Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Trevor Johnson, Petitioner v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

Supreme Court briefJan 7, 2019

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

Term,

JAN 072019

CFFCE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, L-S.

TREVOR JOHNSON v. DARREL VANNOY, Warden

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Trevor Johnson #384076

MPWYfPine-3

Louisiana State Penitentiary

Angola, Louisiana 70712-9818

December 26. 2018

PREPARED B 7

David Constance #304580 Offender Counsel Substitute Ill

Main Prison Legal Aid Office

Criminal Litigation Team

La. State Penitentiary

Angola LA 70712

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether reasonable jurist would find that the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt, every essential element of the offense that Mr. Johnson had

committed Aggravated Rape of CF. Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

Whether reasonable would find that the trial, court erred in the defense counsel's

Motion to Suppress the "partially inaudible" telephone into evidence. First, Fourth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article 15 of the

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure; and, Section 605 of the Federal

Communications Act,

Whether reasonable jurist would find that Mr. Johnson was denied the right to a fair

and impartial trial by jury when the State was allowed to strike two African-American

prospective jurors. Batson v. Kentu.c*v, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.'Zd 69 (1986).

Whether jurists of reason would debate that Mr. Johnson was denied Equal Protection

of the law when the district court accepted the non-unanimous verdict, of guilt by the

jury. Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

5, Whether reasonable jurists would determine that Mr. Johnson was convicted with the

unreliable "expert" testimony which fails to meet the threshold of the Dtwbert test for

scientific validity. Daithert v. Dow Pharmaceutica.& Fry e v. Uiüted States.

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INTERESTED PARTIES

District Attorney's Office

22 Judicial District Court

701 N. Columbia St.

Covington, LA 70433

Darrel Vannoy, Warden

Louisiana State Penitentiary

General Delivery

Angola, LA 70712

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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

INTERESTED PARTIES

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................................... ii

Petition for Writ of Certiorari....................................................................................................................1

NOTICE OF PRO-SE FILING.................................................................................................................. 1

OPINIONS................................................................................................................................................. 2

JURISDICTION.................................................................. ...................................................................... 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED..................................................2

STATEMENTOF THE CASE .............................................................................................................. ..... 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT...............................................................................................3

LAWAND ARGUMENT..........................................................................................................................5

ISSUENO. 1..............................................................................................................................................5

Whether reasonable jurists would find that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt, every essential element of the offense that Mr.. Johnson had committed Aggravated

Rape of CF; and whether reasonable jurists would find that the State improperly used

unreliable "Expert" testimony which fails to meet the Daubert test for scientific validity......... 5

Insufficient Evidence: ........................................................................................................................ 5

Unreliable "Expert" Testimony...................................................................................................... 13

ISSUENO. 2............................................................................................................................................16

Whether reasonable jurists would find that the trial court erred in the denial of defense

counsel's motion to suppress the introduction of the partially inaudible telephone call into

evidence; and Whether Mr. Johnson's conviction was obtained in violation of the First,

Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; as the telephone call

submitted to the jury was In violation of the Telecommunication Act ........................................ 16

ISSUENO. 3............................................................................................................................................24

Whether reasonable jurists would debate that the trial court erred in allowing the state to

strike two African-American prospective jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.

79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)........................................................................................ 24

ISSUENO. 5............................................................................................................................................27

Whether reasonable jurists would find that the trial court abused its discretion by accepting

the non-unanimous verdict of guilt by the jury............................................................................. 27

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................29

CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE.................................................................................................................30

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Thevor lthnsm v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES:

Page

U.S. CONSTITUTION:

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution................................................................................20

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ............................... ........................16

Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution............................................2

First Amendment of the United States Constitution................................................................................22

First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution............................................................23

First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution .................................... 1, 16

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution...............................................................passim

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.............................................................................22

Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution..................................................................................20

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ..................................................................... 2, 25, 27

FEDERAL CASES:

Apodocay. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)............................................................................................3, 29

Arlington Hghts. v. Metro. Hsng. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)......27

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).....................................1, 24, 25

Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978)................................................16

Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 6, 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011).......................................................................7

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L.EcL2d 705 (1967).............................................9

Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012).......................................................7

Daubert v. Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)..........................................................................15

Dupuy v. Cain, 210 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2000).............................................................................................6

Evangelisto Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 ....................................................................................3, 29

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).....................................................1

Haynes v. Quartennan, 561 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 2009)..............................................................................25

Hernandez v. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991).....................................................24

Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 639 (5th Cir. 1980)..........................................................................8

Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir.).............................................................................15

Hunter'. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct. 1916,85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).......................................27

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970)......................................................5

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 60 (1979).................................................5

Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170, 125 S.Ct. 2410 (2005)...........................................................25

Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 397 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972)........................................28

Kuhhnann v Wilson, 106 S.Ct. 2616 (1986).............................................................................................8

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009)...................20

Miller-El v Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1032 (2003)...........................................................4

Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)....27

Murray v. Carrier, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (1986)..................................................................................................8

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ii.

Thevor Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed.2d 307 (1939)

Price v. Cain, 560 F.3d 284 (5th Cir 2009)............................................................................................. 25

Sawyer v. Whitley. 112 SCt. 2514 (1992)-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8

Schiup v. Delo, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995)........................................................................................................8

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975)...............................................25

U.S. v. Bently-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1373 (5th Cit 1993).........................................................................25

U.S. v. Fallen, 112 F.2d 894 (2nd Cir. 1940)...........................................................................................21

U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)...........................................................................................................22

U.S. v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2nd Cir. 1940)........................................................................................21

U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).....................................................................................22

United States v. Azure, 801 F. 2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986)..............................................................................15

United States v. Jaramillo, 42 F.3d 920......................................................................................................6

United States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir. 1989).................................................................9

United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d 540............................................................................................6

United States v. Penaloza-Duarte, 473 F.3d 575........................................................................................6

United States v. Stewart, 145 F.3d 273......................................................................................................6

Word v. Cain, 53 F.3d 106 (5th Cir. 1995).................................................................................................8

Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).........................................................................5

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 541 U.S. 652 (2004)................................................................5

LA. CONSTITUTION:

Article I, § 15, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.............................................................................16

Article I, Section Three (3) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 ................................................... 27, 28

Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Art. I § 17 (A).......................................................................................27

STATUTORY PROVISIONS:

110 Stat. 1214............................................................................................................................................2

18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 et seq........................................................................................................................23

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)...................................................................................................................................2

28 U.S.C. § 2253..................................................................................................................................4,30

28 U.S.C. § 2254........................................................................................................................................2

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2) ........................................................................................................................... S

Article 15 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure .................................................................... 1, 17

LaC.Cr.P. Art 782...................................................................................................................................27

LaCh.C. Art. 728.....................................................................................................................................19

LSA-29:20 ................................................................................................................................................ 19

LSA-R.S. 15:1303....................................................................................................................................23

LSA-R.S. 15:1307 .............................................................................................................................. 17, 20

LSA-R.S. 15:1308 and 15:1310 ............................................................................................................... 16

LSA-R.S. 15:1310 .............................................................................................................................. 17, 20

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Thevor Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

iii.

