Opposition Brief — Russell A. Suzuki, et al., Petitioners v. Christopher Deedy

Supreme Court briefMay 19, 2020

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 19-1153

In the Supreme Court of the United States

RUSSELL A. SUZUKI, ET AL., PETITIONERS

CHRISTOPHER DEEDY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

DANIEL R. ORTIZ

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

SCHOOL OF LAW SUPREME

COURT LITIGATION CLINIC

580 Massie Road

Charlottesville, VA 22903

MATTHEW M. MADDEN

Counsel of Record

DONALD BURKE

ROBBINS, RUSSELL, ENGLERT,

ORSECK, UNTEREINER &

SAUBER LLP

2000 K Street, NW, 4th Floor

Washington, DC 20006

THOMAS M. OTAKE

841 Bishop Street, Suite 2201 (202) 775-4500

mmadden@robbinsrussell.com

Honolulu, HI 96813

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not divest the

district court of jurisdiction over respondent’s habeas

petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding

that the trial court’s ruling, at respondent’s first trial,

that there was not “any evidence to support” a jury

instruction on manslaughter liability was an acquittal

barring his retrial on that offense.

(I)

ADDITIONAL RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (D. Haw.):

Deedy v. Connors, No. 18-cv-00094 (Apr. 9, 2020)

United States Court of Appeals (9th Cir.):

Deedy v. Espinda, No. 20-15816 (docketed Apr. 29,

2020)

(II)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below ....................................................................1

Jurisdiction ..........................................................................1

Statement.............................................................................1

Argument .............................................................................9

Conclusion ..........................................................................17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) ........................ 15

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) ........................... 12

California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) .................. 16

Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278

(10th Cir. 2012) ................................................... 12, 13

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) ................................ 5, 9

Espinda v. Gouveia, 140 S. Ct. 814 (2020) ................... 9

Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013)........ 6, 8, 14-16

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) ............................. 5, 10, 11

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ................................ 10

Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2008) ............ 5

Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881 (4th Cir. 1996) ........... 12

Gouveia v. Espinda, 926 F.3d 1102

(9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 814

(Jan. 13, 2020) ............................................................ 7

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) .............. 14

Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) .............. 11

Hoffer v. Bezio, 726 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013) ............... 12

(III)

(IV)

Cases—continued:

Page

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) ................. 9

Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon,

466 U.S. 294 (1984) .......................................... 5, 9, 11

Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310

(9th Cir. 1992) ........................................................... 12

Marshall v. Bristol Superior Court,

753 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2014) ....................................... 12

Martinez v. Caldwell, 644 F.3d 238

(5th Cir. 2011) ........................................................... 12

Neal v. Johnson, No. 09-cv-458,

2009 WL 10702285 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2009) ........... 13

Niles v. Wilshire Inv. Grp., LLC,

859 F. Supp. 2d 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ....................... 13

Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas,

668 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2012) .................................... 12

Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) ........ 5, 9

Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).......................... 11

Seay v. Cannon, 927 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 2019),

cert. denied, No. 19-311, 2020 WL 1496785

(Mar. 30, 2020) .......................................................... 12

State v. Adviento, 319 P.3d 1131 (Haw. 2014) ........... 14

State v. Austin, 422 P.3d 18 (Haw. 2018) ............... 3, 16

State v. Deedy, 407 P.3d 164 (Haw. 2017) ................ 2, 4

State v. Flores, 314 P.3d 120 (Haw. 2013) .................... 2

State v. Knight, 909 P.2d 1133 (Haw. 1996)................. 2

United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,

430 U.S. 564 (1977)............................................. 15, 16

United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) .................. 16

Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227

(10th Cir. 2007) ......................................................... 12

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) ........................ 12

(V)

Statutes and rule:

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................ 1

28 U.S.C. § 1257........................................................... 10

28 U.S.C. § 2241................................................... 4, 9, 11

28 U.S.C. § 2254........................................................... 12

42 U.S.C. § 1983........................................................... 13

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702-208 ........................................... 16

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-701.5 .......................................... 2

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-702 ............................................. 2

Sup. Ct. R. 10 ......................................................... 13, 17

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 19-1153

RUSSELL A. SUZUKI, ET AL., PETITIONERS

CHRISTOPHER DEEDY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The amended opinion of the court of appeals (Pet.

