Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Timmy W. Doucet, Petitioner v. Louisiana

Supreme Court briefDec 6, 2018

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

N o.:

O miGINAL

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

Term, 2017

TIMMY W. DOUCET —Appellant

STATE OF LOUISIANA —Appellee(s)

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

Timmy W. Doucet #717020

MPEY/Spruce4

La. State Penitentiary

Angola, LA 70712

PREPARED 27i

David Constance #304580

Offender Counsel Substitute Ill

Main Prison Legal Aid Office

Criminal Litigation Team

La. State Penitentiary

Angola,, LA 70712

FILED

DEC 062018

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

Whether reasonable jurists determine that it was reversible error for the district court

to permit the jury, over defense counsel's objections, to view SD's drawings during its

deliberations when these drawings amounted to testimonial evidence, which is

specifically prohibited in the Louisiana Criminal Code; Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.

Whether reasonable jurist would debate that the State failed to meet its burden of

proof of beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Doucet is guilt.

LIST OF PARTIES

[ ]

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

I X I All parties Ii not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the

proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows.

District Attorney's Office

Parish of Jefferson

200 Derbigny St, 5 2' Floor

Gretna, LA 70053

Jeff Landry Louisiana Attorney General

P.O. Box 94005

Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005

Dan-el Vannoy, Warden

Louisiana State Penitentiary

General Delivery

Angola, LA 70712

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Page

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

LIST OF PARTIES

INDEX TO APPENDICES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...........................................................................................................ii

OPINIONS....................................................................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION..............................................................................................................................2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED........................................1

NOTICEOF PRO-SE FILING ....................................................................................................... 1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION............................................................................. 1

Permitting the Jury to Review SD's Drawings During Deliberations................................. 5

STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS ....................................................................................... 7

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.....................................................................................................10

ISSUENO. 1..................................................................................................................................10

Reasonable jurists would determine that it was reversible error for the district court to

permit the jury, over defense counsel's objections, to view SD's drawings during Its

deliberations when these drawings amounted to testimonial evidence which is

specifically prohibited in the Louisiana Criminal Code.....................................................10

ISSUENO.2 .................................................................................................................................. 13

Reasonable jurists would argue that the evidence presented during trial was insufficient

to convict Mr. Doucet of Aggravated Rape beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.............13

Testimonyof SD. ..................................................................................................................... 17

SUMMARY. .................................................................................................................................. 26

CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................27

PROOF OF SERVICE .................................................................................................................. 28

INDEX TO APPENDICES AND EXHIBITS

APPENDIX A.

Original Brief by Counsel

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

Defendant's Pro-Se Supplemental Brief on Appeal

Ruling Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

APPENDIX D

Writ Application(s) to the Louisiana Supreme Court

APPENDIX E

Ruling Louisiana Supreme Court

\\Mepd05ICS\Jp-dcnstance801y cxuments\dIerts\ppc*jcet11mmy #717020\pouet11mmyU9ERTodt

Thnm, E Doucet v. Stare of Louisiana

10,

TABLE OF AUTHOR TIES:

Page

U.S. CONSTITUTION:

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ............................................ 1, 14, 17, 26

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution................................................................. 1, 13

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution ................................. 1, 14, 26

FEDERAL CASES:

Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 6, 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011)...........................................................16

Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012)...........................................15

Daubert v. Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)............................................................4, 24

Dupuy v. Cain, 210 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2000).................................................................................14

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)...........................................1

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970)..........................................14

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).............................14, 17

United States v. Jaramillo, 42 E3d 920..........................................................................................15

United States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir. 1989).......................................................4

United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F3 540................................................................................15

United States v. Penaloza-Duarte, 473 F.3d 575............................................................................15

United States v. Stewart, 145 E3d 273..........................................................................................15

LaC.Cr.P. Art. 793...................................................................................................................10, 12

LSA-R.S. 14:42................................................................................................................................7

LSA-R.S. 15:438............................................................................................................................16

RuleX, § (b) and (c) ........................................................................................................................ 1

STATE CASES:

Smith v. Schwander, 345 So.2d 1173, at 1175 (La 1977).............................................................16

State v. Adams, 550 So.2d 595, 599 (La 1989)...........................................................................2, 6

State v. Ayo, 167 So.3d 608 (La 6/30/15). ................................................................................ 4, 23

State Y. Baham, 151 So.3d 698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 10/1/14)...........................................................11

State v. Buras, 459 So.2d 756 (La App. 4th Cir. 1984)...................................................................3

State v. Calloway, 781 So.2d 849, 853 (La App. 5th Cir. 2/28/01)...............................................11

State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La 1983).....................................................................................16

State v. Chism, 591 So.2d 383, 386 (La App. 2nd Cir. 1991).......................................................26

State v. Copes, 566 So.2d 652, 654 (La App. 2nd Cir. 1990).......................................................17

\\Mepd05\JCSthn5thnc8Oly cumentIert YPajcet mmmv #717020otet mmmy UERTodt

Thnmv W Doucet v Stale of Loublana

ii.

State v. Davis, 131 So.3d 1002 (La. App. 5th Cir 12/193)

State v. Eason, 460 So.2d 1139 (La App. 2nd Cir. 1984)..............................................................16

State v. Freetime, 303 So.2d 487, 488-89 (La 1974)..................................................................2, 6

State v. (3ongre, 503 So.2d 785 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987)............................................................3, 7

State v. Gratha, 527 So.2d 488 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988). .......................................................... 3, 12

State v. Green, 493 So.2d 1178 (La. 1986)....................................................................................12

State v. Hammonlree, 363 So.2d 1364, at 1373 (La. 1978)...........................................................16

State v. Hart, 467 So.2d 1366 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).................................................................11

State v. Johnson, 726 So.2d 1126, 1133 (La App. 4th Cit. 1999)...............................................3, 7

State v. Kennedy, 803 So.2d 916 (La. 2001).................................................................................26

State v. Laprime, 437 So.2d 1124 (La 1983)................................................................................26

State v. Lewis, 590 So.2d 1266......................................................................................................11

State v. Loft, 535 So.2d 963 (La App. 2nd Cir. 1988)..................................................................26

State v. Lyles, 858 So.2d 325 (La App. 5th Cit. 9/16(03). ............................................................ 11

State v. Malbrough, 138 So.3d 65 (La. App. 5th Cir. 3/12/14)................................................11, 13

State v. Perkins, 423 So.2d 1103 (La. 1982)..........................................................................3, 7, 11

State v. R.W.W., 953 So.2d 131, 138 (La App. 3rd Cir. 2007)...................................................3, 7

State v. Ray, 577 So.2d 354 (La App. 1st Cir. 1991)...................................................................12

State v. Savoy, 916 So.2d 339, 344 (LaApp. 3rd Cit. 11/2105).......................................................2

State v. Smith, 339 So.2d 829, at 833 (La 1976)..........................................................................16

State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La 1983)....................................................................................16

State v. Tammetta, 624 So.2d 433 (La App. 5th Cir. 9/15/93)......................................................12

State v. Wright, 445 So. 2d 1198 (La 1984)..................................................................................16

MSCELLANEOUS:

110k858(3).....................................................................................................................................12

75 CJS Rape § 94...........................................................................................................................25

AACAP PRACTICE PARAMETERS: J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHEAThY,

36:10 SUPPLEMENT OCTOBER 10, 1997.................................................................................21

Criminal LawKey 110k1159.2(1).................................................................................................15

Criminal Law Key 110k1159.2(8).................................................................................................15

\\Mepd05S\ -dcxxistance80\ly Dcuments\JIerts'p\pwcet mmmy #717020Pouet limmy UERTOdt

Thnmy W Doucel v. Stare ofLoulsana

in.