LSA-R.S. 37:3390.4

.19

LSA-R.S. 93.2..........................................................................................................................................19

R.S. 15:1310 ............................................................................................................................................. 20

Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act .................................................................... 1, 20, 21, 22

STATE CASES;

State ex rel Nicholas v. State of Louisiana, 520 So.2d 377(La 1988)......................................................9

State v Davis, 498 So 2d 723 (La. 1986)...................................................................................................9

State v. Ayo, 167 So.3d 608 (La 6/30/15) ...............................................................................................14

State v. Bertrand, 6 So.3d 38 (La 3/17/09)..............................................................................................27

State v. Chism, 591 So.2d 383, 386 (La App. 2nd Cir. 1991)...................................................................8

State v. Gibson, 391 So.2d 421 (La 1980)................................................................................................9

State v. Kennedy, 803 So.2d 916 (La 2001)..............................................................................................8

State v. Laprime, 437 So.2d 1124 (La 1983)...........................................................................................8

State v. Lott, 535 So.2d 963 (La App. 2nd Cn 1988)..............................................................................8

State v. Melvin Maxie, Docket No.: 13-CR-725 (10/11/18) ................................................................ 4, 29

State v. Williams, 423 So.2d 1048 (La 1982).........................................................................................16

Trevor Johnson v. State of Louisiana, docket number 2015-KH-0267 (La 1/8/16).................................3

MISCELLANEOUS:

75 CJS Rape § 94.......................................................................................................................................7

Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)..........................................................2

Article 15 of the Telecommunication Act................................................................................................ 16

Criminal LawKey 110k1159.2(1).............................................................................................................6

Criminal LawKey 110k1159.2(8).............................................................................................................6

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1Jevor Jthnim v Darrel Viuznoy, Warden

iv.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

Term,

No.:

TREVOR JOHNSON v. DARREL VANNOY, Warden

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Pro Se Petitioner, Trevor Johnson respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the

judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, entered in the above

entitled proceeding on October 16, 2017 (Date PCR filed); that the issues presented to the Fifth Circuit

were: (1) Whether reasonable jurists would find that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt, every essential element of the offense that Mr. Johnson had committed Aggravated Rape; (2)

Whether reasonable jurists would find that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's Motion to

Suppress the "partially inaudible" telephone conversation into evidence.; (3) Whether reasonable jurists

would find that Mr. Johnson was denied the right to a fair and impartial trial by jury when the State was

allowed to strike two African-American prospective jurors; (4) Whether jurist of reason would debate

that Mr. Johnson was denied Equal Protection of the Law when the district court accepted the nonunanimous verdict of guilty by the jury; and, (5) Whether reasonable jurists would determine that Mr.

Johnson was convicted with unreliable "expert" testimony which fails to meet the threshold of the

Daubert test for scientific validity; is such that no juror, acting reasonably would have voted to find

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

NOTICE OF PRO-SE FILING

W. Johnson requests that this Honorable Court view these Claims in accordance with the rulings of

Hainesv. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 SCt. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

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Thevor Jthnson Y. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Fifth Circuit was assigned Docket No.: 17-30933. This pleading was filed as a

Certificate of Appealability.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on October 31, 2018; and the Application for ReHearing was denied on November 29, 2018. This Court's Certiorari jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourteenth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 28 U.S.C. §

2254, as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat.

1214 are reproduced in the Appendix. (App. C-F).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This pleading is based upon a criminal conviction in the 22 Judicial District Court, in and for the

Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana Although Mr. Johnson was convicted of Aggravated Rape

by a non-unanimous jury, he was ordered to serve a life sentence at hard labor without the benefit of

Probation, Parole, or Suspension of Sentence. Post-trial motions were denied by the district court.

After conviction, Mr. Johnson timely filed his Original and Pro-Se Supplemental Briefs on Appeal

to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Johnson's

conviction and sentence on June 8, 2012.

Mr. Johnson then timely filed his Pro-Se Application for Writs of Certiorari to the Louisiana

Supreme Court, which also affirmed his conviction and sentence on January 25, 2013.

On January 10, 2013, Mr. Johnson filed his Application for Post-Conviction Relief into the 22'

Judicial District Court. On February 11, 2014, Mr. Johnson received the State's Answer. On February

18, 2014, Mr. Johnson filed Traverse to the State's Answer to the Application. the ONLY notification of

AU Ruling was when the district court denied his Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and Appointment

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Rev or Johnson v. Darrel l4znnay, Warden

of Counsel and Petition for Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum had been denied on February 12, 2014.

The denials of these aforementioned motion are the QJ

Rulings which Mr. Johnson has received

from the 22 Judicial District Court.

After numerous Status Checks to the district court, on September 4, 2014, the Clerks response to

this Status Check simply stated, "In response to your letter dated 9-4-14, the Post-Conviction Petition

was denied on 2-10-14, subsequent pleading to traverse is moot, per Judge Richard A. Swartz on this

11'day of September, 2014."

Mr. Johnson filed numerous motions in an attempt to have the Court forward him a copy of the

final ruling on his PCR. On October 17, 2014, Mr. Johnson filed his Application for Supervisory Writ

into this Honorable Court. On January 12, 2015, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, "Writ denied on the

shoing made in part and Writ denied in part" (See: Reasons on Ruling).

On January 8, 2016, Mr. Johnson was denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State ex rd.

Trevor Johnson

Stat e ofLiiwq, docket number 2015-KH-0267 (La. 1/8/16)(per curiam).

On February 1, 2016, Mr. Johnson filed a Pro-Se Petition for Habeas Corpus to the U.S. Eastern

District Court of Louisiana On November 7, 2017, the U.S. Eastern District Court of Louisiana denied

Mr Johnson relief Notice of Intent to Seek Certificate of Appealability was then filed on November

27, 2017.

On December 7, 2017, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals docketed Mr. Johnson's Appeal, and

was denied on October 31, 2018. Mr. Johnson then filed for Re-Hearing on November 13, 2018, which

was denied on November 29, 2018. Mr. Johnson now timely files for Writ of Certiorari to this

Honorable Court, with Mr. Johnson requesting relief for the following reasons to wit:

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

First and foremost, this Court must consider the fact that in Evangelisto Rainosv. Louisiana. No.

18-5924, ordered the State to file a Brief in Opposition to Mr. Ramos' Petition for Writ of Certiorari. It

appears as though the United States Supreme Court has, after 46 years of affinning Apodoca v.

Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), determined that it is time to review the constitutionality of Louisiana's

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Thevor Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

non-unanimous jury verdicts.

This Honorable Court must also consider the fact that on November 6, 2018, the voters of

Louisiana voted to change the Law concerning non-unanimous verdicts. Although the new law only

applies to persons whose trial commences on or after January 1, 2019, the State admiUed that the Law

was premised on racial discrimination during the arguments concerning such during the Legislative

Session. ALaw based on discrimination cannot stand.

This Court must also consider that in State Y. Melvin Maxie.. Docket No.: 13-CR-725 (lith JDC

10/11/18), Parish of Sabine, the Honorable Stephen B. Beasley declared that the use of non-unanimous

verdicts unconstitutional. Although this case may only be used as "Persuasive Law," this was the first

time that "Expert" testimony was submitted to a Court which proves beyond a reasonable doubt that

the Law was based an racial premises. It is well settled that a Law based on any discriminatory basis is

unconstitutional, and cannot stand.

Before a prisoner seeking Post-Conviction Relief under § 2254 may appeal a district court's denial

or dismissal of the Petition, he must first seek and obtain a COA from a Circuit Justice or Judge, 28

U.S.C. § 2253. When a habeas applicant seeks a COA, the Court of Appeals should limit its

examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merits of his Claims. E.g., Slack 529 U.S., at

481, 120 S.Ct. 1595. This inquiry does not require full consideration of the factual or legal basis

supporting the Claims. Consistent with this Court's precedent and the statutory text, the prisoner need

only demonstrate "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." § 2253 (c)(2).

Mr. Johnson has satisfied this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with

the district court's resolution of his case or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further. E.g., Id, at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595. He need not convince a Judge, or,

for that matter, three Judges that he will prevail, but must demonstrate that reasonable jurist would find

the district court's assessment of the constitutional Claims debatable or wrong. Ibid., pp. 1039-1040.

Quoting, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1032 (2003).

Furthermore, as Mr. Johnson has shown this Honorable Court the fact that the decisions rendered

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flevor Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

by the state courts and the federal district court: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United Stales; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.CA.

§ 2254(d)(2). 1liam--vJajI, 120 S.ct. 1495, 529 U.S. 362 (2000);

ky.A1zqdq,, 124

S.Ct. 2140, 541 U.S. 652 (2004).

