Amicus Curiae Brief — Illinois Liberty PAC, et al., Petitioners v. Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 6, 2019

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No. 18-755

IN THE

___________

ILLINOIS LIBERTY PAC, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE

REGISTERED WITH THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF

ELECTIONS, EDGAR BACHRACH, AND KYLE

MCCARTER,

PETITIONERS,

LISA MADIGAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

__________

BRIEF FOR THE CATO INSTITUTE AS

AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONERS

__________

February 6, 2019

Ilya Shapiro

Counsel of Record

Trevor Burrus

CATO INSTITUTE

1000 Mass. Ave. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 842-0200

ishapiro@cato.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................. 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT ......................................................... 1

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 4

THE FIRST AMENDMENT BROADLY

PROTECTS POLITICAL SPEECH ...................... 4

A. The Founders Envisioned Campaigns with

Open Debate and Uninhibited Political

Expression ......................................................... 6

B. Buckley Correctly Held That Campaign

Spending Is a Form of Speech Protected by

the First Amendment and Foresaw the

Dangers of Even Those Contribution Limits

It Approved ........................................................ 7

II. BUCKLEY’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN

CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES

IS UNWORKABLE AND DOES NOT SOLVE

THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION ................... 9

A. The Buckley Distinction Is Untenable and

Unworkable ....................................................... 9

B. Eliminating the Buckley Distinction Would

Both Energize Our Democracy and Reduce

Corruption ....................................................... 14

III.STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE

BUCKLEY DISTINCTION ................................. 15

A. Stare Decisis Means Following the Law, Not

Preserving Every Precedent or Maintaining

Erroneous Decisions........................................ 15

B Abandoning the Buckley Distinction Would Be

Consistent with Stare Decisis ......................... 20

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 22

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) ............... 18, 19

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ................... passim

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,

285 U.S. 393 (1932) ................................................ 19

Calif. Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) .... 10

Citizens United v. FEC,

558 U.S. 310 (2010) .................................... 6, 7, 8, 21

Colo. Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC,

518 U.S. 604 (1996) ............................................ 3, 12

FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.,

470 U.S. 480 (1985) .................................................. 8

FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc.,

551 U.S. 449 (2007) ................................................ 19

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,

501 U.S. 529 (1991) ................................................ 17

Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) ............... 20

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) .................... 21

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2006) ................ 11, 12

McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) ... 3, 8, 12, 13

Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) ............. 2, 6, 10

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ........ 5

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC,

528 U.S. 377 (2000) ................................................ 12

Patterson v. McClean Credit Union,

491 U.S. 164 (1989) .......................................... 17, 18

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)............. 17, 18

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)................. 1

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) ................... 19

Other Authorities

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries

(U. Chicago Press 1979) (1765) ........................ 16, 17

Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free

Speech, 42 St. Louis U. L.J. 789 (1998) ................. 10

Cong. Research Serv., Supreme Court Decisions

Overruled by Subsequent Decision (1992) ............. 19

David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten

Years (1997) .............................................................. 7

Dhammika Dharmapala and Filip Palda, Are

Campaigns Contributions a Form of Speech?

Evidence from Recent U.S. House Elections,

112 Pub. Choice 81 (July 2002) ............................. 14

Geoffrey R. Stone, “Is Money Speech?,” Huffington

Post, Feb. 5, 2012, https://bit.ly/1hHxWvS ............. 7

Ilya Shapiro & Caitlyn W. McCarthy, So What If

Corporations Aren’t People?,

44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 701 (2011)............................ 5

Ilya Shapiro & Nicholas Mosvick, Stare Decisis

after Citizens United: When Should Courts

Overturn Precedent,

16 Nexus: Chap. J. Pub. Pol’y 121 (2011) ............. 18

James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law

(12th ed. 1989) (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed. 1873) ........ 16

