Amicus Curiae Brief — Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al., Petitioners v. Democratic National Committee, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 19, 2021
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Nos. 19-1257 & 19-1258
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
MARK BRNOVICH, Attorney General of Arizona, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,
Respondents.
ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,
Respondents.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE EDUCATION FUND, AND 52 OTHER
PUBLIC-INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS, AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
ARPIT K. GARG
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 663-6000
LASHAWN WARREN
MICHAEL ZUBRENSKY
LEIGH CHAPMAN
THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
1620 L Street, NW, Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-3311
DEBO P. ADEGBILE
Counsel of Record
MARISSA MEDINE
NELSON CASTAÑO
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
7 World Trade Center
250 Greenwich Street
New York, N.Y. 10007
(212) 295-6717
debo.adegbile@wilmerhale.com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................... ii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................... 2
ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 5
I.
SECTION 2 HAS A VITAL CONTINUING
ROLE IN PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS’
EQUAL ACCESS TO THE BALLOT ................................ 5
A. Voting Rights Have Been Increasingly
Under Attack in the Last Decade ...................... 5
B. Recent Attacks On The Right To Vote
Disproportionately Affect Minority
Voters ................................................................... 10
II. THIS COURT SHOULD CONTINUE TO
INTERPRET SECTION 2 TO EMPOWER
COURTS TO PROTECT AGAINST THE
PERSISTENT AND ADAPTIVE PROBLEM OF
DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING..................................... 17
A. For Generations, This Court Has
Protected Democracy By Striking
Down Barriers To Participation ....................... 17
B. Courts Can And Must Be Vigilant To
Combat Discrimination In Voting .................... 22
C. The Court Should Continue To Interpret
Section 2 To Empower Courts To
Combat Discrimination In Voting ...................... 25
CONCLUSION ................................................................. 30
APPENDIX: LIST OF AMICI ..................................... 1a
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544
(1969) .............................................................................. 2
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) .................................. 20
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) .......................... 3
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) ............................................................................ 17
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991)........................ 2, 3
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) ......................... 20
Dougherty County Board of Education v.
White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978) ............................................. 4
Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2020).... 11, 24, 25
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) .............. 28
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis.
2014) ....................................................................... 27, 28
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) ............. 19, 20
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).................... 21
League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) ......................................... 23
Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2020) .................... 11
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) .............................. 18
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) .......................... 17
North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v.
McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016) .............. 23, 24
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted,
768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014) ...................................... 14
One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Thomsen,
198 F. Supp. 3d 896 (W.D. Wis. 2016) ...................... 11
Reno v. Bossier Parrish School Board,
528 U.S. 320 (2000) ....................................................... 4
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)............... 24
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) ................... 18, 19
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966) ............................................................................ 21
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) .............................. 19
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) ...................... 26
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.
2016) ..................................................... 11, 25, 26, 27, 28
Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex.
2014) ............................................................................. 11
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ....................... 21
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
52 U.S.C. § 20507 ................................................................. 6
Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) ........................... 21
Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) ........................... 22
Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402 (1975) ............................. 22
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982) ........................... 22
Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921 (1992) ....................... 22
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006) ....................... 22
2011 Wis. Act 23 ................................................................. 27
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
Hearing on Protecting the Right to Vote: Best
and Worst Practices Before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of
the House Committee on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong. 10 (Comm. Print 2019)
(statement of Dale Ho), available at
https://bit.ly/2LjlfhC .................................................. 12
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Barreto, Matt, et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID Requirements on the Electorate—New Evidence from Indiana,
42 Politics & Political Sci. 111 (2009) ....................... 16
Berman, Ari, Republicans Are Trying to Kick
Thousands of Voters Off the Rolls During
the Pandemic, Mother Jones (Apr. 14,
2020), https://bit.ly/2LqoP9W ............................... 6, 13
Bhutta, Neil, et al., Disparities in Wealth by
Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of
Consumer Finances, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (Sept. 28,
2020), https://bit.ly/3oFtKCn .................................... 10
Brater, Jonathan, et al., Purges: A Growing
Threat to the Right to Vote, Brennan Center for Justice (2018), https://bit.ly/
3mY1lpy ..................................................................... 6, 7
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Carlisle, Madeleine & Abigail Abrams, The Supreme Court’s Alabama Ruling Could
Disenfranchise Thousands of High Risk
Voters, Time (Oct. 23, 2020), https://bit.ly/
3nyyIQ3 ......................................................................... 7
Center for Global Policy Solutions, The Racial
Wealth Gap: Asian Americans and Pacific
Islanders (Apr. 2014), https://bit.ly/
2XvUOIm .................................................................... 10
Corasaniti, Nick, et al., The Times Called Officials in Every State: No Evidence of Voter
Fraud, N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 2020),
https://nyti.ms/3baEnJN ............................................. 9
Currier, Erin & Sheida Elmi, The Racial
Wealth Gap and Today’s American
Dream,
PEW
(Feb.
16,
2018),
https://bit.ly/3oen9yA ................................................ 10
Derysh, Igor, After Democrats Flip State,
Georgia Moves to Shut Down Early Voting
Locations Ahead of Senate Runoff, Salon
(Dec. 9, 2020), https://bit.ly/3om2nxi ....................... 15
Derysh, Igor, GOP Vows to Probe Georgia
Election “Catastrophe” in Minority Areas,
Dems Say it Was “No Accident,” Salon
(June 10, 2020), https://bit.ly/350i2dL...................... 14
Election 2012: Voting Laws Roundup, Brennan
Center for Justice (Oct. 11, 2012),
https://bit.ly/34ZIG6D ................................................. 5
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Emerson, Thomas I., Malapportionment and
Judicial Power, 72 Yale L.J. 64 (1962) .................... 20
Ford, Matt, The Entirely Preventable Battles
Raging Over Voting Rights, The Atlantic
(Apr. 14, 2017), https://bit.ly/2KI6zc9 ...................... 26
Fried, Hannah, The Problem of Voter Purging—and Where We Go from Here, The
