Amicus Curiae Brief — Arlene's Flowers, Inc., dba Arlene's Flowers and Gifts, et al., Petitioners v. Washington, et al.
Supreme Court briefOct 15, 2019
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No. 19-333
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
__________________________________________
ARLENE’S FLOWERS, INC., DBA ARLENE’S
FLOWERS AND GIFTS, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,
Respondents.
__________________________________________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Washington
__________________________________________
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
THE ETHICS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
COMMISSION OF THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST
CONVENTION, THE ISLAM AND RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM ACTION TEAM OF THE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM INSTITUTE, AND THE
JEWISH COALITION FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
__________________________________________
DAVID H. THOMPSON
Counsel of Record
JOHN D. OHLENDORF
HALEY N. PROCTOR
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
1523 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 220-9600
dthompson@cooperkirk.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
October 15, 2019
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1
INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 4
ARGUMENT .............................................................. 5
I.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S RELIGION CLAUSES
BAR THE GOVERNMENT FROM COMPELLING
PARTICIPATION IN RELIGIOUS EVENTS. ................. 5
II.
THE WASHINGTON COURT’S INJUNCTION
VIOLATES THIS LIMIT BY REQUIRING PETITIONER
TO ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE IN RELIGIOUS
CEREMONIES. ..................................................... 10
A. All of the major Western religions,
including Petitioner’s faith, view
weddings as sacred events with
inherent religious significance. ............. 11
1. Judaism. ........................................... 11
2. Christianity. ..................................... 14
3. Islam. ................................................ 16
B. The injunction compels Petitioner to
participate in same-sex weddings she
finds objectionable as a matter of
conscience. .............................................. 19
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 25
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
573 U.S. 682 (2014) ............................................... 25
Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) ................................................. 6
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1 (2004) ..................................................... 7
Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) ................................................ 6
Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) ................................................. 9
Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) ............................... 2, 3, 4, 9, 10
Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983) ................................................. 8
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) ............................................. 6
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290 (2000) ................................................. 5
School Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) ................................................. 9
iii
CONSTITUTIONS
U.S. CONST.
amend. I ............................................................... 2, 5
amend. XIV .............................................................. 5
MASS. CONST. art. III (1780) ...................................... 8
STATUTES AND RULES
Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785)
art I .......................................................................... 2
art. II ................................................................ 2, 8, 9
CODE OF CANON LAW Can. 1124 ............................... 15
1 Eliz. 1, c.2 (1559) ................................................. 6, 7
3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A COLLECTION
OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 170–71
(W.W. Hening ed., 1823).......................................... 7
SUP. CT. R.
10(c) .......................................................................... 4
37.2(a) ...................................................................... 1
37.6 ........................................................................... 1
OTHER AUTHORITIES
2 Corinthians 6:14–18 .............................................. 15
Deuteronomy
7:3 ........................................................................... 13
24:1 ......................................................................... 11
Ephesians 5:22–33 ................................................... 14
iv
Exodus 20:2 .............................................................. 25
Genesis
1:28 ......................................................................... 12
2:18 ......................................................................... 12
2:24 ................................................................... 11, 14
24:58 ....................................................................... 11
John
2:1–11 ..................................................................... 14
3:28–29 ................................................................... 14
Leviticus 20:26.......................................................... 25
Matthew
9:15 ......................................................................... 14
19:6 ......................................................................... 14
25:1–13 ................................................................... 14
Quran
2:221 ....................................................................... 18
5:5 ........................................................................... 18
30:21 ....................................................................... 17
60:10 ....................................................................... 18
Revelation 21:2 ......................................................... 14
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) .......................................... 9
A Christian View of Civil Marriage, FOCUS ON THE
FAMILY, https://bit.ly/2IgJHMc ............................. 16
A Service of Christian Marriage, DISCIPLESHIP
MINISTRIES: THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH,
https://bit.ly/2nedUUZ ........................................... 15
v
Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, The Purpose of
Marriage in Islam, ISLAMIC INSIGHTS,
https://bit.ly/2MdzCkl ............................................ 17
BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER ........................................ 22
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
(2d ed. 1994) ..................................................... 15, 16
Customs of Shavuot, ORTHODOX UNION
(June 30, 2006), https://bit.ly/2pXHzCI ................ 21
Dr. Russell Moore, Should a Minister Officiate
at the Weddings of Unbelievers?
