Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mark Anthony Soliz, Petitioner v. Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

No. ________________

__________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

__________________________________________________

MARK ANTHONY SOLIZ,

Petitioner,

-vLORIE DAVIS, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

Respondent.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

__________________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________________________________________________

Carlo D’Angelo

CARLO D’ANGELO, PC

100 East Ferguson;

Suite 1210

Tyler, TX 75702

Caro@dangelolegal.com

(903) 595-6776 (work)

(903) 407-4119 (fax)

Seth Kretzer

LAW OFFICES OF SETH KRETZER

440 Louisiana Street; Suite 1440

Houston, TX 77002

seth@kretzerfirm.com

Member, Supreme Court Bar

(713) 775-3050 (work)

(713) 929-2019 (fax)

COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEYS FOR

PETITIONER SOLIZ

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether this Court should grant certiorari to remand this case to the Fifth

Circuit because the Fifth Circuit misapplied this Court’s “plain statement” rule to

determine if a state court’s procedural default determination did not clearly state

that it was relying on specific state rules to predicate said default.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This petition stems from a habeas appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals from the Northern District of Texas. Soliz was the defendant/appellant.

Lorie Davis, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, was the respondent in the

district court, and the appellee in the Fifth Circuit.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner is not a corporate entity.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented for Review……………………........………………………….ii

Parties to the Proceedings Below …………………………....……………………iii

Rule 29.6 Statement…………….…………………………………………………iii

Table of Authorities…………………………………………..…………………...iv

Citations of Opinions and Orders Entered Below……………………..………....viii

Statement of Jurisdiction……………………………………...……………………1

Federal Constitutional Provision Involved…………………………...……...…….2

Statement of the Facts and Case…………………........……………………………2

Argument: Reasons for Granting Relief………………….………………………...8

Conclusion……………………...…………………….……………………...……14

Certificate of Mailing……………………...…………………………..………….14

Certificate of Service………………………...………………………..…………..15

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allen v. Stephens, 805 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 2015)……………...…………………….6

Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999) ……………....…...……….….8

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) ………………..…..……………….10

Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)…………………...….….5

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) ………………..…...……………….13

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) ……………………….…….……….7

Decker v. State, 717 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)……….…………….….5

Druery v. Thaler, 647 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 2011) …………….……...………….….6

Ex parte Moore, 395 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ………..……….….….5

Fama v. Comm’r of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 2000) ….…..……….….13

Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)…………...……….…….6

Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)…………...……….…….7

Garcia v. Stephens, 793 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2014) ……….……………………….10

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) ……………...…...……………………….….8

Holmes v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 619, 146 S.W.2d 400 (1940) ………………...….8

Hopper v. Dretke, 106 F. App’x 221 (5th Cir. 2004) ……………..…...……….….7

Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 641 (5th Cir.1999) ……………..…...………….….8

Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2006) ……………..…...…………..….13

iv

Koerner v. Gregas, 328 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2003) ……………..…...………..….13

Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) ……….……..…...………………….….10

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ……………..…...………………….….12

Newell v. Hanks, 283 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2002) ……………..…...……………….13

Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2007) ……………..…...……………….….8

Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) …………...………....….6

United States v. Green, 272 F.3d 748 (5th Cir. 2001) ……………....………….….6

United States v. Sarras, 571 F.3d 1111 (11th Cir. 2009) ………………...…….….8

Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1998)……………….………….….6

Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2001) …………...…...………….….8

Willeford v. State, 72 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002) …………….….8

Wilson v. Lindler, 8 F.3d 173 (4th Cir. 1993) …………………...….………….….6

Woodall v. State, 336 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)………….…………….6

STATUTES, RULES, AND GUIDELINES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)………………………………………………………………...1

U.S. CONST, amend. VI …………………………………………………………..2

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 ……………………………………...………………………..5

v

SECONDARY SOURCES:

Brian R. Means, Postconvction Remedies, §24.5 (West, June 2017) ……………..8

vi

CITATIONS OF OPINIONS AND ORDERS ENTERED BELOW

The Fifth Circuit’s January 9, 2018, opinion is attached as Appendix “A.”

