990); D.C. Code § 34-1701(a)(1) (1991); Fla. Stat.

§ 501.059(7)(a) (1991); Ga. Code Ann. § 46-5-23(a)(1) (1990); Ind.

Code § 24-5-14-1 (1988); Iowa Code § 476.57.1 (1991); Kan. Stat.

Ann. § 50-670(a)(5) (1991); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:810.B(1) (1991);

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1498.1.A (Supp. 1990); Minn. Stat.

§ 325E.26.2 (Supp. 1987); Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-451 (1989); Nev.

Rev. Stat. § 597.814 (1989); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-p (McKinney

1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 75-30(c) (West 1979); Okla. Stat. tit.

15, § 752.10 (1991); Or. Rev. Stat. § 759.290(3)(a) (1989); 52 Pa. Code

§ 63.1 (1988); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-446(A) (1991); Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 47-18-1501(b)(1) (1990); 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 23.32(a) (1986);

Wash. Rev. Code § 80.36.400(1)(a) (1987).

Laws in California and New York, for example, defined an autodialer as “any automatic equipment” that

(i) “incorporates a storage capacity of telephone numbers to be called or a random or sequential number generator capable of producing numbers to be called” and

(ii) has the capability to “disseminate a prerecorded

message to the telephone number called.” Cal. Pub. Util.

Code § 2871 (West 1980); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-p

(McKinney 1988); see Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-451 (1989)

(using nearly identical phrasing). Kansas law similarly

defined autodialers to include “any user terminal equipment which * * * can dial, with or without manual assistance, telephone numbers which have been stored or

programmed in the device or are produced or selected

by a random or sequential number generator,” and that,

when connected, “disseminate a recorded message.”

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-670(a)(5) (1991). Oklahoma law

regulated any “automatic equipment that: a. stores telephone numbers to be called, or has a random or sequential number generator capable of producing numbers to be called, and b. conveys a prerecorded or synthesized voice message to the number called without the

use of a live operator.” Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 752.10 (1991).

Congress departed from those state-law antecedents

in two significant respects. First, and most directly relevant here, Congress enacted a definition of “automatic

telephone dialing system” that is most naturally read to

encompass only those automated systems that “us[e] a

random or sequential number generator.” 47 U.S.C.

227(a)(1)(A); see pp. 15-18, supra. That language is especially noteworthy because Congress had before it

readily available state-law alternatives (such as the Oklahoma statute quoted in the preceding paragraph)

whose incorporation into the TCPA would have unambiguously adopted the position that Duguid advocates

in this case. “That departure in language suggests a departure in meaning.” Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call

Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367, 1376 (2020).

Second, Section 227(b)(1)(A) prohibits calls that are

placed to certain sensitive categories of telephone numbers (including cell phones) using either an “automatic

telephone dialing system” or an “artificial or prerecorded voice.” 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A). And Section

227(b)(1)(B) prohibits “any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded

voice,” regardless of the technology used to place the

call. 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(B). Most of the TCPA’s statelaw predecessors, by contrast, applied only to calls that

were made using a specified dialing technology and delivered a prerecorded message. Even under petitioner’s reading of the “automatic telephone dialing system” definition, the TCPA as a whole therefore would

restrict a broader set of automated calls to the covered

types of telephone lines than the bulk of the antecedent

state laws, since the TCPA’s substantive restrictions

encompass all calls made using an artificial or prerecorded voice, regardless of the dialing technology used.

Consistent with its intent to supplement existing

state-law measures, Congress thus could adopt an “automatic telephone dialing system” definition that was

narrower than most of its state-law predecessors because that definition served a different purpose under

the TCPA than under most of the state laws. Under the

typical state law, the relevant definition limited the

statute’s coverage by rendering it applicable to some

but not all prerecorded-voice calls. Under the TCPA,

by contrast, the definition expands the statute’s coverage to encompass additional calls that do not use an artificial or prerecorded voice. And to accommodate those

uncommon instances where a predecessor state law

might sweep more broadly than the combined scope of

the federal prohibitions in the TCPA, Congress included a savings clause providing that “nothing in [the

TCPA] * * * shall preempt any State law that imposes

more restrictive intrastate requirements or regulations

on * * * the use of automatic telephone dialing

systems,” “the use of artificial or prerecorded voice

messages,” or “the making of telephone solicitations.”

47 U.S.C. 227(f)(1).

C. The TCPA’s Regulatory History Provides No Sound

Reason For The Court To Reject The Most Natural

Reading Of Section 227(a)(1)(A)

In adopting Duguid’s reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A),

some courts have relied on the FCC’s prior interpretations of the definition. The Second Circuit has concluded that the “aptness of [that court’s] interpretive

approach is * * * confirmed by the FCC’s consistent

interpretation of the TCPA.” Duran, 955 F.3d at 285;

see id. at 285-287. The Ninth Circuit has suggested

that, by failing to “overrule the FCC’s interpretation”

of Section 227(a)(1)(A) when it added the governmentdebt exception in 2015, Congress “gave the [agency’s]

interpretation its tacit approval.” Marks, 904 F.3d at

1052. The regulatory history of the TCPA is more complicated than that analysis acknowledges, and it provides no sound reason to deviate from the most natural

reading of the statutory text.

1. Contrary to the Second Circuit’s statement, the

FCC has not consistently interpreted the TCPA

to apply to “non-random- or non-sequential-number-

generating technology.” Duran, 955 F.3d at 286. Rather, in the immediate wake of the statute’s enactment,

the FCC concluded, as petitioner argues here, that a device is not an “automatic telephone dialing system” unless it uses a random or sequential number generator.