(Sept. 11, 2008), https://bit.ly/2pCuyOJ................ 15
(NUHP%XùUD(NLQFL, Marriage ceremonies in
Islam, DAILY SABAH (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2ICSx7p....................................... 18, 19
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN WORSHIP........................... 22
GEORGE MONGER, MARRIAGE CUSTOMS OF THE
WORLD (2004) ................................................... 16, 18
JOSEPH H. HERTZ, THE AUTHORIZED DAILY
PRAYER BOOK (1965) .............................................. 12
Lauren Dubell-Beadle, Your Chuppah—
Everything You Need To Know, SMASHING THE
GLASS (Apr. 17, 2018), https://bit.ly/2nlSDbQ ...... 21
Marriage Guidelines, ST. MARY OF THE
ASSUMPTION CATHOLIC CHURCH,
https://bit.ly/34XDoHf............................................ 21
Marriage, THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND,
https://bit.ly/2o0I5zs ........................................ 15, 16
vi
Menachem Posner, What is Shabbat?,
CHABBAD.ORG, https://bit.ly/2IjlTrp....................... 22
Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and
Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2003) ................... 7, 8
Nikah (Marriage) & Walima (Reception) in Islam,
CENTRAL-MOSQUE.COM, https://bit.ly/2w9s3Dy ... 18,
19
Planning a Catholic Wedding, FOR YOUR
MARRIAGE, https://bit.ly/2OdN0aR........................ 15
Planning Your Catholic Wedding, CATHOLIC
WEDDING HELP, https://bit.ly/2McDZvY ............... 21
Rabbi Maurice Lamm, Choosing the Date for
the Jewish Wedding, CHABAD.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2nLy2OF ........................................... 12
Rabbi Maruice Lamm, Designing the Jewish
Wedding: The Rabbi, CHABAD.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2mXpPpU .......................................... 13
Rabbi Maurice Lamm, Fasting on the Jewish
Wedding Day, CHABAD.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2psBzBO ..................................... 12, 13
Rabbi Maurice Lamm, Jewish Betrothal
Blessings, CHABAD.ORG, https://bit.ly/2oB9Myy ... 13
Rabbi Maurice Lamm, The Bridal Canopy (Chuppah), CHABAD.ORG, https://bit.ly/30QU1kE .......... 21
vii
Rabbi Maurice Lamm, The Jewish Betrothal
(Kiddushin), CHABAD.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2nZhna6 ............................................ 11
Rabbi Maurice Lamm, The Jewish Marriage
Ceremony, CHABAD.ORG, https://bit.ly/2nV13aw .. 11
Rabbi Maurice Lamm, The Jewish Nuptials
(Nissuin), CHABAD.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2n15JLv ...................................... 11, 12
Rabbi Maurice Lamm, The Prayers on the
Jewish Wedding Day, CHABAD.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2oyOtxE ............................................ 13
Rabbi Shlomo Shulman, Guide to the Jewish
Wedding, AISH.COM (June 30, 2001),
https://bit.ly/2MDeYvM ............................. 12, 13, 14
Rev. Brian Croft, When Should a Pastor Say
‘No’ to a Wedding?, THE GOSPEL COALITION
(Feb. 19, 2016), https://bit.ly/2oanFnp ................. 15
Rev. Douglas Escue, The Colors of the Liturgical
Seasons, LUTHERAN CHURCH MISSOURI SYNOD,
https://bit.ly/2OhYxGg ........................................... 21
SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN AMERICA 513 (1902)............................... 8
Saqib Saab, Weddings: To Separate Or Not To
Separate, MUSLIM MATTERS (May 22, 2008),
https://bit.ly/2OjHeob ............................................ 19
Saulat Pervez, Family: The Building Blocks of
Society, WHYISLAM.ORG, https://bit.ly/2LKT7Sf ... 17
viii
Shaahima Fahim, Must Wedding Bells Go
Ka-Ching?, MUSLIM MATTERS (Nov. 18, 2013),
https://bit.ly/2ANxB93 ........................................... 19
Suzana Nabil Saad, How Does a Muslim Get
Married?, ABOUTISLAM.NET (Jan. 1, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2ADNgIf ...................................... 17, 18
Tariq Nisar Ahmed, Fiqh of Love, MUSLIM
MATTERS (May 11, 2009),
https://bit.ly/2oOvgYW .......................................... 17
Why Not Milk & Meat?, AISH.COM,
http://bit.ly/35fCDcA .............................................. 22
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici are various organizations dedicated to promoting religious freedom. The Ethics and Religious
Liberty Commission (“ERLC”) is the moral concerns
and public policy entity of the Southern Baptist Convention, the nation’s largest Protestant denomination,
with over 46,000 churches and 15.2 million members.
The ERLC is charged by the Convention with addressing public policy affecting such issues as religious liberty, marriage and family, the sanctity of human life,
and ethics. The Islam and Religious Freedom Action
Team of the Religious Freedom Institute amplifies
Muslim voices on religious freedom, seeks a deeper
understanding of the support for religious freedom inside the teachings of Islam, and protects the religious
freedom of Muslims. The Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty is an incorporated group of lawyers, rabbis, and communal professionals who practice Judaism and are committed to defending religious liberty.
Although this case involves Christian religious
beliefs, the decision below is of great concern to all
faith groups, including especially members of minority religions, who depend upon the Religion Clauses to
1 Pursuant to SUP. CT. R. 37.2(a), Amici certify that counsel
of record for all parties received timely notice of the intent to file
this brief, and that all parties have given written or blanket consent to the filing of this brief. Pursuant to SUP. CT. R. 37.6, Amici
certify that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole
or in part, no party or party’s counsel made a monetary contribution to fund its preparation or submission, and no person other
than amici or their counsel made such a monetary contribution.
2
protect their rights of conscience. Amici therefore urge
the Court to grant certiorari and vacate the injunction
that coerces Petitioner to attend and participate in religious ceremonies.
