Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Robin Brindle, et al., Petitioners v. Delta Airlines, Inc., et al.

No. 19-

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

_________________________

ROBIN BRINDLE, KATHLEEN BROWN, SANDRA CARTER,

MARCIE LAPORTE, AND KELVIN RAMIREZ,

Petitioners,

V.

DELTA AIRLINES, INC., AND THE RHODE ISLAND

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING,

Respondents.

_________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the Rhode Island Supreme Court

_________________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_________________________

VICKI J. BEJMA

Robinson & Clapham

123 Dyer Street

Suite 135

Providence, RI 02903

STUART BANNER

Counsel of Record

UCLA School of Law

Supreme Court Clinic

405 Hilgard Ave.

Los Angeles, CA 90095

(310) 206-8506

banner@law.ucla.edu

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the preemption provision of the Airline

Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1),

exempts airlines from state and local wage regulation.

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Rhode Island Supreme Court:

Brindle et al. v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, by and through its Director, et al.,

Nos. 2016-324-M.P., 2016-325-M.P., 2016-326-M.P.,

2016-328-M.P., 2016-329-M.P. (June 18, 2019)

Rhode Island Superior Court, Providence County:

Brown et al. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. PC-20123075 (Oct. 3, 2016)

Ramirez v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and

Training, Nos. PC-2012-3071, PC-2012-3072, PC2012-3073, PC-2012-3074, PC-2012-3075, PC-20123076 (Sept. 3, 2014)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iv

OPINIONS BELOW.................................................... 1

JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1

STATUTES INVOLVED ............................................. 1

STATEMENT .............................................................. 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................. 4

I. The decision below creates a lower

court conflict on whether the Airline

Deregulation Act preempts state and

local wage regulation. ........................................... 5

II. The decision below is wrong. .............................. 10

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 14

APPENDICES

A. Rhode Island Supreme Court opinion

(June 18, 2019) .................................................... 1a

B. Rhode Island Superior Court opinion

(Oct. 3, 2016) ..................................................... 16a

C. Rhode Island Superior Court opinion

(Sept. 3, 2014) .................................................... 38a

D. Decision

of

the

Rhode

Island

Department of Labor and Training

(Sept. 1, 2015) .................................................... 59a

E. Decision

of

the

Rhode

Island

Department of Labor and Training

(May 18, 2012) ................................................... 66a

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Allied Concrete and Supply Co. v. Baker, 904

F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2018) ........................................ 8

American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S.

219 (1995) .............................................................. 11

Amerijet Int’l, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 627

F. Appx. 744 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) ............ 6

Bedoya v. American Eagle Express Inc., 914

F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 2019), pet. for cert. filed

Apr. 29, 2019 (No. 18-1382) .................................... 7

California Div. of Labor Standards

Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,

Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997) ................................... 5, 11

California Trucking Ass’n v. Su, 903 F.3d

953 (9th Cir. 2018) .................................................. 8

Californians for Safe and Competitive Dump

Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184

(9th Cir. 1998) ......................................................... 8

Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045 (7th

Cir. 2016) ................................................................. 8

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S.

251 (2013) ................................................................ 5

DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d

81 (1st Cir. 2011) ................................................. 4, 9

Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637

(9th Cir. 2014) ......................................................... 8

Filo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac, 357 P.3d

1040 (Wash. 2015) ................................................... 6

Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1

(1987) ..................................................................... 13

Gary v. Air Group, Inc., 397 F.3d 183 (3d Cir.

2005) ........................................................................ 7

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S.

246 (1994) .............................................................. 13

v

Lupian v. Joseph Cory Holdings LLC, 905

F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2018) ............................................ 7

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504

U.S. 374 (1992) ................................................ 10, 11

New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue

Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.

645 (1995) .............................................................. 12

Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273

(2014) ..................................................................... 11

People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp.,

Inc., 329 P.3d 180 (Cal. 2014) ................................. 7

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp.

Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008) ....................................... 6

S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of

America, Inc., 697 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2012) ........... 6

Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.,

Inc., 813 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 2016) ........................... 9

Tobin v. Federal Express Corp., 775 F.3d 448

(1st Cir. 2014) .......................................................... 9

Watson v. Air Methods Corp., 870 F.3d 812

(8th Cir. 2017) (en banc) ..................................... 8. 9

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ..................................................... 1

29 U.S.C. § 218(a) ..................................................... 13

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ................................................... 11

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) ............................................... 6

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) .................................... 4, 5, 10

R.I. Gen. Laws § 25-3-3(a) ......................................... 2

Stephen G. Breyer, Two Models of

Regulatory Reform, 34 S.C.L. Rev. 629

(1983) ..................................................................... 10

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Robin Brindle, Kathleen Brown, Sandra Carter,

Marcie LaPorte, and Kelvin Ramirez respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment

of the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court

(App. 1a) is published at 211 A.3d 930. The 2016

opinion of the Rhode Island Superior Court (App.

16a) is available at 2016 WL 5865984. The 2014

opinion of the Rhode Island Superior Court (App.

38a) is available at 2014 WL 4412618.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court

was entered on June 18, 2019. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

STATUTES INVOLVED

R.I. Gen. Laws § 25-3-3(a) provides in relevant

part: “Work performed by employees on Sundays and

holidays must be paid for at least one and one-half (1

½) times the normal rate of pay for the work performed.”

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) provides in relevant part:

“[A] State … may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of

law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.”

2

STATEMENT

Until this case, the federal courts of appeals and

state supreme courts were unanimous in holding

that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 does not

preempt state and local wage regulation. Airlines,

like other employers, have been subject to state and

local laws governing the wages they pay their employees.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has now broken

with this consensus. In the decision below, the court

held that the ADA exempts Delta Airlines from a

state law requiring employers to pay time and a half

for work on Sundays and holidays, on the ground

that compliance with the law could reduce the number of employees Delta hires.

This Court should grant certiorari. In the fortyplus years since it was enacted, the ADA has never

been thought to preempt state and local wage regulation. In the ADA, Congress deregulated the relationship between airlines and their customers, not

the relationship between airlines and their employees.

1. Petitioners Robin Brindle, Kathleen Brown,

Sandra Carter, Marcie LaPorte, and Kelvin Ramirez

were customer service agents for Delta Airlines. App.

2a. They worked at the T.F. Green Airport in Warwick, Rhode Island, just outside Providence. Id.

Under Rhode Island law, employers must pay one

and a half times an employee’s normal wage for work

on Sundays and holidays. R.I. Gen. Laws § 25-3-3(a).

In 2011, petitioners filed complaints with the Rhode

Island Department of Labor and Training in which

they alleged that Delta had violated this statute by

3

failing to pay time and a half for the hours they

worked on Sundays and holidays. App. 2a. Delta

conceded that it not complied with the state statute.

Delta argued instead that the statute was preempted

by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Id.

The Department dismissed the complaints without taking any testimony, on the ground that the

statute is preempted by the ADA. Id. at 3a, 66a-70a.

The Rhode Island Superior Court reversed and remanded to the Department for factfinding. Id. at 3a,

38a-58a.

On remand, the Department heard the testimony

of two witnesses. The President of the Rhode Island

Airport Corporation testified that if airlines faced

higher labor costs, the airport would be less competitive. Id. at 4a. Delta’s station manager at the airport

testified that higher wages could cause Delta to reduce staffing at the airport. Id. at 4a-5a. The Department once again dismissed the complaints on

the ground that the statute is preempted by the

ADA. Id. at 5a, 59a-65a.

The Superior Court affirmed. Id. at 6a, 16a-37a.

The court reasoned that the time-and-a-half statute

“attempts to regulate the work force on Sundays and

holidays, which undoubtedly affects the competitive

market force of airlines.” Id. at 30a. The court concluded that “a state law is preempted by the ADA

when it directly substitutes the state’s own policies

for competitive market forces.” Id. at 31a.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at

1a-15a.

The court observed that the ADA preempts state

laws “related to a price, route, or service of an air

4

carrier.” Id. at 8a (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)).

After summarizing this Court’s cases interpreting

this provision, App. 8a-12a, the court noted that a

state law is not preempted merely because it imposes costs on airlines. Id. at 12a. As the court explained, “were preemption to apply to a state law

solely in that circumstance, preemption ‘would effectively exempt airlines from state taxes, state lawsuits of many kinds, and perhaps most other state

regulation of any consequence.’” Id. (quoting DiFiore

v. American Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 89 (1st Cir.

2011)).