The Commission explained in its first TCPA rulemaking

that certain technologies, such as speed-dialing or callforwarding systems, would not qualify as autodialers

because they call numbers that “are not generated in a

random or sequential fashion.” 1992 TCPA Order 8776;

see id. at 8773. Three years later, the Commission reiterated that view, explaining that the autodialer restrictions in the TCPA cover calls made to “randomly or

sequentially generated telephone numbers,” not those

“directed to * * * specifically programmed contact

numbers.” 1995 TCPA Order 12,400.

The FCC did not construe Section 227(a)(1)(A) to encompass autodialing equipment with the capacity to dial

from a preselected list of numbers until more than a

decade after the TCPA’s enactment. In 2003, in response to the proliferation of so-called predictive dialers, the agency explained that the “evolution of the teleservices industry ha[d] progressed to the point where

using lists of numbers is far more cost effective.” 2003

TCPA Order 14,092. In light of those changing patterns

of use, the agency stated that “to exclude * * * equipment that use[s] predictive dialing software from the

definition of ‘automat[ic] telephone dialing equipment’

simply because it relies on a given set of numbers would

lead to an unintended result.” Ibid. The FCC reiterated that view in subsequent rulings. See 2015 TCPA

Order 7971-7972; 2012 TCPA Order 15,392 n.5; 2008

TCPA Order 559. Regardless of the scope of the FCC’s

authority to adopt these different interpretations of

“automatic telephone dialing system,” the Second Circuit was wrong to find confirmation of its view in any

perceived consistent regulatory interpretation.

In addition, the most recent FCC pronouncement on

the scope of the autodialer definition (the 2015 TCPA

Order) was vacated by the D.C. Circuit. See ACA Int’l

v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 702-703 (2018). And while the

Commission has since solicited comments on the proper

resolution of the question presented here, it has not announced a view on the matter since the D.C. Circuit

ruled. There is consequently no current FCC interpretation of the term “automatic telephone dialing system”

to which a court could potentially defer.

2. The Ninth Circuit also erred in holding that Congress had tacitly ratified the FCC’s more expansive interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A) by amending the

TCPA in 2015 to add the government-debt exception.

See Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052 (citing Lorillard v. Pons,

434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)). As the court of appeals recognized (ibid.), ‘‘Congress is presumed to be aware of

an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute

and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a

statute without change.’’ Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580.

But the 2015 law that added the government-debt exception to the TCPA modified the automated-call restriction, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A), and the prohibition on

calls made to residential telephone lines using an artificial or prerecorded voice, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(B). See

Bipartisan Budget Act § 301, 129 Stat. 588. That law

did not amend or reenact the TCPA’s definition of “automatic telephone dialing system.” The Commission’s

most recent order addressing the autodialer definition

(the 2015 TCPA Order), moreover, was already under

review by the D.C. Circuit when the 2015 amendments

were enacted. And the legislative history of those

amendments does not discuss the autodialer definition

or the Commission’s interpretation of it. There is consequently no reason to suppose that Congress intended

to ratify the view reflected in the 2015 TCPA Order.

D. Policy Concerns Provide No Sound Reason To Reject

The Most Natural Interpretation Of Section 227(a)(1)(A)

1. In 2015, the FCC observed that, unless the autodialer definition is construed broadly, “little or no modern dialing equipment would fit the statutory definition.” 2015 TCPA Order 7976. Duguid views it as a

“telling indication that [petitioner’s] reading is wrong”

that, under petitioner’s view, the TCPA’s autodialer

definition “ ‘refers to a small universe of rapidly obsolescing robocalling machines.’ ” Br. in Opp. 29-30 (quoting Pet. 13-14). That argument is misconceived.

Because it is often difficult to anticipate “how business needs and technology w[ill] evolve,” Glasser, 948

F.3d at 1309, the possibility that technological developments might give a statutory provision diminishing

practical effect provides no basis for adopting anything

other than the best reading of the statutory text. The

TCPA “also generally prohibits nonconsensual calls to

numbers associated with a ‘paging service’ or ‘specialized mobile radio service,’ yet those terms have largely

ceased to have practical significance” as the technologies to which they refer have become obsolete. ACA

Int’l, 885 F.3d at 699 (quoting 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).

The inference that Duguid would draw is particularly

unwarranted because the decreased use of random or

sequential number generators is an effect that the TCPA

was intended to produce. Standing alone, the obsolescence of such devices would more naturally be viewed

as evidence of the TCPA’s success than of its failure.

Technological changes or changes in patterns of use

might result in widespread use of devices that do not

utilize random or sequential number generators (or

transmit messages that use an artificial or prerecorded

voice), but that cause the same annoyance to consumers

as the devices that the TCPA restricts. If Congress

concludes that this has occurred, it can amend the

TCPA to take account of those changes. But even compelling evidence of such developments would provide no

sound reason for the Court to adopt Duguid’s reading

of existing law.

