Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Robert Doyle, Petitioner v. Douglas Palmer, Clerk, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

No. 19-939

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE

PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,

2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1

AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE

EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION

“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY

PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood

Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,

in the City of New York, on the 16th day of December,

two thousand nineteen.

Present:

ROBERT D. SACK,

BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

DENNY CHIN,

Circuit Judges.

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_________________________________________________

ROBERT DOYLE,,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vDOUGLAS C. PALMER, in his official capacity

as the Clerk of the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of New York,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:

TODD C. BANK, Kew Gardens, NY

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:

MATTHEW J. MODAFFERI, Assistant United States

Attorney (Rachel G. Balaban, Varuni Nelson, Assistant

United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Richard P.

Donoghue, United States Attorney for the Eastern

District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York (Weinstein, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is

AFFIRMED.

2a

Plaintiff-appellant Robert Doyle (“Doyle”) appeals

from a judgment of the district court entered May 28,

2019, dismissing his claims against defendant-appellee

Douglas C. Palmer, Clerk of Court of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York

(“Defendant”). By memorandum and order entered

March 28, 2019, the district court granted Defendant’s

motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Doyle, an attorney, challenges the constitutionality

of Eastern District of New York (“E.D.N.Y.”) Local Rule

1.3(a), which requires applicants seeking bar

admission in the district to submit an affidavit from an

E.D.N.Y.-barred attorney attesting to the applicant’s

good moral character (the “sponsor affidavit”). Doyle

claims Local Rule 1.3(a) is unconstitutional for three

reasons: (1) Congress unconstitutionally delegated its

rulemaking power to the Judiciary; (2) the rule violates

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and

(3) the rule violates the First Amendment. We assume

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,

procedural history, and issues on appeal.

“We review a district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.” Hernandez v.

United States, 939 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2019)

(citation omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

3a

For substantially the reasons stated by the district

court, we affirm. The complaint fails to state a

plausible claim for relief. Doyle’s claim that the

requirement of a sponsor affidavit is somehow

unconstitutional is specious, and we reject it.

We have considered all of Doyle’s arguments and

conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing

reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

[s/ Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe]

4a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ROBERT DOYLE,

Plaintiff,

-againstDOUGLAS PALMER, Clerk of the Federal

District Court, Eastern District of New York,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

18-CV-4439

JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior United States

District Judge:

Parties

Appearances

Plaintiff

Todd C. Bank

Law Office of Todd C. Bank

119-40 Union Turnpike, Fourth Fl.

Kew Gardens, NY 11415

718-520-7125

5a

Defendant

I.

Matthew J. Modafferi

United States Attorney’s Office

Eastern District of New York

271 Cadman Plaza East

Brooklyn, NY 11201

718-254-6229

Introduction

This case arises out of a challenge to Local Rule

1.3(a) of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York’s “sponsor affidavit

requirement.” Applicants to the bar of the Eastern

District of New York must submit an affidavit from a

current member of the bar, who has known the

applicant for a minimum of one year, stating what the

attorney knows of the applicant’s character and

experience.

Plaintiff Robert Doyle brings this action against

the Clerk of the Federal District Court for the Eastern

District of New York. He seeks both a declaration that

the sponsor affidavit requirement is unconstitutional

and a writ of mandamus to allow plaintiff to apply for

admission to the Eastern District of the New York bar

without complying with the sponsor affidavit

requirement.

Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted.

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II.

Claims

First, plaintiff challenges the foundation of the

federal courts’ authority to adopt rules governing the

admission of attorneys by arguing that Local Rule

1.3(a)’s sponsor affidavit requirement is the result of

an unconstitutional delegation of power by Congress to

the Judiciary. Second, he claims that the sponsor

affidavit requirement contravenes the Fifth

Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses. Third, he alleges that it violates his rights

under the First Amendment.

None of these claims have merit.

“[A] district court has discretion to adopt local rules

that are necessary to carry out the conduct of its

business. This authority includes the regulation of

admissions to its own bar.” Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S.

641, 645, 107 S.Ct. 2607, 96 L.Ed.2d 557 (1987)

(citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1654; 28 U.S.C.

§ 2071; Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1) (“After giving public

notice and an opportunity for comment, a district court,

acting by a majority of its district judges, may adopt

and amend rules governing its practice.”); Chambers v.

NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115

L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (the scope of the federal court’s

inherent power includes “the power to control

admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who

appear before it” (citation omitted) ).

“The practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of

right for one who is qualified by his learning and his

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moral character.” Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401

U.S. 1, 8, 91 S.Ct. 702, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1971) (citations

omitted). The sponsor affidavit requirement is a valid

exercise of the Eastern District of New York’s

judiciary’s authority to adopt local rules related to an

applicant’s fitness to practice law. See In re Sutter, 543

F.2d 1030, 1037 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Whether grounded

upon the inherent power of the court or upon the rulemaking power conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 2071, the

operative principle is the same: if the local rule is

related to the management of the court’s business and

it is not inconsistent with a statute or other rule or the

Constitution, then it is valid.”); Ex parte Secombe, 60

U.S. 9, 13, 19 How. 9, 15 L.Ed. 565 (1856) (“[I]t rests

exclusively with the court to determine who is

qualified to become one of its officers ....”). The court

reasonably depends upon a lawyer’s veracity and good

faith and is therefore entitled to investigate the

character of those who seek to practice before it.

Relevant is a review of the local rules for the

United States courts. See, infra, Section V(A); Exhibit

A (table summarizing court’s survey of federal courts’

rules). It demonstrated that admission requirements

similar to the sponsor affidavit requirement of the

Eastern District have been widely adopted by federal

courts. See Ex. A (finding that 47 of 94 district courts

require a sponsoring attorney to state what she or he

knows of the applicant’s character and/or experience at

the bar; 6 require the sponsoring attorney know the

applicant for at least one year). In Exhibit A, attached,

those courts requiring the sponsoring attorney know

the applicant for at least a fixed amount of time are

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marked with an asterisk.

The court reviewed the admission materials for

each federal court. But, the application forms for

several district courts—Western District of Arkansas,

Central District of California, Eastern District of

California, Southern District of California, District of

Colorado, Northern District of Florida, Southern

District of Florida, District of Kansas, District of

Massachusetts, District of Nebraska, District of North

Dakota, Western District of Wisconsin—were not

readily accessible.

There is no legal basis for the elimination of the

sponsor affidavit requirement, but it may, in some few

instances, make it more difficult to gain admission. For

this reason, the requirement that the sponsoring

attorney know the applicant for a year should probably

be eliminated. Most courts do not require the sponsor

to have known the applicant for any amount of time

prior to commenting on their character and experience.

III.

Background

A.

Challenged Rule

Local Rule 1.3(a) sets out the requirements for

admission to the bar of the Eastern District of New

York. It provides, in relevant part:

“[An] application for [bar] admission ...

shall ... be accompanied by an affidavit of

an attorney of this Court who has known

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the applicant for at least one year, stating

when the affiant was admitted to practice

in this court, how long and under what

circumstances the attorney has known

the applicant, and what the attorney

knows of the applicant’s character and

experience at the bar.”

(emphasis added).

The form affidavit that sponsoring attorneys are asked

to fill out is simple, to the point, and should present no

difficulty to an applicant. It is set out below:

[form affidavit]

B.

Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is an attorney admitted to practice in the

State of New York. See Hr’g Tr. 11:1–5, Feb. 19, 2019.

He allegedly wishes to become a member of the bar in

the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of

New York. Am. Compl. ¶ 23. But, he contends he

cannot comply with the sponsor affidavit requirement

without compromising his beliefs or his self-identity.

See id. ¶¶ 23, 29, 33.

To enable a current member of the bar to provide

a reasonably accurate assessment of his character,

Doyle alleges that he must engage in certain

“necessary activities.” Id. ¶ 24. They include the

“disclosure, to a [s]ponsor, of [his] beliefs regarding

philosophical, religious, political, social, moral, and

ethical matters ... [and] of a sufficient number of

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experiences of [his] that demonstrate consistency, or

inconsistency, with any of [his] [p]ersonal [b]eliefs.” Id.

¶¶ 25–26. He contends that it “would be virtually

impossible for [him] to engage in the [n]ecessary

[a]ctivities to a degree that would avoid the nonnegligible risk ... that the [s]ponsor would be

untruthful in ‘stating what [he] knows of [his]

character.’” Id. ¶ 31. He believes that taking this “risk”

is immoral and claims that this belief is “fundamental

to his self-identity.” Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.