INTHE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appellant respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[]

For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is

[ ]

reported at

;or,

has been designated for publication but is not yet reported or,

is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

petition and is

[ ]

[}

to the

;or,

reported at

has been designated for publication but is not yet reported or,

is unpublished.

[ X] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix

to the petition and is the Louisiana Supreme Court in Docket Number 2018K-0077.

[ ]

[X]

[ ]

reported at

;or,

has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

is unpublished.

The opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals appears at Appendix "C" to the

petition and is

[X]

[ ]

reported at 237 So3d 598 (La App. 50' Cir. 12/27/17); or,

has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

is unpublished.

\\MepdU\ICSJp-thnsthnce5O'Jly umen\dentsDcet limmy #7 17020'Pouzet mmmy U9OERTodt

Thnniy W Ducet v. S1ae VLoulstana

IiJTKi ) (Si (Ski

[ ]

For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was

[ ]

No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

and a copy of the order

Appeals on the following date:

denying rehearing appears at Appendix_____

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including

(date) on

(date) in

Application No.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

[X ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was November 18,

2016.

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following

date:

and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at

Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

(date) on

(date) in Application

to and including

No.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

\\Mepd05\ICS\Ip-doDnstance8Oy cume \dents'JYPojcet11mmy #717020\ouzet11mmyUERT.odt

Thnmy W Dwwd Y. State of LouLslana

CONSTITUTIONAL AN]) STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This conviction was obtained in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution. Specifically, Mr. Doucet was denied the right to a fair and impartial trial

with the district court allowing the jury to view the drawings (with testimonial evidence) during

deliberations.

NOTICE OF PRO-SE FILING

Mr. Doucet requests that this Honorable Court view these Claims in accordance with the rulings of

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Mt Doucet is a layman of the

law and untrained in the ways of filings and proceedings of formal pleadings in this Court. Therefore,

he should not be held to the same stringent standards as those of a trained attorney.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

In accordance with this Court's Rule X § (7,) and (c), Mr. Doucet presents for his reasons for

granting this wit application that:

Review on a Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a

Writ of Certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The following, although neither

controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court

considers.

A state court of last resort (Louisiana Supreme Court) has decided an important federal question in

a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States Court of

Appeals.

A state court or a United States Court of Appeals has decided an important question of federal law

that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a

way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.

\\Mepd05\IcSp-donstance80\My cxumen\d1ents\DDc&icet11mmy #717020'Pouet11mmyUSZERT.odt

Thnmy W Doucwt v. State Lou1sana

The Court of Appeals properly determined that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to review

SD's drawings during the deliberations.

However, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that such was "harmless error" due to the fact

that the drawing failed to "depict what occurred during the crimes themselves or any other significant

fact nor did it bear directly on an element of the offense."

The Court of Appeals specifically stated that:

"In the instant case, State's Exhibit 18 is a one-page document that contains several pictures and

writing on it. The bottom right hand portion contains the drawing the jury wanted to see,

namely, a picture of a person behind bars. Next to that picture is written, 'You're a m onster .. ."

Above that picture is a drawing of another person, and next to that person is written, Tm going

to kill you when I get out of this place!' In the top right hand corner is a gavel with the words,

'Not guilty!' written next to it In the middle of the page is a drawing of what appears to be a

girl, and next to that drawing are the words, 'This is all just a bad dream ... and you're never

waking up! U' In the top left hand corner is a drawing of a girl with the words, 'We didn't gather

enough evidence, so we think you have been lying to us and there was no case.' Below that

picture is a drawing of a person, who it appears has cut marks on her arm s. In the bottom left

had corner, there is a drawing of an individual, and there are words next to it stating, 'Look at

what you've done! U' At the top of the exhibit in the middle are the words, 'Was it because of

me? Yes, it was me .

The Court, in its own decision, admits that the written portion of the drawings are "testimonial" due

to the fact that SD explained the meaning of the drawings during her testimony. Although the drawings

did not contain depictions of the actual allegation, SD did express her "thoughts" and "fears" of the

possibility of Mr. Doucet being found "not guilty" as the had drawn each of these. During SD's

testimony, the State was able to obtain testimony as to the reason of each individual drawing on this

page. Therefore, the drawings reemphasized SD's testimony, and the jury should not have been

permitted to review such during deliberations.

"The general reason for the prohibition is a fear that jurors might give undue weight to the limited

portion of the verbal testimony thus brought into the room with them." SatgLij, av916 Sold 339,

344 (La App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05)(quoting State v. Adams, 550 Sold 595, 599 (La. 1989); and State v.

\\MepdOs\IcS\Ip-dcnstancesU\My D3cuments\d1entsP\Dwcet urn my #7 17O2O\Do.cet Tim my U9CERTodt

Thnmy W Daucd v. State if LouWana

Freethne, 303 So.2d 487, 488-89 (La. 1974)). Also see: Stale Y. Gongre, 503 Sold 785 (La App. 3

Cir. 1987)(wherein the court found > Article 793 violated when the trial court allowed the jury to

review the transcript of the defendant's oral statement for the purpose of examining its contents) and,

State v. Perkins, 423 Sold 1103 (La 1982Xwherein the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's

conviction and remanded the case for anew trial because the trial court allowed the jury to review the

defendant's written statement after retiring for deliberations). State v. 1?. W W. 953 So.2d 131, 138 (LaApp. 3 Cir. 2007).

Louisiana courts have reversed many convictions where the jury viewed a defendant's confession or

written statement or re-examined verbal testimony during deliberations. State v. Adams, supra (jury

reviewed defendant's confession to police); State v. Burg,s459 Sold 756 (La. App. 4' Cir. 1984)

(aggravated kidnapping reversed because during deliberations the jury was given a transcript of

recorded telephone calls between the kidnappers and the victim's family); Swe j(kq4q, 527 So.2d

488 (La App. 5th Or. 1988)(jury reviewed the defendant's written statements). Graaa noted that

prejudice was presumed, quoting Freeman, supra State v. Johnson, 726 So.2d 1126, 1133 (La App.

4th Cir. 1999).

The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in denying Mr. Doucet relief in his Assignment

of Error concerning insufficiency of the evidence.

It appears as though the Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration that SD had testified as

to her eight or nine different personalities that only, "me, myself, and F' know about (Rec.pp. 301-2);

SD had on her "serious" personality for the trial (Rec.pp. 301-2); SD had a bigger imagination than

everyone in the courtroom (Rec.pp. 302-3); that these incidents had "popped" in SD's head on the

school bus on the way home (Rec.pp. 283-4); that the stories SD conjure up, "pop" into her head; and

that she could tell the same story over and over without changing anything in the story (Rec.pp. 302-3).

\\MepdU5\JcS\p-daDnsthnce8O\My D3cuments\dlents\D\Dcijcet limmy #7 17020\Douet Timmy u9cERT.odt

2Jminy W Dowd v. State (fLoz4s1ana

Mr. Doucet properly argued the fact that the physical examination failed to corroborate SD's

allegations. The Court of Appeals has also erroneously determined that Dr. Jackson's testimony

concerning, "the hymen was like a 'donut opening, like a ring," has merits. Dr. Jackson offered NO

evidence which would support her "theory,"

The Science Community recognizes Dr. Jackson's field of expertize as "Junk Science," and that the

testimony is contrary to the findings of the American Pediatrics Association (which she claims to quote

from). Dr. Jackson's testimony is ONLY to improperly "bolster" the testimony of the alleged victim

and to "give credibility" to the testimony given, not for substantial evidence to show proof of guilt.

