Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Qihui Huang, Petitioner v. Ajit Varadaraj Pai, Chairman of Federal Communications Commission, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 12, 2019

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No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

QIHUI HUANG

Petitioner,

AJ1T VARADARAJ PAi

Respondent

Chairman of the Federal Communication

Commission (FCC).

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

l\V V;

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dated: September 11, 2019

Qihui Huang, M.S.

P.0. Box 34014

Bethesda, MD 20827

(240) 423-0406

qhh@hotmail.com

Petitioner, Pro Se

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Ql. Whether lower court could not comply rulings

of Supreme Court on:

(a) “[Respondent’s] silence implies consent, not the

opposite—and courts generally behave accordingly,

affirming without further

discussion when they

agree, not when they disagree,” Kernan v. Hinojosa,

2016, 136 S.Ct. 1603; Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 1991, 111

S.Ct. 2590; and about 33 U.S. courts complied it.

(App. 1.7)?

(b) McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework;

and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 109 S.Ct. 1775,

(1989). And

especially risky”, Burlington Northern and Santa

FeRy. Co. v. White,2006,126 S.Ct. 2405.

Q2. Whether anyone or lower court could prevent,

relieve, comfort, or assist in prevent Respondent’s

punishment, when he deprived Petitioner of life

without due process of law, under Constitution 5th

and 14th Amendments?

Q3. Whether anyone or lower court could alter,

destroy, mutilate, or conceal both parties consented

important core material facts or objects?

Q4. Whether the bodily or personal injured victim

could seek compensations at civil court or justice, on

discriminations and retaliations, which caused by

defendant “not acting under color of law, willfully

caused many bodily injuries to Petitioner, because of

the race or national origin”?

LIST OF PARTIES

The Petitioner in this case is Qihui Huang, pro

se. The Respondent in this case is Ajit Varadaraj

Pai, the Chairman of Federal Communications

Commission (FCC). And Pai is responsible for

actions of his two managers of branch chief Martin

Doczkat and division chief Walter Johnston.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

LIST OF PARTIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

LIST OF APPENDICEVIS

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Specialty

B. Backgrounds

1. Respondent willfully caused many bodily

injuries and substantial risks of death to

Petitioner.

2. Respondent has duties to, but he did not,

respond for Petitioner’s sickness, which

caused by his discriminations.

3. Respondent discriminatorily concluded

Petitioner’s performance was unacceptable

GS-15 and bad.

C. Court procedures

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Ql. Comply Supreme Court’s rulings.

(a) “behave accordingly, affirming without

further discussion”.

(b) discriminations and retaliations.

Q2. Const. 5th and 14th Amend, protect victim’s life.

Q3. Alter or conceal facts or objects.

Q4. Seek civil remedies on criminal actions.

5. Involve significant public concerns.

6. Comments - Request “EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER

LAW” a phrase engraved on the front of this building.

CONCLUSION

APPENDICES

LIST OF APPENDICES (“App.”)

page

A. Order denying petition for rehearing of D.C.

Circuit, on April 16, 2019, (No. 17-5290,

September Term, 2018).

B. Order of D.C. Circuit, on January 30, 2019. (No.

17-5290, September Term, 2018).

C. Order of D.C. District, on October 19, 2016, (case

l:16-CV-00398-JEB).

D. Memo, of D.C. District, on October 19, 2016, (case

l:16-CV-00398-JEB).

E. Order of D.C. District, on September 15, 2017,

(case l:16-CV-00398-JEB).

38a

F. Memo. D.C. District, on September 15, 2017,

39a

(case l:16-CV-00398-JEB).

G. Petitioner’s Brief at D.C. Circuit, on June, 28,

59a

2018.

H. A list of organizations, who concern Petitioner’s

97a

life and support her lawsuits.

I. Constitutions and Statutes Involved

103a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

page

Cases

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,

2006,126 S.Ct. 2405.

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246 (1976)

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)

Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1419

(2016)

Kernan v. Hinojosa, 2016, 136 S.Ct. 1603.

3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14,18,19

Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994)

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886)

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 1991, 111 S.Ct. 2590.

3,4,8,9,11,12,13,14,18,19

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1874 (2017)

There are about 33 cases cited at page 62a to 68a.

Statutes

18 U. S. C § 249 Hate crime acts.

18 U. S. C § 4

28 U. S. C. §1254 (1)

2, 4, 5, 19

15, 21

vii

42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.

1, 15

Maryland Criminal Law § 3-204 Reckless

4, 5, 13, 14, 19

endangerment (a)(1).

