Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lazina King, et al., Petitioners v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc.

No.

IN THE

uprtnte Iiiurt of fly i1Inifc

tate

LAZINA KING; RIA KING, PETITIONERS

V.

CALIBER HOME LOANS INC.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LAZINA KING

Pro se

RIA KING

Pro Se

1005 Comanche Drive

Oxon Hill, MD 20745

202-256-7775

CURRY & TAYLOR • 202-393-4141

RECEIVED

NOV 2 6 2018

THE CLERK

;4Y: OOU:r. u.s.

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

The Dodd and Frank Act of 2014 promulgated the

prohibition against "dual tracking" the loan

modification/loss mitigation program and foreclosure

process at the same time. It is contained in the provisions

of Regulation X and may be enforced by a borrower

pursuant to section 6(f) of the Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act (RESPA), (12 U.S.C. 2605 (f)). 12 C.R.F. §

1024.41 (a). Section 6(f) of RESPA, provides that

monetary damages and cost are available for RESPA

violations. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)-(4). The prohibition on

dual tracking is contained in 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(g), which

states in relevant part that if a borrow submits a

complete loss mitigation application after a servicers has

made the first notice or filing required by applicable law

for any judicial or non-judicial foreclosure process but

more than 37 days before a foreclosure sale, a servicer

shall not move for foreclosure judgement or order of sale,

or conduct a foreclosure sale. Maryland Courts on all

levels have violated our fifth and seventh amendment

rights by allowing Caliber Home Loans to break federal

and state law by allowing foreclosures to continue despite

the fact they are being notified that mortgage companies

are in direct violations of federal and state laws:

Is the RE SPA Regulation X Section 6(1) which was

promulgated by Dodd-Frank Act remedial in nature

which provides a private right of action to an injured

party for violations of the Act and does the seventh

amendment grant a right to a jury trial when the act has

been violated and the injured party request a jury trial to

recover statutory damages for 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (1) (1) 12

C.F.R. § 1024.41(g) violations?

H

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED ...........................................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................iii

OPINIONSBELOW ......................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION............................................................................... 1

RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED .........................................1

STATEMENT..................................................................................1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION...............................10

CONCLUSION...............................................................................16

APPENDIX

AppendixA.............................................................................. la

AppendixB.............................................................................. 3a

AppendixC............................................................................ 15a

Relevant Provisions Involved............................................. 16a

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Above the Belt. Inc. v. Bohannan Roofing Inc 99

F.R.D. 99 (E.D.Va. 1983) ......................................................17

Alston v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 585 F.3d

753 (3rd Cir. 2009) ..................................................................17

Baltimore Gas & Electric Co, v. Pub Serv, Cornmn

of Maryland, 305 MD. 145, 161 (1986) ..................................13

Barbato v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 14-cv-2233,

2016 WL, 158588 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 12, 2016) ...........................12

Cannon V. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677

(1979)........................................................................................13

Cortv.Ash 422 U.S. 66 (1975).................................................13

Gagliano v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. CO., 546

F.3d 230, 241 n. 8 (4th Cir. 2008) ..........................................18

Gonzalez v. Deutshce Bank Trust Co., 632 F. Appx

32, 34 (2d Cir. 2016)................................................................12

Houston v. U.S. Bank Home Morgt. Wis Servicing,

505 Fed. Appx. 543, 548, n. 6 (6th Cir. 2012).......................14

Hutchinson v. Stanton, 994 F.3d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir.

1993).........................................................................................18

In re Carter, 553 F.3d 979, 985 n.5 (6th Cir 2009) ..................17

Jones v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp. Inc., 606 F.3d 119,

124 (3d Cir. 2010)......................................................................2

Langston v. Riffe, 359 MD. 396,409 (2000)...............................3

McLean v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 398 Fed Appx

467, 471 (11th Cir. 2010)...................................................14, 17

Medrano v. Flagstar, FSB, 704 F.3d 661, 665-66 (9th

Cir. 2012) .................................................................................17

Nash v. PNC Bank, N.A., Civ No. 16-2910,2017 WL

1424317 at *3 (D. Md. April 2017).........................................17

Simmons v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 14-CV333, 2015 WL 4759441, at *4 (D.N.H. Aug. 11,

2015).........................................................................................13

Vossbrink v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc 773

'lv

F.3d 423 (2d Cir 2014) (per curiam)

Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l

Management Co., 86 MD.APP. 533, 550, 587, A.2d

569, 577(1991).................................................................