This testimony does not meet the criteria of Daubert v. Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

The testimony of these "Expert" witnesses was recently deemed unreliable in the Louisiana

Supreme Court in State Y. Ava, 167 So.3d 608 (La. 6/30115), where the Court reversed the convictions

of Derrick Mais, Brett Ward, Clayton King, and Michael Ayo for the charges of Aggravated Rape and

Attempted Aggravated Rape.

Testimony "so unbelievable on its face that it defies physical laws" would be "incredible as a

matter of law." Uriited States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cit 1989).

It appears as though the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal and the Louisiana Supreme Court

failed to take into consideration that SD had testified as to her eight or nine different personalities that

only, "me, myself,and I" know about (Rec.pp. 3 01-2); SD had on her "serious" personality for the trial

(Rec.pp. 301-2); SD had a bigger imagination than everyone in the courtroom (Rec.pp. 302-3); that

these incidents had "popped" in SD's head on the school bus on the way home (Rec.pp. 283*4); that the

stories SD conjure up, "pot?' into her head; and that she could tell the same story over and over without

changing anything in the story (Rec.pp. 302-3).

Mr. Doucet properly argued the fact that the physical examination failed to corroborate SD's

allegations. The Court of Appeals has also erroneously determined that Dr. Jackson's testimony

\\Mepd05CS\Ip-doDnsthnce80\My Dcuments\Ients\D\Dwcet mmmy #717020\Douet limmy UERT.odt

llmmy W Dowd v. State ifLouIthana

concerning, "the hymen was like a 'donut opening, like a ring," has merits. Dr. Jackson offered NO

evidence which would support her "theory,"

The Science Community recognizes Dr. Jackson's field of expertize as "Junk Science," and that the

testimony is contrary to the findings of the American Pediatrics Association (which she claims to quote

from). Dr. Jackson's testimony is ONLY to improperly "bolster" the testimony of the alleged victim

and to "give credibility" to the testimony given, not for substantial evidence to show proof of guilt.

This testimony does not meet the criteria of Daubert v. Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

The testimony of these "Expert" witnesses was recently deemed unreliable in the Louisiana

Supreme Court in State v. Aio, 167 So.3d 608 (La 6/30/15), where the Court reversed the convictions

of Derrick Mais, Brett Ward, Clayton King, and Michael Ayo for the charges of Aggravated Rape and

Attempted Aggravated Rape.

Testimony "so unbelievable on its face that it defies physical law&' would be "incredible as a

matter of law" United statesv. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 605 (sth Cit 1989).

Permitting the Jury to Review SD's Drawings During Deliberations:

The Court of Appeals properly determined that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to review

SD's drawings during the deliberations.

However, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that such was "harmless error" due to the fact

that the drawing failed to "depict what occurred during the crimes themselves or any other significant

fact nor did it bear directly on an element of the offense."

The Court of Appeals specifically stated that:

"In the instant case, State's Exhibit 18 is a one-page document that contains several pictures and

writing on it. The bottom right hand portion contains the drawing the jury wanted to see,

namely, a picture of a person behind bars. Next to that picture is written, 'You're a monster . . ."

Above that picture is a drawing of another person, and next to that person is written, I'm going

to kill you when I get out of this place!' In the top right hand corner is a gavel with the words,

'Not guilty!' written next to it In the middle of the page is a drawing of what appears to be a

girl, and next to that drawing are the words, 'This is all just a bad dream

and you're never

...

',MepdO5VS\Jp-donstance8OMy

Thw,y W Dtut v. &ale 4 fLoMWana

cumen&Øerts'\Dcucet limmy #7 17O2O\oet mm my UERTOdt

waking up!!!' In the top left hand corner is a drawing of a girl with the words, 'We didn't gather

enough evidence, so we think you have been lying to us and there was no case.' Below that

picture is a drawing of a person, who it appears has cut marks on her anus. In the bottom left

had corner, there is a drawing of an individual, and there are words next to it stating, 'Look at

what you've done! U' At the top of the exhibit in the middle are the words, 'Was it because of

me? Yes, it was me ..."

Furthenn ore, the Court of Appeal, in its Ruling stated that (p. 15):

"In this case, our review reveals that the trial judge erred by permitting the jury to view the

State's Exhibit 18 during jury deliberations. That exhibit contained numerous writings that

duplicated the victim's testimony by written words contained on that page. As such, we find that

the jury could have viewed the exhibit for its verbal contents, i.e, the victim's feelings and

emotions about defendant wanting to kill her, about going to court, and about committing

suicide, which she had testified about at trial. Thus, when the trial judge allowed the jury to

view this document with the victim's writings, the jury was allowed "access to written

evidence" for its verbal content, which is prohibited by LaC.Cr.P. Art. 793?'

The Court of Appeal failed to consider that the jury deliberated for several hours before requesting

to see this document However, after viewing the document, the jury's deliberation ended quite quickly,

and returning a guilty verdict. The Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the viewing of the

drawing was harmless error.

The Court, in its own decision, admits that the written portion of the drawings are "testimonial" due

to the fact that SD explained the meaning of the drawings during her testimony. Although the drawings

did not contain depictions of the actual allegation, SD did express her "thoughts" and "fears" of the

possibility of Mr. Doucet being found "not guilty" as she had drawn each of these. During SD's

testimony, the State was able to obtain testimony as to the reason of each individual drawing on this

page. Therefore, the drawings reemphasized SD's testimony, and the jury should not have been

permitted to review such during deliberations.

"The general reason for the prohibition is a fear that jurors might give undue weight to the limited

portion of the verbal testimony thus brought into the room with them." &qfry, Savoy, 916 Sold 339,

344 (La App. Yd Cir. 11/2105)(quoting State v. Adams, 550 So.2d 595, 599 (La 1989); and State v.

\\Mepd)5\ICSJp-donsta,ce8O'1y Dcuments'1dients\D)aicet Timmy #717020pouet limmy U9CER.T.odt

limmy W Doucet Y. State q'Loustana

Freetbne. 303 So.2d 487,488-89 (La 1974)). Also see: State v. Gongre, 503 So.2d 785 (La App. 3

Cir. 1987)(wherein the court found > Article 793 violated when the trial court allowed the jury to

review the transcript of the defendant's oral statement for the purpose of examining its contents) and,

State v. Perkins, 423 So.2d 1103 (La 1982Xw6erein the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's

conviction and remanded the case for a new trial because the trial court allowed the jury to review the

defendant's written statement after retiring for deliberations). State v. 1?. W W. 953 So.2d 131, 138 (La

App. 3m Cir. 2007).

Louisiana courts have reversed many convictions where the jury viewed a defendant's confession or

written statement or re-examined verbal testimony during deliberations. State v. Adams, supra (jury

reviewed defendant's confession to police); State v. Burg s, 459 So.2d 756 (La App. 4 Cir. 1984)

(aggravated kidnapping reversed because during deliberations the jury was given a transcript of

recorded telephone calls between the kidnappers and the victim's family); £4

jg, 527 So.2d

488 (La. App. 5th Cm 1988)0uiy reviewed the defendant's written statements). Gracia noted that

prejudice was presumed, quoting Freeman, supra State v. Johnson, 726 So.2d 1126, 1133 (La App.