NO FEAR ACT;

The Constitution Fifth Amendment

2, 3, 4,15

The Constitution First Amendment

2, 15, 18

The Constitution Seventh Amendment

15, 18

The Constitution Fourteen Amendment

2,3,4,15,18

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended

/. Petitioner, multiple mediums (one has about

195,000 subscribers), and her many supporters,

(there are about 30 organizations, which estimate

leading and representing more than 22,400 peoples,

(see App. H) respectfully request to grant this

petition.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The final order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit, is in App. A. (case

No. 17-5290 September Term, 2018). The

unpublished Order of the U.S. District Court for the

District of Columba Circuit is in App. B. Petitioner’s

Brief is in App-G.

The first Order and Memorandum for honorable

Judge James E. Boasberg (JEB) of District Court for

the District of Columbia are in App. C, D. (case 1:16CV-00398-JEB).

The

second

Order

and

Memorandum of district court Judge are in App. E,

JURISDICTION

The order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit was entered on January

30, 2019, (No. 17-5290, September Term, 2018), See

App-B. A timely petition for rehearing and rehearing

en banc was denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit, which entered on

April 16, 2019. See App. A.

On June 7, 2019, for application 18A1265, Case

Analyst Clayton Higgins granted Petitioner

extension of time to file this petition to and including

September 13, 2019.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED

The First, Fifth, Fourteenth Amendments of U.S.

Constitution. 18 U.S.C § 249 Hate crime acts. All

laws related to employment discriminations and

retaliations, including but not limited to: Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §

2000e et. seq.; NO FEAR ACT; and etc. Some

statutes reprinted in App. I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Specialty

In general lawsuits, both parties have undisputed

and contented material facts. Then, they are looking

for judgments of laws on these facts. The similarity

of this lawsuit is there exists some both parties

undisputed and contented important core material

facts. But, the difference of this lawsuit is these

important core material facts and objects were been

concealed or covered up in lower court’s rulings.

Petitioner specially seeks and requests for

Judgments on these concealed or removed material

facts or objects. Upon which, a reasonable jury with

common senses could find or conclude Respondent

violated laws. When person reads the Court’s

rulings, who will think the judgment is fair. When

person reads these concealed, covered up or removed

some important core material facts or objects, as a

reasonable jury, could find Respondent violated laws

and want to revere the ruling of dismissal this suit.

Backgrounds

Basically, both parties, including Respondent’s

“consent and not opposite” material facts, laws, and

conclusions in followings, which: (a) were being

altered, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed in

“courts [did not] behave

rulings; and (b)

accordingly”, Kernan u. Hinojosa, 2016, 136 S.Ct.

1603; Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 1991, 111 S.Ct. 2590. See

App. 1.7.

Petitioner was a former federal government

employee

of the

Federal

Communications

Commission (FCC) about 24 years. At the FCC,

Petitioner was a top grade GS-15 level senior

electronics engineer for about 12 years, until being

constructively discharged by Respondent around

January 2016. At the FCC, Petitioner received

promotions, step increases, good or excellent

performance evaluations, and many performance

awards including cash awards. Petitioner is three

times co-author of publications with Nobel Prize

winners on Nobel Prize winning project. Petitioner

saved many million dollars for U.S. government, (she

never requested for money award), and significantly

contributed the winning of 2006 Nobel Physics Prize.

Petitioner is an Asian American foreign-born old

disabled woman.

Respondent is current FCC Chairman. Petitioner

claimed multiple counts in her original Complaint

and complained his intentional discriminations and

retaliations, and violating Constitution Fifth and

Fourteen Amendments to deprive petitioner of life,

and etc. Now, Petitioner would focus on one core

issue of: at work place, Respondent violated

Constitution Fifth and Fourteen Amendments to

deprive, or attempted to deprive her of life without

due process of law. Respondent knew this happening

of his managers acted to deprive Petitioner of life.

When he formerly was an FCC Commissioner,

Petitioner e-mailed him, FCC Chairman and other

commissioners, and requested to protect her life.

But, there was no high lever managers cared of

Petitioner’s life and helped her.

Respondent’s “consent and not opposite” (Kernan

v. Hinojosa, 2016, 136 S.Ct. 1603; and Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 1991, 111 S.Ct. 2590, App. 1.7), and

had no fact nor law to oppose genuine material facts

and laws of his actions: — (a) “not acting under color

of law, willfully caused [many] bodily injuries] to

[Petitioner] because of the race or national origin”,

18 U.S.C. §249,(a)(1), see App. 1.4; and (b) “not

recklessly: engage [d] in conduct that create[d]

[many] substantial risk[s] of death or serious

physical injury to [Petitioner]” at work place,

Maryland Criminal Law § 3-204 Reckless

endangerment (a)(1), App. 1.5.