2. To the extent policy concerns inform this Court’s

analysis of the statutory text, legitimate policy concerns

support petitioner’s reading as well. As petitioner explains (and the court of appeals did not deny), under

Duguid’s and the court’s reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A),

the TCPA’s definition of “automatic telephone dialing

system” could potentially sweep in every modern

smartphone. See Pet. 26-27; Pet. App. 7-9; see also ACA

Int’l, 885 F.3d at 702-703. Any ordinary smartphone

can “store * * * telephone numbers to be called,” 47

U.S.C. 227(a)(1)(A), even though it does not use a random or sequential number generator to perform that

function. Under Duguid’s view, that is enough to satisfy

the first of the two prongs of the TCPA’s autodialer definition. And with respect to the second prong, a modern

smartphone certainly has, in the ordinary sense, “the

capacity * * * to dial such [stored] numbers,” 47 U.S.C.

227(a)(1)(B), since smartphones function as telephones

even though they have many other features as well.

To be sure, if the Court adopted Duguid’s interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A), the ultimate practical effect of its decision would depend substantially on the

way in which Section 227(a)(1)(B) and other TCPA provisions are construed. Both in this case and in Marks,

for example, the Ninth Circuit construed Section

227(a)(1)(B) to require that the relevant device be capable of dialing stored numbers “automatically.” Pet.

App. 6 (quoting Marks, 904 F.3d at 1053). But while the

defined term at issue here is “automatic telephone dialing system,” 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1), the word “automatically” does not appear in Section 227(b)(1)(B) itself.

The Marks court’s approach would also mean that various subsidiary issues—for example, the extent to which

prohibited dialing must be accomplished without human

intervention in order to occur “automatically,” see Allan, 968 F.3d at 578; Duran, 955 F.3d at 289 n.39; and

“how much is required to enable” the requisite functions

before a device has that “capacity,” see ACA Int’l, 885

F.3d at 695-696—would be important in determining

the TCPA’s practical effect.

The present uncertainty regarding the proper interpretation of neighboring TCPA provisions makes it difficult to assess with confidence the practical consequences of adopting Duguid’s construction of Section

227(a)(1)(A). But the possibility that Duguid’s interpretation could be adopted without sweeping in ordinary

smartphones provides no affirmative reason to reject

the most natural reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)’s text.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should hold

that Section 227(a)(1)(A) requires the capacity to use a

random or sequential number generator, leaving the political Branches free to amend the statute if they believe

that other policy considerations warrant that step.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

JEFFREY B. WALL

Acting Solicitor General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

SOPAN JOSHI

Senior Counsel to the

Assistant Attorney General

JONATHAN Y. ELLIS

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

MARK B. STERN

MICHAEL S. RAAB

LINDSEY POWELL

CASEN B. ROSS

Attorneys

SEPTEMBER 2020

APPENDIX

47 U.S.C. 227 provides:

Restrictions on use of telephone equipment

(a)

Definitions

As used in this section—

(1) The term “automatic telephone dialing system” means equipment which has the capacity—

(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to

be called, using a random or sequential number

generator; and

(B)

to dial such numbers.

(2) The term “established business relationship”,

for purposes only of subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), shall have

the meaning given the term in section 64.1200 of title

47, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on January 1, 2003, except that—

(A) such term shall include a relationship between a person or entity and a business subscriber

subject to the same terms applicable under such

section to a relationship between a person or entity and a residential subscriber; and

(B) an established business relationship shall

be subject to any time limitation established pursuant to paragraph (2)(G)). 1

So in original.

appear.

Second closing parenthesis probably should not

(1a)

(3) The term “telephone facsimile machine”

means equipment which has the capacity (A) to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an

electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a

regular telephone line, or (B) to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic signal received over

a regular telephone line onto paper.

(4) The term “telephone solicitation” means the

initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is

transmitted to any person, but such term does not include a call or message (A) to any person with that

person’s prior express invitation or permission, (B) to

any person with whom the caller has an established

business relationship, or (C) by a tax exempt nonprofit organization.

(5) The term “unsolicited advertisement” means

any material advertising the commercial availability

or quality of any property, goods, or services which

is transmitted to any person without that person’s

prior express invitation or permission, in writing or

otherwise.

(b)

Restrictions on use of automated telephone equipment

(1) Prohibitions

It shall be unlawful for any person within the

United States, or any person outside the United States

if the recipient is within the United States—

(A) to make any call (other than a call made

for emergency purposes or made with the prior

express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or

prerecorded voice—

(i)

to any emergency telephone line (including any “911” line and any emergency line

of a hospital, medical physician or service office, health care facility, poison control center,

or fire protection or law enforcement agency);

(ii) to the telephone line of any guest room

or patient room of a hospital, health care facility, elderly home, or similar establishment; or

(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a

paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the

called party is charged for the call, unless such

call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or

guaranteed by the United States;

(B) to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior

express consent of the called party, unless the call

is initiated for emergency purposes, is made solely

pursuant to the collection of a debt owed to or

guaranteed by the United States, or is exempted

by rule or order by the Commission under paragraph (2)(B);

computer, or other device to send, to a telephone

facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement,

unless—

(i)

the unsolicited advertisement is from

a sender with an established business relationship with the recipient;

(ii) the sender obtained the number of the

telephone facsimile machine through—

(I) the voluntary communication of such

number, within the context of such established business relationship, from the recipient of the unsolicited advertisement, or

(II) a directory, advertisement, or site

on the Internet to which the recipient voluntarily agreed to make available its facsimile

number for public distribution,

except that this clause shall not apply in the

case of an unsolicited advertisement that is

sent based on an established business relationship with the recipient that was in existence before July 9, 2005, if the sender possessed the

facsimile machine number of the recipient before July 9, 2005; and

(iii) the unsolicited advertisement contains a notice meeting the requirements under

paragraph (2)(D),

except that the exception under clauses (i) and (ii)

shall not apply with respect to an unsolicited advertisement sent to a telephone facsimile machine

by a sender to whom a request has been made not

to send future unsolicited advertisements to such

telephone facsimile machine that complies with

the requirements under paragraph (2)(E); or

(D) to use an automatic telephone dialing

system in such a way that two or more telephone

lines of a multi-line business are engaged simultaneously.