4' Cir. 1999).

However, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief without written opinion.

STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

On January 14, 2016, the Grand Jury that was impaneled in Jefferson Parish indicted Mr. Timothy

W. Doucet (Mr. Doucet) for Aggravated Rape, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:42. The allegation indicated

that Mr. Doucet had sexual intercourse with SD when she was eight years old and the sexual contact

lasted until the minor reached the age often.

Mr. Doucet entered a plea of not guilty to the charge, and he completely denied before and after

trial that he raped SD. Mr. Doucet indicated that he and SD's father have been having a series of verbal

\\Mepd05\JCs\Ip-dojnstance80tly Dcumen

Thnny W Doucet v. State (Lou1sana

ents\p\pcucet limmy #717020\Douet urn my UERT.odt

and physical conflicts long before the instant allegation. In fact, the evidence showed that Mr. Doucet

and his brother's wife were having an affair, which may have culminated into Mr. Doucet being

targeted as the person who allegedly raped SD. It was the sexual affiuir that Mr. Doucet was having with

his brother's wife that resulted in the family tension between Mr. Doucet and his brother. Mr. Doucet

further argued that SD's false allegation of rape was simply an escalation of the brewing conflict

between himself and SD's father.

Following the conclusion of all discovery matter, the prosecution and defense counsel selected a

tive-member jury. The State then presented evidence from several witnesses, including the pre-teen

minor who testified that Mt Doucet had sexual intercourse with her, starting when she was eight years

old and continuing until she was ten years old. SD happened to be visiting with her grandparents in

Jefferson Parish at the time of the allegation.

Defense counsel presented to the jury that SD suffered from Asbergers Syndrome (it was stated that

SD's conditions makes her hyper-focused and sometimes disruptive), and lived with her parents who

had frequent sex parties with other couples. Given the promiscuous behavior of SD's parents, Mr.

Doucet argued before the jury that if SD had been sexually assaulted, it was more likely by one of the

men who participated in her parents' sex parties.

Also, during questioning, SD testified that she had 8 or 9 different personalities and that this

allegation had "popped up in my head on the way home on the bus." SD further testified that, "My

imagination is bigger than everyone in the room," and that she could tell the same fictional story over

and over.

During its deliberations, the jurors requested access to the drawings that SD drafter during the time

the was undergoing therapy following the alleged rape. Defense counsel strenuously objected to the

jury having access to these drawings, arguing that SlYs drawings were equivalent of hearing her

\Mepd05CSJp-doDnstance8Oly Dcumenllerts\Dwcet Timmy #717020\Pouet urn my USOERT.odt

Thnmy W Doucet v. State .jLouWana

testimony a second time. The district court disagreed, ruling that the jury could have access to her

drawings while deliberating Shortly thereafter, the jury returned with a unanimous verdict against Mr.

Doucet for Aggravated Rape. Defense counsel filed Motions for a New Trial and a Post-Verdict

Judgment of Acquittal, alleging the district court committed reversible error in allowing the jury to

view SD's drawings while in deliberations.

The district court denied all post-trial motions, and the district court sentence Mr. Doucet to life

imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of Probation, Parole, or Suspension of Sentence, to be

served with the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Correction.

On June 1, 2017 Mr. Doucet, through counsel appointed by the Louisiana Appellate Project timely

filed his Original Brief on Appeal. Mr. Doucet filed his Motion for Leave to Supplement Appeal, and to

Review the Record Upon receipt of the Court of Appeals Record, Mr. Doucet observed the that the

Record failed to include the Vow Dire proceedings. On June 22, 2017, Mr. Doucet filed a Motion for

Production of Additional Records and Request for Extension of Time to File Brief.

Mr. Doucet's motion was granted, and the district court was ordered to forward the Voir Dire in its

entirety. Mr. Doucet was informed that he would have twenty (20) days after receiving his Voir Dire

transcript to file his Pro-Se Supplemental Brief.

On August 17, 2017, Mr. Doucet received the Voir Dire transcript from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals, and was notified that his deadline for filing his Pro-Se Supplemental Brief is

September 5, 2017.

On August 25, 2017, Mr. Doucet timely filed his Pro-Se Supplemental Brief on Appeal.

On December 27, 2017, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Doucet's

conviction and sentence, and remanded the matter to the district court in order to correct the Uniform

Commitment Order to reflect hard labor, and Sex Offender Registration Notification.

\\Mepd05\1CSp-daxisthnce8O1y

limmy W Doucet v. Stale qLouLsana

umen13\dients\D)cucet limmy #717020\J)otxet fl m my USCER1odt

Mr. Doucet timely filed Writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was denied on October 8,

2019 without written opinion.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

SD, a thirteen-year old middle-school student, reported to her parents and then to the police that she

had been red by an adult relative when she was eight years old. SD indicated that she was made to

have sex with this male relative several times while she was visiting with her grandparents in Jefferson

Parish.

SD also testified to the "exact" same incident concerning her cousin, which allegedly occurred in

the State of Mississippi, informing the jury that she did not want her cousin to get into trouble for his

actions.

ISSUE NO. 1

Reasonable jurists would determine that it was reversible error for the district court to

permit the jury, over defense counsel's objections, to view SD's drawings during its

deliberations when these drawings amounted to testimonial evidence which is specifically

prohibited in the Louisiana Criminal Code.

According to La. C.Cr.P. Art. 793, ajuly may be permitted to have access to view any document or

object received in evidence if a specific request is made by the jury foreperson and the document or

object is necessary to enable the jury to arrive at a verdict.

In this case, the drawings were the equivalent of testimony, and the statute specifically indicates

that "[t}estimony shall not be repeated to the jury." These drawings at issue came from SD's thoughts,

feelings and emotions

all of which she had already testified to during the trial. Not long after

receiving SD's drawings, the jury returned with a unanimous verdict against Mr. Doucet. Therefore, the

district court committed reversible error when it overruled defense counsel's objections and permitted

the jury to have access to these drawings during jury deliberations.

As mentioned earlier, the jury is not to inspect any written evidence or have said evidence read to

\\Mepd05\ICS\Ip-dcnsthnce80'J4y Dxument3\d1erts\PJ)cucet11mmy #717020Pouet11mmyUSERtodt

10.

Thmnzy W Daswt v. State qLouLstana

the jury; however, the object that was involved in this case was several drawings or sketches that

pertained to the alleged victim's thoughts, beliefs, feelings or emotions. The State attempted to show

that SD's drawings were nothing more than photographs which were drawn in conjunction with her

testimony thereby making the photographs nothing more than harmless error. See: Stale v. Cal/away.

781 So.2d 849, 853 (La App. 5' Cir. 2/28/01).

Yet, these drawings were not based on a reproduction of a physical location or object, but rather, it

was a depiction of the alleged victim's feelings and emotions resulting from the allegation. See: $LqLy.

Perkins, 423 Sold 1103 (La 1982).

These however, were sketches and drawings of her feelings and thoughts about the alleged incident

that were done to help her cope with what she alleged to have happened since she already had difficulty

communicating with others; thus, these drawings were testimonial. See: State v. Li/es. 858 So.2d 325

(La. App. 5' Cir. 9/16/03).

The drawings were dark in nature because the drawings reflected her anxiety, fears and nightmares.