Leadership Conference on Civil & Human
Rights (Jan. 30, 2020), https://bit.ly/
359Kudq ......................................................................... 7
Gruber-Miller, Stephen & Zachary Oren Smith,
Iowa Counties Can’t Set Up Drop Box Systems for Absentee Ballots, Secretary of
State Says, Des Moines Register (Aug. 26,
2020), https://bit.ly/3hub7P6 ....................................... 8
Harmon, Lauren, et al., The Health of State
Democracies, Center for American Progress
Action
Fund
(July
2015),
https://bit.ly/3nhzBwh ............................................... 13
Hood III, M.V. & Charles S. Bullock III, Worth
a Thousand Words?: An Analysis of Georgia’s
Voter
Identification
Statutes,
36 Am. Pol. Research 555 (2008) .............................. 16
Hajnal, Zoltan, et al., Voter Identification Laws
and the Suppression of Minority Votes,
79 J. of Pol. 363 (2017) ................................................ 16
Jaffe, Louis L., Was Brandeis an Activist? The
Search
for
Intermediate
Premises,
80 Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1967)....................................... 20
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Keyssar, Alexander, U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights Meeting, Part 2, C-SPAN (Aug. 18,
2017), https://bit.ly/3nF4laG ............................... 22, 23
Killough, Ashley, et al., Texas Governor Limits
Election Drop Boxes to One Per County in
Sprawling State, CNN (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://cnn.it/3nATs9Y ................................................ 7
Klain, Hannah, et al., Waiting to Vote, Brennan
Center for Justice (June 3, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3b3xjyq .............................................. 7, 15
Lewis, John, Together, You Can Redeem the
Soul of our Nation, N.Y. Times (July 30,
2020), https://nyti.ms/2XR1bGk ............................... 25
Levine, Zahavah & Thea Raymond-Sidel, Mail
Voting Litigation in 2020, Part IV: Verifying Mail Ballots, LawFare (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3q93WyX ................................................ 8
Litt, David, Claims of ‘Voter Fraud’ Have a
Long History in America. And They Are
False, The Guardian (Dec. 4, 2020),
https://bit.ly/34YqLxb ................................................. 8
Mattise, Jonathan, Tennessee Official: Fear of
Virus Not Reason to Vote by Mail, ABC
News (May 12, 2020), https://abcn.ws/
38LepcM ........................................................................ 7
Mayer, Kenneth R., Press Release: Voter ID
Study Shows Turnout Effects in 2016 Wisconsin Presidential Election (Sept. 25,
2017), https://bit.ly/3oPPQ5g .................................... 29
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Mazzei, Patricia, Hispanics, Democrats Biggest
Groups in Florida’s List of Potential
Noncitizen Voters, Analysis Shows, Tampa
Bay Times (May 12, 2012), https://bit.ly/
2JKHRXT ................................................................... 14
Menter, Aviel, Mail Voting Litigation in 2020,
Part I: Application and Eligibility to Vote
By Mail, LawFare (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3500D54 ................................................... 7
New Voting Restrictions in America, Brennan
Center for Justice (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://bit.ly/383e0U8................................................... 5
Niesse, Mark, Strict Absentee Voting Limits
Proposed After Record Georgia Turnout,
Atlanta Journal Constitution (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://bit.ly/3scrPrb .................................................... 9
Peretti, Terri, Constructing the State Action
Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry
273 (2010) ..................................................................... 17
Pettigrew, Stephen, The Racial Gap in Wait
Times: Why Minority Precincts Are Underserved by Local Election Officials, 132
Political Sci. Quarterly 527 (Nov. 2017),
available at https://bit.ly/3bqCdFT ......................... 15
Ramakrishnan, Karthick & Farah Z. Ahmad,
Language Diversity and English Proficiency, Center for American Progress
(May 27, 2014), https://ampr.gs/3idORJF ............... 13
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Rutenberg, Jim, The Attack on Voting, N.Y.
Times Magazine (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://nyti.ms/3o56Y6N ............................................. 8
Rutenberg, Jim, et al., Trump’s Fraud Claims
Died in Court, but the Myth of Stolen Elections Lives On, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://nyti.ms/2LmVKfM........................................... 9
Statement by Texas Attorney General Greg
Abbott, (June 25, 2013), https://bit.ly/
34Z3Stm ....................................................................... 26
Stewart III, Charles, 2012 Survey of the
Performance of American Elections, MIT
(Feb. 25, 2013) ............................................................. 16
Stewart III, Charles, Voter ID: Who Has
Them? Who Shows Them?, 66 Okla. L. Rev.
21 (2013) ....................................................................... 16
Timm, Jane C., Trump’s False Fraud Claims
Are Laying Groundwork for New Voting
Restrictions, Experts Warn, NBC News
(Dec. 6, 2020), https://nbcnews.to/38RI980 ............... 8
The Leadership Conference Education Fund,
Democracy
Diverted
(Sept.
2019),
https://bit.ly/3nPvIz0 ............................................. 7, 14
United States Census Bureau, Reported Voting
and Registration, by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, for States (Nov. 2016),
http://bit.ly/2LSQrVd ................................................ 12
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
United States Census Bureau, Reported Voting
and Registration, by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, for States (Nov. 2018),
http://bit.ly/2XLaYhm ............................................... 11
United States Commission on Civil Rights, An
Assessment of Minority Voting Rights Access in the United States: 2018 Statutory
Report (Sept. 2018), https://bit.ly/3ondIge ............. 13
Voting Laws Roundup 2013, Brennan Center
for
Justice
(Dec.
19,
2013),
https://bit.ly/3aYXh5V ................................................ 5
Voting Laws Roundup 2014, Brennan Center
for
Justice
(Dec.
18,
2014),
https://bit.ly/3pDHsWt ............................................ 5, 6
Voting Laws Roundup 2015, Brennan Center
for
Justice
(June
3,
2015),
https://bit.ly/3aYby2X ................................................. 5
Voting Laws Roundup 2016, Brennan Center
for
Justice
(Apr.
18,
2016),
https://bit.ly/383BVCU ................................................ 6
Voting Laws Roundup 2017, Brennan Center
for
Justice
(May
10,
2017),
https://bit.ly/387P2mB ................................................. 6
Voting Laws Roundup 2018, Brennan Center
for
Justice
(Apr.
2,
2018),
https://bit.ly/38QSXmH ............................................... 6
Voting Laws Roundup 2019, Brennan Center
for
Justice
(July
10,
2019),
https://bit.ly/3o6t9JH ................................................... 6
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Voting Laws Roundup 2020, Brennan Center
for
Justice
(Dec.
8,
2020),
https://bit.ly/3rI1rVM .............................................. 5, 9
Weil, Matthew, et al., The 2018 Voting
Experience:
Polling
Place
Lines,
Bipartisan Policy Center (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://bit.ly/35vAUBz............................................... 15
Weiner, Rachel, Florida’s Voter Purge Explained, Wash. Post (June 18, 2012),
https://wapo.st/2Xdnfea............................................. 14
Wines, Michael, Wisconsin Strict ID Law Discouraged Voters, Study Finds, N.Y. Times
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://nyti.ms/3hUOvHX ............ 29
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human
Rights (“The Leadership Conference”) is a coalition of
over 220 organizations committed to the protection of
civil and human rights in the United States.1 It is the
nation’s oldest, largest, and most diverse civil and human rights coalition. The Leadership Conference was
founded in 1950 by three legendary leaders of the civil
rights movement—A. Philip Randolph, of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Roy Wilkins, of the
NAACP; and Arnold Aronson, of the National Jewish
Community Relations Advisory Council. One of the
missions of The Leadership Conference is to promote
effective civil rights legislation and policy. The Leadership Conference was in the vanguard of the movement to secure passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957,
1960 and 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its
subsequent reauthorizations, and the Fair Housing Act
of 1968.
The Leadership Conference Education Fund (“The
Education Fund”) is the research, education, and communications arm of The Leadership Conference. It focuses on documenting discrimination in American society, monitoring efforts to enforce civil rights legislation, and fostering better public understanding of issues of prejudice. The Education Fund has published
studies and reports on many subjects, including voting
rights.
