Amicus Curiae Brief — American Institute for International Steel, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. United States, et al.

No. 19-1177

In The

___________

AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STEEL,

INC., SIM-TEX, LP, AND KURT ORBAN PARTNERS, LLC,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES AND MARK A. MORGAN, ACTING

COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND

BORDER PROTECTION,

___________

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit

___________

BRIEF OF THE CATO INSTITUTE

AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

Ilya Shapiro

Counsel of Record

CATO INSTITUTE

1000 Mass. Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 842-0200

ishapiro@cato.org

April 27, 2020

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In challenging certain steel tariffs under Section

232 of the Trade Expansion Act, petitioners present

the following question:

1. Is section 232 facially unconstitutional on the

ground that it lacks any boundaries that confine the

President’s discretion to impose tariffs on imported

goods and, therefore, constitutes an improper delegation of legislative authority and a violation of the

principle of separation of powers established by the

Constitution?

Amicus Cato Institute agrees that this question requires resolution, but suggests that the Court, in

granting the petition, add the following question for

briefing:

2. Is judicial review of the exercise of a president’s

statutory authority a necessary complement to

any permissible delegation of Congress’s power to

regulate foreign commerce?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ........................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT ......................................................... 1

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 4

I. THE COURTS BELOW IMPROPERLY

ABANDONED JUDICIAL REVIEW ................... 4

A. Section 232 Is a Congressional Delegation

That Implicates Neither Executive Power

Nor Political Questions ................................... 5

B. This Court’s Precedents Do Not Bar

Judicial Review of the President’s

Statutory Powers ............................................. 7

II. LOWER COURTS ARE SPLIT OVER

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT’S

STATUTORY POWERS ....................................... 8

III. “NONSTATUTORY REVIEW” ALLOWS

FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE

REASONABLENESS OF THE

PRESIDENT’S EXERCISE OF HIS

STATUTORY POWERS ..................................... 11

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 14

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States,

376 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (Ct. Intl. Trade 2019) .. 2, 6, 7

Atchison v. Wichita Bd. of Trade,

412 U.S. 800 (1973) .............................................. 13

Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC,

462 U.S. 87 (1983) ................................................ 12

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)............... 12

Corus Group PLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,

352 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................. 10

Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. S.D. ex rel. Payne,

250 U. S. 163 (1919) ............................................... 6

Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 562 (1994) ...................... 7

Dep’t of Commerce v. New York,

139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) .......................................... 12

East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump,

950 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2019) .............................. 10

Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,

426 U.S. 548 (1976) ................................................ 3

Franklin v. Massachusetts,

505 U.S. 788 (1992) ........................................ 11, 13

J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States,

276 U.S. 394 (1928) ................................................ 3

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) .................... 4

Mass. Lobstermen's Ass’n v. Ross,

945 F. 3d 535 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ............................... 9

iv

Motions Sys. Corp. v. Bush,

437 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................. 10

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) ........................ 13

Mt. States Legal Found. v. Bush,

306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002)............................... 9

Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Trade Rep.,

5 F. 3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ................................... 6

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194 (1947) ........... 13

See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States,

289 U.S. 48 (1933) .................................................. 6

Tulare Cty. v. Bush,

306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002)............................... 9

United States v. George S. Bush & Co.,

310 U.S. 371 (1940) ................................................ 7

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)............. 3

Statutes

19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A) .......................................... 11

19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii) ....................................... 8

19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(3)(A) ............................................ 6

5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2) .................................................... 1

Other Authorities

Adam Behsudi, “Mattis Departure Leaves Space

for More 232 Tariffs,” Politico, Dec. 21 2018 ....... 12

George Bronz, The Tariff Commission as a

Regulatory Agency,

61 Colum. L. Rev. 463 (1961) ................................. 6

v

Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President:

Nonstatutory Review Revisited,

97 Colum. L. Rev. 1612 (1997) ............................. 11

Michelle Fox, “Commerce Secretary Ross: Tariffs

Are ‘Motivation’ for Canada, Mexico to Make a

‘Fair’ NAFTA Deal,” CNBC, Mar. 8, 2018 ........... 12

Mohit Oberoi, “Why Steel Investors Are Mindful of

Capacity Utilization Rates,”