Thus, allowing the jury to view these images a second time in the deliberation room was synonymous

to SD coming into the deliberation room and repeating her testimony to the jurors. See: State v. Lewis,

590 So.2d 1266, writ denied, 600 Sold 634 (La 1992)(stating that it is automatic reversible error for

the jury to hear testimony repeated to them; see also St

jJiri, 467 So.2d 1366 (La.. App. 5' Cir.

1985); State v. Ba/tam, 151 So.3d 698 (La App. 40' Cir. 10/1/14), writ denied, 178 So.3d 138 (La

9/18/15)(stating that ajuiy is prohibited from bringing the transcript of the witness' testimony into the

deliberation room).

In State v. Maibrougll, 138 So.3d 65 (La App. 5' Cir. 3/12114), "Trial court acted Within its

discretion in not allowing jury, during deliberations, to view the certified packet for a prior driving

while intoxicated (DWI) conviction that was to serve as a predicate offense for third offense DWI,

\\Mepd05\Ip-donstance8Oy cumenflent&ppwcet Timmy #717020Douet Timmy USOERT.odt

llmmy W Doucet v. State qcLou1thana

II.

where packet contained written infonnation, the jury did not indicate why it wanted to view packet, it

appeared that the jury wanted to view packet to determine whether defendant's lack of a signature on

the 'Certificate' at end of guilty plea form rendered his prior guilty plea invalid, and all of State's

exhibits, including packet, were published to the jury prior to the deliberations." La.C.Cr.P. Art. 793.

110k858(3).

Furthermore, in Malbroug1. the Court of Appeals had held that, "Generally, ajuly is not allowed to

inspect written evidence during deliberations except for the sole purpose of a physical examination of

the document itself to determine an issue which does not require the examination of the verbal contents

of the document" See also: State v. Davis, 131 So.3d 1002 (La App. 5 Cir. 12/19/13), writ denied,

147 So.3d 703, habeas corpus dismissed by, Davisv. Cain, 2016 WL 4529877.

In the case of State v Twnmetta, 624 So.2d 433 (La App. 51h Cir 9/15/93), Mr. Tammetta had

complained of the Judge permitting the jury to take into the deliberations, the written statements of the

girls made when they first reported Tammettato school officials. Mr. Tainmetta argued that, "during its

deliberations, the jury asked for and was allowed to examine the evidence, including the girls' written

statements, which is a violation of LaC.Cr.P. Art. 793, which mandates that a jury must rely on its

memory in reaching a verdict.

In the case of Tainmeila, during deliberations, while both counsels were out of the courtroom, the

judge allowed the statements to go into the jury room. He advised counsel of this later, and Tammetta's

attorney objected.

The Court could not say that this was hannless error and that there is no reasonable probability it

might have contributed to Tammetta's conviction. See: State v. Green, 493 Sold 1178 (La 1986);

State v. Gracia, 527 So.2d 488 (La App. 5' Cir. 1988); State v. Ray, 577 So.2d 354 (La App. 1 Cir.

1991). This error violated substantial rights and is reversible. Twmne#a, supra.

\\MepdO5\IcS\Jp-donstance80\My Dcumenients\D\Dcucet mmmy #717020\Douet mmmy UERtodt

Thnnzy W Douct v. State fLoulsana

12.

La.C.Cr.P. Art. 793 states in pertinent part:

Art. 793. Use of evidence in jury room; reading of recorded testimony; jurors' notes.

A. Except as provided in Paragraph B of this Article, a juror must rely upon his memory in

reaching a verdict. He shall not be permitted to refer to notes or to have access to any written

evidence. Testimony shall not be repeated to the jury.

This Court cannot conclude that this article had been sent to the jury room during deliberation in

order to compare a signature or to see or feel it with its regard to its actual existence. State v.

Maibrough, 138 So.3d 65 (La. App. 5' Cir. 3/12/14).

Reasonable jurists could argue that the trial court erred in allowing the "drawings" in the jury room.

As the "drawings" consisted of "written" testimony which had been presented during SD's testimony

concerning her thoughts at the time of competing such, this Court must find that the written portions of

the "drawings" have to be considered as "testimony," and improperly allowed in the jury room

pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. Art. 793.

In the case before the Bar, Mr. Doucet contends that the trial court's decision to allow the State's

Exhibit of the drawing (which included SD's thoughts) cannot be considered "harmless error," and this

Court cannot say that there is no reasonable probability it might have contributed to Mr. Doucet's

conviction.

The drawings depicted not only who she believed sexually assaulted her, but also how the assault

impacted her physical and emotional well being. These drawings greatly impacted the jury's impression

of whether Mr. Doucet was guilty of the alleged offense; thus, the ruling violated his Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution right to a fair and impartial trial, and Mr. Doucet requests that this

Court vacate and set aside his conviction based on the district court's reversible error.

\\MepdU5S'Jp-do,nsthnce8O\1y

Thnnp W Lkawd v. Sa1e qLcuthana

cumenl\dIents\D\pcucet limmy #717020\0ouet 11 mmy U9ERTOdt

13.

ISSUE NO. 2

Reasonable jurists would argue that the evidence presented during trial was insufficient to

convict Mr. Doucet of Aggravated Rape beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginw

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

After a thorough review of the evidence, Mr. Doucet contends that jurists of reason would not have

found him guilty of Aggravated Rape beyond a reasonable doubt due the alleged victim's testimony.

The actual evidence in this case indicates that no one other than Devon had sexually abused the alleged

victim in this case.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons accused of a crime against

conviction unless the State proves every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970).'

In Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the United States

Supreme Court reached the legal standard of review, i.e., "... whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt ..." In the court's view, the factfinder's role as

weigher of evidence was preserved by considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution: ". The criterion thus impinges upon 'jury' discretion only to the extent necessary to

guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct., at

2790, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573-574. This standard is applied with "explicit reference to the substantive

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Id. at 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. at 2791 n. 16.

Dupity v. Cain, 210 F.3d 582 (5' Cir. 2000).

The deferential standard of review, whereby reviewing courts must affirm a conviction if; after

viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

This type of error has been recognized as patent error preventing conviction for the offense La.C,Cr,P, art 920(2),

see indicative listing at State , GI1k't. 200 La. 935, 9 So. 2d 235, 239 (1942), Quoting: State v. Cnthy. 338 Sold 584,

588 (La.1976).

\\Mepd05cS'Jp-dconstance80ly

Thnnjy W Doucet v. Slate q'LouWana

cumenIents'Pajcet11mmy #717020\JDotxet11mmyU9ZERT.odt

14.

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,

does not permit the type of fme-grained factual parsing necessary to determine that the evidence

presented to the factfmder was in "equipoise," and that therefore reversal of the conviction is

warranted,abrogating United States v. faramLilo, 42 F3d 920, United States v. Ortega Revna, 148

F.3d 540, United States v. Pe

za-Duarte 473 F.3d 575, and, United States v. Stewart, 145 F.3d

273. Criminal Law Key 11Okl159..2(1).

Courts reviewing a conviction are empowered to consider whether the inferences drawn by a jury

were rational, as opposed to being speculative or insupportable, and whether the evidence is sufficient

to establish every element of the crime. Criminal Law Key 110k1159.2(8).

The Jackson standard, which has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, may be

difficult to apply to specific cases but is theoretically straightforward. In contrast, the "equipoise rule"

is ambiguous. At one level, whether it applies only to cases ungirded by circumstantial evidence, as

opposed to direct or circumstantial evidence, is not entirely clear. Moreover, no court opinion has

explained how a court determines that evidence, even when viewed most favorably to the prosecution,

is "in equipoise." Is it a matter of counting inferences or of determining qualitatively whether

inferences equally support atheory of guilt or innocence?

