Amicus Curiae Brief — Thomas E. Dobbs, State Health Officer of the Mississippi Department of Health, et al., Petitioners v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, et al.
Supreme Court briefJul 28, 2021
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NO. 19-1392
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
THOMAS E. DOBBS, M.D., M.P.H. IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ON
BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS PATIENTS, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
BRIEF OF 396 STATE LEGISLATORS
FROM 41 STATES AS AMICI CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
ADAM J. MACLEOD
5345 Atlanta Highway
Montgomery, AL 36109
(334) 386-7527
amacleod@faulkner.edu
JEFFREY A. SHAFER
Counsel of Record
Langdon Law LLC
8913 Cincinnati-Dayton Rd.
West Chester, Ohio 45069
(513) 577-7380
jshafer@langdonlaw.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 1
ARGUMENT .............................................................. 2
I.
State legislatures have the power and duty to
declare and secure to all persons those rights
that are part of the fundamental law on which
the Constitution is predicated ............................. 2
A. Legislatures must declare and secure all
the civil rights of fundamental law .............. 2
B. It is the province of state legislatures to
declare and specify rights ............................. 6
II. State legislatures must declare and secure all
the rights of all persons ..................................... 12
A. Legislatures must declare and define the
boundaries of the fundamental rights of
life, limb, and liberty ................................... 12
B. A legislature must declare and secure the
rights of all persons ..................................... 18
III. The viability threshold prevents legislatures
from securing the rights of all persons ............. 21
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 22
APPENDIX: List of Participating Amici ........... App-1
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Akron v. Akron Ctr for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983)............................................ 21
Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999).............................................. 6
Connecticut v. Menillo,
423 U.S. 9 (1975).................................................. 9
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam,
__ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) ...................... 6
District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008).............................................. 4
Ferguson v. Gies,
46 N.W. 718 (Mich. 1890) .................................... 8
Gamble v. United States,
__ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) ....................... 6
Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007).............................................. 9
Hopt v. Utah,
110 U.S. 574 (1884)............................................ 17
Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968 (1997).............................................. 9
iii
Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162 (1875) ............................... 5
Moore v. E. Cleveland,
431 U. S. 494 (1977)............................................. 2
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)............................................ 22
Ramos v. Louisiana,
__ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) ....................... 6
Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)............................ 7, 12, 15, 22
Smith v. Alabama,
124 U.S. 465 (1888).............................................. 5
Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler,
22 F. Cas. 756 (No. 13,156) (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) .. 4
Torres v. Madrid,
__ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021) ......................... 6
Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793 (1997)............................................ 15
Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997).................................. 2, 11, 20
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989).............................................. 9
iv
Constitutional Provisions:
U.S. Const. art. I § 8 cl. 8 ........................................... 4
U.S. Const. art. IV §2 ................................................. 4
U.S. Const. amends. I - IX ..................................... 4, 6
Legislative Materials:
Civil Rights Act of 1866 ............................................. 8
Civil Rights Act of 1875 ............................................. 8
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ............................................. 8
Miss. Code Annot. § 43-33-723 (West 2021).............. 8
Other Authorities:
Adam J. MacLeod, Our Universal and Particular
Constitution, Public Discourse (October 4,
2018) ..................................................................... 5
Adam J. MacLeod, Of Brutal Murder and
Transcendental Sovereignty: The Meaning of
Vested Private Rights, 41 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 253 (2017) .................................................. 14
Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone,
145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1996) .............................. 5, 6
v
David S. Sytsma, Matthew Hale as Theologian
and Natural Law Theorist, in Great Christian
Jurists in English History 163 (Mark Hill QC
and R.H. Helmholz, eds. 2017) .......................... 16
Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of
American Constitutional Law, 12 Mich. L.
Rev. 247 (1914) .................................................. 14
Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive
Legislation:
A
Basic
Principle
of
Jurisprudence. 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775 (1936)..... 14
James M. Ogden, Lincoln’s Early Impressions of
the Law in Indiana, 7 Notre Dame L. Rev. 325
(1932).................................................................... 6
James R. Stoner, Jr., Common-Law Liberty:
Rethinking American Constitutionalism
(2003).................................................................... 5
James Wilson, Of Man, as Member of Society, in 1
Collected Works of James Wilson (Kermit L.
Hall and Mark David Hall, eds. 2007) ........ 16, 18
James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of
Individuals, in 2 Collected Works of James
Wilson (Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall,
eds. 2007) ........................................................... 14
Jeffrey
D.
Jackson,
Blackstone’s
Ninth
Amendment: A Historical Common Law
Baseline
for
the
Interpretation
of
Unenumerated Rights, 62 Okla. L. Rev. 167
(2010).................................................................... 5
vi
John Finnis, Intention and Identity: Collected
Essays: Volume II (2011) ............................. 15, 18
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States (5th ed. 1891) ................... 14
Joshua J. Craddock, Protecting Prenatal Persons:
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Prohibit
Abortion?, 40 Harv. J.L. Pub. Pol’y 539 (2017)
............................................................................ 20
Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in
the Early Republic, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1421 (1999)
............................................................................ 14
Grégoire Webber et al, Legislated Rights:
Securing Human Rights through Legislation
(2018).................................................................... 8
Matthew Hale, Of the Law of Nature (David S.
Sytsma, ed. 2015)............................................... 11
Morris L. Cohen, Thomas Jefferson Recommends
a Course of Law Study, 1119 U. Pa. L. Rev.
823 (1971) ............................................................. 5
Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) ...................................................... 18
R.H. Helmholz, Natural Law in Court: A History
of Legal Theory in Practice (2015) ...................... 6
Robert A. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American
Culture (1984) ...................................................... 5
vii
The Digest of Justinian, 1.5.2 .................................. 18
The Declaration of Independence (1776)................. 18
Thomas M. Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative
Power of the States of the American Union
(1868).................................................................. 14
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England (1765) ....................................... passim
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici curiae (listed in the Appendix hereto) are
396 duly elected members of state legislative bodies
representing 41 states. They have a strong interest in
explaining the duty constitutionally incumbent on
them to secure to all persons within the legal
protection of their respective states the fundamental
common law right to life, as being among the “other
rights retained by the people” under the Ninth
Amendment and further protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. They also have an
interest in how the viability threshold, which the
Fifth Circuit employed below, impedes their efforts to
discharge that duty.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A state legislature’s first duty is to declare and
secure the civil rights of all persons who are within
the protection of its laws. A legislator’s job description
is defined foremost by his or her oath to uphold the
Constitution of the United States and the constitution
of the particular state in which he or she serves. A
viability prerequisite to abortion regulations prevents
state legislatures from doing that job, because it
arbitrarily immunizes abortionists from liability
when they infringe others’ civil rights prior to
viability. This Court should abandon the viability
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no person other than amici and their counsel made any
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief. Counsel were timely notified of this brief
as required by Supreme Court Rule 37.2, and all parties
consented to its filing.