(2) Regulations; exemptions and other provisions

The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement the requirements of this subsection. In implementing the requirements of this subsection, the

Commission—

(A) shall consider prescribing regulations to

allow businesses to avoid receiving calls made using an artificial or prerecorded voice to which they

have not given their prior express consent;

(B) may, by rule or order, exempt from the

requirements of paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, subject to such conditions as the Commission

may prescribe—

(i)

calls that are not made for a commercial purpose; and

(ii) such classes or categories of calls made

for commercial purposes as the Commission

determines—

(I) will not adversely affect the privacy

rights that this section is intended to protect; and

(II) do not include the transmission of

any unsolicited advertisement;

requirements of paragraph (1)(A)(iii) of this subsection calls to a telephone number assigned to a

cellular telephone service that are not charged to

the called party, subject to such conditions as the

Commission may prescribe as necessary in the interest of the privacy rights this section is intended

to protect;

(D) shall provide that a notice contained in an

unsolicited advertisement complies with the requirements under this subparagraph only if—

(i)

the notice is clear and conspicuous and

on the first page of the unsolicited advertisement;

(ii) the notice states that the recipient

may make a request to the sender of the unsolicited advertisement not to send any future unsolicited advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine or machines and that failure to comply, within the shortest reasonable time, as determined by the Commission, with such a request meeting the requirements under subparagraph (E) is unlawful;

(iii) the notice sets forth the requirements

for a request under subparagraph (E);

(iv)

the notice includes—

(I) a domestic contact telephone and

facsimile machine number for the recipient

to transmit such a request to the sender; and

(II) a cost-free mechanism for a recipient to transmit a request pursuant to such

notice to the sender of the unsolicited advertisement; the Commission shall by rule re-

quire the sender to provide such a mechanism and may, in the discretion of the Commission and subject to such conditions as the

Commission may prescribe, exempt certain

classes of small business senders, but only if

the Commission determines that the costs to

such class are unduly burdensome given the

revenues generated by such small businesses;

(v) the telephone and facsimile machine

numbers and the cost-free mechanism set forth

pursuant to clause (iv) permit an individual or

business to make such a request at any time on

any day of the week; and

(vi) the notice complies with the requirements of subsection (d);

(E) shall provide, by rule, that a request not

to send future unsolicited advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine complies with the requirements under this subparagraph only if—

(i)

the request identifies the telephone

number or numbers of the telephone facsimile

machine or machines to which the request relates;

(ii) the request is made to the telephone or

facsimile number of the sender of such an unsolicited advertisement provided pursuant to

subparagraph (D)(iv) or by any other method of

communication as determined by the Commission; and

(iii) the person making the request has

not, subsequent to such request, provided express invitation or permission to the sender, in

writing or otherwise, to send such advertisements to such person at such telephone facsimile machine;

(F) may, in the discretion of the Commission

and subject to such conditions as the Commission

may prescribe, allow professional or trade associations that are tax-exempt nonprofit organizations

to send unsolicited advertisements to their members in furtherance of the association’s tax-exempt

purpose that do not contain the notice required by

paragraph (1)(C)(iii), except that the Commission

may take action under this subparagraph only—

(i)

by regulation issued after public notice and opportunity for public comment; and

(ii) if the Commission determines that

such notice required by paragraph (1)(C)(iii) is

not necessary to protect the ability of the members of such associations to stop such associations from sending any future unsolicited advertisements;

(G)(i) may, consistent with clause (ii), limit

the duration of the existence of an established

business relationship, however, before establishing any such limits, the Commission shall—

(I)

determine whether the existence of

the exception under paragraph (1)(C) relating

to an established business relationship has resulted in a significant number of complaints to

the Commission regarding the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile

machines;

(II) determine whether a significant number of any such complaints involve unsolicited

advertisements that were sent on the basis of

an established business relationship that was

longer in duration than the Commission believes is consistent with the reasonable expectations of consumers;

(III) evaluate the costs to senders of demonstrating the existence of an established business relationship within a specified period of

time and the benefits to recipients of establishing a limitation on such established business relationship; and

(IV) determine whether with respect to

small businesses, the costs would not be unduly

burdensome; and

(ii) may not commence a proceeding to determine whether to limit the duration of the existence of an established business relationship before the expiration of the 3-month period that begins on July 9, 2005;

(H) may restrict or limit the number and duration of calls made to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service to collect a

debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States;

and

(I)

shall ensure that any exemption under

subparagraph (B) or (C) contains requirements

10a

for calls made in reliance on the exemption with

respect to—

(i)

the classes of parties that may make

such calls;

(ii) the classes of parties that may be

called; and

(iii) the number of such calls that a calling

party may make to a particular called party.

(3) Private right of action

A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by

the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State—

(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this

subsection to enjoin such violation,

(B) an action to recover for actual monetary

loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in

damages for each such violation, whichever is

greater, or

(C)

both such actions.

If the court finds that the defendant willfully or

knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations

prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in

its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an

amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount

available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.

