Amicus Curiae Brief — Thomas E. Dobbs, State Health Officer of the Mississippi Department of Health, et al., Petitioners v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, et al.
Supreme Court briefJul 29, 2021
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No. 19-1392
In the Supreme Court of the
United States
THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR MONIQUE CHIREAU WUBBENHORST,
M.D., M.P.H., GRAZIE POZO CHRISTIE, M.D.,
COLLEEN MALLOY, M.D., AND THE CATHOLIC
ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
HEATHER GEBELIN HACKER
Counsel of Record
HACKER STEPHENS LLP
108 Wild Basin Rd., Suite 250
Austin, Texas 78746
heather@hackerstephens.com
(512) 399-3022
TA BLE O F C O NTE N TS
Page
Table of authorities ....................................................... III
Interest of amici curiae ................................................... 1
Summary of argument..................................................... 3
Argument.......................................................................... 5
I. Roe and Casey’s Viability Standard Is
Incomplete and Outdated According to Current
Science. .................................................................. 5
A. “Viability” no longer means what it did at
the time of Roe and Casey.............................. 5
B. Ultrasound technology has dramatically
improved and provides a clear window into
the womb to witness the humanity of the
unborn child. ................................................... 8
C. Improved imaging has provided greater
information about fetal development. ......... 14
D. Advancements in technology have led to
recognition of the fetus as a patient by
mainstream medicine. .................................. 18
E. Current science shows that the fetus is paincapable much earlier than previously
thought. ......................................................... 22
II. Casey Is Unworkable and Should Be
Overruled. ........................................................... 26
A. Casey does not allow for restrictions based
on increased knowledge of how the brutal
abortion procedure affects the unborn
child................................................................ 27
(I)
II
B. Casey is inconsistent with the Court’s
recognition of other State interests that
justify abortion restrictions. ........................ 30
C. Casey’s standard is arbitrary and has had
damaging effects. .......................................... 32
Conclusion ...................................................................... 36
III
TA BLE O F AU T HO R I TIE S
Page(s)
Cases:
Baze v. Rees,
553 U.S. 35, 49 (2008) ............................................... 26
Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky.,
139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019)............................................... 30
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc.,
462 U.S. 416 (1983)................................................... 27
EMW Women’s Surg. Ctr., P.S.C. v.
Friedlander,
960 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2020) .................................... 31
Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007)........................................... passim
Harris v. W. Alabama Women’s Ctr.,
139 S. Ct. 2606 (2019)......................................... 30, 31
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs,
945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................ 3, 33
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun.
Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)......................................... 21, 26
June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo,
140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020)......................................... 33, 34
McCorvey v. Hill,
385 F.3d 846 (5th Cir. 2004) .............................. 22, 33
MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem,
795 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2015) .................................... 33
IV
Page(s)
Cases—Con’t:
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Fam.
Plan. & Preventative Health Servs., Inc v.
Smith,
913 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2019) .................................... 28
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)........................................... passim
Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)....................................... 4, 5, 7, 30
Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005)................................................... 22
S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,
141 S. Ct. 716 (2021)................................................... 4
Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914 (2000)............................................. 27, 33
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Obst. & Gyns.,
476 U.S. 747 (1986)................................................... 31
W. Alabama Women’s Ctr. v. Williamson,
900 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2018) ................................ 31
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989)............................................. 31, 34
Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton,
978 F.3d 896 (5th Cir. 2020) ............. 14, 28, 29, 30, 31
Statutes:
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-105, § 2(14)(M), 117 Stat. 1201 (2003) ....... 32
V
Page(s)
Other Authorities:
A. Kurjak & A. Luetic, Fetal neurobehavior
assessed by three-dimensional/fourdimensional sonography, Zdravniski
Vestnik., Vol. 79, 790-99 (Nov. 2010) ................ 11, 12
A. Pawlowski, 'Miracle baby': Born at 21 Weeks,
She May Be the Most Premature Surviving
Infant (Nov. 2017),
https://www.today.com/health/born-21-weeksshe-may-be-most-premature-surviving-babyt118610 ........................................................................ 6
Am. Coll. Obstet. & Gyns., Obstetric Care
Consensus: Periviable Birth (2019),
https://www.acog.org/clinical/clinicalguidance/obstetric-careconsensus/articles/2017/10/periviable-birth ........... 26
Am. Coll. Obstet. & Gyns., Facts are Important:
Fetal Pain,
https://www.acog.org/advocacy/facts-areimportant/fetal-pain........................................... 24, 34
Americans’ Opinions on Abortion: Knights of
Columbus/Marist Poll Nat’l Survey 7 (Jan.
2021),
https://www.kofc.org/en/resources/newsroom/polls/kofc-national-survey-withtables012021.pdf....................................................... 35
Bryan A. Garner, et al., The Law of Judicial
Precedent (2016)................................................... 5, 35
VI
Page(s)
Other Authorities—Con’t:
C. Malloy, M. Chireau Wubbenhorst, T. Sander
Lee, The Perinatal Revolution, Issues in L. &
Med. 26 Vol. 34 no. 1, 15-41 (Spring 2019) .... passim
Cari Romm, FDA Warning: Stay Away From
‘Keepsake’ Ultrasounds, The Atlantic, Dec.
14, 2014,
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/20
14/12/fda-warning-stay-away-from-keepsakeultrasounds/383816/ ................................................... 9
Carlo V. Bellieni, Analgesia for fetal pain
during prenatal surgery: 10 years of progress,
Pediatric Res. 1612-18 (Sept. 24, 2020) .......... passim
D. Stulberg, et al., Abortion provision among
practicing obstetrician-gynecologists, Obstet.
Gyn., Vol. 118 no. 3, 609–14 (Sept. 2011) ................ 34
Elyse Samuels, How do parents find out the sex
of their baby today? Exploring the trend of
gender-reveal parties, Wash. Post, May 13,
2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parent
ing/wp/2018/05/13/how-do-parents-find-outthe-sex-of-their-baby-today-exploring-thenew-trend-of-gender-reveal-parties/ ........................ 9
F. Chervenak & L. McCullough, Should Sex
Identification Be Offered As Part of the
Routine Ultrasound Examination?, 8 J.
Ultrasound Obstet. Gyn. 293–94 (1996) ................. 11
VII
Page(s)
Other Authorities—Con’t:
F. Gary Cunningham, et al., eds. Williams
Obstetrics 181–343 (25th ed. 2018).......................... 18
Fox Television, Extreme Preemie, ‘About the
Size of a Hand,’ Goes Home in Georgia (July
2020),
https://fox6now.com/2020/07/01/extremepreemie-comes-home-for-first-time/ ........................ 6
GE Healthcare, GE Healthcare Voluson HDlive
Ultrasound Imaging Short Movie (Dec. 5,
2011), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=BD7quHKgEuk............................... 13
GE Healthcare, Introducing Versana Active
with an Advanced Cart (Jul. 8, 2020),
https://youtu.be/noMXN-iJjhw ................................. 9
GE Healthcare, Vscan Air, https://handheldultrasound.gehealthcare.com/. ..................................... 9
James C. Mohr, Abortion in America: The
Origins and Evolution of National Policy,
1800-1900 (1978) ......................................................... 8
K. Marsal, et al., One-Year Survival of
Extremely Preterm Infants After Active
Perinatal Care in Sweden, J. of Am. Med.
