Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Brent Edward Lovett, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefMay 15, 2019

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FILED

MAY 152019

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

L'FPEME CO'JRT U.S.

BRENT EDWARD LOVETT,

Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

Ninth Circuit Case No: 18-16498

District Court Civil Case No: 2:17-cv-01580-JCM

Orig. CR Case No: 2:11-cr-00165-JCM-GWF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Brent Lovett

Petitioner-Pro Se

8211 Omni Court

Las Vegas, Nevada 89149

Telephone: 702-427-6657

Facsimile: 888-420-6834

Email: brentlovett267gamiI.com

*Petitioner Pro Se

May 12, 2019

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioner Brent Edward Lovett (Prisoner in Custody of BOP, RRC) moves

this Court to remand the case back to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for the

Court to explain and detail "whV' the 20 pages of detailed legal arguments

(concerning the drug use, disbarment and imprisonment of his Appellate Counsel)

which clearly shown that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

[section 2255 motion] states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right

"and" that any jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

was correct in its procedural ruling" did not meet its test, and what that test

was, and what issue was this test applied to.

Under the protections of 5th and 14th Due Process clauses, should the

Courts be required to state the reasons for determinations and then indicate

the evidence and record that were relied upon to protect precepts of

fundamental fairness and to protect against arbitrary enforcement?

Is Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,484 (2000) unconstitutionally vague

because the opinion is worded in a standardless way that invites arbitrary

enforcement which has resulted in a "void for vagueness" standard?

What is a "Jurists of Reason", what is "Debatable"?

Should a "Jurists of Reason" be understood as a "jurists deciding

reasonably," i.e., as an inquiry into conduct, not status? If two people disagree on

any topic, is that debatable?

At the COA stage, the only question is whether the applicant has shown that

jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his

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constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.

This Court has never heard a case on the merits of any test into what is

reasonable, or how to determine what is debatable. Without any kind of test, the

Courts across this country have ruled inconsistently on this issue. The Courts have

used this "lack of a standard test" to deny prisoners their Constitutional rights with

the "blanket statement" from Slack v. McDaniel which has no possible verifiable

standard, which in itself is a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violation of the

United States Constitution right to Due Process.

Wouldn't any "Jurists of Reason" find it debatable whether the district court

was correct, when it ruled a counsel was not ineffective, when:

The counsel failed to follow 4 Appellate Court orders?

The counsel failed to file the Appellate Brief by the Court imposed

deadlines, 8 times, over 16 months?

The counsel failed to meet with and communicate with his client?

The counsel files a partial appellate brief without input or notice to his

client, and failed to argue any of the non-frivolous issue presented by the

client?

The counsel was a known drug addict?

The counsel was terminated from 14 other federal cases due to his

failure to represent his clients?

The counsel was disbarred from practicing law?

The counsel was arrested in a drug sting, and charged with accessory

to murder?

What is a fair test to give adequate guidance, so that the average

4.

person can determine, what a reasonable jurist would find debatable?

Persons of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning

of [an] enactment and or ruling. Denial of due process is the failure to observe that

fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.................................................................................2

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................5

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI .......................................................6

OPINIONS BELOW..............................................................................................6

JURISDICTION....................................................................................................6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED................................................7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................................................................8

LegalBackground ......................................................................................8

FactualBackground.................................................................................13

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS IN THIS CASE........................................15

FIFTH -AMENDMENT ...........................................................................15

SIXTH AMENDMENT.............................................................................15

FIRST AMENDMENT.............................................................................15

ISSUES PRESENTED WHICH ARE DEBATABLE AMONG.........................16

JURISTS OF REASON.......................................................................................16

ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE COA ................................................................19

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .........................................................20

CONCLUSION....................................................................................................21

DECLARATION..................................................................................................21

AppendixA..........................................................................................................22

AppendixB..........................................................................................................23

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ............................................24

rd

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979 .......................................................................10

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)..........................................................................10

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134,140-41 (2012)...............................................................6

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327(2003)................................................................... 6

Slackv. McDaniel .................................................................................................................... 3, 6

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,484 (2000).......................................................................2

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)..........................................................................................10

Statutes

18U.S.C.1 ...............................................................................................................................13

28 U.S.C. 1254 ........................................................................................................................... 6

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)...............................................................................................................6

28 U.S.C. §1746..........................................................................................................................25

28 U.S.C.S.

2253(c) ..................................................................................................................8

5

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Brent Lovett respectfully request that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to

review the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's judgment which was "Before:

SCHROEDER and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

"The request for a certificate of appealability (Docket Entry No. 2)

is denied because appellant has not shown that "jurists of reason would

find it debatable whether the [section 2255 motion] states a valid claim

of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find

it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,484 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134,140-41 (2012); Miller-El

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Appeals' decision is attached hereto as Appendix 1. And the

unpublished orders denying rehearing en banc are included as Appendix B

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals' judgment was issued on January 10, 2019.

