Amicus Curiae Brief — Roxanne Torres, Petitioner v. Janice Madrid, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 7, 2020
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No. 19-292
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
ROXANNE TORRES,
Petitioner,
v.
JANICE MADRID AND RICHARD WILLIAMSON,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL
FUND, INC. IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
SHERRILYN A. IFILL
Director-Counsel
JANAI S. NELSON
SAMUEL SPITAL
JIN HEE LEE*
KEVIN E. JASON
ASHOK CHANDRAN
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.
40 Rector St., 5th Floor
New York, NY 10006
(212) 965-2200
jlee@naacpldf.org
DANIEL HARAWA
Of Counsel
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.
700 14TH ST, NW SUITE 600
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc.
*Counsel of Record
February 7, 2020
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................ 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT ......................................................... 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 5
I.
A Police Officer’s Discharge of A Firearm
Is A Quintessential Fourth Amendment
Seizure................................................................... 5
II. The Decision Below Risks Eviscerating the
Primary Vehicles for Ensuring
Accountability for Egregious Police
Misconduct. ........................................................... 8
III. Preserving This Court’s Longstanding
Precedent Regarding Fourth Amendment
Seizure Is Especially Important Given
Law Enforcement’s Historically
Oppressive Use of Weapons in AfricanAmerican Communities. ..................................... 12
A. Law Enforcement Historically
Employed Oppressive Practices,
Including Use of Firearms, to Control
and Intimidate African Americans
Before and After Emancipation. ................. 12
B. African-American Civil Unrest in the
Mid-Twentieth Century, a Response in
ii
Part to Unconstitutional Police
Violence, Led to the Expansive Use of
Weaponry by Police. .................................... 17
C. Far Too Many Law Enforcement
Agencies Throughout the Country
Presently Continue the Excessive Use
of Weapons in African-American
Communities. ...................................... 22
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 28
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 (1972)............................................. 1
Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986) (overruling Swain)............... 1
Berghuis v. Smith,
559 U.S. 314 (2010)............................................. 2
Buck v. Davis,
137 S. Ct. 759 (2017)........................................... 1
California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621 (1991)......................................... 5, 7
Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty.,
396 U.S. 320 (1970)............................................. 1
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 (1983)............................................. 10
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971), holding modified by
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) ......... 3
Davis v. City of New York,
No. 10-cv-699 (S.D.N.Y.) ..................................... 2
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614 (1991)............................................. 1
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
CASES
Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429 (1991)............................................. 6
Flowers v. Mississippi,
139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019)......................................... 2
Georgia v. McCollum,
505 U.S. 42 (1992)............................................... 1
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
482 U.S. 656 (1987)........................................... 14
Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989)........................................... 10
Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48 (2010)............................................... 2
Ham v. South Carolina,
409 U.S. 524 (1973)............................................. 1
Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340 (1987)............................................. 8
Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 673 (1977)............................................. 3
Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499 (2005)............................................. 2
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
CASES
Kennedy v. Louisiana,
554 U.S. 407 (2008)............................................. 2
Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85 (2007)............................................... 2
Kisela v. Hughes,
138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018)......................................... 7
Liberal v. Estrada,
632 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2011)............................. 6
McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987)............................................. 1
Michigan v. Chestnut,
486 U.S. 567 (1988)......................................... 3, 5
Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012)............................................. 2
Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322 (2003)............................................. 2
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017)........................................... 2
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978)........................................... 14
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
CASES
Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005)............................................. 2
Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston,
137 S. Ct. 1277 (2017)....................................... 10
Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965)............................................. 1
Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985)....................................... 4, 7, 11
Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)............................................. 5, 8
Tolan v. Cotton,
572 U.S. 650 (2014)............................................. 2
Turner v. Fouche,
396 U.S. 346 (1970)............................................. 1
United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980)......................................... 5, 6
United States v. Saari,
272 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2001)............................... 6
United States v. Smith,
794 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2015)............................... 6
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
STATUTES
The Civil Action for Deprivation of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .............................. 8
OTHER AUTHORITIES
2 Statutes at Large of South Carolina 255
(Thomas Cooper ed.) (1837) .............................. 13
Amina Khan, Getting Killed by Police is a
Leading Cause of Death for Young Black
Men in America, L.A. Times (Aug. 16,
2019) .................................................................. 28
Amy Held, Authorities Release Dashcam
Video From Shooting of Philando
Castile, NPR (June 20, 2017) ........................... 27
Anta Plowden, Bringing Balance to the
Force: The Militarization of America's
Police Force and Its Consequences,
71 U. Miami L. Rev. 281, 286–87 (2016).......... 19
Bobby L. Lovett, Memphis Riots: White
Reaction to Blacks in Memphis, May
1865-July 1866, 38 Tenn. Hist. Q. 9
(1979) ................................................................. 15
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Police Use of
Nonfatal Force, 2002-2011 (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/punf0211.pdf ........................................ 22
Chiraag Bains, When Backing the Blue
Backfires, The Marshall Project
(Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017
/09/20/when-backing-the-blue-backfires .......... 27
Claude Sitton, Birmingham Bomb Kills 4
Negro Girls In Church; Riots Flare; 2
Boys Slain, N.Y. Times (Sept. 16, 1963),
https://www.nytimes.com/1963/09/16/
archives/birmingham-bomb-kills-4-negro
-girls-in-church-riots-flare-2-boys.html ........... 18
Donald E. Reynolds, The New Orleans Riot
of1866: Reconsidered,
5 La. Hist. 5, 6–7 (1964) ................................... 16
Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty
to the War on Crime: The Making of
Mass Incarceration in America 64–65
(Harv. Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2016) ...18, 19, 20, 21
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Fanna Gamal, The Racial Politics of
Protection: A Critical Race Examination
of Police Militarization,
104 Cal. L. Rev. 979, 990 (2016)....................... 19
James Gilbert Ryan, The Memphis Riots of