1
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief in letters on file with the Clerk. No counsel for a party authored this
brief in whole or in part, and no entity or person, other than amici
curiae, its members, and its counsel, made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
2
The Leadership Conference and The Education
Fund believe that a vital national interest is at stake in
this case. That national interest is the right of all citizens to vote free from discrimination and to choose
leaders that represent their interests and, by doing so,
to promote the influence of the United States throughout the world as a viable and vibrant democracy.
Several other organizations also join as signatories
to this brief. These organizations are identified and
their interests set forth in the Appendix.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioners and their amici ask this Court to adopt
an interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
that would render that provision hopelessly ineffective
in combating the new species of vote-denial laws, i.e.,
laws that make it disproportionately more difficult for
minority voters to participate in the political process.
This Court should reject that request.
‘‘Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965
for the broad remedial purpose of ‘rid[ding] the country
of racial discrimination in voting.’’’ Chisom v. Roemer,
501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991). Recognizing that “the Voting
Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying
citizens their right to vote because of their race,” Allen
v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969),
this Court stated that the Act, including Section 2,
“should be interpreted in a manner that provides the
broadest possible scope in combating racial discrimination,” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403. As Justice Scalia recognized, Section 2, by “proscrib[ing] practices with discriminatory effect whether or not intentional,” “provides a powerful, albeit sometimes blunt, weapon with
3
which to attack even the most subtle forms of discrimination.” Id. at 406 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I. Now is not the time to weaken Section 2. In
Bartlett v. Strickland—a recent case in this Court substantially interpreting Section 2—a plurality of this
Court recognized that “racial discrimination and racially polarized voting are not ancient history.” 556 U.S. 1,
25 (2009). “Much remains to be done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity to share and
participate in our democratic processes and traditions;
and [Section] 2 must be interpreted to ensure that continued progress.” Id.
Bartlett’s teaching remains true today. While some
discriminatory practices have been abandoned, the last
decade has witnessed many jurisdictions placing new
hurdles in front of the ballot box: hampering voter registration, limiting early and absentee voting, closing
poll locations, purging voters from the rolls, and imposing strict voter-identification requirements. And it is
reasonable to expect that such restrictions are likely to
increase in quantity and severity in the future, amidst a
litany of unsubstantiated but oft-repeated claims of
voter fraud.
These restrictions on voting disproportionately affect minority voters, and substantially so. Minority
voters, after all, disproportionately lack the resources
to satisfy increasingly demanding voting requirements,
due to the vestiges of current and past discrimination
(including state-sponsored discrimination).
The growing tide of voting restrictions that lessen
minority voters’ opportunity to participate equally in
the political process reflects the “protean strategies” of
vote denial that “led Congress to adopt the Voting
Rights Act” in the first place. Dougherty Cty. Bd. of
4
Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 37 n.6 (1978); see also Reno
v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 366 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Voting
Rights Act not intended to permit jurisdictions “to
pour old poison into new bottles”).
II. Democracies are fragile and endure where society relies on voter participation as the core means by
which political disagreements are mediated at regular
intervals. This understanding underlies the respective
roles that the branches of the federal government play
to ensure that our democracy endures, matures, and
thrives. The role of the federal courts is particularly
significant because the problem of discrimination in
voting has proven to be a substantial and enduring
threat to political participation.
History teaches that the solution is vigilance. That
is, courts must be willing and able to look past formalities and to closely examine the facts and historical context, in order to ferret out discriminatory voting laws.
This Court should interpret Section 2 accordingly.
Section 2 should be capacious enough to empower
courts to consider the totality of the circumstances and,
based on that context-specific inquiry, determine
whether a particular electoral barrier crosses the line
from a mere electoral rule into one that disproportionately and unjustifiably lessens minority voters’ opportunity to participate equally in the political process.
The Voting Rights Act and its core enforcement
provision, Section 2, represent a hard-won federal embrace of a bedrock minority-inclusion principle in
American democracy. This Court should adhere to that
principle and vindicate Section 2.
5
ARGUMENT
I.
SECTION 2 HAS A VITAL CONTINUING ROLE IN PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS’ EQUAL ACCESS TO THE
BALLOT
A. Voting Rights Have Been Increasingly Under
Attack in the Last Decade
1. Between 2010 and 2020, 28 states passed new
laws or policies restricting access to the ballot. Specifically, 16 states enacted strict voter-identification laws,
12 states enacted laws or adopted policies that make it
more difficult to register and to stay registered to vote,
12 states enacted laws or adopted policies that that
make it more difficult to vote early or absentee, and 3
states created new barriers for restoring the right to
vote for people with past criminal convictions. New
Voting Restrictions in America, Brennan Center for
Justice (Nov. 18, 2019), https://bit.ly/383e0U8; Voting
Laws Roundup 2020, Brennan Center for Justice (Dec.
8, 2020), https://bit.ly/3rI1rVM.
An even larger number of voting restrictions have
been considered in state legislatures in the last decade.
In 2011 and 2012, 180 restrictive bills were considered
in 41 states. Election 2012: Voting Laws Roundup,
Brennan Center for Justice (Oct. 11, 2012),
https://bit.ly/34ZIG6D. In 2013, 92 restrictive bills
were introduced in 33 states. Voting Laws Roundup
2013, Brennan Center for Justice (Dec. 19, 2013),
https://bit.ly/3aYXh5V. And from 2014 through 2019,
state legislatures considered a total of 83, 113, 77, 99,
70, and 87 restrictive bills in each respective year. Voting Laws Roundup 2014, Brennan Center for Justice
(Dec. 18, 2014), https://bit.ly/3pDHsWt; Voting Laws
Roundup 2015, Brennan Center for Justice (June 3,
6
2015), https://bit.ly/3aYby2X; Voting Laws Roundup
2016, Brennan Center for Justice (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://bit.ly/383BVCU; Voting Laws Roundup 2017,
Brennan Center for Justice (May 10, 2017),
https://bit.ly/387P2mB; Voting Laws Roundup 2018,
Brennan Center for Justice (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://bit.ly/38QSXmH; Voting Laws Roundup 2019,
Brennan Center for Justice (July 10, 2019),
https://bit.ly/3o6t9JH. A significant number of these
bills—in some years, over half—were voter ID laws
and other restrictions making it harder to register to
vote by either requiring proof of citizenship or actively
reducing voter-registration opportunities. See, e.g.,
Voting Laws Roundup 2014, Brennan Center for Justice (Dec. 18, 2014), https://bit.ly/3pDHsWt; Voting
Laws Roundup 2017, Brennan Center for Justice (May
10, 2017), https://bit.ly/387P2mB.
2. In addition to the just-mentioned legislative efforts to restrict access to voting, there have also been
administrative efforts by state officials to restrict voting access.
For example, between 2014 and 2016, state officials
removed 16 million voters from voter rolls nationwide.