John Coleman and Paul F. Manna, Congressional

Campaign Spending and the Quality of

Democracy, 62 J. Pol. 757 (2002) ........................... 14

John Coleman, The Distribution of Campaign

Spending Benefits across Groups,

63 J. Pol. 916 (2001) ............................................... 14

John J. Coleman, “The Benefits of Campaign

Spending,” Cato Institute Briefing Paper No. 84

(September 4, 2003) ......................................... 14, 15

John Samples, “Move to Defend: The Case against

the Constitutional Amendments Seeking to

Overturn Citizens United,” Cato Institute Policy

Analysis No. 724 (Apr. 23, 2013) ............................. 5

John Samples, The Fallacy of Campaign Finance

Reform (2006) ................................................... 13, 15

Lilian BeVier, Money and Politics: The First

Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform,

73 Cal. L. Rev. 1045 (1985) .................................... 13

Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of

England 45 (Charles M. Gray ed., 1971) (1820) ... 16

The Federalist No. 10 (Madison) ................................. 6

The Federalist No. 51 (Madison) ................................. 6

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

The Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public policy

research foundation dedicated to advancing individual

liberty, free markets, and limited government. Cato’s

Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies promotes the principles of limited constitutional government that are the foundation of liberty. To those ends,

Cato conducts conferences and publishes books, studies, and the annual Cato Supreme Court Review. This

case concerns Cato because it involves arbitrary and

unjustified restrictions on political speech, the protection of which is at the core of the First Amendment.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The First Amendment broadly protects political expression to “assure [the] unfettered interchange of

ideas for the bringing about of political and social

changes desired by the people.” Roth v. United States,

354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Campaign contributions and

expenditures facilitate such interchanges and are thus

vital to our democracy. Yet Illinois’s campaign finance

restraints unconstitutionally stifle political speech

and inhibit the unfettered interchange of ideas.

Illinois’s regulatory scheme was designed to disproportionately favor certain types of political donors and

restrict political speech for everyone else. While legislative committees can spend unlimited amounts to

support candidates, individuals and other organizations are hampered by contribution limits that were

upheld in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

Rule 37 statement: All parties were notified of and consented to the filing of this brief. No party’s counsel authored any

of this brief; amicus alone funded its preparation and submission.

Buckley correctly held that spending money,

whether in the form of contributions or expenditures,

is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment.

Id. at 21. The Court, however, treated only caps on

campaign expenditures—and not on contributions—as

direct restrictions of political speech, reasoning that

“while contributions may result in political expression

if spent by a candidate or an association to present

views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone

other than the contributor.” Id. The Court has since

abandoned the concept of “speech by proxy” generally,

yet the distinction between contributions and expenditures remains. That distinction has been the target of

persistent, cogent criticism and its underlying logic repudiated in subsequent decisions.

Perhaps most concerning, the Buckley distinction

allows states to infringe on individuals’ constitutionally protected liberty to engage in unobstructed political speech and expression. Limits on the money an individual can contribute to the political party, committee, or candidate of his or her choice unconstitutionally

restrains the freedom of political speech. There is

“practically universal agreement” that the central purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses of the First

Amendment was “to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,

218 (1966). Since speech is intimately related to

money, contribution limits effectively allow speech but

only up to a government-approved amount.

In Buckley itself, Chief Justice Burger argued that

contributions and expenditures are both core political

speech and “two sides of the same First Amendment

coin.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Restrictions on

both violate the Constitution. Id. at 241–42. Justice

Thomas has repeatedly noted that the distinction is illogical and argued that both contribution and expenditure limits implicate core First Amendment values.

Money contributes to the political debate whether it is

spent independently or through a candidate or political party. Colo. Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518

U.S. 604, 636–67 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas asserted

that Buckley’s framework should be abandoned and replaced with strict scrutiny of both contributions and

expenditure limits. Id. at 639. He advanced the same

argument in McCutcheon v. FEC, where the plurality

heightened the level of scrutiny for contribution limits

yet did not reach strict scrutiny. 572 U.S. 185, 228–32

(2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). While

McCutcheon chipped away at the Buckley decision, it

fell short of doing away with the largely semantic distinction between contributions and expenditures.