The court nevertheless held that the ADA

preempts the Rhode Island time-and-a-half statute,

because “Delta has demonstrated that compliance

with [the statute] goes far beyond a mere increase in

labor costs.” App. 13a. Paying time and a half “could

impact the services that Delta and other airlines

provide on Sundays and holidays,” by causing them

to operate with a smaller staff. Id. at 14a. A reduced

staff on Sundays and holidays “would make Delta

less competitive in the Rhode Island market.” Id. at

15a. The court concluded that the statute is

preempted by the ADA because it “does in fact ‘relate

to’ the services provided by Delta.” Id.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Court should grant certiorari. Because of the

decision below, there is now a conflict among the

lower courts over whether the Airline Deregulation

Act preempts state and local wage regulation. The

decision below is clearly incorrect. The ADA cannot

preempt Rhode Island’s time-and-a-half statute

without also preempting all state and local laws that

5

could raise an airline’s labor costs, including workers

compensation laws, workplace safety laws, payroll

and income taxes, and the like. The ADA was intended to ensure that airlines compete for customers, not to give airlines a free pass from state employment regulation.

I. The decision below creates a lower court

conflict on whether the Airline Deregulation Act preempts state and local wage

regulation.

The Airline Deregulation Act preempts any state

law “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). The phrase “related to”

obviously has a broad reach, but “the breadth of the

words ‘related to’ does not mean the sky is the limit.”

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251,

260 (2013). As Justice Scalia observed of the same

preemptive phrase in ERISA, “everything is related

to everything else,” so if the phrase is read with a

wooden literalism, the result will be “a degree of

preemption that no sensible person could have intended.” California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S.

316, 335-36 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).

Until this case, the federal courts of appeals and

state supreme courts unanimously held that the Airline Deregulation Act does not preempt state and local wage regulation. As the Seventh Circuit summarized the cases, airlines’ “labor inputs are affected by

a network of labor laws, including minimum wage

laws, worker-safety laws, anti-discrimination laws,

and pension regulations. … Yet no one thinks that

the ADA or the FAAAA preempts these and the

6

many comparable state laws.” S.C. Johnson & Son,

Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of America, Inc., 697 F.3d 544,

558 (7th Cir. 2012). 1

For example, in Filo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac,

357 P.3d 1040, 1057-59 (Wash. 2015), the Washington Supreme Court held that the ADA does not

preempt a city’s minimum wage ordinance. The

court observed that “the ADA does not preempt generally applicable laws that regulate how an airline

behaves as an employer, even though the law indirectly affects the airline's prices and services.” Id. at

1058. “The fact that [the ordinance] may impose

costs on airlines and therefore affect fares is inconsequential.” Id.

Likewise, in Amerijet Int’l, Inc. v. Miami-Dade

Cty., 627 F. Appx. 744, 747-51 (11th Cir. 2015) (per

curiam), the Eleventh Circuit held that the ADA

does not preempt Miami-Dade County’s minimum

wage ordinance. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the

air carrier’s argument that the ordinance was “related to” its services because paying higher wages

would force it to charge its customers higher prices.

Id. at 751. “In this regard,” the court concluded, the

minimum wage ordinance “is no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local

regulation, which Congress could not possibly have

intended to eliminate.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit conThe Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of

1994 includes a preemption provision, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1),

that was copied from the ADA’s preemption provision and was

intended to have the identical scope. The two provisions are

therefore interpreted identically. Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008).

1

7

sidered this point so obvious that it did not even publish the opinion.

Likewise, in People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor

Transp., Inc., 329 P.3d 180, 185-90 (Cal. 2014), the

California Supreme Court held that the FAAAA does

not preempt a variety of state employment statutes,

including a minimum wage law. The court explained

that “the FAAAA does not preempt generally applicable employment laws that affect prices, routes, and

services.” Id. at 188.

Likewise, in Lupian v. Joseph Cory Holdings LLC,

905 F.3d 127, 135-38 (3d Cir. 2018), the Third Chircuit held that the FAAAA does not preempt a state

statute barring unauthorized deductions from employees’ paychecks. “Wage laws like” the one at issue

“are a prime example of an area of traditional state

regulation,” the court observed. Id. at 136. The Third

Circuit held that the state statute “is steps away

from the type of regulation the FAAAA’s preemption

clause sought to prohibit.” Id. See also Bedoya v.