1866: Terror in a Black Community
During Reconstruction,
62 J. Negro Hist. 243 (1977) ............................. 15
Jesus Jimenez, Former Fort Worth officer
Aaron Dean indicted on murder charge
in shooting of Atatiana Jefferson, Dallas
Morning News (Dec. 20, 2019) ......................... 26
Joe Fox, et al., What We’ve Learned about
Police Shootings 5 Years After Ferguson,
Wash. Post (Aug. 9, 2019)................................. 27
John Robert Lewis, The King Legacy,
30 Vt. L. Rev. 349 (2006) ............................ 17, 18
Justin Nix et al., A Bird’s Eye View of
Civilians Killed by Police in 2015:
Further Evidence of Implicit Bias, 16
Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 309 (2017). .............. 22
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Kimberly A. Crawford, Report of Deadly
Force: Tamir Rice,
http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf
_prosecutor/en-US/Tamir%20Rice%20
Investigation/Crawford-Review%20of%
20Deadly%20Force-Tamir%20Rice.pdf............ 27
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Different Lyrics, Same
Song: Watts, Ferguson, and the
Stagnating Effect of the Politics of Law
and Order,
52 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 305 (2017) ............. 19
Lynn Peeples, What the Data Say About
Police Shootings, Scientific American
(Sept. 5, 2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/what-the-data-say-about-policeshootings/ .......................................................... 28
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Mark Berman, Former Chicago police
officer Jason Van Dyke sentenced to more
than 6 years for killing Laquan
McDonald, Wash. Post (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation
al/former-chicago-police-officer-jasonvan-dyke-sentenced-to-more-than-6years-for-killing-laquanmcdonald/2019/01/18/ e3c0e140-1b3811e9-8813-cb9dec761e73_story.html ............... 26
Meridith Edwards & Dakin Andone, ExSouth Carolina cop Michael Slager gets
20 years for Walter Scott killing,
CNN.com (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/07/us/mich
ael-slager-sentencing/index.html .................... 26
Philip L. Reichel, Southern Slave Patrols as
a Transitional Police Type,
7 Am. J. Police 51(1988) ................................... 13
Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Ctr. for Policing
Equity, The Science of Justice: Race,
Arrests, and Police Use of Force 4
(2016), https://policingequity.org/
images/pdfs-doc/CPE_SoJ_Race-ArrestsUoF_2016-07-08-1130.pdf ................................ 22
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Philp M. Stinson, Police Shootings: A New
Problem or Business as Usual? .......................... 9
Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen.,
Memorandum for Heads of Department
Components and United States Attorneys
(March 31, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/954916/download ............................. 9
Reuben Fischer Baum, Allegations of Police
Misconduct Rarely Result in Charges,
FiveThirtyEight (Nov. 25, 2014),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/alleg
ations-of-police-misconduct-rarelyresult-in-charges ................................................. 9
Rich Morin & Renee Stepler, Pew Research
Center, The Racial Confidence Gap in
Police Performance 5 (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wpcontent
/uploads/sites/3/2016/09/ST_2016.09.29_
Police-Final.pdf ................................................... 9
Rich Morin, et al., Behind the Badge, Pew
Research Center (Jan. 11, 2017) ...................... 25
xiii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Robin D.G. Kelley & Earl Lewis, To Make
Our World Anew: A History of African
Americans (2000) ................................. 13
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s
Role in the Prosecution of Unjustified
Police Killings —Challenges and
Solutions, 52 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev.
397, 405 (2017) .................................................... 9
Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis
of Racial Differences in Police Use of
Force, Working Paper 22399, Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research (2018),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22399; ............. 22
Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and
Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas
(2003) ................................................................. 13
Sarah Maslin Nir, Officer Peter Liang
Convicted in Fatal Shooting of Akai
Gurley in Brooklyn, N.Y. Times (Feb. 11,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/
nyregion/officer-peter-liang-convicted-infatal-shooting-of-akai-gurley-inbrooklyn.html .................................................... 26
xiv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin
Luther King, Jr., and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference 227-28
(1986) ................................................................. 17
Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing:
Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers,
51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 611 (2016) .................. 19
Solomon Northup, Twelve Years a Slave
(1977) ................................................................. 14
Southern Poverty Law Ctr., Ku Klux Klan:
A History of Racism and Violence 13
(6th ed. 2011),
https://www.splcenter.org/20110228/kuklux-klan-history-racism .................................. 15
United Press Int’l, Six Dead After Church
Bombing, Washington Post (Sept. 16,
1963),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
national/longterm/churches/archives1.ht
m ........................................................................ 18
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the
Chicago Police Department (2017)................... 25
xv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page(s)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the
Cleveland Division of Police (2014) ............ 23, 24
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the
Ferguson Police Department (2015) .......... 23, 24
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the
New Orleans Police Department (2011) .... 23, 24
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the
Puerto Rico Police Department (2011)....... 24, 25
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the
Seattle Police Department (2011) .................... 24
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the
Baltimore City Police Department (2016) ....... 23
Philp M. Stinson, Police Shootings: A New
Problem or Business as Usual?,
Uprooting Criminology Blog (2015),
https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/cgi/viewco
ntent.cgi?article=1050&context=crim_ju
st_pub .................................................................. 9
Woman Shot Dead by Texas Police Through
Bedroom Window, BBC News (Oct. 13,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldus-canada-50032290 ......................................... 26
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc. (“LDF”) is the nation’s first and foremost civil
rights legal organization. Through litigation,
advocacy, public education, and outreach, LDF strives
to secure equal justice under the law for all
Americans, and to break down barriers that prevent
African Americans from realizing their basic civil and
human rights.
LDF has long been committed to eradicating the
pernicious influence of racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system. LDF has served as counsel of
record in multiple cases before this Court challenging
such discrimination. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202 (1965); Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty.,
396 U.S. 320 (1970); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346
(1970); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972);
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Buck v.
Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017). LDF has also submitted
amicus curiae briefs to this Court in numerous cases
to provide its expertise on matters pertaining to race
and the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (overruling Swain);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614
(1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992);
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003); Johnson v.
1
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amicus
curiae state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in
whole or in part and that no person other than amicus curiae, its
members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the
preparation or submission of this brief. Pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 37.3, counsel for amicus curiae state that both
parties have filed blanket consent to the filing of amicus briefs.