INTRODUCTION
In 1779, Thomas Jefferson staked out a bold position on the relationship between church and state:
Because “Almighty God hath created the mind free,
and manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether insusceptible of restraint, . . . no man [should] be compelled to frequent
. . . any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever.” Act for Establishing Religious Freedom art. I &
II (1785). When the People enshrined the First
Amendment into their fundamental charter, they
made this principle the law of the land—barring the
state from enacting any “establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
The freedom of conscience secured by these Religion Clauses was a significant, and deliberate, break
with the past. For in earlier times, Governments (including the American States) had often compelled
their citizenry to attend worship regularly. In direct
contrast to these earlier intrusions upon liberty of conscience, “[i]t is beyond dispute” that the First Amendment takes these types of laws off the table, “guarantee[ing] that government may not coerce anyone to . . .
participate in religion or its exercise.” Lee v. Weisman,
3
505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); see also id. at 640–42 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“no quarrel” with that proposition).
Yet the Washington courts in this case imposed
a permanent injunction flatly contrary to this bedrock
principle. That injunction requires Petitioner—owner
and operator of a floral shop that specializes in creating custom floral arrangements for weddings—to offer
her services “on the same terms” to opposite-sex and
same-sex couples, without “any disparate treatment.”
Pet.App.140a. Because one of the services Petitioner
offers is the “full wedding support” package—which
entails attending the wedding, “participat[ing] in rituals that occur” there, and “do[ing] whatever it takes
to make the entire ceremony an enjoyable and successful event,” Pet.App.383a–84a—the effect of this
injunction is to require Petitioner to attend and participate in same-sex weddings.
That violates Petitioner’s core rights of conscience. Throughout history, marriage has been recognized as an event of special religious significance. Indeed, all three major Western religions view the wedding ceremony as an inherently spiritual event—an
opportunity for believers to worship God and celebrate
an institution that, according to these beliefs, He instituted and ordained. For many religious believers,
attending and participating in these ceremonies is
thus a matter of deep spiritual significance—and forcing them to attend and participate in marriage ceremonies they object to as a matter of conscience violates their most deeply held beliefs. In Petitioner’s
case, as she explains, she believes that participating
4
in same-sex weddings “would go against God’s definition of marriage,” Pet.App.373a, would be “dishonoring to God,” and would make her “accountable to the
Lord,” Pet.App.387a. Forcing Petitioner to attend
wedding ceremonies she finds deeply objectionable as
a matter of conscience would thus “coerce [her] to support or participate in” religious ceremonies, in violation of our deepest Constitutional commitments. Lee,
505 U.S. at 587.
Washington State can no more compel dissenting
citizens to attend and participate in weddings they
find objectionable as a matter of conscience than it can
fine them for missing Mass on Sunday. This Court
should grant the writ. SUP. CT. R. 10(c).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Perhaps the most central guarantee of the
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses is that the State
cannot compel citizens to attend and participate in religious services they find objectionable as a matter of
conscience. Compulsory religious attendance was the
signal feature of the religious establishments the
First Amendment was designed to forbid. And the
freedom not to engage in religious observances has
long been part of the unquestioned bedrock of this
Court’s religious liberty jurisprudence. As the Court
explained (on this point, without dissent) in Lee v.
Weisman, “[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a minimum,
the Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or
its exercise.” 505 U.S. at 587.
5
II. The injunction imposed by the Washington
courts below directly violates this settled rule. All of
the major Western religions view the wedding ceremony as an inherently religious event. Weddings generally are led by spiritual leaders and involve explicit
acts of worship such as public prayer, benedictions,
scripture readings, and the singing of hymns. But the
injunction at issue in this case would compel Petitioner, by force of law, to attend and participate in
these religious ceremonies—even when she objects to
doing so, as a matter of conscience, because she sincerely believes her involvement “would go against
God’s definition of marriage.” Pet.App.373a. That result violates both Religion Clauses, and this Court
cannot allow it to stand.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S RELIGION CLAUSES
BAR THE GOVERNMENT FROM COMPELLING PARTICIPATION IN RELIGIOUS EVENTS.
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment establish the twin commands that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, nor
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses not only share
the Bill of Rights’ first sentence; they share a “common purpose”: “to secure religious liberty.” Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000) (quotation marks omitted). When the State acts to require
an individual, by force of law, to participate in a
6
religious ceremony that is contrary to her beliefs, it
has violated both Clauses in a single stroke. For the
Establishment Clause does not brook the “compulsion
by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of
any form of worship.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940). And the Free Exercise Clause
likewise forbids the Government from requiring individuals to participate in religious ceremonies they
find objectionable as a matter of conscience. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018) (“[I]t can be assumed that a member of the clergy who objects to gay
marriage on moral and religious grounds could not be
compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of
his or her right to the free exercise of religion.”). 2
The history of the Religion Clauses demonstrates
that the freedom not to attend religious ceremonies
was the very paradigm of the liberty of conscience
those provisions were designed to secure. At the time
of the Founding, English law had since 1559 required
“all and every person” to “resort to their parish church
or chapel . . . upon every Sunday” to “abide orderly and
soberly during the time of the common prayer, preachings, or other service of God” under pain of a fine of
As the Court’s statement in Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects, the Free Exercise Clause encompasses a historicallyrooted prohibition against laws that coerce individuals to engage
in religious worship or practices that is distinct from its constraints on laws that regulate physical acts associated with the
“exercise of religion,” see Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
2
7
“twelve pence.” 1 Eliz. 1, c.2 (1559). “Established religion came to these shores with the earliest colonists,”
Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2115 (2003), and
while the strength of these establishments waned
over time during the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary periods, even “[a]t the founding, at least six
States had established religions.” Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring). The men who wrote and adopted the
First Amendment at the end of the eighteenth century
were exceedingly familiar with established churches,
and they were well aware that the hallmark of the
type of practice they meant the Religion Clauses to
bar was forced attendance at, and participation in, religious services.