Assn. Vol. 301 no. 21, 2225–33, (June 3, 2009) ......... 6
Keith L. Moore, et al., The Developing Human:
Clinically Oriented Embryology 85 (11th ed.
2020) .............................................................. 14, 16, 17
VIII
Page(s)
Other Authorities—Con’t:
L. Harris, Second Trimester Abortion
Provision: Breaking the Silence and
Changing the Discourse, Repro. Health
Matters, Vol. 16 no. supp. 31, 74–81
(2008)............................................................. 28, 30, 34
M. Allen, et al., The Limit of Viability—
Neonatal Outcome of Infants Born at 22 to 25
Weeks’ Gestation, N. E. J. Med. Vol. 329 no.
22, 1597–1601 (Nov. 25, 1993) ................................... 6
M. Cullen, et al., A Comparison of Transvaginal
and Abdominal Ultrasound in Visualizing
the First Trimester Conceptus J. Ultrasound
Med. Vol. 8, 565–69 (1989) ....................................... 10
M. Sato, et al., 4D ultrasound study of fetal
facial expressions at 20–24 weeks of gestation,
Int’l J. Gyn. Obstet. Vol. 126 no. 3, 275–79,
(Sept. 2014) ............................................................... 13
Mark A. Curran, Fetal Development, (Mar.
2019),
https://perinatology.com/Reference/Fetal%20
development.htm#15................................... 14, 16, 17
Mayo Clinic, In vitro fertilization,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/testsprocedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac20384716 ..................................................................... 7
IX
Page(s)
Other Authorities—Con’t:
Miriam Falco, Study: Major benefits for spina
bifida surgery in the womb, CNN, Feb. 10,
2011,
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/02/09/s
urgery.spina.bifada/index.html................... 21Philips
Healthcare, Advanced screening views of the
fetal heart - Part 1 - 4-chamber color and PW
Doppler, (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=UaC0S7W2OWM .............. 16
Royal Coll. of Obstet. and Gyns., Fetal
awareness review of research and
recommendations for practice: report of a
working party (Mar. 2010) ...................................... 24
S. Campbell, A Short History of Sonography in
Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Facts, Views, &
Visions: Issues in Obst., Gyn., & Repro.
Health, Vol. 5 no. 3, 213–29, (2013) .......... 8, 10, 11, 13
S. Derbyshire & J. Bockmann, Reconsidering
fetal pain, J. Med. Ethics, Vol. 46, no. 1, 3–6
(2020)................................................................. passim
Shawn Shinneman, The Surgeon Who Works On
Babies Before They’re Born, Dallas Mag., Oct.
2018 ........................................................................... 20
Testimony of Dr. Anthony Levatino, C-SPAN,
“Planned Parenthood Medical Procedures,”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0tQZhEi
saE ............................................................................ 28
X
Page(s)
Other Authorities—Con’t:
Ultrasound Ireland, 15 Weeks Pregnant - Your
15th Week Of Pregnancy 0:03-1:31, (July 17,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=mDjwNOeM3jE ...................................... 16
Ultrasound Ireland, Scan of the Week: 15 Weeks
Pregnant (The Advanced Early Ultrasound),
(July 17, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbIEmTq
8UyQ ......................................................................... 17
Ultrasoundlink, What is 4D ultrasound scan?,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBV7i9zR
Ato ................................................................. 11, 13, 16
V. Glover & N. Fisk, Fetal pain: implications
for research and practice, Brit. J. Obstet.
Gyn. Vol. 106, 881–86 (Sept. 1999) ................... 24, 26
W. Hern & B. Corrigan, What About Us? Staff
Reactions to D&E, Adv. In Planned
Parenthood Vol. 15 no. 1, 3–8 (Jan. 1980) .............. 28
William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L.
Rev. 735, 736 (1949) ................................................. 35
INTE RE ST O F A MIC I C U RI AE
Amici curiae are Monique Chireau Wubbenhorst,
M.D., M.P.H., Grazie Pozo Christie, M.D., Colleen Malloy, M.D., and The Catholic Association Foundation. 1
Dr. Monique Chireau Wubbenhorst is a board-certified obstetrician-gynecologist. Dr. Wubbenhorst graduated from Mount Holyoke College and attended medical
school at Brown University. She received a master’s in
public health from Harvard University. She completed
her residency in obstetrics and gynecology at Yale-New
Haven Hospital and her postdoctoral fellowship in health
services research at the Sheps Center for Health Services Research at the University of North CarolinaChapel Hill. She was on the faculty at Duke University
School of Medicine from 2003-2018. She is a fellow of the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG). Dr. Wubbenhorst recently served as the Senior
Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau of Global
Health at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Dr. Wubbenhorst’s clinical career has focused on caring for women in disadvantaged populations,
especially the African-American community.
Dr. Grazie Pozo Christie is a practicing physician
specializing in diagnostic radiology. Dr. Christie graduated from Columbia University and received her medical
degree from the University of Miami Miller School of
Medicine. She completed her residency in diagnostic radiology and a fellowship in orthopedic radiology at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami. She is a diplomate of
the American Board of Radiology. For over two decades
Petitioner and Respondent provided blanket consent for the
filing of amicus briefs. Rule 37.3(a). No counsel for any party authored this brief, in whole or in part. No person or entity other than
amici contributed monetarily to its preparation or submission.
1
2
she has been in private practice as a general radiologist
in Miami, working mainly in underserved communities.
Using a variety of modalities, including ultrasound, magnetic resonance imaging and computed tomography, she
works closely with referring physicians to diagnose disease in her patients. As part of her daily practice, Dr.
Christie interprets ultrasounds of pregnant women and
their developing babies.
Dr. Colleen Malloy is board-certified in both neonatal-perinatal medicine and pediatrics. She is an Assistant
Professor of Pediatrics (Neonatology) at Northwestern
University Feinberg School of Medicine in Chicago. Dr.
Malloy graduated from the University of Notre Dame
and received her medical degree from Northwestern
University Feinberg School of Medicine. She completed
her residency in pediatrics and her fellowship in neonatology at Loyola University Medical Center in Chicago.
She maintains a clinical practice at Northwestern Memorial Hospital and the Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children’s
Hospital of Chicago. In her clinical practice, Dr. Malloy
helps to manage high-risk pregnancies and cares for babies born prematurely as well as term babies with health
issues.
As they care for both women and their unborn children as their patients, amici physicians have seen
firsthand in their clinical practices how science has advanced dramatically since Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
were decided. These advancements not only affect when
a fetus is viable, but also create new concerns that States
should be able to consider when restricting abortion.
The Catholic Association Foundation (TCA) is a lay
organization dedicated to being a faithful voice for Catholics in the public square. TCA has previously filed
3
amicus curiae briefs in this Court. TCA responds to the
call of the Catholic Church for members of the lay faithful to apply Catholic teaching, wisdom, and principles to
the issues of the day. TCA strives toward achieving a society in which the common good and the dignity of every
human person—born or unborn—is upheld.
SU M MA RY O F A RGU ME NT
48 years after Roe v. Wade, innumerable advances in
science and medicine now inform our understanding of
pregnancy, fetal development, and viability in ways unimaginable in 1973. Mississippi prohibited abortions after 15 weeks’ gestation because of that evidence. See Pet.
