Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Joel Marvin Munt, Petitioner v. Minnesota

Supreme Court briefJan 7, 2019

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F

IN THE

FQ ED

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

-

Joel Marvin Munt

---PETITIONER

(Your Name)

VS.

State of Minnesota--- RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

Minnesota Supreme Court

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Joel Marvin Munt

(Your Name)

5329 Osgood Ave N.

(Address)

Stillwater, MN 55082

(City, State,.Zip Code)

N/A

(Phone Number)

Joel Marvin Munt

CLERK

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

Did MN Supreme Court violate Separation of Powers?

Did MN Supreme Court's interpretation of Minn.Stat. § 590 and

Minn.R.Crim.P. 27.03 unconstitutionally permit violations of

the Constitution to go unredressed and did it permit

Plaintiff's sentence to go uncorrected despite facially being

in violation of Double Jeopardy and State Statutes?

Did MN Supreme Court's violation of rules of statutory

construction render their effort to save their judicially

created exception unavailing?

Did MN Supreme Court draw an unreasoned distinction between

Minn.Stat. § 609.035, 609.04 and 611.02.

Joel Marvin Munt

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

Joe! Marvin Munt

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONSBELOW ......................................................................................................................1

JURISDICTION.............................................................................................................................2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...................................................3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................................................... 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..........................................................................................35

CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................40

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIXA

3re'ne (o4

Decision of the Minnesota Court-

-ofAPPENDIX B

Denial of

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

Joel Marvin Munt

Re-vi-e-w

by Minnesota Supreme Court

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

AUTHORITY

CASES

Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 US 482 (1947)

Sank v. Germain, 112 S.Ct. 1146 (1992)

Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 180

L.Ed.2d 269 (2011)

Butz v. Economou, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)

Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763 (Minn.

2005) (en banc)

Earl v. Fabian, 556 F.3d 717 (8th Cir. 2009)

Erickson v. Sunset Memorial Park Assn., 259

Minn. 532, 108 N.W.2d 434 (1961)

Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505

US 469 (1992)

Food and Drug Administration v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 529 US 120

(2000)

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 US 460 (1983)

Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S.Ct. 681 (2009)

Jones v. Bock, 549 US 199, 127 S.Ct. 910

(2007)

Klinger v. Dept. of Corr., 107 F.3d 609 (8th

Cir. 1997)

Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 US 526,

157 L.Ed.2d 1024, 124 S.Ct. 1023 (2004)

Lenz v. Coon Creek Watershed District, 278

Minn. 1, 153 N.W.2d 209 (1967)

Lexicon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &

Lerach, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998)

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 US 189 (1971)

Minneapolis Eastern Railway Co. v. City of

Minneapolis, 247 Minn. 413, 77 N.W.2d 425

(1956)

People for Environmental Enlightenment and

Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v. Minn.

Environmental Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d

858 (Minn. 1978)

Quam v. State, 391 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1986)

State ex rel. Canton v. Weed, 208 Minn. 342,

294 N.W. 370 (1940)

State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290 (Minn.

1995)

State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 181)

State v. Fleming, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016)

Joel Marvin Munt -

PAGE NUMBER (S)

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7-8

8

9

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8

7

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7

8-9

8

13

9

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5

9

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AUTHORITY

State v. Hernandez, 2001 Minn.App. LEXIS 638

(Minn.Ct.App. June 12, 2001)

State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 1998)

State v. Leinweber, 228 N.W.2d 120 (1975)

State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276 (Minn. 2013)

State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849 (Minn.

1980)

State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759 (Minn. 1999)

State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440 (1997)

U.S. v. Butler, 297 US 1, 56 S.Ct. 312, 80

L.Ed. 477 (1936)

U.S. v. Sandstrom, 594 F.3d 634 (8th Cir.

