Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Maria I. Sanutti-Spencer, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania

Supreme Court briefSep 22, 2018

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NO:

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

MARIA SANUTTI-SPENCER-Petftioner

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA- Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MARIA SANUTTI-SPENCER- PRO-SE

iNMATE IOU 0X1149

SC I -MU N CV

P.O. BOX 180

MUNCY, PA. 177756

SEP 28 2W8

OCR OF I1F c:LFUc

IJ1!:Vj1_

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Does excluding evidence of another's motive, of the

decedent's drug addiction, drug dealing, his physical

abuse of the defendant and the defendant's significant

health issues violate the right to present a complete

defense when this evidence suggests another person

committed the crime for which the defendant was charged

and convicted?

Suggested answer: Yes.

(ii)

(

II.. List of Parties

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the

cover page.

III. Table of Contents

Question Presented for Review

Page

(i).

List of Parties

Page

(iii).

III.

Table of Contents

Page

(iii).

IV.

Index of Appendices

Page

(iii).

Table of Authorities

Page

(iv).

VI.

Opinion Below

Page

VII.

Jurisdiction

Page

of the Questions

Page

IX.

Concise Statement of the Case

Page

Concise Statement of Reasons Relied Upon

for Appeal

Page

15.

Conclusion

Page

40.

VIII. Reference of the Text of the Order

XI.

IV. Index, To Appendices

Appendix A': P e nnsylvania Superior Court, filed on Jan

11, 2018.

Appendix B: Court of Common Pleas, Columbia County, Pa., filed

on jan 9, 2017.

AppendixC; Pennsylvanai.Supreme Court, Denied Certiorari

filed on june 26, 2018.

(iii)

V.!

Table of Authorities

Bollenback v. U.S., 326 U.S. 607,612 (1946).....................................Page

Chambers v.Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1997) ............................ Page

Francis v. Franklin, 47 U.S. 307 (1984).............................................Page

39- .40

Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976)................................Page

Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. .91, 92, (1893)................................Page

Montana v Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,53 (1996) ........................................ Page

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 422, 57 Led 2d 854,

98 S ct. 2864.......................................................................................Page

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.s. 510. 514 (

) .............................Page 39

CRAWFORD V.iWashington, 540 U.S. 36 (2004).

rage

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Page

SIXTH AMEDM11ENT

Page

(iv)

Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F. 3d. 221 (3rd. Cir. 2008).......Page 31

U. S. v. Anton, 597 F 2d. 371,375 (3rd Cir. 1979)............................Page

U.S. v. Kindle, 925 F. ed.2721 276 (8th Cir. 1991).............................Page

U.S. v. Jackson, 437 U.S. 907 (1978)........... ........................................ Page

IlLS. v. Nixon, 694 F.3d623,?Q..%

.Page 30

Federal Rule of Evidence 602 .............................................................Page 29-30

FederiiliRule of Evidence;L.

Pag 30

Federal Rule of Evidence 701 ............................................................. Page 29

Federal Rule of Evidence 702..............................................................Page 30,31

Federal Rule of Evidence 801 ...............................................................Page 27

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3)..........................................................Page 23 , 24

Federal Rule of Evidence 804..............................................................Page

6 Wigmore on Evidence 1838 at 463 ...................................................Page 36

Kassin SM, "Why confessions trump innocence." Am Psychol. 2012 Sept;

67(6): 431-45. doi:10.1037/aoo28212. Epup 2012 Apr30 ......... ............... Page 32

Kassin Sm, Neman K, " On the Power of Confession Evidence: An

experimental .Test of Fundamental Difference Hypothesis." Law Hum Behay.

1997 Oct; 21(5): 469-84 ............................................................................ page

(V.)

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

V I. OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is

II I reported at

; or,

I has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

the petition and is

I reported at

; or,

] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

] is unpublished.

For cases from state courts:

The opinior nf the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix

to the petition and is

eported at UNKNOWN- Information unavailable ; or,

I has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

] is unpublished.

The opinion of the Pa. Court of Common Pleas

appears at Appendix B

to the petition and is

court

I reported at UNKNOWN- Information unvi1hle

;or,

] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

] is unpublished.

-1-

VILE JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was

] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[1 A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: ______________________________ and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including

(date) on

(date)

in Application No.

________________________

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

ç,For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court cleidpd my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix A

Jan 11, 2012

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ I An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including

(date) on _____________________ (date) in

Application No.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

-2-

viii. Reference to the Text of the Oflte'i1n Qu

estion

"It was within the province of the trial judge to exclude

Appellant's health

issues on the basis of irrelevancy and unfair prejudic

e. We discern no

abuse of discretion in that regard." See Superior Court Opin

ion, January

11, 2018, at ii (internal citations omitted); Atta

ched as Appendix A. The

trial court's 1925 (a) Opinion is attached as Appendix B.

"As Appellant did not raise self-defense in this case

, it was within the

court's -discretion to exclude evidence of the Victim's bad

character traits.

We discern no abuse of the court's discretion." See App

endix A at 13-

14 (internal citations omitted).

"Here, the trial court ruled that these statements [fro

the dad wit-

nesses] were hearsay and properly deemed inadmiss

ible

because they

were irrelevant. We agree." See Appendix A at 16.

-3-

"[T]he Corporal's tesftmony was based on his experience as a police of-

ficer and what he directly obseed.

We discern no error or abuse of

discretion." See Appendix A at 20.

"[T]he court decided not to take action based on the reasonable ground

that the {sequestraon]violation had no material impact on the testi-

mony and no impact on the outcome of the trial. We agree." See Appendix

Aat23.

(( [A]s noted by the court, the 'record pl ainly dkates that the jury was

•

instructed adequately and in accordance with the law.' Further, the court

reminded the jury that it was their duty to 'find from the edence the

facts that would support such an allegation to reach [its] conclusions.' Accordingly, we discern no error.

Judgement of sentence affirmed." See Appendix A at 26-27.

•

-4-

ix.

Concise Statement of the Case

This case has a significant case history, including a two-week jury trial.