Virginia law, for instance, until 1776 had required “any person or persons of the age of twenty one
years or more” to “resort to their parrish church or
chappel once in two months to hear devine service
upon the sabbath day,” on pain of forfeiting “five shillings or fifty pounds of tobacco” (though dissenters
from the established Anglican church were permitted
to attend other authorized Protestant sects). 3 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA 170–71 (W.W. Hening ed., 1823).
The requirement was robustly enforced; “[i]n a study
of grand jury presentments in Virginia between 1720
and 1750, missing church was the most common indicted offense in eleven of the twenty-two counties; it
8
was the second most common offense in seven of the
others.” McConnel, supra, at 2145.
Other States enforced similar laws making
church attendance compulsory. Massachusetts’s 1780
Constitution (drafted principally by John Adams) expressly authorized the legislature “to enjoin upon all
the subjects an attendance upon the instructions of
[Protestant teachers of piety], at stated times and seasons, if there be any on whose instructions they can
conscientiously and conveniently attend.” MASS.
CONST. art. III (1780). And Connecticut imposed a
“penalty for non-attendance upon Church” until 1816.
SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
AMERICA 513 (1902).
The drafting history of the First Amendment
leaves no doubt that the Framers had such laws compelling church attendance front and center in their
minds when they enacted the Federal Constitution’s
religious liberty guarantee. This Court has often
looked to Virginia’s disestablishment of religion as especially instructive evidence of the First Amendment’s meaning, “because that colony took the lead in
defining religious rights.” Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 788 n.5 (1983). One of the key documents in
Virginia’s disestablishment was the Act Establishing
Religious Freedom—written by Jefferson in 1779 and
finally adopted in 1785—which made clear that the
foundation-stone of religious liberty was the principle
“[t]hat no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever.” Act for Establishing Religious Freedom art. II
9
(1785), available at https://bit.ly/2pnvu9M. Indeed, in
introducing his draft of the proposed Religion Clauses
before the First Congress, James Madison explained
that “he apprehended the meaning of the words to be,
that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel
men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience.” 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 758 (Joseph Gales
ed., 1834).
This Court has long understood that the freedom
not to participate in mandatory religious observance
is the bedrock of liberty of conscience. One of the earliest principles to emerge as the Court’s religious liberty jurisprudence began to take modern form in the
1960s was the rule that the Government cannot require schoolchildren to participate in “religious activity” such as compulsory prayer. Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 424 (1962). Such “require[d] religious exercises,” this Court insisted, were “in direct violation” of
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. School
Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
224 (1963). And while the fractured opinions in Lee v.
Weisman reflect a variety of approaches to the Religion Clauses, one of the few points of common ground
in that case was that “[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise.” 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992);
see also id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (First
Amendment bars “Government pressure to participate in a religious activity”); id. at 609 (Souter, J.,
10
concurring) (Government cannot “coerce religious observance”); id. at 640–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy
and of financial support by force of law and threat of
penalty. Typically, attendance at the state church was
required . . . .”).
Determining the proper scope of the Religion
Clauses is often a difficult endeavor. But under the
text and original meaning of those provisions, and the
longstanding precedent interpreting them, there is at
least one easy rule: the Government cannot compel individuals to attend or participate in religious observances to which they object as a matter of conscience.
II.
THE WASHINGTON COURT’S INJUNCTION VIO-
LATES THIS LIMIT BY REQUIRING PETITIONER TO
ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE IN RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES.
The injunction Washington sought and obtained
in this case flagrantly violates this simple, bedrock
rule. All three of the major Western religions—including Petitioner’s own Christian faith—view the marriage ceremony as an inherently sacred event, suffused with religious significance. Washington’s injunction would force Petitioner to attend and participate in these inescapably religious ceremonies—specifically including same-sex wedding ceremonies, to
which Petitioner objects as a matter of deep religious
commitment. That result cannot stand. Washington
can no more require its citizens to attend and
11
participate in wedding ceremonies than it could fine
dissenters for failing to attend Church on Sunday.
A. All of the major Western religions, including Petitioner’s faith, view weddings as sacred events with inherent
religious significance.