2
California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005); Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85 (2007); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407
(2008); Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650 (2014); Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.
Ct. 855 (2017); Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228
(2019).
LDF is especially concerned with policing policies
and practices that target and disproportionately
harm communities of color, especially African
Americans. For over a decade, LDF has represented a
class of African American and Latino public housing
residents and their guests in a federal lawsuit
challenging the unlawful policing of public housing
residences in New York City. See Davis v. City of New
York, No. 10-cv-699 (S.D.N.Y.). Since 2015, LDF’s
Policing Reform Campaign has worked to address
issues of unconstitutional police practices, to
eliminate racial bias and profiling in policing, and to
end police violence against citizens. LDF has also
testified before the United States Congress, as well as
the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
about the prevalence of racial bias in police use of deadly
force, and the need to eliminate racial bias in the
criminal justice system in order to foster confidence and
trust in our public institutions.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has recognized that the Fourth
Amendment, including its proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures, is “the very
3
essence of constitutional liberty.” Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454 n.4 (1971), holding
modified by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)
(quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303–
04 (1921)). As such, “[t]he right of personal security is
also protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . because
its protection [is] viewed as ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 673
n.42 (1977) (citation omitted).
Ignoring these pronouncements, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined, as a matter
of law, that Petitioner Roxanne Torres was not
“seized” when two officers fired thirteen bullets into
her moving car—striking her twice in the back—
because she was able to continue driving. A Fourth
Amendment seizure, under the lower court’s
reasoning, requires more than an officer exerting
physical force to make the targeted suspect stay
during an encounter with police—the individual must
in fact stay.
This reasoning ignores both precedent and
history. As this Court has made clear, a “seizure”
under the Fourth Amendment occurs when police
either apply any amount of physical force to a person
or take action that would make a reasonable person
feel not free to leave an interaction. Neither test
permits an analysis of the specific response of the
target of the police conduct. In fact, this Court has
emphasized that this Fourth Amendment inquiry
“calls for consistent application from one police
encounter to the next, regardless of the particular
individual’s response to the actions of the police.”
Michigan v. Chestnut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988).
4
Importantly, affirming the decision below risks
undermining an important vehicle by which police are
held accountable for unlawful use of force, with
particular harm to African-American communities
that are too often subject to police violence to this day.
If this Court takes the extraordinary position that a
police officer deliberately shooting at and wounding
an individual is not a Fourth Amendment “seizure,”
many innocent victims of police shootings will be left
without a remedy. Such a striking departure from this
Court’s longstanding precedent would defy common
sense, demanding that, in order to obtain any
constitutional relief, individuals wounded by an
officer remain in place and risk death while the
officer, trained to “shoot to kill,” continues to fire at
will. Affirming the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning would
also undermine this Court’s clear prohibition in
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), against using
deadly force on fleeing suspects who do not constitute
a threat to officers or the public.
The lower court’s decision to immunize many
police shootings from Fourth Amendment scrutiny is
particularly
troubling
for
African-American
communities, which have disproportionately been
victims of police violence that has often involved
weapons. From the very inception of modern
American law enforcement, weapons—and firearms
specifically—have been deployed as a means of
policing
and
oppressing
African-American
communities. Today, far too many police officers
continue to draw and use guns as a means of
unjustified control of African Americans, rather than
for valid law enforcement reasons. The Tenth
Circuit’s decision leaves these countless people
without recourse.
5
Accordingly, this Court should preserve the
protections long recognized under the Fourth
Amendment, which are especially vital to AfricanAmerican individuals who are at greatest risk of
police violence. The decision below must be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.
A Police Officer’s Discharge of a Firearm Is
A
Quintessential Fourth
Amendment
Seizure.
In the seminal case, Terry v. Ohio, this Court
explained that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs
when an officer restrains the “liberty of a citizen” in
one of two ways: either by “physical force” or by “show
of authority.” 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). A seizure by
“physical force” occurs by the “laying on of hands or
application of physical force to restrain movement,
even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.” California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). A seizure by
“show of authority,” by contrast, occurs when, “in view
of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident,
a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980). Importantly, the
Mendenhall test employs an “objective standard” that
“calls for consistent application from one police
encounter to the next, regardless of the particular
individual’s response to the actions of the police.”
Chestnut, 486 U.S. at 574.
A police officer who draws and fires a weapon, as
in the instant case, implicates both types of seizure.
Mendenhall recognized that “the display of a weapon
by an officer”—even without it actually being drawn
6
or fired—can be a “show of authority” that
communicates to a reasonable person that they are
not free to leave. 446 U.S. at 554. That makes sense
because reasonable people know that police officers
have special permission to carry guns and to use them
if necessary.
Courts have thus recognized that when an officer
approaches an individual with their hands resting on
their holstered gun, that display of authority signals
the ability to use deadly force and conveys to a
reasonable person that they are not free to ignore the
officer and go about their day. See, e.g., United States
v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2015) (officer
approaching defendant with hand on gun was
relevant to finding there was a seizure); Liberal v.
Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that an “officer’s action of putting his hand on his gun,
without drawing it, let[s] [a person] know that there
could be adverse consequences for any failure to
submit to authority”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Plainly, then, an officer who unholsters their gun
and actually points it at a person signals to any
reasonable person that they are not free to turn
around and walk away. That is, by definition, a “show
of authority” that would convey to a reasonable
person that they are not “free to ‘disregard the police
and go about his business.’” Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (quoting California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)); see also United States v.
Saari, 272 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 2001) (seizure
occurred where officers were outside of defendant’s
apartment with guns drawn).
7
The seizure in this case involves an even greater
show of authority. It does not involve an officer simply
putting a hand on a gun or pointing it at someone. It
involves two officers actually firing their weapons and
wounding a suspect. When an officer shoots a person,
a seizure has occurred. Indeed, the Hodari D. Court
explained that, at common law, “an arrest is effected
by the slightest application of physical force.” 499 U.S.
at 625 (emphasis added). If the slightest application
of physical force is enough to effect an arrest, then the
use of deadly force must certainly be a Fourth
Amendment seizure. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7
(stating that “there can be no question that
apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure
subject to the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment”); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138
S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (describing a non-fatal police
shooting as “deadly force”).