App. 65a-70a, 75a-100a. But the lower court, relying on
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, held that “[n]o state interest is constitutionally
adequate to ban abortions before viability, so the interests advanced here are legally irrelevant to the sole issue
necessary to decide the Clinic’s constitutional challenge.” Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d
265, 275 (5th Cir. 2019). Under Casey, Mississippi is compelled to permit doctors to kill living, pain-capable human fetuses—as science now shows—in a way that even
an animal could not be legally killed.
As a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist, radiologist, and neonatologist, amici physicians have had frontrow seats in witnessing the comprehensive scientific innovations over the last few decades. Advancing science
has painted an intimate portrait of the fetus and its humanity. Science has told us volumes about the unborn
child’s development and its capacity to feel pain, and
mainstream medicine treats the unborn child as a patient. Yet amici physicians are also witness to the fruits
4
of abortion jurisprudence that is out-of-sync with the latest medical science. As they care for their unborn patients, they are confronted with the evidence of their undeniable humanity—evidence that Casey deems legally
irrelevant. It is their professional view that in Roe’s own
terms, we have arrived at a quite different “point in the
development of man’s knowledge” about life in utero.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973), holding modified
by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (plurality op.). The Court’s jurisprudence should
reflect—or, at least, leave room for—this new understanding. As it stands now, it does not.
If the Court’s abortion jurisprudence purports to rely
on science, it should at least rely on modern science. But
Casey effectively declared all scientific developments irrelevant and the viability line absolute, even though Casey itself relied on evolving science in declaring Roe’s trimester framework rigid and unworkable. If there is no
flexibility for States to consider scientific advancements
in limiting abortion, Casey requires “science-based policy yield to judicial edict.” S. Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2021) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). Roe and Casey’s viability framework is outdated and unworkable. It must be overruled.
5
ARGU ME N T
I. Roe and Casey’s Viability Standard Is Incomplete
and Outdated According to Current Science.
This Court reconsiders constitutional precedent
“when it is convinced that its earlier decision rested on a
dated or incorrect view of the facts or law.” 2 Current science makes clear that Roe and Casey’s viability standard
is out-of-date. Since those cases were decided, scientific
advancements have allowed both physicians and the public to learn more about the unborn child and its development, including its capacity to feel pain. Technology has
allowed the fetus to be viable outside the mother’s womb
significantly earlier, and has allowed physicians to provide medical treatment, even surgery, to the fetus in
utero. Mainstream medicine considers the unborn child
a patient. These developments have revealed the human
form of the fetus and undermine viability as the sole factor States may consider in limiting abortion. Roe and Casey’s fundamental premise is therefore outmoded and
must be reconsidered because of current science.
A. “Viability” no longer means what it did at the
time of Roe and Casey.
This Court’s definition of viability is the point at
which the fetus is “potentially able to live outside the
mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.” Roe, 410 U.S.
at 160. In 1973, viability meant 28 weeks’ gestation (the
cusp of the third trimester), but by 1992, it was 23 or 24
weeks, well into the second trimester. Casey, 505 U.S. at
860. Those babies—previously at the very edge of possible survival—now survive at much higher rates.
Bryan A. Garner, et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 367
(2016).
2
6
In 1993, the New England Journal of Medicine reported the survival rate at 22 weeks to be zero. 3 In 2009,
the Journal of the American Medical Association reported the survival rate at 22 weeks’ gestation was 9.8%. 4
In 2015, the New England Journal of Medicine reported
the survival rate as 22.1%. 5 In 2016, Pediatrics reported
a 31% survival rate. 6 And a 2017 Canadian study showed
the survival rate at 22 weeks was 64.4%. 7 The NICU now
commonly cares for infants born at these gestational
ages. Babies born at only 21 weeks have now survived. 8
And a recent study suggested that artificial womb technology is feasible. 9 The supposed viability line has now
3
M. Allen, et al., The Limit of Viability—Neonatal Outcome of
Infants Born at 22 to 25 Weeks’ Gestation, N. E. J. Med. Vol. 329
no. 22, 1597–1601 (Nov. 25, 1993), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/
10.1056/NEJM199311253292201?articleTools=true.
4
K. Marsal, et al., One-Year Survival of Extremely Preterm Infants After Active Perinatal Care in Sweden, J. of Am. Med. Assn.
Vol. 301 no. 21, 2225–33, (June 3, 2009), https://jamanetwork.com
/journals/jama/fullarticle/184015.
5
C. Malloy, M. Chireau Wubbenhorst, T. Sander Lee, The Perinatal Revolution, Issues in L. & Med. 26 Vol. 34 no. 1, 15-41, 26
(Spring
2019),
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ilmed34&div=6&id=&page= (footnote omitted).
6
Id. (footnote omitted).
7
Id. (footnote omitted).
8
Fox Television, Extreme Preemie, ‘About the Size of a Hand,’
Goes Home in Georgia (July 2020), https://fox6now.com/2020/
07/01/extreme-preemie-comes-home-for-first-time/; A. Pawlowski,
'Miracle baby': Born at 21 Weeks, She May Be the Most Premature
Surviving Infant (Nov. 2017), https://www.today.com/health/born21-weeks-she-may-be-most-premature-surviving-baby-t118610.
9
See Malloy, supra, at 33 (footnote omitted).
7
moved at least a month and a half earlier than was contemplated in Roe. 10
According to Casey, Roe’s “central holding” is “that
viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a
legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.” 505 U.S. at
860. Because the plurality assumed that any movement
in that line would be trivial, Casey was willing to accept
the “imprecision” of the viability line as “within tolerable
limits” because “there is no line other than viability
which is more workable.” Id. at 870. But as discussed
above, the movements in the viability line, as defined by
Roe, are significant.
Further, Casey accepted that “there may be some
medical developments that affect the precise point of viability,” but did not allow for “medical developments”
that affect other aspects of the abortion issue. Id. (emphasis added). These developments, discussed below, are
just as relevant to the “balance” Casey struck between
the woman’s liberty interest and the State’s interest in
“the life of the fetus that may become a child,” id. at 846,
861. They show that the fetus is not merely a clump of
tissue that “may become” a child—it is an “unborn child,
a child assuming the human form.” Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 160 (2007). The human form of the child,
regardless of its viability, is unaccounted for by Casey.
Roe’s definition of viability no longer only describes a premature infant’s survival. Even human zygotes can now survive “outside
the mother’s womb” with “artificial aid,” Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. See,
e.g., Mayo Clinic, In vitro fertilization, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac-20384
716.
10
8
B. Ultrasound technology has dramatically
improved and provides a clear window into the
womb to witness the humanity of the unborn
child.
Even without ultrasound technology, doctors have
long known that the baby was alive in the womb. In 1859,
the American Medical Association unanimously approved a report deeming abortion the “unwarrantable
destruction of human life.” 11 But the development of fetal
ultrasound revolutionized our understanding of the fetus. Technological advances since Roe and Casey have allowed for widespread use and better-quality images, giving the public a growing appreciation of the fetus in
utero.