2
threshold and liberate state legislatures to legislate
in favor of all civil rights belonging to all persons.
ARGUMENT
I.
State legislatures have the power and duty
to declare and secure to all persons those
rights that are part of the fundamental law
on which the Constitution is predicated.
A. Legislatures must declare and secure all
the civil rights of fundamental law.
State legislators have the constitutional duty, and
therefore the power, to protect the fundamental, civil
rights of persons. The fundamental law in which
those fundamental rights are found is the common
law, which consists of both natural duties and those
ancient, customary rights and immunities that are
foundational to ordered liberty. Thus, a state
legislature must declare and secure to all persons
within the protection of its laws the rights that those
persons have by natural and customary law. Cf.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-22
(1997) (upholding state legislation that prohibited
assisted suicide and reasoning that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s “Due Process Clause specially protects
those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition’.” (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U. S.
494, 503 (1977)).
The Founders took for granted Blackstone’s
teaching that legislatures have compelling reasons to
secure fundamental rights because they have an
obligation to do so. Blackstone remonstrated that
3
the principal aim of society is to protect
individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute
rights, which were vested in them by the
immutable laws of nature, but which could
not be preserved in peace without that mutual
assistance and intercourse which is gained by
the institution of friendly and social
communities.
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England *124 (1765) (hereinafter “Blackstone’s
Commentaries”). “Hence,” he said, “it follows, that the
first and primary end of human laws is to maintain
and regulate these absolute rights of individuals.” Id.
Blackstone taught that the legislative power is to
declare existing common-law rights and duties and to
remedy any defects in the legal security for those
rights. Id. at *42-43, 52-58, 86-87.
The Founders echoed this view in the Declaration
of Independence, declaring that governments are
instituted among men in order to secure the
inalienable rights with which human beings are
endowed by nature and nature’s God. They also
accused the crown and Parliament of infringing the
rights of “our constitution,” which in 1776 could only
have been a reference to the common-law constitution
of British North America. This view predicated the
Constitution of the United States, which expressly
secures natural rights, such as life and religious
liberty, and common-law rights, such as jury trials
and freedom from the quartering of soldiers in one’s
home, and expressly disclaims any intent to disparage
the other rights of the fundamental law.
4
Indeed, the point of having legislatures,
executives, and courts is to secure the rights that
Americans already have. Neither state legislatures
nor the Constitution of the United States create those
rights. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 592 (2008) (stating that “it has always been
widely understood that the Second Amendment, like
the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a preexisting right,” that it “is not a right granted by the
Constitution,” and is not “in any manner dependent
upon that instrument for its existence.”). Some, but
not all, of the rights of natural persons are
enumerated in the Constitution of the United States
and its amendments. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; art.
IV, §2; amends. I-VIII. Others are enumerated in
state constitutions. See e.g., Soc’y for the Propagation
of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 766 (No.
13,156) (C.C.D.N.H. 1814). Still others are declared in
American constitutions but not enumerated. U.S.
Const. amend. IX (“The enumeration of certain rights
herein shall not be construed to deny or disparage
other rights retained by the people.”) (emphasis
added). State legislatures have a duty to declare and
secure all fundamental rights, both enumerated and
unenumerated.
Fundamental rights are those that persons enjoy
by fundamental law—natural law and common law—
with or without any written constitution. Because the
common law includes natural rights, to understand
the fundamental rights declared and secured by the
Constitution, it is sufficient to look to the common
law, especially as explained by William Blackstone.
Established common-law doctrines constitute the best
evidence of the existence and meaning of both
5
enumerated and unenumerated, fundamental rights.
Jeffrey D. Jackson, Blackstone’s Ninth Amendment: A
Historical Common Law Baseline for the
Interpretation of Unenumerated Rights, 62 Okla. L.
Rev. 167 (2010) (explaining why the unenumerated
rights referred to in the Ninth Amendment should be
understood with reference to a common law baseline,
especially
as
specified
in
Blackstone’s
Commentaries); Adam J. MacLeod, Our Universal
and Particular Constitution, Public Discourse,
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/10/43788/
(October 4, 2018). “The interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States is necessarily
influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed
in the language of the English common law, and are
to be read in the light of its history.” Smith v.
Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888). The terms and
concepts of the common law provided the “the
nomenclature of which the framers of the
Constitution were familiar.” Minor v. Happersett, 88
U.S. (21 Wall) 162, 167 (1875). Accord James R.
Stoner, Jr., Common-Law Liberty: Rethinking
American Constitutionalism 9-29 (2003).
American
constitutional
rights
are
not
philosophical abstractions. They are described in
detail in common law treatises, such as those by Coke
and Hale, and especially Blackstone’s Commentaries.
The framers crafted American constitutions—state
and federal—in common law terms. And Blackstone
was their teacher and lexicographer. Morris L. Cohen,
Thomas Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law
Study, 1119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 823 (1971); Robert A.
Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture 11
(1984);
Albert
W.
Alschuler,
Rediscovering
6
Blackstone, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1996); R.H.
Helmholz, Natural Law in Court: A History of Legal
Theory in Practice 131–41 (2015). As this Court has
rightly
acknowledged,
Blackstone’s
“works
constituted the preeminent authority on English law
for the founding generation.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 715 (1999). Blackstone retained his influence
through the adoption of the Civil War Amendments.
James M. Ogden, Lincoln’s Early Impressions of the
Law in Indiana, 7 Notre Dame L. Rev. 325, 328
(1932). And this Court continues to turn to Blackstone
today. 2
B. It is the province of state legislatures to
declare and specify rights.
It is the province of state legislatures to declare
and specify those fundamental rights that the U.S.