2010)

United States v. Goldenberg, 168 US 95 (1897)

United States v. Granderson, 511 US 39, 127

L.Ed.2d 611, 114 S.Ct. 1259 (1994)

Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 US 458 (1969)

STATUTES AND RULES

MN.Const.Art.III, sec. 1

MN.R.Crim.P. 27.03

Minn.Stat. § 590

Minn.Stat. § 609.035

Minn.Stat. § 609.04

Minn.Stat. § 611.02

Minn.Stat. § 645.08, subd. 1

Minn.Stat. § 645.16

S.Ct.R. 10

U.S. Const. Art. 1 Sec. 9 Cl. 2

U.S. Const. Art. VI Cl. 2

U.S. Const. Art. VI Cl. 3

U.S. Const. Arnd. 1

U.S. Const. Arnd. 14

OTHER

Joel Marvin Munt

PAGE NUMBER(S)

10

8

11

5

6

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3,5

11,13-4,14,15

11,15

4,6,10,13,14,17

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17

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment

below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal 'courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

to the petition and is

; or,

[ I reported at

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ I is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

the petition and is

to

; or,

[ I reported at

[ I has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ I is unpublished.

[x] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix A

to the petition and is

; or,

[ I reported at

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

is unpublished.

The opinion of the

appears at Appendix

court

to the petition and is

or,

[ ] reported at

[ I has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ 11 is unpublished.

.

Joel Marvin Munt

1.

JURISDICTION

[ I For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was

[ ]No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

IA timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court

of Appeals on the following date:

and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

,

]An extension of time to file the petition for writ of certiorari was

granted to and including

(date) on

(date) in Application No.

A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

[x I For cases from state courts

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix A

[ ]No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

/

[x IA timely petition for review was thereafter denied on the following date:

and a copy of the order denying review

appears at Appendix B

[ ]An extension of time to file the petition for writ of certiorari was

granted to and including

(date) on

(date) in Application No.

A

-

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

Joel Marvin Munt

2.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Provision

U.S. Const. Art. 1 Sec. 9 Cl. 2

The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be

suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the

public Safety may require it.

U.S. Const. Art. VI Cl. 2

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which

shall be made in Pursuance thereof

shall be the supreme Law

of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound

thereby

...

U.S. Const. Art. VI Cl. 3

The senators and representatives, and the members of the

several state legislatures; and all executive and judicial

officers, both of the United States and the several states,

shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this

Constitution

U.S. Const. Amd. 1

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the

right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition

the Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const. Amd. 14

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge

the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws.

MN.Const.Art.III, sec. 1

The powers of government shall be divided into three

distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial.

No person or persons belonging to or constituting one of

these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly

belonging to either of the others except in the instances

expressly provided in this con s titution.

Joel Marvin Munt

3.

Provision

Minn.Stat. § 609.035

if a person's conduct constitutes more than one offense under

the law of the state, the person may be punished for only one

of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of

them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them.

Minn.Stat. § 609.04

Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of

either the crime charged or an included offense, but not

both. An included offense may be any of the following:

A lesser degree of the same crime; or

An attempt to commit the crime charged; or

An attempt to commit a lesser degree of the same crime;

or

A crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were

proved; or

A petty misdemeanor necessarily proved if the

misdemeanor charge were proved.

-

A conviction or acquittal of a crime is a bar to further

prosecution of any included offense, or other degree of the

same crime.

Minn.Stat. § 611.02

Every defendant in a criminal action is presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved and, in case of a reasonable

doubt, is entitled to acquittal; and when an offense has been

proved against the defendant, and there exists a reasonable

doubt as to which of two or more degrees the defendant is

guilty, the defendant shall be convicted only of the lowest.

Joel Marvin Munt

4.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Did MN Supreme Court violate Separation of Powers?

Separation of powers protects the individual as well as the

branches. Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2358-59, 180

L.Ed.2d 269 (2011)

"The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct

departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or

persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments

shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either

of the others except in the instances expressly provided in

this constitution." MN.Const.Art.III-, sec. 1

Nowhere in the Minnesota Constitution does it "expressly"

provide that any Minnesota Court has the power to take on the

role of legislator by modifying laws. A court has inherent

judicial authority to engage in activities that are necessary to

the performance of judicial functions, but "the judiciary is not

to resort to inherent authority when doing so would not 'respect

the equally unique authority of' another branch of government."