1. Judaism.
The traditional Jewish wedding, as currently
practiced in the Western world, combines two separate stages or ceremonies: Kiddushin, or the formal
betrothal, and nissuin, or the nuptials. Rabbi Maurice
Lamm, The Jewish Marriage Ceremony, CHABAD.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2nV13aw. “The Betrothal portion of the
ceremony consists of a preliminary benediction, the
marriage proposal, and the giving of the ring.” Rabbi
Maurice Lamm, The Jewish Betrothal (Kiddushin),
CHABAD.ORG, https://bit.ly/2nZhna6. Although they
vary across branches of Judaism, the customs and
practices surrounding Kiddushin are rooted in the Bible. See Genesis 24:58, Deuteronomy 24:1. Once the
betrothal is complete, the ceremony concludes with
the nuptial ceremony, in which “the couple stands under the chuppah [a special canopy], [and] the officiant
recites the seven marriage blessings.” Rabbi Maurice
Lamm, The Jewish Nuptials (Nissuin), CHABAD.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2n15JLv. Both elements of the wedding
ceremony are suffused with religious significance.
Jews believe that marriage itself was instituted
by God, Genesis 2:24, and is a divine blessing that
both provides companionship for the husband and
12
wife and ensures for the procreation of future generations, Genesis 1:28, 2:18. Marriage is viewed as a covenant, and it is patterned after the paradigmatic covenant, in the Jewish tradition, “the covenant of G-d
and His people, Israel.” Rabbi Lamm, supra, The Jewish Nuptials (Nissuin). Moreover, the wedding day itself has special religious significance, since it “is considered a personal Yom Kippur for the chatan (Hebrew for groom) and kallah (bride), for on this day all
their past mistakes are forgiven as they merge into a
new, complete soul.” Rabbi Shlomo Shulman, Guide to
the Jewish Wedding, AISH.COM (June 30, 2001),
https://bit.ly/2MDeYvM.
The religious significance of the wedding ceremony in the Jewish tradition is underscored by the
many religious rules and limits that govern the wedding and the dates on which it may be scheduled under Jewish law. Rabbi Maurice Lamm, Choosing the
Date for the Jewish Wedding, CHABAD.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2nLy2OF. Moreover, the central declaration that the groom makes to the bride is only one sentence long, declaring that the betrothal is being conducted “according to the law of Moses and of Israel.”
JOSEPH H. HERTZ, THE AUTHORIZED DAILY PRAYER
BOOK 1011 (1965). Although not every branch of Judaism follows it, “an ancient tradition advises bride
and groom to fast on the day of their wedding”—in
part, again, because the event is viewed as “a day of
forgiveness” for the bride and groom, making the
event a time “of spiritual inventory and of repentance,
akin to Yom Kippur.” Rabbi Maurice Lamm, Fasting
13
on the Jewish Wedding Day, CHABAD.ORG, https://
bit.ly/2psBzBO. And “[i]t is customary for the chatan
and kallah not to see each other for one week preceding the wedding.” Rabbi Shulman, supra, Guide to the
Jewish Wedding.
Punctuating the inherently religious nature of
marriage in orthodox Judaism, intermarriage between a Jew and a member of any other religion is
strictly forbidden. Deuteronomy 7:3.
The wedding itself “is not simply a beautiful ceremony—it is an intricate web of laws and customs
that the Torah has ordained and society has developed for the protection of the family and social morality.” Rabbi Maruice Lamm, Designing the Jewish
Wedding: The Rabbi, CHABAD.ORG, https://bit.ly
/2mXpPpU. Accordingly, the wedding generally must
be overseen by a Rabbi—who “has no part in effecting
the marriage itself,” but who is critical to ensuring
“that the marriage process is executed according to
the laws of Moses and Israel.” Id. And the ceremony
includes multiple elements of religious worship. Specific prayers are recited. Rabbi Maurice Lamm, The
Prayers on the Jewish Wedding Day, CHABAD.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2oyOtxE. The officiating rabbi reads a
betrothal blessing invoking “the L-rd our G-d, King of
the universe” who “has sanctified His people Israel.”
Rabbi Maurice Lamm, Jewish Betrothal Blessings,
CHABAD.ORG, https://bit.ly/2oB9Myy. Rabbis, members of the couple’s family, and/or the couple’s friends
recite seven benedictions meditating on “our faith in
God as Creator of the world, Bestower of joy and love,
14
and the ultimate Redeemer of our people.” Rabbi
Shulman, supra, Guide to the Jewish Wedding.
The wedding thus occupies a place of deep religious significance, according to traditional Judaism.
The ceremony is a spiritual event “full of meaningful
rituals, symbolizing the beauty of the relationship of
husband and wife, as well as their obligations to each
other and to the Jewish people.” Rabbi Shulman, supra, Guide to the Jewish Wedding.
2. Christianity.
While many of its specific understandings and
practices differ from Judaism, the traditional Christian understanding of the wedding unites with the
Jewish faith in viewing the event as an inherently religious ceremony. Like Jews, most Christians view
marriage as a relationship instituted by God at the
time of the creation of the world. Genesis 2:24. Christ
reaffirmed the divine origin of the institution, teaching “what God has joined together, let not man separate.” Matthew 19:6. Jesus performed his first miracle
at a wedding in Cana of Galilee. John 2:1–11. And for
many Christians, marriage takes on a special religious significance because of Christ’s repeated statements comparing Himself to a Bridegroom, see Matthew 9:15, 25:1–13; see also John 3:28–29, and St.