In the interests of judicial economy, Maria only highlights the relevant

portions of the proceedings for the issues raised in this petition for allowance of appeal.

There is one aspect that all sides agree about: In 2012, Frank Spencer was

found shot to death at his home near Millville. This trial focused around

who killed Frank Spencer and whether there was a conspiracy to kill him.

The government's theory of the case was that Maria Sanutti-Spencer, the

ex-wife of the deceased, acted in concert with her father, Anthony Rocco

Franklin, to shoot and kill the deceased. The government asserted Maria

subjected the decedent to a reign of terror, that if she couldn't have him,

no one could, and that her father was in the mob. RR. 565: 15-21' 223: i625; 2224:11-14 2229:9-18.

-5--

Maria was in poor health at the time of these alleged crimes. RR. 127. 127:1

0-11.

Maria has serious medical problems

RR. 125-126:19-3. Maria has diabetes.

RR. l 11:7-8; 125-126:19-3. At trial, she weighed only 98 pounds. RR. 11:7-8

She lost a significant amount of vision in her left eye due to diabetes. RR.

127:

16-22. In 2013, she was ill (diagnosed in March 0f2012 with End Stage Renal Failure) and

required a kidney transplant.RR.2089:10-11. Maria did ultimately receiv

kidney transplat.RR. 2089:20-23. All of this leads to the reality that Mária

chronic health problems physically precluded her from being able to do what

facts required her to climb 125 feet up the side of a mountain, climb a tree,

an awkward position with a heavy rifle at a makeshift snipers nest, pull a

the

rest in

trigger

and shoot her ex-husband, Frank Spener, at distance, then later this 98 pound

woman dragged the 220-230 pound decedent inside. RR; 246. This medic

evidence, (which was not a complete list of her medical limitations and conditions),

that

she was

physically incapable of carrying out the murder and dragging the body inside

was

not allowed. RR. 273-274.

1 Maria was charged with Homicide, Criminal Solicitiation to Commit

Homicide, Criminal Attempt to

Commit Homicide; Arson, Criminal Solicitiation to Commit Arson, Crimina

l Conspiracy, Burglary,

Criminal Solicitation to Commit Burglary, Receiving Stolen Property, terroris

tic Threats, and Perjury on

July 28, 2014.

A week prior to the murder Maria was limping. RR.857:15-18; 857-858;25-4. On

June 30, 2012, the day before the murder, Maria was limping. RR. 107-108:16-7;

112:14-20; 1803-1804:20-19.ie decedent jogged by he, mocking her. RR. 18031804:20-19. The decedent not oiy mocked Maria, but he was physically and

mentally abusive towards Maria and their children. There were numerous domestic

incidents which occurred at the Fair view property they owned. RR 605:17-233.

N.T. 11/13/2015 at 52. Maria was in a diabetic coma and when she arrived home

from the hospital, the decedent threw her down a flight of stairs. RR. 605:17-23.

Eounsel told the trial court he intended to call their children to testify about the

physical abuse. RR. 605:8-23. But this evidence was not allowed. RR. 273-274.

On November 17, 2015, defense counsel provided a proffer on the testimony of two

prison guards, the Batuik brothers, and an inmate. RR. 1745. The Batuik brothers

were present ad prepared to testify. The- Batuik brothers took statements from

the

then -imprisoned dad between 2007 and 2009 at SCI Coal Township. RR. 1745:

21. The dad told them that he hated the deceased, was interested in "meeting with

the deceased when paroled, and wanted to either kill the deeased or 'send him a

message." RR> 1745:8-2 1. Defense counsel argued these statements are

admissable under the exception to hearsay found at 803(3) (state of mind). RR.

1746:1-14.

(7)

The trial court disagreed, holding that this evidence was too far in the past. RR. 1737: 20-21.

To highlight this incongruity, the goverment had been permitted to introduce Maria's alleged

threats going father back than 2007 (as far back as 2002). RR. 1736: 8-10; NT. 11/12/2015 at

61-64; NT. Vol. IV. at 65. The government was allowed to crawl back many more years to find

motive than the accused was allowed to consider the dad's sole, independent counter-motive.

The inmate proffer was for John Ulrich. RR. 1747:7-20. Ulrich approached authorities after

learning Maria and dad were charged with murder. RR. 263. He told authorities of a

conversation he had with the dad whileincarcerated at FCI Schuylkill in 2008. RR. 263; 1747:

7-20. The dad knew that Ulrich was being released. So dad requested a favor from him. RR.

263. The dad wanted Ulrich to "send' the deceased" a message." RR. 1747: 7-20. The dad

explained why: the deceased was abusive towards Maria and their children. RR. 263. The dad

asked Ulrich "to take care of the problem". RR. 263. Ulrich asked what he meant, to which the

dad responded, "I want him gone." R.R. 263. The trial court denied the request to present this

witness. RR. 1755: 22-17.

On February 5, 2010, Michael Fry told police that the decedent was a cutomer of his

methamphetamine distribution. RR. 1119:2-10. Fry said the decedent would "get the most, as

about 3 grams per delivery." RR. 267-268. This information was in a report authorized by

Trooper Russel Burcher.

-8-

Defense counsel brought in Trooper Burcher for a proffer. RR. 928: 13-22.

2008-2009, Trooper Burcher was working in conjunction with the

FBI.

RR. 931:15-21. He was involved in the execution of a Title IILwarran

t. RR.

22-24. He intercepted communications involving

the decedent. R.R.

4- 7. The decedent was identified as a methamphetamine customer

of Fry. RR. 932: 21-25. The decedent obtained the methamph

etamine

from Fry and Molly Hippenstiel. RR. 933:

4-9. The decedent was identi-

fied as a local distributor and user of methamphetamine. RR. 933:

10-17.

The Title III wiretap showed that the decedent was a subordinate of

Fry.