11a

(4) Civil forfeiture

(A)

In general

Any person that is determined by the Commission, in accordance with paragraph (3) or (4) of

section 503(b) of this title, to have violated this

subsection shall be liable to the United States for

a forfeiture penalty pursuant to section 503(b)(1)

of this title. Paragraph (5) of section 503(b) of

this title shall not apply in the case of a violation

of this subsection. A forfeiture penalty under

this subparagraph shall be in addition to any other

penalty provided for by this chapter. The amount

of the forfeiture penalty determined under this subparagraph shall be determined in accordance with

subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 503(b)(2)

of this title.

(B)

Violation with intent

Any person that is determined by the Commission, in accordance with paragraph (3) or (4) of

section 503(b) of this title, to have violated this

subsection with the intent to cause such violation

shall be liable to the United States for a forfeiture

penalty pursuant to section 503(b)(1) of this title.

Paragraph (5) of section 503(b) of this title shall

not apply in the case of a violation of this subsection. A forfeiture penalty under this subparagraph shall be in addition to any other penalty provided for by this chapter. The amount of the forfeiture penalty determined under this subparagraph shall be equal to an amount determined in

accordance with subparagraphs (A) through (F) of

12a

section 503(b)(2) of this title plus an additional

penalty not to exceed $10,000.

(C)

Recovery

Any forfeiture penalty determined under subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be recoverable under

section 504(a) of this title.

(D)

Procedure

No forfeiture liability shall be determined under subparagraph (A) or (B) against any person

unless such person receives the notice required by

section 503(b)(3) of this title or section 503(b)(4) of

this title.

(E)

Statute of limitations

Notwithstanding paragraph (6) of section

503(b) of this title, no forfeiture penalty shall be

determined or imposed against any person—

(i)

under subparagraph (A) if the violation charged occurred more than 1 year prior

to the date of issuance of the required notice or

notice of apparent liability; or

(ii) under subparagraph (B) if the violation charged occurred more than 4 years prior

to the date of issuance of the required notice or

notice of apparent liability.

(F)

Rule of construction

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the

Commission may not determine or impose a forfeiture penalty on a person under both subparagraphs (A) and (B) based on the same conduct.

13a

(c)

Protection of subscriber privacy rights

(1) Rulemaking proceeding required

Within 120 days after December 20, 1991, the

Commission shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding

concerning the need to protect residential telephone

subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. The proceeding shall—

(A) compare and evaluate alternative methods and procedures (including the use of electronic

databases, telephone network technologies, special directory markings, industry-based or companyspecific “do not call” systems, and any other alternatives, individually or in combination) for their

effectiveness in protecting such privacy rights, and

in terms of their cost and other advantages and disadvantages;

(B) evaluate the categories of public and private entities that would have the capacity to establish and administer such methods and procedures;

procedures may apply for local telephone solicitations, such as local telephone solicitations of small

businesses or holders of second class mail permits;

(D) consider whether there is a need for additional Commission authority to further restrict

telephone solicitations, including those calls exempted under subsection (a)(3) of this section,

and, if such a finding is made and supported by the

record, propose specific restrictions to the Congress; and

14a

(E) develop proposed regulations to implement the methods and procedures that the Commission determines are most effective and efficient to accomplish the purposes of this section.

(2) Regulations

Not later than 9 months after December 20, 1991,

the Commission shall conclude the rulemaking proceeding initiated under paragraph (1) and shall prescribe regulations to implement methods and procedures for protecting the privacy rights described in

such paragraph in an efficient, effective, and economic manner and without the imposition of any additional charge to telephone subscribers.

(3) Use of database permitted

The regulations required by paragraph (2) may

require the establishment and operation of a single

national database to compile a list of telephone numbers of residential subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations, and to make that compiled

list and parts thereof available for purchase. If the

Commission determines to require such a database,

such regulations shall—

(A) specify a method by which the Commission will select an entity to administer such database;

(B) require each common carrier providing

telephone exchange service, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission, to inform

subscribers for telephone exchange service of the

opportunity to provide notification, in accordance

with regulations established under this paragraph,

15a

that such subscriber objects to receiving telephone solicitations;

(C) specify the methods by which each telephone subscriber shall be informed, by the common carrier that provides local exchange service

to that subscriber, of (i) the subscriber’s right to

give or revoke a notification of an objection under

subparagraph (A), and (ii) the methods by which

such right may be exercised by the subscriber;

(D) specify the methods by which such objections shall be collected and added to the database;

(E) prohibit any residential subscriber from

being charged for giving or revoking such notification or for being included in a database compiled

under this section;

(F) prohibit any person from making or transmitting a telephone solicitation to the telephone

number of any subscriber included in such database;

(G) specify (i) the methods by which any person desiring to make or transmit telephone solicitations will obtain access to the database, by area

code or local exchange prefix, as required to avoid

calling the telephone numbers of subscribers included in such database; and (ii) the costs to be recovered from such persons;

(H) specify the methods for recovering, from

persons accessing such database, the costs involved in identifying, collecting, updating, disseminating, and selling, and other activities relating

to, the operations of the database that are incurred

by the entities carrying out those activities;

16a

(I)

specify the frequency with which such database will be updated and specify the method by

which such updating will take effect for purposes

of compliance with the regulations prescribed under this subsection;

(J) be designed to enable States to use the

database mechanism selected by the Commission

for purposes of administering or enforcing State

law;

(K) prohibit the use of such database for any

purpose other than compliance with the requirements of this section and any such State law and

specify methods for protection of the privacy rights

of persons whose numbers are included in such database; and

(L) require each common carrier providing

services to any person for the purpose of making

telephone solicitations to notify such person of the

requirements of this section and the regulations

thereunder.