Brater et al., Purges: A Growing Threat to the Right to
Vote 1, Brennan Center for Justice, (2018),
https://bit.ly/3mY1lpy. Between 2016 and 2018, another 17 million names were removed. Berman, Republicans Are Trying to Kick Thousands of Voters Off the
Rolls During a Pandemic, Mother Jones (Apr. 14,
2020), https://bit.ly/2LqoP9W. And while some degree
of voter-list maintenance is appropriate and necessary
under federal law, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4), studies have
established that many purge procedures are riddled
with errors and lacking in adequate safeguards, result-
7
ing in thousands of voters being wrongfully removed
from the voter rolls. Brater, Purges 1-3, 6-9, supra; see
also Fried, The Problem of Voter Purging—and Where
We Go from Here, The Leadership Conference on Civil
& Human Rights (Jan. 30, 2020), https://bit.ly/359Kudq.
“Another well-documented phenomenon is the
steady increase in poll closures.” Klain et al., Waiting
to Vote 12, Brennan Center for Justice (June 3, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3b3xjyq; see also The Leadership Conference Education Fund, Democracy Diverted 10-18, The
Leadership Conference Education Fund (Sept. 2019),
https://bit.ly/3nPvIz0. Thousands of polls have closed
over the last decade. Klain, Waiting to Vote, supra.
Notably, in many jurisdictions, “polling places are being
closed faster than voters are switching to early voting.”
Id.
Most recently, in the 2020 Presidential election,
several state officials made decisions imposing onerous
burdens on voters seeking to cast their ballots. States
like Texas, for example, actively issued orders making
it more difficult for voters to deposit their mail ballots
in drop-off sites. See Killough et al., Texas Governor
Limits Election Drop Boxes to One Per County in
Sprawling
State,
CNN
(Oct.
5,
2020),
https://cnn.it/3nATs9Y. Election officials in several
other states interpreted election statutes narrowly, in
ways that restricted whether voters could cast absentee ballots or vote curbside. See, e.g., Carlisle &
Abrams, The Supreme Court’s Alabama Ruling Could
Disenfranchise Thousands of High Risk Voters, Time
(Oct. 23, 2020), https://bit.ly/3nyyIQ3; Mattise, Tennessee Official: Fear of Virus Not Reason to Vote by Mail,
ABC News (May 12, 2020), https://abcn.ws/38LepcM;
Menter, Mail Voting Litigation in 2020, Part I: Appli-
8
cation and Eligibility to Vote By Mail, LawFare (Oct.
27, 2020), https://bit.ly/3500D54; Gruber-Miller &
Smith, Iowa Counties Can’t Set Up Drop Box Systems
for Absentee Ballots, Secretary of State Says, Des
Moines Register (Aug. 26, 2020), https://bit.ly/3hub7P6.
Many other state decision-makers chose not to take action to ease restrictions on voting methods that made it
more difficult for health-compromised voters to cast
their ballots safely in a pandemic. See, e.g., Levine &
Raymond-Sidel, Mail Voting Litigation in 2020, Part
IV: Verifying Mail Ballots, LawFare (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3q93WyX.
3. Finally, and perhaps most concerning, there is
every reason to expect that states will continue to enact more (and likely more severe) voting restrictions—
in response to recent, baseless claims of rampant voter
fraud.
The threat of voter fraud is the most common justification for restrictive election laws and procedures.
See Litt, Claims of ‘Voter Fraud’ Have a Long History
in America. And They Are False, The Guardian (Dec.
4, 2020), https://bit.ly/34YqLxb. Yet advocates for
these restrictions have rarely (if ever) been able to
show any evidence of widespread fraud. Rutenberg,
The Attack on Voting, N.Y. Times Magazine (Sept. 30,
2020), https://nyti.ms/3o56Y6N. Still, these claims have
led to the adoption of practices like strict voter ID laws
and hasty voter purges. Id.
As this Court is well aware, many powerful voices
have alleged widespread voter fraud in the 2020 general election. See, e.g., Timm, Trump’s False Fraud
Claims Are Laying Groundwork for New Voting Restrictions, Experts Warn, NBC News (Dec. 6, 2020),
https://nbcnews.to/38RI980. These allegations have
9
been rejected by election officials from every state, who
have said they do not suspect or have any evidence of
widespread illegal voting. Corasaniti et al., The Times
Called Officials in Every State: No Evidence of Voter
Fraud,
N.Y.
Times
(Nov.
19,
2020),
https://nyti.ms/3baEnJN. Similarly, every court to
consider such allegations has rejected them as meritless. Rutenberg et al., Trump’s Fraud Claims Died in
Court, but the Myth of Stolen Elections Lives On, N.Y.
Times (Jan. 7, 2021), https://nyti.ms/2LmVKfM. Nevertheless, state legislators in Georgia, Pennsylvania,
and Texas have already reacted to these unsupported
fraud claims by pre-filing bills that propose new voter
ID laws, make it more difficult to vote by mail, and
propose more aggressive voter-roll purges. See Voting
Laws Roundup 2020, Brennan Center for Justice (Dec.
8, 2020), https://bit.ly/3rI1rVM; see also, e.g., Niesse,
Strict Absentee Voting Limits Proposed After Record
Georgia Turnout, Atlanta Journal Constitution (Jan. 7,
2021), https://bit.ly/3scrPrb.
In short, the assault on voting rights is likely to
continue.
B. Recent Attacks On The Right To Vote Disproportionately Affect Minority Voters
Although the voting restrictions discussed in Section I.A burden all voters, they have been consistently
found to significantly and disproportionately burden
minority voters’ opportunity to participate in the political process. This is so for obvious reasons. Each voting
restriction—whether strict voter-identification requirements, poll closures, or otherwise—imposes additional costs on voting. These additional costs are disproportionately tougher to bear for minority voters,
given the persistent wealth gap between White and
10
non-White citizens. See Currier & Elmi, The Racial
Wealth Gap and Today’s American Dream, PEW (Feb.
16, 2018) (in 2014, typical White household had 31 days
of income in savings, whereas typical Black household
had just 5 days), https://bit.ly/3oen9yA; Bhutta et al.,
Disparities in Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the
2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Sept. 28, 2020) (in
2019, typical White family had five times the wealth of
typical Hispanic family), https://bit.ly/3oFtKCn; Center
for Global Policy Solutions, The Racial Wealth Gap:
Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (Apr. 2014) (in
2014, median wealth of White households was over
$35,000 higher than that of Asian households),
https://bit.ly/2XvUOIm. Thus, with fewer resources to
spend on overcoming additional obstacles to the ballot,
minority voters are left with an unequal opportunity to
participate in the political process.
That disproportionate burden is well-documented
at every stage of voting—from registering to vote,
staying registered to vote, getting to the polls, and
casting a ballot.
1. Registering to vote is the initial hurdle for voters, and one that is generally an impediment for minority voters. The most recent Census survey data available from the November 2018 election reveals that only
53.7% of eligible Hispanic voters, 54.2% of eligible
Asian American voters, and 63.7% of eligible Black voters are registered to vote. See U.S. Census Bureau,
Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex, Race and
Hispanic Origin, for States (Nov. 2018) (Table 4b),
http://bit.ly/2XLaYhm. By contrast, 68.4% of eligible
White voters are registered to vote. Id.
11
Registering to vote has become even more difficult
for minority voters in some states with the introduction
of onerous proof-of-citizenship requirements. Kansas,
for example, enacted a proof-of-citizenship requirement
so strict that it resulted in 31,089 applicants being denied registration—a figure representing approximately
12% of all voter applications during the relevant time
period. Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1128 (10th Cir.