RR. 934:16-22. The decedent was obtaining methamphetamine from

Fry

and re-distributing it to others. RR. 934-935: 20-16. The decedent

was a

low-level drug user. RR. 937: 21-25. The decedent preferred methamph

et-

amine and cocaine as his drug of choice. RR 937-938: 21-6. Cont

empora-

neous with the death, evidence of recent drug use was found at the

de-

ceased's home. RR. 244. No drugs were discovered in. the dece

dent's

body A pipe used to smoke crack cocaine was found outside the

ceased's house ding the investigation. RR 244-245.

de-

The government filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the decedent's character. RR. 145. Specifically, the government sought to exdude the fact that the decedent "was prone to violence, physically and

mentally abus [ive t6] Sanutti-Spencer and others, suffered from mental

illness, was committed, and was engaged in drug activity." RR. 145. The

government further requested to exclude Maria's health. RR. 149.

The trial court held that the evidence regarding the decedent's physical

and emotional abuse, his drug use, and his mental health were not rele vant to the charges Maria was facing.

273-274. After the proffer of

Trooper Burcher, the trial court again precluded the evidence as irrelevant. RR. 950: 1-25.

During Corporal Andreuzzi's testimony, he was. repeatedly allowed to

testify as to his opinion on matters well beyond being someone who

merely relayed facts as they occurred. RR. 772-773: 18-3; 782: 19-25; 788:

2-17; 8 04-805: 13 -18. Defense counsel objected multiple times to this type

of testimony. RR. 773: 4-11; 783: 1-14; 788: 18-25)- 804-805: 24-13. The corporal was providing expert opinion without being qualified as an expert.

RR. 783: 6-14. The trial court held that the corporal was allowed to explain why he felt items were out of place. RR. 783: 15-19. The corporal was

testifying that he did something or noted something out of place because

of his experience as a police officer. See RR. 784: 28 (emphasis added).

Most importantly, over defense objection, the corporal was allowed to

opine that a particular pair of yellow cleaning gloves found inside the

home were used to move the body from outside the house to inside the

house. RR. 772-773: 21-3.

During trial, an important comment attributed to Maria came into question. It was alleged at trial that Maria told Derk Reed at a football game,

in the end zone area, that she was

there when the decedent took his

breath. RR. i849: 22-25; 186o-1861: 2

last

4-1; 18 73: 13 -15. Defense counsel dis-

credited Reed during cross-exami

nation. See RR, 1851-1867. Reed intro-

duced the decedent to his girlfriend

. RR. 1851-1852: 17-16; 158-186: 11-

17.The decedent often went back

and forth between the girlfriend an

Maria. RR. 1585-1586: 11-17 1590-1

591

: 4-22; 1599: 22-4; 1607: 3-1

5. Reed

admitted he hated Maria. RR. 1863

-1864: 24-5.

To support the alleged admission,

of Brian Wawroski. RR.

the government introduced testimon

1873:13-15. Defense counsel attempted to sho

Wawroski could not hear over the

12-3. Reed testified before lun

noise in the end zone. RR. 1859-1

86o:

as to these events. RR. 1868-1869

: 23-5.

After lunch, Wawroski testified. RR

. 1870-1871: 21-2. Reed was ques-

tioned on cross-examination abou

t the noise level in the end zone.

RR. 1859-1860: 12-3. Wawroski tes

See

tified that it was quieter in the en

zone, without even being asked by

the government. RR. 1871-1872:

On cross examination, defense co

21-5.

unsel elicited that Wawroski sough

12-

out Reed during the lunch break and spoke to Reed about

Reed's testi-

mony. RR. 1878-1879: 15-13. Reed told Wawroski that defense coun

sel

"quizzed" him on the noise level in the end zone. RR. 1879:3-13.

Defense counsel requested to strike the witness' testimony

for violating

the rules of sequestration. RR. 1881: 2-4. The motion was

denied. RR.

1881: 7-16.

After the jury started deliberating, they requested the trial

court provide

more information on counts one, two, six, and fourteen. RR.

2324-2325:

19-2. After that re-charge, the government requ

ested the accomplice lia-

bility instruction to be read even though there was no specific

that part of the jury instruction. RR. 2335: 6-12. The trial

request for

court stated that

it would read one line: that the defendant caused the deat

h of Frank

Spencer, acting as either a principal or an accomplice. RR.

2335: 13-25. The

government corrected the trial court that it was only an alleg

ation, and

defense counsel objected to reading that. RR. 2335-2336: 24-1.

13,

The trial court then instructed the jury exactly as follows: "On or about

July isv, 2012, the Defendant did intentionally cause the death of Frank

Spencer at 20 Fairview Drive, Hemlock Township, Columbia County.

The Defendant having acted as a principal or an accomplice in bringing

about Spencer's death by murder." Defense counsel asked the court to

clarify that it is an allegation. RR. 2336: 1-16. It briefly said sO. See 2336:

17-25. After the jury was excused from the courtroom, defense counsel

requested a mistrial. RR. 2337: 1-14 Not only did the instruction not address any question the jury had, but the trial court read an allegation as if

it was fact even despite the government's prior proper correction that it

was only an allegation. RR. 2337:4

' -14. Within an hour, the jury returned

with a verdict of guilty on all counts. RR. 2329: 3-4; 2339-2342: 25-25. Maria

appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion as to four of the issues raised on appeaL and held one issue was

waived for failure to object at trial. See Appendix A,

at 11; 13-14; 16; 18; 20; 23; 26-27.

Concise Statement of Reasons Relied Upon for Appeal

We fully understand and respect that the role of the United States Supreme Court

is different than that of the Pennsyvania Superior Court. Whereas the Superior

Court is generally and most accurately referred to as "an error correcting court,'

the United States Supreme Court, while capable of correcting error encountered in

one particular trial, is concerned more with issues of importance beyond the

particular facts and parties involved. This case meets both the broader aims

unique to this level of review as well as giving the opportunity to correct a

particular set of errors.