On October 31, 2018 (received November 8, 2018), the Honorable Jennifer Walker Elrod denied

Mr. Johnson's Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

Mr. Johnson suggest that the judgment denying COA calls for further scrutiny. Mr. Johnson

contends that all issues previously raised in the original Habeas Corpus petition and Motion for COA

are before this Honorable Court for review for the following reasons to wit:

LAW AND ARGUMENT

ISSUE NO. 1

Whether reasonable jurists would find that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt, every essential element of the offense that Mr. Johnson had committed Aggravated

Rape of CF; and whether reasonable jurists would find that the State improperly used

unreliable "Expert" testimony which fails to meet the Dali bert test for scientific validity.

Insuffi dent Evi den Ce:

The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, every essential element of the offense that Mr.

Johnson had committed Aggravated Rape of CF.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons accused of a crime against

conviction unless the State proves every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970).1 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99

S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 60 (1979).

In Jackson. the United States Supreme Court reached the legal standard of review, i.e.,

This type of error has been recognized as patent error preventing conviction fcr the offense, La,C.Cr,P. art. 920(2),

see indicative listing at State s. Ga.Wo 200 La. 935, 9 So.2d 235, 239 (1942). Quoting: State v. Cravby, 338 3o.2d 584,

588 (La.197.

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Thevorfthnscmv. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt

In the court's

view, the factfinder's role as weigher of evidence was preserved by considering all of the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution:".. The criterion thus impinges upon 'jury' discretion only

to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law." Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319,99 S.Ct., at 2790, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573-574. This standard is applied with "explicit reference

to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." id. at 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. at

2791 n. 16. Dupup t'. Cain, 210 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2000).

This does not does not permit the type of fine-grained factual parsing necessary to determine that

the evidence presented to the factfinder was in "equipoise," and that therefore reversal of the

conviction is warranted; abrogating United States v. Jarainillo, 42 F.3d 920, United States v. Ortega

Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, United Statesv. Penal oza-Duarte, 473 F.3d 575, and, United States v. Stewart,

145 F.3d 273. Criminal Law Key 11Ok11592(1.

Courts reviewing a conviction are empowered to consider whether the inferences drawa by ajury

were rational, as opposed to being speculative or insupportable, and whether the evidence is sufficient

to establish every element of the crime. Criminal Law Key 110k1159.2(8).

The Jackson standard which has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, may be

difficult to apply to specific cases but is theoretically straightforward. In contrast, the "equipoise rule"

is ambiguous. At one level, whether it applies only to cases ungirded by circumstantial evidence, as

opposed to direct or circumstantial evidence, is not entirely clear. Moreover, no court opinion has

explained how a court determines that evidence, even when viewed most favorably to the prosecution,

is "in equipoise." Is it a matter of counting inferences or of determining qualitatively whether

inferences equally support atheory of guilt or innocence?

In any event, when appellate courts are authorized to review verdicts of conviction for evidentiary

"equipoise," they must do so on a cold appellate record without the benefit of the dramatic insights

gained from watching the trial. The potential to usurp the juiy's function in such circumstances is

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Thevor Johnson Y. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

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inescapable. Jackson's "deferential standard" of review, however, "does not permit the type of finegrained parsing" necessary to determine that the evidence presented to the faclfmder was in

"equipoise." Compare: Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064, 182 L. Ed. 2d 978 (2012).

Jackson also "unambiguously instructs that a reviewing court, 'faced with a record of historical

facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume

record

even if it does not affirmatively appear in the

that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to

that resolution.' Cavazosv. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 6,181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011).

This case gives the Court the opportunity to give concrete substance to the rule of law that

contradictory testimony, such as incredible, inherently improbable or impeached testimony, is

insufficient to uphold a conviction.

Corroboration of a victim's testimony in sexual offense cases is triggered only by contradictions

in the victim's trial testimony. Thus, corroboration is mandated when the victim's testimony is

so contradictory and in conflict with physical facts, surrounding circumstances and common

experience that its validity is rendered doubtful such that corroboration of the victim's

testimony is required to sustain the conviction.

75 CJS Rape § 94

There is no corroborating evidence in this case. The testimony of the accusing witnesses in this case

was clearly contradictory and impeached, as shown by the record, notwithstanding the fact that the

State suppressed further Brady impeachment evidence from the defense at trial.

The State produced no physical evidence which would establish that anyone had committed any

sexual offenses against this alleged victim. Indeed, even the question of venue of a crimes rests upon

the establishment that an actual crime happened in the first place. The corpus delicti in the instant case

is not satisfied by testimony of the prosecutrix without any corroborating circumstances. There is not

even a doctors report in evidence that establishes the possibility of sexual activity of kind.

The fact that impeached testimony, standing alone, cannot uphold a conviction under the law is

predicated upon the fact that impeached testimony, standing alone, fails to establish a corpus delicti in

the first instance

- . -

While the credibility ofawitness is a matter for the finder of fact, once impeached, that witness's

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Rev or Jthnsez Y. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

testimony becomes suspect under the law and must be corroborated in order to be convincing evidence

of guilt or innocence. This is especially true where the credibility of the witness is paramount to the

outcome of the case.

"Impeached testimony, as a general rule, cannot stand alone to convict" Stale v. C7Lcm, 591 So.2d

383, 386 (La App. 2 d Cir. 1991), citing, State v. Laprime, 437 So.2d 1124 (La 1983); State v. Loll,

535 So.2d 963 (La App. 214 Cir. 1988).

In State v. Kennedy, 803 So.2d 916 (La 2001), in Justice Traylor's dissenting opinion, it is stated

that the Louisiana Supreme Court has found that, "The victim's testimony, standing alone, can prove

that the act occurred,

. . ."

but is qualified in FN9, "However, we have also ruled post-trial that

impeached testimony of a witness, standing alone, cannot prove the offense."

Jadson v. Virginia, supra Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 639 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,

451 U.S. 1028, 101 S.Ct. 3019, 69 L.Ed.2d 398 (1981); In re Winsizip, 5upra2 The Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons accused of a crime against conviction unless the State

proves every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

The United States Supreme Court in Schiup v. Delp, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995) held that the appropriate

standard for showing that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to address

the claim is that of Murray v. Carrier, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (1986).

Only truly extraordinary cases will meet this standard. Prior to Schiup v. Delo, the federal circuit

courts have been divided on what standard is required in showing a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

That is, the standards of Kuhlmann v.

106 S.Ct. 2616 (1986),

106 S.Ct.

2639 (1986); or Sawyer v. Whi.tley, 112 S.Ct. 2514 (1992).

Wardv. Cain, 53 F.3d 106 (5th Cir. 1995), the miscarriage ofjustice standard as defined in Schiup

Y. Delo, is "where the petitioner shows, as a factual matter, that he did not commit the crime of

conviction. Ward had made no showing that it is more likely than not no reasonable juror would have

2This type of error has been recognized as patent error preventing conviction for the offense, La.C.Cr.P. art.

920(2), see indicative listing at State i'. Gulllot, 200 La. 935, 9 So.2d 235, 239 (1942). Quoting: State v. Crosby,

338 So.2d 584, 588 (La. 1976).

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Thevor Jthni v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

found him guilty if given a correct instruction."

The testimony adduced during these proceedings, along with the State's failure to produce

physical evidence, failed to show guilt of my essential element of the charged offense in this matter.

The testimony of the victim (CF), along with the testimony of the State witnesses provided no

corroborating evidence or testimony to the actual commission of this or MY offense involving Mr.

Johnson.

State v Davis, 498 So 2d 723 (La 1986), "impeachment

...

inconsistent statements, constitutional

right to impeach, A constitutional right exist to present a defense," State ex rd Nicholas v. State of

Louisiana, 520 Sold 377(La. 1988); and the right includes the right to impeach witnesses by prior

inconsistent statements. State v Davis,, supra. If that right is infringed, a conviction cannot be affirmed

unless appellate review shows the constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Chapman v California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Gibson, 391 Sold

421 (La. 1980).

The inconsistencies in the victim's testimony alone should be sufficient to obtain relief in the courts.