In any event, when appellate courts are authorized to review verdicts of conviction for evidentiary

"equipoise," they must do so on a cold appellate record without the benefit of the dramatic insights

gained from watching the trial. The potential to usurp the july's function in such circumstances is

inescapable. Jackson's "deferential standard" of review, however, "does not permit the type of fine-

grained parsing" necessary to determine that the evidence presented to the factfmder was in

"equipoise." Compare: Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012).

Jackson also "unambiguously instructs that a reviewing court, 'faced with a record of historical

\\MepdO5\ICSdorstance8O\My cumen

Thnmy W Doucet v. State ofLouWana

entsPcucet limmy #7 17U2O')otcet limmy UERtodt

15.

facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume

record

- -

even Wit does not affirmatively appear in the

that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to

that resolution.' Cavazosv. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 6, 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011).

When, as here, the conviction rests upon circumstantial evidence, that evidence must exclude every

reasonable hypothesis except guilt. LSA-R.S. 15:438. Whether circumstantial evidence excludes every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence presents the following question of law:

In all cases where an essential element of the crime is not proven by direct evidence, LSAKS. 15:438 applies. As an evidentiary rule, it restrains the factfinder [in the first instance, as

well as the reviewer on appeal, to accept as proven all that the evidence tends to prove and then

to convict only if every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. Whether

circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence presents a

question of law. State v. ilammontree, 363 So.2d 1364, at 1373 (La. 1978); Smith v.

Sdawander. 345 So.2d 1173, at 1175 (La. 1977); State Y. Smith, 339 So.2d 829, at 833 (La

1976). In applying LSA-R.S. 15:438, all the facts that the evidence variously tends to prove

on both sides are to be considered, disregarding any choice by the factfinder favorable to

the prosecution. The reviewer as a matter of law can afflnn the conviction only if the

reasonable hypothesis is one favorable to the State and there is no extant reasonable hypothesis

of innocence.2

However, this statutory rule is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard to be applied

instead of an efficiency of the evidence test whenever the state relies on circumstantial evidence to

prove an element of the crime. State v. Wright, 445 So. 2d 1198 (La. 1984); Stale v. Eason, 460 So.2d

1139 (La App. 2 Cir. 1984), writ denied, 463 So.2d 1317 (La 1985). Although the circumstantial

evidence rule may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror's

reasonable doubt formula, it emphasizes the need for careful observance of the usual standard and

provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of

circumstantial evidence. State v. ChLsm, 436 So.2d 464 (La 1983)); State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471

(La. 1983). Ultimately, all evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to

satisfy a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wright, supra,

2 Stale ii Skajini, pp. 19-20,431 So.2d 372 (La. 1982)[emphasis added].

\\Mepd05VCS\Jp-danstance80\1y Dcuments 1entsP\Pwcet11mmy #717020\Doucet11mmyU9CERTodt

Thniny W Douat v. Stale of LouLs2ana

16.

State v. Eason, supra State v. Copes, 566 So.2d 652, 654 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990).

A fair review clearly proves that the statements substantially impeach each other. The question

remains were these child got this fabricated story. Could this be because the alleged victim believed

that Mr. Doucet had aftempted to run over her father, or the fact that SD emphatically testified about

her imagination? SD also testified that these allegations had "popped into her head" on the way home

from school one day (Rec.p. 283).

In light of the overwhelming amount of inconsistent testimony, after viewing evidence in light most

favorable to prosecution, any rational trier of fact could not have found the essential element of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14. (See: Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S.Ct.

2781,443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979); Winship, supra.).

Testimony of SD:

The alleged victim's own testimony during the course of this trial would indicate that SD could not

be believed by a reasonable jury. SD proclaimed that she was a "greaf' story teller and could tell the

same "story" over and over without changing anything in the story.

The jury erroneously determined that SD's testimony was credible due to the fact that there were

too many discrepancies in her testimony.

First, when SD was questioned as to how the allegations were "brought to the light," she testified

that, "It was just a thought that popped up in my head on the way home on the bus" (Rec.p. 283). SD

testified that the stories that she conjured up to tell her friends and family also "just popped up" in her

head.

What made you tell your mom when you were 12?

It was just a thought that popped in my head on the way home on the bus.

When you say a thought that popped up in your head on your way home in the bus, the bus

from school.

The thought that popped in your head, what was this thought?

\\Mepd05\IS\I -dnsthnce8O1y DcumenI\dients\D\DajcetTimmy #717020\Douet11mmyU9OERtodt

21mm,W Doucet Y. SWJe ofLouIslana

17.

Well, I don't really exactly I don't exactly remember.

(Rec.pp. 283-4)

Why does that worry you?

Because, of course, with all the murder documentaries I've seen, everyone needs to gather

evidence for every case.

Why does it worry you if there's no evidence?

Because if there's not enough evidence, then the person who might convicted of

I mean

the suspect might not actually be the suspect, the person who actually did it.

(Rec.pp. 295-6)

- -

SD was unsure of herself when she testified that: (1) "There's no drugs in all that" (Rec.p. 304)

when she was questioned if any of the police documentaries that she watched concerned any abuse

concerning children; and then she testified that, °The show were mainly about drug abuse" (Rec.p. 362).

During cross-examination, SD first testified that she had two (2) personalities (including the one

that doesn't show up oflen)(Rec.p. 300). SD testified that, "It's basically my dark side. Then, SD

testified that she has eight (8) or nine (9) different personalities, and proudly stated that her imagination

was "bigger than everyone in the room" (Rec.pp. 301-2). During cross-examination, SD testified that:

Do your parents know about these personalities?

Not that not really. Just me, myself, and I.

Do bad things happen to these personalities?

No, they're just there until they eventually pop up. That's what happens.

Can you send them away?

Yeah, I can. I can store them all away. I have my serious personality on right now

(emphasis added).

(Rec.pp. 301-2)

- -

Although the State argued that SD could not have just thought these allegations up," SD did testify

that she watched quite a bit of true police documentaries, including a documentary on a child abuse

case on television (Rec.p. 304). SD also testified that she was a"reat" story teller, and that her stories

had been based upon fantasy. In fact, when questioned about "things that make you unique," SD

testified as:

\\MepdO5\ICS\Ip-d03nstance80\My

Thnmy W. Doucat v. Stale 4fLOUWtZn€Z

ument\dIents'P\pcucet1]mmy #717020Douet11mmyU9OERTodt

18.

I want to ask you, also, right underneath that, Things that make you unique. You say, my

imagination.

Yes.

Do you have abig imagination?

Yes, bigger probably bigger than all of your imaginations.

Than everyone in the room?

Yeah, probably. Fm not frying to brag or anything.

That's okay. Is this how you have so many stories to tell people?

Yeah.

(Rec.pp. 302-3)

- -

During SD's testimony, she was adamant about the one time that she had remembered Mr. Doucet

sexually abusing her. However, SD also testified that Mr. Doucet had sexually assaulted her on several

occasions, but could not remember what had happened on any of the alleged incidents (Rec.p. 279),

and that her mouth had touched Mr. Doucet's crotch, but could not really remember what had happened

(Rec.p. 280).

Also, during the cross-examination, SD made similar allegations against her cousin, Devon with the

following testimony:

Why would Devon be mad at you?

Well, the question you asked before, I said, "Break" He did hurt me once.

Onetime?

Yeah, once.

Where were you?

I was at my house.