.

12

3

STATUTES

12 U.S.C. § 2601 ...............

12 U.S.C. § 2601(a)...........

12. U.S.C. § 2605(f) ..........

12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1).......

12 U.S.C. § 2617(a)...........

12 U.S.C. § 5512(b) ..........

124 Stat. 1376 ...................

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)...........

Pub. L. No. 111-203 .........

1

2

14

15

2

1

2, 41 15

1

2

REGULATIONS

12 C.F.R. § 1024.41 .......................................................................1

12 C.F.R. §1024.41(c)(1) ...............................................................7

12 C.F.R § 1024.41(d) ...................................................................7

12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(g) ..................................................................2

78 Fed. Reg. 10 .............................................................................2

I

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Lazina King and Ria King

respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgement of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Pet. App.

A) The opinion of the District Court (Pet. App. B)

JURISDICTION

The District Court for Maryland granted a

motion to dismiss based on Res Judicata on September

22, 2017. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District

Court order on June 18, 2018. (Pet. App. A) The Court

of Appeals denied petitioner's timely petition for

rehearing en bane on August 21, 2018. This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED(see appendix)

STATEMENT

12 C.F.R. § 1024.41, a Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau ("CFPB") regulation promulgated

pursuant to section 1022(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12

U.S.C. § 5512(b), and the Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act (RESPA!) 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.

Section 1024.41 prohibits, among other things, a loan

servicer from foreclosing on a property in certain

circumstances if the borrower has submitted a complete

2

loan modification, or loss mitigation, application. 12

C.F.R. § 1024.41(g).

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of

1974 (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617, is "a consumer

protection statute that regulates the real estate

settlement process." Jones v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp.

Inc., 606 F.3d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 2010). Congress enacted

RESPA to "insure that customers throughout the

Nation are provided with greater and timelier

information on the nature and costs of the settlement

process and are protected from

certain abusive

practices." 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a). Originally under the

umbrella of the Department of Housing and Urban

Development, RE SPA's rulemaking authority was

transferred to the CFPB in 2010's Dodd—Frank Wall

Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.

No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. See 12 U.S.C. § 2617(a).

These rules are codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024 and

collectively known as "Regulation X."l In 2013, the

CFPB amended Regulation X to implement new rules

governing mortgage servicing. 1 See generally 78 Fed.

Reg. 10,696 (Feb. 14, 2013) (effective Jan. 10, 2014).

These new rules came after the financial crisis, but

responded to problems that had long preceded it:

.

.

.

As a result, the new rules addressed servicers'

obligations to (1) "establish reasonable policies and

procedures to achieve certain delineated objectives"; (2)

"provide information about mortgage loss mitigation

options to delinquent borrowers"; (3) "establish policies

and procedures for providing delinquent borrowers

Regulations that the CFPB implements pursuant to section 6 of

RESPA are privately enforceable. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f).

3

with continuity of contact with servicer personnel

capable of performing certain functions"; and (4)

"evaluate borrowers' applications for available loss

mitigation options." 78 Fed. Reg. at 10,696.

This petition arises from a conflict most directly

between the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court

and the statutory text enacted by Congress which is

relevant to these proceedings. Congress passed laws to

provide greater protection for consumers during the

housing crisis which affected the entire United States.

The National Mortgage Settlement which was

settled on February 9, 2012 with the federal

government and 49 states one of which was Maryland

guides this case. Our case is guided by the National

Mortgage Settlement, from that historic settlements all

banks were/is required to comply with the 305 new

mortgages servicing standards which was later slated

under the Consumer Protection Board umbrella and

designed as the Dodd and Frank Act of 2014 was

enacted to further protect consumers against the unfair

practices.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

explained that; "under Maryland Law, statues are

remedial in nature if they are designed to correct

existing law, to redress existing grievance and to

introduce regulations conducive to the public good."

Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l

Management Co., 86 MD.APP. 533, 550, 587, A.2d 569,

577(1991) (citing State v. Barnes, 273 MD. 195, 208, 328

A.2d 737, 745 (1974)), reviewed on other grounds, 326

MD. 663, 607, A.2d 8 (1992). Langston v. Riffe, 359 MD.

396, 409 (2000).

rdl

Following these tests, Congress explained its

general remedial purpose for the Dodd-Frank Act,

RESPA, and Regulation X in its preamble to the final

legislation as follows: An Act to promote the financial

stability of the United States by improving

accountability and transparency in the financial system,

to end "to big to fail" banks misconducts, to protect the

American tax payer by ending bail outs, to protect

consumers from abusive financial services practices,

and for other purposes. Dodd-Frank, 124 Stat 1376

(emphasis added). In addition, the remedial purpose of

Dodd-Frank is also shown in the statutory text enacted

by Congress relevant to these proceedings; A servicer

of a federally related mortgage shall not.. .fail to take

timely action to respond to a borrower's request to

correct errors relating to allocation of payments, final

balances for purposes of paying off the loan, or avoiding

foreclosure, or other standard servicer's duties.. .or fail

to comply with any other obligation found by the

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, by

regulation, to be appropriate to carry out the consumer

protection purposes of this chapter, 12 U.S.C.A. §

2506(k)(1)(C)(E) (emphasis added).

The court of appeals are deeply and avowedly

divided over cases involving foreclosure and the rights

covered under Regulation X of RESPA. This case

presents an opportunity to resolve that important

conflict and can be used to deter "to big to fail" banks

from further harming consumers with prematurely

foreclosing on consumers' homes before exhausting all

options available to them. Our very own Department of

Treasury Secretary during his confirmation testimony

admitted to fast-tracking foreclosures and most

5

recently, Wells Fargo has admitted to foreclosing on

homes due to a "technical" glitch.

Petitioner Lazina King purchased her property at

141 N. Huron Drive in 1996. In 2007, she was

approached by Beneficial Home Loans to refinance the

property. She didn't have enough income and they

used her daughter Ria King's income and added Ria to

the loan. Beneficial later sold the loan to Caliber Home

Loans, Inc., in or around December of 2013.

In or around April 2014, petitioners requested a loan

modification and faxed over a list of documents to get

the process started. This would be the start of a

nightmare dealing with Caliber Home Loans, Inc. The

initial package, Caliber claimed they "lost", they also

claimed that they could not contact us because of an

alleged cease and desist order' that never existed.

Caliber allowed us to resubmit our documents in May.

Documents were faxed and Caliber confirmed receipt

on or around May 21, 2014.

On or around June 3', Caliber initiated their first

notice of intent to foreclose3, while the loan modification

documents were pending review. Lazina King was

served on or around the 14th of June. Upon being

served, we immediately contacted Caliber and they

informed us again that they had closed the file because

we were missing documents, they also stated that they

found

at

Guidance

can

be

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulatorv-implernentation.

On the Notice of Intent to Foreclose, the document stated that

the Kings were eligible for in-house modification, deed-in-lue,

repayment plan...; however, the Kings never got an opportunity to

benefit from any of those programs.

2

6

could not contact us because of this alleged cease and

desist order. On or around May 27, 2014, Caliber had

requested more documents and more documents were

submitted.4

On or around July 13, 2014 we contacted Caliber

again to get a status of the loan modification. Caliber

again stated that documents were missing but they had

closed the file because they couldn't contact us due the

alleged cease and desist order. Caliber agreed to

reopen the file and they sent us a letter dated July 15,

2014 requesting the same documents they had

previously requested. On or around July 30, 2014, we

submitted the documents again, everything that

Caliber asked for and stuff they didn't to ensure that

we would get a proper review of our loan modification

application.

On August 4, 2014, Caliber sent us a letter in the

mail stating that they had received our application and

they were reviewing it. That letter was missing

pertinent information and we had no clue that Caliber

was in the process of scheduling a foreclosure sale.

On or around August 27, 2014, we received a letter

in the mail informing us of the pending sale scheduled

for September 9, 2014. Caliber failed to make a final

decision on the loan modification application in violation

of section 1024.41(d)5 of the loan modification servicing

rules.