In this petition, it is averred that the Pennsylvania Superior Court so abused its

discretion requiring the exercise of the United States Supreme Court's supervisory

authority. As perhaps an indicator of the arnountof time and thought placed on

this review, the Superior Court repeatedly made some basic errors including

misidentiing the prosecuting entity. Multiple times, the Pennsylvaia Superior

Court refers to the prosecuting entity as either the D.A. or the distruct attrney. See

Appendix A at 16;19;21;25. But the Office of the Attorney General prosecuted

this case, It is the canary in this coalmine as we look deeper into thie issues

presented.

Excluding evidence of another's motive, of the decedent's

abuse, and of Maria's significant health issues violated her

right o present a complete defense.

The right to present a complete defense must be safeguarded by this Court. When

so much evidence is excluded it violates the defendant's Due Process right.

Maria was not allowed to present a complete defense. The trial court excluded the

following evidence:

• how sick Maria was and how she was not physically capable of climbing a

mountain, holding a very heavy rifle, aiming it, pulling the trigger, firing it

at a distance, and then dragging a 220-230 pound rnanto a house or even

particpate in like events:

how abusive the decedent was to show he was not afraid of her, but rather it

was she who was terrified by him;

how involved the decedent was in drug use and in the dangerous thug trade;

and

how another person, her father, a notorious criminal with alleged mafia

connections who had allegedly acted as a mafia hitman had repeatedly

sought to kill the decedent. See RR. 127:10-11;111;7

125-126:19-3;127:16-22;2089:1011;605:17-23;l19:2-1

932:21-25;937-938:21-6:1745:8-21;1747:7-20-

These exclusions violated Maria's Due Process right

both at the Federal and State level of examinatio

he right to be able to present a complete defense

not new and has been well articulated by the Supre

Court of the United States (SCOTUS) since 1943.

the 'Fourteenth Amendment analysis

Under

the SCOTUS has held

"[t]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to

process is

due

in essence, the right to a fair opportuniity

to defend against the State's accusations. The right

to confront and cross examine witnesses and to call

witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recog

nized

as essential to due process. "Chambers v. Mississipp

410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).

The SCOTUS explained that Chambers was a fact-specific decision: "thus, the

holding of Chambers- if one can be discerned from such a fact-intensive case- is

certainly not that a defendant is denied 'a fair opportunity to defend against the

State's accusations" whenever 'critical evidence' favorable to him is excluded, but

rather that erroneous evidentiary rulings can, in combination, rise to the level of a

due process violation." Montana v. Egei/ioff, 518 U.S. 37, 53 (1996). (emphasis

added).

This case is precisely that: multiple erroneous evidentiary rulings in combination

rose to a Due Process violation contra the federal and state constitutional

protections. The accused was denied her fundamental right to present a complete

defense. The trial court allowed some evidence to be presented through witnesses,

but did not allow these witnesses to testify to their full knowledge of the relevant

facts. Oter witnesses were excluded in full.

The Superior Court did not addrss the fact that Maria's physical health was

relevant to rebut the decedent's fear of her and rele-vant to rebut the reign

of terror

allegation the Commonwealth made. See AppendixA, 10-11. Maria's health

show that if the decedent was afraid of her, it was an unreasonable fear. Maria

suffers from severe diabetes. RR. 111:7-8, 125-126;19-3. She suffered from

kidney failure. RR. 149. She had been on dialysis. RR. 149. At the time of

trial,

she weighed only 98 pounds. RR. 111:7-8. Just prior to the murder, multip

witnesses saw Maria limping. RR. 857:1 5-18;857-858:25-4; 107-108:16

7;112:14-20. Atone point, the decedent even mocked her limp by joggin

g by her

at their son's championship baseball game. RR. 107-108:1, 6-7; 1803-1804:2

0-19.

It is not simply that she was precluded from presenting evidence that she was

physically incapable of committing the acts on the day of the murder. Irfie

goverment launched into evidence that she was conducting a reign of terror

on the

decedent. It introduced evidence of Maria's alleged threats against the deced

ent as

far back as 2002. See RR. 1058-1061:18-15. The goverment, because

the ill

WC9-s

health evidence ws

notallowed, was able to establish unrebutted the deced

ent's

fear of Maria. In truth, if the jury had been allowed to hear it, Maria's physical illnesses rebutted

fearof a near moribund and diseased small women. If the jury heard how sick Maria was, they

would not believe that the decedent was afraid of her or, at least, not rationally afraid of her.

Excluding this evidence would be akin to the trial court excluding evidence in a "peeping torn"

trial the defendant was blind.

The decedent's abuse and drug use is also relevant to rebutting the Commonwealth's theory of a

reign of tenor. Maria attempted to show that the decedents drug use caused him to hallucinate

and become paranoid, his fear was not reasonable (if he was actually afraid of her), ad that she

did not conduct this reign of teror the Commonwealth alleged. The Pennsylvnai Superior Court

acknowleged that the evidence must be relevant to the crime or defense at issue, but did not

addresss Maria's defense that this reign of tenor did not occur and that the decedent was not

afraid of her.

Both the trial court and the Pennsylvania Superior Court believed that the evidence of the

decedent's abuse and drug use would be unfairly prejudicial to the Commonwealth. But neither

explain why. See Appendix A at 13. The Commonwealth does not suffer prejudice simply

because the relevant evidence rebuts their theory of the case. In fact, that is highly relevant. The

jury is to hear all the relevant facts and determine the truth of the matter.

Will

The goverment called no less than 12 witnesses that testified the decedent was afraid

of Maria. Maria had a right to rebut this theory. Maria was not permitted to

introduce evidence of the decedent's abuse which would show that he was not afraid

of Maria. Someone who is afraid will not attack but will instead hide. This prior

physical abuse testimony involved incidents that occurred during the time where

witnessess claimed the decedent told them he was afraid of Maria. For example, the

decedent threw Maria down a flight of stars, following her release, from 30 days in

the hospital. RR. 60.5:17-23.