2020).
And more than one federal court has documented
the struggles that minority voters especially face in
providing proof of citizenship. In One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Thomsen, the district court found that, in
Wisconsin, “[t]he lack of a valid birth record correlated
strikingly, yet predictably, with minority status” and
that “states with a history of de jure segregation have
systemic deficiencies in their vital records systems.”
198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 915 (W.D. Wis. 2016), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665 (7th
Cir. 2020). Similarly, in Veasey v. Perry, the district
court found illustrative the story of Mrs. Bates, a Black
retiree living on a $321 monthly income, who testified
on the difficulties of saving $42 to pay for a birth certificate because she “had to put the $42.00 where it was
doing the most good” and her family “couldn’t eat the
birth certificate [or] . . . pay rent with the birth certificate.” 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 665 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d
216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
In addition to proof-of-citizenship requirements,
some states have enacted other requirements making it
more difficult to register new voters. Florida, for example, passed a law in 2011 that imposed a 48-hour
deadline on submitting collected voter registration
12
forms, with penalties of $50 per form per day late.
Hearing on Protecting the Right to Vote: Best and
Worst Practices Before the Subcomm. on Civil Rights
& Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong. 10 (Comm. Print 2019) (statement of
Dale Ho, at 3, ACLU Director, Voting Rights Project),
available at https://bit.ly/2LjlfhC. A federal court decision ruling that the Florida law was unconstitutional
did not stop Tennessee in 2018 from passing a similar
(in fact, worse) law. The Tennessee law imposed fines
of up to $10,000 for submitting incomplete registration
forms (while also imposing criminal liability if an entity
took more than 10 days to submit registration forms).
Id. These changes, unsurprisingly, chilled voter registration drives. In Florida, the League of Women Voters halted all registration activity, Rock the Vote excluded Florida from its national voter registration
drive, and large numbers of volunteers dropped out of
the NAACP’s voter registration drives. Id.
These chilling effects are especially significant for
minority voters, who are much more likely than White
voters to register through private voter registration
drives. In 2016, 6.9% of Black voters and 5.7% of Hispanic voters registered through private drives, compared to only 3.4% of White voters. See U.S. Census
Bureau, Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex,
Race and Hispanic Origin, for States (Nov. 2016) (Table 12), http://bit.ly/2LSQrVd.
2. Even after successfully registering to vote, minority voters are at greater risk than White voters of
being removed from voter rolls.
As noted above, tens of millions of voters have been
purged from the voter rolls in the last decade. See supra p.6. And many voter-roll purges have been riddled
13
with errors. In Ohio, for example, in 2019 the secretary
of state released a list of 235,000 voters set to be
purged; voting-rights groups identified 40,000 errors in
the list—i.e., an error rate of over 15%. Berman, Kick
Thousands of Voters Off Role the Rolls During a Pandemic, supra. In 2017, Wisconsin claimed that 340,000
voters should be purged because they had moved, but
an analysis by the League of Women Voters revealed
that 7% of the voters on the list (i.e., over 20,000 voters)
had not moved. Id.
Such errors are generally more likely to affect minority voters. For example, most states rely on voterroll crosscheck systems that seek to purge duplicate
registrations, but those systems are more likely to generate false positives with minority voters, as such voters are more likely to share a common surname. Studies have found that 50% of people of color have a common surname compared to only 30% of White people.
As a result, Black voters are overrepresented by 45%
on crosscheck lists, Asian voters by 31%, and Hispanic
voters by 24%, whereas White voters are underrepresented by 8%. Harmon et al., The Health of State Democracies 25, Center for Am. Progress Action Fund
(July 2015), https://bit.ly/3nhzBwh. Additionally, voters with limited English proficiency are less able to respond to erroneous purge letters because they may not
comprehend such letters, and such voters are disproportionately of Latino or Asian background, see Ramakrishnan & Ahmad, Language Diversity and English
Proficiency 3-4, Center for Am. Progress (May 27,
2014), https://ampr.gs/3idORJF. The United States
Commission on Civil Rights thus concluded that recent
voter purges have generally resulted in the disproportionate disenfranchisement of minority voters. U.S.
Comm’n on Civil Rights, An Assessment of Minority
14
Voting Rights Access in the United States: 2018 Statutory Report 144-157 (Sept. 2018), https://bit.ly/3ondIge.
Some states have also tried to retroactively remove
voters believed to be noncitizens; the resulting errors
have disproportionately affected minority voters. In
Florida, for example, a list that the state had created in
2012 of 2,700 potential non-citizens was found to include
at least 500 citizens. Weiner, Florida’s Voter Purge
Explained,
Wash.
Post
(June
18,
2012),
https://wapo.st/2Xdnfea. Of the 2,700 individuals listed,
87% were minority voters and 58% were Hispanic voters. Id. By way of comparison, Hispanic voters were
only 13% of the active voter base at the time. Mazzei,
Hispanics, Democrats Biggest Groups in Florida’s List
of Potential Noncitizen Voters, Analysis Shows, Tampa
Bay Times (May 12, 2012), https://bit.ly/2JKHRXT.
3. Even those who are successfully registered for
an upcoming election then confront additional obstacles
at the polls.
As noted above, many jurisdictions have closed
polling sites and/or reduced hours for voting. See supra
p.7. Such closures and reductions are likely to “disproportionately and negatively affect[]” Black voters, Ohio
State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524,
533 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 2014 WL
10384647 (6th Cir. 2014), because many of these closures take place in predominantly minority communities, see The Leadership Conference Education Fund,
Democracy Diverted (Sept. 2019), https://bit.ly/
3nPvIz0. For example, in Georgia, of the 214 polling
places closed since 2010, 80 have been in metro Atlanta,
where most Black voters live. Derysh, GOP Vows to
Probe Georgia Election “Catastrophe” in Minority Areas, Dems Say it Was “No Accident,” Salon (June 10,
15
2020), https://bit.ly/350i2dL. The same pattern repeated itself in the recent runoff Senate election in Georgia;
for example, state officials decided to close 6 of 11 early-voting polling sites in Cobb County, specifically in
those areas where most of the county’s Black and Hispanic voters live. Derysh, After Democrats Flip State,
Georgia Moves to Shut Down Early Voting Locations
Ahead of Senate Runoff, Salon (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3om2nxi.
More generally, the phenomenon of long lines at
the polls—which is, of course, exacerbated by poll closures and reduced voting hours—disproportionately
affects minority voters. In 2017, research demonstrated that “a voter in a predominantly minority precinct
experiences a line that is twice as long, on average,
than a voter in a predominantly white precinct.” Pettigrew, The Racial Gap in Wait Times: Why Minority
Precincts Are Underserved by Local Election Officials,
132 Political Sci. Quarterly 527, 527 (Nov. 2017), available at https://bit.ly/3bqCdFT. Indeed, several studies
have found that “the more voters in a precinct who are
non-white, the longer the wait times.” Weil et al., The
2018 Voting Experience: Polling Place Lines 21, Bipartisan
Policy
Center,
(Nov.