Petitioner did not and cannot sue Respondent’s

criminal violations. Because Respondent’s actions

could be more precisely or properly described or

summarized by words in criminal laws, wherefore,

she borrowed, used, or cited these words in her

complaints. Respondent insists his unlawful actions.

Until now, he had no any apology and no

compensation to Petitioner. Until now, Respondent

did not receive any punishment on his unlawful

actions.

Petitioner is an Asian American foreign-born old

disabled weak woman. For unknown reasons, lower

court

protected

law

violator

Respondent.

Aforementioned important core material facts and

objects of Respondent violated Constitution fifth and

fourteenth Amendments and more were been

altered, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed in lower

courts’ judgments (see App. A,B,C,D,E,F,G), even

both parties consented these important core material

facts or objects.

1. Respondent willfully caused many bodily

injuries and substantial risks of death to

Petitioner.

Respondent (and his two managers Doczkat and

Johnston) attempted to deprive Petitioner’s life.

Respondent “not acting under color of law,_willfully

caused [many] bodily injuries] to Petitioner because

of her race or national origin”, 18 U.S.C. §249, (a)(1)

App. 1.4. Defendant knowingly and not “recklessly

created many substantially risks of death or serious

physical injuries to [Petitioner]” (Maryland Criminal

Law, §3-204,(a)(1), App. 1.5).

Before Respondent (with his two managers)

discriminately concluded her bad performance and

disqualified for GS-15 position, Petitioner was health

and her blood pressure was normal even without

medicine. After Respondent (and Doczkat, Johnston)

discriminatorily attacked and concluded her

performances were disqualified for GS-15 and bad,

when they communicated with her, they always or

frequently caused Respondent’s blood pressures un

controllably and promptly raised to life-threatening

high level, (about 180 mmHg, the highest was 223

mmHg). Peoples, including Respondent, with

common senses would know that with such high

blood pressures had caused Petitioner suffered many

substantial risks of death or serious physical injures

to her, such as stroke, cerebral and brain

hemorrhage, cerebral rupture, brain death, heart

attack, angina pectoris and many other life-threaten

diseases.

During that time, her blood pressures were

normal and did not rise when other persons and

other supervisors communicated with her.

Petitioner, FCC on-site nurse, FCC union

chairwoman, and doctors multiple times requested to

move her from direct contact with appointed acting

branch chief Doczkat and instead assign her to other

supervisors. Respondent refused all these requests,

and enjoyed very much that he created many

substantial risks of death and serious bodily injures

to Petitioner. Petitioner and her many supporters

(App. H) hopes Constitution could respect and

protect her life - the most important treasure of all

she has. Petitioner could NOT take many

substantial risks of death or serious physical injures

to work. Petitioner believes, that no any person,

including Respondent himself, would take any

unnecessary high risk of death to work.

Then, Respondent (and Doczkat) concluded “fail”

in Petitioner’s performance evaluation, denied her

within grade step increase, and other actions against

Petitioner. No matter how well she performed,

Respondent or they purposed and predetermined

that her performance were bad, (see following facts).

Based on what she suffered and experienced from

Respondent, to avoid dying at workplace as

Respondent wanted, and being fired as Respondent

planed, Petitioner constructively discharged and left

FCC around January 2016. Petitioner was

substantially been forced to leave the position, which

she loved, contributed, and worked for more than 24

years of her best times in her life.

2. Respondent must respond for Petitioner’s

sickness, which caused by his discriminations.

Respondent’ discriminatory conclusions of her

performance were disqualified for GS-15 and bad,

caused Petitioner became very sick. After that, when

two

managers

(Doczkat

and

Johnston)

communicated with her, it always or frequently

caused Petitioner’s blood pressures un-controllably

and promptly raised to life-threaten high (about 180

mmHg).

Before Respondent (and Doczkat)’s bad conclusions

on her, Petitioner was very healthy. Petitioner’s

blood pressures were normal even without medicine.

Respondent’s bad or malicious conclusions on her,

caused her became sick. After they concluded and

attacked her without fact and law, (see following

oaragraph) that she disqualified for GS-15 and bad

performance, when they communicated with her,

Petitioner’s blood pressures un-controllably and

promptly raised to very high, life-threatening levels

(about 180 mmHg, highest 223 mmHg).

3. Without

supporting

fact

and

law,

Respondent and newly appointed acting

branch

chief

Doczkat

discriminatorily

concluded Petitioner’s performance were

unacceptable GS-15 level and bad.