When we submitted the additional documents we added a note

stating that Caliber had permission to contact us to discuss our

loan modification.

for complete loss mitigation applications which they received

more than 37 days before the scheduled foreclosure sale by: (1)

7

On or around August 28, 2014, we reached out to

Caliber by phone and fax to try to get information on

what was going on and to ask about the status of the

modification. Caliber stated that we were still missing

documents, but could not tell us what we were missing

and they informed us again that they couldn't contact

us because of the alleged cease and desist order. We

spoke to their attorneys who stated that they can only

postpone the foreclose sale if Caliber requested it,

Caliber stated that the foreclosure sale could only be

postponed if the attorney's on file halted it. Section

1024.41 (c) and (d) of the Mortgage Servicing Rule

which required the defendants to postpone the sale

once they received a completed lost mitigation

application and no other documents were requested.'

On or around September 3, 2014, after consulting

with Caliber, we wrote to the courts to ask if they could

halt the foreclosure sale so Caliber could have enough

time to review our loan modification. However, on or

failing to decision a complete loss mitigation application within 30

days; (2) failing to notify us in writing within 30 days of their

review, and (3) failing to provide reason or reasons for the denial of

each loan modification option.

6

Section 1024.41 (c) and (d) of the Mortgage Servicing Rule

required defendants to: (1) decision complete loss mitigation

applications received more than 37 days before a foreclosure sale

within 30 days of receipt, 12 C.F.R. §1024.41(c)(1); (2) provide

written notice, referred to as the "evaluation notice", to borrowers

within 30 days of receiving the complete loss mitigation package

stating the determination of which loss mitigation option, if any, it

will offer the borrower, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(c)(1)(ii); and (3) if the

application is denied for any loan modification option, state the

specific reason or reasons for the denial of the loan modification

option, 12 C.F.R § 1024.41(d).

re

around September 9, 2014, Caliber sold the property to

the same attorney's that initiated the foreclosure

request. On September 13, 2014 the circuit court

denied our request, but at that point it did not matter,

the property was already sold, thus damages had

occurred.

On March 27, 2015, we wrote to the court of

appeals requesting an appeal on the foreclosure, we

sent the request to the wrong court and the Court of

Special Appeals gave us an extension until April 17,

2015 to re-submit our request for an appeal. We resubmitted the request on April 16, 2015 and waited for

further instructions. We were doing all this pro se'.

We also submitted several requests in an attempt to

halt the execution of the eviction all of which were

denied and all which failed to reach the merits of their

decisions on why they were denied.

On or around January 21, 2016, we submitted

another motion to halt the execution of the eviction

while we waited on the Court of Special Appeals to

make a decision. That motion was granted with a

stipulation that we had to pay a $25,000 supersedes

bond. We had until March 7, 2016 to come up with the

money. We requested an extension of time to file the

bond and the extension was granted and the eviction

was halted; however, in Valbuena v. Ocwen Loan

Servicing, LLC and Bingham v. Ocwen Loan Servicing,

In Judge Hazel opinion he list that the house was sold on

September 19, 2014; however, court documents show that the

house was actually sold on September 9, 2014 before the circuit

court issued the denial of our request to halt the foreclosure

proceedings. Again proving negligence on the courts part and the

filing and entering of legal documents.

9

LLC, the courts had concluded that posting a

supersedes bond would likely be infeasible, if not

impossible.. .to require supersedes bond would leave

plaintiffs with recourses for clear statutory violations.

Again, the circuit court for Prince Georges County

On or around November 25, 2015, we filed our

Federal Claim for violation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the

Truth in Lending Act and the Federal Credit

Protection Act, Negligence, Intentional inflection of

emotional distress etc.' Violations of the Dodd and

Frank Act has a statute of limitation of three years and

we were in the three year time.

On or around February 9, 2016, the Court of

Special Appeals dismissed the case because they said

we didn't submit the case in the allotted 30 day time

frame, when in actuality we did, we did have a

certificate of service and Caliber had gotten a copy of

the request. Since we already had the federal case

pending we decided not to request reconsideration to

point out the fact that we did have what they said we

didn't.