State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 280, 282 (Minn. 2013) (quoting

State. v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. 19 r81))\ . ml.,. MI Supreme

N

Court has never permitted one branch to exercise the power

exclusively assigned to another, see Quam v. State, 391 N.W.2d

803, 809 (Minn. 1986)

-

.

The creation of criminal laws and

determining the lawful penalties for the violation of those laws

is clearly a legislative function and the MN Constitution

Joel Marvin Munt

5

contains no express provision that would permit the MN Supreme

Court to exercise this power. Further, the MN Supreme Court

lacks the authority to alter the plain, unambiguious meaning of

the Separation of Powers provision of the MN Constitution. Any

attempt to do so would be a violation itself.

At issue is the Judicially created multiple victim exception to

Minn. Stat. 609.035.

"The general rule is that if a person's conduct constitutes

more than one offense, the person may be punished for only one

of the offenses. Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (1994) This court has

carved out an exception to this multiple punishment bar when

multiple victims are involved, and has upheld multiple

sentences for multiple crimes arising from the same behavioral

incident. See State v. Sookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn.

1995); State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 850 (Minn. 1980).

In Marquardt, this court stated the rule that one sentence may

be imposed per victim in multiple-victim cases as long as the

multiple sentences "do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality

of the defendant's conduct." 294 N.W.2d at 851." State v.

Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 453 (1997) (emphasis added)

.

Seeming to have realized that facially they violated the

constitution, the MN Supreme Court tried to say what they were

really doing was just interpreting their statute, but creating

such an exception goes beyond that.

The statute is explicit about the exceptions to this

restriction, none of which apply to Defendant and none include

an exception for multiple victims. "When statute lists specific

exemptions, other exemptions are not to be judicially implied."

Joe! Marvin Munt

6.

Klinger v. Dept. of Corr., 107 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1997)

.

See

also Jones v. Bock, 549 US 199, 127 S.Ct. 910 (2007) ("[T]he

judge's job is to construe the statute

-

not to make it better"

The judge "must no read in by way of creation" but instead abide

by the "duty of restraint, th[e] humility of function as merely

the translator of another's command." "No mere omission ... which

may seem wise to have specifically provided for, justif[ies] any

judicial addition to the language of the statute" at 921

(quoting United States v. Goldenberg, 168 US 95 (1897)).

"If [the legislature] enacted into law something different

from what it intended, then it should amend the •statute to

conform to its intent. 'It is beyond our province to

rescue [the legislature] from its drafting errors, and to

provide what we might think ... is the preferred result.'

United States v. Granderson, 511 US 39, 68, 127 L.Ed.2d

611, 114 S.Ct. 1259 (1994) (concurring opinion)

This

allows both of our branches to adhere to our respected, and

respective, constitutional roles." Lamie v. United States

Trustee, 540 US 526, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024, 124 S.Ct. 1023

(2004) at 1038-9.

.

If a "statute requires expansion, that is the job of [the

legislature]

."

Food and Drug Administration v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 529 US 120 (2000). "It is not

for us to speculate, much less act, on whether [the legislature].

would have altered its stance had the specific events of this

case been anticipated" Id at 147 (citation omitted)

When the meaning of statutory language is clear, that

meaning governs application of the statute. Minn.Stat. §

645.16. Then "further construction is neither necessary nor

Joel Marvin Munt

-

7.

permitted." Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 777 (Minn.

2005) (en banc), and the "court must enforce it according to its

terms." Earl v. Fabian, 556 F.3d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 2009)

.

See

Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S.Ct. 681 (2009); Bank v. Germain,

112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992)

Words and phrases should be construed according to the

rules of grammar and according to their common meanings.

Minn.Stat. § 645.08, subd. 1.

"Shall", "will", and "must" are all words "of an

unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain

procedures shall, will, or must be employed" (internal quotes

omitted)

.

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 US 460, 471-2 (1983)

.

The

mandatoy "shll" normally creates "an obligation impervious to

judicial discretion". Lexicon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad

Hynes & Lerach, 140 L.Ed.2d 62, 64 (1998) (see Anderson v.

Yungkau, 329 US 482, 485 (1947)); State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d

317, 319 (Minn. 1998)

.

command of the Statute.