Both the trial court and the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the evidence of the

decedent's drug use was speculation. See Appendix A at. 13. The decedeht's drug use

not only would have come from witnesses close to the dece ent, the decedent's own

proffered medical testirnoney in a prior custody hearing and from Trooper Burcher

who, through a Title III wiretap investigation, intercepted the decedent's

communications regarding his drug use and drug dealing. This investigation was

between 2008 and 2009, the same time that the Commonwealth alleged Maria was

conducting her reign of terror. The trooper's investigation was not speculation.

Next, the trial court never addresed why the "dad witnesses" (Joim Ultrich and the

Batuik brothers) did not meet the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. The

Pennsylvania Superior Court even notes this in footnote 4. See Appendix A at 16.

But even the Pennsylvania Superior court does not explain why this testimony

does

not qualify - under the state of mind exception.

These, witnesses were to testify to converations they had with tlifather. Ulrich

another inmate with¶ather

her,, was being released in 2008. When the dad learned

that Ulrich was being released, he requested a favor. RR. 263. The dad wante

Ulrich to send the decedent a message. RR. 1747:7-20.ihe dad told Ulrich that

the

decedent was abusive towards Maria and their children'. RR. 263. The dad reques

ted

Ulrich "take care of the problem." RR. 263. Ulrich asked what he wanted, which

the

dad responded, "I want him gone." RR. 263.

The Batuik brothers, two prison guards, took statements from the father during

2007,

2008 and 2009. Th dad told both guards he hated the decedent. RR. 1745:8-21.

told these guards he either wanted to send the decedent a message or kill the

decedent. RR. 1745:8-21. These statements were admissable under F.R.E.

803(3)

(state of mind)

Although the dad was charged with this murder and fled the country to Argentina,

Rule 803(3) was available, as an exception against hearsay regardless of whether

declarant was i.available. F.R.E. 803 (3) provides:

"a statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motiv

intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental

feelings, pain, or bodily health), but not incl

uding a statement of memory or

belief to prove the fact remembered or believe

d unless it relates to the validity

or terms of the declarant's will." F.R. B. 803

(3) (emphasis added).

The statment the dad made to the Batuik brot

hers and Ulrich were clearly his well-

settled and consistent intent, motive, and plan

. The dad intended to kill the decedent,

one way or another. The - dad solicited Ulrich

to kill the decedent. The dad told the

Batuik brother's his intent and plan to kill the

decedent upon his release.. The dad told

Ulrich his motive-that the decedent was,abu

siv e towards Maria and their kids.

This evidence meets the exception to hearsay

relevant, it makes the fact that Maria's father,

under Rule 803(3). The evidence ws

alone, committed the murderr

•pTobable than without this evidence. The acto

rs and whether or not the actor

committed this crime alone, is undoubtedly

4 fact

of consequence i fi this proceedings

Yet, the trial court and the Pennsylvania Sup

erior Court do not adddress the state of

mind exception to the rule against hea

rsay

Both the trial court and the Pennsylvania Sup

erior Court discuss the co-conspirator

exception. Maria did not raise the co-consipir

ator exception in her appellant's brief to

the Pennsylvania Superior Court: It is as if the

aspect. The Pennylvania Superior Court had

appellat brief was never read as to this

no reason to address the co-conspirator

exception. Maria raised the state of mind exception. Other than quoting the rule, the

Pennsylvania Superior Court does not explain why the declarant (her father) telling someone he

hated the decedent and wanted to meet with the decedent and send the decedent "a message"

upon release from prison was not her father's motive, intent, and plan. See Appendix A at 15-16!

This information meets the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The significant amount of relevant evidence this trial court excluded violatd Maria's right to Due

Process. We respectfully request this Court to protect the right to preset a complete defense.

-24-

2. Excluding evidence of the decedent's motive, intent,

bias, ill-will, malice and the nature of the marital

relationship violate the defendant's Constitutional

right to confront the decedent, when his out-of-court

statements, regarding his fear of the defendant, are

offered into evidence at her trial.

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, (2004) , this Court held

the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to exclude all

testimonial hearsay statements made by a declarant whom the

defendant had no opportunity to confront either before trial

or during trial. Regardless if it fits in an established

hearsay exception.

In the Courts words, the Confrontation Clause "commands, not

that evidence is reliable, but the reliability be assessed in

particular manner; by testing in the crucible of crossexamination."

The Crawford Court did not set out what constitutes testimonial

evidence. However, the opinion provides important insight

about how the court may view testimonial evidence. Evidence

is testimonial when it: (a) resembles the "civil-law mode of

criminal procedure" and i.ts"use of ex parte examinations as

as evidence against the accused;" (b) is "given in response to

structured police questioning;" (c) Was produced with ( ) the

"involvement of government officers" who ( ) had an "eye toward

trial," or (d) Was made" under circumstances which would lead

an objective witness to reasonably believe that the statement

would be available for use at a later trial."

In the present case the Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in admitting statements made by the decedent

to his family, friends, attorney's and police officer's. And in admitting the decedent's letters to the County

District Attorney Office and Columbia County Judge. The statements and letters are as follows:

'1. Letters to President Judge Thomas James and District Attorney, Gary Norton. See Appendix B. at 19.

Statements made to Joseph Yodock, decedent's friend. The decedent telling Mr. Yodock that he was

contacting law enforcement. See Appendix B. at 29.

Decedent's statement made to Sgt. Traugh, Hemlock Twp. Police Officer, alleging someone was searching

"how to kill somebody" on his computer. See Appendix B. at 32.

The Trial Court held that the statments were relevant to assist the Jury's understanding of the history of the case

and to demonstrate the decedent's fear of the defendant. See Appendix. B. at 19, 29, and 32. These statements

were permitted under Pa. R. Evid. 801-803, which do not differ from the Federal Rule of Evidence.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court acknoweldged in its decision that other statements were also offered as

evidence to demonstrate the decedent's fear. They were as follows:

The decedent expressed anger and hostility toward the victim following divorce and custody hearings. See

Appendix B. at 4.

A police officer helped the decedent compose a no-trespass letter to the defendant. See Appendix A. at 4.

The police responded to approximately 16 incidents at the home of the decedent and the defendant. See

Appendix A. at 3.