On or around March 23, 2016, the halt on the

eviction was lifted and we were evicted on April 29,

2016. We lost our property while we were trying to

obtain a loan modification and the Court of Maryland

failed us at every level. Through shame proceeding

Caliber was able to continue with the foreclosure

S

In order to have a private right of action for claims you have to

have lost the property to foreclosure see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

No. 14-CV-333, 2015 WL 4759441, at *4 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 2015);

accord Wenegierne, 2015 WL 2151822).

10

proceedings, while they were telling us they are

reviewing us for a loan modification and don't worry

because we cannot be foreclosed upon until a decision

was made.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

There was collusion between the purchaser

and the trustee. The house was purchased by U.S.

Bank Trust N.A. as Trustee for LSF8 Master

Participation Trust a partner company of Caliber.

The same attorney's that initiated the foreclosure

were the same attorneys who purchased the

property. The house was sold on September 9,

2014 according to court documents. We didn't

receive notice that our request was denied until the

15 of September. Caliber also robo-signed court

documents and didn't verify any of the information

they provided to the courts in the foreclosure case.

1. The Fifth Amendment "Due Process Clause"

the guarantee of due process for all persons requires

the government to respect all rights, guarantees, and

protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution and all

applicable statues before the government can deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property.'

Due process essentially guarantees that a party will receive a

fundamentally fair, orderly, and just judicial proceeding. The

identical text in the fourteenth Amendment explicitly this due

process requirement to the state as well.

11

The Fourth Circuit recently remanded a RESPA

case concluding that claim preclusion was not merit in

Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Serving LLC, (16-1909 411 Cir.

2017). As pro se litigants, our petition was supposed to

be read liberal but in Judge Hazel opinion, he stated

that we didn't offer any case law to push the case in our

favor, but there was another case Weisheit v. Roseberg

& Associates, LLC (Civil No. JKB-17-0823) which

contained the same claims as ours and was able to

commence in the United States District Court of

Maryland and ours was dismissed. Chief Judge Bredar

denied the Defendants (Rosenberg and Bayview Loan

Servicing) motions to dismiss and allowed Weisheit to

continue her claim for violations of Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and Fair Debt

Credit Protection Act (FDCPA). There's a clear

conflict amongst the District Court of Maryland

regarding RESPA, FDCPA, etc. cases, as there are no

rhyme or reason on how a case proceeds for

adjudication aside from the fact that our claims were

submitted pro se and the other case with the exact

same issue had an attorney.

The 7th Amendment states in suits at common

law, where the value in controversy shall exceed

twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be

preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be

otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United

States, than according to the rules of the common law.

In Feltner v. Columbia Picture Television Inc., The

Honorable Justice Thomas concluded "as a result, if a

party so demands, a jury must determine the actual

amount of statutory damages.. .to preserve the

substance of the common law right of trial by jury." We

were never afforded a day in court.

12

2. There is a clear conflict with the 2 11 Circuit,

11111

Circuit, 61h Circuit, and 4th Circuit Courts:

The Courts have made it clear that a claim of

fraud may preclude the court from applying res

judicata or any claim preclusion doctrine. In federal

cases such as Barbato v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 14cv-2233, 2016 WL, 158588 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 12, 2016)

(quoting Babb v. Capitalsource, Inc., 558 F. App'x 66,

68 (2d Cir. 2015)). In Vossbrink v. Accredited Home

Lenders, Inc 773 F.3d 423 (2d Cir 2014) (per curiam),

the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated

federal and state law in issuing and servicing his loan

Id. At 436. Such a claim falls outside the ambit of res

judicata because the injuries "stem from the same

transaction but are not directly cause by the foreclosure

judgment.' Gonzalez v. Deutshce Bank Trust Co., 632 F.

App'x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2016).

In Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC,

(16-1909 4" Cir. 2017) Submitted January 20, 2017

and Decided January 25, 2017 in an unreported opinion

before the Honorable(s) Wilkinson, Duncan, and

Thacker

the Fourth Circuit concluded that claim

preclusion was not merit and remanded the RESPA

claims back to the District Court for further

proceedings.

-

Caliber deprived us of our rights under federal

and state laws. The Courts has made it clear

that... .claims for RESPA violations are only ripe once a

violation of the statue has occurred and damages have

been suffered see Simmons v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

13

No. 14-CV-333, 2015 WL 4759441, at *4 (D.N.H. Aug.