Moreover, according to this Court’s precedent,
which the Tenth Circuit failed to follow, the actual
restraint of an individual is not dispositive as to
whether a seizure has occurred. In Hodari D., this
Court stated that the “word ‘seizure’ readily bears the
meaning of a laying on of hands or application of
physical force to restrain movement, even when it is
ultimately unsuccessful.” 499 U.S. at 626 (emphasis
added). To hold otherwise defies the reality of a
potentially deadly encounter with a police officer who
has decided to discharge a weapon. Under the Tenth
Circuit’s rationale, the application of the Fourth
Amendment would hinge on an individual’s
unpredictable physical reaction to state violence. This
interpretation would exclude from constitutional
review egregious scenarios where an individual,
posing no threat, continued movement after an officer
8
struck them with a bullet. The Constitution must
compel otherwise.
II.
The Decision Below Risks Eviscerating the
Primary
Vehicles
for
Ensuring
Accountability
for
Egregious
Police
Misconduct.
This Court has time and again recognized that the
Fourth Amendment is the “principal mode of
discouraging lawless police misconduct.” Terry, 392
U.S. at 13 (citation omitted); accord Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 350 (1987) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment “was aimed at deterring police
misconduct”). The paradigmatic example of “police
misconduct” is an unreasonable shooting of a civilian,
and the Fourth Amendment’s protections are
essential to preventing such egregious misconduct.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision, however, would
immunize a significant number of police shootings
from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, thereby leaving
even heinous examples of police misconduct
unchecked.
Indeed, civil rights suits, brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, play a vital role in reforming abusive police
practices and deterring Fourth Amendment
violations by law enforcement that disproportionately
harm African-American communities. A history of
anemic accountability practices within police
departments 2 and diminished oversight by the United
2 See infra Part III.C.
9
States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 3 have
heightened the importance of individual civil suits.
Such legal actions create an essential opportunity to
transparently assess the reasonableness of officer’s
use of force. 4 Such transparency is especially
important in light of African-American’ existing fears
of officers’ routine use of excessive levels of force. 5
3 Since 2017, DOJ has publicly reduced its role in investigating
constitutional violations within police departments, noting “It is
not the responsibility of the federal government to manage nonfederal law enforcement agencies.” Press Release, Office of the
Att’y Gen., Memorandum for Heads of Department Components
and
United
States
Attorneys
(March
31,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/954916/
download
4 Officers suspected of using excessive force are rarely charged
and are rarely convicted. See Philp M. Stinson, Police Shootings:
A New Problem or Business as Usual?, Uprooting Criminology
Blog
(2015),
https://scholarworks.
bgsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=crim_just_
pub; Reuben Fischer Baum, Allegations of Police Misconduct
Rarely Result in Charges, FiveThirtyEight (Nov. 25, 2014),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
allegations-of-police-misconduct-rarely-result-in-charges/. The
grand jury process cloaks officer indictments—and, more
typically, failures to indict—in secrecy. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.,
The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of Unjustified Police
Killings —Challenges and Solutions, 52 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev.
397, 405 (2017).
5 Rich Morin & Renee Stepler, Pew Research Center, The Racial
Confidence Gap in Police Performance 5 (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/3/2016/09/ST_2016.09.29_Police-Final.pdf (finding
that only 33% of African-American respondents believe local
police do an “excellent or good job” when it comes to using the
right amount of force for each situation).
10
Thirty years ago, this Court held that the Fourth
Amendment, and no other constitutional provision,
governs the use of force by a police officer before
detention. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989) (“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection
against this sort of physically intrusive governmental
conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide
for analyzing these claims.” (footnote omitted).
Damages suits also became a primary vehicle for
relief because, except in limited circumstances,
plaintiffs are barred from seeking an injunctive
remedy to reform police practices. City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 137 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“We now learn that wrath and outrage
cannot be translated into an order to cease the
unconstitutional practice, but only an award of
damages to those who are victimized by the practice
and live to sue and to the survivors of those who are
not so fortunate.”). And, even in damages claims
under the Fourth Amendment, the increasingly broad
reach of qualified immunity prevents recovery in all
but the most egregious of circumstances. See SalazarLimon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282–83
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“We have not
hesitated to summarily reverse courts for wrongly
denying officers the protection of qualified immunity
in cases involving the use of force. But we rarely
intervene where courts wrongly afford officers the
benefit of qualified immunity in these same cases.”
(internal citations omitted)).
Given the exclusive nature of the civil damages
remedy under the Fourth Amendment for victims of
police misconduct like Ms. Torres, which are already
11
limited by various judicial constraints, the question
before the Court takes on particular importance: if
police use of force must be examined within the
confines of the Fourth Amendment, then courts
should not sidestep the “reasonableness” analysis by
categorically removing certain uses of force from
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. This is especially true
when, like the instant case, the misconduct at issue
involves police use of deadly force.
Indeed, affirming the Tenth Circuit’s decision
below would upend this Court’s seminal holding in
Tennessee v. Garner, which specifically prohibited the
use of “deadly force to prevent the escape of an
apparently unarmed suspected felon . . . unless it is
necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury
to the officer or others.” 471 U.S. at 3 (emphasis
added). Yet, under the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, an
officer’s unreasonable use of deadly force on an
unarmed fleeing suspect, who posed no threat to
others, would be beyond constitutional scrutiny
merely because the officer missed the mark. Such an
arbitrary result is patently at odds with this Court’s
precedent and creates arbitrary distinctions that defy
common sense.
It is, therefore, incumbent on this Court to
maintain its longstanding interpretation of “seizure,”
as set forth in Hodari D., to provide civilians—
African-American in particular—a meaningful
opportunity to hold officers accountable for their
excessive use of force. A contrary ruling would
immunize officers’ actions despite their intent to
12
restrain, apprehend, and even kill a suspect, simply
because they were unsuccessful in their efforts.