American Eagle Express Inc., 914 F.3d 812, 824 (3d

Cir. 2019), pet. for cert. filed Apr. 29, 2019 (No. 181382) (holding that the FAAAA does not preempt

state law governing whether workers are classified

as employees or independent contractors, and noting

that “[m]any of our sister circuits have similarly held

that the FAAAA and ADA do not preempt state employment laws,” id. at 820); Gary v. Air Group, Inc.,

397 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the

ADA does not preempt a state statute protecting

employee whistleblowers, because an employee’s suit

under the statute is “comparable to a garden variety

employment claim”).

8

Likewise, in Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d

1045, 1055 (7th Cir. 2016), the Seventh Circuit held

that the FAAAA does not preempt an Illinois statute

prohibiting an employer from taking unauthorized

deductions from its employees’ wages. The “relevant

distinction,” the Seventh Circuit held, is between

“state laws that affect the carrier’s relationship with

its customers and those that affect the carrier’s relationship with its workforce.” Id. at 1054.

Likewise, in Californians for Safe and Competitive

Dump Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184,

1189 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit held that the

FAAAA does not preempt a California statute requiring employers to pay prevailing wages. Although

the statute caused the employer to increase its prices

by 25% and to alter the services it offered customers,

the court held that the statute’s effect on prices and

services was “no more than indirect, remote, and

tenuous.” Id. See also Allied Concrete and Supply Co.

v. Baker, 904 F.3d 1054, 1068 (9th Cir. 2018) (same);

Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 647

(9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the FAAAA does not

preempt California statutes requiring employers to

give their employees periodic meal and rest breaks,

because such statutes “are normal background rules

for almost all employers doing business in the state

of California”); California Trucking Ass’n v. Su, 903

F.3d 953, 961-67 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the

FAAAA does not preempt state law governing

whether workers are independent contractors).

The Eighth Circuit has reached the same conclusion in dicta. In Watson v. Air Methods Corp., 870

F.3d 812, 818-20 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc), the court

held that the ADA does not preempt Missouri’s

9

common law of wrongful discharge. “[A] wrongfuldischarge claim is akin to claims arising under background employment laws that are not expressly

preempted by the ADA,” the unanimous en banc

court explained. Id. at 818. “Laws regulating minimum wages, worker safety, and discrimination

based on race, sex, or age may affect a carrier’s costs,

but they generally operate at a level one or more

steps away from the moment at which the firm offers

its customer a service for a particular price.” Id. at

818-19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The federal courts of appeals and state supreme

courts were thus unanimous until the decision below. The lower courts “drew the preemption ‘dividing

line’ between state laws that regulate ‘how [a] service is performed’ (preempted) and those that regulate how an airline behaves as an employer or proprietor (not preempted).” Tobin v. Federal Express

Corp., 775 F.3d 448, 456 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting

DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 87-88

(1st Cir. 2011)). Thus in DiFiore, the First Circuit

held that the ADA preempts a state law regulating

the collection of service charges from customers because the law “directly regulates how an airline service is performed and how its price is displayed to

customers—not merely how the airline behaves as

an employer.” Id. at 88. The court made clear that

“[w]e do not endorse American’s view that state regulation is preempted whenever it imposes costs on

airlines.” Id. at 89. See also Schwann v. FedEx

Ground Package Sys., Inc., 813 F.3d 429, 438-39 (1st

Cir. 2016) (holding that the FAAAA preempts a state

law with the effect of requiring FedEx to use em-

10

ployees rather than independent contractors, because the law directly regulates how shipping service

is performed rather than merely increasing the cost

of labor).

The decision below upsets this consensus. The

Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the ADA

preempts the state’s time-and-a-half law because

paying higher wages “could impact the services that

Delta and other airlines provide on Sundays and holidays,” App. 14a, and “would make Delta less competitive in the Rhode Island market,” id. at 15a.

Every other court that has addressed this issue

would have reached the opposite conclusion.

II. The decision below is wrong.

Review is also warranted because the decision below is clearly wrong.

Before 1978, airlines were largely insulated from

price competition, so fares were very high. The purpose of the Airline Deregulation Act was to benefit

consumers by making the airlines compete on the

basis of price. The ADA achieved that goal. Airfares

declined dramatically. See Stephen G. Breyer, Two

Models of Regulatory Reform, 34 S.C.L. Rev. 629,

630-39 (1983).