Under the Crawford analysis, the admissibility of the statments and letters are a clear abuse of discretion. All of

the statement and letters were by definition testimonial hearsay statements, made by the decedent, out-of-court.

The defendant did not have an opportuntiy to confront the defendant at or before her trial. Moreover, these

statements and letters were given in response to structured police questioning or were produced with the

involvement of goverment officials and all were made with an eye towards future legal proceedings. The

decedent and the defendant were in a divorce and custody battle from 2006 through 2012. In addition, the

decedent and the defendant were the subject of the "arson investigation" of the decedent's property. An

objective witness could reasonably believe the statements and letters would be available for use at a later date.

RR.928:13-22 ; 931: 22-24; 932: 4-7; 932:21-25; 933: 4; 933:10-17; 934:-935:20-16; 937:21-25; 937-938:21-6

and RR. 244.

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgement; if in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or

misapplies the law, or the judgement exercised in shown by the records to mainfestly unreasonable or the

product of partiality, prejudice, bias orill will, discretion has been abused.

I respectfully request this Court to undertake review to protect the right provided by the Confrontation Clause

and the United States Constittution.

3. A lay witness, such as

police officer, exceeds the scope

of lay opinion testimony when he testifies that he believes

a certain set of cleaning gloves found in the decedent's

house (later found to have Maria's. DNA in them) were used

to drag the body.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the trial. transcript does not

support this claim because the Corporal did not specifically state that

Maria used the yellow cleaning gloves to drag the body into the house.

The Court reasoned the Corporal's testimony " may have given rise to an

inference that the appellant did drag. the victim's body into the house."

However, the Corporal's testimony was based on his experience as a police

officer and what he directly observed." See Appendix at 20.

If not for the perfectly timed objection by trial counsel the corporal

would have testified that he believed the yellow cleaning gloves were worn

to pull the body inside the residence. yellow cleaning gloves that have

Maria's DNA in them. The Corporal cannot, nor can anyone, know that the

gloves were worn to pull the body inside. This is beyond lay opinion

testimony. This is beyond testimony of what the Corporal directly observed.

Further, if this evidence, as the Pennsylvania Superior Court held, "was

helpful for the fact finder to interpret the evidence" then Maria's health

is even more relevant. See Appendix A at 10.. The evidence of Maria's

health would rebut the theory that she pulled the body inside the residence.

She could not have pulled a 220-230 pound body at all.

Federal Rules Of Evidence 701 allows opinion testimony if it is:

rationally based on the witness's perception;

helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or

to determining a fact in issue; and.

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702."

Federal Rule of Evidence 702, provides expert testimony is allowed

if,

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;

the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help, the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and

the expert's methodology is generally accepted in the relevant

field.

In this case, the trial court explained in it's 1925(b) opinion

that the

testimony was permitted "because we found that it was rationally

based on

the investigator's perceptions and informed by his experience and

training."

RR. 2509.

Here we have exactly what Rule 701 forbids. The Government elicit

testimony onthe Corporals experience and training, not his persona

l kriowlege.

Personal knowledge is required as a basis for all lay witness testimo

ny.

F.R.E. 602. Testimony is to be rejected if first hand observation

is not

adequate to support opinion. U.S. v. Jackson, 437 U.S. 907 (1978)

This attribution as to what exactly happened and its particular

mechanism

of action is beyond speculative and certainly is not something 'remote

within the "ken of a layperson." This huge leap of definitively

tying

these particular gloves not merely to the defendant, but to the act

moving the body from outside to inside is not something that one's next

door neighbor can make. Perhaps it is a leap so far that no one no matter

how many degrees or how much experience one can gather in a lifetime can

legally or scientifically make. At the very least, At is the exact

definition of 'specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by the average

layperson." F.R.E. 702.

The Goverment may not use Federal rule of Evidence 701(c) as an end

run around reliability requirement of Federal Rule 702, and the disclosure

requiremnet of Rules of Procedure. Preventing such attempts is the very.

purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 701 (c). Hirst v. Inverness Hotel

Corp., 544 F. 3d. 221, 50 VI 1122, & FED R. Evid. Sery (CBC) 728

( 3rd.

cir. V.I. 2008); U.S. v. Nixon , 694 F.3d 623, 2012 Fed App 0324P, 2012

FED APP 324P, 89 Fed. R. Evid Serv. (CBC) 728 (3 rd cir. V.I. 2008).

4. A trial court should strike the testimony when

a wit

ness admits to

violating a sequestration

order and the violation impacted the

witness' testimony and the

outcome of the trial.

It is respectfully requested that thi

s Honorable Court undertake

to provide a firm stan

review

ce on witnesses violat

ing the rules of

sequestration. In affirming

the trial court, the Pennsy

lvania Superior

testimony did not have a mat

erial impact on the

outcome of trial. See App

endix A at 23. But Wawros

ki testified to a confession by Maria.

Court held that Wawroski's

In a criminal trial, very

few pieces of evidence are

confession. Many a thesis,

more powerful than a

peer reviewed scientific pap

er,

view journal article has exa

mined the dichotomy that exi

sts

creased evidence that confes

sions may be unreliable and

power that they posess as

a proverbial gold standard

See as examples, Kassin Sm,

Neumann K, "On the Pow

An Experimental Test of Fun

damental Difference Hypoth

1997 Oct;21(5):469-84 and

Kassin SM, "Why confes

and law rebetween in-

the near total

of evidence to juries.

of Confession Evidence:

esis. "Law Hum Behay.

sions trump innocence."

Am Psychol. 2012 Sept;67(6

):431-45. doi:10.1037/a00282

12. Epup 2012 Apr 30.

A sequestration orderwas iss

ued as to all witnesses.

fact witnesses, Derk Reed,

The goverment focused on an

the decedent died and saw

testified before lunch. See

RR. 1832-1870.

intense argument Reed had

with Maria in the end

e. RR.1872:12-25; 1847-1848

:12-7. It was during

zone during a football gam

this heated arguement that

One of the goverment's

Maria allegedly admitted she

him take his last breath.

