Reply Brief — Jimcy McGirt, Petitioner v. Oklahoma
Supreme Court briefApr 10, 2020
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No. 18-9526
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
_________
JIMCY MCGIRT,
Petitioner,
v.
OKLAHOMA,
Respondent.
________
On Writ of Certiorari
to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
________
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
________
IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN
Counsel of Record
ZACHARY C. SCHAUF
ALLISON M. TJEMSLAND*
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Ave., NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 639-6000
igershengorn@jenner.com
*Not admitted in D.C.;
supervised by principals of the
Firm
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................... iii
INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 1
ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 3
I.
II.
The Creek Nation Had A Reservation................ 3
A.
The Creek Were Given A
“Reservation.”............................................. 3
B.
The Creek Domain Is Not A
“Dependent Indian Community.” ............ 7
C.
Oklahoma’s “Dependent Indian
Community” Theory Does Not
Explain Post-Statehood Events. ............ 10
Congress Never Disestablished The Creek
Reservation. .......................................................... 11
A.
No Text Disestablished The Creek
Reservation. .............................................. 12
B.
Oklahoma’s “Context” Arguments
Fail. ............................................................. 16
C.
Oklahoma’s “Subsequent History”
Arguments Fail......................................... 18
III.
Congress Did Not Transfer To Oklahoma
Jurisdiction Over The Creek Reservation........ 20
IV.
Oklahoma’s Claims About Consequences
Are Overstated. .................................................... 24
CONCLUSION ................................................................ 26
ii
ADDENDUM
Quit Claim Deed from the City of Tulsa to
C.W. Robertson, Sr. (June 25, 1906),
available from http://www.countyclerk.
tulsacounty.org/Home/Land ............................... 1a
Quit Claim Deed from the City of Tulsa to
Dane M. Jackson (Jan. 28, 2019), available
from http://www.countyclerk.tulsacounty.
org/Home/Land ..................................................... 3a
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) ........................ 7, 8
Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Mingus, 165
U.S. 413 (1897) ........................................................... 6
Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877) ................................ 7
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).............. 15
Cherokee Nation v. Journeycake, 155 U.S. 196
(1894) .......................................................................... 6
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of
New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) .............................. 25
DeCoteau v. District County Court for Tenth
Judicial District, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) .................. 14
Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193
U.S. 127 (1904) ........................................................... 6
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) ...... 4, 5
Dowell v. School Board of Oklahoma City
Public Schools, 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D.
Okla. 1963)................................................................ 23
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) ............................ 12
Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.D.C.
1976), aff’d, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ........... 15
Henry v. City of Muskogee, 986 P.2d 1151
(Okla. Civ. App. 1999) ............................................ 14
iv
Hydro Resources, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 608 F.3d
1131 (10th Cir. 2010) ..............................................7-8
Maxey v. Wright, 54 S.W. 807 (Indian Terr.
1900) ............................................................................ 6
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373 (1902) .............. 4
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) .......... 6
Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904)................... 14
Mosier v. Momsen, 74 P. 905 (Okla. 1903) ................. 14
Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir.
2017) ............................................................................ 3
Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072
(2016) ...................................................... 12, 17, 18, 25
Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of
New York, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) .............................. 16
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60
(1962) ........................................................................ 16
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584
(1977) ........................................................................ 12
Scott v. Epperson, 284 P. 19 (Okla. 1930) .............22-23
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).................. 12, 17
Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394 (1896).................. 9
State v. Romero, 142 P.3d 887 (N.M. 2006) ............... 10
The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761
(1866) .......................................................................... 9
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909) .... 4, 16
v
United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103
(1935) .......................................................................... 9
United States v. Elliott, 131 F.2d 720 (10th Cir.
1942) ............................................................................ 5
United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978).............. 3, 7
United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535
(1938) .......................................................................... 8
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) ....... 8, 9
Winebrenner v. Forney, 189 U.S. 148 (1903) .............. 6
STATUTES
Act of Feb. 28, 1809, 2 Stat. 527 .................................... 9
Act of May 26, 1824, 4 Stat. 75 ...................................... 9
Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 ...................... 5
Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 740 ................................... 9
Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 322, 17 Stat. 626 ..................... 4
Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81 ...................... 22
Act of Feb. 13, 1891, 26 Stat. 749 .................................. 4
Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62 ......................... 21
Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 676, 31 Stat. 861
(“Allotment Agreement”) ................................ 13, 14
Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137
(“Five Tribes Act”) ................................................. 19
Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 183 .................. 24
Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267
(“Enabling Act”) ............................................... 22, 23
vi
Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325 ............... 19
Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2911, 34 Stat. 1286 ............... 23
Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312 .................. 19
Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 ............... 19
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 18......................................... 14
Okla. R.L. § 1170 (1911) ............................................... 14
Treaty between United States and Cherokee
Nation, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799 .......................... 4
Treaty with the Creeks, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat.
366 ............................................................................... 5
Treaty with the Creeks, Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat.
417 ............................................................................... 5
Treaty with the Creek, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat.
785 ............................................................................... 4
Treaty with the Weas, Oct. 2, 1818, 7 Stat. 186.......... 9
Treaty with the Wyandots, etc., Sept. 29, 1817,
7 Stat. 160................................................................... 6
LEGISLATIVE M ATERIALS
47 Cong. Globe (1873) ..................................................... 6
11 Cong. Rec. 2351 (1881) .............................................. 6
16 Cong. Rec. 934 (1885) .............................................. 11
40 Cong. Rec. 2977 (1906) ............................................ 17
S. Doc. 54-111, 2d Sess. (1897)..................................... 17
S. Doc. 59-143, 1st. Sess. (1906)..................................... 7
vii
Statehood for Oklahoma: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on the Territories, 58th Cong.
(1904) ........................................................................ 17
OTHER A UTHORITIES
Brief for Petitioners, Nebraska v. Parker, 136
S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14–1406)............................ 17
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Oklahoma v.
Brooks, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989) (No. 88-1147) ......... 26
Angie Debo, And Still the Waters Run (1940) ......... 18
Department of the Interior, Census Office,
Report on Indians Taxed and Indians Not
Taxed in the U.S. (1894) .......................................... 7
Mansfield’s Digest of Statutes of Arkansas, ch.