Market Realist (Oct. 2, 2014) ................................. 5

President Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Signing

of the Memorandum Regarding the Investigation

Pursuant to Section 232(B) of the Trade

Expansion Act (Apr. 20, 2017) ............................. 13

U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, The Effect of Imports

of Iron Ore and Semi-Finished Steel on the

National Security (Oct. 2001)................................. 5

U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, The Effect of Imports of

Steel on the National Security (Jan. 2018) ............ 5

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

The Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public-policy

research foundation established in 1977 and dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty,

free markets, and limited government. Cato’s Robert

A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies was established in 1989 to help restore the principles of limited

constitutional government that are the foundation of

liberty. Toward those ends, Cato publishes books and

studies, conducts conferences, and produces the annual Cato Supreme Court Review.

This case interests Cato because the separation of

powers ensures that no constitutional actor accumulates too much power. Under our Constitution, Congress can’t simply give away its legislative powers—

to the president or otherwise—and make the exercise

of those powers judicially unreviewable.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Courts routinely review agency action for reasonableness. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2). But when Congress

delegates the same type of regulatory authority to the

president, lower courts generally refrain from reasonableness review, out of a mistaken understanding of

this Court’s precedent. As a practical result, the president is thus permitted to do almost anything when

exercising statutory powers.

This perverse incentive animates the “national security” tariffs on steel imports at issue here. Under

1 Rule 37 statement: All parties were timely notified and con-

sented to the filing of this brief. Nobody other than amicus authored this brief in any part or funded its preparation or filing.

2

black letter law, any court would have set aside these

measures as arbitrary and capricious. Still, in the face

of tell-tale signs of irrational decision-making, the

courts below struggled to apply the Court’s precedent,

which they understood—incorrectly—to forbid judicial oversight.

A three-judge panel of the Court of International

Trade (“CIT”) conceded the dangers of unbound authority, but felt helpless to investigate. According to

the CIT, Section 232 falls into “a gray area where the

President could invoke the statute to act in a manner

constitutionally reserved for Congress but not objectively outside the President’s statutory authority, and

the scope of review would preclude the uncovering of

such a truth.” Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United

States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1345 (Ct. Intl. Trade

2019). But this cannot be right: The rule of law doesn’t

allow for “gray areas” where the president may act

within the statute but outside the Constitution.

The Federal Circuit’s unpublished disposition is

similarly perplexing. On the one hand, the court denied the “availability of judicial review of the factual

or discretionary presidential determinations”; on the

other hand, the court allowed that review remains for

“questions about the scope of statutory authority.”

Compare Pet. App. at 20–21 with Pet. App. at 21–22.

The problem with the court’s reasoning is that an irrational “determination” cannot be distinguished

3

from action that exceeds “the scope of statutory authority.” Instead, these are two descriptions of the

same ultra vires conduct.

The absence of meaningful judicial review, in turn,

raises serious concerns about the nondelegation doctrine. At a minimum, the nondelegation principle requires that Congress delineate limits on its delegated

authority with an “intelligible principle.” J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409

(1928). If, however, the president is permitted to take

unreasonable action under Section 232, then plainly

there can be no “boundaries” on the president’s power

to regulate foreign commerce. See Yakus v. United

States, 321 U.S. 414, 423 (1944).

In Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,

this Court identified two intelligible principles in Section 232: The president must regulate for “national

security” purposes, and the regulation must pertain

to “imports.” 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1976). In observing

that the “broad” phrase “’national interest’ . . . stands

in stark contrast with [Section 232’s] narrower criterion of ‘national security,’” the Algonquin court implicitly acknowledged that these limits amount to judicially testable standards. Id. at 569.

Congress did not intend for courts to allow the

president to simply cite “national security” as a pretense for unfettered regulatory power. There must be

some limits on the president’s power.

Of course, the president is not normally a direct

delegee of statutory authority, and his office must be

respected as the head of a coequal branch of government. Nevertheless, an attenuated judicial review,

4

properly accounting for the president’s unique constitutional status—and requiring no national security

expertise—would satisfy the constitutional minimum

of judicial oversight. Otherwise, there are no limits on

presidential power to regulate foreign commerce,

which eviscerates the nondelegation principle.