III.
Preserving This Court’s Longstanding
Precedent Regarding Fourth Amendment
Seizure Is Especially Important Given Law
Enforcement’s Historically Oppressive Use
of
Weapons
in
African-American
Communities.
From the earliest days of modern policing, the
threat of gun violence has been used to communicate
a lack of freedom and subject African Americans to
state control. Today, police shootings remain
disturbingly
frequent,
with
victims
disproportionately being African American. By
exempting a category of police shootings from Fourth
Amendment scrutiny, the decision below will make it
even more difficult to remedy state-sponsored
violence, thus exacerbating the reasonable fear of
such violence that continues to define the lived
experiences of too many African Americans.
A. Law
Enforcement
Historically
Employed
Oppressive
Practices,
Including Use of Firearms, to Control
and Intimidate African Americans
Before and After Emancipation.
Policing in America has its roots in the control of
African-American communities in the Southern
colonies; scholars have identified slave patrols as the
13
first publicly funded police agencies. 6 In 1704, for
example, the Carolina colonies created America’s first
Patrol Act, 7 which required militia captains to form
special patrols to “take up all slaves which they shall
meet without their master’s plantation which have
not a permit or ticket from their masters, and the
same punish.” 8 They were authorized by law to use
force, including weapons, against violators they
caught. 9 The Carolinas were not alone. Nearly all
Southern colonies and states empowered slave patrols
to act on their behalf for the purpose of apprehending
slaves. 10 Throughout the South, these entities exacted
unspeakable terror on African Americans as agents of
the colonial or state governments.
Slave patrollers earned a reputation for brutality:
they carried out their duties, armed with guns, whips,
and hounds. 11 In the seminal work, Twelve Years a
Slave, Solomon Northup explained:
6 Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia
and the Carolinas 69, 103 (2003); Philip L. Reichel, Southern
Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type, 7 Am. J. Police 51,
66 (1988).
7 Reichel, supra note 6, at
59.
8 2 Statutes at Large of South Carolina 255 (Thomas Cooper ed.)
(1837).
9 Robin D.G. Kelley & Earl Lewis, To Make Our World Anew: A
History of African Americans 193 (2000).
10 Reichel, supra note 6, at 66–67 (noting how slave patrols in
Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas, Georgia, Missouri, and
Mississippi were uniformly authorized to act as agents of their
respective local governments).
11 Hadden, supra note 6, at 113, 123–24.
14
Patrollers, whose business it is to seize and
whip any slave they may find wandering
from the plantation[,] have the right, either
by law, or by general consent, to inflict
discretionary chastisement upon a black
man caught beyond the boundaries of his
master’s estate without a pass, and even to
shoot him, if he attempts to escape. 12
Following the formal abolition of slavery,
Southern states immediately devised new means of
controlling African Americans through police
enforcement of “Black Codes,” which, among other
things, “limited the rights of Negroes to own or rent
property and permitted imprisonment for breach of
employment contracts.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 390 (1978) (Marshall, J.
dissenting). These were “poorly disguised substitutes
for slavery” that “defined racial status; . . . forbade
[blacks from] owning firearms or other weapons;
controlled the movement of blacks by systems of
passes; required proof of residence; prohibited the
congregation of groups of blacks; restricted blacks
from residing in certain areas; and specified an
etiquette of deference to whites . . . .” Goodman v.
Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 672 (1987) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted).
Police violence was key in enforcing the Black
Codes. For example, police officers instigated and
participated in the 1866 Memphis riot, which resulted
12 Solomon Northup, Twelve Years a Slave 180–81 (1977).
15
in the mass murder of scores of African-American
men, women, and children. 13 In the weeks leading up
to the riot, white policemen had been arresting
African Americans on baseless excuses, including the
violation of curfew laws invalidated by the end of
slavery. 14 These police often used force without
warning. 15 In congressional testimony following the
riot, scores of white witnesses described police abuse
administered to African-American residents—the
arrest of an African American for even a minor charge
often prompted a severe beating by the all-white
Memphis police force. 16 By the time order was
restored two days later, 46 African Americans had
been killed and at least five African-American women
had been raped. 17 Although the Memphis Police
Department was immediately placed under the
supervision of a state board, no officers were arrested
or fired. 18
Less than three months later, a similar massacre
occurred in New Orleans during a Louisiana state
13 Bobby L. Lovett, Memphis Riots: White Reaction to Blacks in
Memphis, May 1865-July 1866, 38 Tenn. Hist. Q. 9, 22 (1979);
Southern Poverty Law Ctr., Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism
and
Violence
13
(6th
ed.
2011),
https://www.splcenter.org/20110228/ku-klux-klan-historyracism.
14 James Gilbert Ryan, The Memphis Riots of 1866: Terror in a
Black Community During Reconstruction, 62 J. Negro Hist. 243,
245 (1977).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 244.
17 Ryan, supra note 14, at 243; Lovett, supra note 13, at 30.
18 Lovett, supra note 13, at 30.
16
constitutional convention, which had been convened
to challenge the established white government. 19 In
response to racial taunts from a white observer, 20 a
single shot was fired from within an assembly of 200300 African-American marchers in support of the
convention—hitting no one. 21 Rather than arresting
the suspected shooter, the police officers on the scene
fired a volley of shots into the crowd. 22 As one
historian described, “[m]any Negroes who approached
individual policemen, begging to be arrested, were
shot down in cold blood.” 23 According to official
accounts, 38 individuals were killed and 146 were
wounded—34 of the dead and 119 of the wounded
were African American. 24 No officer was arrested or
punished for the massacre. 25
The transformation of antebellum slave patrols
into late-nineteenth-century police forces was thus a
change in name only. Police violence in AfricanAmerican communities continued, unabated, with the
blessing of the state. Little would change through the
mid-twentieth century and the birth of the Civil
Rights Movement.
Donald E. Reynolds, The New Orleans Riot of 1866:
Reconsidered, 5 La. Hist. 5, 6–7 (1964).