The District Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order is attached as

Appendix “B.”

viii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Fifth Circuit’s Opinion was filed September 18, 2018. This Court’s

jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

1

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,

unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury … nor be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law …. U.S. CONST, amend. VI.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defense. U.S. CONST, amend. VI.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides, in pertinent part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits on State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

1.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

Motion to Suppress

On December 16, 2010, a grand jury indicted Soliz with capital murder for

intentionally causing the death of Nancy Weatherly while committing the offenses

of robbery or burglary.

2

Soliz filed a pretrial “Motion for Hearing on Admissibility of any Statement

by Defendant Whether Written or Oral or Evidence Resulting from Same/Motion to

Suppress” [C.R. 264] wherein he requested the court to suppress any statements

given to agents of the Fort Worth Police Department on or about June 29, 2010,

contending that the statements were custodial and in violation of Miranda. In sum,

the statements were not voluntarily given and were obtained in violation of the

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,

Article I and the requirements of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1963).

Soliz’s video-taped and written statements were admitted in the suppression

hearing. The video-taped statement was admitted as State’s Exhibit No. 1, and the

transcript of the videotape was admitted as State’s Exhibit No. 1A. The type-written

statements were admitted as State’s Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4. The trial court overruled

Appellant’s Motion to Suppress these items. [R.R. Vol. 6, pg. 122, CR 1746].

2.

Soliz Introduced The Confession In His Recross-Examination of

Detective Paine

Q. Detective Paine, I'll show you what’s been previously marked as State’s

Exhibit No. 1 and also marked Defense Exhibit No. 8, and ask you to identify

that, please.

A. It'’s a DVD that I believe contains a recording of Mr. Soliz’s interview.

MR. HEISKELL: Okay. Your Honor, at this time, we would offer State's

1 and Defense Exhibit No. 8.

MR. STRAHAN: No objection.

3

THE COURT: I want to just understand, you -- you offered State’s

Exhibit No. 1?

MR. HEISKELL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: As your own document?

MR. HEISKELL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: As your own pleading?

MR. HEISKELL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Without qualification?

MR. HEISKELL: Without qualification, Judge, yes, sir.

THE COURT: For all purposes?

MR. HEISKELL: For all purposes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Admitted.

3.

CCA’s Resolution of The Suppression Claim

On direct appeal, the CCA resolved this point of error as follows:

4

The record establishes that at trial, defense counsel offered the

audiovisual recording of appellant’s oral statement without

qualification and for all purposes while cross-examining one of the

detectives who interviewed appellant. The prosecutor did not object,

and the recording was published to the jury. By offering his oral

statement into evidence, appellant waived error concerning the trial

court’s ruling on his motion to suppress this statement. See Decker v.

State, 717 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (stating that, when

appellant offered his confession into evidence before the jury and the

trial court admitted it as a defense exhibit, appellant waived his

objection to the admission of his confessions); see also Ex parte Moore,

395 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (stating that when a

defendant affirmatively asserts during trial that he has “no objection”

to the admission of evidence, he waives any error in its admission

despite a pre-trial ruling denying his motion to suppress).

Appellant’s written statements were offered by the prosecutor and

admitted into evidence after appellant’s oral statement had been

admitted and published to the jury. These written statements were

summaries of the oral statement. Because appellant waived error with

respect to his oral statement, the admission of his written statements

does not constitute reversible error. See Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253,

282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Points of error three through six are

overruled.

Soliz v. State, 432 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

4.

Federal District Court’s Resolution of the Suppression

Claim

a.

Procedural Bar

5

With regard to procedural bar, the Memorandum Opinion first explains that

even though Respondent Davis urges the “contemporaneous-objection rule” as its

trump-card, the CCA’s opinion never mentions “the contemporaneous-objection

rule” or its rule-based origin, Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

The contemporaneous objection rule, if that is what the CCA applied, is

adequate to preclude federal review. See Allen v. Stephens, 805 F.3d 617,

635 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2382, 195 L. Ed. 2d 269 (2016).