1. Since Roe, ultrasound went from being infrequent, expensive, and cumbersome, to becoming part of
the standard of care. Fetal ultrasound was pioneered in
1958. 12 For the first time, physicians could visually observe a living fetus. 13 But the first images were rudimentary, and the first machines enormous and expensive,
making ultrasound largely inaccessible. 14 As technology
advanced, smaller, less expensive ultrasound machines
were developed, resulting in greater access and more
routine use. 15 Once fetal ultrasound became
James C. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy, 1800-1900 157 (1978).
12
See S. Campbell, A Short History of Sonography in Obstetrics
and Gynaecology, Facts, Views, & Visions: Issues in Obst., Gyn., &
Repro. Health, Vol. 5 no. 3, 213–29, (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3987368/.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Ultrasound machines are now as small as laptop computers;
others are simply handheld transducers that transmit images to a
11
9
democratized, the public began to appreciate the undeniable humanity of the unborn child. One sure sign of this
new cultural understanding: the ultrasound images
posted on refrigerators and social media by expectant
parents (and grandparents) across America. These
black-and-white, baby-on-the-way images have informed
the minds and hearts of lay people who have become increasingly aware that what is at issue in this legal debate
are members of the human family, even when small and
hidden in the haven of the womb.
Over the last decade, ultrasound has been widely
used not only for medical purposes, but also for bonding
with the unborn child. Ultrasound facilities are common
in shopping malls, providing families with keepsake images. 16 The reliability of ultrasound to determine the
baby’s sex has also made “gender reveals” popular, and
many families prepare gender-specific nurseries and layettes well in advance of the baby’s arrival. 17
smartphone. See, e.g., GE Healthcare, Introducing Versana Active
with an Advanced Cart (July 8, 2020), https://youtu.be/noMXNiJjhw; GE Healthcare, Vscan Air, https://handheldultrasound.gehealthcare.com/.
16
See, e.g., Cari Romm, FDA Warning: Stay Away From ‘Keepsake’ Ultrasounds, The Atlantic, Dec. 14, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/12/fda-warning-stay-away-fromkeepsake-ultrasounds/383816/.
17
See Elyse Samuels, How do parents find out the sex of their
baby today? Exploring the trend of gender-reveal parties, Wash.
Post, May 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parenting/wp/2018/05/13/how-do-parents-find-out-the-sex-of-their-babytoday-exploring-the-new-trend-of-gender-reveal-parties/.
10
2. The quality of ultrasound images has improved
dramatically since Roe and Casey. Sonograms in the
1970s were rudimentary: 18
Sonograms in the late 1980s 19 were still blurry and indefinite, as the below image illustrates. A sonographer’s
guess as to the baby’s sex in those days was unreliable.
Transvaginal ultrasound, a technological leap that occurred in the early 1990s, allowed for greater visibility of
Campbell, supra, at Fig. 7.
See M. Cullen, et al., A Comparison of Transvaginal and Abdominal Ultrasound in Visualizing the First Trimester Conceptus
J.
Ultrasound
Med.
Vol.
8,
565–69,
568
(1989),
https://perma.cc/778Q-BFCC.
18
19
11
the fetus in early pregnancy. 20 This technique provided
evidence destroying the argument that the fetus in early
pregnancy was merely a “clump of cells.” In 1996, four
years after Casey, ultrasound technology clear enough to
reliably determine the fetus’s sex was so new that physicians still debated whether they should routinely tell parents this information. 21 Now, ultrasound technology allows for 3D and 4D real-time imaging. 22 The below 3D image of a first trimester fetus demonstrates the dramatic
increase in imaging capability as compared to what was
available around the time of Casey. 23
See Campbell, supra.
See F. Chervenak & L. McCullough, Should Sex Identification Be Offered As Part of the Routine Ultrasound Examination?,
8 J. Ultrasound Obstet. Gyn. 293–94 (1996), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1046/j.1469-0705.1996.08050293.x/epdf.
22
See, e.g., Ultrasoundlink, What is 4D ultrasound scan?,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBV7i9zRAto (demonstrating
differences in current 2D, 3D, and 4D technology).
23
A. Kurjak & A. Luetic, Fetal neurobehavior assessed by threedimensional/four-dimensional sonography, Zdravniski Vestnik.,
Vol. 79, 790-99, 794 (Nov. 2010), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287702538_Fetal_neurobehavior_assessed_by_three-dimensionalfour-dimensional_sonography.
20
21
12
Using a 3D ultrasound, clinicians can see a ten-week fetus
moving its arms, and in the eleventh week, moving its tiny
fingers. 24 The incredible detail in these images even allows
one to see if the unborn child has her mother’s nose or her
father’s chin, even in the second trimester, as below: 25
24
25
Id. at 795.
Id. at 796.
13
3D and 4D images, surface rendered, reveal the human
face of the fetus: plump cheeks, delicately formed lips,
and tiny noses: 26
In 4D renderings, we can observe movement. The baby
can be seen yawning, sucking her thumb, and kicking. 27
4D technology also shows fleeting expressions: the grimace of a cry, a frown wrinkling the forehead, a curve of
the lips into a smile. 28 The baby’s mouth opens, and we
can even see the tongue moving. 29 These detailed images
Campbell, supra, at Fig. 15.
See GE Healthcare, GE Healthcare Voluson HDlive Ultrasound Imaging Short Movie (Dec. 5, 2011), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=BD7quHKgEuk.
28
See, e.g., M. Sato, et al., 4D ultrasound study of fetal facial
expressions at 20–24 weeks of gestation, Int’l J. Gyn. Obstet. Vol.
126 no. 3, 275–79, (Sept. 2014); https://obgyn.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1016/j.ijgo.2014.03.036.
29
Ultrasoundlink, supra, at 1:24-1:29.
26
27
14
have opened a window into the womb, allowing us to witness the human form of the child.
C. Improved imaging has provided greater
information about fetal development.
Increasing availability of ultrasound and sophisticated imaging of the fetus has provided now-vivid particulars of fetal development.
At 15 weeks’ gestation—only three weeks into the
second trimester, and over a month before the middle of
pregnancy—the child is already well past the embryonic
stage of development and into the fetal stage, which extends from 11 to 39 weeks. 30 At 15 weeks’ gestation, the
fetus is small, but looks unmistakably human, despite not
yet being “viable” according to Casey. At 15 weeks, the
child’s average length is 4-6 inches from the crown of the
head to the rump, and 4.1 ounces in weight. 31 The reproduced image below is close to scale. 32
See Keith L. Moore, et al., The Developing Human: Clinically
Oriented Embryology 85 (11th ed. 2020).
31
See Mark A. Curran, Fetal Development, (Mar. 2019),
https://perinatology.com/Reference/Fetal%20development.htm#15; see also Moore, supra, at 86.
32
This image depicting a 15-week fetus is part of an exhibit admitted into evidence based on expert testimony in Whole Woman's
Health v. Paxton, 978 F.3d 896 (5th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 978 F.3d 974 (5th Cir. 2020), and can be
found at page 4268 of the record on appeal.
30
15
16
At 15 weeks’ gestation, all major organs are formed
and functioning, including the liver, kidneys, pancreas,
and brain. 33 Although the child receives nutrients and oxygen through the umbilical cord, the digestive, urinary,
and respiratory systems are practicing for extra-uterine
life. At 15 weeks, the fetus swallows and urinates; she
even “breathes,” filling her lungs with amniotic fluid and
expelling it. 34 The cardiovascular system is fully formed.