App. 3-7) is unpublished but is available at 788 Fed.

Appx. 549. The original opinion of the court of appeals

is unpublished but is available at 783 Fed. Appx. 780.

The order of the district court (Pet. App. 8-52) is

reported at 326 F. Supp. 3d 1022.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was initially

entered on November 7, 2019 (Pet. App. 1). The court

of appeals issued an amended opinion on December

20, 2019, and a petition for rehearing was denied on

the same date (Pet. App. 1-2). The petition for a writ

of certiorari was filed on March 18, 2020. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

STATEMENT

At respondent’s first trial for second-degree

murder, the state trial court ruled that there was not

“any evidence to support manslaughter” and refused

(1)

to instruct the jury on that lesser-included offense.

Pet. App. 12. That trial ended without a verdict, and

respondent was later acquitted of second-degree

murder after a new trial. Respondent moved to

dismiss his case because the Double Jeopardy Clause

bars retrying him on lesser-included offenses of which

the court acquitted him at his first trial. The trial

court denied that motion, and the state supreme court

affirmed. A federal district court later granted

respondent habeas relief barring his retrial on the

manslaughter charge. The court of appeals affirmed

in relevant part.

1. Respondent was a diplomatic security officer

with the U.S. Department of State. While off duty

during a summit in Honolulu, he fatally shot a man

during an incident at a restaurant. Pet. App. 10. Respondent maintains that he acted in self-defense, and

that his actions were necessary to protect himself and

others. State v. Deedy, 407 P.3d 164, 183 (Haw. 2017).

State prosecutors charged respondent with seconddegree murder and using a firearm to commit that

offense. Pet. App. 10. Under Hawaii law, seconddegree murder occurs when a person intentionally or

knowingly causes the death of another. Haw. Rev.

Stat. § 707-701.5. Manslaughter is a lesser-included

offense, see State v. Knight, 909 P.2d 1133, 1139

(Haw. 1996), that occurs when a person recklessly

causes the death of another, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707702. Hawaii juries must be instructed on lesserincluded offenses whenever “there is a rational basis

in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant

of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of

the included offense.” State v. Flores, 314 P.3d 120,

128 (Haw. 2013). By contrast, when there is a rational

evidentiary basis for a jury to find that a defendant

acted intentionally, but not to find that he acted

recklessly, then courts do not give a manslaughter

instruction on a second-degree-murder charge. State

v. Austin, 422 P.3d 18, 38-39 (Haw. 2018).

2. a. At respondent’s first trial, prosecutors argued

that respondent intentionally fired the fatal shot. Pet.

App. 12. Respondent did not dispute that he intended

to shoot the decedent, but contended that he did so

only in self-defense. With respondent’s intent not in

dispute, prosecutors and respondent both “specifically

objected to instructing the jury on reckless manslaughter.” Ibid.

The trial court agreed. It held that there was not

“any evidence to support manslaughter.” Pet. App. 12.

The court therefore instructed the jury only on seconddegree murder, and not on manslaughter or assault.

Id. at 13. Ultimately, respondent’s first jury was

unable to reach a verdict, resulting in a mistrial. Ibid.

b. Hawaii retried respondent. Pet. App. 14. At

respondent’s second trial, respondent moved to bar

any jury instruction on manslaughter or assault,

arguing that the trial court’s instructional ruling at

his first trial had acquitted him of those offenses. Ibid.

Prosecutors acknowledged that the instructional

ruling was “based on the evidence presented in the

first trial,” id. at 42 n.18, and reasserted the state’s

“same position that there’s not a rational basis in the

evidence to support the giving of the manslaughter

instruction,” id. at 16-17.