By abandoning judicial review of the president’s

statutory powers, the CIT and Federal Circuit ducked

their duty “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Those cases, moreover, are

part of a wider circuit split on this important constitutional question. There is, accordingly, an urgent

need for the Court to provide guidance by affirming

that Section 232 is a permissible legislative delegation only if complemented by calibrated judicial review. This controversy is an ideal vehicle for the Court

to clarify that its precedents do not preclude reasonableness review when presidents exercise a congressional delegation of authority.

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURTS BELOW IMPROPERLY

ABANDONED JUDICIAL REVIEW

The section 232 tariffs demonstrate quintessentially unreasonable decision-making. For example,

the Commerce Department’s investigation failed to

account for the “reliability” of importing countries.

The last time it investigated steel imports under Section 232, the department determined there would be

no national security threat “even if the United States

were dependent on imports” because these products

“are imported from reliable foreign sources.” U.S.

Dep’t of Commerce, The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore

5

and Semi-Finished Steel on the National Security, 27

(Oct. 2001). The department did not explain why it

broke with the past here by refusing to consider the

allied status of our trading partners in assessing the

“national security” of steel imports.

Similarly, the Commerce Department unreasonably relied on flimsy evidence to support its contention

that tariffs should be set at a level that allows steel

mills to operate at least an 80 percent “utilization

rate.” To justify this crucial metric, the department

provided, without explanation, a footnote to a short

online article—fewer than 300 words and more than

three years old—that offers no support for such a conclusion. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security, 47 (Jan. 2018)

(linking to Mohit Oberoi, “Why Steel Investors Are

Mindful of Capacity Utilization Rates,” Market Realist (Oct. 2, 2014)).

There are many more obvious examples of unreasoned decision-making associated with the Section

232 tariffs on steel imports, but those specific instances are immaterial to this facial challenge. Instead, the point here is to demonstrate the doctrinal

misunderstanding that prevented the courts below

from performing any meaningful oversight of executive authority.

A. Section 232 Is a Congressional Delegation That Implicates Neither Executive

Power Nor Political Questions

Although its precise reasoning is unclear, the Federal Circuit seems to believe that Section 232

6

“strengthens authority within the President’s independent constitutional power.” Pet. App. at 19.

But this Court has described Congress’s constitutional power to pass a tariff statute as being “exclusive and plenary.” See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill.

v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56 (1933). Section 232

tariffs thus emanate from “a core legislative function.”

See Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc., 376 F. Supp. at 1346

(Katzman, J., dubitante). Indeed, the laying of duties

is one of the few broad regulatory tasks that was once

performed directly by lawmakers via a long series of

detailed and specific tariff acts passed up through the

early 20th century. See George Bronz, The Tariff

Commission as a Regulatory Agency, 61 Colum. L.

Rev. 463, 464 (1961) (listing tariff acts).

Although the president has a constitutional role in

foreign commerce during peacetime, that function is

limited to the negotiation of international agreements. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Trade Rep., 5

F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (refusing to review the

president’s decision making in the exercise of statutory authority to negotiate a multilateral trade agreement). Section 232, by contrast, authorizes the president to negotiate international agreements only after

an affirmative finding that imports threaten national

security. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(3)(A).

To be sure, this Court is rightly reluctant to perform judicial review when the president’s statutory

authority implicates political questions of executive

power. See, e.g., Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. S.D. ex rel.

Payne, 250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919) (denying review of

president’s assessment of state of war as a statutory

7

condition for regulation). But Section 232 does not entail a political question. Instead, it involves a congressional delegation that is quite similar to the authorities exercised by any regulatory agency.

B. This Court’s Precedents Do Not Bar Judicial Review of the President’s Statutory

Powers

Both the CIT and Federal Circuit denied that judicial review has ever been available for the president’s decision-making under Section 232. In so holding, their opinions purported to align with two of this

Court’s rulings—Dalton v. Spector, 511 U.S. 562

(1994), and United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310

U.S. 371 (1940)—that supposedly reflect a longstanding custom of refusing to review the president’s decision-making under statutory grants of authority from

Congress, even where political questions are not present. See Pet. App. at 20–21; Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel,

376 F. Supp. 3d at 1341–42.

These cases are inapposite, however, because they

pertain to regulatory regimes whereby an independent body—the Defense Base Closure and Realignment

Commission in Dalton and the Tariff Commission in

George S. Bush & Co.—rendered an expert recommendation to the president, who then could either

agree or disagree. Compare Dalton, 511 at 465

(“Within two weeks of receiving the Commission’s report, the President must decide whether to approve or

disapprove, in their entirety, the Commission’s recommendations.”) with George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S.

at 376–77 (outlining statutory provision that restricts

8

the president to accepting or rejecting the Tariff Commission’s recommendations).