The CCA did not, however, cite Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1,

which is the contemporaneous objection rule for preservation of error on

appeal. See Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 738-39 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014).

Next, the District Court hypothesized an alternative rule on which the CCA

might have based its holding, “invited error”:

Based on the trial record and the CCA reasoning, it appears that the

CCA might have applied the invited-error doctrine. See Woodall v.

State, 336 S.W.3d 634, 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“the law of invited

error provides that a party cannot take advantage of an error that it

invited or caused, even if such error is fundamental”). But see Prystash

v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (explaining that

invited error is a type of “estoppel” not “waiver”). Like the

contemporary objection rule, the invited-error doctrine qualifies as a

state procedural bar which may preclude federal review. See Druery v.

Thaler, 647 F.3d 535, 545-46 (5th Cir. 2011).

[T]he invited-error doctrine applies on federal habeas review as well.

Id. at 545 (citing United States v. Green, 272 F.3d 748 (5th Cir. 2001);

Fields v. Bagley, 275 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2001); Parker v. Champion,

148 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Lindler, 8 F.3d 173 (4th Cir.

1993). Regardless of any state-court ruling, this claim is procedurally

barred in this Court under Druery because trial counsel invited any error

by introducing the oral confession at trial.

6

b.

Merits Analysis Under Miranda

Soliz next contends that his confession was involuntary because

the police ignored his request to terminate the interview when he said,

“I wish I could get up and leave . . . but I can’t . . . guys got me shackled

here.” 58 RR 21. As Soliz asserts, the accused’s right to cut off

questioning must be scrupulously honored or his statement will be

inadmissible. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S. Ct. 321, 46

L. Ed. 2d 313 (1975) (citing Miranda). The invocation of the right to

remain silent must, however, be unambiguous. Thompkins, 560 U.S. at

381-82.

The recording shows that Soliz misheard the detective say that

he, Soliz, could get up and leave. Soliz's response that he wished he

could get up and leave — with an emphasis on "could"-was not a

request to terminate the interview. It was a statement regretfully

acknowledging that he was shackled and under arrest. Soliz did not say

that he wanted to stop talking. The fact that he immediately continued

his conversation with the detective supports the interpretation that he

simply misheard the detective say he could get up and leave if he was

not sorry. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462, 114 S. Ct.

2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (holding that the statement, “Maybe I should

talk to a lawyer” was not a request for counsel); Hopper v. Dretke, 106

F. App’x 221, 231-32 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that question, “[c]an I

go back and think about it?” was ambiguous invocation of right to

remain silent and did not require cessation of

questioning).

Because the underlying factual assertions are not supported by the

record, claim 20 is denied.

5.

Fifth Circuit’s Holding

7

The Fifth Circuit made clear that it was utilizing it’s ‘best-guess’ as to what

the Texas state court had in mind: “We have previously held that “[t]he invitederror doctrine qualifies as a state procedural bar.” Druery v. Thaler, 647 F.3d 535,

545 (5th Cir. 2011).

ARGUMENT: REASONS FOR GRANTING RELIEF

I.

THE CCA NEVER STATED ITS BASIS FOR APPLING A PROCEDURAL BAR

Professor Means states the point starkly: “absent a clear and express statement

that the ruling was on procedural grounds, the claim is not procedurally defaulted.”

Brian R. Means, Postconvction Remedies, §24.5 (West, June 2017).

The ratio decindini of the CCA’s opinion is this: “[b]ecause appellant waived

error with respect to his oral statement, the admission of his written statements does

not constitute reversible error.”

Soliz certainly agrees that, “[t]he ‘Texas contemporaneous objection rule

constitutes an adequate and independent state ground that procedurally bars federal

habeas review of a petitioner’s claims.’” Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 641, 652 (5th

Cir.1999).