Constitution leaves unspecified. U.S. Const. amend. X
(“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”)
2 A few examples from recent years include Gamble v. United
States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) (the Court’s opinion,
the concurrence, and one dissent citing Blackstone multiple
times to determine the meaning of the phrase “the same offense”
in the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause); Department
of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct.
1959, 1969 (2020) (calling Blackstone’s Commentaries a
“satisfactory exposition of the common law of England”); Ramos
v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020) (citing
Blackstone in explanation of the holding that the requirement of
juror unanimity is “a vital right protected by the common law”
and therefore the Constitution’s jury trial guarantee); Torres v.
Madrid, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 989, 996, 997, 998, 1000 (2021)
(citing Blackstone multiple times to determine meaning of
Fourth Amendment “seizure”).
7
(emphasis added). The legislature’s particular duty to
declare and secure the natural and customary rights
of America’s fundamental common law can be seen
clearly by reading together the Ninth, Tenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States. The Bill of Rights marks off certain
rights as beyond the competence of Congress (and
now, by incorporation, the states) to alter or abolish.
It immunizes those rights by enumerating them and
by stating in particular terms the official duties with
which they correlate. But as the Ninth Amendment
makes clear, the enumeration of certain common-law
rights does not deny or disparage all the other rights
that the American people enjoy by virtue of natural
law and their ancient customs. The Ninth
Amendment expressly reserves to the people those
civil and fundamental rights that they enjoyed prior
to ratification, which are their natural rights, other
common-law rights and liberties, and some privileges
enumerated in state constitutions.
Significantly, this Court declined in Roe v. Wade
to speak on behalf of the Ninth Amendment. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Though the District
Court in Roe attempted to locate an abortion privilege
in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the
people, Id. at 122, this Court did not, instead locating
it in substantive due process doctrine. Id. at 153.
Thus, the Roe Court did not intend to disrupt the
power of state legislatures to articulate the rights
secured by the Ninth Amendment and the limitations
on those rights. This makes sense in light of the
historic role that parliaments and legislatures played
in protecting rights against infringement by the
crown, the crown’s courts, and other officials.
8
Because many states refused to remedy
infringements of fundamental rights prior to the Civil
War, the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary to
ensure to all persons due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws, and to empower Congress to
remedy infringements of those rights. It bears
emphasis that the Fourteenth Amendment was
necessary to recall state legislatures to their original
task. Far from repealing the people’s retention of
fundamental rights declared by the Ninth
Amendment,
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
strengthened it. And far from abrogating the duty of
state
legislatures
to
declare
and
secure
unenumerated rights, the Fourteenth Amendment
reinforced that duty.
Legislatures are equipped to deliberate about and
secure the rights of all persons as they identify and
specify the boundaries between rights. See Grégoire
Webber et al, Legislated Rights: Securing Human
Rights through Legislation (2018). Many of the great
civil rights achievements in American history have
been legislative achievements. See, e.g., the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, Civil Rights Act of 1875, and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. And these include state
statutes that declare and secure common law rights
against unreasonable discrimination. See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718, 719, 720 (Mich. 1890)
(explaining that the Michigan Civil Rights Act of 1885
declared and provided new remedies to vindicate the
common-law right against discrimination because of
race in public accommodations); Miss. Code Ann. § 4333-723 (West 2021) (prohibiting racial and other
unlawful discrimination in housing finance).
9
This Court has never denied that state
legislatures have the power and duty to declare and
specify the boundaries of fundamental rights in the
abortion context. To the contrary, this Court has
ratified the legislative province to identify, specify,
and secure the rights of our fundamental law. Often
using the term “interests” or “state interests,” in
Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975), Webster v.
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), Mazurek
v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997), Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), and on other occasions,
this Court has acknowledged the power of legislatures
to regulate abortion to protect fundamental rights
such as life, health, equal protection of the laws, and
the integrity of the medical profession, a crucial
condition for the right of bodily integrity.
Legislatures have primary responsibility to
declare and give specific form to civil rights because
the liberties of each must be defined and limited to
respect the rights of all. The settlement of the
boundaries between civil liberties must be fair to all,
not just to powerful special interest groups who use
their special standing privileges to file facial
challenges to abortion laws in federal court.
In many respects, legislatures are better
equipped for this task than courts, whose job is to
secure the rights of the litigants who happen to
appear in any case or controversy. The job of a court
is to specify a right in a legal judgment resolving a
dispute between two parties. To generalize that
particular judgment, to make that right universal and
absolute for all persons, carries the risk that the
tribunal will unintentionally invite infringement of
the rights of persons who are not parties to the
10
litigation. Significantly, most constitutional abortion
cases proceed without any involvement of the persons
who are most interested in, and affected by, the
outcome: expectant mothers, fathers, grandparents,
physicians and other health care professionals who
are called to deal with the fallout of abortions, and,
critically, unborn human beings. By contrast,
legislatures hear evidence and find facts about the
rights of all interested persons.
Legislatures must give specific form and content
to rights as they define, secure, and vindicate them.
Rights are defined by their legal limitations. Even
absolute rights have limits. And not all rights are
absolute. That a right is absolute (e.g., the right to
life) does not entail that it means the same thing for
all persons in all contexts. It is the duty of a
legislature to discern different meanings of rights and
to fashion remedies and sanctions for deprivation of
those rights.
For one thing, not all natural persons are
similarly situated with respect to all civil rights. For
example, a member of the armed forces may lawfully
be ordered to take actions that place his life in
jeopardy, actions that a civilian may not be lawfully
ordered to undertake. Closer to the issue in this case,
unborn persons possess rights of inheritance but not
powers of disposition of private property. 1
Blackstone’s Commentaries, at *126, 453. They have
the right to live but lack the legal capacity to sue or
be sued on their own behalf. Id. at *125-26, 452. Thus,
they enjoy rights of “life” and “property” within the
meaning of the due process clauses, though they do
not possess all of the powers that often attend those
rights.
11
Furthermore, a lawmaker must fashion remedies
and sanctions for rights infringements that are
commensurate and responsive to the particular
wrong. Because not all persons who contribute to a
person’s death are equally culpable, legislatures
justly distinguish between them. The sanction for
reckless acts that cause death need not be as severe
as the sanction for intentional homicide. Legislatures
also reasonably take into account the circumstances
of the person whose life is lost. For example, remedies
for wrongful death may take into account a person’s
stage of development and relationship to any
dependents.