IV.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

To grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, “a court must

accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true,

drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.”

Clark St. Wine & Spirits v. Emporos Sys. Corp., 754

F.Supp.2d 474, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).

V.

Analysis

A.

Survey of Federal Courts’ Local

Rules

A review of the local rules for the 94 United States

district courts, the 12 United States circuit courts, and

the United States Supreme Court was made under this

court’s direction ex mero motu, see Ex. A (survey of

federal courts’ local rules). See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2)

(courts may take judicial notice of facts that can be

readily determined from sources whose accuracy

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cannot be reasonably questioned). The survey revealed

that Local Rule 1.3(a)’s sponsor affidavit requirement

is, in general, consistent with the admission

requirements of other federal courts.

United States courts have largely adopted their

own sponsor requirements: 47 district courts, 8 circuit

courts, and the Supreme Court require a sponsoring

attorney to affirm that the applicant possesses good

moral and professional character. See Ex. A. 24 district

courts and the Supreme Court require affirmation from

two or more sponsors. See id.

Relatively rare is the Eastern District’s Local Rule

1.3(a)’s requirement that the sponsor has known the

applicant for at least one year. See id. Only 5 other

district courts impose a similar condition. See id.

(finding that the District for District of Columbia,

Northern District of Illinois, District of Maryland,

Southern District of New York, and Southern District

of Texas require that the sponsor knows the applicant

for at least one year; the District of Connecticut and

District of Vermont for at least 6 months). This

requirement appears unnecessary. A sponsoring

lawyer should not need to know an applicant for a year

to fairly assess his or her character and experience. It

creates avoidable problems for first-time applicants, as

well for those attorneys new to the New York area, who

may not have access to the same networks as many of

their peers.

It is recommended that the judges of the Eastern

District of New York revise Local Rule 1.3(a) by

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removing the condition that the sponsoring attorney

must have known the applicant for a minimum of one

year. If the change is made, it is probably desirable to

coordinate the shift with the Federal District Court for

the Southern District of New York whose local rules

mirror those of the Eastern District. On a rare

occasion, the one-year requirement may needlessly

exclude a worthy attorney who lacks the requisite

professional or social connections. In our unequal

society, we should be encouraging those on the lower

end of the socioeconomic ladder, with less

acquaintanceships with lawyers, to enter the legal

profession as a means to move up in status and to

support themselves and their families—as well as to

help others.

B.

Constitutional Delegation of Power

by Congress to the Judiciary

Doyle claims that Local Rule 1.3(a)’s sponsor

affidavit requirement is unlawful because it is the

result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative

power to the federal courts. The crux of his argument

is that Congress cannot delegate the power to enact a

rule like the sponsor affidavit requirement because it

does not have the power to enact such a rule itself

“whose application ... in a particular district court is

not based upon the presence or absence of any

particular rationale of factors.” See Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n at

13, ECF No. 27, Dec. 3, 2018.

Plaintiff’s claim is baseless. See Mistretta v.

United States, 488 U.S. 361, 387, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102

13a

L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (“Congress has undoubted power to

regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts,

and may exercise that power by delegating to this or

other federal courts authority to make rules not

inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the

United States.” (quotation marks and citation

omitted)). As the district court in In re Frazier put it:

Congress possesses the power to establish

courts inferior to the Supreme Court and

to make all laws necessary and proper for

executing that power. U.S. Const., art. I,

§ 8, cl. 9; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. As

part of the power to make necessary

regulations in establishing a lower court

system, Congress can prescribe rules for

practice and procedure in those courts.

Congress has not exercised this power

directly, however, but has instead

delegated the rule-making authority to

the courts themselves.... So long as the

lower courts do not exceed the authority

delegated to them, they can prescribe

rules of practice to the same extent as

could Congress if it exercised the power

directly.

594 F.Supp. 1173, 1178 (E.D. La. 1984), aff’d, 788 F.2d

1049 (5th Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds, Frazier v.

Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 107 S.Ct. 2607, 96 L.Ed.2d 557

(1987).

Congress delegated to federal courts the express

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authority to enact desirable local rules to conduct the

business before them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; 28 U.S.C.