Not only is the baby’s heartbeat detectable, as it has
been for nine weeks, but the four chambers of the fetal
heart are visible. 35 So is the blood “whooshing” between
the chambers on color doppler ultrasound. 36 At 15 weeks,
the baby’s head, starting with the brain, is a marvel of
intricacy. The brain’s large frontal lobes, ventricles, and
thalamus fill most of the space. 37 The fetal profile is clear:
the gently sloping nose, the distinct upper and lower lips
and chin: 38
See Curran, supra, at 13 weeks.
Moore, supra, at 87; Curran, supra, at 11 weeks; see also, e.g.,
Ultrasound Ireland, 15 Weeks Pregnant - Your 15th Week Of Pregnancy (July 17, 2015), 0:03-1:29, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=mDjwNOeM3jE.
35
See Curran, supra, at 6 weeks; Philips Healthcare, Advanced
screening views of the fetal heart - Part 1 - 4-chamber color and PW
Doppler, (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
UaC0S7W2OWM.
36
See Philips Healthcare, supra.
37
Ultrasoundlink, supra, at 0:24.
38
See Ultrasound Ireland, supra.
33
34
17
The external genitalia are visible, allowing sonographers
to inform families whether their baby is a son or daughter. 39
Although many women cannot yet feel movements, 40
a baby at 15 weeks’ gestation is very active. Unless the
baby is asleep, kicking and arm-waving are commonly
seen during ultrasound evaluations. 41 The fetal spine is
often gently curved as the fetus rests against the
mother’s uterine wall. But then the baby plants her feet
against the wall in front of her and stretches vigorously. 42
This is the living reality of what is at issue in this case:
a tiny boy or girl who, at 15 weeks, kicks, breathes, and
hiccups, who has little fingers that open and close—and
who has undeniably “assum[ed] the human form.” Gonazles, 550 U.S. at 160.
Moore, supra, at 88; Curran, supra, at week 14.
Moore, supra, at 86; Curran, supra, at week 15.
41
Moore, supra, at 88; see also, Ultrasound Ireland, Scan of the
Week: 15 Weeks Pregnant (The Advanced Early Ultrasound), (July
17, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbIEmTq8UyQ (2D
ultrasound scan of 15-week baby).
42
See id.
39
40
18
D. Advancements in technology have led to
recognition of the fetus as a patient by
mainstream medicine.
Science has not only plainly revealed the human form
of the unborn child. It has led to the recognition of the
fetus as a patient in her own right. Obstetricians have
viewed the baby as a patient along with the mother. 43 But
until recently, there was a limit to what doctors could do
to confirm a problem with the fetus, and little that could
be done about it. Sophisticated imaging, genetics, and
the exploding field of fetal therapy have increased our
knowledge of fetal life. Mainstream medicine now recognizes the fetus as a patient, capable of being treated and
worthy of care. Clinicians also recognize that the fetus’
environment in the womb can impact the rest of her life. 44
When Roe was decided, perinatal medicine was a
brand-new field. 45 The development of diagnostic technology like ultrasound and MRI, which allowed physicians to safely visualize the living fetus in real time
throughout pregnancy, “shifted the focus from the newborn, with a severe disorder that could not be corrected
after birth, to the possibility of prenatal medical or surgical intervention that could help ameliorate the clinical
manifestations of disease … these diagnostic capabilities
led to further research … and the realization that the fetus was, and is, a patient.” 46
Cf. F. Gary Cunningham, et al., eds. Williams Obstetrics 181–
343 (25th ed. 2018) (section in seminal obstetrics textbook titled
“The Fetal Patient”).
44
Malloy, supra, at 15 (footnote omitted).
45
Id. at 16.
46
Id.
43
19
Improved diagnostic capability has allowed for many
conditions to be treated medically while the fetus is still
in utero. 47 One of the most common interventions is the
preventative treatment of neural-tube defects. Doctors
routinely advise women to take folic acid starting before
conception and throughout their pregnancy, as it reduces
neural-tube defects like spina bifida. 48 Magnesium sulfate has been examined extensively as a means to reduce
the risk of cerebral palsy. 49 Congenital adrenal hyperplasia can be diagnosed very early in pregnancy and
treated starting at 7-9 weeks’ gestation. 50 Other fetal
problems that can be medically prevented or treated are
HIV infection and thyroid disease. 51
Aside from diagnosis of the fetus, imaging has also
made it possible for interventional surgical procedures
to be performed in utero. Using ultrasound for guidance,
doctors can safely perform amniocentesis, biopsies, surgery and sampling. 52 As imaging technology advanced,
better visualization led to “drastically improved” screening for certain conditions and an explosion in possible
treatments. 53
Laparoscopic-type techniques, known as fetoscopy,
have “revolutionized” fetal procedures. 54 These procedures use endoscopes (small, fiber-optic guided instruments) within the uterus. Using ultrasound guidance, fetoscopy enables doctors to place shunts (to treat
See id. at 17–19.
Id. at 17.
49
Id. at 18.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 18–19.
52
Id. at 17.
53
See id. at 16–17.
54
Id. at 19.
47
48
20
problems like bladder obstruction), and correct blood
vessel abnormalities. 55 Life-saving interventions are now
available for fetuses diagnosed with congenital heart disease. Fetal hemolytic disease, often fatal if untreated,
may be treated in utero through fetal blood transfusions. 56
Advancing technology also allows doctors to perform
open fetal surgery as early as 15 weeks’ gestation. 57 Over
the last decade, fetal surgeries have “soared as never before.” 58 During these surgeries, physicians will open the
uterus and operate directly on the fetus, producing images like the one below, which reinforce the human form
of the child in the womb. 59
Id.
Id.
57
Shawn Shinneman, The Surgeon Who Works On Babies Before They’re Born, Dallas Mag., Oct. 2018, https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2018/october/timothy-crombleholme-works-on-babies-before-theyre-born/.
58
Carlo V. Bellieni, Analgesia for fetal pain during prenatal
surgery: 10 years of progress, Pediatric Res. 1612-18, 1 & Fig. 1
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41390-020-011702.
59
Malloy, supra, at 21; see also Shinneman, supra.
55
56
21
The below image was taken during a surgery to repair
open spina bifida. 60
During open fetal surgery, surgeons can remove tumors and repair congenital diaphragmatic hernias. 61
Other conditions successfully treated in open fetal surgery include large lung tumors, severe kidney obstruction, low amniotic fluid, and twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome. 62
The rapidly developing field of fetal therapies and
surgery—completely undeveloped at the time of Roe and
still largely futuristic at the time of Casey—is significant
for purposes of evaluating whether the “underpinnings”
of those cases have been “eroded.” Janus v. Am. Fed’n
of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2482 (2018) (citation omitted). These new technologies
have confirmed that in the view of mainstream medicine,
Miriam Falco, Study: Major benefits for spina bifida surgery
in the womb, CNN, Feb. 10, 2011, http://edition.cnn.com
/2011/HEALTH/02/09/surgery.spina.bifada/index.html (image of a
22-week fetus grasping the surgeon’s finger).
61
Malloy, supra, at 21–23.