Some features of the law governing infants are
immutable, while others are subject to variation. Id.
at * 452-54. They are, in the words of common-law
jurists, matters of indifference. Id. at *54-55;
Matthew Hale, Of the Law of Nature 192-93 (David S.
Sytsma, ed. 2015). This Court has sometimes failed to
distinguish between them. Criminal penalties and
civil remedies associated with abortion may vary,
though the right to life itself is not negotiable. This is
because the law securing an absolute right may vary
quite a lot concerning whom it reaches and in what
ways.
For example, the right to life remains inviolable
and absolute though a legislature may choose to
sanction those who are most culpable for its
deprivation and not others. For example, law
prohibiting physicians from assisting a suicide secure
the right to life though they impose no criminal
sanctions on the deceased or his family. See
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 713 (noting that “the
movement away from the common law's harsh
12
sanctions did not represent an acceptance of suicide;
rather, as Chief Justice Swift observed, this change
reflected the growing consensus that it was unfair to
punish the suicide's family for his wrongdoing.”)
(emphasis added).
Similarly, state legislatures have long recognized
that abortionists are the true, culpable parties in an
abortion. Mothers are often victims of coercion. And
mothers suffer the consequences of the abortion
procedure itself. For these and other reasons,
legislatures may choose not to impose legal sanctions
on them, notwithstanding that their unborn children
have a right to live.
The Roe Court failed to understand this. The
Court looked to state laws that impose criminal
sanctions on abortionists, rather than on the mothers
themselves, and then erroneously inferred that the
law is indifferent to the lives of the unborn. Roe, 410
U.S. at 157 n.54. But that is to equate inequality of
sanctions with legality of the conduct. That not all
wrongdoers are equally culpable or equally subject to
criminal sanction does not make a legal wrong into a
right.
II. State legislatures must declare and secure
all the rights of all persons.
A. Legislatures must declare and define the
boundaries of the fundamental rights of
life, limb, and liberty.
Among the fundamental rights enjoyed by
persons prior to the U.S. Constitution’s ratification,
and retained by the people expressly through the
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, are the
13
rights of life, limb, and liberty. Legislatures must be
free to secure all of those fundamental rights by
defining the limitations of each and by fashioning
remedies and sanctions for their infringement or
deprivation.
Chief among the fundamental rights are the
absolute rights, namely the rights of life, limb, health,
liberty from enslavement and unjust confinement,
and property. 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries at *11741. An absolute right is not a right without any
limitations. It is instead a right that a person enjoys
prior to government, vested in him or her by the laws
of nature, simply by virtue of being human, which
governments are incompetent to take away. Id. at
*119 (“By the absolute rights of individuals, we mean
those which are so in their primary and strictest
sense; such as would belong to their persons merely
in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled
to enjoy, whether out of society or in it.”).
The absolute rights are not abstract licenses or
liberty interests. To the contrary, the common-law
jurists all made very clear that liberty is bounded and
constrained by natural law, the ancient customary
rights and duties of the common law, and those civil
laws that are necessary to secure the rights of others.
Id. at *121-22. That a right is absolute means simply
that it is vested—in jurisprudential terms, that it has
built into it an immunity from retrospective or
retroactive abrogation—so that governments are
powerless to deprive any person of the right unless
and until the person has been proven to have forfeited
the right by committing some wrong, and that the
wrong has been established in some proceeding that
14
satisfies the requirements of due process, or until the
person dies a natural death. Id. at *125, 128-30.
The notion that certain rights become vested, and
so immunized against retrospective abrogation, is not
that rights have no limitations but rather that they
have already built into them those limitations that
are part of fundamental law and so require no further
limitation or abrogation. James Wilson, Of the
Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 Collected Works of
James Wilson 1055-56 (Kermit L. Hall and Mark
David Hall, eds. 2007) (hereinafter “Wilson”); Edward
S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American
Constitutional Law, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 247, 255 (1914);
Adam J. MacLeod, Of Brutal Murder and
Transcendental Sovereignty: The Meaning of Vested
Private Rights, 41 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 253 (2017).
That concept of vested rights is foundational to the
whole project of American constitutionalism. Thomas
M. Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States
of the American Union 357-413 (1868); Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States §§ 1398–99, at 272–274 (5th ed. 1891); Elmer
E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation:
A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev.
775, 780–82 (1936); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of
Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 Va. L. Rev.
1421 (1999).
The right to limbs means that no one may
“wantonly destroy or disable” another person’s
members. Blackstone’s Commentaries at *126.
Similarly, the right to life is a right not to be
intentionally killed. It is not a guarantee against
death. The rights to life and limb are universal and
15
absolute because they correlate with the universal
duty not to act with a purpose to end another person’s
life or maim them. Though state legislatures may and
do regulate risky activities, the rights themselves do
not guarantee against all risks of death or injury.
For example, the rights do not prohibit all actions
by an expectant mother that may pose risks to the
health or life of her unborn child. This is why many
state legislatures reasonably exclude from abortion
prohibitions all procedures that are intended to save
the life of the mother. An action undertaken to save a
human life, accepting but not intending that a death
may result, is not an intentional killing. Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802 (1997) (distinguishing
assisted suicide from medical procedures that risk
death, explaining that “[t]he law has long used actors’
intent or purposes to distinguish between two acts
that may have the same result,” and citing criminal
cases); John Finnis, Intention and Identity: Collected
Essays: Volume II 173-97 (2011) (explaining the
distinction between intended results and foreseen
side effects and its foundational role in tort and
criminal law).
The Roe Court, failing to understand this,
mistakenly
concluded
that
the
Fourteenth
Amendment must not secure the right of the unborn
to live as long as the law excepts procedures intended
to save the lives of mothers. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 n.54.
The Court ignored the fact that the right to life (like
rights generally) is marked out as much by its
variable boundaries as by its substantive content. As
James Wilson explained, “With consistency, beautiful
and undeviating, human life, from its commencement
to its close, is protected by the common law,” but the
16
question “how different degrees” of aggression toward
human lives “may be justified, excused, alleviated,
aggravated, redressed, or punished, will appear both
in the criminal and in the civil code of our municipal
law.” 2 Wilson at 1068.