Rehearing was denied on February 28, 2019. The Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,

unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in

the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or

public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice

put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just

compensation.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they

reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Legal Background

Certificate of Appealability.- When habeas corpus petitioner seeks to

initiate an appeal of the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition after April 24,

1996, the right to appeal is governed by the certificate of appealability

requirements found at 28 U.S.C.S. § 2253(c). When the district court denies a

habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying

constitutional claim, a certificate of appealability should issue and an appeal of

the district court's order may be taken if the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Nowhere, has the

Court defined what is a Jurist of Reason, or what is Debatable, thus leaving the

Courts in an entirely arbitrary position to issue blanket statements, as in this

case, when the motion and the record were overwhelmingly clear of the

Constitutional errors presented, and that any jurist or reason would debate what

the Court did, and would debate that the Petitioners Constitutional rights were

violated.

The certificate of appealability (COA) inquiry is not coextensive with a merits

analysis. At the COA stage, the only question is whether the applicant has

shown that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of

his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are

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adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. When a court of appeals

sidesteps the COA process by not reviewing the case at all, just issuing a blanket

statement as it has done a thousand time, it has in fact denied the Petitioner his

Constitutional rights to Due Process.

The Requirements of Due Process.—Although due process tolerates

variances in procedure "appropriate to the nature of the case," it is nonetheless

possible to identify its core goals and requirements. First, "[p]rocedural due

process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the

mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property." Thus, the required

elements of due process are those that "minimize substantively unfair or

mistaken deprivations" by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a

state proposes to deprive them of protected interests.

The core of these

requirements is notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Due process

may also require an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and

for discovery; that a decision be made based on the record, and that a party

be allowed to be represented by counsel.

Decision on the Record. Although this issue arises principally in the

administrative law area, it applies to criminal law as well. "[T]he decision maker's

conclusion

.

.

.

must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the

hearing or on the record. To demonstrate compliance with this elementary

requirement, the decision maker should state the reasons for his determination

and indicate the evidence he relied on, though his statement need not amount to

a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law." (Goldberg v.

Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (citations omitted)).

Burden of Proof and Presumptions.—The Due Process Clause does

prevent the deprivation of liberty or property upon application of a standard of

proof too lax to make reasonable assurance of accurate fact finding. Thus, "[t]he

function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process

Clause and in the realm of fact finding, is to 'instruct the facifinder concerning the

degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of

factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." (Addington v. Texas,

441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)

(Justice Harlan concurring)).

As long as a presumption is not unreasonable and is not conclusive, it

does not violate the Due Process Clause. Legislative fiat may not take the place

of fact in the determination of issues involving life, liberty, or property, however,

and a statute or opinion creating a presumption which is entirely arbitrary and

which operates to deny a fair opportunity to repel it or to present facts pertinent to

one's defense is void.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS—CRIMINAL Generally: The Principle

of Fundamental Fairness The Court has held that practically all the criminal

procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights—the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth

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Amendments—are fundamental to state criminal justice systems and that the

absence of one or the other particular guarantees denies a suspect or a

defendant due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition,

the Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects against practices and

policies that violate precepts of fundamental fairness, even if they do not

violate specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The standard query in such

cases is whether the challenged practice or policy violates "a fundamental

principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of a free government

and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such government."

Clarity in Criminal Statutes: The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine.

Criminal statutes or opinions that lack sufficient definiteness or specificity are

commonly held "void for vagueness." Such issues "may run afoul of the Due

Process Clause because it fails to give adequate guidance to those who would

be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with which they

are charged, or to guide courts in trying those- who are accused." "Men of

common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of [an]

enactment or opinion. In other situations, a opinion may be unconstitutionally

vague because the opinion is worded in a standardless way that invites arbitrary

enforcement. In this vein, the Court has invalidated two kinds of laws as "void

for vagueness": (1) laws that define criminal offenses; and (2) laws that fix the

permissible sentences for criminal offenses. With respect to laws that define

criminal offenses, the Court has required that a penal statute provide the

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definition of the offense with "sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can

understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Court opinion must follow this same

definition "sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what must

be presented and what test must be met and in a manner that does not

encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."