29 (1884) ................................................................... 21
Petition for Certiorari, Oklahoma v. Brooks,
490 U.S. 1031 (1989) (No. 88-1147) ......................... 3
1
INTRODUCTION
After six briefs and argument in Murphy, Oklahoma
has relegated to last the one argument it pressed there
(disestablishment). It leads with a brand-new argument
(Creek lands were a “dependent Indian community,”
never a reservation) that contradicts concessions it
made in Murphy and that the Solicitor General cannot
countenance. Then, Oklahoma follows with an argument
it declined to press previously (Congress transferred
jurisdiction even over reservations), before closing with
the old stand-by that the sky will fall unless Oklahoma
gets its way.
Oklahoma can shift arguments, but it cannot dodge
the fundamental principles that foreclose its position.
Decisions about sovereign rights—when to terminate
treaty promises and how to transfer jurisdiction among
competing sovereigns—are for Congress. And Congress
makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text.
Oklahoma loses because, on each argument, the text
refutes its position.
First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The
relevant treaties “solemnly guaranteed” lands for the
Creek to govern, and both treaty and statute identified
those lands as a “reservation.” Nothing more was
needed. That is especially true because this Court reads
treaties as the Indians would have done. Here, after the
Creek insisted on fee patents to bolster their treaty
promises of a separate domain, they surely understood
that their march on the Trail of Tears would yield at
least the protections other reservations enjoyed, not the
rump Indian lands that Oklahoma reimagines.
2
Second, Congress did not disestablish that
reservation. The problem is not that Congress forgot to
use “magic words.”
It is that Congress had
disestablishment language at hand and chose not to use
it. Congress considered the “cession” language it had
used before in diminishing the Creek reservation and in
instructing the Dawes Commission, but acceded to
Creek resistance and merely allotted Creek land among
members. Likewise, Congress preserved the Creek
government “in full force and effect for all purposes
authorized by law”—precisely to prevent the lands from
entering the public domain.
Oklahoma and Tulsa argue that statutory text
accomplished disestablishment when it required the
Creek to convey to allottees “all [its] right, title and
interest” in the land. Nonsense. That is boilerplate deed
language identical to that used—at statehood and
today—by Oklahoma and its cities, including Tulsa itself,
when conveying property to private parties. Surely
Tulsa does not diminish city limits with every land sale.
As for Oklahoma’s assertion that cession and allotment
were essentially the same, that is not textual
interpretation but wishful thinking.
Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction
when Oklahoma became a State. At statehood, the
Major Crimes Act (“MCA”) established exclusive
federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes by Indians
on reservations in “any State.”
When Congress
overrides the MCA and cedes jurisdiction to a State, it
does so expressly. Oklahoma and the Solicitor General
identify no statutes that uniquely exempted Oklahoma
from the MCA; indeed, the relevant text treats
3
Oklahoma just like its sister States. No surprise, then,
that Oklahoma’s state and federal courts have rejected
this argument for 30 years.
Finally, Oklahoma and the Solicitor General contend
that adhering to text will yield disruption. But little
evidence backs the rhetoric. Indeed, 30 years ago, they
made near-identical claims about half-a-million acres of
Oklahoma’s Indian lands, prophesying a “return to the
state of lawlessness which Congress attempted to
alleviate as early as 1889.” Cert. Pet. at 45, Oklahoma v.
Brooks (No. 88-1147). Yet the sky did not fall.
ARGUMENT
I.
The Creek Nation Had A Reservation.
In Murphy, Oklahoma did “not dispute that the
[Creek] reservation was intact in 1900.” Murphy v.
Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 954 (10th Cir. 2017). Now, however,
Oklahoma (though not the United States) claims the
Creek’s domain was “a dependent Indian community,
not a reservation.” Br. 1. With this relabeling,
Oklahoma would duck Parker and substitute a test
under which allotment alone disestablishes. Br. 14-16.
This maneuver fails.
A.
The Creek Were Given A “Reservation.”
Oklahoma barely tries to square its new story with
the statutory text or the amicus briefs addressing this
point. MCN Br. 5-11; NCAI Br. 4-13. Today’s “Indian
country” definition, which includes “reservation” lands,
dates from 1948. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648
(1978). The best evidence of what Congress understood
“Indian country” to encompass is that, in treaties and
4
statutes before 1948, Congress had identified Creek
lands as a “reservation.” After the Creek ceded certain
lands, an 1866 treaty recognized a “reduced Creek
Reservation.” 1866 Treaty art. IX; see Pet’r Br. 6.
Another 1866 treaty did the same, Treaty between
United States and Cherokee Nation, July 19, 1866, art.
IV, 14 Stat. 799, as did an 1873 statute directing
negotiation of a cession from “the Creek reservation,”
Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 322, 17 Stat. 626, and an 1891
statute describing a cession by referencing the “West
boundary line of the Creek Reservation,” Act of Feb. 13,
1891, 26 Stat. 749, 750.
Oklahoma has zero evidence that Congress in 1948
intended to narrow “reservation” to exclude lands
Congress previously identified as such. Cf. U.S. Br. 36
(rejecting suggestion that the 1948 codification effected
a significant substantive change).
Oklahoma also
identifies zero statutes that exclude Creek lands from
“reservation” status; the only statute it cites referred to
the “five civilized tribes[’]” lands as “Indian country”
without saying they were not reservations. Br. 10.
This conclusion accords with this Court’s broad
understanding of the term “reservation.” Long ago, this
Court rejected a technical definition restricting that
term to lands reserved from cessions of a tribe’s
aboriginal lands. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243, 269 (1913). Instead, a “reservation” “describe[s] any
body of land … reserved … from sale for any purpose.”
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909); see
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 390 (1902) (“it is
enough that from what has been done there results a
5
certain defined tract appropriated to certain purposes”).
Here, from public-domain lands ceded by the
Quapaw and Osage, the United States by treaty
“establish[ed] boundary lines [to] secure a … permanent
home to the whole Creek nation”—“solemnly
guarant[eeing] to the Creek” those lands, with the right
“to govern themselves.” 1832 Treaty art. XIV; 1833
Treaty, Preamble, art. II; see Pet’r Br. 5; MCN Br. 6-8.