Similarly, the absolute right of liberty is defined
by the limitations that the other rights of
fundamental law place around it. The absolute right
of liberty in common law is freedom from confinement
or imprisonment without due course of law. 1
Blackstone’s Commentaries at *130-33. The right of
liberty is a corollary of the presumption of innocence
(and vice versa), and is a meaningful right just insofar
as it secures to the bearer his freedom unless and
until he is proven to have injured another person in
an act of criminal wrongdoing. James Wilson, Of Man,
as Member of Society, in 1 Wilson at 638-39. See also
David S. Sytsma, Matthew Hale as Theologian and
Natural Law Theorist, in Great Christian Jurists in
English History 163, 178 (Mark Hill QC and R.H.
Helmholz, eds. 2017) (explaining how Matthew Hale
derived the presumption of innocence from natural
and divine law). Liberty is thus limited by the law of
public wrongs. Its boundaries are the public rights of
others.
One of those boundaries is the right to life. The
duty not to murder, and the duty of states to respond
to violence with criminal sanctions, are natural
obligations. So, the right to life defines an inherent,
pre-positive law limitation on the liberty of citizens
and officials.
The common law is amenable to quite a lot of
variation, but it has some important, fixed rights
17
which limit liberty. It contains a small number of
absolute rights and inherent wrongs. All of them
constrain liberty. In addition to the right to life, these
rights include the right not to be enslaved, and the
right to keep one’s limbs; while the inherent wrongs
include intentional killing and maiming. 1
Blackstone’s Commentaries, at *117-30. This means
that no person can ever lawfully be at liberty to kill,
maim, or enslave.
The relationship between liberty, on one hand,
and life and limb, on the other, is not symmetrical.
Liberty does not constrain life and limb in the same
way that they limit liberty, and state legislatures are
duty-bound to constrain the liberty of those who
murder and maim. States have especially compelling
interests to secure those fundamental rights that are
unalienable, which are of interest to the whole
community and which no one—not even the person
whose life is at stake—has the power to waive or give
away. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) (“The
natural life, says Blackstone, ‘cannot legally be
disposed of or destroyed by any individual, neither by
the person himself, nor by any other of his fellow
creatures, merely upon their own authority.’ 1 Bl.
Com. 133. The public has an interest in his life and
liberty.”). No state has just laws if it does not secure
absolute rights and prohibit inherent wrongs. And
because state legislatures have an obligation to
declare and secure absolute rights and to remedy
inherent wrongs, they also have the power to do so.
18
B. A legislature must declare and secure
the rights of all persons.
The point of the law is to protect the rights of all
persons. The Digest of Justinian, 1.5.2 (“So, since all
law is made for the sake of human beings, we should
speak first of the status of persons.”); The Declaration
of Independence (1776); Preamble to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (“Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world… Now, therefore, The General Assembly,
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations.”); John Finnis, Intention and
Identity: Collected Essays: Volume II 19-35 (2011).
Rights-bearing persons include both artificial
persons, such as corporations, and natural persons.
Natural persons are human beings at all stages of
human development. This is not only a biological fact
and moral premise, it is also the law of the
Constitution.
Blackstone explained the difference between
natural and artificial persons: “Natural persons are
such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are
such as are created and devised by human laws for
the purposes of society and government, which are
called corporations or bodies politic.” 1 Blackstone’s
Commentaries at *119. A natural person—a person
who enjoys the absolute right to life—is therefore any
person who is formed as a person without the
assistance of law. Obviously, this includes infants,
born and unborn. 2 Wilson at 1068. Though a minor
19
person does not yet enjoy all the rights and privileges
that human law confers upon persons—she cannot yet
vote, for example—she is nevertheless already formed
as a bearer of the absolute rights conferred on her by
the laws of nature. A minor person, like an adult
person, possesses the rights not to be enslaved,
defamed, maimed and (yes) intentionally killed.
In case there were any doubt as to whether
absolute rights extend to unborn persons, Blackstone
expressly mentioned them in his chapter on absolute
rights—chapter 1 of the first volume of the
Commentaries—and he made it clear that unborn
human beings are among the persons who possess
such rights:
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right
inherent by nature in every individual; and it
begins in contemplation of law as soon as an
infant is able to stir in the mother’s womb. For
if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion
or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if any
one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her
body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this,
though not murder, was by the ancient law
homicide or manslaughter. But the modern
law doth not look upon this offence in quite so
atrocious a light, but merely as a heinous
misdemeanor. An infant in ventre sa mere, or
in the mother’s womb, is supposed in law to
be born for many purposes. It is capable of
having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold
estate, made to it. It may have a guardian
assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an
estate limited to its use, and to take
20
afterwards by such limitation, as if it were
then actually born.
Because all persons are bearers of fundamental
rights, all persons are entitled to the equal protection
of the laws. 1 Wilson at 638-39. This includes the right
not to be discriminated against unjustly, for example
because of race or sex. This right is also fundamental
in our common law and constitutional tradition, and
has long been declared by state constitutions, public
accommodation statutes, and other state laws. The
right is placed in jeopardy when abortionists
selectively terminate an unborn person because she is
female or disabled, or for some similarly-illegitimate
reason.
The right to life remains among the most
fundamental of the fundamental rights of all persons.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 714-15. It is not merely a
privilege or immunity of citizenship, but is also among
those ancient, natural, and customary rights that
belong to human beings as human beings. Equally
fundamental is the right of equal protection of the
laws. Both rights belong to all natural persons, which
is to say, human beings, male and female, able and
disabled, born and unborn. Compare Id. at 741
(Stephens, J., concurring) (“The State has an interest
in preserving and fostering the benefits that every
human being may provide to the community.”);
Blackstone’s Commentaries at *125-26; Joshua J.
Craddock, Protecting Prenatal Persons: Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Prohibit Abortion?, 40 Harv.
J.L. Pub. Pol’y 539 (2017) (demonstrating that
“person” in the Fourteenth Amendment includes preborn human beings).
21
III. The
viability
threshold
prevents
legislatures from securing the rights of all
persons.
A viability threshold prevents legislatures from
declaring and securing fundamental, constitutional
rights. It deprives legislatures of their necessary
power to declare and secure some fundamental rights,
such as the right to life and the right not to be
discriminated against for unjust reasons. It falsely
characterizes the artificial immunity of the
abortionist to perform an abortion before an arbitrary
moment in pregnancy 3 as without legal limit and
leaves other fundamental rights – the rights of life
and equal protection – without protection. It prevents
legislatures from specifying the boundaries of rights
and liberties, and from extending to all persons the
equal protection of the laws.