This time, however, the trial court overruled the

parties’ joint objection to instructing the jury on

lesser-included offenses. Pet. App. 17. The court

concluded that its prior ruling had not acquitted

respondent of any offenses because that ruling had

not amounted to “a resolution or determination of

guilt or innocence.” Id. at 18. The trial court went on

to instruct respondent’s second jury on manslaughter

and assault, as well as second-degree murder. Ibid.

That jury acquitted respondent of second-degree

murder, but deadlocked on the other offenses. Ibid.

c. Anticipating a third trial, respondent moved to

dismiss his indictment, renewing his double-jeopardy

objection to being retried for manslaughter or assault.

The trial court denied respondent’s motion by minute

order and certified an interlocutory appeal. That

appeal was transferred to the Hawaii Supreme Court,

which affirmed in a divided decision. The supreme

court majority held that the trial court’s ruling at

respondent’s first trial had been procedural and was

not an acquittal on manslaughter or assault. Pet. App.

19; see also Deedy, 407 P.3d at 176. The supreme court

remanded for further proceedings, and the trial court

set a new trial date.

3. a. Following the Hawaii Supreme Court’s

decision, respondent petitioned for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States

District Court for the District of Hawaii. Pet. App. 21.

The habeas petition asked the district court to bar

respondent’s further prosecution for manslaughter

and assault on double-jeopardy grounds, and to

discharge him from bail and other conditions of his

pretrial release. Ibid.

The district court granted the writ. Pet. App. 37.

The court started by affirming its subject-matter

jurisdiction over respondent’s Section 2241 petition.

Id. at 27-35. Petitioners contended that the district

court lacked jurisdiction because the state supreme

court had denied respondent’s double-jeopardy

challenge. Id. at 28. The district court disagreed,

explaining that Section 2241 “provides generally for

the granting of writs of habeas corpus by federal

courts.” Ibid. (quoting Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724,

735 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). All courts of appeals to

have addressed the issue, it observed, “have uniformly

held that a pretrial petition seeking to preclude a retrial is properly brought pursuant to § 2241.” Id. at 29

n.12. The court also relied on Justices of Boston

Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 (1984), in

which this Court affirmed a district court’s assertion

of habeas jurisdiction over a double-jeopardy

challenge to retrial on grounds that a state’s highest

court had rejected, id. at 299-303. Pet. App. 28.

The court also rejected petitioners’ “muddled

application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine” as being

“entirely without merit or even practical sense.” Pet.

App. 29-30. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court

explained, generally “bars a losing party in state court

from seeking what amounts to appellate review of [a]

state-court judgment in federal court based on the

losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself

violates the loser’s federal rights.” Id. at 29 n.13

(citing Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415416 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-486 (1983)). But “it is

well-established” and “beyond serious dispute,” the

district court emphasized, “that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not touch the writ of habeas corpus.” Id.

at 32-33. The district court pointed to this Court’s

recognition, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 n.8 (2005), that, by

“authorizing federal habeas review,” Congress has

“explicitly empower[ed] district courts to oversee

certain state-court judgments.” Pet. App. 33 n.16.

On the merits, the district court held that the trial

court acquitted respondent of manslaughter and

assault at his first trial, and that the Double Jeopardy

Clause bars retrying him on those offenses. Pet. App.

40. The district court relied on Evans v. Michigan, 568

U.S. 313 (2013), in which this Court held that “‘any

ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to

establish criminal liability for an offense’ is an

acquittal that precludes retrial.” Pet. App. 38 (quoting

568 U.S. at 318).

The district court reviewed the trial court’s

colloquy with counsel at respondent’s first trial,

during which the court “declared ‘I don’t think there’s

any evidence to support manslaughter’” and declined

to instruct the jury on that offense. Pet. App. 41; see

also id. at 12-13, 40-48. The court recognized that

Hawaii law requires courts to instruct juries on any

lesser-included offenses with a rational basis in the

evidence. Id. at 40-41. “Notwithstanding this

obligation,” the district court explained, the trial court

had “declined to instruct the jury on lesser included

offenses, including reckless manslaughter, because

the evidence was insufficient to do so.” Id. at 41. The

district court therefore concluded that the trial court’s

“instructional ruling during the first trial,

determining that there was no rational basis in the

evidence to give an instruction on reckless manslaughter, was necessarily a determination that the

evidence was insufficient to establish [respondent’s]

criminal liability for the lesser offenses. That, under

Evans, is an acquittal.” Id. at 47.