Paul’s comparison of the relationship between husband and wife as a symbol of the relationship between
Christ and the Church. Ephesians 5:22–33; see also
Revelation 21:2; Pet.App.385a (noting that marriage
has special significance for Petitioner because “the
15
Bible compares marriage to the relationship between
Jesus and His Church”).
Like Judaism, Christianity places certain restrictions on weddings that reinforce their religious
significance. Many Christian denominations either
will not perform a wedding between unbelievers, or
between a believer and someone who is not a member
of the faith, or require special permission for such a
marriage to occur. See 2 Corinthians 6:14–18; CODE
OF CANON LAW Can. 1124, available at https://
bit.ly/2ptmqjI; Dr. Russell Moore, Should a Minister
Officiate at the Weddings of Unbelievers? (Sept. 11,
2008), https://bit.ly/2pCuyOJ. Many church bodies
will also decline to conduct a wedding between persons they believe are engaged in an open, public sin
such as cohabitation before marriage. Rev. Brian
Croft, When Should a Pastor Say ‘No’ to a Wedding?,
THE GOSPEL COALITION (Feb. 19, 2016), https://bit.ly/
2oanFnp.
The traditional Christian marriage ceremony is
itself an inherently religious event. Indeed, Roman
Catholics consider marriage to be a sacrament. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 400 (2d ed. 1994). A
Christian wedding ordinarily incorporates all of the
features of a worship service: readings from the Bible,
prayers led by the minister, the singing of Christian
hymns, and the delivery of a homily or sermon. Planning a Catholic Wedding, FOR YOUR MARRIAGE,
https://bit.ly/2OdN0aR; A Service of Christian Marriage, DISCIPLESHIP MINISTRIES: THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, https://bit.ly/2nedUUZ; Marriage, THE
16
CHURCH OF ENGLAND, https://bit.ly/2o0I5zs. The wedding may also include the celebration of Holy Communion. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra,
at 405.
The traditional Christian wedding thus is ordinarily conducted in a house of worship and officiated
by a religious minister. Cf. Pet.22 (noting that Respondents Ingersoll and Feed’s marriage was led by a
minister). But even when a wedding is conducted
solely by civil authorities, and is designed to be devoid
of outward religious content, the event still retains intense religious significance for many Christians.
Whatever the ceremonial trappings, it remains, in
many Christian church bodies, an institution established and ordained by God, a symbol of the relationship between Christ and the Church, and a sacred covenant binding in the eyes of God. See A Christian View
of Civil Marriage, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY,
https://bit.ly/2IgJHMc; CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH, supra, at 400.
3. Islam.
As in the Christian and Judaic traditions, in Islam a wedding is an act of worship with deep religious
significance. Due to the wide geographic compass of
the Muslim world, there are a variety of differing cultural traditions associated with Islamic weddings; a
Muslim wedding in Indonesia may feature many traditional customs not present in an Egyptian wedding.
GEORGE MONGER, MARRIAGE CUSTOMS OF THE WORLD
160 (2004). Yet there remains a core of shared
17
marriage traditions and practices, and part of that
core is the uniform belief that a wedding is a religious
event.
Much like the other two Abrahamic faiths, Islam
views marriage as a divinely-instituted blessing; according to the Quran, “[a]nd of [God’s] signs is that He
created for you from yourselves mates that you may
find tranquility in them; and He placed between you
affection and mercy.” Quran 30:21. In the Islamic
faith, marriage is viewed as “a sacred social contract
between a man and a woman,” Saulat Pervez, Family:
The Building Blocks of Society, WHYISLAM.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2LKT7Sf, and because of the many blessings it brings, it is affirmatively encouraged by the
Muslim faith, Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, The Purpose
of Marriage in Islam, ISLAMIC INSIGHTS, https://
bit.ly/2MdzCkl. Chief among these blessings, according to Islamic belief, is the role of marriage in
strengthening the spiritual life of both husband and
wife. Id. Indeed, the Prophet Muhammad taught that
when choosing a spouse, the primary consideration
should be the potential partner’s “deen” or faith and
piety. Tariq Nisar Ahmed, Fiqh of Love, MUSLIM MATTERS (May 11, 2009), https://bit.ly/2oOvgYW; Suzana
Nabil Saad, How Does a Muslim Get Married?,
ABOUTISLAM.NET (Jan. 1, 2017), https://bit.ly/
2ADNgIf.
As with Judaism and Christianity, the fundamentally sacred nature of marriage in the Islamic
faith is underscored by the religious restrictions
placed on potential marital partners. The Quran
18
places specific limits on the ability of either male or
female Muslims to marry outside the faith. See Quran
2:221, 5:5, 60:10.
Given the deep religious significance of marriage
in the Islamic tradition, there can be no surprise that
the wedding ceremony itself is viewed as a religious
event. Although, again, there is much variance in cultural detail, the shared core of the wedding ceremony—or nikah—is steeped in religious significance.