4,
2019),
https://bit.ly/35vAUBz. And a more recent nationwide
study also found that neighborhoods which became less
White over the past decade had fewer electoral resources in 2018 than counties that became more White.
See Klain et al., Waiting to Vote 10, supra.
4. Finally, if voters surmount all of the previously
discussed obstacles, they may encounter yet another
significant roadblock before being allowed to cast a ballot: strict voter ID requirements. As noted above, 16
16
states in the past decade have enacted such laws. See
supra p.5.
And there is overwhelming evidence that strict
voter ID laws disproportionately prevent minority voters from equal participation in the voting process. In
large part, this is because minority voters are much
less likely to have the limited types of accepted ID.
See, e.g., Stewart, Voter ID: Who Has Them? Who
Shows Them?, 66 Okla. L. Rev. 21, 36-43 (2013); Barreto et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID Requirements on the Electorate—New Evidence from Indiana, 42 Politics & Political Sci. 111 (2009); Hood III &
Bullock III, Worth a Thousand Words?: An Analysis of
Georgia’s Voter Identification Statutes, 36 Am. Pol. Research 555 (2008); Hajnal et al., Voter Identification
Laws and the Suppression of Minority Votes, 79 J. of
Pol. 363 (2017). Additionally, minority voters are also
more likely than White voters to be asked to present
ID, further compounding the disproportionate effect of
strict voter ID laws. Stewart, 2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections iii, MIT (Feb. 25,
2013).
*
*
*
As the prior discussion demonstrates, over the last
decade, numerous jurisdictions have adopted voting
regulations that significantly (and likely unjustifiably)
burden minority voters’ participation in the political
process. Especially in the absence of Section 5, Section
2 plays an essential role in advancing the federal commitment to protecting minority voters and ensuring
that they have an equal opportunity to participate in
the political process.
17
II. THIS COURT SHOULD CONTINUE TO INTERPRET SECTION 2 TO EMPOWER COURTS TO PROTECT AGAINST
THE PERSISTENT AND ADAPTIVE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING
A. For Generations, This Court Has Protected
Democracy By Striking Down Barriers To
Participation
Many consider Brown v. Board of Education to
mark the beginning of the Court’s civil rights awakening. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). But the Court began long before then, deciding significant cases that dislodged entrenched voting discrimination and advanced the prodemocracy values of our Constitution that rely so heavily on full and open political participation. This history,
although familiar to many, is especially worth reviewing today, when the importance of protecting full participation as a bedrock of legitimacy for our democracy
has never been more evident.
1. The Court first targeted a form of blatant
apartheid and exclusion, namely the persistent efforts
to exclude Black voters from the Democratic Party, in
the “white primary” cases. See Peretti, Constructing
the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 273, 276 (2010).
The first case in this series was Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927). Justice Holmes’s opinion for the
unanimous Court held that a Texas statute facially prohibiting Black people from participating in Democratic
party elections was a “direct and obvious infringement”
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
clause. Id. at 541.
As we are seeing today, an advance for minority
participation faced immediate backlash. Texas quickly
18
enacted a new statute declaring that each political party’s executive committee would have the power to prescribe the qualifications of its own members. Nixon,
the same plaintiff, sued again because the Democratic
party had (unsurprisingly) excluded Black voters such
as himself. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
Against the state’s urging that a political party is always a “voluntary association” immune from Fourteenth Amendment limitations, the Court held narrowly that the Texas Democratic party’s executive committee was acting pursuant to state-delegated power in
determining its membership and was therefore an
agent of the state for that purpose. Id. at 83. The
Court left open the question of whether a political party, “without restraint by any law to determine its own
membership,” could constitutionally exclude Black people. Id.
In 1944, the Court squarely confronted “whether
the exclusionary action of [a political] party was the action of [a] State.” Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661
(1944). It would have been all too easy for the Court to
give the easy, formalistic answer of “no,” because a political party was a private organization. But the Court
looked past formalities, straight into the substantive
heart of the voting problem. The Court expressly recognized that the problem of minority exclusion in voting went to the heart of American democracy: “The
United States is a constitutional democracy” and “[i]ts
organic law grants to all citizens a right to participate
in the choice of elected officials without restriction by
any state because of race.” Id. at 664. And that right,
the Court explained, “is not to be nullified by a state
through casting its electoral process in a form which
permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination in the election.” Id. The Court accordingly
19
looked at the practical realities in the way primary
elections, state regulation, and voter access intertwined, concluding that the political party’s exclusion
was “state action within the meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 663-664.
Less than a decade later, the Court confronted yet
another permutation of the exclusionary practices
struck down in Allwright. In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953), the private organization that was excluding
Black voters was not a political party (or regulated as
such), but its pre-primaries had dictated the result in
the actual primaries for decades. In holding that the
private organization’s exclusion constituted state action, Justice Black’s plurality opinion rested principally
on the practical reality that the pre-primary was “an
integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the elective process.” Id. at 469. Justice Clark, concurring on
behalf of himself and three other justices, described the
arrangement as an “old pattern in new guise.” Id. at
480. Again, the Court looked past formalities and
grounded its ruling in the facts and historical context.
2. The Court next targeted a more subtle but
equally fatal obstacle to democratic inclusion: the situation where minority voters can formally cast a ballot,
but in reality, that ballot does not carry the same
weight as a ballot cast by White voters.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot concerned the constitutionality of an Alabama law that famously gerrymandered
the municipality around Tuskeegee “from a square to
an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure.” 364 U.S. 339,
340 (1960). The Court recognized that the gerrymander
“was cloaked in the garb of the realignment of political
subdivisions,” id. at 345, but nevertheless held that the
20
Tuskegee gerrymander was blatant and impermissible
race discrimination, see id. at 341.
One year after Gomillion, in Baker v. Carr, the
Court corrected a profound systemic dysfunction in the
political process—the inability of minority voters to
have their voting rights recognized and remedied by a
federal court. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The plaintiffs in
Baker urged that Tennessee’s legislative apportionment statute was unconstitutional. The district court
determined that the matter presented a nonjusticiable
“political question” and dismissed the case. Id. at 209.
But the Court disagreed, holding that the “right asserted [was] within the reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 237. As commentary presciently observed at the time, Baker
“move[d] broadly in the direction of developing and
supporting procedures necessary for the effective operation of a modern democratic system.” Emerson,
Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 Yale L.J. 64
(1962). Without the Court’s reluctant but indispensable
intervention, dispossessed minority voters would have
lacked—indeed today might still not have—a way to
vindicate their voting rights in federal court. By enforcing the fundamental promise of equal representation, despite fear of entering a “political thicket,” Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), the Court in
fact conveyed to the nation that it stood for democracy.
As one commentator observed: “At least some of us
who shook our heads over Baker v. Carr are prepared
to admit that it has not been futile, that it has not impaired, indeed that it has enhanced, the prestige of the
Court.” Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search
for Intermediate Premises, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 991
(1967).