Had the treaties stopped there, no one could dispute that
Congress had created a “reservation.” Cf. Donnelly, 228
U.S. at 269 (“nothing can more appropriately be deemed
‘Indian country’ … than a tract of land that, being a part
of the public domain, is lawfully set apart as an Indian
reservation”).
Oklahoma, however, says that because the United
States secured these lands by also issuing a patent, the
Creek lack a reservation and forfeit Parker’s
protections. Br. 12. The text shows that argument is
wrong. By statute and treaty, the patent was an
additional layer of protection, which the Indian
Removal Act authorized the Creek to receive “if they
prefer.” Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, § 3, 4 Stat. 411. It
did not even issue until 1852. Pet’r Br. 6. Tulsa’s
assertion that “the fee patent … is the foundation of the
land’s Indian country status,” Tulsa Br. 18-19, is thus
baloney. See United States v. Elliott, 131 F.2d 720, 724
(10th Cir. 1942) (“The primary basis for the grant to the
Cherokee Nation was the treaty. The patent was only a
confirmation thereof.”).
Meanwhile, prior treaties had created reservations
6
(and referred to them as such) by providing for feesimple patents. NCAI Br. 11; see, e.g., Treaty with the
Wyandots, etc., arts. VI, X, XX, Sept. 29, 1817, 7 Stat.
160. No Creek in 1832 could have fathomed that, by
accepting a backstop fee patent, the Nation would lose
protections.
Indeed, it wasn’t just Congress that understood
Creek lands as a reservation.
What Oklahoma
disparages as “[i]solated, colloquial references,” Br. 13,
include this Court’s contemporaneous statement that it
had “no doubt” that a statute governing “reserved”
lands applied to Indian Territory “reservations,” Atl. &
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mingus, 165 U.S. 413, 435, 440 (1897),
and the Court of Appeals for the Indian Territory’s
declaration that the “contention that the Creek Nation
is not now an Indian reservation is not tenable,” Maxey
v. Wright, 54 S.W. 807, 810 (Indian Terr. 1900). Accord
Cherokee Nation v. Journeycake, 155 U.S. 196, 205-07,
212-16 (1894) (Cherokee “reservation”); Winebrenner v.
Forney, 189 U.S. 148, 152 (1903); Delaware Indians v.
Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127, 139 (1904); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 555 n.5 (1981). Myriad
congressional and executive documents, including
Oklahoma’s own, reflect the same view. NCAI Br. 8-9;
47 Cong. Globe 763-64 (1873); 11 Cong. Rec. 2351 (1881);
infra 7-8.
By contrast, Oklahoma’s motley non-statutory
sources only elevate the Five Tribes’ lands over other
reservations. An 1894 Census Report says that the Five
Tribes’ lands were not “ordinary Indian reservations”—
then refers to the “Chickasaw … Cherokee, … Creek,”
7
and “Choctaw … reservation[s],” and identifies in maps
the Five Tribes’ lands as within “[b]oundar[ies] of Indian
[r]eservations.” Dep’t of Interior, Census Office, Report
on Indians Taxed and Indians Not Taxed in the U.S. at
242, 252, 261, 284 (1894). Likewise, when a Choctaw
chief “object[ed] to being classified with the reservation
Indians,” it was because he viewed the Choctaw as “selfsustaining”—while acknowledging that the “tendency to
classify [Indian Territory] Indians” as “reservation
Indians” was “widespread” and “prevail[ed] even in
Congress.” S. Doc. 59-143, 1st. Sess. at 33 (1906).1
B.
The Creek Domain Is Not A “Dependent
Indian Community.”
Oklahoma cannot dodge Solem and Parker by
recharacterizing Creek lands as a “dependent Indian
community.” Oklahoma emphasizes that the Creek
domain “originally” met the two requirements for a
“dependent Indian community”—federal set-aside and
superintendence. Br. 11. That, however, shows nothing:
All reservations at inception met these requirements,
see Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522
U.S. 520, 527 (1998), but that does not make them
“dependent Indian communities” or render Solem and
Parker inapplicable. Rather, this term is a “catch-all,”
Hydro Res., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 608 F.3d 1131, 1157, 1159
1 Oklahoma errs in suggesting that the test of Bates v. Clark, 95
U.S. 204 (1877)—tying “Indian country” status to Indian title—
applies because it governed when the Creek received their
reservation. Br. 9. This Court has rejected Bates’ “more technical
and limited definition,” John, 437 U.S. at 649, and applied Solem to
19th-century reservations.
8
(10th Cir. 2010) (Gorsuch, J.), for “a limited category of
Indian lands that are neither reservations nor
allotments” but still are “Indian country,” Venetie, 522
U.S. at 528. No “catch-all” is needed for the Creek
domain—by treaty and statute, it was a reservation.
Oklahoma urges the Court to look beyond
“semantics.” Br. 11. But as substance, Oklahoma’s
position fares worse. The one thing everyone knew in
the 19th century was that the Creek enjoyed greater
federal protection than other tribes. Supra 5. And the
one thing uniting all the “dependent Indian
communities” this Court has addressed is their lack of
similar federal treaty promises of territorial integrity
and self-government. Pet’r Br. 20-21. In United States
v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), the United States had
not signed treaties creating the borders of the New
Mexico Pueblos; Spain and Mexico had. Id. at 39. In
United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938), the Reno
Indian Colony was trust land “purchased … by Congress
to provide … for needy Indians”; they concededly had
“no reservation.” Id. at 537 & n.5. And in Venetie,
Congress had “revoked the Venetie Reservation.” 522
U.S. at 527. The treaty-protected Creek domain is in a
different league.
There is nothing to Oklahoma’s attempts to
denigrate these protections. First, Oklahoma relies on
the Creeks’ fee patent, Br. 9-12, but fee title does not
separate dependent Indian communities from
reservations. The McGowan tract was a dependent
Indian community even though the “government
retain[ed] title.” 302 U.S. at 539. Meanwhile, Congress
9
has (as noted) created reservations from fee lands.
Supra 5-6. Oklahoma would wreak havoc by relegating
all such lands nationwide to a less-protected status.