This Court, in maintaining the Buckley distinction,

has given states carte blanche to reduce political

speech. Illinois’s law manages to both limit individual

speech and favor legislative committees, neither of

which comports with the First Amendment. The court

below relied on the Buckley distinction, failing to sufficiently scrutinize the Illinois law. To avoid such results in future, the Court should apply strict scrutiny

to restrictions on both contributions and expenditures.

Buckley’s contribution/expenditure distinction also

leads to bizarre results that do little to reduce corruption. Instead, money has been pushed away from political parties and advocacy groups, toward entrenched

legislative committees, leaving political parties, PACs,

and other groups with a distinct lack of “resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.

Nor does stare decisis require contribution limits to

be preserved, including the discriminatory limits challenged here. The Buckley distinction is of relatively recent constitutional vintage and has produced an arbitrary, irrational, and increasingly unworkable campaign finance system with no apparent advantages.

Stare decisis is an important principle vital to our legal

system but it is not a command for courts to abide by

all past decisions, even erroneous ones. Instead, it is a

prudential policy that—especially in the context of

constitutional interpretation—allows the Court to

overturn decisions offensive to the First Amendment.

Free speech fosters political change, holds officials

accountable, and otherwise sustains a healthy democracy. Limits on individual donations impede robust political speech. Amicus respectfully submits that the

Buckley distinction was made in error and that the

Court now has a chance to liberate political speech.

The Court should establish that states cannot hinder

political speech for individuals and PACs to favor preferred groups like legislative committees. Not only

would this energize our democracy and reduce corruption, it is also what the First Amendment requires.

ARGUMENT

I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT BROADLY

PROTECTS POLITICAL SPEECH

“[T]he central purpose of the Speech and Press

Clauses was to assure a society in which ‘uninhibited,

robust, and wide-open’ public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only in such a

society can a healthy representative democracy flourish.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270

(1964). Free speech “is needed for republican government” and “informs voters about the conduct of elected

officials, thereby helping voters to hold officials responsible at election time.” John Samples, “Move to

Defend: The Case against the Constitutional Amendments Seeking to Overturn Citizens United,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 724 (Apr. 23, 2013), at 2.

“Officials in power have every reason to fear speech. It

fosters change, not least in elections. Elected officials

have strong reasons to find acceptable ways to suppress free speech.” Id. at 3.

Moreover, the First Amendment protects political

speech regardless of the nature or identity of the

speaker. People don’t lose their rights upon coming together and forming associations, be they unions, nonprofit advocacy groups, private clubs, for-profit corporations, or any other group. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro &

Caitlyn W. McCarthy, So What If Corporations Aren’t

People?, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 701, 707-08 (2011). Restrictions on campaign donations—particularly based

on legislative committee status—impede robust political speech and thus rob our democracy of the vibrancy

and dynamism it would otherwise have.

Indeed, restricting the liberty to engage in political

campaigns because such engagement somehow injures

the political system is fundamentally contrary to the

constitutional structure of rights and powers. As

James Madison said, “it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because

it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.” The

Federalist No. 10, at 51–52 (Madison) (Garry Wills ed.,

2003). And as this Court held in a landmark decision,

“[i]f the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits

Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations

of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.”

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 313 (2010). Monetary contributions to parties and campaigns are a

form of political speech, so they too are protected by

the First Amendment. Illinois’s strange system chills

political speech and should be strictly scrutinized.

A. The Founders Envisioned Campaigns with

Open Debate and Uninhibited Political Expression

The Founders believed that elections are the principal means of controlling government. See, e.g., The

Federalist No. 51, at 316 (Madison) (Garry Wills ed.,

2003) (“A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on the government.”). Elections keep politicians accountable to voters, which in turn constrains

the government’s power. If electoral competition

ceases to exist, the Madisonian nightmare of government without restraint becomes possible. That’s why a

“major purpose” of the First Amendment is “to protect

the free discussion of governmental affairs,” Mills, 384

U.S. at 218, by limiting the government’s interference

with the marketplace of ideas, especially political

ideas. Free and open debate is “integral to the operation of the system of government established by our

Constitution.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.