(4) Considerations required for use of database

method

If the Commission determines to require the database mechanism described in paragraph (3), the

Commission shall—

(A) in developing procedures for gaining access to the database, consider the different needs

of telemarketers conducting business on a national, regional, State, or local level;

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(B) develop a fee schedule or price structure

for recouping the cost of such database that recognizes such differences and—

(i)

reflect the relative costs of providing

a national, regional, State, or local list of phone

numbers of subscribers who object to receiving

telephone solicitations;

(ii) reflect the relative costs of providing

such lists on paper or electronic media; and

(iii) not place an unreasonable financial

burden on small businesses; and

through special markings of area white pages directories, and (ii) if such directories are needed as

an adjunct to database lists prepared by area code

and local exchange prefix.

(5) Private right of action

A person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf

of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State bring

in an appropriate court of that State—

(A) an action based on a violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin

such violation,

(B) an action to recover for actual monetary

loss from such a violation, or to receive up to $500

in damages for each such violation, whichever is

greater, or

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(C)

both such actions.

It shall be an affirmative defense in any action

brought under this paragraph that the defendant has

established and implemented, with due care, reasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent

telephone solicitations in violation of the regulations

prescribed under this subsection. If the court finds

that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the

regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court

may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the

award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times

the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this

paragraph.

(6) Relation to subsection (b)

The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to permit a communication prohibited by subsection (b).

(d)

Technical and procedural standards

(1) Prohibition

It shall be unlawful for any person within the

United States—

(A) to initiate any communication using a telephone facsimile machine, or to make any telephone

call using any automatic telephone dialing system,

that does not comply with the technical and procedural standards prescribed under this subsection,

or to use any telephone facsimile machine or automatic telephone dialing system in a manner that

does not comply with such standards; or

(B) to use a computer or other electronic device to send any message via a telephone facsimile

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machine unless such person clearly marks, in a

margin at the top or bottom of each transmitted

page of the message or on the first page of the

transmission, the date and time it is sent and an

identification of the business, other entity, or individual sending the message and the telephone number of the sending machine or of such business,

other entity, or individual.

(2) Telephone facsimile machines

The Commission shall revise the regulations setting technical and procedural standards for telephone facsimile machines to require that any such

machine which is manufactured after one year after

December 20, 1991, clearly marks, in a margin at the

top or bottom of each transmitted page or on the first

page of each transmission, the date and time sent, an

identification of the business, other entity, or individual sending the message, and the telephone number

of the sending machine or of such business, other entity, or individual.

(3) Artificial or prerecorded voice systems

The Commission shall prescribe technical and procedural standards for systems that are used to transmit any artificial or prerecorded voice message via

telephone. Such standards shall require that—

(A) all artificial or prerecorded telephone

messages (i) shall, at the beginning of the message, state clearly the identity of the business, individual, or other entity initiating the call, and (ii)

shall, during or after the message, state clearly

the telephone number or address of such business,

other entity, or individual; and

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(B) any such system will automatically release the called party’s line within 5 seconds of the

time notification is transmitted to the system that

the called party has hung up, to allow the called

party’s line to be used to make or receive other

calls.

(e)

Prohibition on provision of misleading or inaccurate caller identification information

(1) In general

It shall be unlawful for any person within the United

States, or any person outside the United States if the

recipient is within the United States, in connection

with any voice service or text messaging service, to

cause any caller identification service to knowingly

transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, cause

harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value, unless

such transmission is exempted pursuant to paragraph (3)(B).

(2) Protection for blocking caller identification information

Nothing in this subsection may be construed to

prevent or restrict any person from blocking the capability of any caller identification service to transmit caller identification information.

(3) Regulations

(A)

In general

The Commission shall prescribe regulations to

implement this subsection.

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(B)

Content of regulations

(i)

In general

The regulations required under subparagraph (A) shall include such exemptions from the

prohibition under paragraph (1) as the Commission determines is appropriate.

(ii)

Specific exemption for law enforcement

agencies or court orders

The regulations required under subparagraph (A) shall exempt from the prohibition under paragraph (1) transmissions in connection

with—

(I) any authorized activity of a law enforcement agency; or

(II) a court order that specifically authorizes the use of caller identification manipulation.

(4) Repealed. Pub. L. 115–141, div. P, title IV,

§402(i)(3), Mar. 23, 2018, 132 Stat. 1089

(5) Penalties

(A)

(i)

Civil forfeiture

In general

Any person that is determined by the Commission, in accordance with paragraphs (3)

and (4) of section 503(b) of this title, to have

violated this subsection shall be liable to the

United States for a forfeiture penalty. A forfeiture penalty under this paragraph shall be in

addition to any other penalty provided for by

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this chapter. The amount of the forfeiture

penalty determined under this paragraph shall

not exceed $10,000 for each violation, or 3 times

that amount for each day of a continuing violation, except that the amount assessed for any

continuing violation shall not exceed a total of

$1,000,000 for any single act or failure to act.

(ii)

Recovery

Any forfeiture penalty determined under

clause (i) shall be recoverable pursuant to section 504(a) of this title. Paragraph (5) of section 503(b) of this title shall not apply in the

case of a violation of this subsection.