Petitioner was tasked to study and report

wireless microphones at U.S. markets by former

branch chief Mr. Robert Weller (Weller) around

April, 2014. Mr. Weller left FCC around end of July,

2014. Then, Respondent non-competitively appointed

Martin Doczkat as acting branch chief. Few days

after that, Respondent and Doczkat concluded and

attacked that Petitioner’s performances were

unacceptable GS-15 and bad, on this study report.

Any one, more or all following facts and laws

obviously evidenced Respondent’s intentional

discriminations

against

Petitioner

for

his

conclusions.

(a) Doczkat is an U.S. born young White man, and is

about 25-30 years younger than Petitioner. Around

August 2014, Doczkat was only at GS-15 position

(non-competitively appointed) few months (about 4

months). Petitioner performed at GS-15 position

about ten and half years. Peoples with common

senses could reasonably see that Doczkat obviously

had less GS-15 working experience comparing with

Petitioner and all other GS-15 level employees in the

same branch.

(b). Doczkat wrote to Petitioner on 9/11/2014: “As a

GS-15 electronics engineer specialized in radio

communications system .... you are expected to

originate novel approaches ...”. “Further in your role

as a GS-15, you are expected to conduct original

studies

spectrum

utilization

involving

simultaneous transmission ...”. He thought

Petitioner did not do what he expected. Petitioner

questioned him, did he mean that he concluded that

she disqualified for GS-15 and bad performance. He

consented (Kernan v. Hinojosa, 2016, 136 S.Ct. 1603;

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 1991, 111 S.Ct. 2590; App. 1.7)

• •:.

and did not correct her if that was .Petitioner’s

misunderstanding, while he has duty to correct her.,

for conclusion of Petitioner’s unacceptable GS-15

were NOT in the written work assignment. And

former branch chief Mr. Weller did not and never tell

her to do it.

(d) Pursuant to the Agreement, between the FCC and

the Union, and multiple regulations of U.S.

government, her former supervisor Mr. Weller must

fully respond the result of the report, based on

Petitioner

fully

followed

his

instructions.

Respondent had no any evidence of Petitioner did

not. Wherefore, Respondent (and Doczkat) must first

conclude Mr. Weller disqualified for GS-15 and bad

performance, but he did not conclude such.

(e) Respondent (and Doczkat) must conclude all

Petitioner’s former more than 10 year’s supervisors

disqualified for their positions at GS-15 or senior

executive service (SES), based on they consistently

did not find Petitioner disqualified for GS-15 for

more than 10 years, but Doczkat concluded it few

days when he became acting branch chief, and few

months being GS-15.

(f) Petitioner responded each and all Doczkat’s 83

comments on the report, and asked his further

response. Respondent (and Doczkat) did not provide

further written response, but “consent and not the

opposite” (Kernan v. Hinojosa, 2016, 136 S.Ct. 1603;

and Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 1991,111 S.Ct. 2590, App.

1.7) all of her responses and evidenced his

conclusions were totally wrong.

(g) Respondent (and Doczkat) did not attack

Petitioner on technical issues in the report. Except

one sentence, he did not criticize her English in the

report. Even there were technical errors, Respondent

must first conclude Mr. Weller disqualified for GS15, not Petitioner. Respondent predetermined and

purposed to conclude Petitioner’s bad performance,

then, Respondent always could fabricate many

pretexts for their predetermined purposes.

(h) Former supervisor Mr. Weller asked Petitioner to

submit the final version on 7/10/2014, for he to

review it before he left FCC, based on her memory.

Petitioner submit the final version to him before that

day. Mr. Weller had no any negative comment on the

report, before he left FCC about 20 days later.

(i) Facts showed and would reasonably question this

task on Petitioner was their purpose to fabricate

pretexts attacking her. Based on: (1) Petitioner

usually worked on projects which from the front

office of Office of Technology and Engineering (OET),

FCC Chairman’s office, or higher; but this task was

not; (2) Managers refused her requests to add more

employees to work on it, because he did not want to

attack other employees; (3) no any other person

(except two branch chiefs) read it; and (4) When

Petitioner was sick for about half year, no any other

employee continually worked on it. All these facts

evidenced that this task is Respondent wasted

taxpayers’ money, and for him fabricated pretexts

Petitioner.

attacking

(j) Any one, more, or all of aforementioned facts,

laws, and arguments could clearly evidence

Respondent erred in his discriminatory conclusions

of Petitioner’s bad performance and disqualified for

GS-15. Until now, Respondent insists his errors,

without any apologize and compensation to

Petitioner. This fact evidenced that Respondent’s

errors were his intentions.

B. Court Procedures

On October 16, 2016, honorable Judge James, E.