Certainly, Sandoval does not suggest that all fee-held
lands are “dependent Indian communities.” When
Sandoval observed that the Pueblos’ “fee … patents”
were “essentially the same as … the Five Civilized
Tribes[’],” 231 U.S. at 46, 48, it meant just that: They
had the same form of title, not that the Pueblos were like
the Creek in all respects.
Second, Oklahoma invokes United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935). But when Creek Nation
called the Creek a “dependent Indian community,” it
was only commenting that the Nation was “under the
guardianship of the United States,” like all federally
recognized tribes. Id. at 109.
Third, Oklahoma asserts that the Creek treaties
preceded the 1850s “federal reservation policy.” Br. 910. But this Court has understood earlier treaties as
creating reservations. E.g., Spalding v. Chandler, 160
U.S. 394, 407 (1896) (1820 treaty); The New York
Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 766 (1866) (1784 and 1842
treaties). Many earlier treaties and statutes used the
word “reservation.”2 And here, the treaties and statutes
show that Congress understood the Creek lands in the
same way.
2 Treaty with the Weas, Oct. 2, 1818, art. 2, 7 Stat. 186; Act of Feb.
28, 1809, 2 Stat. 527; Act of May 26, 1824, 4 Stat. 75; Act of June 30,
1834, 4 Stat. 740.
10
Finally, Oklahoma would not prevail even if its
relabeling succeeded. This Court has never heard a
“dependent Indian community” disestablishment case,
and Oklahoma offers no reason that treaty-protected
lands should be subject to lower disestablishment
standards just because of labels. Cf. State v. Romero,
142 P.3d 887, 894 (N.M. 2006) (applying Solem to
Pueblos). The Creek lands received the strongest
possible protections, irrespective of what Oklahoma now
calls them.
C.
Oklahoma’s
“Dependent
Indian
Community” Theory Does Not Explain
Post-Statehood Events.
Oklahoma claims its theory explains post-statehood
prosecutions.
Br. 16-21.
Not so.
Oklahoma
acknowledges that lands subject to “restraints on
alienation” remained dependent Indian communities and
“Indian country.” Br. 14-15. And post-statehood,
substantial Creek land remained restricted—yet
Oklahoma prosecuted Indian crimes there anyway.
Pet’r Br. 12, 14. Regardless, Oklahoma’s practice proves
nothing. As we explained—yet Oklahoma ignores—
States during the early 20th century illegally exercised
civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservations and
Indian country in 10 States, including Oklahoma. Pet’r
Br. 51.
And in 1942, the Interior Department
acknowledged that Oklahoma’s courts “assumed
jurisdiction” over Oklahoma’s Indian country, without
11
legal justification. Pet’r Br. 51-52.3
The same is true of Oklahoma’s “jurisdictional gap”
argument. Br. 20. Oklahoma’s “dependent Indian
community” theory (like its disestablishment argument)
does not avoid a gap as to minor Indian-on-Indian
crimes: Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over restricted
allotments and tribally owned lands—yet neither tribal
nor federal courts had jurisdiction over minor crimes.
That States everywhere prosecuted Indian country
crimes anyway, supra 10, readily explains why Congress
did not focus on Oklahoma’s theoretical gap. Similar
gaps were common nationwide. Pet’r Br. 52-53. Indeed,
Congress in 1885 removed “assault and battery” from
the MCA’s list of covered crimes while recognizing that
doing so risked creating gaps for those crimes. 16 Cong.
Rec. 934 (1885). Congress deemed the availability of
“the court of Indian offenses” sufficient to address such
“trivial violations.” Id.
II.
Congress Never Disestablished The Creek
Reservation.
It is no wonder Oklahoma has demoted its
disestablishment argument: Under this Court’s textfirst test, Oklahoma cannot prevail.
3 The federal government prosecuted on the Osage Reservation
briefly post-statehood because it was “not … allotted” until later.
Br. 25. That reflected confusion that tribal ownership and
reservation status might be coextensive, no more. Infra 13.
12
A.
No Text Disestablished The Creek
Reservation.
Oklahoma and the Solicitor General start by
rewriting the governing test. Oklahoma says text takes
a back seat to a “holistic[]”—read: nontextual—inquiry
into what Congress “intended” based on the State’s
account of “historical context,” Br. 6, 35, and the Solicitor
General relegates Parker to a cameo, see U.S. Br. 5, 7.
But Parker controls, and it reaffirms that, in
disestablishment cases as elsewhere, text governs. Nor
can Oklahoma gainsay that this Court has never found
disestablishment without clear text. It cites Hagen and
Rosebud as finding diminishment even though
“Congress contemplated cession, but went another
route.” Br. 32. Each, however, relied on express
statutory text. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 412 (1994)
(“restored to the public domain”); Rosebud Sioux Tribe
v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (“[C]ede, surrender,
grant, and convey to the United States.”); see Pet’r Br.
21-22 & n.1.
Oklahoma next attacks a strawman, claiming
Petitioner demands “magic words.” Br. 6, 29-30; see U.S.
Br. 25. But Oklahoma’s problem is not the absence of
magic words. Br. 2. It is that Parker requires a “textual
indication of … intent to diminish reservation
boundaries,” Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1079
(2016), not simply to transfer “title of individual plots,”
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984). Oklahoma
cannot identify any clear text—and that failure is
telling, because Creek-related treaties and statutes in
1856, 1866, and 1893 used hallmark language of
13
“cession.” Pet’r Br. 24. Congress abandoned such
language due to Creek resistance, not because “cession”
was “out of place” given Congress’s goals. U.S. Br. 26;
see Pet’r Br. 25 (refuting this argument, without answer
from Solicitor General).
Oklahoma pleads for a more lenient standard because
turn-of-the-century Congresses supposedly did not
grasp how to disestablish or understand that reservation
status “might not be coextensive with tribal ownership.”
Br. 29 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 468). But Solem and
Parker grappled with the same arguments. This Court
responded by delineating which land transfers
disestablished and which did not based on statutory
text—distinguishing
cession
from
allotment.
Oklahoma’s protestation that Congress saw nothing
“hinging on the differen[ce]” between cession and
allotment, Br. 7; see U.S. Br. 21, deprives words of their
meaning and defies the entire thrust of this Court’s
cases.
The distinction between cession and allotment also
explains why Oklahoma’s sole textual argument fails.