62
Id. at 23–24.
60
22
“the fetus has truly become a patient.” 63 That only
changes if the same child is unwanted by its mother and
slated for abortion. 64 At minimum, the same ethical principles governing the medical treatment of the fetus
should govern elective abortion of the fetus. As the Court
acknowledged in the death penalty context, human dignity is not dependent on whether that human is slated to
die. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By
protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the
Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.”)
E. Current science shows that the fetus is paincapable much earlier than previously thought.
“[N]eonatal and medical science … now graphically
portrays, as science was unable to do [at the time of Roe],
how a baby develops sensitivity to external stimuli and
to pain much earlier than was then believed.” McCorvey
v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 852 (5th Cir. 2004) (Jones, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). With the development of fetal surgery, it was necessary for physicians to consider
fetal pain, and anesthesia to prevent it, to ensure treatment is done humanely. After reviewing scientific evidence from the last decade, researchers have now concluded that “the human fetus can feel pain when it undergoes surgical interventions and direct analgesia must
be provided to it.” 65 Advancing technology also provides
more information about how the fetus experiences the
brutal abortion procedure that ends its life. The
Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 33 (“The fetus is considered a ‘person’ when carried
by a woman who plans to continue the pregnancy, but the fetus is
not considered a person when the mother plans abortion.”)
65
Bellieni, supra, at 1.
63
64
23
possibility of fetal pain warrants the same consideration
given in the context of medical treatment as it does in the
context of abortion, yet Casey’s rigid framework makes
no allowance for it. 66
Generally, pain is perceived after receptors transmit
the pain message to the spinal cord, which carries the
message into the deeper parts of the brain—the thalamus and cortex—for processing. These structures are
developing in the baby well before “viability.” By 12
weeks’ gestation, sensory fibers have grown into the spinal cord and connected with the thalamus, which is the
“essential organ of the affective side of our sensation, especially pain,” and has “pivotal importance” for “fetal
pain.” 67 Also by 12 weeks, the first projections from the
thalamus connect with the cortical subplate. 68 The subplate is a transient developmental structure that forms
underneath the cortical plate proper. 69 Neurons first migrate into the subplate until the cortical plate above is
sufficiently mature; the neurons then migrate to the cortex. 70 The subplate gradually becomes white matter. 71
See S. Derbyshire & J. Bockmann, Reconsidering fetal pain,
J. Med. Ethics Vol. 46, no. 1, 3–6, 4 (2020), https://jme.bmj.com/content/46/1/3 (“[W]hile all the evidence suggests that surgeons performing therapeutic fetal interventions routinely consider pain relief for the fetus, surgeons performing abortions have their focus on
the pregnant woman as their patient. Consequently they more
rarely consider fetal pain relief during the preparation and execution of abortion. Whether or not the fetus feels pain, therefore, is
relevant to current medical practice surrounding abortion and could
motivate changes in practice.” (footnote omitted)).
67
Bellieni, supra, at 2.
68
Derbyshire, supra, at 4.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
66
24
The fact that the fetus lacks a fully functional cortex
before 24 weeks’ gestation led some scientists to believe
that fetal pain perception was impossible before then, despite evidence showing that the fetus will respond to noxious stimuli much earlier. 72 In 2010, the Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) issued a report making this conclusion, 73 and the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) recently relied on it to make the same argument. 74
But researchers now criticize the RCOG report as illfounded: “We could rewrite this [report] as ‘in theory
they can’t feel pain, therefore they don’t.’” 75 And more
recent research “call[s] into question the necessity of the
cortex for pain and demonstrat[es] functional thalamic
connectivity into the subplate.” 76 Further, “even if the
cortex is deemed necessary for pain experience, there is
now good evidence that thalamic projections into the
subplate, which emerge around 12 weeks’ gestation, are
functional and equivalent to thalamocortical projections
that emerge around 24 weeks’ gestation.” 77 Researchers
now believe that “current neuroscientific evidence
See, e.g., V. Glover & N. Fisk, Fetal pain: implications for
research and practice, Brit. J. Obstet. Gyn. Vol. 106, 881–86, 882
(Sept. 1999), https://obgyn.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111
/j.1471-0528.1999.tb08424.x.
73
See Royal Coll. of Obstet. and Gyns., Fetal awareness review
of research and recommendations for practice: report of a working
party (Mar. 2010), https://www.rcog.org.uk/globalassets/documents/guidelines/rcogfetalawarenesswpr0610.pdf.
74
Am. Coll. of Obstet. & Gyns., Facts are Important: Fetal
Pain,
https://www.acog.org/advocacy/facts-are-important/fetalpain (undated but referencing the Trump Administration).
75
Bellieni, supra, at 5 (footnote omitted).
76
Id. at 3.
77
Id. at 4.
72
25
undermines the necessity of the cortex for pain experience. Thus, current neuroscientific evidence supports
the possibility of fetal pain before the ‘consensus’ cut-off
of 24 weeks.” 78
Review of the last decade’s research shows that science has also disproved other theories arguing that fetal
pain is impossible before 24 weeks. 79 In fact, “one of the
most prominent researchers” in the field of fetal pain,
“who had always excluded” its eventuality, “has changed
his conclusions, due to the new evidence.” 80 He now concludes that “[o]verall, the evidence, and a balanced reading of that evidence, points towards an immediate and
unreflective pain experience mediated by the developing
function of the nervous system from as early as 12
weeks.” 81
The relevance to abortion was not lost on the prominent researcher who reconsidered his views due to new
science. Even though he is pro-choice, he and his co-author (who is pro-life) noted that their personal views
“should not interfere with discussion of whether fetal
pain is possible and whether the science of fetal development can rule out the possibility of fetal pain.” 82
It is still unknown exactly how the fetus experiences
pain. But even if it does not experience pain like an adult
with a fully formed cortex, fetal pain is still worthy of
consideration. 83 In fact, evidence suggests that the
Id. at 4.
Id. at 1–7.
80
Id. at 1.
81
Derbyshire, supra, at 6 (emphasis added).
82
Id. at 3.
83
Id. at 4–6; see also, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49 (2008)
(plurality op.) (“Our cases recognize that subjecting individuals to a
78
79
26
unborn child, like infants, may even experience pain
more severely than mature people. 84 Medicine already
recognizes this, and physicians avoid suffering in even
previable fetuses. Fetal anesthesia is the standard of
care for any fetal procedure. 85 And the standard of care
for babies born alive that are too young to be resuscitated still includes palliative care: pain medication,
warmth, and swaddling for comfort. 86 Yet when those
same babies are subjected to abortion, their suffering is
deemed irrelevant because they are destined to die. That
this Court’s precedent requires this perverse result is
more than sufficient to require its reversal.
II. Casey Is Unworkable and Should Be Overruled.
Aside from changes in fact or law, other factors the
Court considers in deciding to overrule precedent, see
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478–79, favor overruling the viability standard because it has proven unworkable.
risk of future harm—not simply actually inflicting pain—can qualify
as cruel and unusual punishment.”)
84
Glover, supra, at 882 (“The last pathways in the nociceptive
system … do not form until after birth, raising the possibility that
the fetus may actually be more sensitive to noxious stimuli than the
older child, and may explain why the newborn shows exaggerated
behavioural responses to sensory provocation.”).