Boasberg (JEB) of U.S. District Court for District of

Columbia erroneously dismissed most counts except

one count. This remaining count claimed that

Respondent denied Petitioner’s within grade step

increase (grade GS-15, from step 7 to step 8) around

February 2015. Respondent argued that Petitioner

failed to exhaust administrative remedies on this

count. Both parties, including Respondent’s “consent,

not the opposite” evidenced material facts. The true

material facts were: Respondent did not and never

started his administrative remedies, when Petitioner

contacted the Office of Workplace Diverse (OWD)

and asked for an EEO counselor. But the district

“court [DID NOT] behave accordingly, affirming

without further discussion when they agree, not

when they disagree,” Kernan v. Hinojosa, 2016, 136

S.Ct.l603;YZs£ v. Nunnemaker, 1991, 111 S.Ct. 2590,

App. 1.7. District Court Judge failed to explain how

never

existed

the

Petitioner

exhausting

administrative remedies. On September 15, 2017,

District Court Judge unfairly dismissed this lawsuit,

while no one opposed Petitioner’s multiple motions.

See App. E, F.

On January 30, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals

for District of Columbia Circuit erroneously notpublish ruled and affirmed the lower court’s

decision, (see App. B) On April, 16, 2019, the U.S.

Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit

erroneously or unfairly denied petitioner’s petition

for rehearing en banc, (see App. A). Where, similarly,

Respondent’s “consent and not-opposite” Id. many

material facts, laws, arguments, and conclusions in

her multiple motions, did not get “courts behave

accordingly, affirming without further discussion

when they agree, not when they disagree,” Id.

The important things are lower court altered,

destroyed, mutilated, or concealed both parties

“consent and not opposite” Id. (App. 1.7) important

core material facts and objects. For example,

Respondent willfully caused many bodily injuries to

Petitioner (see App. 1.4), and knowingly caused her

suffered many “substantial risks of death or physical

injuries to her”, Maryland Criminal Law, (see App.

1.5). Based on these being concealed material facts

and objects, a reasonable jury would find and

conclude that Respondent violated laws and is guilty.

Also, lower court disparately and adversely

treated and ruled against Petitioner, based on she is

an Asian American foreign-born old (more than 67

years now) disabled woman, and is a member of

statutes protected class. Petitioner and many of her

supporters do not understand why federal statutes

did not and could not comply on her lawsuits. All

peoples hope that there could be a fair and just

place, for an Asian American foreign-born old

disabled woman does not suffer a real “miserable

world” treatments in her life.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Question 1(a) — Whether lower court could not

comply Supreme Court’s two rulings of

silence implies consent, not the opposite—and

courts generally behave accordingly, affirming

without further discussion when they agree,

not when they disagree”, Kernan v. Hinojosa,

2016, 136 S.Ct. 1603; Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 1991,

111 S.Ct. 2590; and about 33 U.S. courts

complied it. App. 1.7.

There are about or more than 33 U.S. Courts

cited and complied aforementioned rulings of

Supreme Court, see page 62a to 68a. But Petitioner

- a member of statutes protected class, was been

excluded by the lower courts’ rulings of her lawsuits.

Respondent implied his “consent and not-opposite”,

Id. many of Petitioner’s motions included its

consents of material facts, laws, and conclusions. But

lower court did not and never comply Supreme

“courts generally behave

Court’s rulings of

accordingly, affirming without further discussion

when they agree, not when they disagree,” Id. App.

1.7. And lower court dismissed her lawsuits. See

following examples of Petitioner filed motions at

District of Columbia Circuit.

See Petitioner filed first group motions around

end of May 2018. For all of these motions,

Respondent implied his “consent and not-opposite”,

Id., included its contents of material facts, laws, and

conclusions. But lower court did not and never

comply Supreme Court’s rulings of “courts generally

behave accordingly, affirming without further

discussion when they agree, not when they

disagree,” Id. App. 1.7. Lower court dismissed this

lawsuit for not publish it, on April, 2019, (see App.

A, B). See Petitioner filed:

“Motion for clarification of District Court’s factual

findings, which concealed or removed physical

evidences (MD Criminal Law, § 9-307) on Appellees

Appellant

discriminatory

conclusions

disqualifying for GS-15 position”; around 5/22/2018.

“Motion for reversal and vacatur District Court’s

ruling on Appellees’ discriminatory conclusions of

appellant disqualifying for GS-15 position.” around

5/23/2018.

“Motion for clarification of District Court’s factual

findings and rulings, where “concealed or removed

physical evidences” (MD Criminal Law §9-307) of

Appellees knowingly “created many substantial risks

of death ... to appellant” at work place (MD Criminal

Law §3-204). Appellees caused appellant could not

work because to avoid her death, and deprived her

constitutional rights”, filed around 5/25/2018. And,

“Motion for reverse and vacate District Court’s

ruling on Appellees’ discriminations and retaliations

of (1) “willfully caused bodily injury to Appellant” (18

U.S.C.A §249); (2) “not recklessly created many

substantial risks of death to Appellant” (MD

Criminal Law §3-204); and (3) deprived her

constitutional rights of life”, filed around 5/29/2018.