The court rejected petitioners’ contention that the

trial court’s instructional ruling had been too

“informal” to constitute an acquittal. Pet. App. 43-45.

The court observed that the ruling was made on the

record and in open court. Id. at 44. In any event, it

explained, “neither the label of the ruling, nor the

perceived formality of the proceeding[,] matters.” Ibid.

What matters, the court reasoned, is that the trial

court’s “decision was based upon its substantive view

of the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 45.

The district court also rejected petitioners’

argument that the trial court’s characterization of its

prior ruling as not having acquitted respondent is

controlling. Pet. App. 45-47. “Evans makes clear,” the

court explained, “that even if the [trial] court believes

in hindsight that it was erroneous to find that the

evidence did not support submitting reckless

manslaughter to the jury, that ruling was nonetheless

an acquittal.” Id. at 46.

b. The court of appeals affirmed in part and

reversed in part in an unpublished memorandum

decision. Pet. App. 4. To begin with, the court of

appeals held that the “Rooker-Feldman doctrine did

not bar the district court from exercising jurisdiction

over the § 2241 petition.” Ibid. The court of appeals

cited its prior decision rejecting Hawaii’s contrary

position in Gouveia v. Espinda, 926 F.3d 1102, 11071110 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 814 (Jan.

13, 2020).

On the merits, the court of appeals agreed with the

district court that respondent was acquitted of manslaughter at his first trial, and that the Double

Jeopardy Clause therefore precludes retrying him on

that charge. Pet. App. 4. The court of appeals determined that Hawaii’s requirement that courts instruct

juries on lesser-included offenses that have a rational

evidentiary basis means that the trial court’s ruling

that there was “no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction” was a conclusion that the

state’s evidence was not sufficient to establish

respondent’s liability for that offense. Id. at 5. That is

an acquittal, the court of appeals held, regardless of

what the trial court labeled it or even if it “might have

been (according to the State) wrong.” Ibid. (citing

Evans, 568 U.S. at 318, 325).

The court of appeals reversed the district court’s

grant of habeas relief barring respondent’s retrial for

assault based on a prior acquittal of that offense. Pet.

App. 6. The court of appeals concluded that it had

been “legally unclear,” at the time of respondent’s first

trial, whether assault was a lesser-included offense of

second-degree murder. Ibid. The court held that the

trial court’s implicit decision not to instruct respondent’s first jury on assault therefore did not acquit

him of it. Ibid.

Respondent sought panel rehearing, and both

petitioners and respondent sought rehearing en banc.

Pet. App. 1-2. The petitions were denied, ibid., but the

panel amended its original opinion to allow the

district court to consider on remand whether respondent’s retrial for assault should be barred based on

abandonment or estoppel, id. at 6. Judge Smith

concurred in part and dissented in part from the

amended opinion. He agreed that respondent had

been acquitted of the manslaughter charge, but

disagreed with the panel majority that there was

anything left for the district court to decide on remand

about the assault offense. Id. at 7.1

1 On remand, the district court denied respondent a writ of

habeas corpus barring his retrial for first- and second-degree

assault. Deedy v. Connors, No. 18-cv-00094, 2020 WL 1815219

(D. Haw. Apr. 9, 2020). The court granted a certificate of

appealability, id. at *1, and respondent’s appeal is pending,

Deedy v. Espinda, No. 20-15816 (9th Cir.).