Oklahoma concedes that the 1901 allotment agreement
provides the key text. Br. 2. Yet the text Oklahoma
invokes is simply an allotment provision, requiring
deeds to convey “to [the allottee] all right, title and
interest of the Creek Nation.” Allotment Agreement
§ 23; Pet. Br. 9. Everywhere, allotment’s point was to
convey such title and interest in land. While Oklahoma
suggests that this provision uniquely conveyed
governmental interests with land ownership, Br. 32, it
merely followed the boilerplate that deeds must employ.
14
Mosier v. Momsen, 74 P. 905, 906 (Okla. 1903); Okla. R.L.
§ 1170 (1911); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 18. Tulsa used
near-identical language to transfer properties it owned.
Add. 1a, 3a. Presumably, Tulsa did not thereby
surrender sovereign powers or diminish city limits.
Accord Henry v. City of Muskogee, 986 P.2d 1151, 115253 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999) (“City [of Muskogee]” in 1907
conveyed to church “all right, title and interest in” tract
purchased “from the Creek Nation”). Oklahoma’s
theory is especially bizarre because, if Creek deeds
transferred such powers, they directed them to
recipients—allottees—who could not exercise them. By
contrast, this Court has found disestablishment only
when tribes “cede[d] to the United States all their claim,
right, title, and interest.” DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Court
for Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975)
(emphasis added).
Double proof that Congress did not divest the Creek
of all sovereign interests comes from Section 42, which
recognized continuing Creek authority to legislate over
“the lands of the tribe, or of individuals after allotment,
or the moneys or other property of the tribe, or of the
citizens thereof,” subject to presidential veto. Allotment
Agreement § 42. Oklahoma says Section 42 covers only
“tribal property interests,” Br. 38, when the plain text is
not so limited. Oklahoma calls Petitioner’s reading
“strained,” id., without acknowledging this Court’s
statement that identical language in the Choctaw
agreement “permit[ted] the continued exercise” of
“legislative … power” “within [tribal] borders,” which
federal officials could enforce. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194
U.S. 384, 389, 393 (1904). And Oklahoma blinds itself to
15
the point of Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 949-50 (8th Cir.
1905), which applied Morris to non-Indian land in Creek
townsites. Oklahoma notes that this Court has not
followed Buster’s broad interpretation of tribal
authority over non-Indian fee land. Br. 39. What
matters, however, is Buster’s holding that, whatever
power tribes have on reservations, the Creek retained it
after allotment.
This renders irrelevant Oklahoma’s assertion that
reservations cannot endure when tribes lose “both title
and sovereignty.” Br. 31. The statutes cannot be read
as divesting the Creek of all power over their land—
perhaps why the United States carefully says only that
Creek “governmental authority” was “greatly
circumscribed.” U.S. Br. 3. References to the Creek’s
“shell of a government,” and the “suspen[sion]” of Creek
laws, Br. 39, merely recognized practical realities:
Creek laws were subject to presidential veto, these laws
depended on the executive branch for enforcement, and
the necessary cooperation was not forthcoming given
the executive’s “deliberate attempts to frustrate
[Creek] government[].” Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp.
1110, 1130 (D.D.C. 1976). If succumbing to such pressure
disestablished, the United States would have few
reservations left. Everywhere, federal officials were
squashing tribal governments while seeking “to end the
tribe as a separate political … unit.” MCN Br. 33; Pet’r
Br. 35.
Oklahoma suggests that statehood contributed to
disestablishment. Br. 31. But Congress routinely
admitted States that were half Indian country, Pet’r Br.
16
38-39, and Congress created the reservation Solem
confirmed just before statehood, MCN Br. 26. Indeed,
the notion that statehood is inconsistent with broad
expanses of Indian country is particularly risible here:
At statehood, 83% of Eastern Oklahoma was
indisputably “Indian country” (as restricted allotments),
and nearly half remained so in 1908. Pet’r Br. 12;
Murphy Resp. Br. 36 n.5.4
Oklahoma conjures disestablishment from the
assertion that statehood “violat[ed] Congress’s promise
that tribal land would never be part of a state.” Br. 31;
see U.S. Br. 19. But this breach-one-breach-all approach
to treaty interpretation inverts the governing canons of
construction. Statutes and treaties are “construed
liberally in favor of the Indians.” Oneida Cty. v. Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985). This
Court will not read statutes to abrogate more treaty
promises than their text compels.5
B.
Oklahoma’s “Context” Arguments Fail.
Oklahoma’s description of the historical “context”
4 The Solicitor General (at 11, 15) invokes the grant to the Creek of
U.S. citizenship and participation rights in the Oklahoma
constitutional convention. But shortly after, Congress granted full
“citizenship to all native-born Indians.” U.S. Br. 15. It is perplexing
why he believes this step disestablished only the Creek reservation.
See Celestine, 215 U.S. at 289-90.
5 The State contrasts the Enabling Act’s reservation of federal
rights with language in other statehood acts. Br. 34. As this Court
has explained, however, those formulations “were considered
interchangeable.” Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 70
(1962).
17
fails to provide the “unequivocal evidence,” Parker, 136
S. Ct. at 1080, this Court demands. Oklahoma relies
principally on cherry-picked statements about events
that did not happen. For example, the 1897 Creek
Memorial lamenting that the Creek must “become
accustomed to State laws” did so while contemplating
“the civil death of the Muscogee Nation.” S. Doc. 54-111,
2d Sess. at 1-2 (1897). And it was dissolution that
Congress equated with “abrogation of all the former
treaties” and the end of federal “control over the
property of th[e] Indians,” which would instead “be
controlled by the new State.” 40 Cong. Rec. 2977 (1906)
(Sen. McCumber); Statehood for Oklahoma: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Territories, 58th Cong. 137
(1904) (Mr. Howe). Meanwhile, everywhere “the turnof-the-century
assumption”
was
that
Indian
reservations shortly “would cease to exist.” Solem, 465
U.S. at 468. It is therefore neither surprising nor
probative that Oklahoma can cite statements
prophesying the end. E.g., id. at 478 (legislative history
referencing “reduced,” “diminished” reservation);
Nebraska Parker Br. 45 (similar).
By contrast, Petitioner cites specific understandings
of events that actually happened. Oklahoma emphasizes
Congress’s motives for reversing dissolution. Br. 37.