On June 28, 2018, Petitioner filed her Brief, see

App. G. On August 31, 2018, Respondent filed

“Response in Opposition”. Based on Petitioner’s

knowledge or understanding, Respondent did not

opposed but consented (App. 1.7) many material fact,

laws, and conclusion in her brief. Wherefore, Petition

wanted to request honorable court to comply laws,

and she filed another group, about nine, motions on

October 31, 2018. Respondent did not oppose, had no

fact nor law to oppose, and implied his consent, (App.

1.7) all of following motions: 1.

“Motion (I) for the Court to affirm without further

discussion the material facts, laws, and conclusions

that U.S. District Court Judge erred in five “issues

presented for review” at her Brief (laws in fll).”

“Motion (II) for the court to affirm without

further discussion the material facts, laws, and

findings that appellees discriminatorily ‘concluded

appellant disqualified for a GS-15 Position’. Oppose

Appellees where they lied, misconstrued, altered, or

concealed the objects or facts, 18U.S.C.A §1512

(C)(1), etc.”

“Motion (III) for the Court to affirm without

further discussion the material facts, laws, and

findings that Appellees discriminatorily and.

retaliatorily attempted to ‘deprive of Appellant’s life

without due process of law’, and violated U.S. Const.

Amend. 1, 5, 14, etc., (laws in 1[II). Where Appellant

evidenced then Appellees consented.”

“Motion (IV) for the Court to affirm without

further discussion the material facts, laws, and

findings that Appellees discriminatorily and

retaliatorily ‘whether or not acting under color of

law, willfully caused bodily injury to Appellant’

(18U.S.C.A,§249). Where facts and laws evidenced

then Appellees consented.”

1 Court clerk changed some Petitioner’s “Motion” to “Reply”.

Petitioner disagrees it. Petitioner’s motions were what she

respectfully requested court to do. Also, Based on her

understanding, (see Local Rule 27), there is no constrain to file

motions. Also, “Reply” must be filed within certain days. She

guesses that deadline of fling “Reply” might be passed already.

■:

“Motion (V) for the Court to affirm without

further discussion the material facts, laws, and

findings that Appellees discriminatorily and

retaliatorily “denied Appellant’s within grade step

increase”, and violated 42U.S.C.^2000e-16(c) and

U.S. Const. Amend. 1. Which Appellant evidenced

then Appellees consented. Oppose Appellees where

they lied, misconstrued, altered, or concealed the

objects or facts, 18U.S.C.A § 1512(c)(1),etc.”

“Motion (VI) for judges to contact an authority

who can initiate criminal cases (18U.S.C.A.§4,§3,

§2)”;

“Motion (VII) for a trial by jury.”

“Motion (IV) for Appellant to also seek damage

remedies under Bivens Actions, based on her

Constitutional Rights (Const. Amend. 1, 5, 7, 14)

have been deprived and violated.”. And

“Motion (IX) to stay processing on other less

important claims and issues, until after Court ruled

on those presented issues in Appellant’s Motions.”

Respondent did not oppose any or all of above

motions. Respondent’s “consent, and not-opposite” of

material facts and laws, had no facts nor laws to

support him, resulted lower “court [DID NOT]

behave accordingly, affirming without further

discussion when they agree, not when they

disagree”, Id. and about 33 U.S. courts complied it,

(see page 69a to 74a). Lower court did not grant

Petitioner’s motions, but dismissed her lawsuit.

Question 1(b) — Whether lower court could not

comply Supreme Court established McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework; and

rulings of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 109

S.£t. 1775, (1989).

• •:

Respondent did not oppose but consented, Id.

material facts and laws of: (1) Petitioner is a member

of statutes protected class; (2) Respondent

disparately and adversely treated her as stated in

her Complaints and all counts; and (3) Respondent

failed to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory or

non-retaliatory reason for his actions in paragraph

(2); wherefore, (4) Petitioner has established the

prima

facie

Respondent’s

intentional

discriminations and retaliations under Supreme

Court established McDonnell. Douglas burdenshifting framework. Then, these facts and laws were

altered, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed in

rulings. And, lower court unfairly dismissed this

suit.

Respondent needs or must, but he failed to

provide his statements, that he would have made the

same decisions and actions absent the race, sex,

national origin, age, disabled discriminations or

retaliations. Wherefore, facts established the prima

facie of Defendant’ intentional discriminations and

retaliations, under U.S. Supreme Court ruled in

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 109 S.Ct. 1775, (1989).