11, 2015); accord Wenegieme, 2015 WL 2151822,. The

Courts have also made it clear that the only remedy

available to a claimant is monetary damages and not the

reversal of any state-court judgement as in Servantes v.

Caliber Home Loans Inc, 14-13324, 2014 VL 6986414,

and Szczodrowski v. Specialized loan Servicing Inc.

LLS, NO. 15-10668,2015 WL 196687.

The Court of Appeals has long held that "the

contemporaneous interpretation of a statue by the

agency charged with its administration is entitled to

great deference..." Baltimore Gas & Electric Co, v.

Pub Serv, Comm'n of Maryland, 305 MD. 145, 161

(1986).

Here the Court should afford the same

deference to the CFPB's interpretation consistent with

the remedial purpose of Dodd-Frank, RESPA,

Regulation X and the holdings of Billings, Cooper, and

Lage. If the Court fails to give such deference to the

remedial purpose of Dodd-Frank, the Court implicitly

the court would be creating a different obligation

intended by Congress and frustrating our rights and

similar homeowners in the state of Maryland.

Applying the Cort v. Ash1° 422 U.S. 66 (1975)

test and ask the following questions regarding RESPA,

Regulation X Act promulgated by Dodd-Frank; (1) Are

we "the appellants" one of the class for whose special

benefit the statue was enacted? (2) Is there any

indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,

either to create such remedy or to deny one? (3) Is it

consistent with the underlying purpose of the

legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for us "the

appellants"? The answer to those three questions are

'°

See also Cannon V. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)

14

yes and the dismissal of our Federal Claim shielded

Caliber from being penalized for their violations of the

very statue that was intended and implemented to

protect consumers like us, and created a different

obligation that was not intended by Congress when

signing the Dodd-Frank Act into law which

promulgated the RESPA Regulation X rules.

5. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Is Wrong.

Certiorari is further warranted because

the decision to grant the dismissal based on res judicata

is wrong.

A. The decision to affirm the Federal Court

ruling on dismissing our case based on

res judicata conflicts with the text,

structure, and purpose of the Dodd and

Frank Act of 2014 which promulgated the

RESPA Regulation X.

Remedy for RESPA (Regulation X) violations

came into existence in January 2014 with the new rules

taking effect and promulgating the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act of 1979, under the new

found rules and Pursuant to 12. U.S.C. § 2605(f), a

borrower may recover actual damages, attorney fees,

costs and statutory penalty up to $2,000 for pattern or

practice. The majority of courts also held under these

new rules that emotion distress damages were available

as actual damages. See e.g. Catalan v. GMAC morgt.,

Corp, 629 (711, Cir. 2011); McLean v. GMAC Mortgage

Corp., 398 Fed Appx 467,471 (lith Cir. 2010), Houston

v. U.S. Bank Home Morgt. Wis Servicing, 505 Fed.

Appx. 543, 548, n. 6 (6111 Cir. 2012). The courts made it

15

clear that under RESPA (Regulation X) violations that

injunction relief was not available. See Gray v. Cent.

Mortg. Co. 2010 U.S. Dist Lexis 47877 (N.D. Cal. April

14, 2010); the courts also made it clear that monetary

compensation was the only thing available under the

new rules and the violation had to occur during the

foreclosure process and the home had to have been lost

and all chances of redemption was lost before you could

file a claim for damages i.e. actual damages attributed

to the alleged RESPA violations. See 12 U.S.C. §

2605(0(1); citing (Minson v. Citimortgage, Inc., Civ No.

12-2233,2013, at *5 (D. Md. May 29, 2013).)

B. The Chevron Test which the Supreme

Court ruled that the U.S. Congress may

delegated regulatory authority to an

agency, and that agency regulations carry

the weight of the law.