Fair TriaL—As noted, the provisions of the Bill of Rights now applicable to the

states contain basic guarantees of a fair trial— right to counsel, right to speedy

and public trial, right to be free from use of unlawfully seized evidence and

unlawfully obtained confessions,, and the like. But this does not exhaust the

requirements of fairness. "Due process of law requires that the proceedings

shall be fair, but fairness is a relative, not an absolute concept.

.

.

.

What is fair

in one set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in others." Conversely, "as

applied to a criminal legal process, denial of due process is the failure to observe

that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to

declare a denial of it

.

.

.

[the Court] must find that the absence of that fairness

fatally infected the process; the acts complained of must be of such quality as

necessarily prevents a fair process.

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Factual Background

In April 2011, the Government obtained a One Count Indictment which

charged Lovett with a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1344 and alleged that on or

about May 2006 to in or about August 2006 Lovett "...enriched himself by

fraudulently obtaining a commercial real estate loan from which he would

skin part of the loan proceeds for himself." The Indictment alleged that

Lockheed Federal Credit Union (LCU) loan was obtained by Lovett using

false documents and providing false information.

It also alleged that Lovett omitted to disclose his ownership and

control of Bay Resorts International (Bay) and Equity Resources (Equity),

the seller and the buyer respectively of the property known as 2400 North

Tenaya (Property). Finally, the Indictment alleged that Lovett obtained

approximately $1,337,396.60 from the proceeds of the sale from the

property from Bay to Equity, then allowed the property to go into

foreclosure after only making four payments to LCU.

On February 19, 2013, started a 7 day trial in which Lovett was

found guilty of the one count.

May 24, 2013 (Dk#223), Lovett files a motion for a new trial, due to

newly discovered evidence.

May 29, 2013 (Dk#226) Lovett is sentenced to 98 months. June 3,

2013 (Dk#230) Notice of Appeal is filed.

August 8, 2016 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirms Lovett's

conviction.

October 26, 2016 Application for Writ of Certiorari filed with the United

13

States Supreme Court.

April 3, 2017 Order denying Writ of Certiorari.

April 12, 2017 Lovett files §2255 together with motion to exceed page

volume.

May 24, 2017, District Court grants Lovett's request to exceed page

volume.

July 10, 2018 the District Court denies Petition under §2255.

The Court of Appeals' for the Ninth Circuit judgment was issued on

January 10, 2019. Rehearing was denied on February 28, 2019.

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS IN THIS CASE

FIFTH -AMENDMENT

> Constitutional Right to offer testimony of witnesses.

> Constitutional Due Process right to the dismissal of the Grand Jury

Indictment due to Prosecutorial Misconduct.

-

> Constitutional Right to Equal Protection which forbids

discrimination.

> Constitutional Right to present a complete defense.

> Constitutional Right to be presented with critical evidence.

SIXTH AMENDMENT

> Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial.

> Constitutional Right to confront witnesses and to interview

witnesses, and to be presented with evidence suppressed by the

FBI.

> Constitutional Right to the compulsory process for obtaining

witnesses and expert witnesses.

> Constitutional Right to present a complete defense.

> Constitutional Right to the Assistance of Counsel.

> Constitutional Right to assist in your own defense.

> Constitutional Right to control your own defense.

> Constitutional Right to a meaningful representation.

FIRST AMENDMENT

> Constitutional Right to access to the courts and to have the

questions presented and ruled on by the Court.

Throughout the Motion for a New Trial (DC Dk#223), the §2255

Petition and the Reply to the Government's response together with the

facts detailed herein, Lovett has made a substantial showing of the denial

of his Constitutional Rights, together in the light of all the evidence and

facts presented, it is more likely than not, that no reasonable juror would

have convicted Lovett.

15

ISSUES PRESENTED WHICH ARE DEBATABLE AMONG

JURISTS OF REASON

To meet the requirements for a Certificate of Appealability, the Petitioner must

show that reasonable jurists could debate whether or, for that matter, agree that

the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues

that were presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further. The Petitioner has presented a substantial showing on the following

debatable issues:

The District Court erred when it failed to address the fact that Disbarred Court

Appointed Appellate Counsel Gamage failed to follow the Orders of the

Appellate Court which was a violation the Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Right

to effective counsel, before the Court ruled that some of the issues were

barred due to the Successive Claim Rule or procedural defaulted due to

Gamage's failure to raise them on appeal.

The District Court erred when it failed to address the fact that Disbarred Court

Appointed Appellate Counsel Gamage failed to render ANY legal assistance

to the Petitioner before the Court ruled that some of the issues were barred

due to the Successive Claim Rule or procedural defaulted due to Gamage's

failure to raise them on Appeal. (Gamage was disbarred for this very reason).