In such rare circumstances, the regulatory design

per se guards against unreasonable decision making.

In both Dalton and George S. Bush & Co., the president’s authority to alter the status quo was thereby

confined to the acceptance of recommendations from

an independent body insulated from direct presidential control. By thus limiting presidential discretion,

these statutory designs filled the essential role normally played by judicial review regarding the nondelegation doctrine—that is, ensuring that the president operates within congressional standards.

Section 232 is different. Here, the president is advised by a cabinet department whose head he can remove at-will. If, moreover, the president agrees with

his subordinate’s determination, he can depart from

the recommended remedy. See 19 U.S.C. §

1862(c)(1)(A)(ii). Because Section 232 lacks the structural protections of the statutes at issue in Dalton and

George S. Bush & Co., those cases neither reflect the

legal landscape at the time of Algonquin nor inform

the present controversy.

II. LOWER COURTS ARE SPLIT OVER JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT’S

STATUTORY POWERS

Relative to the Federal Circuit, the D.C. Circuit

has adopted a broader standard of review. For example, Mt. States Legal Found. v. Bush involved a challenge to the president’s authority under the Antiquities Act, which authorizes the president regulate “the

smallest area compatible” with the proper care for

9

“landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and

other objects of historic or scientific interest” on public

lands. 306 F.3d 1132, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (setting

forth statutory text). Appellants argued that courts

have a responsibility to review whether the president

had complied with the statute’s limits—that is,

whether the president regulated the “smallest area”

necessary to protect “objects”—or else “the Act constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of congressional

authority.” Id. at 1133.

Unlike the Federal Circuit, the D.C. Circuit distinguished Dalton and George S. Bush & Co. To the D.C.

Circuit, those cases are “inapposite” when the enabling act “places discernable limits on the President’s

discretion.” Id. at 1136. In these circumstances,

“[c]ourts remain obligated to determine whether statutory restrictions have been violated.” Id. Out of “separation of powers concerns,” however, the panel

adopted heightened pleading requirements for factual

allegations. Id. at 1137. See also Mass. Lobstermen’s

Ass’n v. Ross, 945 F.3d 535, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

(“[A]lthough the precise ‘scope of judicial review’ remains an open question, at a minimum, plaintiffs'

pleadings must contain plausible factual allegations

identifying an aspect of the designation that exceeds

the President's statutory authority.”) (citations omitted); Tulare Cty. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1142 (D.C.

Cir. 2002) (“Insofar as [plaintiff] alleges that the Monument includes too much land, i.e., that the President

abused his discretion by designating more land than

is necessary to protect the specific objects of interest,

10

[plaintiff] does not make the factual allegations sufficient to support its claims.”).

At least two opinions by Federal Circuit judges

have acknowledged the split between their court and

the D.C. Circuit over how to handle challenges to a

president’s statutory powers. See Motions Sys. Corp.

v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

(Gajarsa, J., concurring) (arguing that his court

should follow the D.C. Circuit in distinguishing Dalton and allow for review of the range of the president’s

statutory discretion); Corus Group PLC v. Int’l Trade

Comm’n, 352 F.3d 1351, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

(Newman, J., dissenting in part) (objecting to the majority’s reliance on Dalton and pointing to Mt. States

Legal Found. for the proposition that sister courts

“found no jurisdictional infirmity in permitting the

plaintiff to challenge the President’s actions and seek

relief directly from the President”).

The Ninth Circuit recently adopted an altogether

different framework for reviewing the president’s

statutory powers. In East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v.

Trump, the court determined that presidential decisions are subject to “hard look” review under certain

circumstances—namely, when the president’s determination is combined with an agency action that together creates an “operative rule of decision.” 950

F.3d 1242, 1271 (9th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit’s

novel standard would arguably apply to Section 232

tariffs, because the president is permitted to regulate

11

imports only if the Commerce Department finds a national security threat. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A).