However, the problem remains that the CCA’s opinion says nothing

about procedural bar; neither the words “contemporaneous objection” or “TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1” are to be found. See Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 2007)

(“a federal court always must be chary about reaching a conclusion, based on

speculative analysis of what a state court might do, that a particular claim is

8

procedurally foreclosed”); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1135 (10th Cir. 1999)

(declining to hold unexhausted claim procedurally defaulted where “it is not at all

clear” that the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred).

By contrast, Supreme Court caselaw requires that application of the state

procedural bar must be uncertain if it is to pretermit federal review. “[T]he mere

fact that a federal claimant failed to abide by a state procedural rule does not, in and

of itself, prevent this Court from reaching the federal claim.” Harris v. Reed, 489

U.S. 255, 261 (1989) (“The mere existence of a basis for a state procedural bar does

not deprive this Court of jurisdiction; the state court must actually have relied on

the procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.”)

(emphasis added).

While Soliz certainly agrees that AEDPA “compels federal courts to review

for reasonableness the state court’s ultimate decision, not every jot of its reasoning”,

Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2001), the district court’s “invited

error” rationale is both 1) something the CCA never referenced in the its opinion and

2) completely inapposite to the facts of Soliz’s case.

It is a legal parameter that an “invited error” is not reviewable on appeal.

United States v. Sarras, 571 F.3d 1111, 1137 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Sarras concedes that

he did not object to Ortiz’s response. Normally, we would review such a claim for

plain error. But because Sarras’s claimed error is ‘invited error,’ it is thus

9

unreviewable.”); Willeford v. State, 72 S.W.3d 820, 824 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2002) (“[W]e hold that the invited error doctrine applies and will not consider

whether the trial court erroneously included the instruction about which Appellant

now complains.”); Holmes v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 619, 146 S.W.2d 400, 403 (1940)

(defendant objected to the wording of the charge, the wording was taken out, then

defendant complained the wording was not in the charge, appellate court held

defendant invited error and could not complain).

By contrast, the CCA never said Soliz’s suppression arguments were insulated

from review, but to the contrary addressed them specifically.

II.

SOLIZ’S CONFESSION WAS INADMISSIBLE UNDER MIRANDA

A defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent must be unambiguous

and unequivocal. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).

This is a two-part inquiry, considered under the ‘totality of the

circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’ First, the waiver must

have been ‘the product of free and deliberate choice rather than

intimidation, coercion, or deception.’ Second, ‘the waiver must have

been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’

Garcia v. Stephens, 793 F.3d 513, 521 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

The Memorandum Opinion recognizes that 1) Soliz was in custody at the time

he was interrogated by the Fort Worth police officers and 2) failure to cut off

custodial questioning after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent violates his

10

rights and renders any subsequently obtained statements inadmissible. See, e.g.,

Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 100 (1975).

The following statement is a stark reality of the interrogation of Soliz: “I wish

I could get up and leave ... but I can’t ... guys got me shackled here...” [SX 1;1A, pg.

14].

As a speculative matter, Soliz might have wanted to terminate the interview

because it was very late at night or early in the morning; he was very tired, and was

slumped over in his chair and asleep at one point during the interview. [R.R. Vol. 6,

pg. 42]. But as a positive matter, Soliz wanted to terminate the interview because, as

he stated, he would leave except that he was “shackled here.”.

The facts of Soliz’s case contrast with those at issue in Garcia: “Even

assuming that Garcia was young, exhausted, and without his glasses, Garcia cannot

show that he failed to understand the warnings or that he attempted to invoke his

rights in any way.”

Garcia, 793 F.3d at 522. Perhaps Garcia was ‘young,

exhausted, and of bad eyesight’ for reasons intrinsic to his own physicality; however,

Soliz was “shackled here” because of (extrinsic) police conduct.