While states have the authority to regulate their

own elections, that regulation must be consistent with

the Constitution. Illinois’s scheme runs counter to the

foundational principle that free and robust political

debate is essential to our democracy. The Founders

wrote the First Amendment to protect such speech.

They didn’t want speech to be restricted by artificial

limits on financial support, which provides the means

for political debate. See generally David. M. Rabban,

Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years (1997). Accordingly,

the Court has repeatedly held that campaign contributions and expenditures are protected speech.

B. Buckley Correctly Held That Campaign

Spending Is a Form of Speech Protected by

the First Amendment and Foresaw the

Dangers of Even Those Contribution Limits It Approved

It is impossible to separate speech from the money

that facilitates it. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S.

310 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The First

Amendment protects more than just the individual on

a soapbox and the lonely pamphleteer.”). “Not a single

justice of the United States Supreme Court who has

voted in any of the more than a dozen cases involving

the constitutionality of campaign finance regulations,

regardless of which way he or she came out in the case,

has ever embraced the position that money is not

speech.” Geoffrey R. Stone, “Is Money Speech?,” Huffington Post, Feb. 5, 2012, https://bit.ly/1hHxWvS. Accordingly, this Court correctly held in Buckley that the

spending of money, whether in the form of contributions or expenditures, is a form of speech protected by

the First Amendment. 424 U.S. at 21. Candidates need

funding to amplify and effectively disseminate their

message to the electorate. Id. Restricting political contributions and expenditures “necessarily reduces the

quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the

size of the audience reached.” Id. at 19. Contributions

and expenditures facilitate this interchange of ideas

and cannot be regulated as “mere” conduct unrelated

to the underlying communicative act of making a contribution or expenditure. Id. at 24.

Moreover, as the Court underlined in McCutcheon,

the government cannot merely assert that political

speech in the form of financial contributions is a proxy

for corruption: “Any regulation must instead target

what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its appearance.” 572 U.S. at 192. Quid pro quo is simply defined as “dollars for political favors.” Id. (quoting FEC

v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.

480, 497 (1985)). Quid pro quo corruption does not necessarily arise from contributions; in fact, the Court has

maintained the opposite—the government “may not

regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of

money in politics.” McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 191. Even

quid pro quo corruption is a very narrow set of circumstances—after all, people may contribute to campaigns, yet “government regulation may not target . . .

the political access such support may afford. ‘Ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption.’” Id. at 192, citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. Consequently,

laws like Illinois’s cannot be justified by the unscrutinized claim that political speech inevitably leads to

corruption, an idea that is both mistaken and out of

pace with this Court’s jurisprudence.

Further, the Court in McCutcheon said it was impermissible for the government “to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others.” 572 U.S. at 191. In bifurcating the rights of legislative committees and individuals, to the benefit of the former and detriment of the

latter, Illinois’s law does precisely that. For no articulable reason, it regards individuals and PACs as hazardous to democracy but legislative committees as benign, distributing rights according to a flawed, idiosyncratic threat analysis.

While the Buckley Court allowed certain restrictions on contributions—though not expenditures—it cautioned that they “could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented

candidates and political committees from amassing

the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” 424

U.S. 21. Technology has evolved rapidly in the decades

since Buckley, and political candidates have adapted

to it, rendering the advocacy of yesterday obsolete and

revealing that old restrictions are likewise dated.

Campaigns are fundamentally different than they

were nearly a half-century ago, and this changing

landscape sheds new light on the many constitutional

problems with the Buckley restrictions. The Court

should recognize that and rethink those restrictions.