The ADA’s preemption provision was intended

“[t]o ensure that the States would not undo federal

deregulation with regulation of their own.” Morales

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378

(1992). To that end, the ADA bars states from enacting any law “related to a price, route, or service of an

air carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). Congress made

clear, by enacting this “broad pre-emptive” provision,

Morales, 504 U.S. at 383, that airlines must compete

11

for customers in a free market. “The ADA is based on

the view that the best interests of airline passengers

are most effectively promoted, in the main, by allowing the free market to operate.” Northwest, Inc. v.

Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 288 (2014).

The states thus may not regulate the methods by

which airlines advertise their fares, Morales, 504

U.S. at 387-90, or the terms of the frequent flyer

programs airlines use to retain passengers, Northwest, 572 U.S. at 285-88; American Airlines, Inc. v.

Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995). When airlines

compete for customers, the ADA’s preemption provision leaves the playing field “largely to the airlines

themselves, and not at all to States.” Id.

The ADA deregulated the relationship between

airlines and their customers; it did not deregulate

the relationship between airlines and their employees. The ADA was not meant to exempt airlines from

state and local wage regulation. That sort of exemption has nothing to do with achieving the ADA’s goal

of making airlines compete on airfares.

In the decision below, the Rhode Island Supreme

Court reasoned that if state law requires an airline

to pay a higher wage, the airline might hire fewer

employees, which would affect the level of service the

airline would offer. On this reasoning the state law

would be “related to” the airline’s “service.” App. 15a.

But this Court has already rejected such wooden

reasoning. The preemption provision in ERISA, like

that in the ADA, preempts state laws that “relate to”

an employee benefits plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Yet

the Court held that ERISA does not preempt California’s prevailing wage law, despite the California

law’s clear effect on the cost of labor. California Div.

12

of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325-34 (1997). Indeed,

the Court cited the “basic regulation of employment

conditions” as an example of state law that is clearly

not preempted by ERISA, even though state employment laws “invariably affect the cost and price of

services” offered through employee benefits plans.

New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield

Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 660 (1995).

The same logic applies to the preemption provision in the ADA. If the ADA preempts any state law

that increases an airline’s cost of labor, the ADA will

preempt state minimum wage laws, state maximum

hours laws, state workplace safety laws, and state

workers compensation laws. It will preempt state

laws prescribing state holidays and state laws requiring employers to allow employees to miss work

for jury service. It will preempt state income taxes,

state payroll taxes, state occupational licensing requirements, and state unemployment insurance programs. All these state laws (and many more) “relate

to” an airline’s services in just the same way as

Rhode Island’s time-and-a-half statute, by making it

more expensive to hire workers. Indeed, if a state

has a law barring employers from enslaving their

workers and forcing them to work for no pay, that

law would also be preempted by the ADA under the

decision below, because it too would increase the cost

of labor.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court should not have

gone down this road. The ADA simply does not exempt airlines from state and local wage regulation,

even though such laws make it more expensive to

hire employees.

13

If there were any doubt on this point, it would be

dispelled by the fact that the federal minimum wage

statute—the Fair Labor Standards Act—explicitly

authorizes states and municipalities to establish “a

minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).

The ADA could not preempt state and local wage

regulation without repealing this provision as to airline employees. When Congress enacted the ADA,

however, it gave no indication of intending any such

repeal.

Below, Delta argued that Rhode Island’s timeand-a-half statute differs from other state and local

wage laws because it originated as a “Blue Law” to

encourage the observance of Sunday as a day of rest.

But the ADA does not distinguish among state laws

on this basis. The time-and-a-half statute’s only effect on airlines is to make it more expensive to hire

workers on Sundays and holidays. Like other state

and local wage laws, it is not preempted by the ADA.

“Pre-emption of employment standards ‘within the

traditional police power of the State’ ‘should not

lightly inferred.’” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,

512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987)). The decision

below is an egregiously mistaken interpretation of

the Airline Deregulation Act that creates a conflict

among the lower courts. This Court should grant certiorari and reverse.

14

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

VICKI J. BEJMA

Robinson & Clapham

123 Dyer Street

Suite 135

Providence, RI 02903

STUART BANNER

Counsel of Record

UCLA School of Law

Supreme Court Clinic

405 Hilgard Ave.

Los Angeles, CA 90095

(310) 206-8506

banner@law.ucla.edu