In Mississippi?

A; Mm-hum.

Which room were you in?

My brother's.

You don't share a room with your brother?

No, Idonot.

Did Devon hurt your private area?

No.

No?

\\Me05CS'ip-doDnsthnce8Oy Dcument\d1ent5\D'cucetTImmy #717020\Douet11mmyU9OERtodt

Thnmy W Doucelv. State jLou1sana

19.

No, he just like he broke my heart. I know that's not considered an injury, but I'm talking

about like what he did, he made me feel uncomfortable and he made me sad.

Did he make fun of you?

No, he did not.

IguessI - - howdidhebreakyourheart?

what I've said in this case, it got me

Like I'm

from what all this and what I've done

thinking about that part. Well, I'm not really too sure if it happened or not, but I think

okay so, of course my brother left the room and like Devon just covered me and him up

with a blanket and he pulled out his crotch but I was sad. I mean like I didn't know he would

do it. I mean like but from what I thought in the case, I think T-Bird sent him to do it or

else he would have been punished, I think.

Todowhat?

Abuse me.

To-Yeah.

I thought you said he pulled out

His crotch.

Did he do something with it?

He made me lick it. Pm not sure if this happened, I mean I think it did. I don't exactly

remember clearly.

Do you have trouble remembering sometimes?

Yeah.

When you get nervous?

Mm-hum.

Did you tell anyone about that?

Well, I recently told the attorneys the last time I was here.

Did you tell your mom?

Yeah, I told my mom. Like I remember I was talking to another set of attorneys back in

Pearl River.

And you told your mom about Devon?

Yeah. I told them and my mom and my dad.

Did you tell Devon to stop?

No, Iwas too busy.

Busy?

Like the doing the thing he wanted me to do.

Sorry. Do you remember how long ago that was?

Iwas eight.3

3 It must be noted that this is the EXACT same age that 3D stated that the abuse began with Mr. Doucet, and one of the

\Mepd05'1cS-dojnstance801y

Thnmy W Douct v. State a"LouLsana

uments!ents\D)c*.jcet mmmy #717020Douet limmy UERTOdt

20.

(Rec.pp. 319-21)

On Re-Direct Examination, SD testified that:

Okay. You got upset when Ms Landry asked about Devon. Is that because you don't want

Devon to get in trouble for what happened?

Yeah, plus I thought you said not to talk about Devon. Only the two times that it

happened and that T-Bird abused me (emphasis added).

(Rec.p. 324)

This testimony elicited from SD would appear as though SD had been "coached" prior to her

testimony in this case.

After reviewing this testimony above, this Court must also consider the possibility that this is a case

of Perpetrator Substitution by SD. According to the AACAP PRACTICE PARAMETERS: J. AM.

ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY, 36:10 SUPPLEMENT OCTOBER 10, 1997 (pages 50s

and 5 1s), Perpetrator Substitution is one of the many possible explanations of false allegations of

sexual abuse. Sometimes children make false accusations. Although most allegations made by children

are true, the evaluator should consider the ways in which false allegations might come about an

allegation may be partly true (that the child was abused), but partly false (as to who was the

perpetrator). An allegation may have a nidus of truth, but may have been inaccurately elaborated in

response to repetitive questioning.

In Perpetrator Substitution, the child may actually may have been sexually abused and manifests

symptoms consistent with abuse, but identifies the wrong person as the perpetrator, resulting in a false

allegation. The child may do this to protect the actual offender or the child may displace the memories

and accompanying affects onto another individual. It must be noted that SD's version of the incident

with Mr. Doucet was EXACTLY the same as it was with Devon. Same exact scenario, same exact

actions, etc.

SD had testified that she believed that Mr. Doucet had sent Devon in to do that or else Devon

exact same situation concerning Mr. Doucet.

ccuments'1ents\D'Dctcet11mmy #717020\Pouet11mmyU9OER1odt

I flmmy W\\Mepd05\ICSdcxnsthnce801y

21.

Douct v. State ,(LauIsana

would have been punished for what he had done (Rec.pp. 319-21). But, during her testimony, nothing

was presented by the State which proved that Mr. Doucet or any other adult had knowledge of this

incident until after SD made allegations against Mr. Doucet.

Although SD had testified that Mr. Doucet had threatened her in order to prevent her from reporting

these indiscretions, she had informed Dr. Jamie Jackson that Mr. Doucet had offered her twenty (20)

dollars (Rec.p. 361).

It's sad, but quite possible, that SD had made these allegations against Mr. Doucet due to the fact

that during her testimony, SD stated that her father, Michael Doucet, had told her that Mr. Doucet tried

to run him over with his pickup thick previously. SD also testified that she had overheard her father

discussing that Mr Doucet had tried to run him over (Rec.p. 318).

And you told us earlier that your uncle was banned from your house in Mississippi?

Yes, ma'am.

Do you know why?

He tried to kill my dad by running him over, he told me, I think.

Who told you?

Myda4i

Your dad told you Timmy tried to run him over?

Well, I heard him in a conversation. Then he told me.

(Rec.pp.3 17-8)

To enable the State to overcome the alleged victim's lack of credibility, the State enrolled the

assistance of Dr. Jamie Jackson of the Aubrey Hepburn Care Center, which is part of Children's

Hospital through LSU. Dr. Jackson had testified as an "Expert" in the field of Child Abuse Pediatrics

(Rec.p. 355).

Although Dr. Jackson met with SD one time, and there was no physical evidence of any sexual

assault.4 Dr. Jackson was of the opinion that SD had been sexually abused by Mr. Doucet. Dr. Jackson

4 Nour Although 2D testified that Mr. Doucet raped her numous time from the age of eight (8) to ten (10), Dr. Jackson

testified that the hymen was" normal" and showed no signs of trauma.

\Mepd05CS'Jpnsthnce80\1y Cocumenl\dIert&P\Pcucet limmy #717020\Pouet 11mmyU9ERTodt

Thnmy W Doua!tv. State qLouIsfana

22.

also testified to the fact that every time that she has testified, she has testified that the child (alleged

victim) was likely to have been sexually abused.

Recently, the testimony of these "Expert" witness have been criticized by the Courts. The Louisiana

Supreme Court, in State v. Api, 167 So3d 608 (La 6/30/15), reversed the convictions of Derrick Mais,

Brett Ward, Clayton King, and Michael Ayo for the charges of Aggravated Rape and Attempted

Aggravated Rape. In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, "reports of alleged victim's

pretrial statements to witnesses that she had not been raped, but had instead been injured in an accident

on a four-wheeler, constituted newly discovered evidence and that warranted new trial."

In the case ofg, "experts" in the field of forensics had testified that:

'[D]elayed piecemeal revelations of sexual abuse are common with younger victims, who

usually make their first disclosure to peers instead of to a parent or to authorities 'because they

are concerned about getting into trouble, family problems, and embarrassment,' and also

because they 'often consider trying to forget about such events or pretend like they never

happened.' according to Rickles, RP appeared to fit that pattern: she disclosed the rapes for the

first time to Devon Radecker on the night they happened; she then made only the partial

disclosure of a beating and attempted rape to her mother, the authorities, and forensic

interviewers, [JoBeth] Rickles and [Dr] Atzemis, eventually adding the detail of the attempted

oral intercourse; and she finally made full disclosure to her mother, the Attorney General's

Office, and then to jurors at trial. Dr. Atzemis also opined that the bruises on RP's body could

have stemmed from blunt force trauma but were more likely caused by a laying-on of hands

during sexual assault.