19
20 Id. at 11.
21 Id. at 11-12.
22 Id. at 12.
23 Id. at 13.
24 Id.
25 Id.
17
B. African-American Civil Unrest in the
Mid-Twentieth Century, a Response in
Part
to
Unconstitutional
Police
Violence, Led to the Expansive Use of
Weaponry by Police.
The mid-twentieth century witnessed massive
social upheaval as African-American citizens engaged
in nonviolent, civil disobedience in the face of
excessive—and
often
deadly—force
by
law
enforcement. Indeed, the public display of police
brutality, embodied by the actions of Birmingham
Public Safety Commissioner Bull Connor, brought
“the nation to its conscience to recognize the injustice”
of the Jim Crow South. 26 Perhaps most infamous was
“Bloody Sunday” on March 7, 1965, when
approximately 600 peaceful protesters in Selma,
Alabama challenged their disenfranchisement in a
march across the Edmund Pettus Bridge. 27 These
protestors were met by state troopers and sheriff
deputies, who “beat[ them] with night sticks and bull
whips, trampl[ed them] with horses, and releas[ed]
the tear gas.”28
The police violence inflicted on African-American
civil rights protesters was not limited to night sticks
and tear gas. Law enforcement also used firearms in
26 See David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King,
Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 227-28
(1986).
27 John Robert Lewis, The King Legacy, 30 Vt. L. Rev. 349, 356
(2006).
28 Id.
18
response to civil rights protests. Indeed, the
nonviolent march that led to Bloody Sunday was
spurred by the death of Jimmy Lee Jackson, who was
fatally shot by a state trooper a few weeks earlier as
he was trying to protect his mother from a police
beating during a peaceful demonstration in nearby
Marion, Alabama. 29 During another demonstration in
1963—in the aftermath of the bombing of the 16th
Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama,
which killed four young African-American girls—
police killed Johnny Robinson, a sixteen-year-old
African-American teenager, by shooting him in the
back as he ran away.30
Police confrontation with African Americans
came to a head during a series of civil uprisings in
predominantly
African-American,
urban
neighborhoods in the mid-1960s. One of the largest in
history occurred during the summer of 1965 in the
Watts neighborhood of South Central Los Angeles, in
connection with an aggressive encounter between
officers and a African-American family during a
routine traffic stop. 31 The ensuing six days of civil
29 Id. at 355.
Claude Sitton, Birmingham Bomb Kills 4 Negro Girls In
Church; Riots Flare; 2 Boys Slain, N.Y. Times (Sept. 16,
1963), https://www.nytimes.com/1963/09/16/archives/birmingha
m-bomb-kills-4-negro-girls-in-church-riots-flare-2-boys.html;
United Press Int’l, Six Dead After Church Bombing, Washington
Post (Sept. 16, 1963), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/national/
longterm/churches/archives1.htm.
30
Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on
Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America 64–65
31
19
unrest resulted in 34 deaths, over a thousand injuries,
and an estimated $200 million in property damage. 32
Thirty-one of the 34 deaths were Watts residents
killed by law enforcement authorities, including
Fenbroy Morrison George, an African-American man
who was fatally shot by police while attempting to
save the belongings of his wife and three children
from their burning home. 33
A presidential task force that was formed to
investigate the causes of the Watts uprising
determined unequivocally that it was motivated in
large part by abusive policing. 34 The report noted that
Los Angeles police considered the African-American
community to be a “hostile territory to be kept in
check by a continuous show of force.” 35 Indeed, the
(Harv. Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2016); see also Fanna Gamal, The
Racial Politics of Protection: A Critical Race Examination of
Police Militarization, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 979, 990 (2016); Anta
Plowden, Bringing Balance to the Force: The Militarization of
America's Police Force and Its Consequences, 71 U. Miami L.
Rev. 281, 286–87 (2016).
Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and
Guardian Officers, 51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 611, 641 (2016); see
also Gamal, supra note 31, at 990–91; Plowden, supra note 31,
at 286–87.
32
33 Hinton, supra note 31, at 69.
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Different Lyrics, Same Song: Watts,
Ferguson, and the Stagnating Effect of the Politics of Law and
Order, 52 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 305, 324–25 (2017). At the time
of the uprising, South Los Angeles was 81% African American,
with 27% of families living in poverty and 65% of adults older
than age 25 not having a high school degree. Gamal, supra note
31, at 991.
34
35 Brown, Jr., supra note 34, at 326 (2017).
20
Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, William
Parker, stated that the Watts uprising was “very
much like fighting in Viet Cong,” and both state and
local law enforcement “quickly established blockades
and posted signs throughout the riot zone that
threatened to kill residents (‘Turn left or get shot,"
one declared).” 36
Subsequent uprisings in Newark and Detroit
followed similar patterns to Watts. In Newark, which
saw widespread unrest for six days in July 1967, 24
individuals died—all but two of whom were African
American. 37 Victims of police violence included 12year-old Michael Pugh, who was fatally shot in front
of his house by the National Guard as he took out the
trash after curfew, and Hattie Gainer, a 54-year-old
grandmother whose daughter was told by police that
they had “made a mistake” and “shot the wrong
person.” 38 Likewise, Detroit experienced five days of
unrest after police raided a bar in a predominantly
African-American neighborhood, resulting in the
deaths of 43 people, 32 of whom were African
American. 39
In both Newark and Detroit, like Watts, police
brutality and the “growing animosity between white
patrolmen” and African-American residents were the
underlying cause of the violent uprisings.40 Similar
conclusions were reached by the National Advisory
36 Hinton, supra note 31, at 69.
37 Id. at 109.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 106.
40 Id. at 110.
21
Commission on Civil Disorders (called the “Kerner
Commission” after its chair, Illinois Governor Otto
Kerner), which was established by President Lyndon
Johnson in response to the widespread AfricanAmerican civil unrest during the summer of 1967. The
Kerner Commission noted “a widespread belief
among Negroes in the existence of police brutality and
in a ‘double standard’ of justice and protection—one
for Negroes and one for whites.” 41
What followed the release of the Kerner
Commission’s report was not a comprehensive plan to
address unlawful police shootings and brutality in
African-American communities, but instead the
provision by the federal government of “new militarygrade weapons and surveillance technologies” 42 to
state and local law governments to assist with urban
control. Ultimately, federal spending increased
exponentially—from $10 million in 1965 to about
$850 million in 1973—to support state and local law
enforcement with the “mission . . . to expand
supervision and control in low-income urban
communities.” 43
Police violence, including deadly force from police
shootings, in African-American communities played a
central role in instigating widespread protests in the
1960s. Yet, instead of remedying the underlying
grievances of these protests, the state response has
been to further weaponize law enforcement to control
African-American communities, particularly in urban
41 Id. at 5.
42 Hinton, supra note 31, at 13.
43 Id. at 2–3.
22
areas, and leave in place the oppressive police tactics
that too often lead to unjustified use of lethal force.