In our Constitution, as in the common law which
our Constitution declares, the right to life cannot be
taken away, only voluntarily forfeited in an act of
criminal wrongdoing that has been proven in a
proceeding which satisfies the requirements of due
process. Not even the sovereign can lawfully deprive
any natural person of the right to life, and certainly
not a fellow citizen. By conferring on abortionists an
absolute immunity during the early stages of
pregnancy, the viability threshold gives them a free
3 See
Akron v. Akron Ctr for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
461 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating “[t]he choice of
viability as the point at which the state interest in potential life
becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any point
before viability or any point afterward.”)
22
hand to deprive small human beings of the most
fundamental right of all.
The Constitution provides no warrant for such a
sweeping immunity. To the contrary, this Court has
insisted that the state has legitimate and powerful
interests to protect the health of the mother and the
life of her child “from the outset of pregnancy.”
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992). The privacy interest of the abortionist-patient
relationship “cannot be said to be absolute.” Roe, 410
U.S. at 154.
CONCLUSION
To arbitrarily disparage some rights by inventing
liberties for abortionists to infringe absolute rights of
life and limb is to exceed the purposes of government,
and thus to act contrary to law. For these reasons, this
Court should make clear that abortionists are not
immune from criminal and civil liability for actions
taken before viability.
Respectfully submitted,
ADAM J. MACLEOD
5345 Atlanta Highway
Montgomery, AL 36109
(334) 386-7527
amacleod@faulkner.edu
July 28, 2021
JEFFREY A. SHAFER
Counsel of Record
Langdon Law LLC
8913 Cincinnati-Dayton Rd.
West Chester, Ohio 45069
(513) 577-7380
jshafer@langdonlaw.com
APPENDIX
i
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Participating Amici .............................. App-1
App-1
Sen. Mark Abraham
(LA)
Sen. Dennis Baxley
(FL)
Rep. Cheryl Acton (UT)
Rep. Terry Baxter (IA)
Rep. Beryl Amedee (LA)
Sen. Mike Bell (TN)
Rep. Mark W. Anderson
(CT)
Rep. Cecil Bell (TX)
Rep. Bruce D. Anderson
(MN)
Rep. Keith Bell (TX)
Rep. Eddie Andrews
(IA)
Rep. Mary Bentley (AR)
Rep. Amy B. Arata
(ME)
Sen. Michael Bergstrom
(OK)
Rep. Sue Austin (ME)
Rep. Aaron Bernstine
(PA)
Sen. Michael Azinger
(WV)
Rep. Hardy Billington
(MO)
Sen. Darren Bailey (IL)
Sen. Brian Birdwell
(TX)
Sen. Paul Bailey (TN)
Sen. Bo Biteman (WY)
Sen. Bob Ballinger (AR)
Rep. Walter Blackman
(AZ)
Rep. Sonia Eubanks
Barker (AR)
Rep. Brooke Boden (IA)
Sen. Nancy K. Barto
(AZ)
Rep. Brad Boles (OK)
App-2
Rep. Shawnna Bolick
(AZ)
Rep. Dustin Burrows
(TX)
Sen. Colin Bonini (DE)
Rep. Dennis Bush (IA)
Rep. Greg Bonnen (TX)
Del. Kathy Byron (VA)
Rep. Josh Bonner (GA)
Rep. Briscoe Cain (TX)
Rep. Russell Bowers
(AZ)
Del. Ronnie R.
Campbell (VA)
Sen. Janice Bowling
(TN)
Rep. Wes Cantrell (GA)
Sen. Paul Boyer (AZ)
Sen. Jim Carlin (IA)
Rep. Steve Bradley (IA)
Rep. Glen Casada (TN)
Rep. Ken Bragg (AR)
Rep. Jeff Cason (TX)
Rep. Randy Bridges
(KY)
Rep. Scott Cepicky (TN)
Rep. Bob Brooks (PA)
Sen. Clyde Chambliss
(AL)
Rep. Karilyn Boggan
Brown (AR)
Sen. Jake Chapman
(IA)
Rep. Joshua Bryant
(AR)
Rep. Mark Cisneros (IA)
Sen. David Bullard
(OK)
Sen. David A. Clemens
(ND)
App-3
Sen. Robert Clements
(NE)
Rep. Brent Crane (ID)
Sen. Wes Climer (SC)
Rep. Denise Crosswhite
Hader (OK)
Sen. Heather Cloud
(LA)
Sen. Rusty Crowe (TN)
Rep. Joe Cloud, MD
(AR)
Rep. Vic Dabney (SC)
Rep. Mark Cochran
(TN)
Sen. Nahan Dahm
(OK)
Del. Mark Cole (VA)
Rep. Jay Dean (TX)
Sen. Cole Conley (ND)
Rep. Jennifer Henson
Decker, Esq. (KY)
Rep. Sherie Conley
(OK)
Rep. Fred Deutsch (SD)
Rep. David Cook (AZ)
Sen. Dick Dever (ND)
Rep. Bud Cook (PA)
Rep. Russ Diamond
(PA)
Rep. David Cook (TX)
Assemblyman David J.
DiPietro (NY)
Sen. Mark Costello (IA)
Rep. Clay Doggett (TN)
Del. Kirk Cox (VA)
Sen. Michael J. Doherty
(NJ)
Rep. Tom Craddick
(TX)
Rep. Jim Dotson (AR)
App-4
Rep. Rebecca Dow (NM)
Rep. John Fillmore (AZ)
Rep. Gary Drinkwater
(ME)
Rep. Caleb Finck (SD)
Rep. Timothy D. Dukes
(DE)
Rep. Michael Firment
(LA)
Sen. Cris Dush (PA)
Rep. Joseph M. Fischer
(KY)
Sen. Michael Dwyer
(ND)
Rep. Dean Fisher (IA)
Rep. Rick Edmonds
(LA)
Rep. Beth Folsom (NH)
Rep. Kathy Edmonston
(LA)
Rep. James Frank (TX)
Rep. Barbara Ehardt
(ID)
Del. Nicholas J. Freitas
(VA)
Rep. Jake Ellzey (TX)
Rep. Joel Fry (IA)
Rep. Julie Emerson
(LA)
Sen. Julie Frye-Mueller
(SD)
Rep. Sebastian Ertelt
(ND)
Sen. Mike Gabbard (HI)
Rep. Brian S. Evans
(AR)
Sen. David Gallegos
(NM)
Rep. Greg Ferch (ID)
Rep. Tom Gann (OK)
Rep. Mark FIichem
(AZ)
Rep. Ron Gant (TN)
App-5
Sen. Todd Gardenhire
(TN)
Rep. Rusty Grills (TN)
Rep. Thomas Gerhold
(IA)
Sen. Lawrence K.