The nikah is considered a sacred ceremony; it generally takes place in a mosque, Nikah (Marriage) &
Walima (Reception) in Islam, CENTRAL-MOSQUE.COM,
https://bit.ly/2w9s3Dy, and it is officiated by an Imam
or other scholar of Islamic law, (NUHP%XùUD(NLQFL,
Marriage ceremonies in Islam, DAILY SABAH (Oct. 19,
2017), https://bit.ly/2ICSx7p; MONGER, supra, at 160.
The ceremony begins with a sermon by the officiant
“invit[ing] the bride and the groom, as well as the participating guests in the assembly to a life of piety, mutual love, kindness, and social responsibility,” Saad,
supra, How Does a Muslim Get Married?, and it concludes with prayer, or “dua,” such as “May Allah bless
you and bless it for you and may He join you with
goodness!” Nikah (Marriage) & Walima (Reception) in
Islam, supra; see also Saad, supra, How Does a Muslim Get Married?
The nikah ceremony is traditionally followed by
a celebratory banquet, or walima. Id. At a traditional
Muslim wedding, the male and female guests attending the walima will be seated separately, with a partition between them, in compliance with the Quran’s
19
command against improper and immodest mixing of
the sexes. Saqib Saab, Weddings: To Separate Or Not
To Separate, MUSLIM MATTERS (May 22, 2008),
https://bit.ly/2OjHeob; Nikah (Marriage) & Walima
(Reception) in Islam, supra.
As in the other Abrahamic religious traditions,
the wedding is thus an event of deep spiritual significance in the Muslim faith, “[a] sacred ceremony,” Ekinci, supra, Marriage ceremonies in Islam, and fundamentally “an act of worship,” Shaahima Fahim, Must
Wedding Bells Go Ka-Ching?, MUSLIM MATTERS (Nov.
18, 2013), https://bit.ly/2ANxB93.
B. The injunction compels Petitioner to
participate in same-sex weddings she
finds objectionable as a matter of conscience.
The permanent injunction entered and affirmed
by the courts below provides as follows:
[Petitioner and her employees] are permanently enjoined and restrained from . . . discriminating against any person because of
their sexual orientation. The terms of this
permanent injunction include a prohibition
against any disparate treatment in the offering or sale of goods, merchandise, or services to any person because of their sexual
orientation, including but not limited to the
offering or sale of goods, merchandise, or
services to same-sex couples. All goods, merchandise, and services offered or sold by
20
[Petitioner] shall be offered and sold on the
same terms to all customers without regard
to sexual orientation . . . , including but not
limited to goods, merchandise and services
for weddings & commitment ceremonies.
Pet.App.140a.
By its plain meaning and effect, this injunction
requires Petitioner to participate in wedding ceremonies she finds objectionable as a matter of religious
faith. One of the principal “services for weddings” that
Petitioner “offers or sells” is what she describes as
“full wedding support.” When an engaged couple purchases this package, Petitioner explains,
Arlene’s floral designers offer to help before,
during, and after the wedding ceremony to
ensure that all flowers are beautiful
throughout the ceremony and reception. Often this might require touching up an arrangements, changing out flowers if needed,
attending the ceremony, and assisting with
the clean-up and removal of floral arrangements afterwards.
Pet.App.383–84.
Designing, creating, and installing the floral arrangements for a wedding is a critical part of the marriage ceremony, and the floral arrangements carry religious significance in many faiths. As Petitioner testified below, her floral “creations adorn the ceremony
and often define the style and colors of the wedding.”
Pet.App.382a. In the Christian tradition, for example,
21
a couple may choose white flowers, as a symbol of purity; or the color of the flowers may be designed to
match the liturgical colors of the current season of the
Church year. See Marriage Guidelines, ST. MARY OF
THE ASSUMPTION CATHOLIC CHURCH, https://bit.ly/
34XDoHf; Rev. Douglas Escue, The Colors of the Liturgical Seasons, LUTHERAN CHURCH MISSOURI
SYNOD, https://bit.ly/2OhYxGg. In some Catholic weddings, it is customary for the couple to present a bouquet of flowers before a statue of the Virgin Mary, as
a way of venerating the special role the mother of
Christ has within that faith tradition. Planning Your
Catholic Wedding, CATHOLIC WEDDING HELP, https://
bit.ly/2McDZvY. In Jewish weddings, the florist is often called upon to decorate the chuppah, or bridal canopy, which is the “legal instrument” that “formally
permits the couple’s new status of marriage of be actualized.” Maurice Lamm, The Bridal Canopy (Chuppah), CHABAD.ORG, https://bit.ly/30QU1kE; see, e.g.,
Lauren Dubell-Beadle, Your Chuppah—Everything
You Need To Know, SMASHING THE GLASS (Apr. 17,
2018), https://bit.ly/2nlSDbQ. Moreover, Judaism has
long seen floral and plant displays as bearing religious
significance. Rabbis have debated whether particular
holiday displays are praiseworthy or prohibited in
synagogues. Customs of Shavuot, ORTHODOX UNION
(June 30, 2006), https://bit.ly/2pXHzCI.