What matters, however, is that Congress sought to
avoid precisely the result that Oklahoma claims
Congress intended: ceding Creek domains to “control[]
by the new State.” 40 Cong. Rec. 2977 (1906) (Sen.
McCumber).
Likewise, Petitioner invokes the
negotiating history to show that Congress chose
allotment, not “cession,” Pet’r Br. 27, while Oklahoma
18
can only speculate that Congress did not believe its
textual choices mattered. Br. 32-33.
Nor can Oklahoma gain by invoking the poststatehood transfer of Indian cases to Oklahoma courts.
We have answered that already: Treating practice as
probative makes no sense when myriad States were
exercising jurisdiction Congress never conferred, supra
10, and Oklahoma, aided by federal indifference, was
engaged in “systematic and wholesale exploitation of the
Indian through evasion or defiance of the law.” Angie
Debo, And Still the Waters Run 117 (1940); Pet’r Br. 51.6
C.
Oklahoma’s
“Subsequent
Arguments Fail.
History”
Oklahoma’s “subsequent history,” Br. 40, floats past
the critical point. “[T]his Court has never relied solely
on this third consideration to find diminishment,”
Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1081, not even in Parker, where the
“Tribe was almost entirely absent … for more than 120
years,” id. at 1081-82.
A few examples underscore that Oklahoma’s “‘mixed
record’ of subsequent treatment,” 136 S. Ct. at 1082,
does not advance the ball.
First, Oklahoma neglects Congress’s understanding.
Congress in 1906 resolved boundary disputes with
reference to the “west boundary line of the Creek
6 Oklahoma notes that a few federal officials upheld their duties. Br.
19-20. But loose anecdotes are no answer to the relentless
lawlessness and dereliction documented by Debo and Harjo.
19
Nation,” 34 Stat. at 343, which would be
incomprehensible if Creek boundaries had dissolved, see
MCN Br. 26-27 (similar examples). Oklahoma and the
Solicitor General also rely on self-serving legislative
history from Oklahoma’s Senator and Representative
declaring all Oklahoma reservations extinct, Br. 41; U.S.
Br. 22, while ignoring that the statute Congress actually
passed recognized “existing Indian reservations” in
Oklahoma. Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 831, § 1, 49 Stat.
1967; Pet’r Br. 31; see Murphy Resp. Br. 51 n.13
(addressing 25 U.S.C. § 1452(d)).
Congress’s post-statehood decisions about restricted
allotments, Br. 42, show the opposite of what Oklahoma
hopes. Congress gave state courts jurisdiction over
restricted allotments as “federal instrumentalit[ies].”
Murphy Resp. Br. 53-54. Outside of reservations,
Congress does not generally deputize state courts as
federal actors. Likewise, allotted lands—once free of
alienation restrictions—were taxable because of
Congress’s authorization. Five Tribes Act § 19; Pet’r Br.
10; see Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, § 4, 35 Stat. 312. That
happened on many reservations, including Parker’s.
Murphy Resp. Br. 54.
As to judicial decisions, Oklahoma cannot show the
evidence is other than mixed. Petitioner cited cases
recognizing the Creek Nation’s continuing boundaries.
Pet’r Br. 32. By contrast, Oklahoma relies on decisions
that inaccurately imply the Nation ceased to exist.
Murphy Resp. Br. 53 n.14 (addressing cases).
As to the executive branch, Oklahoma can only
20
dismiss the federal liquor indictments across the Creek
reservation, Pet’r Br. 31-32, as reflecting an “overbroad”
understanding of “Indian country” and “confusion.” Br.
19 n.6. And it dismisses the federal maps recognizing the
Nation’s reservation as “inconsistent,” Br. 42—ignoring
Parker’s point that inconsistent, subsequent-history
evidence cannot support disestablishment.
III.
Congress Did Not Transfer To Oklahoma
Jurisdiction Over The Creek Reservation.
Reprising their hand-wavy disestablishment
arguments, Oklahoma and the Solicitor General
alternatively insist that Congress conferred on
Oklahoma jurisdiction even over Indian reservations—
invoking a smattering of statutes they deem “especially
significant.” Br. 21; U.S. Br. 32. But at statehood, the
MCA recognized exclusive federal jurisdiction over
qualifying crimes on “any Indian reservation” or “Indian
country” within “any State.” Pet’r Br. 45. The question
therefore is not whether the Enabling Act
“reintroduced” exclusive federal jurisdiction. Br. 26. It
is whether Congress gave Oklahoma thenunprecedented jurisdiction over its “Indian country.”
The answer is no, as state and federal courts have
concluded for 30 years. Pet’r Br. 44.
1. Oklahoma ultimately concedes that Congress must
speak in “‘plain terms’” to alter the MCA. Br. 27
(quoting Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103-04
(1993)). But it ignores what this standard means.
Whenever Congress has shifted Indian-country
jurisdiction to States, it has spoken clearly to say that
“[j]urisdiction is conferred on” the State—including in
21
Oklahoma, where Congress in 1908 transferred limited
jurisdiction over restricted allotments by saying that
they “shall ... be subject to [state-court] jurisdiction.”
Pet’r Br. 46-47.
There is no clear transfer here. Oklahoma says that
an 1897 statute giving “the United States courts in
[Indian Territory] … jurisdiction” over civil and criminal
cases, and applying “the laws of the United States and
the State of Arkansas … to all persons therein,
irrespective of race,” Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat.
62, 83, gave “Oklahoma jurisdiction over” Indian
reservations post-statehood “irrespective of race.” Br.
21. But unlike the MCA, the 1897 statute does not speak
to post-statehood jurisdiction. And giving federal
territorial courts adjudicatory jurisdiction over offenses
defined in an assimilated body of federal law, as the 1897
statute did with Arkansas law, is very different from
giving a State plenary jurisdiction to legislate and
adjudicate on reservations. Pet’r Br. 48. Oklahoma
pronounces that it would be “passing strange” for the
MCA to create distinctions after statehood that did not
exist before. Br. 26. But it has no answer to Petitioner’s
showing that statehood always had that effect, Pet’r Br.
48-49, simply asserting that the “situation was
different,” Br. 27.7
7 The United States (at 13-14) invokes the Curtis Act’s “town site”
provisions, but they did not extend state criminal law to Indians.