(iii) Procedure

No forfeiture liability shall be determined

under clause (i) against any person unless such

person receives the notice required by section

503(b)(3) of this title or section 503(b)(4) of this

title.

(iv) 4-year statute of limitations

No forfeiture penalty shall be determined or

imposed against any person under clause (i) if

the violation charged occurred more than 4 years

prior to the date of issuance of the required notice or notice or apparent liability.

(B)

Criminal fine

Any person who willfully and knowingly violates this subsection shall upon conviction thereof

be fined not more than $10,000 for each violation,

or 3 times that amount for each day of a continuing

violation, in lieu of the fine provided by section 501

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of this title for such a violation. This subparagraph

does not supersede the provisions of section 501 of

this title relating to imprisonment or the imposition of a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.

(6) Enforcement by States

(A)

In general

The chief legal officer of a State, or any other

State officer authorized by law to bring actions on

behalf of the residents of a State, may bring a civil

action, as parens patriae, on behalf of the residents

of that State in an appropriate district court of the

United States to enforce this subsection or to impose the civil penalties for violation of this subsection, whenever the chief legal officer or other State

officer has reason to believe that the interests of

the residents of the State have been or are being

threatened or adversely affected by a violation of

this subsection or a regulation under this subsection.

(B)

Notice

The chief legal officer or other State officer

shall serve written notice on the Commission of

any civil action under subparagraph (A) prior to

initiating such civil action. The notice shall include a copy of the complaint to be filed to initiate

such civil action, except that if it is not feasible for

the State to provide such prior notice, the State

shall provide such notice immediately upon instituting such civil action.

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(C)

Authority to intervene

Upon receiving the notice required by subparagraph (B), the Commission shall have the right—

(i)

to intervene in the action;

(ii) upon so intervening, to be heard on all

matters arising therein; and

(iii) to file petitions for appeal.

(D)

Construction

For purposes of bringing any civil action under

subparagraph (A), nothing in this paragraph shall

prevent the chief legal officer or other State officer from exercising the powers conferred on that

officer by the laws of such State to conduct investigations or to administer oaths or affirmations or

to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and other evidence.

(E)

Venue; service or process

(i)

Venue

An action brought under subparagraph (A)

shall be brought in a district court of the United

States that meets applicable requirements relating to venue under section 1391 of title 28.

(ii)

Service of process

In an action brought under subparagraph

(A)—

(I) process may be served without regard to the territorial limits of the district

or of the State in which the action is instituted; and

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(II) a person who participated in an alleged violation that is being litigated in the

civil action may be joined in the civil action

without regard to the residence of the person.

(7) Effect on other laws

This subsection does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United

States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or

of an intelligence agency of the United States.

(8) Definitions

For purposes of this subsection:

(A)

Caller identification information

The term “caller identification information”

means information provided by a caller identification service regarding the telephone number of, or

other information regarding the origination of, a

call made using a voice service or a text message

sent using a text messaging service.

(B)

Caller identification service

The term “caller identification service” means

any service or device designed to provide the user

of the service or device with the telephone number

of, or other information regarding the origination

of, a call made using a voice service or a text message sent using a text messaging service. Such

term includes automatic number identification services.

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(C)

Text message

The term “text message”—

(i) means a message consisting of text, images, sounds, or other information that is transmitted to or from a device that is identified as

the receiving or transmitting device by means

of a 10-digit telephone number or N11 service

code;

(ii) includes a short message service (commonly referred to as “SMS”) message and a multimedia message service (commonly referred to

as “MMS”) message; and

(iii) does not include—

(I) a real-time, two-way voice or video

communication; or

(II) a message sent over an IP-enabled

messaging service to another user of the

same messaging service, except a message

described in clause (ii).

(D)

Text messaging service

The term “text messaging service” means a

service that enables the transmission or receipt of

a text message, including a service provided as

part of or in connection with a voice service.

(E)

Voice service

The term “voice service”—

(i) means any service that is interconnected with the public switched telephone network and that furnishes voice communications

27a

to an end user using resources from the North

American Numbering Plan or any successor to

the North American Numbering Plan adopted

by the Commission under section 251(e)(1) of

this title; and

(ii) includes transmissions from a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other

device to a telephone facsimile machine.

(9) Limitation

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, subsection (f ) shall not apply to this subsection

or to the regulations under this subsection.

(f )

Effect on State law

(1) State law not preempted

Except for the standards prescribed under subsection (d) and subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, nothing in this section or in the regulations

prescribed under this section shall preempt any State

law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or regulations on, or which prohibits—

(A) the use of telephone facsimile machines

or other electronic devices to send unsolicited advertisements;

(B) the use of automatic telephone dialing

systems;

messages; or

(D)

the making of telephone solicitations.

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(2) State use of databases

If, pursuant to subsection (c)(3), the Commission

requires the establishment of a single national database of telephone numbers of subscribers who object

to receiving telephone solicitations, a State or local

authority may not, in its regulation of telephone solicitations, require the use of any database, list, or

listing system that does not include the part of such

single national database that relates to such State.

(g)

Actions by States

(1) Authority of States

Whenever the attorney general of a State, or an

official or agency designated by a State, has reason

to believe that any person has engaged or is engaging

in a pattern or practice of telephone calls or other

transmissions to residents of that State in violation of

this section or the regulations prescribed under this

section, the State may bring a civil action on behalf of

its residents to enjoin such calls, an action to recover

for actual monetary loss or receive $500 in damages

for each violation, or both such actions. If the court

finds the defendant willfully or knowingly violated

such regulations, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal

to not more than 3 times the amount available under

the preceding sentence.