§ 2071. Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of

September 25, 1789, Ch.20, 1 Stat. 73, 92, now codified

as section § 1654 of Title 28, provides:

In all courts of the United States the

parties may plead and conduct their own

cases personally or by counsel as, by the

rules of such courts, respectively, are

permitted to manage and conduct causes

therein.

Section 2071(a) of Title 28 provides:

The Supreme Court and all courts

established by Act of Congress may from

time to time prescribe rules for the

conduct of their business. Such rules

shall be consistent with Acts of Congress

and rules of practice and procedure

prescribed under section 2072 of this

title.

28 U.S.C. § 1654 and 28 U.S.C. § 2071, along with Fed.

R. Civ. P. 83, “authorize the adoption of rules for

conducting court business and this includes reasonable

standards for admission to practice for the court.” In re

G.L.S., 745 F.2d 856, 859 (4th Cir. 1984) (emphasis

added). The sponsor affidavit requirement is a lawful

exercise of the court’s authority to regulate admission

to its own bar. See Frazier, 482 U.S. at 645, 107 S.Ct.

2607; Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir.

15a

1968) (“The district courts have broad discretion in

prescribing requirements for admission to practice

before them ... [and] ha[ve] a valid interest in

regulating the qualifications and conduct of counsel

....”).

This claim is meritless and must be dismissed.

C.

Fifth Amendment Claims

Construed liberally, the amended complaint raises

Fifth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection

claims against the defendant. Both fail as a matter of

law.

There is not the slightest hint that the Rule has

ever been employed based on race, gender, or other

discriminatory way. See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,

328 U.S. 217, 223, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946)

(“Wage earners, including those who are paid by the

day, constitute a very substantial portion of the

community, a portion that cannot be intentionally and

systematically excluded in whole or in part without

doing violence to the democratic nature of the jury

system.”).

Doyle cannot establish a deprivation of a liberty

interest or property right necessary to prevail on a Due

Process claim. See Sutera v. Transportation Sec.

Admin., 708 F.Supp.2d 304, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“To

prevail on either a procedural or a substantive due

process claim, a claimant must establish that he

possessed a liberty or property interest of which the

16a

defendants deprived him.”); Maynard v. United States

Dist. Court, 701 F.Supp. 738, 743 (C.D. Cal. 1988)

(“[C]ourts have held that the right to practice law is

not a property right protected by the Due Process

Clause.” (citing In re Roberts, 682 F.2d 105, 107 (3rd

Cir. 1982) ); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278,

281, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957)

(“Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with

conditions.” (citation omitted) ).

Nor can he demonstrate that the sponsor affidavit

requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause.

“Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or

inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a

license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic

of legislative choices.... [A rule] that neither proceeds

along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental

constitutional rights must be upheld against equal

protection challenge if there is any reasonably

conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational

basis for the [rule].” F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,

508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211

(1993).

“Under rational basis review, the challenged rule

‘comes ... bearing a strong presumption of validity, and

those attacking the rationality of the [rule] have the

burden to negative every conceivable basis which

might support it.’” Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of

Multijurisdiction Practice v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 191, 196

(4th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (citing F.C.C. v.

Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct.

2096). “Where there are ‘plausible reasons’ for

17a

Congress’ action, ‘our inquiry is at an end.’” F.C.C. v.

Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313–14, 113 S.Ct.

2096 (citation omitted).

No impairment of a fundamental right or

classification based on a suspect class can be

established. See, e.g., Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354,

358 (9th Cir. 1990) (“There is no fundamental right to

practice law ... [and] [a]ttorneys do not constitute a

suspect class.”); Brooks v. Laws, 208 F.2d 18, 28 (D.C.

Cir. 1953) (“There is no inherent right to practice law.

The right arises after qualification under the rules has

been established.”).

Local Rule 1.3(a)’s requirement that a sponsoring

attorney provide his or her knowledge of the

applicant’s qualifications, experience, and good moral

character is rationally related to the applicant’s fitness

to practice law. See, e.g., Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam.

of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1

L.Ed.2d 796 (1957) (“A State can require high

standards of qualification, such as good moral

character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an

applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have

a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or

capacity to practice law.” (citations omitted) ). It is

necessary for the court to rely upon the good moral

character and the intellectual capability of the

attorneys before it, partly to protect the clients and

partly to protect the court and the public. See Ex parte

Secombe, 60 U.S. at 13, 19 How. 9; Randall v.

Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 540, 7 Wall. 523, 19 L.Ed. 285

(1868) (“The authority of the court over its attorneys

18a

and counsellors is of the highest importance.”).

Plaintiff’s unsupported claims alleging Fifth

Amendment violations are dismissed.

D.

First Amendment Claims

Plaintiff’s allegations that the sponsor affidavit

requirement violates his rights under the First

Amendment are not actionable.

“Generally, the government may license and

regulate those who would provide services to their

clients for compensation without running afoul of the

First Amendment.” NAAMJP v. Howell, 851 F.3d 12,

19 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citations

omitted). “A lawyer’s procurement of remunerative

employment is a subject only marginally affected with

First Amendment concerns. It falls within the ... proper

sphere of economic and professional regulation.”

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459, 98

S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978).

The sponsor affidavit requirement does not violate

the First Amendment. It does not target any speech

based on its content or on the viewpoint of the speaker.

Any possible miniscule impact that it may have on

expressive activities does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Boy Scouts of America v.

Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d

554 (2000). It is nothing more than a standard

regulation of the legal profession that, as noted above,

see, supra, Section V(C), passes rational basis review.

19a

See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228, 105 S.Ct. 2557, 86

L.Ed.2d 130 (1985) (“Regulations on entry into a

profession, as a general matter, are constitutional if

they ‘have a rational connection with the applicant’s

fitness or capacity to practice’ the profession.” (citation

omitted) ).

The court’s rule merely requires that an applicant

demonstrates his character and experience to a

member of the Eastern District of New York bar. See,

supra, Section III.A. It is essentially a request for a

reference who can comment reliably on the applicant’s

general fitness to practice law. It does not require a

comprehensive survey of the applicant’s legal

experience or an explanative analysis of her or his

ethical beliefs. The court may reasonably inquire

generally into the personal and professional

background of applicants to its bar without

contravening the First Amendment. See Howell, 851

F.3d at 19; cf. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,

792, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975) (“The

interest ... in regulating lawyers is especially great

since lawyers are essential to the primary

governmental function of administering justice, and

have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’” (citations

omitted) ).

Construing the facts in the manner most helpful to

the plaintiff, Doyle cannot establish a violation of his

freedom of association. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S.

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d

462 (1984) (“The right to associate for expressive

purposes is not ... absolute. Infringements on that right

20a

may be justified by regulations adopted to serve

compelling state interests, unrelated to the

suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through

means significantly less restrictive of associational

freedoms.” (citations omitted) ). He cannot establish a

violation of his freedom of conscience. See, e.g,

Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker,

680 F.3d 194, 212 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen *305 the

government seeks to enforce a law that is neutral and

generally applicable, it need only demonstrate a

rational basis for its enforcement, even if enforcement

of the law incidentally burdens religious practices.”

(quotation marks and citations omitted) ).

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims lack merit and

are dismissed.

VI.

Conclusion

A.

Proposal to Revise Local Rule 1.3(a)

This court suggests that the Eastern District of

New York amend Local Rule 1.3(a) by removing the

requirement that the sponsor “has known the

applicant for at least one year.” The condition appears

unnecessary for an attorney of the court to provide a

fair assessment of an applicant’s character and

experience.

B.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended

complaint is granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

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Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Enter judgment in favor of the defendant.

SO ORDERED.

[signature]

Jack B. Weinstein

Senior United States

District Judge

Date: March 18, 2019

Brooklyn, New York

VII.

Exhibit A: Survey of Federal Court Local

Rules—Requirements for Attorneys to Sponsor

Applicant’s Admission to the Bar

[“ Survey of Federal Court Local

Rules—Requirements for Attorneys to

Sponsor Applicant’s Admission to the Bar”]

22a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated term of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood

Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,

in the City of New York, on the 31 st day of January,

two thousand twenty.

ORDER

No. 19-939

_________________________________________________

ROBERT DOYLE,,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vDOUGLAS C. PALMER, in his official capacity

as the Clerk of the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of New York,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________

Appellant, Robert Doyle, filed a petition for panel

rehearing, or, in the alternative, for rehearing en banc.

The panel that determined the appeal has considered

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the request for panel rehearing, and the active

members of the Court have considered the request for

rehearing en banc.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is

denied.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

[s/ Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe]

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