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioners renew their contention (Pet. 12-19)

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested the

district court of jurisdiction to adjudicate respondent’s

habeas petition. The court of appeals correctly

rejected that contention, and the decision below does

not conflict with any decision of this Court or another

court of appeals. This Court recently denied review in

the case on which the court below relied in rejecting

petitioners’ argument, see Espinda v. Gouveia, 140

S. Ct. 814 (2020) (No. 19-516), and the same result is

warranted here.

a. The court of appeals was unquestionably correct

in upholding the district court’s jurisdiction over

respondent’s habeas petition. The general federal

habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, empowers the

federal district courts to grant relief to a habeas

petitioner who “is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”

Id. § 2241(c)(3). Under this Court’s cases, it is “clear

that ‘the use of habeas corpus has not been restricted

to situations in which the applicant is in actual,

physical custody.”’ Justices of Boston Mun. Court v.

Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300 (1984) (quoting Jones v.

Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963)). Rather, the

federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction extends to those

habeas petitioners, like respondent, who have been

released on pretrial conditions. See ibid. The district

court thus had jurisdiction under Section 2241 to

adjudicate respondent’s request for habeas relief.

Petitioners’ contrary view rests on the RookerFeldman doctrine (see District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.

Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)), which treats

this Court’s statutory jurisdiction to exercise appellate review over state-court judgments, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257, as implicitly withdrawing jurisdiction from

the federal district courts “to review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp.

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005).

The premise of petitioners’ argument is that, by

barring respondent’s retrial for manslaughter, the

district court exercised “appellate jurisdiction” and

“reverse[d] the judgment” of the Hawaii Supreme

Court that had rejected respondent’s double-jeopardy

claim. Pet. 4; see also id. at 9 (contending that “the

district court reversed the Hawai’i Supreme Court’s

decision”); id. at 13 (arguing that respondent’s

petition “invit[ed] the [district] court to review and

invalidate the decision rendered by the Hawai’i

Supreme Court”).

That incorrect premise fundamentally misunderstands the nature of federal habeas review. The writ

of habeas corpus vindicates “the right of personal

liberty,” by empowering the federal courts to order a

habeas petitioner’s release from unlawful custody.

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-431 (1963). The federal

court “can act only on the body of the [habeas]

petitioner”; “it cannot revise the state court

judgment.” Id. at 431. For that reason, a federal

habeas petition is not within the limited category of

cases governed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—

i.e., “cases brought by state-court losers complaining

of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and

inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.

Of course, district courts exercising habeas jurisdiction routinely address legal issues that state courts

previously decided, as was the case here when the

district court resolved respondent’s double-jeopardy

claim. In fact, habeas petitioners generally must

exhaust available state remedies before they file a

Section 2241 petition. See, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal

Court, 411 U.S. 345, 353 (1973); Ex Parte Royall, 117

U.S. 241, 252-253 (1886). It is therefore commonplace

for state courts to have rejected a habeas petitioner’s

constitutional claim before he seeks federal relief. In

Lydon, for example, this Court upheld a district

court’s exercise of habeas jurisdiction to decide a

pretrial detainee’s double-jeopardy claim after the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had rejected

it. See 466 U.S. at 298-303.2

That routine feature of habeas review does not

convert it into appellate review of state-court

judgments. To the contrary, nothing in the RookerFeldman doctrine “stop[s] a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a

party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter

previously litigated in state court.” Exxon Mobil, 544

U.S. at 293. In that setting, the law of preclusion

governs the effect of the state court’s decision, but

does not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction to

proceed. Ibid. And it is well-settled that a state court’s

Petitioners appear to argue (Pet. 15-16) that the court of

appeals created a special exemption from the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine for double-jeopardy claims, which petitioners argue

“runs afoul” of this Court’s statement in Lydon, 466 U.S. at 302

n.2, that the same custody standard applies to habeas petitions

pressing double-jeopardy claims as to other habeas petitions.

That is incorrect. The court of appeals held that the RookerFeldman doctrine was inapplicable because the district court had

jurisdiction to grant habeas relief conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 2241,

not because of the nature of respondent’s claims.

prior decision on federal constitutional issues is not

res judicata in a subsequent federal habeas case.