C. Far Too Many Law Enforcement
Agencies Throughout the Country
Presently Continue the Excessive Use of
Weapons
in
African-American
Communities.
Regrettably, the excessive use of weapons in
African-American communities by law enforcement
officers is hardly a relic of the past. The data are clear
that officers continue to threaten, and actually use,
weapons against African Americans without legally
sufficient justification. Media stories of officerinvolved shootings of African Americans have
recently brought this dangerous form of statesponsored discrimination into glaring relief, spurring
national conversations about race and policing.
The federal government’s own data have
consistently shown that African Americans are
disproportionately subject to force of all levels in
encounters with law enforcement. 44 In the past two
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Police Use of Nonfatal Force,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/
2002-2011
(2015),
pub/pdf/punf0211.pdf; see also Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Ctr. for
Policing Equity, The Science of Justice: Race, Arrests, and Police
Use
of
Force
4
(2016),
https://policingequity.org/
images/pdfs-doc/CPE_SoJ_Race-Arrests-UoF_2016-07-081130.pdf; Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial
Differences in Police Use of Force, Working Paper 22399, Nat’l
(2018),
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22399; Justin Nix et al., A Bird’s
44
23
decades alone, DOJ determined that numerous police
departments routinely use firearms, tasers, or other
weapons inappropriately and disproportionately
against African Americans. In Baltimore, for
example, African Americans—who account for just
over 60% of the population—experienced almost 90%
of force used by police. 45 DOJ found similarly striking
racial disparities in police departments in several
other cities, including Ferguson and New Orleans. 46
Equally troubling is the relative frequency with
which many officers use weapons without sufficient
legal justification. In DOJ’s investigations of multiple
police departments, officers were found to “fire their
guns . . . against unarmed or fleeing suspects who do
not pose a threat of serious harm,” 47 use tasers “as an
all-purpose tool bearing no risk,” 48 “too hastily resort
to . . . [t]asers,” 49 and employ other weapons in clearly
Eye View of Civilians Killed by Police in 2015: Further Evidence
of Implicit Bias, 16 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 309, 309 (2017).
45 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Baltimore City Police
Department 61 (2016) (hereafter, “DOJ Baltimore Rep.”).
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson Police
Department 28, 62 (2015) (hereafter, “DOJ Ferguson Rep.”)
(noting that African Americans, just 67% of the Ferguson
population, were the victims of 88% of police use of weapons);
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the New Orleans Police
Department 39 (2011) (hereafter, “DOJ New Orleans Rep.”)
(finding that African Americans were the subject of 84% of uses
of force despite being only 59% of the total population).
46
47 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Cleveland Division
of Police 13 (2014) (hereafter, “DOJ Cleveland Rep.”).
48 DOJ Ferguson Rep. at 30.
49 DOJ Cleveland Rep. at 13
24
inappropriate situations. 50 In Seattle, 57% of officers’
use of batons were found unnecessary and
inappropriate. 51 In Albuquerque, “officers were not
justified under federal law in using deadly force in the
majority of [officer-involved shootings].”52
A lack of accountability allows such practices to
run rampant. Problems of underreporting, 53 anemic
investigation, 54 and the rarity of departmental
discipline 55 render attempts at internal oversight
largely meaningless. In a recent survey of police
officers, an overwhelming 72 percent believed that
officers who consistently do a poor job are not held
50 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Puerto Rico
Police Department 33–35 (2011) (hereafter, “DOJ Puerto Rico
Rep.”) (documenting inappropriate uses of batons, tasers, and
firearms); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Seattle
Police Department 4, 9 (2011) (hereafter, “DOJ Seattle Rep.”)
(concluding that over half—57%—of uses of batons were
unnecessary and excessive).
51 DOJ Seattle Rep. at 4, 9.
52 Ltr from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Richard J. Berry, Mayor of
Albuquerque 10 (Apr. 10, 2014) (hereafter, “DOJ Albuquerque
Rep.”).
53 See, e.g., DOJ Ferguson Rep. at 38 (“[O]fficers frequently do
not report the force they use at all.”).
54 See, e.g., DOJ New Orleans Rep. at 19 (“The investigations
generally did not include the investigative steps or analysis
necessary to make a credible determination of whether the use
of force was lawful.”).
55 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Chicago
Police Department 68 (2017) (hereafter, “DOJ Chicago Rep.”)
(noting that internal review process sustained only 1.4% of all
complaints of excessive force).
25
accountable by internal accountability practices. 56
Those protections that do exist are particularly
illusory for African-American communities; white
victims of police violence are significantly more likely
to have complaints of misconduct investigated and
substantiated than African-American victims. 57 As
such, reliance on internal investigations alone means
that people “will continue to be subjected to
preventable harm at the hands of police.” 58
Underpinning these studies are the stories of
countless innocent African Americans who have been
injured or killed by police too hasty to draw guns. In
recent years, as public awareness of police brutality
has increased, juries have convicted police officers for
unjustifiably shooting and killing unarmed AfricanAmerican people such as Akai Gurley, Walter Scott,
and LaQuan McDonald. 59 Most recently, the nation
56 Rich Morin, et al., Behind the Badge, Pew Research Center
(Jan.
11,
2017),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
2017/01/11/behind-the-badge/.