Applying a. restrictive view such as res judicata

in this case would exceed the scope of Congress's intent

as Congress has explained its general remedial purpose

for Dodd-Frank, RESPA, and Regulation X as well as

the FDCPA in its preamble to the final legislation as

follows: An Act to promote the financial stability of the

United States by improving accountability and

transparency in the financial system, to end "to big to

fail", to protect the American tax payer by ending bail

outs, to protect consumers from abusive financial

services practices, and for other purposes. DoddFrank, 124 Stat 1376 (emphasis added). In addition, the

remedial purpose of Dodd-Frank is also shown in the

statutory text enacted by Congress relevant to these

proceedings; A servicer of a federally related mortgage

shall not.. .fail to take timely action to respond to a

16

borrower's request to correct errors relating to

allocation of payments, final balances for purposes of

paying off the loan, or avoiding foreclosure, or other

standard servicer's duties.. .or fail to comply with any

other obligation found by the Bureau of Consumer

Financial Protection, by regulation, to be appropriate to

carry out the consumer protection purposes of this

chapter, 12 U. S.C.A. § 2506(k)(1)(C)(E) (emphasis

added). Under the Chevron Act there were no bases in

applying a restrictive view of the Dodd and Frank Act

of 2014 and therefore, res judicata should not have

applied.

C. The case involves one or more questions

of exceptional importance.

This case contains Federal Questions with

regards to the violations of RESPA and the FDCPA

and the lower courts would benefit from a ruling

regarding RESPA claims in the state of Maryland. As

it stands now there are no rhyme or reason on how

these cases commence, as noted earlier, cases with the

same claims (one with an attorney and the other pro se)

had two totally different outcomes as well as case in

this circuit and other circuits have totally different

outcomes, where cases for violation of RESPA etc.,

dual tracking, and violations of FDCPA are being

remanded back to court while ours keep being

dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Again, RESPA is a consumer protection statute

designed to protect mortgagors from "certain abusive

practices in the real estate mortgage industry. "Nash v.

17

PNC Bank, N.A., Civ No. 16-2910, 2017 WL 1424317 at

*3 (D. Md. April 2017) (internal quotation marks

omitted). It is implemented by Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau (CFPB) regulation, collectively

known as Regulation X. RESPA has been remedially

in favor of greater coverage to further its goals of

providing more information for consumers and

preventing abusive practices by servicers. See Medrano

v. Flagstar, FSB, 704 F.3d 661, 665-66 (91" Cir. 2012);

McLean v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 398 F. Appx 467, 471

(1111 Cir. 2010); In re Carter, 553 F.3d 979, 985 97,.5 (611

Cir 2009); Alston v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 585

F.3d 753 (3 Cir. 2009).

No law sanitizes defendants' conduct or removes

it from reach. Assuming arguendo that the issue of

standing to foreclose were decided as defendants' posit,

their concealment of evidence necessary to understand

the magnitude of their scheme militate against

preclusion Caliber never produced the cease and desist

notice, Caliber never made a final decision on the loan

modification request and Caliber withheld pertinent

information from us that proved detrimental to our case

and all of which were deemed unethical and ruled as

against the law under the RESPA Regulation X 6(f) as

promulgated by Dodd and Frank Act of 2014. In the

Circuit Court the claim for damages was not ripe 11.

We point to Above the Belt. Inc. v. Bohannan

Roofing Inc 99 F.R.D. 99 (E.D.Va. 1983) for its

reasoning to grant Writ for Certiorari "Bey. 997 F.

Supp. 2cT at 320". We also look to Gagliano v. Reliance

"In United States Law, ripeness refers to the readiness of a case

for litigation; "a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon

contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or

indeed may not occur at all".

18

Standard Life Ins. Co., 546 F.3d 230, 241 n. 8 (4th Cir.

2008) (citing Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat. Fire Ins.

Co., 148 F. 3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (citations

omitted)); Hutchinson v. Stanton, 994 F.3d 1076, 1081

(4th Cir. 1993) these cases were decided to prevent

manifest injustice. Through negligent acts, omissions

and fraud Caliber was able to forciose on our property

while a pending application for modification was still

being reviewed. Our house was located on prime

property, where the new National Harbor was built,

within that year of 2014 a total of 10 houses were

foreclosed upon, three of those houses burned down

(including our old house) and they all were rebuild the

same exact way. One could assume that it is a

conspiracy to get the long withstanding residents out of

the area and take over and "revitalized" the property.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ

of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully Submitted,

Lazina King

Pro Se

Ria King

Pro Se

1005 Comanche Drive

Oxon Hill, MD 20745

202-256-7775