Soliz’s request to leave and thereby terminate the interview was not granted

by the Detectives. In fact, Detective Boetcher talked Soliz out of terminating the

interview by ignoring his request and continuing to question him. This occurred

when the Detective stated to Appellant: “Am gonna get up here and leave ... because

11

I don’t waste time on people that don’t feel sorry ... so ...we’ll start with ...the house

on Pearl.” [SX 1;1A, pg. 15]. Detective Boetcher did not even acknowledge that

Soliz requested to terminate the interview. This violated Soliz’s right to terminate

the interview at any time.

In sum, the interrogation was a custodial interrogation and that his rights under

Miranda were violated

III.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING CREATES A CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS

IN OTHER CIRCUITS LEADING TO DIFFERENT RESULTS WITH RESPECT TO

WHETHER FEDERAL REVIEW IN HABEAS CORPUS IS OBTAINABLE

The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion as to procedural default resulted in a decision

that conflicts with this Court’s decisions in both Long 1 and Coleman 2 and other

cases in which the Long presumption has been applied. It also explains why the Fifth

Circuit arrived at a result opposite from other circuit courts that have confronted

In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), this Court announced the rule for determining

whether a state court’s ambiguous reference to state law constitutes an adequate and independent

ground for its decision: “[W]hen … a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal

law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any

possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most

reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that

federal law required it to do so.” Id. at 1041 (emphasis added). In Harris v. Reed, this Court

extended to habeas review Long’s rule for determining whether a state court has relied on an

independent state ground. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 244,265 (1989). As Harris makes clear, the

“plain statement” rule applies “regardless of whether the disputed state-law ground is substantive

(as it was in Long) or procedural, as in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 … (1985).” Id.

at 263.

2

See, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (noting that after Long, a state court that wishes

to look to federal law for guidance or as an alternative holding while still relying on an independent

and adequate state ground can avoid the presumption by stating “clearly and expressly that [its

decision] is … based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds.”

1

12

similar situations. For example, the Second Circuit held in Fama v. Comm’r of Corr.

Servs., 235 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 2000), and reiterated in Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d

130 (2d Cir. 2006), that so-called “either/or adjudications” by state courts do not

preclude federal review under the Long presumption. See also Newell v. Hanks, 283

F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2002) (presumption applied where state court failed to articulate

basis of denial and it was unclear from the record and nature of the claim whether

the state court relied on an independent state ground or federal grounds in disposing

claim); Koerner v. Gregas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing Ninth

Circuit case law as standing for the proposition that “where a state court decision

affords no basis for choosing between a state law ground that would bar federal

review, and one that would not, that decision cannot bar federal review”). Under

these decisions, if a federal court cannot tell whether the state court held that an

applicant failed to meet the state law prong or the federal law prong of Campbell,

then the Long presumption would apply. In short, under the rules of these other

jurisdictions, Mr. Soliz’s IAC claim would have received federal review.

13

CONCLUSION

Soliz prays this Court to grant certiorari.

Respectfully submitted this 9th day of January 2019.

Carlo D’Angelo

CARLO D’ANGELO, PC

100 East Ferguson;

Suite 1210

Tyler, TX 75702

Caro@dangelolegal.com

(903) 595-6776 (work)

(903) 407-4119 (FAX)

Seth Kretzer

LAW OFFICES OF SETH KRETZER

440 Louisiana Street; Suite 1440

Houston, TX 77002

seth@kretzerfirm.com

Member, Supreme Court Bar

(713) 775-3050 (work)

(713) 929-2019 (fax)

COURT-APPOINTED

PETITIONER SOLIZ

ATTORNEYS

FOR

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that, on the 9th day of January 2019, this pleading was served

on the Court via FEDEX.

____________________________

Seth Kretzer

14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on the 9th day of January, 2018, a true and correct copy

of this petition and appendices was sent to:

Jefferson David Clendenin

Office of the Attorney General

300 W. 15th Street

Austin, Texas 78701

____________________________

Seth Kretzer

15