Even when the couple chooses not to order floral
arrangements with independent religious significance, the work they ask the florist to perform may
implicate the florist’s religious beliefs. In Judaism, for
22
example, merely deriving economic benefit from a
product or service may transgress Jewish law: just as
an Orthodox Jewish merchant may not sell a cheeseburger to any customer due to the mitzvah against deriving any benefit from a mix of dairy and meat, Why
Not Milk & Meat?, AISH.COM, http://bit.ly/35fCDcA, a
Jewish wedding vendor may not be permitted to provide services for a wedding that occurs on the Sabbath
or select holy days, even if her attendance is not required, Menachem Posner, What is Shabbat?, CHABBAD.ORG, https://bit.ly/2IjlTrp. And attendance at the
ceremony, without more, may involve the florist in religious practice. In the Christian faith, for example,
congregants are often called upon to make a collective
promise to uphold the couple in their marriage. EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN WORSHIP 286; BOOK OF COMMON
PRAYER 425.
Moreover, as Petitioner explains,
When I attend wedding ceremonies for Arlene’s, I also participate in rituals that occur
at the wedding. For example, I have frequently stood for the bride, clapped in appreciation of the married couple, and prayed
along with the officiant as the officiant leads
the wedding attendees. . . . When providing
full wedding support, my employees and I
are at the disposal of the Bride and we want
to help any way that we can. I have greeted
guests as they arrived to the ceremony,
helped with entertaining children as the
wedding party prepared for the ceremony,
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styled hair for the wedding party, and even
assisted with cleaning the wedding party’s
attire.”
Pet.App.383–84.
By requiring Petitioner to offer her wedding services on the “same terms to all customers without regard to sexual orientation,” Pet.App.140a, Washington’s injunction thus requires her to attend and participate in same-sex wedding ceremonies. To be sure,
Respondents are not forcing Petitioner to officiate at
those ceremonies, to lead the prayers, or to sing in the
choir. But the protections of the Religion Clauses have
never been confined to ministers or other officiants.
Freedom of religion includes the freedom to practice,
not just to preach, the religion of one’s choosing.
The court below resisted these conclusions, contending that Petitioner “does not claim” that attendance at and participation in the actual wedding event
“are services that she is providing for a fee,” as opposed to “voluntary,” and her participation is thus not
“covered by [the] injunction.” Pet.App.12a. That is incorrect. The record clearly shows that Petitioner’s attendance at, and close involvement in, the wedding
ceremony is an integral part of one of the “services”
she “offers and sells,” Pet.App.140a: the “full wedding
support” package. Pet.App.383. And even if there
were any doubt about that, this argument wholly ignores the fact that the injunction entered below not
only requires that Petitioner offer and sell her “services” to same-sex couples, it further requires her to
24
do so “on the same terms” and without “any disparate
treatment.” Pet.App.140a. Were Petitioner to attend
and “do whatever it takes” when providing floral services for opposite-sex couples, Pet.App.384a, but decline to attend and support same-sex couples in the
same way, there can be no doubt—none at all—that
Respondents would haul her into court for violating
the terms of the injunction. And Respondents would
plainly not be satisfied by any protestation by Petitioner that her disparate participation in opposite-sex
and same-sex weddings was “not before the Court” because she was merely “voluntarily involv[ing] herself”
in some weddings but not others. Pet.App.12a.
The Washington courts also sought to dismiss
the patent violation of religious freedom entailed by
their injunction in another way: by pointing to a supposed contradiction in Petitioner’s (concededly sincere) religious beliefs. While Petitioner “believes that
participating . . . in a same-sex wedding . . . is tantamount to endorsing marriage equality for same-sex
couples” in violation of her faith, the court below noted
that she “acknowledged that selling flowers for an
atheistic or Muslim wedding would not be tantamount
to endorsing those systems of belief.” Pet.App.8a.
There is no tension between those two commitments.
As Petitioner explained, her religious faith is violated
by participating in same-sex weddings not because it
entails any endorsement of the religious beliefs of the
couple, but because it is a tenet of her faith that “God
defines marriage as a spiritual union between one
man and one woman,” and that faith does not allow
25
her to “go against God’s definition of marriage or assist others in doing so.” Pet.App.373a. In a similar
vein, an Orthodox Jewish florist might provide services for a Muslim or Christian wedding while maintaining that it would be prohibited for her to provide
services for a wedding ceremony in which a Jew was
converting to a different religion, since Jewish law enjoins celebrating a Jew’s departure from the covenantal relationship between God and the Jewish people.
Leviticus 20:26; Exodus 20:2. And in any event, even
if the courts below did perceive a contradiction in Petitioner’s belief system, the Constitution makes it utterly inappropriate for them to “tell [Petitioner] that
[her] beliefs are flawed.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724 (2014). As the court below was at pains to emphasize, there is no doubt that
Petitioner’s religious objection to participating in
same-sex weddings is sincere. Pet.App.20a. Under the
First Amendment, that must be the end of the matter.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this Court should grant
the writ and reverse the judgment of the Washington
Supreme Court.
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October 15, 2019
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID H. THOMPSON
Counsel of Record
JOHN D. OHLENDORF
HALEY N. PROCTOR
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
1523 New Hampshire
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 220-9600
dthompson@cooperkirk.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.