Grooms (SC)
Rep. Priscilla Giddings
(ID)
Sen. Garlan Gudger
(AL)
Rep. Jeffery A. Gifford
(ME)
Sen. Stacey Guerin
(ME)
Del. Todd Gilbert (VA)
Rep. Steve Gunderson
(MT)
Rep. Mark M. Gillen
(PA)
Rep. Stan Gustafson
(IA)
Rep. Ron Gillham (AK)
Sen. Dennis Guth (IA)
Rep. Barbara Gleim
(PA)
Sen. Bob Hall (TX)
Sen. Carl Glimm (MT)
Sen. Warren Hamilton
(OK)
Rep. Justin Gonzales
(AR)
Rep. Joseph D. Hamm
(PA)
Rep. Martin Graber
(IA)
Rep. Jeff Hanley (ME)
Sen. Jesse Green (IA)
Rep. Jon Hansen (SD)
Rep. James Gerard
Grego (OK)
Sen. Marty Harbin (GA)
Rep. Abigail Griffin
(ME)
Rep. Cody Harris (TX)
App-6
Rep. Kelly E. Hastings
(NC)
Rep. Steve Huebert
(KS)
Rep. David Hawk (TN)
Rep. Chip Huggins (SC)
Rep. Jason Heitkamp
(ND)
Sen. Shelley Hughes
(AK)
Rep. Esther Helton
(TN)
Rep. Bud Hulsey (TN)
Sen. Joey Hensley (TN)
Sen. Lynn Hutchings
(WY)
Rep. Tim Hicks (TN)
Rep. Mary Beth Imes
(KY)
Rep. Ed Hill (MT)
Sen. Ed Jackson (TN)
Rep. Brian Hill (OK)
Rep. Jon Jacobsen (IA)
Rep. Valarie Hodges
(LA)
Rep. Kathy Javner
(ME)
Rep. Jake Hoffman (AZ)
Rep. Dr. Tom Jeneary
(IA)
Rep. Steven Holt (IA)
Rep. Phil Jensen (SD)
Rep. Dodie Horton (LA)
Rep. Jacey Jetton (TX)
Rep. Taffy Howard (SD)
Rep. Joel John (AZ)
Rep. Brad Hudson
(MO)
Sen. Craig Johnson (IA)
App-7
Sen. Jack Johnson (TN)
Rep. Phil King (TX)
Rep. Mike Jones (PA)
Rep. MaryAnne Kinney
(ME)
Rep. John Kavanagh
(AZ)
Rep. Stephanie Klick
(TX)
Sen. Lisa Keim (ME)
Sen. Joshua Klumb
(SD)
Rep. Kelly Keisling
(TN)
Sen. Jack Kolbeck (SD)
Rep. Ann Kelley (MO)
Rep. Sam Kong (HI)
Sen. Brian Kelsey (TN)
Rep. Kim Koppelman
(ND)
Rep. Gerrid Kendrix
(OK)
Sen. Tim Kraayenbrink
(IA)
Rep. David Kerr (IA)
Rep. Matthew Krause
(TX)
Sen. Chris Kidd (OK)
Sen. Joyce Krawiec
(NC)
Rep. Keith Kidwell
(NC)
Sen. Dennis K. Kruse
(IN)
Rep. Dwight Kiefert
(ND)
Rep. Christopher Kurka
(AK)
Sen. Mary Kiffmeyer
(MN)
Rep. Jack Ladyman
(AR)
Sen. Josh Kimbrell (SC)
Sen. Mike L. Lang (MT)
App-8
Del. Dave A. LaRock
(VA)
Rep. Sherman Q. Mack
(LA)
Sen. Oley Larsen (ND)
Rep. Jeff Magrum (ND)
Rep. Jeff Leach (TX)
Rep. Theresa Manzella
(MT)
Rep. Tom Leatherwood
(TN)
Sen. Scott Martin (PA)
Rep. Ben Leman (TX)
Rep. Rick Mason (ME)
Rep. Mark Lepak (OK)
Sen. Becky Massey (TN)
Rep. Andrew Lewis
(PA)
Sen. Doug Mastriano
(PA)
Rep. Laurel Libby (ME)
Rep. Stan May (OK)
Sen. David Livingston
(AZ)
Rep. Danny McCormick
(LA)
Rep. Mark Lowery (AR)
Rep. John R. McCravy,
III (SC)
Sen. Jon Lundberg (TN)
Rep. Andrew C.