Then, these facts and laws were altered, destroyed,

mutilated, or concealed in ridings. And, lower court

unfairly dismissed this suit.

Question 1(c)- Whether lower court could not

comply Supreme Court’s rulings of “retaliation

...

constitute crimes and are therefore

•.

especially risky”, Burlington Northern and

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 2006,126 S.Ct. 2405.

“First, an employer who wishes to retaliate

against an employee for engaging in protected

conduct is much more likely to do so on the job.

There are far more opportunities for retaliation in

that setting, and many forms of retaliation off the

job constitute crimes and are therefore especially

risky.”,JBurlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.

White, 2006,126 S.Ct. 2405.

“It was a landmark case for retaliation claims. It

set a precedent for claims which could be

considered retaliatory under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. In this case the standard for

retaliation against a sexual harassment complainant

was revised to include any adverse employment

decision or treatment that would be likely to

dissuade a ‘reasonable worker’ from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination.”, https://en.

wikipedia.org.

Supreme Court stated are what happened on

Petitioner, that “an employer [Respondent] who

wishes to retaliate against an employee [Petitioner]

...is much more likely to do so on the job. There are

far more opportunities for retaliation, and many

forms of retaliation constitute crimes and are

therefore especially risky.” Supreme Court ruled

“many forms retaliation ... constitute crimes”, as

Respondent acted. But, lower court dismissed

Petitioner’s lawsuit.

Question 2 — Whether any one or court could

prevent, relieve, comfort, or assisted in

prevent Respondent’s punishment, when he

violated Constitution 5th and 14th Amendments

to deprive Petitioner of life without due

process of law.

Constitution Fifth and Fourteen Amendments’

equal protection respect, care, and protect

Petitioner’s life. No one could unlawfully to deprive

Petitioner of life without due process of law. But,

Respondent did such actions. Petitioner’s “consent

and not-opposite”, Id. on material facts and laws of

he acted to deprive Petitioner of life, without due

process of law, at work place. Respondent “consented

and not-opposed” App. 1.7 Petitioner’s “Motion (III)

for the Court to affirm without further discussion

the material facts, laws, and findings that Appellees

discriminatorily and retaliatorily attempted to

‘deprive of Appellant’s life without due process of

law’, and violated U.S. Const. Amend. 1, 5, 14, etc.,

(laws in T|II). Where Appellant evidenced then

Appellees consented.” This motion submitted to D.C.

Circuit on 10/31/2018.

Respondent applied his “consent, and notopposite” Id. for all of Petitioner aforementioned

abput 13 motions, which submitted in D.C. Circuit.

Lower court persistently did not comply Supreme

Court’s rulings (App. 1.7), but dismissed this lawsuit,

(App. A, B).

Question 3 — Whether any one or court could

alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal both parties

consented important core material facts or

objects in court proceedings?

Aforementioned facts and laws showed lower

courts altered, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed

both parties consented important core material facts

and objects. For example, Respondent implied his

“consent and not-opposite” (Kernan v. Hinojosa,

2016, 136 S.Ct. 1603; and Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 1991,

111 S.Ct. 2590, App. 1.7) genuine material facts and

laws of, at work place, he: (a) violated 5th and 14th

Amendments of Constitution; (b) “not acting under

color of law, willfully caused [many] bodily injuries]

to [Petitioner] because of the race or national origin”,

(18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), App. 1.4); and (c) “not

recklessly: engage[d] in conduct that create[d]

[many] substantial risk[s] of death or serious

physical injury to [Petitioner]” (Maryland Criminal

Law §3-204, App. 1.5). Defendant has no fact, no

evidence, and no law to oppose it. Lower court judge

admitted these both parties consented important

core material facts or objects; but these facts and

laws were been altered, destroyed, mutilated, or

concealed in rulings. See App. A, B, C, D, E, F. Then,

lower court dismissed this lawsuit.

Question 4 — Whether the bodily or personal

injured victim could seek compensations at

civil court or justice, on discriminations and

retaliations, which caused by defendant “not

acting under color of law, willfully caused

many bodily injuries to Petitioner, because of

the race or national origin”?

For the general practices, a victim suffered bodily

or personal injury could legally seek civil justice of

defendant’s criminal actions. See: (a) “Civil Justice

for Victims of Crime”, where, stated “any crime

victim may be able to file a civil lawsuit against a

perpetrator or other responsible party”, https://

victimsofcrime.org,- (b) “An assault can give rise to

both criminal charges and a personal injury civil

lawsuit.”, www.alllaw.com; (c) “Civil Justice for

Victims of Crime”, http://co.marion.or.us.