The Court must give effect to the plain

Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling

Co., 505 US 469, 476 (1992). "All officers of the government,

from the highest to the lowest, are creatures, of the law, and

are bound to obey it.," Butz v. Economou, 5.7 L.Ed.2d 895, 897

(1978)

"This conclusion is consistent with the general policy of

statutory construction followed by this court of

Joel Marvin Munt

8.

harmonizing statutes dealing with the same subject matter.

Lenz v. Coon Creek Watershed District, 278 Minn. 1, 11, 153

N.W.2d 209, 217 (1967); State ex rel. Canton v. Weed, 208

Minn. 342, 344, 294 N.W. 370, 371 (1940) We also presume

that, in enacting a statute, the legislature acted with

full knowledge of prior legislation on the same subject.

Erickson v. Sunset Memorial Park Assn., 259 Minn. 532, 543,

108 N.W.2d 434, 441 (1961); Minneapolis Eastern Railway Co.

v. City of Minneapolis, 247 Minn. 413, 418, 77 N.W.2d 425,

428 (1956)." People for Environmental Enlightenment and

Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v. Minn. Environmental Quality

Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 866 (Minn. 1978)

.

Nothing in the plain text of the law could lead anyone to

believe that it contains an exception for multiple victims.

The MN Supreme Court clearly violated separation of powers.

2. Did MN Supreme Court's interpretation of Minn.Stat. § 590 and

Minn.R.Crim.P. 27.03 unconstitutionally permit violations of

the Constitution to go unredressed and did it permit

Plaintiff's sentence to go uncorrected despite facially being

in violation of Double Jeopardy and State Statutes?

"The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and

established by the people. All legislation must conform to

the principles it lays down. When an act or Congress is

appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to

the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the

government has only one duty; to lay the article of the

Constitution which is invokes beside the statute which is

challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the

former." U.S. v. Butler, 297 US 1, 56 S.Ct. 312, 318, 80

L.Ed. 477 (1936)

The Courts have ruled that Double Jeopardy is only violated

in a single proceeding when multiple punishments are imposed for

the same crime contrary to the legislature's intent.

Sandstrom, 594 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2010)

.

U.S. V.

"The legislature is

vested with the power to prescribe punishment for criminal acts

Joel Marvin Mont

9.

and limits prescribed by the legislature." State v. Pflepsen,

590 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Minn. 1999). The Minnesota legislature's

intent is stated clearly 609.035, 609.04 and 611.02.

"we need not rely on our case law when a-controlling

statute resolves the issue before us" State v. Fleming, 883

N.W.2d 790, 798 n. 6 (Minn. 2016).

Petitioner was convicted on four counts of 1st degree

murder, and the included charges of 2nd degree intentional

murder, kidnapping, and drive by shooting. Minn.Stat. 609.04

prohibits a Defendant from being convicted of both an offense

and an included offense. It further goes on to define what

constitutes an included offense. Minn.Stat. 611.02 prohibits

being convicted of an offense and a lesser degree, and if you

are convicted of both then only the lesser can stand.

It is for the jury, not the Court to make a finding of

guilt. If they convict of multiple degrees in violation of the

law then clearly there was doubt in their minds about which the

defendant was guilty of.

In State v. Hernandez, 2001 Minn.App. LEXIS 638

(Minn.Ct.App. June 12, 2001) a defendant who was convicted, of

2nd and 4th degree controlled substance charges had his 2nd

degree conviction reversed and the case was remanded to the

district court for sentencing on the 4th degree charge, pursuant

to Minn.Stat. § 611.02.

Joel Marvin Munt

10.

In State v. Leinweber, 228 N.W.2d 120 (1975) the Court

clearly construed Minn.Stat. § 611.02 to extend to all lesser

included offenses. Thus any violation of 609.04 must be

resolved (per 611.02) by vacating all but the lowest conviction.

At minimum this would mean second degree murder rather than

1st degree, which would give Petitioner an out date. Statutory

construction says even more relief is due.

It does not seem disputed that Minn.Stat. 609.04 and 611.02

were violated in Plaintiff's case, thus violating Double

Jeopardy. The MN Supreme Court's argument is that because

Plaintiff did not know to raise this on direct appeal and

because the DCC prevented him from doing so post-conviction that

the law is unenforceable. Can then the Constitution still be

said to be the supreme law? Is it justice to allow a Defendant

to serve a life sentence when the state's law clearly says the

conviction and thus the sentence is illegal?