McDaniel (MO)
Rep. Shannon
Lundgren (IA)
Rep. Bob McDermott
(HI)
Rep. Peter Lyford (ME)
Rep. Kevin McDugle
(OK)
Rep. Susan Lynn (TN)
Rep. Sandy McGarry
(SC)
App-9
Rep. Richard McGrew
(AR)
Rep. Tina L. Mulally
(SD)
Rep. Ron Mendive (ID)
Rep. Jim Murphy (TX)
Rep. Rob Mercuri (PA)
Rep. Tammy Nichols
(ID)
Sen. Jake A. Merrick
(OK)
Rep. Candy Noble (TX)
Rep. Mayes Middleton
(TX)
Rep. Becky Nutt (AZ)
Rep. Josh Miller (AR)
Rep. Brandon Ogles
(TN)
Rep. Tim Miller (MN)
Sen. Cindy O'Laughlin
(MO)
Rep. Brett R. Miller
(PA)
Rep. Tom Oliverson
(TX)
Rep. Jon Milligan (AR)
Rep. Jim Olsen (OK)
Rep. Debra Moody (TN)
Sen. Steven V. Oroho
(NJ)
Sen. Mike Moon (MO)
Sen. Arthur Orr (AL)
Rep. Arnold Mooney
(AL)
Rep. Anne Osmundson
(IA)
Rep. Raquel MooreGreen (OR)
Rep. Chuck Owens (LA)
Rep. Geanie Morrison
(TX)
Sen. Mike Padden (WA)
App-10
Rep. Jacqueline Parker,
Esq. (AZ)
Rep. Aaron Pilkington
(AR)
Sen. Dale Patten (ND)
Sen. Mark Pody (TN)
Rep. Kenton
Patzkowsky (OK)
Del. Charles Poindexter
(VA)
Rep. Dennis Paul (TX)
Rep. Suzie Pollock (MO)
Rep. Bob Paulson (ND)
Sen. Rogers Pope (LA)
Rep. Gary Paur (ND)
Sen. Charles Postles
(DE)
Rep. John Payton (AR)
Sen. Bill Powers (TN)
Rep. Tracy Pennycuick
(PA)
Rep. Dennis Powers
(TN)
Sen. Charles Perry (TX)
Rep. Mike Prax (AK)
Rep. Sue Lucas
Peterson (SD)
Rep. Tony Randolph
(SD)
Rep. Jason Petrie (KY)
Rep. Kim Ransom (CO)
Sen. Brian Pettyjohn
(DE)
Del. Margaret Ransone
(VA)
Rep. Bob Phalen (MT)
Sen. Jason Rapert (AR)
Rep. Randy Pietzman
(MO)
Rep. Kathy L. Rapp
(PA)
App-11
Rep. George Rauscher
(AK)
Rep. Karen M. Rohr
(ND)
Rep. Jay Reedy (TN)
Sen. Paul Rose (TN)
Sen. Shane Reeves (TN)
Rep. Leslie Rossi (PA)
Rep. Amy Regier (MT)
Sen. Ken Rozenboom
(IA)
Sen. Lora Reinbold
(AK)
Rep. Dan J. Ruby (ND)
Rep. Bill Rhiley (KS)
Rep. Matthew Ruby
(ND)
Sen. Rex Rice (SC)
Rep. Tim Rudd (TN)
Sen. Bryant L.
Richardson (DE)
Sen. Frank M. Ruff
(VA)
Rep. Marcus E.
Richmond (AR)
Rep. Todd Russ (OK)
Rep. Dennis Riddell
(NC)
Rep. Francis X. Ryan
(PA)
Rep. Brad Roae (PA)
Rep. John Rye (AR)
Sen. Kerry Roberts
(TN)
Rep. Sandy Salmon (IA)
Rep. Eric Roberts (OK)
Rep. Heidi Sampson
(ME)
Rep. Sean Roberts (OK)
Rep. Scott Sanford (TX)
App-12
Rep. Bernie Satrom
(ND)
Rep. Bruce Skaug (ID)
Rep. Austen Schauer
(ND)
Rep. Kathy Skroch (ND)
Rep. Paul T. Schemel
(PA)
Sen. Cary Smith (MT)
Sen. Gregg Schmedes,
M.D. (NM)
Rep. Garry R. Smith
(SC)
Rep. Louis C. Schmitt,
Jr. (PA)
Rep. Robin Smith (TN)
Rep. Nick Schroer (MO)
Rep. Reggie Smith (TX)
Sen. Jason Schultz (IA)
Rep. Chris Sneed (OK)
Rep. Brian H. Seitz
(MO)
Sen. Jerry Sonnenberg
(CO)
Sen. David Sessions
(AL)
Rep. Matt Soper (CO)
Rep. Jerry Sexton (TN)
Sen. Steve Southerland
(TN)
Rep. Matt Shaheen
(TX)
Rep. Bethany Soye (SD)
Rep. Lola SheldonGalloway (MT)
Assemblyman Parker
Space (NJ)
Rep. Jeff Shipley (IA)
Rep. Mike Sparks (TN)
Sen. Amy Sinclair (IA)
Sen. Drew Springer
(TX)
App-13
Rep. Wendi Stearman
(OK)
Rep. Phil Thompson
(IA)
Rep. Jay Stegall (OK)
Rep. Ed Thompson (TX)
Rep. Vicky Steiner (ND)
Rep. Tony Tinderholt
(TX)
Sen. Cheri Steinmetz
(WY)
Rep. James Allen
Tipton (KY)
Sen. Blake Stephens
(OK)
Rep. Chris Todd (TN)
Rep. Henry Stone (IA)
Rep. Steve Toth (TX)
Sen. Alicia Straub (KS)
Rep. Tammy Townley
(OK)
Rep. Michelle L.
Strinden (ND)
Sen. Greg Treat (OK)
Sen. Larry Stutts (AL)
Rep. Brad Tschida (MT)
Rep. Valoree Swanson
(TX)
Rep. Bill Tveit (ND)
Sen. Jeff Taylor (IA)
Rep. Kevin Van Winkle
(CO)
Sen. Larry Taylor (TX)
Rep. Sarah Vance (AK)
Rep. Bryan Terry (TN)
Rep. Mark Vancuren
(OK)
Sen. Lana Theis (MI)
Rep. Nino Vitale (OH)
App-14
Sen. J.T. "Jabo"
Waggoner (AL)
Rep. James White (TX)
Del. Wendell S. Walker
(VA)
Sen. Zach Whiting (IA)
Sen. Page B. Walley
(TN)
Del. Bill Wiley (VA)
Rep. Wayne
Wallingford (MO)
Rep. Danny Williams
(OK)
Sen. Terry M. Wanzek
(ND)
Rep. Ryan Williams
(TN)
Rep. Barb Wasinger
(KS)
Rep. Bruce Williamson
(GA)
Sen. Bo Watson (TN)
Rep. John Wills (IA)
Rep. Terri Lynn
Weaver (TN)
Del. Tony Wilt (VA)
Rep. Timothy Wesco
(IN)
Rep. Nathan Winters
(WY)
Rep. Kevin West (OK)
Assemblyman Harold
Wirths (NJ)
Rep. Jay West (SC)
Rep. Max Wolfley (OK)
Rep. Cherielynn
Westrich (IA)
Del. Thomas Wright, Jr.
(VA)
Rep. Skyler Wheeler
(IA)
Del. Scott A. Wyatt
(VA)
Sen. Dawn White (TN)
Sen. Ken Yager (TN)
App-15
Rep. Julianne Young
(ID)
Rep. Dave Zimmerman
(PA)
Sen. Brad Zaun (IA)
Sen. Christy Zito (ID)
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