There are costs to lower-court uncertainty over

how to review a president’s regulatory power. The absence of an overarching framework for judicial review

invites presidential adventurism. And in this time of

congressional gridlock, these controversies increasingly spill into the judiciary, as presidents push policy

agendas without legislative assistance. Only this

Court can resolve the lower-court confusion and provide guidance for judicial review of a president’s statutory powers to regulate commerce.

III. “NONSTATUTORY REVIEW” ALLOWS FOR

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE REASONABLENESS OF THE PRESIDENT’S EXERCISE OF

HIS STATUTORY POWERS

Section 232 does not explicitly provide for judicial

review of presidential orders. In Franklin v. Massachusetts, moreover, this Court held that the president

is not an agency under 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), so judicial

review is not available under the Administrative Procedure Act. 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).

But the APA did nothing to alter the basic availability and scope of the traditional “nonstatutory” remedies of mandamus, injunction, and declaratory judgment. See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the

President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 Colum.

L. Rev. 1612 (1997). Within this flexible framework,

12

the Court is free to establish parameters to guide

meaningful judicial review.

Yet even where, as here, the president’s statutory

powers do not implicate political questions, courts

nevertheless might be reluctant to review presidential decision making, out of concern over comparative

institutional competencies. As the Court observed in

Boumediene v. Bush, “neither the Members of this

Court nor most federal judges begin the day with

briefings that may describe new and serious threats

to our Nation and its people.” 553 U.S. 723, 797

(2008). Such concerns about relative expertise would

be misplaced in this case, however, because a properly

attenuated reasonableness review doesn’t require

subject-matter familiarity.

In reviewing a typical exercise of delegated authority, this Court would conduct a wide-ranging inquiry into the reasonableness of the delegee’s decision

making, known as “hard look” review. Balt. Gas &

Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). Where it

applies, “hard look” review extends even to whether

the delegee acted on a “pretextual basis,” Dep’t of

Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019),

which would prove a high bar for the government to

overcome here. See, e.g., Adam Behsudi, “Mattis Departure Leaves Space for More 232 Tariffs,” Politico,

Dec. 21 2018, https://politi.co/2Z0whcV (reporting

that the defense secretary’s resignation removed internal opposition to Section 232 tariffs); Michelle Fox,

“Commerce Secretary Ross: Tariffs Are ‘Motivation’

for Canada, Mexico to Make a ‘Fair’ NAFTA Deal,”

CNBC, Mar. 8, 2018, https://cnb.cx/2G5D2SF (report-

13

ing on non-security reasoning behind tariffs); President Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Signing of the

Memorandum Regarding the Investigation Pursuant

to Section 232(B) of the Trade Expansion Act (Apr. 20,

2017) (“We’ve [Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and

the president] been working on it since I came to office, and long before I came to office.”) (emphasis

added).

Again, however, this Court foreclosed “hard look”

review of the president’s statutory powers in Franklin

v Massachusetts, 505 U.S. at 800–01. Accordingly,

something less searching is required for review of Section 232 actions. These background principles suggest

that a properly attenuated nonstatutory review of

presidential regulation is confined to the subset of

“hard look” factors that are independent of subjectmatter familiarity.

The first factor for a court to consider is the “simple but fundamental rule of administrative law” that

the delegee of congressional power must set forth the

grounds on which it acted. See SEC v. Chenery Corp.,

332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). The second marker is a corollary of the first and entails the “duty to explain [a]

departure from prior norms.” Atchison v. Wichita Bd.

of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973) (citations omitted).

The third guideline on this non-exhaustive list serves

to ensure that the delegee does not “rel[y] on factors

which Congress has not intended it to consider.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

None of these “not so hard look” factors require

courts to possess any expertise beyond common sense.

14

And all of them are offended by the president’s Section 232 steel tariffs, as merits briefing here would

show.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant

the petition and add a further question about the necessity of judicial reasonableness review for any permissible delegation of Congress’s power to regulate

foreign commerce.

Respectfully submitted,

April 27, 2020

Ilya Shapiro

Counsel of Record

CATO INSTITUTE

1000 Mass. Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 842-0200

ishapiro@cato.org