The Constitution is the Supreme Law. As a method of

enforcing the Supreme Law the Constitution provides the

privilege of habeas corpus and right to petition.

The US

Supreme Court's favorable termination doctrine means that

constitutional violations that would invalidate a conviction

Joel Marvin Munt

11.

must be resolved in habeas proceedings before you can exercise

your right to petition. The Federal Government has suspended

the right to habeas corpus after the 1st provision (despite that

the Constitution explicitly says it can only be suspended for

invasion or insurrection), thus leaving many violations of the

Constitution without any federal review.

The MN Supreme Court interprets 27.03 Motions and 590

Petitions in such a way as to permit violation of the

Constitution and law and to do grave injustices to those

unfortunate enough to not be legal wizes on their direct

appeals. If allowed to stand a Defendant whose convictions

facially violate these statutes and double jeopardy has no

remedy in state or federal court! It further permits the State

to ensure that you are unable to file them on direct appeal or

post-conviction petition, as the State did to Plaintiff.

Basically, can I be condemned to life without the

possibility of parole in violation of the law solely because I

did not know to raise these arguments earlier? These are not

things were any facts can be disputed. They are purely matters

of law.

Joel Marvin Munt

12.

Did MN Supreme Court's violation of rules of statutory

construction render their effort to save their judicially

created exception unavailing?

I'm not sure what to do here. The complete argument for

this question is by necessity included in l. The MN Supreme

-

Court argued that rather than violating separation of powers (as

they themselves implicitly said they were doing) they were only

doing construction. In #1 I demonstrated that they violated the

rules of statutory construction, thus their judicially created

exception cannot be justified as merely a product of

construction. It ignores the plain meaning of the words, has no

basis in the words of the law, and ignores the principle that if

the legislature added explicit exceptions it is not for the

court to create its own.

Did MN Supreme Court draw an unreasoned distinction between

Minn.Stat. § 609.035, 609.04 and 611.02.

Unreasoned distinctions between statutes are immaterial. See

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 US 189 (1971); Williams v. Oklahoma

City, 395 US 458 (1969)

In this case the MN Supreme Court said that it could hear the

argument based on Minn.Stat. 609.035 because it only affected

sentence, but could not hear arguments based on 609.04 or 611.02

because they affect convictions. There is nothing in the text of

these laws to support drawing this distinction. All three are bars to

multiple convictions.

Joel Marvin Munt

Further, nothing in 27.03 even says it cannot

13.

grant relief if a conviction would be vacated, only that it is to

correct a sentence unauthorized by law, which clearly applies to

Plaintiff's sentence (at minimum under 611.02)

.

What then justifies

the difference in treatment? And since 609.035 prohibits multiple

convictions, yet can be resolved in a 27.03 motion, why can't 609.04

and 611.02 violations?

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

S.Ct.R. 10 states a non-exhaustive list of reasons for which review

may be granted. This list includes:

has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court,

state court of last resort decided a federal issue contrary to

another state court of last resort or a US Circuit Court,

state court decided a federal question [1] that has not been, but

should be settled by this Court, or [2] in a way that conflicts

with relevant decisions of this court.

It further states the list is "neither controlling nor fully

measur[es] the Court's discretion". I would argue that any time the

Federal Constitution has been violated this Court has a duty to see

that violation is redressed and in fact that upholding the

Constitution is the primary duty of this Court.

1. Did MN Supreme Court violate Separation of Powers?

The prisons of this Minnesota contain thousands of inmates.

These three statutes have been violated for the majority of them and

they are denied correction to their sentences to make them comply with

the law solely because they are not experts at criminal law.

The MN Supreme Court was accurate when it described its action as

a judicially created exception. That when called on for the violation

they try to lamely justify it as statutory construction fails on its

face.

Joel Marvin Mont

14.

I have no idea what actually draws the justices of this court to

a question. A great many violations of the Constitution seem to be

allowed to go uncorrected solely due to procedural issues with no

thought to if the Constitution was violated. Here the too court in

the state violated the constitution and inmates are paying the price

of it.