The victim's (CF) inconsistencies throughout the direct and cross-examination proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that CF has failed to even corroborate the fabrications relayed throughout the investigation and

proceedings of this unjust allegation against him. Testimony "so unbelievable on its face that it defies

physical laws" would be "incredible as a matter of law." United States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 605

(51h

Cir. 1989).

CF testified that she had initially been molested in her mother's room the weekend of her brother's

birthday party (Tr. p. 464). She could explicitly remember what she was wearing at the time of the

sexual assault, but for some reason, could not remember the clothing of Mr. Johnson (Tr. p. 465). As

CF testified in direct and cross-examination, she had failed to remember which falsity to continue to

tell. CF testified that Mr. Johnson had sexually assaulted her after her mother had been taken to work at

9:00 in the morning (486). However, she testified on cross-examination that these incidents would

occur around 12:00 or 1:00 in the morning (Tr. p. 487). Furthermore, CF testified to several different

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Thevor Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

sexual encounters with Mr. Johnson (Tr. pp. 463, 465, 467, 473). But, on cross-examination, CF

testified that Mr. Johnson had sex with her one time (Tr. p. 474, 487). CF had also testified that her

first disclosure was to Melissa (Tr. p. 472), but failed to remember that she had testified that she had

told mother right after the incident (Tr. pp. 468), or that she had told her mother much later after the

incidents (Tr. p. 474), and that her mother had caught them in a sexual encounter (Fr. p. 469).

CF further testified to the fact that she was not living her grandparents due to the sexual abuse by

Trevor, then testified that she had moved in with her grandmother due to the sexual misconduct on the

part of Mr. Johnson (Tr. p. 481). CF then testified that she had stayed with her grandparents due to her

mother working at the Waffle House and CF attending the Pineview School (Fr. p. 483). CF further

testified that she had notified her grandparents and that they "kneV' what was happening with Mr.

Johnson and herself (Tr. p. 481). Then, CF testified that her grandparents did not know until later (Tr.

p. 482). CF then testified that Mr. Johnson had molested her after he had brought her mother to work,

and that her mother's shift began at 9:00 am in the morning (Tr. p. 486). However, CF knew that her

mother's shift started at 6:00 in the morning at the Waffle House.

CF testified that the report introduced into evidence stated that her grandmother did not tell her to

'recant her statemenf' (Tr. p. 477). However, CF did admit that she had stated on the report which was

introduced into evidence that "they" (mother and grandmother) had told her not to tell anyone (Tr. p. 478).

In order to prove any kind of Motive on the part of CF for these allegations, the only information

that this Honorable Court would really need to rely on is CFs own testimony. CF testified that she was

angry with Mr. Johnson for not receiving a computer for Christmas (Fr. p. 485). CF further testified

that she was angry with Mr. Johnson due to the fact that she did want to stay with her father, who had

just recently been released from the penitentiary (Tr. p. 486). What better way to get her wishes of

living with her father, than to tell this hoirible fabrication on her mother and step-father, knowing that

the both of them would be arrested (Tr. p. 495)(testifying that she knew she might have to testify

against her mother also). CF had testified that she had informed Jo Beth Rickles that she had still loved

Trevor Johnson (Tr. p. 489) and that she had sent a letter to Trevor Johnson through her mother which

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Thevor Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

10.

stated that she missed Trevor, loved him, and hoped to see him soon (Tr. p. 489). This does not appear

to be the reaction to someone who had actually sexually assaulted her.

These are just the discrepancies within the victim's own testimony during direct and crossexamination. The over-abundance of discrepancies in the testimony of the victim alone should suffice

to this Honorable Court to grant relief (Tr pp. 459-496). As the Courts have ascertained in case law

that, "testimony of the victim alone is enough to substantiate a conviction," the Courts should be

allowed to determine the validity of the testimony from this victim as unreliable and impeachable as

to the trustworthiness of the testimony of CF, as her testimony and statements varied from person to

person, and from direct examination to cross-examination.

The remarkable discrepancies throughout the investigation and trial proceedings can be noted by a

mere inspection of the record. The State failed in it's endeavors for a valid conviction in this matter.

Many of the noteworthy contradictions are as follows:

Michelle Crowley testified as to the fact that CF had changed her interviews in a manner

convenient to what she wanted Ms. Crowley to hear. CF had even denied that any sexual improprieties

had even happened to her (Tr. p. 387). Ms. Crowley then testified that CF had "sabotaged

relationships" with her friends ('ft. p. 415). As Ms. Crowley had testified that CF was presently in

counseling with her (Tr. p. 406), and that she had no personal knowledge of any sexual contact with

Mr. Johnson (Tr. p. 415). Ms. Crowley further testified that CF was presently on medication (Tr. p.

417). Ms. Crowley testified that CF had informed her that her mom, grandmother and Aunt Monique

knew that Mr. Johnson was sexually molesting her (Tr. p. 407). However, CF testified that her mom,

grandmother and Aunt Monique was not informed until after the initial interview with Ms. Crowley

(Fr. p. 477), that she had told her mother (Tr. p. 468), and that her mother had caught Mr. Johnson

committing an act of sexual molestation (Tr. p. 469). Ms. Crowley testified that CF had reported there

was no acts of anal sex (Tr. p. 421), but CF testified that there was anal sex (Tr. p. 466).

CF had reported to Laura Morse that Trevor Johnson had been "rapg" her (CF) since the 4th grade

(Fr. p. 473), but testified that she had only had sex with Mr. Johnson one time (Tr. p. 474).

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Thevor Jthnsi V. Darsl Vannoy, Warden

The State then proceeded to present the testimony of Jean Noto (Tr. p. 504), who had testified that

she had a conversation with CF in her living room/kitchen area (Tr. p. 506). Ms. Noto further testified

that she had informed CF's mother of these allegations against Trevor Johnson (Tr. p. 507). The State

failed to have CF testify as to whether CF had confided in Ms. Noto or not. Ms. Noto testified that she

had informed Melanie Johnson of the allegations of CF against Mr. Johnson (Tr. p. 507). Mrs. Melanie

Johnson testified that she could not recall such a conversation with Ms. Noto (Tr. p. 689).

Laura Morse had testified to the fact that she had told CF about the sexual assaults occurring within

her household, and that she was going to report these to the school counselor (Tr. p. 456). Ms. Morse

had stated that after disclosing the sexual abuse in her home, CF told her that the same thing was

happening in her home and that they were both going to report their abuse to the school counselor (Tr.

p. 456). Ms. Morse further informed the Court that this conversation was "towards the end of the

school yea?' (Tr. p. 456). Yet, CF testified that she was going iliLt to report Laura's sexual abuse and

since Laura didn't disclose anything to the counselor, CF lodged her allegations against Mr. Johnson

(Tr. p. 472).

Also, the Trinity Report, which CF stated that during the preliminary report that there was no sex

abuse by Mr. Johnson (Tr. p. 424, 425). Later, CF reported that Mr. Johnson had forced her to perform

oral sex upon him, and that there was never any emission from the sexual encounters (Tr. p. 426). CF

testified that she had to clean her sheets from this experience, as she could not lay down "in the mess"

(Tr. p. 470), and that she didn't remember which sexual encounter the emission had occurred (Tr. p.

470-471), but that the emission had occurred during the third sexual assault (Tr. p. 468).

The defense witness also failed to corroborate CFs fabrications during direct examination and

cross-examination. The State had failed to meet their burden in this instance, simply informed the jury

that it was "a sad day that the entire family would turn on CF in favor of Trevor Johnson."

The State's witness had failed to corroborate or re-enforce the testimony of CF in this matter before

the bar. This Honorable Court should note the differences which were presented throughout the

investigation and the actual trial testimony presented to the jury.

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Thevor Jthnsz v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

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The abundance of discrepancies throughout the testimony of the State's witnesses and the victim

constitutes a reasonable probability that there was a substantial abundance of perjury and inconsistencies to

the State's case. Indeterminately, with the many different accounts or non-accounts presented by the

State with the presentation of the testimony that was virtually impossible for any reasonable trier of

fact to keep track of. Basically, the jury should have suffered from mass confusion as a result of the

presentation by the State in this matter.