II. BUCKLEY’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN

CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES IS

UNWORKABLE AND DOES NOT SOLVE

THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION

A. The Buckley Distinction Is Untenable and

Unworkable

In Buckley, the Court decided to treat caps on campaign expenditures, but not campaign contributions,

as direct restrictions upon political speech, reasoning

that, “while contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to

present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by

someone other than the contributor.” Id. at 21. Expenditure limits, by contrast, “represent substantial

rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quality and diversity of political speech.” Id. at 19. Accordingly, it declined to apply strict scrutiny to contribution limits. A later Court plurality described contributions as “speech by proxy” that are “not entitled to full

First Amendment protection.” Calif. Medical Assn. v.

FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981). Yet the impact on the

amount and diversity of political speech coming from

contributions and expenditures is identical:

[T]here is no real difference between the First

Amendment value of a contribution and an expenditure. A contribution is a quintessential act

of political association just as an expenditure is

an act of expression. Nor is there much difference between the real-world potential for corruption posed by each.”

Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech,

42 St. Louis U. L.J. 789, 795 (1998).

Contributions, like expenditures, are protected political speech. Restrictions on political speech are typically held to strict scrutiny: the restriction must be

narrowly tailored to further a compelling government

interest. Mills, 384 U.S. at 218. The Court rightly

holds restrictions on expenditures to strict scrutiny,

but the Buckley distinction prevents it from doing the

same for restrictions on contributions. Lower courts

are confused by this dynamic: they uphold Illinois’s

speech-chilling scheme while scrutinizing and striking

down expenditure caps that likewise chill speech. The

Buckley distinction should be eliminated and replaced

with a strict scrutiny standard for both contributions

and expenditures to avoid inconsistent results.

Even in Buckley itself, several justices questioned

the viability of the contribution-expenditure distinction. Chief Justice Burger, for example, stated that

“contributions and expenditures are two sides of the

same First Amendment coin.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 241

(Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part). Restrictions on both violate the Constitution. Id.

at 241–42. Any attempt to distinguish the two can be

characterized as mere semantics—playing “word

games,” as Chief Justice Burger put it—because both

types of political disbursements have sufficient communicative content to require that laws infringing

them be struck down. Id. at 244.

Chief Justice Burger added that contribution restrictions unconstitutionally hamper candidates and

political activity in the same way as restrictions on independent expenditures. Id. at 244. He pointed out

that “contribution limitations . . . limit exactly the

same political activity that the expenditure ceilings

limit,” id. at 243, specifically, by limiting the amount

of funds that can later be spent. The result is “an effective ceiling on the amount of political activity and

debate that the Government will permit to take place.”

Id. at 242. Yet the ability to project speech is as important as the ability to say it. A political writer would

hardly be comforted if told that the First Amendment

protects his words but not his access to the Internet.

Justice Scalia, dissenting in relevant part in

McConnell v. FEC, appealed to history, observing that

“repressive regimes have . . . attack[ed] all levels of the

production and dissemination of ideas.” 540 U.S. 93 at

251 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also traced some of the absurd consequences of the distinction: “What good is the right to

print books without a right to buy works from authors?

Or the right to publish newspapers without the right

to pay deliverymen?” Id. at 252.

Over time, several justices have criticized Buckley’s

expenditure/contribution distinction. Justice Thomas

is one of its most outspoken critics. See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. at 635–44

(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in

part); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S.

377, 410–29 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting);

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 265–86 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); McCutcheon, 572

U.S. at 228–32 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).

Justice Thomas has written that the Buckley distinction lacks in “constitutional significance.” Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. at 636. And suggested that Buckley’s framework be replaced with a

strict scrutiny test to be applied to both contribution

and expenditure limits. Id. at 639. He also noted that

contributions and expenditures both implicate core

First Amendment values because they both facilitate

political debate. Whether political money is spent independently or through a candidate or political party

is irrelevant. Id. at 636–67.