85
See Bellieni, supra, at 1 (“[T]he human fetus can feel pain
when it undergoes surgical interventions and direct analgesia must
be provided to it.”); Derbyshire, supra, at 4 (“Currently … we are
not aware of any procedures where invasive fetal intervention proceeds without anaesthesia or analgesia, except for abortion.”)
86
See, e.g., ACOG, Obstetric Care Consensus: Periviable Birth
(2019),
https://www.acog.org/clinical/clinical-guidance/obstetriccare-consensus/articles/2017/10/periviable-birth.
27
A. Casey does not allow for restrictions based on
increased knowledge of how the brutal
abortion procedure affects the unborn child.
Since Roe, medicine has developed new ways to treat
the fetus as a patient and is addressing the impact those
treatments have on the fetus with respect to pain. But
over the same period, abortion providers have employed
increasingly brutal abortion methods.
The dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure currently used after 15 weeks’ gestation was not used for
second-trimester abortions at the time of Roe. City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 436 & n.23 (1983); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914, 924 (2000). The Court described this brutal procedure before based on the testimony of late-term abortionist Dr. Leroy Carhart:
The Supreme Court described the D&E procedure in gruesome “technical detail” in Stenberg v.
Carhart, acknowledging that its description “may
seem clinically cold or callous to some, perhaps
horrifying to others.” As the Supreme Court explained, abortion doctors use D&E in the second
trimester because at that stage of fetal development, “the fetus is larger”—“particularly the
head”—and the “bones are more rigid,” meaning
“dismemberment or other destructive procedures” are required. . . . A physician extracts from
the womb what moments before had been a living
“unborn child”—using forceps, scissors, or a similar instrument that “slices, crushes, or grasps”
fetal body parts one at a time. Piece by piece. Arm
by arm. Leg by leg. And as the abortion doctor
“cut[s] or rip[s] the piece from the body”—a torso,
28
a spine, a rib cage—he places each body part on a
tray (or in a dish) 87 to keep inventory and ensure
that nothing is left behind. Sometimes the heart is
still beating on the tray. The fetus dies just as an
adult experiencing corporal dismemberment
would—by bleeding to death as his or her body is
torn apart.
Whole Woman’s Health, 978 F.3d at 913 (Willett, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 88 “As one
bioethicist testified, it’s ‘self-evident that it’s brutal and
inhumane to tear a living organism limb from limb
alive.’” Id. at 930. And “[n]o one would dispute that, for
many, D&E is a procedure itself laden with the power to
devalue human life.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158. 89
87
See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Fam. Plan. & Preventative Health Servs., Inc v. Smith, 913 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir.
2019), on reh’g en banc sub nom. Planned Parenthood of Greater
Texas Fam. Plan. & Preventative Health Servs., Inc. v. Kauffman,
981 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2020) (photograph of aftermath of D&E abortion).
88
See also Testimony of Dr. Anthony Levatino, C-SPAN,
“Planned Parenthood Medical Procedures,” https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=j0tQZhEisaE.
89
Abortion providers do not dispute this. See W. Hern & B. Corrigan, What About Us? Staff Reactions to D&E, Adv. In Planned
Parenthood
Vol.
15
no.
1,
3–8,
7
(Jan.
1980),
https://www.drhern.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/staff-reaction
-de.pdf (“[T]here is no possibility of denying an act of destruction.
It is before one’s eyes. The sensations of dismemberment flow
through the forceps like an electric current.”); L. Harris, Second
Trimester Abortion Provision: Breaking the Silence and Changing
the Discourse, Repro. Health Matters, Vol. 16 no. supp. 31, 74–81,
76 (2008), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1016/S09688080%2808%2931396-2?needAccess=true (“There is violence in
abortion, especially in second trimester procedures.”)
29
Given the recent evidence showing the fetus may experience pain as early as 12 weeks, researchers have directly concluded that “a D&E procedure will deliver repeated nociceptive events that may involve fetal pain before fetal death.” 90 Fetal pain is so likely that the same
researchers advocate for fetal analgesia to be used in
abortions, even before less outwardly brutal procedures
causing fetal death, such as feticidal injections. 91 But the
D&E procedure is inherently brutal and inhumane regardless of whether the fetus can feel it. We would never
countenance dismembering a person (or even an animal)
as a means of causing death, even if the person were
anesthetized first. 92
Researchers note that even among the general public, “concerns about what the fetus might experience or
feel have increased, and women considering an abortion
express concern about the welfare of the fetus.” 93 No
doubt, this is because of the advancements in ultrasound
technology described above. As Casey recognized, “most
women considering an abortion would deem the impact
on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.”
505 U.S. at 882. Yet because of Casey, Mississippi is compelled to permit doctors to kill living, pain-capable human children—because they are “previable” according to
Roe and Casey—in a way that “someone could not legally
Derbyshire, supra, at 5.
Id.
92
Moreover, a scientific disagreement about whether the fetus
feels pain at that age should not foreclose the State from “err[ing]
on the side of caution.” Whole Woman’s Health, 978 F.3d at 930
(Willett, J., dissenting). “Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the
exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than
it does in other contexts.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164.
93
Derbyshire, supra, at 5. (footnotes omitted).
90
91
30
kill an animal.” Whole Woman’s Health, 978 F.3d at 930
(Willett, J., dissenting).
B. Casey is inconsistent with the Court’s
recognition of other State interests that
justify abortion restrictions.
By locking in “viability” as the only legally sufficient
reason a State may prohibit abortions, Casey is also outof-step with the Court’s own recognition of other state
interests justifying regulation of previability abortion.
Some examples: preventing the coarsening of society to
the humanity of newborns, Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157; the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession, who must
simultaneously treat the unborn child as a patient in
some contexts and as mere “tissue” in others, 94 id.; protection of minors, Casey, 505 U.S. at 899–900; and maternal health, Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
Because of advancements in genetic testing, it is now
possible to know the child’s sex soon after fertilization
and whether it has any genetic disorders, like Down Syndrome. Justice Thomas recently explained abortion’s ties
to the eugenics movement, noting that “technological advances have only heightened the eugenic potential for
abortion.” Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 139
S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). Thus,
there is a “compelling interest in preventing abortion
from becoming a tool of modern-day eugenics.” Id. at
1783 & n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring). But Casey does not
permit those interests to be considered in limiting abortion.
See Harris, supra, at 77 (“I thought to myself how bizarre it
was that I could have legally dismembered this fetus-now-newborn
if it were inside its mother’s uterus – but that the same kind of violence against it now would be illegal, and unspeakable.”)
94
31
Of particular relevance, multiple Justices that joined
Roe agreed that fetal pain and development are important considerations. Justice Blackmun, the author of
Roe, found it “obvious” that “the State’s interest in the
protection of an embryo … increases progressively and
dramatically as the organism’s capacity to feel pain, to
experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases day by day.” Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 552 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part)
(cleaned up); see also id. at 569 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part) (stating that the interest in protecting a “developed fetus” from “physical pain or mental anguish” is
“valid”). As Justice Stevens wrote in Thornburgh v.