Unreliable "Expert" Testimony:

Jo Beth Rickles testified in the State's behalf as the ACA worker responsible for the interviews

involving CF (Tr. p. 429). Ms. Rickles testified as to the inconsistencies involved in this matter. Ms.

Rickles stated that according to State's Exhibit 3, there was no sexual contact between Mr. Johnson and

CF (Fr. p. 435). Ms. Rickles testified that CF had reported sexual abuse, then recanted her entire story

(Tr. p. 436). The most amazing statement that Ms. Rickles had testified to is that CF had informed her,

"1 went to someplace with someone else and she said it, so I repeated it." (Tr. p. 445). In this instance,

CF is informing Ms. Rickles that she had accompanied her friend, Laura Morse, to the counselor's

office in order for Laura to report the sexual assaults occurring in Lauras own household. Apparently,

Laura had decided against reporting this to the counselor, so CF had instead made allegations against

Mr. Johnson (Fr. p. 472).

Ms. Rickles testified that the interviews with CF were entirely contradictory to each other. These

interviews were conducted in October of 2008 and January of 2009 (Tr. p. 433). Ms. Rickles testified

that the interviews with CF were "like pulling teeth" (Tr. p. 447) and that she had to "pull the answers

out of CF' (Tr. p. 447).

The State presented Dr. Adrienne Atzemis as an expert witness in child abuse pediatrician (Fr. p.

510). Dr. Atzemis testified as to the fact that there was no damage to CF's hymen during the

examination ('Fr. p. 531). Dr. Atzemis testified that ahymen can repair itself even after childbirth (Tr.

p. 533). Dr. Atzemis testified as to the fact that CF had reported anal penetration by Mr. Johnson (Tr. p.

538), although the medical examination showed "normal." Dr. Atzemis testified that CF did not cry or

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Rev or Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

13.

show emotional outbreaks during the interview (Tr. p. 538), that "kids do lie, but not about sex" (Tr. p.

539), and that teenagers also lie (Tr. p. 545). If the doctor believes that a child will lie, why would she

believe that they would not lie about a sexual allegation?

Dr. Atzemis dodged acknowledging that CF's story could be consistent with any type of sexual

misconduct NOT happening (Tr. p. 545). Dr. Atzemis had presented testimony that this household

was very unstable (Tr. p. 551-552), CF's story had transformed from "Nothing came from the penis"

(Fr. p. 555)(directly contradicting CF's testimony that she had to clean the sheets (Tr. p. 470)), from no

oral contact (Tr. p. 556-557), to oral contact (Tr. p. 560), no anal sex (Tr. p. 558), to having anal sex

(Fr. p. 560), from everything happened in the CF's room (Tr. p. 562), to things happened in different

locations in the house (Tr. p. 556, 563), and CF telling her mother every time (Tr. p. 563).

Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State Y. Ay o, 167 So.3d 608 (La 6/30/15), reversed the

convictions of Derrick Mais, Brett Ward, Clayton King, and Michael Ayo for the charges ofAggravated

Rape and Attempted Aggravated Rape. In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, "reports of

alleged victim's pretrial statements to witnesses that she had not been raped, but had instead been

injured in an accident on a four-wheeler, constituted newly discovered evidence and that warranted new

trial."

In the case of4, "experts" in the field of forensics had testified that:

"[D]elayed piecemeal revelations of sexual abuse are common with younger victims,

who usually make their first disclosure to peers instead of to a parent or to authorities

because they are concerned about getting into trouble, family problems, and

embarrassment,' and also because they 'often consider trying to forget about such events

or pretend like they never happened.' according to Rickles, RP appeared to fit that

pattern: she disclosed the rapes for the first time to Devon Radecker on the night they

happened; she then made only the partial disclosure of a beating and attempted rape to

her mother, the authorities, and forensic interviewers, Rickles and Atzemis, eventually

adding the detail of the attempted oral intercourse; and she finally made full disclosure

to her mother, the Attorney General's Office, and then to jurors at trial. Dr. Atzemis also

opined that the bruises on RP's body could have stemmed from blunt force trauma but

were more likely caused by a laying-on of hands during sexual assault.

(FN6.) State v.Ayo, 2014-1933, 167 So.3d 608 (La. 2015).

In the case of Ayo, supra, the alleged victim lied about what had happened. These alleged

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14.

Rev or Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

perpetrators of the horrible crimes had their lives destroyed from June of 2008 to June of 2015, when

the Louisiana Supreme Court granted relief in their cases. These individuals were sentence to life

imprisonment without the benefit of Probation, Parole, or Suspension of Sentence and were considered

"Sex Offenders' during their incarceration. The State had relied heavily on the testimony of its two

"Expert" witnesses, JoBeth Rickles and Dr. Atzemis to obtain these convictions, as in this case. Then

the State has the audacity to continuously consider this type of testimony as credible.

The State has been continually using the testimony of these "experts" who have consistently

testified on behalf of the victim in order to obtain convictions for innocent persons accused of sexual

misconduct. The purpose of this testimony is to overcome the State's lack of evidence (physical, DNA,

or eyewitness). When it comes to a case of credibility between the alleged victim and defendant, this

"Expert" testimony "tips the scale" to ensure the State a conviction, even if it means sentencing an

innocent person to incarceration for the remainder of their lives for a clime that they have not

committed. This practice MUST come to an end.

The Science Community recognizes Dr. Atzemis' field of expertize as "Junk Science," and that the

testimony is contrary to the findings of the American Pediatrics Association (which she claims to quote

from). Dr. Atzemis' testimony is ONLY to improperly "bolster" the testimony of the alleged victim and

to "give credibility" to the testimony given, not for substantial evidence to show proof of guilt. This

testimony does not meet the criteria of Daubert Y. Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

This testimony on credibility has the effect of "putting an impressively qualified expert's stamp of

truthfulness" on a witness' testimony. Azure, infra, at 340. This "stamp" has the effect of "so bolstering

a witness' testimony ... as to increase it's probative strength with the jury and

...

it's admission may in

some situations on this basis constitute reversible error." Hoinan v. United States, 279 E2d 767, 772 (gth Cir).

One of the early cases on this matter has been repeatedly followed is United States v. Azure, 801

F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986). There, the Court held that a pediatrician's comment on whether or not the

victim was indeed telling the truth about being the victim of sexual abuse was held to be reversible

error It states

"...

Credibility, however, is for the jury. The jury is the lie detector in the courtroom ..." It

iepd5\Icsp-dconstance8oyv,y DocumendienVohnson\Johnson T #384076Vohnson Theer ushabwrtodt

evor Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

15.

is now suggested that psychiatrists and psychologists have more expertise in weighing veracity of a

witness than either Judges or juries, and that their opinions can be of value to both Judges and juries in

determining credibility, perhaps. The effect of receiving such testimony, however, may be two fold:

First, it may cause juries to surrender their own common sense in weighing testimony; second, it may

produce a trial within atrial on what is collateral but still an important matter.

WHEREFORE under these circumstances, it is requested that this Court evaluate the evidence

presented at trial to determine whether it was sufficient to sustain the conviction. A thorough review of

the record reveals a reasonable doubt concerning Mn Johnson's guilt of Aggravated Rape. When a

conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence, the double jeopardy provision of Article I, § 15, of the

Louisiana Constitution of 1974 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution prohibit a retrial of the defendant. Burks i' United Stoles, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57

L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); State v. Williams, 423 So.2d 1048 (La 1982). Currently, Trevor T. Johnson should

be ordered discharged, or in the alternate, this matter be reversed and remanded to the district court for

further proceedings.

ISSUE NO. 2

Whether reasonable jurists would find that the trial court erred in the denial of defense

counsel's motion to suppress the introduction of the partially inaudible telephone call into

evidence; and Whether Mr. Johnson's conviction was obtained in violation of the First,

Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; as the telephone

call submitted to the jury was in violation of the Telecommunication Act.