During cross-examination of

Ree

was present when

RR. 1849:13-25.

d, defense counsel focused

noise level in the end zon

1860: 12-3.

e of the high school footba

heavily on the

ll game. RR. 1859-

The sum and gist of the cross-examin

ation was to try to paint the pict

that no such admission was made and

ure

that the game was too noisy to allo

for anyone else to hear this alle

ged comment. The trial court rece

ssed to

lunch.

After lunch, the goverment called

its

next witness, Wawroski. Waworski

testified he was at the same high

school football game. PR. 1871-187

21-9. He stated that he saw the argu

ment-between Maria and Reed walked

over to Reed's aid. PR. 1872:10-19.

He claimed he over-heard the same

admission by Maria, from 10-12 feet

away. PR. 1873:3-15. But at the very

begining of his testimony and comp

letely out of place in its context

without prompting, Wawroski told the jury

it is quieter in the en

d zone:

Q. Do you know the Defendant in this case?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you know an individual by the name of Derk Reed

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I want to turn your attention to September 7th

of 2012. Do yo

recall where you were that evening?

A. Yeah, I believe we werc talking about

the

.foottball gathe, yep.

Q. where were you, Sir?

A. I was in the end zone where most

of the parents and families

that know each other, we gather in

the end zone. It is quieter

down there. you don't have all the

band and noise and what

have you up in the stands. And it

tall..

is a place that we, you know,

PR. 1871-1872: 16-5.

Defense counsel confronted Wawroski

. Through questioning, it was reve

aled

that over lunch break, Wawroski walk

ed over to Reed's office and asked

how

his testimony went. RR. 1878-18790:18-5. Wawr

oski told the trial court

that Reed stated "he was quizzed on the fiel

d." RR. 1879:3-5. Reed

continued, "They are going to quiz you on

the field." RR. 1879:12-13.

Defense counsel requested Waw'roski's testimony

be stricken and asked for a

curative instruction. The trial court deni

ed the motion. RR. 1881: 7-10.

Clearly, both Reed and Wawroki violated the

trial court's sequestration

order. It manifested in the exact harm soug

ht to be avoided by any seques-

tration order, namely this "heads up" allo

wed Waroski to artificially

shape his testimony to correspond with an

The purpose of sequestration is to

prevent witnesses from tailoring

their testimony to that of prior witnesses

dishonesty.

earlier witness Reed.

and to aid in detection of

Geders v. United States, 425 U.S.80,87 (1976).

This Court has held that there are generally

three (3) sanctions

available for violation of an order for exclu

sion (sequestration)

of witnesses: (1) citation for contempt; (2)

comments to jury

concerning the witnesses' misconduct; or (3)

Disqualification.

"particular circumstances" may exist which justi

fy disqualification

Holder v United States, 150 U.S. 91,92,(1893).

Geders v U.S.,

425 U.S. 80,(1976).

The defendant must make a showing of probable

prejudice or an abuse

of discretion as a predicate to reversal based

on a trial court's

disregard of Federal Rule of Evidence 615.

Prejudice is found when there is a showing

made that the contact

resulted in tailoring of witness testimony,

or the development of

less than candid testimony which rule

615 seeks to prevent. United

States v. Kindle, 925 F.2d 272, 276 (8th

Cir. 1991). Geders v.

United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).

Often times litigants overlook context

in favor of the mechanical

application of the law: a type of hype

r technica

l form of mental

gymnastics. here, the context of thes

e events is crucial to the

application of the law. The combined

testimony of Reed and Wawroski

was that the person on trial for murder

saw the last breath of the

person murdered! That is a confession.

But not just a confession

to one person, but to dozens or more;

one-that wwas made so proudly

and boastfully that it was done at a foot

ball game in the crowded

-•• -end zone. This evidence was intended

not merely to give the jury a

confession, but to give the jury a down

-rig

ht proclamation so

cavalierly issued that it was heard by

another person 10-12 feet

away during a crowded football game.

- --

Was it a serious violation? Yes. One

witness intentionally sought

another out to see what the potential

scope and details of his tes-

timony were for the purpose of shaping

What was its impact on the testimony

his own testimony.

of the witness? As we can see,

the second witness, (Wawroski), now with

ill-gotten information from

the first witness (Reed), unnaturally blurted out a key fact that

that made his testimony more credible: the quiet end zone.

What is its probable impact on the outcome of the trial? Given the

truth that a confession is extremely potent to a jury as noted above

and that in this context this was not simply evidence of a sly whispered confession, but rather a bold proclamation, how could it not

have an impact on the jury and an impact on the trial itself?

It is now well recognized that sequestering witnesses "is (next to

cross-examination) one of the greatest engines that the skill of man

has ever invented for the detection of liars in a court of justice"

6 Wigmore on Evidence 1838 at 463.

We respectfully request this Honorable Court undertake review and

find the Trial Court abused it's discretion when the Appellant was

denied the protection of Federal Rule of Evidence 615, which resulted

in prejudice to her or' said another way, it was unfair to her defense

that she did not confess to Reed.

It was error for the trial court to read, as a non-responsive answer to a jury question, the criminal information

as a fact (not as an allegation) prefaced by "attentiongetting words" of "in order to avoid any confusion about

the charges in this case, I am going to read the following

to- you" and then after the reading of the criminal - infor-

mation, the words "That is all I have to say on that issue.

Again, I hope it hope it (sic) clarify the issue for you."

Finally, the Pennsylvania Superior Court claims that the tril court reading

the criminal information as if it was fact was not error because "the trial

court clearly clarified to the jury that it was reading from the Commonwealth's allegations." See Appendix A at 26.

The exact phrasing of what was said is significant:

Ladies and gentleman of the Jury, in order to avoid any confusion about the charges in this case I am going to read the

following to you:

On or about July 1st, 2012, the Defendant did intentionally

cause the death of Frank Spencer at 20 Fairview Drive, Hemlock Township,

Township, Columbia County. The Defendant having acted as a

principal or an accomplice in bringing about Spencer's death

by murder.. That is all I have to say on that issue. Again,

I hope. it clarify (sic) the issues for you.