21
3. The Court also responded to obstacles that
raised pretextual grounds for excluding minority voters from the democratic franchise. In Hunter v. Underwood, this Court invalidated a provision of Alabama’s Constitution, which disfranchised citizens for
misdemeanors “involving moral turpitude,” and had
been applied to bar plaintiffs from voting for life because they had presented a bad check. 471 U.S. 222,
224 (1985). Writing for the unanimous Court, thenJustice Rehnquist explained that the “original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against
blacks on account of race and the section continues to
this day to have that effect.” Id. at 233. Yet again, the
Court looked into the broader context underlying a
formally neutral law and appropriately recognized the
reality of racial discrimination.
History has judged the Court’s cases not as unwarranted judicial interventions in the democratic process
but rather as much-needed guardrails ensuring that
American democracy would endure. In a multiracial
society where voting is the highest act of democratic
expression and citizenship—as voting is “preservative
of all rights,” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886)—the Court embraced a principle of minority inclusion in voting.
Congress followed, in passing the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. If Reconstruction was a rebirth of America around the principle
of minority inclusion, the Voting Rights Act was a new
and meaningful federal commitment to that principle in
practice. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
315 (1966). And Congress—reflecting the will of the
American people—has repeatedly affirmed that commitment, reauthorizing and expanding the Act (includ-
22
ing Section 2) in 1970, 1975, 1982, 1992, and 2006. See
Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970); Pub. L. No. 9473, 89 Stat. 402 (1975); Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
(1982); Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921 (1992); Pub. L.
No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
B. Courts Can And Must Be Vigilant To Combat
Discrimination In Voting
One unfortunate lesson of this Court’s voting-rights
jurisprudence discussed in Section II.A is that the enduring nature of voting discrimination poses a threat to
American democracy. As the pre-eminent historian of
voting and democracy, Professor Alexander Keyssar,
explained in recent testimony, “the history of voting
rights since the founding, and despite our most heroic
images of our country, has not been one of continuous
expansion and enlargement”; rather, it has been “up
and down” with significant periods of contraction.
Keyssar, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Meeting,
Part 2, C-SPAN (Aug. 18, 2017), https://bit.ly/3nF4laG.
And “the conflicts and patterns of exclusion have always been along the lines of race, class, and for a long
time gender.” Id. In short, this country’s “history of
democratic rights is a history of conflict” because “not
everybody wants everybody to participate.” Id.
But the Court’s jurisprudence also points to the solution: Courts must be vigilant to combat the persistent and adaptive problem of discrimination in voting.
That is, courts must recognize the corrosive effects of
voting discrimination and, with the benefit of
longstanding jurisprudence, look past formalities and
examine the practical realities and historical context, in
order to ferret out discrimination in voting. Or, as Professor Keyssar put it, the “lesson” from American history is that “if you want to preserve voting rights, you
23
have to protect them.” Keyssar, Commission on Civil
Rights Meeting, supra.
And recent decisions of this Court and the courts of
appeals demonstrate that federal courts can, in fact, be
vigilant in carefully reviewing the totality of circumstances underlying challenged voting practices and appropriately striking down those that cross the line into
discrimination.
For example, in League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry, this Court held that Texas violated
Section 2 because its redistricting “undermined the
progress of a racial group that ha[d] been subject to
significant voting-related discrimination and that was
becoming increasingly politically active and cohesive.”
548 U.S. 399, 439 (2006). “In essence the State took
away the Latinos’ opportunity because Latinos were
about to exercise it,” the Court stated, which raised the
specter of “intentional discrimination.” Id. at 440. LULAC appropriately recognized that voting progress is
precarious and highlighted how swiftly a state can, with
a “troubling blend of politics and race,” dilute the votes
of a “group that was beginning to achieve § 2’s goal of
overcoming prior electoral discrimination.” Id. at 442.
The Court’s careful assessment, based on the totality of
the circumstances, thus gave minority voters a fair opportunity to choose their leaders.
More recently, in North Carolina State Conference
of NAACP v. McCrory, the Fourth Circuit corrected
the district court’s “failure of perspective,” which had
led it to “ignore critical facts bearing on legislative intent, including the inextricable link between race and
politics in North Carolina.” 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir.
2016). In North Carolina, after “years of preclearance
and expansion of voting access,” Black “registration
24
and turnout rates had finally reached near-parity with
white registration and turnout rates” by 2013. Id. But,
on the day after the Supreme Court handed down Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), a leader of
the party that “newly dominated the legislature” announced “an intention to enact what he characterized as
an ‘omnibus’ election law.” 831 F.3d at 214. The legislature requested “data on the use, by race, of a number
of voting practices” and then passed provisions that
“target[ed] African Americans with almost surgical
precision.” Id. The law was “the most restrictive voting law North Carolina ha[d] seen since the era of Jim
Crow.” Id. at 229. After careful review of the entire
record and totality of circumstances, the Fourth Circuit
stated that it could “only conclude that the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the challenged provisions of the law with discriminatory intent.” Id. at 215.
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit in Fish v. Schwab
struck down Kansas’s proof-of-citizenship voting requirement as unconstitutional and contrary to the National Voter Registration Act. 957 F.3d 1105. The
court recognized the challenge of “separat[ing] those
regulations that properly impose order—thereby protecting the fundamental right to vote—from those that
unduly burden it—thereby undermining it.” Id. at
1122. But the Court refused to accept the state’s formalistic suggestion that, “as a matter of law,” the requirement to present proof of citizenship only imposed
a “limited burden” on voters. Id. at 1130. Rather, the
court examined the facts (as found by the district court)
and determined that the requirement, in fact, disenfranchised 31,089 legitimate voters. Id. And it carefully assessed the state’s proffered justifications for the
proof-of-citizenship requirement, holding that they
25
were insufficiently supported by the record to support
such a significant infringement on the right to vote. Id.
These court decisions reflect the parting words of
civil-rights leader John Lewis. “Democracy is not a
state. It is an act, and each generation must do its part
. . . .” Lewis, Together, You Can Redeem the Soul of
our Nation, N.Y. Times (July 30, 2020),
https://nyti.ms/2XR1bGk.
C. The Court Should Continue To Interpret Section 2 To Empower Courts To Combat Discrimination In Voting
As the foregoing demonstrates, Section 2 represents a federal commitment to the democratic principle
of minority inclusion in voting—a commitment built on
this Court’s own cases protecting democracy. That
principle demands judicial vigilance, to conduct the
careful context-specific inquiry to properly identify discrimination in voting.
This Court should interpret Section 2 accordingly,
to empower courts to exercise the vigilance required to
protect minority participation in democracy. Specifically, Section 2 should be capacious enough to allow courts
to consider the totality of circumstances and, based on
that context-specific inquiry, determine whether a particular electoral barrier crosses the line from a mere
electoral rule into one that disproportionately and unjustifiably lessens minority voters’ opportunity to participate equally in the political process.
This point is well-illustrated by comparing the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits confronting strict voter ID
laws in Texas and Wisconsin respectively. The Fifth
Circuit conducted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis and struck down Texas’s strict voter ID law, based
26
on a significant disparate impact and a nexus with the
state’s own history of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, interpreted Section 2 as a simplistic
equal-treatment rule, and upheld Wisconsin’s strict
voter ID law simply because it did not facially discriminate against minority voters.