ACOG: “The development of a fetus—and pregnancy itself—are not static conditions, and the assertion that the
government’s interest is static simply ignores this reality.” 476 U.S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Current science strengthens these interests, yet Casey precludes States from taking it into account when
limiting abortions. But “[t]he notion that anything in the
Constitution prevents States from passing laws prohibiting the dismembering of a living child is implausible.”
Harris v. W. Alabama Women’s Ctr., 139 S. Ct. 2606,
2607 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). Based on Casey,
multiple lower courts have rejected even modest
measures to lessen suffering, like requiring feticide before D&E abortion. 95 Plainly, Casey goes too far in
See, e.g., EMW Women’s Surg. Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 960
F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. granted in part sub nom. Cameron v.
EMW Women’s Surg. Ctr., P.S.C., 141 S. Ct. 1734 (2021); Whole
Woman’s Health, 978 F.3d 896; W. Alabama Women’s Ctr. v. Williamson, 900 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2018).
95
32
limiting the ability of States to restrict abortion based on
compelling interests like fetal pain.
C. Casey’s standard is arbitrary and has had
damaging effects.
Casey acknowledged that while “legislatures may
draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity
of offering a justification … courts may not.” 505 U.S. at
870. But as time and science has revealed, Casey’s viability line is both arbitrary and unjustified. It requires the
Court to usurp a role that the Constitution gives to the
legislative branch and make decisions no court is
equipped to make. The Court’s adventure in abortion
policymaking has had damaging effects on our political
system. It is time to correct course.
1. The arbitrariness of the viability standard is
demonstrated through the Court’s own later precedent.
In 2003, the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban was enacted by Congress, citing the “medical fact” that “unborn
infants at this stage can feel pain when subjected to painful stimuli and that their perception of this pain is even
more intense than that of newborn infants and older children when subjected to the same stimuli.” Pub. L. No.
108-105, § 2(14)(M), 117 Stat. 1201 (2003) (noting that
“during a partial-birth abortion procedure, the child will
fully experience the pain associated with piercing his or
her skull and sucking out his or her brain”).
Gonzales upheld the Act. But because of Casey’s rigid
framework, it did so only because the typical D&E procedure described above was still permitted, enabling the
continued provision of previability second-trimester
abortion. As Justice Ginsburg noted, it is nonsensical
that the legality of a ban on an indisputably brutal procedure depended on the availability of an “equally”
33
brutal procedure. 550 U.S. at 181–82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). And as Justice Stevens noted, “[t]he notion that
either of these two equally gruesome procedures … is
more akin to infanticide than the other … is simply irrational.” Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 946–47 (Stevens, J., concurring). Yet this is the contradiction that Casey’s standard
requires.
2. As lower courts have recognized, “‘because the
Court’s rulings have rendered basic abortion policy beyond the power of our legislative bodies, the arms of representative government may not meaningfully debate’
medical and scientific advances.” MKB Mgmt. Corp. v.
Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting
McCorvey, 385 F.3d at 852 (Jones, J., concurring)). The
very fact that science dates the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence highlights an underlying problem: In
Casey, unelected judges evaluated scientific evidence
and “weigh[ed] the State’s interests in ‘protecting the potentiality of human life’ and the health of the woman, on
the one hand, against the woman’s liberty interest” in obtaining an abortion. June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140
S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). In other
words, in holding that States cannot prohibit abortion for
any reason before viability, Casey “has already balanced
the State’s asserted interests and found them wanting.”
Dobbs, 945 F.3d at 274. Based on their professional
knowledge, amici physicians submit that the Court has
empirically—and emphatically—struck the wrong balance.
But “[t]here is no plausible sense in which anyone, let
alone this Court, could objectively assign weight to such
imponderable values and no meaningful way to compare
them if there were.” June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2136
34
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). “Pretending that [the Court] could pull that off would require us
to act as legislators, not judges, and would result in nothing other than an ‘unanalyzed exercise of judicial will’ in
the guise of a ‘neutral utilitarian calculus.’” Id. (citation
omitted). The Court has become the national “ex officio
medical board” it did not want to be. Gonzales, 550 U.S.
at 164 (quoting Webster, 492 U.S. at 518–19. It should relinquish that role.
3. The Court’s foray into medical regulation may not
merely be stagnating the legal standard despite advancing science—it may be impeding science. Researchers
fear that acknowledging science on fetal pain may lead to
restriction on abortion. 96 ACOG’s clinging to decade-old
research illustrates this point. 97 It also illustrates how
ACOG’s views 98 are based less on science and more on
the politics of protecting Roe and Casey. It is unconscionable to think that the “medical” community shapes “the
science” to fit its political goals. But this is the division
the Court’s abortion jurisprudence inflames.
4. Abortion is one of the most controversial issues in
the United States and is likely so because of this Court’s
intervention. The Court’s gambit in attempting to
See Derbyshire, supra, at 3 (“Fetal pain has long been a contentious issue, in large part because fetal pain is often cited as a reason to restrict access to termination of pregnancy or abortion.”); see
also Harris, supra, at 77 (abortion providers are “silen[t]” about the
violence of abortion because “frank talk like this is threatening to
abortion rights.”)
97
See ACOG, Facts are important, supra.
98
Most practicing obstetrician-gynecologists do not share this
view, as over 85% do not perform abortions. D. Stulberg, et al.,
Abortion provision among practicing obstetrician-gynecologists,
Obstet. Gyn., Vol. 118 no. 3, 609–14 (Sept. 2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3170127/.
96
35
answer the question for all time and remove the issue
from public debate, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 867, has had
the opposite effect. Confirmations to this Court are now
political bloodsport because of abortion. At least half of
the American public is still as intensely opposed to abortion as it was in 1973. 99
The most democratic solution would be for this Court
to stop acting as “ex officio medical board” and permit
State legislatures, which are politically accountable if
they strike the wrong balance, and can nimbly respond
to current science, to take its place. The Court should not
be tempted to simply draw another arbitrary line, as that
will result in yet more intense litigation and the issue repeatedly returning to the Court. Nor should the Court
hold blindly to principles of stare decisis in retaining unworkable, outdated precedent. Judges “may have compulsions to revere past history and accept what was once
written. But he [or she] remembers above all else that is
the Constitution which he swore to support and defend,
not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on
it.” 100
***
This brief ends where Casey began: “Liberty finds no
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.” 505 U.S. at 843. “Yet
[48] years after … holding that the Constitution protects
a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early
stages, that definition of liberty is still questioned.” Id.
(citation omitted). Scientific advancements over the last
See, e.g., Americans’ Opinions on Abortion: Knights of Columbus/Marist
Poll
Nat’l
Survey
7
(Jan.
2021),
https://www.kofc.org/en/resources/news-room/polls/kofc-nationalsurvey-with-tables012021.pdf.
100
Garner, supra, at 354 (quoting William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735, 736 (1949)) (emphasis added).
99
36
48 years have multiplied, not reduced, those doubts, as
the humanity of the unborn child is undeniable. The
Court should relinquish its role as nationwide abortion
regulator and return the job to States and elected officials where it belongs.
C O NC LU SIO N
The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
HEATHER GEBELIN HACKER
Counsel of Record
HACKER STEPHENS LLP
108 Wild Basin Rd., Suite 250
Austin, Texas 78746
heather@hackerstephens.com
(512) 399-3022
JULY 2021
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.