The trial court erred in denying defense counsel's Motion to Suppress the introduction of a

"partially inaudible" phone call into evidence. The defense counsel properly lodged a contemporaneous

objection, and the admittance of such would be aviolation of Article 15 of the Telecommunication Act

('Th. p. 119), but was erroneously denied by the trial court before the start of the Voir Dire.

Detective Suhre failed to follow any and all procedures involved in the interception or use of these

taped conversations between CF and Trevor Johnson. Pursuant to LSAR.S. 15:1308 and 15:1310,

Detective Suhre failed to obtain permission to record these conversations. Detective Suhre simply took

it upon himself to record conversations which he felt would ascertain additional evidence to build his

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16.

Thevor Jthnsz v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

case against Mr. Johnson.

As Detective Suhre had failed to receive authorization for the recording of these communications,

the Attorney General's Office could have instituted, prosecuted, or intervened in this criminal action as

they are authorized to. Detective Suhre showed complete disregard for the law and Mr. Johnson's

constitutional and statutorily protected rights as enumerated in the United States Constitution,

Louisiana Constitution of 1974, and the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. As the State of

Louisiana has not reverted to the ways of Nazism, these recordings should have been disallowed by the

trial court, as defense counsel had properly lodged an objection to their admittance. The trial court

further disregarded Mr. Johnson's constitutional and statutory rights in siding with the State to allow

these "partially inaudible" recordings to be presented to the jury without the proper foundation being

laid by the State.

The State did propagate their disparity by failing to present Detective Suhre for the purpose of

testifying to lay the foundation of these "partially inaudible" recordings. The State realized that this

would have subjected Detective Suhre to the cross-examination by defense counsel. With the crossexamination by defense counsel, Detective Suhre would have been subjected to the scrutiny of rigorous

questions as to the process of obtaining said recordings to the jury.

Det. Suhre failed to submit an application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of

these "partially inaudible" communications. The failure of Detective Suhre to submit same with the

court was, in fact, an admittance that the State had failed to thoroughly investigate their authority to use

these communications as to the current law in effect at this time in the State of Florida, which requires

and all-party consent in which to lawfully obtain these recordings and for the submitting of same into a

court of law. See: LSA-R.S. 15:1310.

The State would have been subjected to the denial of the introduction of these "partially inaudible"

recordings of communications pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:1307, which prohibits the use of said oral

communications in the course of the proceedings without proper authorization of one of the governing

bodies that are entitled to grant the right of the recording of communications pursuant to Article 15 of

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17.

Thevor Jthnstm V. Darrel Vannoy, War den

the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.

Mr. Johnson's conviction was obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution as the telephone call which was submitted to the jury was recorded in violation of

the Federal Telecommunication Act.

The monitoring of this phone call violated Federal Law. Mr. Johnson submits that the Louisiana

Law for recording a conversation is subject to one-person consent. Calls that cross state lines become

complicated legal issues especially when one state is a one-party consent and the other state is an allparty consent state. What has happened is that you didn't violate the law in the one-party consent state

and violated the law in the all-party state. Moreover, since the call went across a state line, the federal

laws would certainly apply. The most famous case involving this type of issue is the Linda Trip case.

You will recall that Linda Trip recorded the conversations of Monica Lewinaki concerning her

relationship with President Clinton. Trip was in Maryland and Lewinski was in DC. Note that

Maryland is an all-party consent state while DC is a one-party consent state. The law is actually quite

fuzzy on these issues. The recorder and the Court is advised to assume that the stricter law would apply

in each instance.

In all 50 states and through federal law,it's considered illegal to record telephone conversations

outside of the one-party consent. However, the law only addresses the use of one-party and all-party

consent. Anything outside of that is a violation of state law and federal wire-tapping law.

The Federal Communications Commission goes further into details on recording telephone

conversations and states that the party recording must give verbal notification before the recording and

there must be a beep tone on the line to indicate that the line is being recorded.

Louisiana is a one-party consent state. However, Florida is a two-party consent state. At the time of

the conversation, Mr Johnson was, in fact, in the State of Florida for an interview, as this was

stipulated by the State and defense; and Det. Suhre was well aware that Mr. Johnson would try his best

to "cut the conversation short." Detective Ryan Suhre was heard in the background of the conversation

DocumentscHenJohnsonohnson T #384076Vohnaon Trevor ushbwrtodt

Thevor Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

18.

coaching CF in the questions which he wanted presented to Mr. Johnson. The State has improperly

introduced these tapes into evidence; thus violating Federal Law.

CF was not at the age of consent, or having been emancipated, to allow Detective Suhre to record

the communications between Mr. Johnson and herself. A person under the age of eighteen must obtain

permission from their parents or legal guardian in order to make decisions about their selves or their

bodies. LSA-R.S. 93.2.

LaCh.C. Art. 728 defines (2) "Child" means a person under eighteen years of age who, prior to

juvenile proceedings, has not been judicially emancipated or emancipated by marriage.

A"Child" may not even enlist in the military without the consent of their parent or guardian. LSA29:20. Pursuant to LSA.R.S. 37:3390.4: (2) When the person is a minor under the age of eighteen and

the information acquired indicates that the child was a victim or subject of a crime, then, the person

having received the information may be required to testify fully in relation thereto upon any

examination, trial, or other proceeding in which the commission of such crime is subject of inquiry,

unless otherwise prohibited by law.

The State of Louisiana deems a person to be a "Child" until that individual reaches the age of

eighteen. As the State of Louisiana requires that a person be of the age of eighteen in order to vote, sign

a contract, enter the military, consent to sex, etc., the State would deem that a"Child" under the age of

eighteen cannot consent to have their communications intercepted and recorded. The State had failed to

interject into discovery, consent from a parent or guardian was not obtain prior to the interception of

these communications. If Detective Suhre had given the consent to intercept and record these

communications, does that make him the guardian? If Detective Suhre wasn't the guardian, where was

the consent from the parents?

The State failed to call Detective Suhre as a witness to lay the foundation for the introduction of

these recorded conversation. Instead, the State had called Darlene Carter to testify as to the fact that she

had transcribed these "partially inaudible" taped conversations (Tr. p. 574). Ms. Carter testified that she

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They or Johnson V. Darrel Varnzoy, Wanlen

19.

was not a certified transcriptionist (Tr. p. 576), and that she was not present during the conversation

between CF and her stepfather, Trevor Johnson (Tr. p 574-76) These tapes were then improperly

presented to the jury as evidence without the proper testimony to lay the foundation in accordance with

iendez-Diazv. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009).

Detective Suhre failed to fallow procedures for the interception of Oral Communications. LSAR.S. 15:1310, which states the proper procedures for obtaining authorization for the interception of an

oral communication.

The Law prohibits of use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral communications in this matter

LSA-R.S. 15:1307. The State introduced these recordings to the jury as evidence of admittance of the

commission of a crime against CF, and the trial court failed to enforce the laws as set forth in the

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. LSA-R.S. 15:1307.

Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act provides that no person who, as an employee, has

to do with the sending or receiving of interstate communication by wire shall divulge or publish it or its

substance to anyone other than the addressee or his authorized representative or to subpoena issued by

a court or competent jurisdiction or on demand of other lawful authority; and "No person not being

authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,

contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person."

In Nardone Y. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed.2d 307 (1939), the United States

Supreme Court, Judge Roberts gave his opinion stating that: "We nevertheless face the fact that the

plain words of Section 605 forbid anyone, unless authorized by the sender, to intercept a telephone

message, and direct in equally clear language that "no person" shall divulge or publish the message or

its substance to "any person." To recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court is to

divulge the message. The same considerations may well have moved Congress to adopt Section 605 as

evoked the guaranty against practices and procedures violation of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and

Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. For years controversy has raged with respect to the morality of

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20.

Thevor Johnson v. Darrel I/annoy, Warden

the practice of wire tapping by officers to obtain evidence. It has been the view of many that the

practice involves a grave wrong and in any case, should be reversed or prevented."