Justice Thomas likewise took issue with the plurality opinion in McCutcheon, which heightened the level

of scrutiny for contribution limits. In his opinion, the

McCutcheon plurality did not go far enough; “although

purporting not to overrule Buckley, [it] continues to

chip away at its footings. In sum, what remains of

Buckley is a rule without a rationale.” 572 U.S. at 231

(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Instead, the

Court should have adopted “a standard that is faithful

to the First Amendment.” Id. at 232. He went on to invoke Chief Justice Burger’s argument that “Contributions and expenditures are simply ‘two sides of the

same First Amendment coin,’” and likewise characterized the distinction as mere semantics. Id. at 231–32

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 at 241) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Numerous academics have also criticized the Buckley distinction. Prof. Lillian BeVier has argued that

both contributions and expenditures implicate significant First Amendment values, and so they should be

treated the same way. See BeVier, Money and Politics:

The First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform,

73 Cal. L. Rev. 1045, 1063 (1985). She argues that the

distinction is merely semantic because contribution

limits and expenditure limits restrict the same type of

activity. Id. BeVier would also subject both contributions and expenditures to heightened scrutiny. Id. at

1090. Cato’s John Samples has noted that “[s]pending

on elections by candidates and parties depends on

spending by contributors. If candidates and parties do

not raise money, they cannot spend it.” John Samples,

The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform 34 (2006).

The Buckley distinction also reveals itself to be unworkable in practice. Here, the lower court failed to

scrutinize Illinois’s discriminatory contribution system, relying on the distinction between contributions

and expenditures. But if Illinois’s contribution limits

were held to strict scrutiny—like expenditure caps—

they would likely be struck down as unconstitutional.

Having long been the target of persistent, cogent

criticism, and with its underlying logic repudiated in

subsequent rulings like McCutcheon, the Court should

abandon the contribution-expenditure distinction.

B. Eliminating the Buckley Distinction Would

Both Energize Our Democracy and Reduce

Corruption

Our democracy would be energized if freed from

contribution limits. More political speech leads to better informed voters, and the kind of speech fostered by

campaign contributions tends to educate voters who

are less inclined to search out information on their

own. See John J. Coleman, “The Benefits of Campaign

Spending,” Cato Institute Briefing Paper No. 84 (September 4, 2003). See also John Coleman and Paul F.

Manna, Congressional Campaign Spending and the

Quality of Democracy, 62 J. Pol. 757 (2002) (showing

that campaign spending increases public knowledge,

including the ability to place candidates on ideological

and issues scales); John Coleman, The Distribution of

Campaign Spending Benefits across Groups, 63 J. Pol.

916 (2001) (arguing that campaign spending improves

public trust and engagement and improves the accuracy of perceptions about candidates, particularly

among socially disadvantaged groups). In other words,

the speech facilitated by campaign contributions has a

greater effect on those who, but for campaign spending, would be ignorant of electoral issues.

Further, informing voters fosters electoral competition by facilitating more criticism of incumbents and

creating more name recognition for challengers. Coleman, “The Benefits of Campaign Spending,” at 4-5. As

mentioned above, “absent contribution limits, challengers could raise money quickly and easily from a

small number of donors, if they wished.” Dhammika

Dharmapala and Filip Palda, Are Campaigns Contributions a Form of Speech? Evidence from Recent U.S.

House Elections, 112 Pub. Choice 81, 87 (July 2002).

Treating contributions the same as expenditures

would not only be consistent with the Constitution, but

would solve the problems Buckley brought into being

and also lessen corruption and the appearance thereof.

Contrary to what critics charge, “studies indicate

that campaign spending does not diminish trust, efficacy, and involvement.” Coleman, “The Benefits of

Campaign Spending,” at 8. That’s because “spending

increases public knowledge of the candidates, across

essentially all groups in the population. Less spending

on campaigns is not likely to increase public trust, involvement, or attention.” Id. Moreover, “a deregulated

system of campaign finance should be expected to increase electoral competition.” Samples, The Fallacy of

Campaign Finance Reform 186. This competition

would also reduce the power of incumbency and the

corruption that can flow from it.

Further, the Buckley distinction actually increases

the power of incumbents. States are able to impose severe spending caps on individuals and PACs, while

legislative committees with deep-rooted interests have

no limit on spending. Illinois’s system benefits career

politicians with connections to these committees at the

expense of lesser-known candidates with fewer established connections. If the goal is to halt corruption, this

is surely a poor means of achieving it.