1. Texas Voter ID Law. Within hours of Shelby
County, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott declared
that the state’s restrictive voter ID law, which had
been previously blocked under Section 5’s preclearance
mechanism, would “take effect immediately.” Statement by Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott (June 25,
2013), https://bit.ly/34Z3Stm; see also Ford, The Entirely Preventable Battles Raging Over Voting Rights, The
Atlantic (Apr. 14, 2017), https://bit.ly/2KI6zc9. That
law would have disenfranchised over 500,000 voters,
with “Hispanic registered voters and Black registered
voters . . . respectively 195% and 305% more likely than
their Anglo peers to lack” acceptable ID. Veasey, 830
F.3d at 250.
In analyzing the Texas voter ID law, the en banc
Fifth Circuit began by appropriately recognizing that
the essence of a Section 2 claim is that “a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social
and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to
elect their preferred representatives.” Veasey, 830
F.3d at 244 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
47 (1986)). The court thus adopted a two-part test, with
the first part examining statistical evidence “to discern
whether a law has a discriminatory impact” and the
second part considering various factors identified by
Congress “to determine whether such an impact is a
product of current or historical conditions of discrimi-
27
nation such that it violates Section 2.” Id. at 245. In so
doing, the court rejected efforts to adopt simplistic
bright-line rules, reasoning that “assessing whether a
law has a discriminatory impact is no simple matter and
does not lend itself to simple formulation.” Id. at 249
n.41.
Applying the two-part test just described, the Fifth
Circuit then held that the Texas voter ID law violated
Section 2. The law imposed “excessive and disparate
burdens on minority voters,” Veasey, 830 F.3d at 250,
and the law “worked in concert with Texas’s legacy of
state-sponsored discrimination to bring about this disproportionate result,” id. at 264-265. That statesponsored discrimination, the court explained, included
the state’s role in de jure segregation in education, employment, housing, and transportation. Id. at 259.
Although the court struck down Texas’s strict voter ID law, the Fifth Circuit’s careful analysis was tethered to that specific law and its underlying context and
did not sweep more broadly to encompass voter ID
laws generally. At the same time, the court’s decision
had a concrete and measurable impact, ensuring that
hundreds of thousands of minority voters could equally
participate in American democracy.
2. Wisconsin Voter ID Law. In 2011, Wisconsin
enacted a photo ID law that only permitted eight forms
of photo ID. 2011 Wis. Act 23. A federal district court
enjoined the law partly on the ground that it violated
Section 2 by creating a disparate impact on minority
voters. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 863, 879
(E.D. Wis. 2014). Specifically, the district court found
that over 300,000 Wisconsin voters lack acceptable ID,
that Black and Hispanic voters were significantly more
likely than White voters to lack ID, and furthermore
28
that Black and Hispanic voters were less likely to have
the documents necessary to obtain qualified ID. Id. at
854, 870-872.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
voter ID law did not violate Section 2. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 755 (7th Cir. 2014). The Seventh Circuit did not dispute the disparate effect of the voter ID
law, nor that its effect was “traceable to the effects of
discrimination in areas such as education, employment,
and housing.” Id. at 753. The court nevertheless upheld the law by criticizing the two-step approach discussed above and instead reading Section 2 as only “an
equal-treatment requirement.” Id. at 755. The court
accordingly rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge because
the law did not facially “draw any line by race” and “because in Wisconsin everyone has the same opportunity
to get a qualifying photo ID.” Id. at 753, 755.
The Fifth Circuit identified the fundamental problem with the Seventh Circuit’s equal-treatment interpretation. That approach would “giv[e] states a free
pass to enact needlessly burdensome laws with impermissible racially discriminatory impacts” when “[t]he
Voting Rights Act was enacted to prevent just such invidious, subtle forms of discrimination.” Veasey, 830
F.3d at 247.
And the consequences of the Seventh Circuit’s approach are deeply concerning. As a result of the Seventh Circuit’s decision, Wisconsin’s voter ID law was in
place during the November 2016 election. And studies
have conclusively found that the voter ID law significantly disenfranchised minority voters. A survey conducted at the University of Wisconsin found that nearly
17,000 registered voters in just two Wisconsin counties
were deterred from casting ballots because of Wiscon-
29
sin’s voter ID law. Wines, Wisconsin Strict ID Law
Discouraged Voters, Study Finds, N.Y. Times (Sept.
25, 2017), https://nyti.ms/3hUOvHX. Only 8.3% of
White registered voters were deterred, compared to
27.5% of Black registered voters. Mayer, Press Release: Voter ID Study Shows Turnout Effects in 2016
Wisconsin Presidential Election (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://bit.ly/3oPPQ5g. These estimates did not include
people who did not even register to vote because they
did not have an accepted form of ID. Id.; Wines, Wisconsin Strict ID, supra. And while these numbers may
appear small on the surface, they are significant, as the
margin of victory in Wisconsin in the 2016 and 2020
Presidential contests has been less than 25,000 votes.
*
*
*
The point is not that all laws regulating access to
voting are unlawful but that Section 2 should be capacious enough to empower courts to conduct contextspecific inquiries into whether a particular law crosses
the line from a mere electoral rule into one that disproportionately and unjustifiably lessens minority voters’
opportunity to participate equally in the political process. This Court should interpret Section 2 to ensure
that it can serve that crucial purpose.
30
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
Respectfully submitted.
DEBO P. ADEGBILE
Counsel of Record
MARISSA MEDINE
NELSON CASTAÑO
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
7 World Trade Center
250 Greenwich Street
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MICHAEL ZUBRENSKY
(212) 295-6717
LEIGH CHAPMAN
THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE debo.adegbile@wilmerhale.com
ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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(202) 663-6000
JANUARY 2021
APPENDIX
1a
APPENDIX: LIST OF AMICI
ACCESS
Advancement Project National Office
American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations
Andrew Goodman Foundation
Anti-Defamation League (ADL)
Asian & Pacific Islander American Health Forum
Asian Americans Advancing Justice
Black Alliance for Just Immigration
Central Conference of American Rabbis
Clean Elections Texas
Common Cause
Communications Workers of America
Demos
End Citizens United / Let America Vote Action Fund
Fair Count Inc
Generation Vote
Government Accountability Project
Hispanic Federation
Justice for Migrant Women
Lambda Legal
League of Women Voters United States
Matthew Shepard Foundation
Men of Reform Judaism
2a
Mid-Ohio Valley Climate Action
NARAL Pro-Choice America
National Alliance for Partnerships in Equity (NAPE)
National Association of Social Workers (NASW)
National Black Justice Coalition
National Center for Lesbian Rights
National Council of Churches
National Council of Jewish Women
National Education Association
National Equality Action Team (NEAT)
National Women’s Law Center
NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice
New American Leaders Action Fund
New American Voices
Oxfam America
People for the American Way Foundation
PIVOT – The Progressive Vietnamese American
Organization
Planned Parenthood Action Fund
Progressive Turnout Project
Sikh Coalition
Southern Poverty Law Center
The DKT Liberty Project
The Workers Circle
UnidosUS
3a
Union for Reform Judaism
Union of Concerned Scientists
Women Lawyers on Guard Inc.
Women of Reform Judaism
Youth Progressive Action Catalyst
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.