In US v. PaIakoff 112 F2d 888 (2 d Cir. 1940), the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit,

the opinion by Judge L. Hand, Circuit Judge states: "Every telephone talk, like any talk, is antiphonal;

each party is alternately sender and receiver and it would deny all significance to the privilege created

by Section 605 to hold that because one party originated the call he had power to surrender the

others' privilege. There cannot be the least doubt of this as to the answers of the party the party called

up; and while it might indeed be pedantically argued that each party had the power to consent to the

interception of at least so much as he said, that would be extremely unreal, for in the interchange each

answer may, and often does, imply by reference some part of that to which it responds.

It is impossible satisfactorily so to dissect a conversation, and the privilege is mutual; both must

consent to the interception of any part of the talk." In the case of Trevor Johnson, no consent was

obtained. The statute does not speak of physical interceptions of the circuit, or of "taps." It speaks of

"interceptions" and anyone intercepts a message to whose intervention as a listener communicates do

not consent; the means he employs can have no importance; it is breach of privacy that counts. Here,

however, we need not be troubled by niceties, because no matter what the scope of any such implied

consent, it cannot extend to the interception of prosecuting agents bent upon trapping either party

criminally. A fair trial cannot be obtained with the admission of telephone records.

In U.S. v. Fallon, 112 F.2d 894 (2 Cir. 1940), the opinion of Judges L. Hand and Augustus N.

Hand stated that: "This case is controlled by the opinion handed down here with the case of U.S. v.

Polakoff The declarations of the accused over the telephone were even more damaging than the

Polakoffs case and certainly detennined the verdict. A recording apparatus was interposed in the

telephone circuit in the house of the prosecution's chief witness, who was then acting in conjunction

with Agents of the investigation, after all had been arranged, called up the accused and their talk was

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Thevor lthns0n Y. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

21.

recorded. This was repeated another time. Just as in the case of Trevor Johnson. The Judges stated, "We

see no reason for adding to what we have already said in the companion case (The Polak off case), and

the judgment was reversed; and anew trial was ordered.

The government refer to the context of the critical clause, and the legislative history of the

Communications Act, the former to demonstrate that all communications are protected from

interception and divulgence; the latter to prove that the language of the Act must be more narrowly

intercepted to cover only interstate and foreign communications.

Section 605 renders all communications inadmissible, and is prejudicial error for the trial court to

admit them into evidence, either by the defendant or by the prosecution.

Free speech and associated rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States

Constitution. Privacy rights are guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States

Constitution.

In 1972, the Court decided in U.S. v. US. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)(The Keith case) and

held that, for unlawful electronic surveillance even in domestic security matters, the Fourth

Amendment requires a prior warrant.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution consist of the right of the people to be

secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects, against reasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The Fourth

Amendment, accordingly, was adopted to assure that Executive abuses of the power to search would

not continue in our nation.

Justice White wrote in 1984 in U.S. v. Ka.ro, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), "a case involving installation and

monitoring of a beeper which had found it's way into a home, that a private residence is a place in

which society recognizes an expectation of privacy; that warrant-less searches of such places are

presumptively unreasonable, absent exigencies. Id. at 714-715.

The defendant's motion to dismiss the claim against Mr. Johnson should be granted because

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Rev or Jthnsm v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

22.

litigation of that claim would require violation of the defendant's First and Fourth Amendments of the

United States Constitution and the Statutory Law.

The State would erroneously submit to this Honorable Court that this case fails under the exception

of LSA-R.S. 15:1303.

Federal Law requires that the State of Louisiana follow the guidelines of both the state for which

the call originated and the state in which the call was received. The State of Florida requires an allparty consent for the interception and recording of a communication. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 et seq.

Defense counsel had pointed out the trial court, any statement can be construed to say what a

person wants it to say. "Have you stopped beating your wife?" The State had misconstrued and

"twisted" the conversations between Mr. Johnson and CF to sound as if Mr. Johnson had admitted

guilt Mr. Johnson was simply trying to hurry the conversation along in a manner as to not be rude to

his step-daughter. There was no admittance of any improprieties on the part of Mr. Johnson, just

concern as to where CF was calling from, as the number she had called from was not a number that he

was familiar with.

Detective Suhre had violated Mr. Johnson's constitutional rights in obtaining a recording of the

conversation, which was greatly misinterpreted by the State and the jurors, and should not have been

submitted for evidence in this matter. The State has FAILED to submit any PROOF that this

intercepted phone conversation between Mr. Johnson and the alleged victim was legally obtained, as

the interception is in violation of the United States Constitution and also the Louisiana Constitution of

1974 in that he has been subjected to conviction with evidence that has been illegally obtained through

this investigation. Furthermore, as noted above, Detective Suhre had FAILED to obtain any type of

warrant for the recordation of such, nor had he obtained PERMISSION from ANYONE of legal age

for same. The alleged victim WAS NOT of age to consent for the interception of this phone call (which

was across state lines, in violation of the Federal Law).

WHEREFORE, for reasons stated above, this Honorable Court should rule that these tapes were

improperly obtained and admitted into evidence by the trial court This matter should be reversed and

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Thevor Jthnsm v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

remanded to the trial court for a new trial, with the exclusion of these improperly obtained and

submitted communications from the evidence.

ISSUE NO.3

Whether reasonable jurists would debate that the trial court erred in allowing the state to

strike two African-American prospective jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentu dcv, 476

U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed2d 69 (1986).

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court

explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits State prosecutors from

striking prospective jurors from the petit jury on the basis of race, and that when the State racially

exercise its peremptory challenges to excuse black potential jurors from the petit jury on the account of

their race, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

is violated. The Court set forth the standard that a defendant must establish to prove a prima facie case

of purposeful discrimination. Under this standard, the defendant must show that he is a member of a

cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the

venire members of the defendant's race. Second, defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which

there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits

those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Third, defendant must show that these facts

and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude

the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. 14, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.

Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward

with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. The prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's

prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on

the assumption

or his intuitive judgment

that they would be partial to the defendant because of

their shared race. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by

denying that he had a discriminatory motive or affinning his good faith in making individual selection.

Id., 106 S.Ct. at 1723-1724.

Rerna,z.Lejj'gj/, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991), the Supreme Court held that

I Rev or Jthnscn v. Darsl Vannoy, Wanlen

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24.

"Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial

court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether

the defendant has made a prima facie showing became moot." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95

S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), held that the Sixth Amendment requires that jury venire be drawn

from a fair cross section of the community.

In Batson v. KenLu*y, supra, the Supreme Court outlined a three-step process for determining

whether peremptory strikes have been applied in a discriminatory manner: First, the claimant must

make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenges have been exercised on the basis of race.

Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party accused of discrimination

to articulate race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges. Finally, the trial court must

determine whether the claimant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. U.S. v.

Beniiy-Smith, 2 E3d 1368, 1373 (5 Cir. 1993); Haynes v. Quarterman, 561 F.3d 535 (5 Cir. 2009).

As to the first element of Batson, counsel made a prima facie showing that the State's peremptory

strikes were targeted at specifically removing African-Americans from the jury. The State used two (2)

strikes. Each of the two (2) were to strike African-Americans, members of Appellant's racial/ethnical

group. The Court has held that the requisite showing of racial discrimination can be demonstrated by

the fact that 1). peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to

discriminate who are a mind to discriminate, and 2). that the facts and circumstances raise an inference

that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106

S.Ct. 1712; Pricey. Cain, 560 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2009).

In order to make a prima facie showing to satisfy the first element of Batson, the Supreme Court

explained: "We did not intend the first step to be so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade

the judge

certainty

on the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the defendant to know with

that the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.

Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirement of Batson's first step by producing evidence sufficient to

permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. Johnson v. California, 545

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25.