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).3

b. Petitioners are incorrect in contending (Pet. 16)

that the court of appeals’ decision is an “outlier”

among contrary decisions of other circuits. To the

contrary, the courts of appeals regularly decide

appeals from habeas judgments involving petitions

that assert double-jeopardy claims previously rejected

by state courts. See, e.g., Seay v. Cannon, 927 F.3d 776

(4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-311, 2020 WL

1496785 (Mar. 30, 2020); Marshall v. Bristol Superior

Court, 753 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2014); Hoffer v. Bezio, 726

F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013); Phillips v. Court of Common

Pleas, 668 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2012); Martinez v.

Caldwell, 644 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2011); Walck v.

Edmundson, 472 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2007).

Petitioners rely (Pet. 17-19) on Campbell v. City of

Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2012), as having

“applied the teaching of Exxon” in a way that conflicts

with the decision below. But there is no conflict. The

3 In most cases, a criminal defendant must await the

conclusion of state court proceedings before seeking federal

habeas relief, and thus may face the additional limitations on

habeas relief set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That result, however,

is not the product of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but rather of

the holding in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that a

federal court generally may not interfere with an ongoing state

criminal prosecution. See id. at 49. Younger does not apply here,

though, because a “claim that a state prosecution will violate the

Double Jeopardy Clause presents an exception” to its abstention

rule, Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1992);

see also, e.g., Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1234 (10th

Cir. 2007); Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 904-905 (4th Cir.

1996), and petitioners do not contend that Younger barred the

district court from adjudicating respondent’s double-jeopardy

claim in this case.

Tenth Circuit in Campbell held that the RookerFeldman doctrine barred a civil rights suit, filed

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging as “unlawful” a

state court order authorizing the seizure of plaintiff’s

horses. 682 F.3d at 1284. Because Campbell did not

involve a habeas petition, it does not conflict with the

court of appeals’ decision in this case upholding the

district court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate respondent’s

request for habeas relief.

Petitioners also suggest (Pet. 16-17) that two

district court opinions deviate from the decision

below. As an initial matter, district court decisions are

not precedential and thus do not create a conflict

warranting this Court’s review. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).

In any event, the cited decisions are consistent with

the decision below. The unpublished order in Neal v.

Johnson, No. 09-cv-458, 2009 WL 10702285 (E.D. Va.

July 27, 2009), dismissed a state prisoner’s postconviction Section 2241 petition because “the exclusive remedy for habeas review of his state

convictions is under § 2254.” Id. at *1. The court

recognized that “§ 2241(c) extends federal habeas

relief over state pretrial detainees,” such as

respondent here. Ibid. The district court’s decision in

Niles v. Wilshire Investment Group, LLC, 859 F. Supp.

2d 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), involved the dismissal of a

lawsuit asking the court “to review, reject, and

overturn the results” of various state-court foreclosure, conservatorship, and probate proceedings

because those proceedings had themselves been a

“vast scheme and conspiracy” of “manipulating and

subverting the judicial system.” Id. at 318. The

unique, non-habeas circumstances in Niles are

irrelevant to the question presented here.

2. Petitioners also challenge (Pet. 19-24) the court

of appeals’ holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause

bars retrying respondent for manslaughter because

the trial court acquitted him of that offense at his first

trial. Petitioners’ fact-bound contention lacks merit,

and no further review of the court of appeals’

unpublished decision is warranted.

The Double Jeopardy Clause ensures that “once a

person has been acquitted of an offense he cannot be

prosecuted again on the same charge.” Green v.

United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192 (1957). As this Court

explained in Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013),

an “acquittal” is defined broadly in the doublejeopardy context “to encompass any ruling that the

prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal

liability for an offense.” Id. at 318 (emphasis added).

Unlike “[p]rocedural dismissals * * * unrelated to

factual guilt or innocence,” those “substantive rulings”

are “merits-related” and thus serve to “conclude[ ]

proceedings absolutely” against a person on a given

offense. Id. at 319.