Mr. Hoey: Your Honor, I would ask, that is simply the allegation.

The Court: Excuse me, that is the allegation.

Thank you,

counsel. You are absolutely right. That is only the

all-

egations and as in the instructions I gave you before, charge

are only allegations. They are not facts in this case

Unless

you find from the evidence the facts that would suppor

t such

an allegation to reach your conclusions. Thank you,

Counsel.

I appreciate that very much to clarify (sic) that for

the Jury.

Thank you. Would you please (sic) take the Jury out to convene

their deliberations?

RR. 2336: 6-25.

Immediately after the jury was excused from the courtroom,

a mistrial. Within less than an hour, the jury returned

counsel requested

with a verdict of

guilty on all counts. See BR. 2329: 3-4; RR. 2339:25.

What makes this error not merely a slip-of-the-tongue was the fact

that at

sidebar before the error, the trial court told cousel

that it was going to

instruct as follows: 'The defendant didintentionally

cause the death of

Frank Spencer, the defendant having acted as a princi

pal or an accomplice

in bringing about Spencer's death by murder." RR. 2335:

credit, the government corrected the trial court that

it was alleged that

Maria caused the death of Frank Spencer. Nevertheless,

mediately thereafter, it did precisely that as noted

19-23. To its

in moments im-

above, stating it to

the jury as fact, not allegation.

This Court has held: "The influence of the trial judge

on the jury is

necessarily and properly of great weight and jurors are

ever watchful of

the words that fall from him. Particularly in a criminal trial,

the judge's

last word is apt to be the decisive word.", Bollenback v. u.S.,326 U.S. 607

612 (1946).

This Court has stated that the analysis must focus on the specif

ic language

challenged, but the inquiry does not end there. If a specific

portio

n of

the jury charge, considered in isolation, could reasonably have

been under-

stood as creating a presumption that relieves the State of 'its

burden of

on an element of an offense, the potentially offending words

sidered in the context of the charge as a whole. Francis v.

must be conFranklin, '47 U.S. 307 (1984 )

This analysis "requires careful attention to the words actual

ly spoken to

the jury..., for whether a defendant has been accorded his consti

tutional

rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could

have inter-

peted the instruction." Sandstrom, v Montana, 442, U.S. 510,

514.

Here the last words uttered by the judge were in essence and in

rected verdict of guilty. The trial court, after it had been

fact a di-

warned by the

goverment' just moments before, said "On or about July 1st, 2012,

Defendant did intentionally cause the death of Frank Spenc

er at

Drive, Hemlock Township, Columbia County. The Defendant

the

20 fairview

having acted as a

principal or an accomplice in bringing about Spencer's death

by murder.

That is all I have to say on that issue. Again, I hope it clarif

y (sic)

the issues for you." RR. 2236: 6-12. (emphasis added).

Although we must look at the jury instructions as .a whole, some

things

said can not be unsaid. This direct reading of the criminal inform

ation

was prefaced by attention-getting words of "in order to avoid

any confusion

about the charges in this case I am going 'to read the following

After the reading of the criminal information, the trial court

to you."

said " That

;

is all I have to say on that issue. Again, I hope it (sic) clarify the

issue for you."

This Court has explained that in view of the inherent delicacy of judia.'iaL

communications with a deliberating jury, it is important for supplemental

instructions to be accurate, clear and neutral.

There is no requirement

that the court reiterate instructions that concern the goverment's burden

of proof.. Wtien:the Court éxc6&1sthescope of the. juries inquiries, the

Court should avoid invading the jury's province and should respond "forthrightly, but not gratuitously". Thus the judge is not required to

guess as to other possible areas of juror confusion.- In the ordinary,

case, prudence dictates that the trial court should confine its response

to the approximate boundries of the jury inquiry.

In addition,

...

fthe .th

:natittion

could reasonably have been understood as creating a "rebuttable" presumption

or corciasion that relieves the goverment of its burden of persuasion on an

element of an offense, the potentially offending words must be considered

in •the context of the charge as a whole; this analysis requires careful

attention to the words actually spoken to the jury, for whether a defendant

has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which

a responsible juror could have interpreted the instruction.

Morissette v. United States , 342 U.S. 4221 57 L ED 2d 854, 98 S Ct 2864

Francis v franklin, 471 US 307 (1984)

In this trial, the fact that Maria provided not only an alibi defense, but

attempted to show the jury that her father committed this crime

by himself with no imput from her, made this reading of the criminal

information as fact, not accusation, particulary harmful. It removed

from the jury their right to decide the facts and the verdict.

Even giving all of the benefit to the trial court that it was an unintentional gaff (ignoring that the trial court was explicitly corrected by the goverment merely moments before), it was said. Here,

the judge's last words were the decisive words.

[W]here a court has

expressed its opinion on a pivotal- issue in the case, and has expressed

that opinion in a strong, unequivocal and one-sided fashion, abstract

instructions regarding the jury's role as fact finder are not sufficient

remedy. " U. v. Anton,4, 597 F.2d 371, 375 (3rd. Cir. 1979)

It is respectfully requested this Honorable Court take this case, and hold

that the court cannot read the criminal information. as if it was fact.

And if this type of ship of the tongue happens, it must be fixed with a

thorough clarifying instruction. In addition, find that the supplemental

instruction werecoclusoy:d hif.tedt bb-rd -:of persuasion to the

defendant to prove her innocence, a violation of fundan'iental Fourteenth

Amendment due process guarantess.

XI. CONCLUSION

I respectfully request this Honorable Court undertake review,

hold that the Pennsylvania Superior Court abused its discretion,

and GRANT a new trial.

Respectfully,

Dated; September 20, 2018

Mafia SanuttV-,spencer..prd-e

Inmate Id: 0X1149

SCI- MUNCY

P.O. Box 180

Muncy, Pa. 17756

-40-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.