Thevor Johnson v. LMrnJ Vannoy, Warden

U.S. 162, 170, 125 S.Ct. 2410 (2005). The Fifth Circuit in Price v. Cain, supra, interpreted this

tang luage as being "simple and without fri11s" It is beyond logical debate, the record clearly

establishes a pattern allowing the reasonable inference to be drawn that the State's strikes were racially

motivated. Two (2) peremptory challenges were used; Two (2) African-American's of appellant's

racial/ethnical group were selectively and purposefully targeted and struck from the jury. It was then

incumbent upon the Court to conduct further inquiry, as the burden shifted to the State to articulate

race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges.

Defense counsel properly lodged a contemporaneous objection to the State using peremptory

challenges to dismiss the onjy two prospective African-American jurors from this trial. As it was, in

this group of twenty potential jurors, there were only two African-Americans in this panel. The State

peremptorily struck both of these from the jury. These two are Mr. Sidney Harris, a well-respected

law enforcement officer in Orleans Parish, and Mr. Walli Haqq. As the State and defense counsel had

already challenged one African-American for cause, defense had properly raised a contemporaneous

objection to the State dismissing these other two African-Americans from the jury. The State had used

Strike Number 'iWo to dismiss W. Sidney Harris. The colloquy for the strike is located on 1t.pp. 277-278.

After the dismissal of this African-American potential juror, the State further dismissed Mr. Walli

Haqqi, an African-American. First, the State had challenged Mr. Haqqi for cause, which the Court had

denied (Tr. p. 365-365). After the Court had denied the State's challenge for cause, the State then used a

peremptory challenge to dismiss Mr. Haqqi (Tr. p. 368-369). As to the State's challenge for cause, Mr.

Johnson requests this Honorable Court to refer to transcript pages 365-66.

Mr. Johnson now submits to this Honorable Court that the colloquy for the State's challenge for

peremptory dismissal is located on transcript pages 368-369. After a mere inspection of the record in

this matter, this Honorable Court will see that the trial court had denied Mr. Johnson his constitutional

and statutorily protected rights in allowing the State to dismiss these two African-Americans from the jury.

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They or Johnson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

[

ISSUE NO. 5

Whether reasonable jurists would find that the trial court abused its discretion by

accepting the non-unanimous verdict of guilt by the jury.

Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Art. I § 17 (A) allowing non-unanimous jury verdicts and the

enabling statute, La.C.Cr.P. Art. 782, violate Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and

Article I, Section Three (3) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, because the constitutional

provision's enactment was motivated by an express and overt desire to discriminate against blacks on

account of race and because the provision has had a racially discriminatory impact since its adoption.

Unlike the familiar Sixth Amendment challenge to this State's non-unanimous jury regime, a

challenge to the Louisiana Supreme Court has rejected, the Equal Protection challenge presented in this

case has not been addressed on merits by any court. See: State Y. Bertrand, 6 So.3d 38 (La. 3/17/09).

Despite its apparent novelty, this claim follows from a straightforward application of settled United

States Supreme Court jurisprudence that holds that any law that has a racially discriminatory impact

and that was enacted with a racially discriminatory motive violates Equal Protection notwithstanding

that the law may be facially neutral. Hunter

471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d

222 (1985); Arlington Hdghtsv. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct.

555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); ML Healthy City Board of Educati on v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct.

568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).

For example, in Hunter v. Underwood, the Supreme Court affirmed that lower court's invalidation

of an Alabama law that disenfranchised persons convicted of certain misdemeanors. The Court

concluded that although the law was facially neutral with respect to race, the law violate Equal

Protection because it had the effect of disenfranchising a disproportionate percentage of blacks and

because the law was passed in the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1801, a which the "zeal for

white supremacy ran rampant." Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229. The Court further noted that Alabama's

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27.

Thevor fthnsm v. Din-re! Vannoy, Warden

constitutional convention "was part of a movement that swept the post-Reconstruction South to

disenfranchise blacks." Id.

Over 40 years ago, Justice Potter Stewart warned about the Louisiana's flawed system: "[Ten]

jurors can simply ignore the views of their fellow panel members of a different race or class," Johnson

Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 397 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972)(Stewart, J., dissenting). The risk

that the black community and black jurors have been denied a guarantee of meaningful participation in

jury deliberations is simply too great to tolerate any longer.

Non-unanimous juries convict disproportionately greater number of blacks than whites. It is

obviously true that convictions are easier to obtain when juries do not require unanimity to convict. It

necessarily follows that juries in Louisiana convict more persons than they would if unanimity were

required. While black citizens make up only 33% of Louisiana's population, they comprise 76% of

Louisiana's prison population.' It simply cannot be denied that the law, which was born of overt racism,

disproportion adversely affects black persons.

Louisiana's non-unanimous jury system is unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One, Section Three

(3) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.

Accordingly, Mr. Johnson was convicted of the crime by amargin of 11-1. This Court should note

that a life sentence in the State of Louisiana is similar to that of a death penalty, as an offender is

meticulously guaranteed that he will NEVER see the light of day as a free man, and is virtually

sentenced to die in incarceration. Although the State may submit the fact that Mr. Johnson may apply

for a Pardon in twenty years; it should be noted that offenders sentenced to death are also able to apply

for a Pardon. Hence, showing that this life sentence is really a "Virtual Death Penalty' or "Death by

'HttpJ/www.gibbsmagazind.corn/blacks—in—prisons.htm.

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28.

Thevor Jthnson Y. ThiriJ Vannoy, Warden

Incarceration."

This Honorable Court must consider the fact that on November 6, 2018, the voters of Louisiana

voted to change the Law concerning non-unanimous verdicts. Although the new law only applies to

persons whose trial commences on or after January 1, 2019, the State admitted that the Law was

premised on racial discrimination during the arguments concerning such during the Legislative Session.

A Law based on discrimination cannot stand.

This Court must also consider that in State v çkkzMad e. Docket No.: 13-CR-725 (10/11/18), of

the 11th Judicial District Court, parish of Sabine, the Honorable Stephen B. Beasley declared that the

use of non-unanimous verdicts unconstitutional. Although this case may only be used as "Persuasive

Law," this was the first time that "Expert" testimony was submitted to a Court which proves beyond a

reasonable doubt that the Law was based on racial premises. It is well settled that a Law based on any

discriminatory basis is unconstitutional, and cannot stand.

Most recently, the United States Supreme Court, in Evangelisto Ramos Y. Louisiana, No. 18-5924,

ordered the State to file a Brief in Opposition to Mt Ramos' Petition for Writ of Certiorari. It appears

as though the United States Supreme Court has, after 46 years of affinning Apodoca v. Oregon, 406

U.S. 404 (1972), determined that it is time to reviewthe constitutionality of Louisianas non-unanimous

jury verdicts.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, this Honorable Court should reverse this non-unanimous

verdict and Grant the desired relief in this matter.

CONCLUSION

After a review of the Record in this case, Mr. Johnson this Honorable Court must determine that

Mr. Johnson was denied his constitutional rights to a fair and impartial trial in this matter.

Furthermore, jurists of reason would have properly considered Mr. Johnson's Issues and Granted

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Thevor Jthnstm v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

29.

Mr. Johnson relief from his convictions.

The record sufficiently supports Mr. Johnson's allegation of substantial error. Therefore; this

Honorable Court should find that, in the Interest of Justice, Mr. Johnson should receive a new trial, or

in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing to review the merits, of the constitutional violations. Mr.

Johnson seeks relief and has stated grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, specifying, with reasonable

particularity, the factual basis for such relief. Additionally, his pleading clearly alleges Claims which if

proven, entitle him to constitutional relief.

WHEREFORE, after a careful review of the merits of these Claims, Mr. Johnson contends that

this Honorable Court will find that reasonable jurists would not allow these convictions to stand.

Respectfully submitted this 261hday of December, 2018.

Trevor JohnsofC#38407-6

MP WY/Pine-3

Louisiana State Penitentiary

Angola, Louisiana 70712-9818

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by First Class United States Mail this 2

clay of December, 2018. upon counsel of record for Respondent, pursuant to Rule 29 at the following

address;

District Attorney's Office

701 N. Columbia St.

Covington, LA 70433

iature of Petitioner

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Thevor Johnson V. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.