(2) Exclusive jurisdiction of Federal courts

The district courts of the United States, the United

States courts of any territory, and the District Court

of the United States for the District of Columbia shall

have exclusive jurisdiction over all civil actions brought

under this subsection. Upon proper application,

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such courts shall also have jurisdiction to issue writs

of mandamus, or orders affording like relief, commanding the defendant to comply with the provisions

of this section or regulations prescribed under this

section, including the requirement that the defendant

take such action as is necessary to remove the danger

of such violation. Upon a proper showing, a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order

shall be granted without bond.

(3) Rights of Commission

The State shall serve prior written notice of any

such civil action upon the Commission and provide

the Commission with a copy of its complaint, except

in any case where such prior notice is not feasible, in

which case the State shall serve such notice immediately upon instituting such action. The Commission

shall have the right (A) to intervene in the action, (B)

upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein, and (C) to file petitions for appeal.

(4) Venue; service of process

Any civil action brought under this subsection in a

district court of the United States may be brought in

the district wherein the defendant is found or is an

inhabitant or transacts business or wherein the violation occurred or is occurring, and process in such

cases may be served in any district in which the defendant is an inhabitant or where the defendant may

be found.

(5) Investigatory powers

For purposes of bringing any civil action under

this subsection, nothing in this section shall prevent

the attorney general of a State, or an official or agency

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designated by a State, from exercising the powers

conferred on the attorney general or such official by

the laws of such State to conduct investigations or to

administer oaths or affirmations or to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and other evidence.

(6) Effect on State court proceedings

Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit an authorized State official from

proceeding in State court on the basis of an alleged

violation of any general civil or criminal statute of

such State.

(7) Limitation

Whenever the Commission has instituted a civil

action for violation of regulations prescribed under

this section, no State may, during the pendency of such

action instituted by the Commission, subsequently institute a civil action against any defendant named in

the Commission’s complaint for any violation as alleged in the Commission’s complaint.

(8) “Attorney general” defined

As used in this subsection, the term “attorney general” means the chief legal officer of a State.

(h)

Annual report to Congress on robocalls and transmission of misleading or inaccurate caller identification information

(1) Report required

Not later than 1 year after December 30, 2019, and

annually thereafter, the Commission, after consulta-

31a

tion with the Federal Trade Commission, shall submit to Congress a report regarding enforcement by

the Commission of subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e)

during the preceding calendar year.

(2) Matters for inclusion

Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) The number of complaints received by the

Commission during each of the preceding 5 calendar years, for each of the following categories:

(i) Complaints alleging that a consumer

received a call in violation of subsection (b) or

(c).

(ii) Complaints alleging that a consumer

received a call in violation of the standards prescribed under subsection (d).

(iii) Complaints alleging that a consumer

received a call in connection with which misleading or inaccurate caller identification information was transmitted in violation of subsection (e).

(B) The number of citations issued by the

Commission pursuant to section 503(b) of this title

during the preceding calendar year to enforce

subsection (d), and details of each such citation.

503(b) of this title during the preceding calendar

year to enforce subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e),

and details of each such notice including any proposed forfeiture amount.

32a

(D) The number of final orders imposing forfeiture penalties issued pursuant to section 503(b)

of this title during the preceding calendar year to

enforce such subsections, and details of each such

order including the forfeiture imposed.

(E) The amount of forfeiture penalties or

criminal fines collected, during the preceding calendar year, by the Commission or the Attorney

General for violations of such subsections, and details of each case in which such a forfeiture penalty

or criminal fine was collected.

(F) Proposals for reducing the number of

calls made in violation of such subsections.

(G) An analysis of the contribution by providers of interconnected VoIP service and noninterconnected VoIP service that discount highvolume, unlawful, short-duration calls to the total

number of calls made in violation of such subsections, and recommendations on how to address

such contribution in order to decrease the total

number of calls made in violation of such subsections.

(3) No additional reporting required

The Commission shall prepare the report required

by paragraph (1) without requiring the provision of

additional information from providers of telecommunications service or voice service (as defined in section 227b(a) of this title).

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(i)

Information sharing

(1) In general

Not later than 18 months after December

30, 2019, the Commission shall prescribe regulations to establish a process that streamlines

the ways in which a private entity may voluntarily share with the Commission information

relating to—

(A) a call made or a text message sent

in violation of subsection (b); or

(B) a call or text message for which misleading or inaccurate caller identification information was caused to be transmitted in

violation of subsection (e).

(2) Text message defined

In this subsection, the term “text message”

has the meaning given such term in subsection

(e)(8).

( j)

Robocall blocking service

(1) In general

Not later than 1 year after December 30, 2019, the

Commission shall take a final agency action to ensure

the robocall blocking services provided on an opt-out

or opt-in basis pursuant to the Declaratory Ruling of

the Commission in the matter of Advanced Methods

to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls (CG

Docket No. 17–59; FCC 19–51; adopted on June 6,

2019)—

(A) are provided with transparency and effective redress options for both—

34a

(i)

consumers; and

(ii) callers; and

(B) are provided with no additional line item

charge to consumers and no additional charge to

callers for resolving complaints related to erroneously blocked calls; and

blocking emergency public safety calls.

(2) Text message defined

In this subsection, the term “text message” has

the meaning given such term in subsection (e)(8).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.