(FN6.) Sate v. Ay , 2014-1933, 167 So.3d 608 (La. 2015).

In the case of 4y., supra, the alleged victim lied about what had happened. These alleged

perpetrators of the horrible crimes had their lives destroyed from June of 2008 to June of 2015, when

the Louisiana Supreme Court granted relief in their cases. These individuals were sentence to life

imprisonment without the benefit of Probation, Parole, or Suspension of Sentence and were considered

"Sex Offenders" during their incarceration. The State had relied heavily on the testimony of its two

"Expert" witnesses, JoBeth Rickles and Dr. Atzemis to obtain these convictions. Then the State has the

audacity to continuously consider this type of testimony as credible.

\\Mepd05\IcS'Jp-donstance8O\My Dcumen Ients'P\Pwcet limmy #717020'Potcet Timmy UERTodt

23.

Thnmy W Doucet v. State q'LouLana

The State has been continually using the testimony of these "experts" who have consistently

testified on behalf of the victim in order to obtain convictions for innocent persons accused of sexual

misconduct. Mainly, the purpose of this testimony is to overcome the State's lack of evidence (physical,

DNA, or eyewitness). When it comes to a case of credibility between the alleged victim and defendant,

this "Expert" testimony "tips the scale" to ensure the State a conviction, even if it means sentencing an

innocent person to incarceration for the remainder of their lives for a crime that they have not

committed. This practice MUST come to an end.

This type of testimony has been labeled as so inherently unreliable that they cannot aid decision

making in the criminal justice system. The clinician observer applying his or her own theory is simply

unreliable. It is logical that this Court should be reluctant to allow it to be used for a purpose which it

was not intended a credibility evaluation tool.

Therefore, the courts have found that this type of evidence is of highly questionable scientific

validity, and fails to unequivocally pass the Daubert threshold test of scientific reliability. In any

capacity, it is highly unlikely that it will be useful to a jury on the issue of witness' credibility,

especially as a tool for determining whether or not abuse actually occurred. See: Daubert v. Dow

Phar,naceu4cals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Even assuming that CSAAS-based testimony or expert testimony itself does indeed pass the

Daubert threshold test for scientific validity, we now explore whether or not it's use to bolster the

victim's credibility was improper so as to unfairly prejudice the defendant.

Testimony by an expert is not particularly helpful to a jury that must rely upon own common sense

as a barometer for the evaluation of truthfulness. The cases all seem to focus on, in the face such expert

testimony, fears of the jury surrendering it's own common sense in weighing victim testimony and

deferring to a diagnosis was nothing more than a subjective opinion favoring the victim.

\\Mepd05\JCS'Jp-dwnsthnce8Uly Lxxuments\d1erts\p4Dcucet11mmy #717020potxet11mmyU9cERTodt

24.

Thnmy W Doucet Y. State if Louls±ana

In this case, the State had called Dr. Jackson to the stand as an "Expert" witness in order to

corroborate SD's testimony due to the fact that the State understood from the onset of these

proceedings, SD would not be credible to the jury.

Furthermore, This case gives the Court the opportunity to give concrete substance to the rule of law

that contradictory testimony, such as incredible, inherently improbable or impeached testimony, is

insufficient to uphold a conviction.

Corroboration ofavictim's testimony in sexual offense cases is triggered only by contradictions

in the victim's trial testimony. Thus, corroboration is mandated when the victim's testimony is

so contradictory and in conflict with physical facts, surrounding circumstances and common

experience that its validity is rendered doubtful such that corroboration of the victim's

testimony is required to sustain the conviction.

75 CJS Rape § 94

There is no corroborating evidence in this case. The testimony of the accusing witnesses in this case

was clearly contradictory and impeached, as shown be the record, notwithstanding the fact that the

State suppressed flirther Brady impeachment evidence from the defense at trial

Further, incredible, contradictory, or impeached testimony fails to establish a corpus delicti in the

first instance, and also goes to the flns1üp standard at trial

The State produced no physical evidence which would establish that anyone had committed

Aggravated Rape on SD at anytime, at ggy place. Indeed, even the question of venue of a crimes rests

upon the establishment that an actual crime happened in the first place. The corpus delicti in the instant

case is not satisfied by testimony of the prosecutrix without any corroborating circumstances. There is

not even a doctors report in evidence that establishes the possibility of sexual activity of kind.

The fact that impeached testimony, standing alone, cannot uphold a conviction under the law is

predicated upon the fact that impeached testimony, standing alone, fails to establish a corpus delicti in

the first instance

\\Mepd05cSjp-do3nstance8U\My Dcument\dierts\\Dcucet 11 mmy #7 17020\Dotxet 11 m my U9OERTodt

25.

flmmy W Doucet v. Stake 4fLozdthiiw

While the credibility of a witness is a matter for the finder of fact, once impeached, that witness's

testimony becomes suspect under the law and must be corroborated in order to be convincing evidence

of guilt or innocence. This is especially true where the credibility of the witness is paramount to the

outcome of the case.

Impeached testimony, as a general rule, cannot stand alone to convict. State v. ChLn, 591 So.2d

383, 386 (La App. 21Cir. 1991), citing, Stale v. Laprime, 437 Sold 1124 (La. 1983); Slate v. Loll,

535 Sold 963 (La App. 2 Cir. 1988).

In State v. Kennedy, 803 Sold 916 (La 2001), in Justice Traylor's dissenting opinion, it is stated

that the Louisiana Supreme Court has found that, "The victim's testimony, standing alone, can prove

that the act occurred, . . ." but is qualified in FN9, "However, we have also ruled post-trial that

impeached testimony of a witness, standing alone, cannot prove the offense."

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the State has failed to meet its stringent burden of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt, and this Court, after a careful review of the Record, must invoke its

Supervisory Authority of Jurisdiction over the lower courts and Grant the necessary relief.

SUMMARY

The State Courts have erred in failing to address these properly filed Issues concerning the

reversible error of the trial court in allowing the jury to view SD's drawings (with written testimony)

during the course of the deliberations. This is clearly a violation of Mr. Doucet's Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and a denial of Mr. Doucet's constitutional right to a

fair and impartial trial of Lack of Jurisdiction, and have denied erroneously W. Doucet relief.

Furthermore, no reasonable jurists could determine that the testimony of SD was credible after the

fact that she had testified about her "multiple" personalities; the fact that her imagination was "bigger

than everyone's in the courtroom;" and, her story was "exactly" the same concerning the incident in

Mepd05CSp-thnstance801y Documenlerts\DPojcet limmy #717020ouzet limmy USCERTodt

llmmy W Dowd Y. State VLoutsfana

26.

which she testified Mr. Doucet's son had abused her (but, she did not want Mr. Doucet's son to be in

trouble).

Let's not forget that SD testified to the fact that her stories just "pop" into her head (as this incident

had), and that she could tell the same story years later without any variances.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in the previous filings in the State of Louisiana Courts, Mr.

Doucet's Writ of Certiorari should be granted, and this matter be remanded to the district court for a

new trial. Mr. Doucet has shown that this conviction is contrary to clearly established federal law as

established by the United States Constitution and the United States Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Z A-A IrA.M LJ

W-A-C4

Timmy WJoucet

Date: December 5, 2018

Dxument\dIents\Dcucet11mmy #717020\Douet 11mmyUERT.odt

I llmmy W.\\Mepd05\IcS'Jp-donstance80'Jly

DoxiM Y. Stare t(LouLtaaa

27.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.