See, e.g., DOJ Chicago Rep. at 68–69 (noting that white
complainants were three times more likely to have allegations of
excessive force upheld than African American complainants
were).
57
58 DOJ Puerto Rico. Rep. at 32.
59 See, e.g., Sarah Maslin Nir, Officer Peter Liang Convicted in
Fatal Shooting of Akai Gurley in Brooklyn, N.Y. Times (Feb. 11,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/
nyregion/officer-peter-liang-convicted-in-fatal-shooting-of-akaigurley-in-brooklyn.html; Meridith Edwards & Dakin Andone,
Ex-South Carolina cop Michael Slager gets 20 years for Walter
Scott
killing,
CNN.com
(Dec.
7,
2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/07/us/michael-slagersentencing/index.html; Mark Berman, Former Chicago police
26
grappled with the case of Atatiana Jefferson, who was
shot inside her home within seconds of police
arriving. 60 The officer who shot her awaits trial
today. 61
But countless more African Americans are shot by
police officers who are not—and may never be—held
accountable for similarly unjustified conduct. Tamir
Rice, a twelve-year-old in Cleveland, Ohio, was
playing with a toy gun when police officers pulled up
and shot him “[w]ithin one to two seconds” of
arriving. 62 Philando Castile was pulled over for a
routine traffic stop and, just eight seconds later, was
fatally shot by police. 63 This reality for African
officer Jason Van Dyke sentenced to more than 6 years for killing
Laquan
McDonald,
Wash.
Post
(Jan.
18,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/former-chicagopolice-officer-jason-van-dyke-sentenced-to-more-than-6-yearsfor-killing-laquan-mcdonald/2019/01/18/
e3c0e140-1b38-11e9-8813-cb9dec761e73_story.html.
Woman Shot Dead by Texas Police Through Bedroom
Window, BBC News (Oct. 13, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-50032290.
60
61 Jesus Jimenez, Former Fort Worth officer Aaron Dean indicted
on murder charge in shooting of Atatiana Jefferson, Dallas
Morning
News
(Dec.
20,
2019),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2019/12/20/former-fortworth-officer-aaron-dean-indicted-on-murder-charge-inshooting-of-atatiana-jefferson/.
Kimberly A. Crawford, Report of Deadly Force: Tamir
Rice, http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/enUS/Tamir%20Rice%20Investigation/CrawfordReview%20of%20Deadly%20Force-Tamir%20Rice.pdf.
62
Amy Held, Authorities Release Dashcam Video From
Shooting of Philando Castile, NPR (June 20, 2017),
63
27
Americans—in which they are often mere seconds
from death in even the most banal of police
encounters—continues to shape their experiences
with police.
These and numerous other killings of innocent
African Americans by police officers, who have opened
fire without justification, have galvanized national
attention and concern about how police deploy
weapons, and the contours of the Fourth
Amendment’s proscriptions on the conduct of
officers. 64 Since 2015, more than 2,500 police
departments have shot and killed at least one
person. 65 Law enforcement agencies shoot and kill an
average of three people each day—over 1,000 each
year. 66 Further, for every person fatally shot, studies
estimate that two more people are shot non-fatally. 67
And these figures are likely only a fraction of the
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/20/
533711841/authorities-release-dashcam-video-from-shooting-ofphilando-castile.
Chiraag Bains, When Backing the Blue Backfires, The
Marshall
Project
(Sept.
20,
2017),
https://www.
themarshallproject.org/2017/09/20/when-backing-the-bluebackfires.
64
65 Joe Fox, et al., What We’ve Learned about Police Shootings 5
Years After Ferguson, Wash. Post (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/
09/what-weve-learned-about-police-shootings-years-afterferguson/?arc404=true.
Lynn Peeples, What the Data Say About Police Shootings,
Scientific
American
(Sept.
5,
2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-the-data-sayabout-police-shootings/.
66
67 Id.
28
number of people at whom officers draw their guns
but do not shoot.
Racial disparities persist in this use-of-force
landscape.
African-American
men
remain
approximately 2.5 times more likely than white men
to be shot by police during their lifetimes. 68 One in
1,000 African-American males can expect to die at the
hands of police. 69 In fact, police shootings are a
leading cause of death among young AfricanAmerican men in United States. 70
These statistics counsel in favor of more scrutiny
of police officers’ use of their weapons, not less. But
the Tenth Circuit’s rule undermines the main
framework by which courts can examine an officer’s
conduct. See supra, Section II. It opens the door to
countless more unjustified shootings against innocent
people, a burden that will disproportionately affect
African-American communities.
CONCLUSION
African Americans’ lived experiences in the
United States demonstrate the need to guarantee
constitutional protections to those most vulnerable to
abuse by officers acting with state authority. The
Fourth Amendment serves this key function, giving
individuals harmed by police the power to review
68 Id.
69 Amina Khan, Getting Killed by Police is a Leading Cause of
Death for Young Black Men in America, L.A. Times (Aug. 16,
2019),
https://www.latimes.com/science/story/
2019-08-15/police-shootings-are-a-leading-cause-of-death-forblack-men.
70 Id.
29
whether an officer’s actions—and especially their
decision to use force—were sufficiently reasonable.
Affirming the Tenth’s Circuit’s ruling would curtail
this critical judicial oversight. And it would
significantly expand the circumstances under which
officers could use weapons without recourse, even
against the innocent. As history shows, African
Americans will disproportionately bear the costs of
such abusive police practices.
Accordingly, amicus curiae respectfully urges this
Court to reverse the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, and
reinstate Ms. Torres’s claims.
Respectfully submitted,
SHERRILYN A. IFILL
Director-Counsel
JANAI S. NELSON
SAMUEL SPITAL
JIN HEE LEE*
KEVIN E. JASON
ASHOK CHANDRAN
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.
40 Rector St., 5th Floor
New York, NY 10006
(212) 965-2200
jlee@naacpldf.org
DANIEL HARAWA
Of Counsel
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.
700 14TH ST, NW SUITE 600
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc.
*Counsel of Record
February 7, 2020
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.