The District Court erred when it failed to address the undisputed fact that the

trial court had ruled that the emails would not be used in the trial as testimonial

in nature, which in fact that they were.

The District Court failed to address

that the emails were shown during testimony to have been created text

documents or have been altered, which would prove the Petitioner not guilty of

if1

the crime charged.

The District Court erred when it failed to address the undisputed fact that the

Petitioner was denied his right to interview witnesses prior to trial, and then

again denied his right to interview the witness during the trial which prejudiced

the defense of the case by not allowing the Petitioner to prove the computer

server would not allow the sending of remote emails, that someone else was

in Las Vegas directing the submission of the loan documents, and that a

Federal Express package was sent from Las Vegas to the lender with loan

documents while the Petitioner was over 500 miles away on a houseboat in

the middle of Lake Shasta with no cell or computer services which would

prove the Petitioner not guilty of the crime charged.

The District Court erred when it failed to address the ineffective assistance of

the pre-trial counsels, and the undisputed facts that they did not interview a

single witness, or file any meaningful pre-trial motions, or hire the required

expert witness to detail the computer server at Bay Resorts and how the

emails were sent to the lender, or file to dismiss the case due to the violation

of the Petitioner's Speedy Trial rights, or the fact that pre-trial counsel

informed the Court that he could "only do so many trial back to back", and the

fact that he was not prepared on the day of the trial, which forced the

Petitioner to represent himself 5 minutes before trial.

The District Court erred when it failed to address that the Faretta waiver was

not meaningful without a full inquiry of what counsel had done to prepare, if

any of the witnesses were in fact interviewed, if counsel had a defense ready

17

to present, and why would the Petitioner move to represent himself at such a

late hour.

The District Court erred when it failed to address the undisputed fact that the

Petitioners Speedy Trial rights were in fact violated.

The District Court erred when it did not address the cumulative errors.

18

ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE COA

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS

APPELLANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

EFFECTIVE APPELLATE COUNSEL WHICH WAS VIOLATED WHEN

DISBARRED COUNSEL GAMAGE REFUSED TO FOLLOW THE

APPELLATE COURT'S ORDERS.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS THAT

APPELLANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

EFFECTIVE APPELLANT COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED BY DISBARRED

COUNSEL GAMAGE FOR HIS CONTINUED FAILURE TO RENDER

ANY LEGAL ASSISTANCE, WHICH FELL BELOW THE STANDARD OF

A REASONABLY COMPETENT ATTORNEY.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE

UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD RULED THAT THE

EMAILS WOULD NOT BE USED AS TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE

UNDISPUTED FACT THAT LOVETT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO

INTERVIEW WITNESSES FOR HIS DEFENSE OF HIS CASE.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE

ISSUES RAISED IN THE §2255 PETITION UNDER THE SUCCESSIVE

CLAIM RULE AND THE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT RULE WITHOUT

FIRST ADDRESSING AND DETAILING THE INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL CLAIM.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF PRETRIAL COUNSEL.

a. THE GOVERNMENT PLACED THE BLAME FOR

FAILURE TO MOVE FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE

INDICTMENT FOR VIOLATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL

ACT ON THE PRE-TRIAL COUNSELS.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT ADDRESS THAT

THE FARETTA WAIVER WAS NOT MEANINGFUL.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE

SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIMS.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS

PREJUDICE.

19

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court has never heard a case on the merits of any test into what is

reasonable, or how to determine what is debatable. Without any kind of test, the

Courts across this country have ruled inconsistently on this issue. The Courts

have used this "lack of a standard test" to deny prisoners their Constitutional

rights with the "blanket statement" which has no possible verifiable standard,

which in itself is a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution violation right to Due Process.

Previous cases that came to this Court did not ask this Court to supply a

standard clear test.

It is logical for this Court to create a test to conform with the past opinion, and the

Constitution of the United States.

This case has an extensive record and is a good vehicle to conduct the

review that never occurred before.

The record in this case is extensive.

20

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, this Court should grant this petition for writ of

certiorari, remand the case back to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and have

the Court detail why the arguments presented failed to overcome its test, and

what that test was, or this Court should put forth a standardized test of

reasonableness and what is debatable among jurist.

DECLARATION

I hereby verify that the matters alleged herein, and in the the Appellate

Brief, reply, the original §2255 petition and the reply to the Government's

response are true and correct, except as to matter alleged on information and

belief, as to those, I believe them to be true.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Respectfully subm

étitioner-Pro Se

8211 Omni Court

Las Vegas, Nevada 89149

Telephone: 702-427-6657

Facsimile: 888-420-6834

Email: brentlovett267(äqamil.com

*Petitioner Pro Se

21

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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