III.STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE

BUCKLEY DISTINCTION

A. Stare Decisis Means Following the Law,

Not Preserving Every Precedent or Maintaining Erroneous Decisions

Stare decisis reflects the common law’s declaratory

view of precedent. Precedents are not law themselves,

but instead are evidence of the law. See, e.g., Matthew

Hale, The History of the Common Law of England 45

(Charles M. Gray ed., 1971) (1820) (“the Decisions of

Courts of Justice . . . do not make a Law . . . yet they

have a great Weight and Authority in Expounding,

Publishing, and Declaring what the Law of this Kingdom is.”). As William Blackstone explained, stare decisis does not require courts to extend or preserve an

earlier decision that misstated or misapplied the law:

[A judge is] not delegated to pronounce a new

law, but to maintain and expound the old one.

Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to

reason; much more if it be contrary to the divine

law. But even in such cases the subsequent

judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to

vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.

For if it be found that the former decision is

manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not

that such a sentence was bad law, but that it

was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm as has been erroneously determined.

1 Commentaries 69–70 (U. Chicago Press 1979) (1765).

Blackstone concluded that “the law, and the opinion of the judge are not always convertible terms, or

one and the same thing; since it sometimes may happen that the judge may mistake the law.” Id. at 71.

Precedent is binding “unless it can be shown that the

law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case.” James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American

Law 475, 477 (12th ed. 1989) (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed.

1873).

Stare decisis also derives from practical considerations of doctrinal stability to “keep the scale of justice

even and steady.” Blackstone, 1 Commentaries 69. It is

appropriate in many cases because “[i]t is by the notoriety and stability of such rules that professional men

can give safe advice . . . and people in general can venture with confidence to buy and trust, and to deal with

one another.” Kent, 1 Commentaries 476. From its origins, stare decisis was intended to balance reliance on

doctrinal stability with the countervailing interest in

clarification when in an earlier case “the judge may

mistake the law.” Blackstone, 1 Commentaries 71. The

doctrine of stare decisis is basic and vital to our legal

system, yet we maintain important differences in our

application of this traditional principle.

In the United States, stare decisis does not mechanically preserve every precedent. While the doctrine

plays an important part in the Court’s decision making, it is not “an inexorable command.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991) (“[R]ather, it is a

principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”). Underlying stare decisis is the idea that courts do not make the law, but

rather declare what it is. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (although “judges in a real sense ‘make’ law . . . they make

it as judges make it, which is to say as though they

were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is, rather

than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it

will tomorrow be.”) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Consequently, “precedents are not sacrosanct.”

Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172

(1989).

In other words, stare decisis is not “a binding principle by which a court—the U.S. Supreme Court or otherwise—never overrules its own precedent. Indeed, if

precedent could never be reversed then Plessy v. Ferguson and Bowers v. Hardwick could never have

yielded to Brown v. Board of Education and Lawrence

v. Texas, respectively.” Ilya Shapiro & Nicholas

Mosvick, Stare Decisis after Citizens United: When

Should Courts Overturn Precedent, 16 Nexus: Chap. J.

Pub. Pol’y 121, 123–24 (2011).

This Court recognizes the importance of having settled rules of law. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,

235 (1997). But stare decisis is a prudential policy

rooted in the declaratory view of precedent and its underlying interests are not equally compelling for all areas of law. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (“Considerations

in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance

interests are involved”); Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–73

(“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in

the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in

the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free

to alter what we have done.”).

Not surprisingly, stare decisis is most flexible in

constitutional cases, where Congress cannot “fix” an

undesired legal interpretation:

Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because

in most matters it is more important that the

applicable rule of law be settled than that it be

settled right…But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this

Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–

07, 410 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Indeed, this “policy is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can

be altered only by constitutional amendment or by

overruling our prior decisions.” Agostini, 521 U.S. at

235. Moreover, “overruling a constitutional case decided just a few years earlier is far from unprecedented.” FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc. (“WRTL II”),

551 U.S. 449, 501 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part

and in the judgment) (collecting cases). For example,

in the 50 years from 1942 to 1992, this Court reversed

itself 141 times. Cong. Research Serv., Supreme Court

Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decision (1992).