See the famous O.J. Simpson case: “In 1994,

Simpson was arrested and charged with the murders

of his ex-wife, and her boyfriend. He was acquitted

by a jury. In 1997 a civil court awarded $33.5 million

judgment against him for the victims' wrongful

deaths.”, https://en.wikipedia.org. Underlying the

identical material facts, Simpson could be sued by

civil court (where he lost); and criminal court (were

he did not lose). This fact evidenced that for

Respondent’s actions, the victim Petitioner could file

ciyil complaints at civil court, while using the words

or terminologies in criminal laws.

Petitioner called and contacted multiple law

firms, and was clearly and 100% firmly told that a

bodily or personal injury victim could file civil

lawsuits for defendant’s criminal actions. But they

failed to provide a statute of it. Wherefore, to accept

this petition is very important, which will resolve the

conflict issues in laws and procedures.

Petitioner continually stated in court that she did

not sue Respondent’s criminal actions, but used

those words in criminal laws, demonstrated his

intentional discriminations and retaliations.

Lower courts ruled that Respondent’s criminal

actions must b,e sued in criminal court.

“having

Additional question: when peoples

knowledge of the actual commission of a felony [of

Respondent] cognizable by a court of the United

States, ...... make known the same to some judge”,

(see 18 U.S.C. §4). Does the judge has the duty not to

;•

conceal these criminal actions, but further process

it?

5. Multiple mediums, and thousands and

thousands peoples, concern petitioner’s life

and support her lawsuits.

Petitioner shouts loudly not only for herself, but

also for other similarly suffered minorities.

Petitioner has many many supporters. There are

multiple mediums, about 30 organizations, (which

estimate leading and representing more than 22,400

peoples), all concern and support her lawsuits

against Respondent. See App. H. Multiple mediums

published her stories for the public to know what

happening. The “Alliance Cultural Media, Inc.,

(ACM)” published it at YouTube, where for ACM

only, it has about 195,000 subscribers. DCTV,

Fairfax Public Access TV station, Greenbelt Access

Television and/or more TV stations published it.

These and more TV stations, newspapers, websites,

WeChat (Chinese Americans spread news) and more,

would publish more stories for it. Because it has

important issues, which are concerned by the

peoples. All of them support and concern Petitioner,

and sincerely hope Honorable Judges to accept the

petition, resolve questions and disputes, and order

fair judgments on it.

6. Comments, “EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW” a phrase engraved on the front of this building.

This instant case, indeed, is exceptional

importance. It is illogical, irrational and inconsistent

to have dismissed the discrimination, retaliation,

and equal protection claims against Respondent,

while important material facts, laws, or objects were

being altered or concealed. Dismissing this suit,is

obviously contrary to “EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER

LAW” -- a phrase engraved on the front of this

building. “[T]he denial of equal justice is still within

the prohibition of the constitution.” Yick Wo v.

Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).

Lower court dismissed this lawsuit contradicts

that “....when ruling on a defendant’s motion to

dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual

allegatio Lower court dismissed this lawsuit

contradicts that ns contained in the complaint.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations

omitted).

Lower court dismissed this lawsuit contradicts

that “where there is a legal right, there is also a

legal remedy...” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,

1874 (2017) (citation omitted) (Breyer, J.,

dissenting). Dismissing this suit was also contrary

to: “'No man in this country is so high that he is

above the law. No officer of the law may set that law

at defiance with impunity. All officers of the

government, from the highest to the lowest, are

creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.” Davis

v, Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246 (1976) (citations

omitted). It seems that the Supreme Court has not

settled an employment case related to Petitioner

suffered from Respondent, see above Questions and

statements.

The Supreme Court, furthermore, repeatedly

reminded that government employees’ speech is

often most valuable when it concerns a subject they

know best: their jobs. See, Waters v. Churchill, 511

U.S.

661,

674 (1994)

(plurality opinion)

)

(“Government employees are often in the best

position to know what ails the agencies for which

they work;...”). “The discharge of one tells the others

that they engage in protected activity at their peril.”

Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1419

(2016) (citation omitted).

If permitted the outcome to stand uncorrected, it

would likely introduce confusion into the body of the

law in nationwide. The principles involved, also, are

important to others and likely to arise frequently.

Petitioner plans to have a lawyer representing

her, when her petition is granted.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Should Be Granted

Respectfully submitted

Qihui Huang, M.S.________

P.O. Box 34014

Bethesda, Maryland 20827

(240) 423-0406

qhh@hotmail.com.com

Petitioner, Pro Se

Dated on: September 11, 2019

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.