Town sites were established under federal authority, and towns
could only enact ordinances punishable by fines and could only jail
offenders (for 30 days) when authorized by statute. Mansfield’s
Digest of Statutes of Arkansas, ch. 29, §§ 745, 746, 765 (1884).
22
Indeed, the textual problem is worse. At statehood,
Congress provided that “the laws in force in the
Territory of Oklahoma, as far as applicable, shall” apply.
Enabling Act § 13; see Pet’r Br. 12. With Congress
having chosen to apply after statehood the Oklahoma
Territory’s law—where the MCA indisputably applied,
Br. 27—it is incoherent to say that today an 1897 Indian
Territory statute governs jurisdiction over Eastern
Oklahoma’s Indian country.
Oklahoma contests whether the MCA applied to prestatehood Indian Territory, incorrectly claiming that
Petitioner’s argument is “based on [the] assumption that
the [MCA]” applied pre-statehood. Br. 26. To be clear:
Our argument is based on the MCA’s unambiguous poststatehood application in “any State.” Pet’r Br. 45. That
said, the relevant, pre-statehood jurisdictional grant
was an 1890 statute (not the 1889 statute Oklahoma
cites) that excluded jurisdiction only over matters where
“members of [an Indian] nation [were] the only
parties”—leaving ample sweep for the MCA. Act of May
2, 1890, ch. 182, § 30, 26 Stat. 81. Hence, the federal
government’s longstanding position is that the MCA
applied. U.S. Murphy Br. 2a-3a.
Oklahoma also implies that, because the MCA draws
race-based classifications, it could not survive the 1897
act applying federal and Arkansas law “irrespective of
race.” Br. 26. This statute, however, merely provided
that federal and Arkansas law reached everyone.
Despite Oklahoma’s attractive-sounding tale of “raceblind adjudication,” it was not understood to eliminate
racial classifications. Scott v. Epperson, 284 P. 19, 20
23
(Okla. 1930) (applying to Creek an Arkansas law
invalidating inter-racial marriages). Nor was poststatehood Oklahoma a “race-neutral” society. Br. 26;
e.g., Dowell v. School Bd. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 219 F.
Supp. 427, 431-47 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
2. Oklahoma fares no better with the Enabling Act.
The section Oklahoma invokes addresses only transfers
of pending cases—and it provides only that “all causes
… arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States” go to federal court. Enabling Act § 16.
This says nothing about whether, post-statehood, Indian
crimes on reservations remained subject to exclusive
federal jurisdiction.8
Worse, Oklahoma remarkably fails to mention
Congress’s 1907 amendment that directed to federal
courts prosecutions for crimes “which, had they been
committed within a State, would have been cognizable in
the Federal courts.” Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2911, § 1, 34
Stat. 1286. This directive to treat Oklahoma like other
States is the opposite of Oklahoma’s claim that Congress
made Oklahoma different from every other State.
Oklahoma’s insistence that Indian cases were in fact
transferred to state court, Br. 25, proves nothing given
8 Contra Oklahoma (Br. 25), the Enabling Act did not say that state
courts were “successors” to territorial courts for all cases—just
cases properly transferred to state court. In other instances, it
identified federal courts as successors. Murphy Resp. Supp. Reply
6-7 (citing sources).
24
the same unlawful prosecutions occurring nationwide.9
IV.
Oklahoma’s Claims About Consequences Are
Overstated.
As in many cases this Court hears, its decision will
have consequences. Deeming the Creek reservation
disestablished risks disrupting the services the Creek
provide in underserved areas of Eastern Oklahoma
where the Creek exercise sovereign rights. MCN Br.
45-47. The opposite result may trigger certain rules
applicable on Indian reservations that Oklahoma and the
federal government do not recognize today. Oklahoma’s
brief, however, confirms that its claims of a “sea change,”
Br. 43, are overstated.
On the criminal side, Oklahoma and its amici offer no
genuine reason for concern. Cf. MCN Br. 41-43; NCAI
Br. 25, 31-34. Tulsa says the Nation’s Lighthorse Police
Department cannot replace the Tulsa Police
Department, but it acknowledges that crossdeputization agreements already exist. Tulsa Br. 30.
That means policing can continue as before. MCN Br.
37-38. The United States observes that additional
prosecutions will come its way, offering yet another
unsupported, back-of-the-envelope estimate. Br. 38-39
& n.5; see Murphy Resp. Br. 55. But it makes no credible
argument that the federal government cannot handle
the additional prosecutions. Regardless, Congress has
9 Congress did not exempt Oklahoma from the MCA in the Burke
Act, Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 183; see Br. 34. This
Act excluded the Five Tribes because the General Allotment Act,
which it was amending, did so.
25
means available—which it has used before—to fix any
problems. Pet’r Br. 46.
Only for existing convictions is Congress’s authority
more limited. There, Oklahoma’s brief exposes its
argument as rhetoric. The Tenth Circuit decided
Murphy nearly three years ago. In every Murphy
challenge, Oklahoma is the respondent. If the actual
number were large, Oklahoma would have given the
Court a number. When Oklahoma just asserts a “risk[]”
to “thousands” of convictions, Br. 43, it concedes it has
no evidence of large effects.
On the civil side, Oklahoma does not dispute (Br. 4445) that the Creek have virtually no jurisdiction to
regulate non-Indians, or that this Court has never
preempted the application of state law to non-Indians on
fee land. Pet’r Br. 40; see MCN Br. 43-44; MCN Murphy
Br. 32-34; NCAI Murphy Br. 28. It points to “taxation”
of Indians, Br. 44, but all unrestricted fee lands on
reservations are subject to state taxes. MCN Br. 44. On
other tax issues, Oklahoma routinely compacts with
tribes. NCAI Br. 24. Meanwhile, Oklahoma tellingly
ignores City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New
York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), which this Court invoked in
Parker. 136 S. Ct. at 1082. Oklahoma makes much of
jurisdiction over “adoptions and custody disputes,” Br.
44, but ignores the Creek brief addressing those
concerns, MCN Br. 44-45.