The Court has further explained stare decisis as follows:

[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court

has never felt constrained to follow precedent.

In constitutional questions, where correction

depends upon amendment, and not upon legislative action, this Court throughout its history

has freely exercised its power to reexamine the

basis of its constitutional decisions.

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).

The present case turns on the proper interpretation

of the First Amendment, of course, not on statutory

construction or on property or contract rights. “This

Court has not hesitated to overrule decisions offensive

to the First Amendment (a ‘fixed star in our constitutional constellation,’ if there is one)—and to do so

promptly where fundamental error was apparent.”

WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part

and in the judgment) (cleaned up). Courts should not,

and cannot, give as much judicial deference to constitutional decisions as they would to common law cases

or statutes. Stare decisis is thus at its apogee here.

B Abandoning the Buckley Distinction

Would Be Consistent with Stare Decisis

In Janus v. AFSCME, the Court articulated five

principles for when it should or should not follow stare

decisis: (1) the quality of the reasoning; (2) the workability of the rule; (3) its consistency with other related

decisions; (4) developments since the decision; and (5)

reliance upon the decision. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–82

(2018). The Buckley distinction does not survive scrutiny under these factors.

The distinction between expenditures and contributions is poorly reasoned and unworkable. As stated

above, it has been the target of much criticism over the

nearly half-century since it was created. Justice

Thomas especially has reproached the distinction, arguing that it should be replaced with a strict scrutiny

for both expenditures and contributions. This makes a

great deal of sense, because, as it stands, laws that set

expenditure limits are subject to strict scrutiny, while

those that cap contributions are evaluated by a lesser

standard—even as both equally implicate the freedom

of speech. “Arbitrary” is perhaps too charitable a word

to describe this distinction. It has rightly been characterized as playing “word games,” and thus it should not

continue to stand. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 244 (Burger,

C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Nor has the Court applied the distinction consistently, instead chipping away at it in subsequent decisions. “Those who apply the rule to particular cases,

must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Instead of

applying the Buckley distinction and expounding on it

in a clear manner, the Court tried and failed to convincingly sustain it in McCutcheon. The Court has

slowly inched at what seems to be an inevitable result:

overturning Buckley. The distinction has effectively

been sentenced to death by a thousand cuts, and the

Court should put it to rest once and for all.

The contribution-expenditure distinction, controversial and confusing in its own day, has not engendered the kind of reliance interests that stare decisis

contemplates protecting. On the contrary, restrictions

on contributions have had a chilling effect on the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech rights.

In fact, the only entities “relying” on the Buckley

distinction are legislative committees with deeprooted interests and political connections. The Illinois

law favors these committees at the expense of individuals, parties, and PACs. Yet it would be antithetical to

the spirit of the Bill of Rights to say that one group is

“relying” on the First Amendment rights of another

group being extinguished. The Court should not uphold a distinction that allows states to prefer one type

of speaker over all others. Further, the Court must recognize the danger of maintaining distinctions that micromanage and silence political speech, the cornerstone of our democracy.

As Chief Justice Roberts wrote in Citizens United,

“when fidelity to any particular precedent does more

to damage this constitutional ideal [the rule of law]

than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart

from that precedent.” 558 U.S. at 378 (Roberts, J., concurring). Stare decisis does not require preserving or

extending precedents that misstate the law. It does not

shield the distinction created in Buckley from being

reexamined and overturned.

CONCLUSION

The Illinois law at issue here relies on Buckley v.

Valeo’s dubious distinction between contribution limits and expenditure limits—and even then represents

a First Amendment violation. This Court should grant

the petition and reexamine this area of law.

Respectfully submitted,