Important question upon which Supreme Court should rule. See

S.Ct.R. 1O(a)+(b)+(c).

2. Did MN Supreme Court's interpretation of Minn.Stat. § 590 and

Minn.R.Crim.P. 27.03 unconstitutionally permit violations of

the Constitution to go unredressed and did it permit

Plaintiff's sentence to go uncorrected despite facially being

in violation of Double Jeopardy and State Statutes?

The prisons of this Minnesota contain thousands of inmates. Many

of these inmates are denied relief from their convictions and

sentences not due to the lack of merits in their arguments but due to

the time and procedural bars the State imposes, punishing them for not

being attorneys. This places violations of these rules above

violations of the Constitution. The Constitution is meant to protect

the people from the government. Is it so easy for the government to

insulate itself from the Constitution?

These three statutes have been violated for the majority of MN

inmates, including the Petitioner, and they are denied correction to

their sentences to make them comply with the law solely because they

are not experts at criminal law. This means the difference between an

outdate and life in prison for Plaintiff. Had he known to raise this

on direct appeal and known how to raise it he would not now be serving

Joel Marvin Murit

15.

a life sentence (as you can see this is a simple matter of law,

without disputed facts)

The MN Supreme Court was accurate when it described its action as

a judicially created exception. That when called on for the violation

they try to lamely justify it as statutory construction fails on its

face.

I have no idea what actually draws the justices of this court to

a question. A great many violations of the Constitution seem to be

allowed to go uncorrected solely due to procedural issues with no

thought to if the Constitution was violated. Here the too court in

the state violated the constitution and inmates are paying the price

of it.

Important question upon which Supreme Court should rule. See

S.Ct.R. 1O(a)+(b)+(c).

3. Did MN Supreme Court's violation of rules of statutory

construction render their effort to save their judicially

created exception unavailing?

The MN Supreme Court was accurate when it described its action as

a judicially created exception. That when attention was called to the

violation they tried to lamely justify it as statutory construction.

Since they did not actually follow rules of statutory construction and

the exception is clearly adding to the statute (in a way that goes

against its clear text), it clearly was exactly as they originally'

described it.

I have no idea what actually draws the justices of this court to

a. question. A great many violations of the Constitution seem to be

Joel Marvin Munt

16.

1

allowed to go uncorrected solely due to procedural issues with no

thought to if the Constitution was violated. Here the too court in

the state violated the constitution and inmates are paying the price

of it.

Important question upon which Supreme Court should rule. See

S.Ct.R. 1O(a)+(b)+(c)

4. Did MN Supreme Court draw an unreasoned distinction between

Minn.Stat. § 609.035, 609.04 and 611.02.

The Minnesota Legislature used these three statutes to put

limitations on when multiple convictions are permissible, or to put

differently, defined when they are impermissible. The same type of

resolutions naturally exist for them both. Yet the MN Supreme Court

draws a distinction that allows sentences that are illegal under one

to be corrected at any time, but not those that are illegal under the

other two. There is no basis for the Court to permit violations of

double jeopardy to go unremedied on this basis.

I have no idea what actually draws the justices of this court to

a question. A great many violations of the Constitution seem to be

allowed to go uncorrected solely due to procedural issues with no

thought to if the Constitution was violated. Here the too court in

the state violated the constitution and inmates are paying the price

of it.

Important question upon which Supreme Court should rule. See

S.Ct.R. 1O(a)+(b)+(c).

Joel Marvin Munt

17.

CONCLUSION

The State knows its laws. It willfully violates the three at

issue in this petition in almost every criminal case. Judges,

prosecutors, and attorneys are allowing these violations to

occur. Yet only the inmates who are lucky enough to find a

competent jailhouse attorney in time for their direct appeal or

1st post-conviction petition get relief. This is an injustice

on a state-wide scale. I plead with this court's sense of

justice and duty to the Constitution to look at this Petition.

Further information on the legal arguments involved can be

provided if the Court desires.

The important issues in this petition deserve review by the

Supreme Court.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Joel Marvin Munt

Date:

Joel Marvin Munt

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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