If such claims of disruption sound familiar, they
should. When Oklahoma courts 30 years ago held that
the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over
26
restricted allotments, the Solicitor General claimed
“[l]aw enforcement would be rendered very difficult,”
and there would be “grave uncertainty regarding the
application” of “the State’s taxing, regulatory and other
laws.” U.S. Br. at 13-14, Oklahoma v. Brooks (No. 881147). During the intervening decades, none of that
proved true.
CONCLUSION
The judgment below should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN
Counsel of Record
ZACHARY C. SCHAUF
ALLISON M. TJEMSLAND*
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Ave., NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 639-6000
igershengorn@jenner.com
*Not admitted in D.C.;
supervised by principals of the
Firm
Counsel for Petitioner
April 10, 2020
ADDENDUM
1a
#19
The City of Tulsa
to
C.W. Robertson, Sr.
Quit Claim Deed
This indenture made this 25th day of June, 1906,
between the City of Tulsa, Indian Territory, party of the
first part, and C.W. Robertson, Sr. party of the second
party witnesseth:
That for and in consideration of the sum of One
Dollar ($1.00) to it duly paid, the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged, the said party of the first part has
remised, released, conveyed and quit-claimed, and by
these present does quit-claim unto the said party of the
second part, and to his heirs and assigns forever, all its
right, title and interest both at law and equity, in and to
the following described property, to-wit:
The East forty (40) feet of Lot No. Six (6) in Block
No. Nine (9) in the City of Tulsa, Indian Territory, as
shown by the official plat thereof.
To have and to hold the said described premises,
together with all and singular the tenements, here
determents and appurtenances therewith belonging, or
in any wise appertaining, unto the said C.W. Robertson
Sr., his heirs and assigns, forever.
In witness whereof the said party of the first part
has caused these presents to be signed in its name by its
2a
Mayor, and its corporate seal to be affixed, attested by
its Recorder at Tulsa, the day and year first above
written.
The City of Tulsa, I.T.
By John O. Mitchell,
Mayor
Attest: W. D. Abbott Recorder
(Corporate Seal)
Indian Territory, Western District.
Be it remembered, that on the 3rd day of June,
1906, before me, a Notary Public, in and for said district
and Territory, duly commissioned and acting, personally
appeared John O. Mitchell, to me known to be the Mayor
of the City of Tulsa, and the identical person who
subscribed the name of said City and his own name to
the foregoing deed as its Mayor and acknowledged to me
that he signed and executed the same as his free and
voluntary act and deed and as the free and voluntary act
and deed of said corporation for the consideration and
purposes therein mentioned and set forth.
(Seal) Tulsa, Ind Terr.
L.D. Marr.
My commission expires 6/18/1910
Notary Public
Files for record July 5, 1906, at 9:00 a.m.
Otis Larton
Deputy Clerk and Ex. Officio Recorder
3a
Tulsa County Clerk - Michael Willis
Doc # 2019011300 Page(s): 2 Recorded 02/12/2019 04:17:48 PM
Receipt # 19-7517 Fees: $15.00
8383
QUIT CLAIM DEED
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
THAT the CITY OF TULSA, an Oklahoma
municipal corporation, of 175 E. 2nd Street, Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 74103 hereinafter referred to as Grantor, in
consideration of the sum of Ten and No/100 Dollars
($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration,
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does by these
presents, quitclaim, grant, bargain, sell and convey unto
DANE M. JACKSON, a single man, of 9344 E. 3rd Place,
Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74112-2412, hereinafter referred to as
Grantee, his successors and assigns, all of Grantor’s
right, title, interest and estate, both at law and in equity,
of, in and to the following described property
(hereinafter referred to as the “Property”), to-wit:
Lot Two (2), Block Nine (9), MEADOWOOD
ADDITION, to The City of Tulsa, Tulsa County, State
of Oklahoma, according to the recorded plat thereof,
Together with all the hereditaments and
appurtenances thereunto belonging.
This conveyance is subject to all rights-of-way,
easements, leases, deed and plat restrictions, partitions,
severances, encumbrances, licenses, reservations and
exceptions which are of record as of the date hereof, and
4a
is further subject to all rights of persons in possession,
and to physical conditions, encroachments and
possessory rights which would be evident from an
inspection of the Property and is subject to existing
outstanding mineral interests owned by third parties, if
any.
The Property is conveyed “AS IS”, and Grantor
makes no warranty that any of the Property is safe or
suitable for any purpose or use. The Property may be
unsuitable for any use for reasons, including, but not
limited to, rough, unnatural and unstable surfaces,
inadequate subjacent or lateral support, circumstances
relating to the environmental quality of the Property, or
other conditions arising out of the prior use of the
Property. Grantee shall take title to the Property
subject to the exceptions and reservations first above
mentioned and subject to physical conditions,
encroachments and possessory rights which would be
evident from an inspection of the Property.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the Property unto
the Grantee, his successors and assigns, forever, subject
to the terms, conditions, reservations and exceptions set
forth herein, without warranty.
NO DOCUMENTARY STAMPS REQUIRED: TAX EXEMPT Title 68 O.S. §3202(11)
AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO:
Guaranty Abstract Company
320 South Boulder
Tulsa, OK 74103
E-258138
5a
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the name of the
Grantor is hereunto affixed this 28th day of January,
2019.
THE CITY OF TULSA,
an Oklahoma municipal corporation
By: /s/ G.T. Bynum, Mayor
G.T. Bynum, Mayor
ATTEST:
/s/ Deputy
City Clerk
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF OKLAHOMA )
) ss:
COUNTY OF TULSA
)
Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, in
and for said County and State on this 28th day of January,
2019, personally appeared G.T. Bynum, as Mayor of the
City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, to me known to be the identical
person who executed the within and foregoing
instrument on behalf of the City of Tulsa as its Mayor,
and acknowledged to me that he executed the same as
his free and voluntary act and deed, and as the free and
voluntary act and deed of the City of Tulsa for the uses
and purposes therein set forth.
6a
Given under my hand and seal of office the date
and year above written.
/s/
Notary Public
My commission expires: 2/15/21
My commission number: #17001552
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
/s/ (Ms. Swiney)
Senior Assistant City Attorney
Deed presented for filing by:
Guaranty Abstract Company/ Karen Weddington
File Number: 258138
Title Insurer: Fidelity
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.