In the decision below, the court of appeals correctly

identified Evans as stating the relevant legal rule, see

Pet. App. 4, and properly applied that rule to the

particular circumstances of this case. The court of

appeals analyzed the trial court’s colloquy with

counsel at respondent’s first trial and observed that

the trial court had “explicitly stated that there was no

evidence in the record to support instructing the jury

on manslaughter.” Id. at 4-5. As the court of appeals

correctly explained, Hawaii law “requires trial courts

to instruct juries on any lesser-included offense that

has ‘a rational basis in the evidence,’ regardless of

whether ‘the prosecution requests, or the defense

objects to, such an instruction.’” Id. at 5. (quoting

State v. Adviento, 319 P.3d 1131, 1148 (Haw. 2014)).

Because “manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of

second-degree murder,” the trial court’s finding that

“there was no evidence to support a manslaughter

instruction” when “refusing to instruct the jury on

manslaughter” was necessarily a “determinat[ion]

that the State’s proof was insufficient to establish

[respondent’s] criminal liability for that offense.”

Ibid.; see Evans, 568 U.S. at 318.

Petitioners nevertheless contend (Pet. 22) that the

trial court’s ruling could not have been an acquittal

because it was “unsolicited” and not in response to a

“motion or request” for acquittal from respondent. In

the double-jeopardy context, however, the relevant

question is “whether the ruling of the judge, whatever

its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or

not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense

charged.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,

430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (emphasis added). Thus, it is

“the substance of a court’s decision” that “control[s].”

Evans, 568 U.S. at 322. For the reasons explained

above, the substance of the trial court’s ruling was

that the prosecution had failed to introduce sufficient

proof of manslaughter. The court of appeals was thus

correct that “[i]t does not matter that the trial court

did not label the ruling an ‘acquittal.’” Pet. App. 5.

Petitioners invoke (Pet. 22-23) this Court’s

characterization, in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625

(1980), of the requirement that a jury in a capital case

be instructed on lesser-included offenses that are

supported by the evidence as a “procedural safeguard.” Id. at 637. But that characterization has no

logical bearing on the double-jeopardy issue presented

here. A defendant’s entitlement to a lesser-includedoffense instruction is a procedural safeguard because

it avoids presenting the jury with an all-or-nothing

choice that “create[s] the risk of an unwarranted

conviction.” California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1007

(1983). In this case, by contrast, the trial court

declined to instruct the jury on the lesser-included

offense of manslaughter because it concluded that the

prosecution’s evidence did not support that charge.

That was a substantive ruling on the adequacy of the

prosecution’s proof and therefore constitutes an

acquittal for double-jeopardy purposes.

Petitioners also appear to contend (Pet. 23-24) that

the trial court’s ruling was not an acquittal for doublejeopardy purposes because the trial court erred in

concluding at respondent’s first trial that there was

insufficient evidence to instruct the jury on

manslaughter. Petitioners observe that, under Haw.

Rev. Stat. § 702-208, evidence of intentional or

knowing conduct is legally sufficient to establish a

reckless state of mind. Notwithstanding that statute,

however, the Hawaii Supreme Court has held that

trial evidence can fail to “provide a rational basis for

a verdict acquitting [defendant] of murder in the

second degree and instead finding him guilty of * * *

manslaughter.” State v. Austin, 422 P.3d 18, 39 (Haw.

2018). Moreover, even if petitioners were correct that

the trial court’s ruling was mistaken, that would be

irrelevant for double-jeopardy purposes, as the court

of appeals correctly held. See Pet. App. 5. “[T]he fact

that the acquittal may result from * * * erroneous

interpretations of governing legal principles * * * does

not alter its essential character.” Evans, 568 U.S. at

318 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98

(1978)); see also Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571.

In any event, petitioners do not argue that the

court of appeals’ resolution of respondent’s double-

jeopardy claim conflicts with a decision of any other

court, or even that the decision implicates any legal

issue of general applicability. Instead, petitioners

challenge only the court of appeals’ application of a

properly stated legal rule to the particular circumstances of this case, including the trial court’s colloquy

with counsel at respondent’s first trial and Hawaii’s

relevant substantive and procedural law. Petitioners’

fact-bound disagreement with the court of appeals’

non-precedential decision merits no further review.

See Sup. Ct. R. 10.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted.