Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Victor Dewayne White, Petitioner v. Ector County Appraisal District

APPENDIX A

RE: Ca

No. 18-0122

DATE: 5/4/2018

COA #: 11-17-00059-CV

TC#: CC-10,128-T

STYLE: WHITE V. ECTOR COUNTY APPRAISAL DIST.

Today the Supreme Court of Texas denied the petition

for review in the above-referenced case.

VICTOR DEWAYNE WHITE

TDCJ #01835870

MICHAEL UNIT

2664 FM 2054

TENNESSEE COLONY, TX 75886

11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Victor Dewayne White,

*

From the County Court at Law

of Ector County,

Trial Court No. CC-10,128-T.

Vs. No. 11-17-00059-CV

*

December 14, 2017

Ector County Appraisal District,

*

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there

is no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court's

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.

Opinion filed December 14, 2017

UK

In The

(fflebentb Court of Z(ppeal

No. 11-17-00059-CV

VICTOR DEWAYNE WHITE, Appellant

V.

ECTOR COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Ector County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-10,128-T

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ector County Appraisal District sued Victor Dewayne White for the recovery

of delinquent ad valorem taxes. The trial court found that White was delinquent in

the payment of property taxes in the amount of $1,634.31 and authorized Ector

County Appraisal District to foreclose on the property. On appeal, White requests

that this court grant his "Writ of Quo Warranto," vacate the judgment, and vacate

what he describes as a "void" judgment. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Procedural History

The Appraisal District alleged that White had failed to pay his property taxes

on certain real property in Ector County and filed suit. The Ector County Sherriff's

Department completed service of the citation and petition on White, who was

incarcerated in the Ector County Detention Center. Although White never filed an

answer in the suit, he filed a motion to dismiss the case. The Appraisal District

amended its petition and moved the trial court to set a tax hearing; the Appraisal

District served the motion on all parties and counsel that had appeared. White

acknowledged in his appellate brief that he received notice of the tax hearing. The

trial court set the tax hearing for January 23, 2017. On that date, the Appraisal

District appeared with counsel and announced ready, while White, who was not

represented by counsel, did not appear. White also had not requested to appear by

other means.

After the Appraisal District adduced evidence of the delinquent taxes that

White owed for his property, as shown in certified copies of tax records, it moved

for the admission of that evidence, which the trial court admitted. White presented

no evidence in response to the Appraisal District's evidence. At the conclusion of

the hearing, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Appraisal District.

II. Issues Presented

White asserts multiple complaints in his "Writ of Quo Warranto," which this

court accepted as his brief in this appeal. White also filed a reply brief in response

to the Appraisal District's brief. Because of the multiplicity of complaints, we do

not recite them here but, instead, address them in our analysis below.

III. Standard of Review

In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the credibility

of the witnesses. Sw. Bell Media, Inc. v. Lyles, 825 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). When neither party requests findings of fact

2

and conclusions of law following a nonjury trial, all fact findings necessary to

support the trial court's judgment are implied. Shields Ltd. P 'ship v. Bradberry, 526

S.W.3d 471,480 (Tex. 2017) (citing Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d

46, 52 (Tex. 2003)). When, however, as in this cause, a reporter's record is filed,

the trial court's implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal

and factual sufficiency. BMC Software Belg., N. V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789,

795 (Tex. 2002). We conduct any review of sufficiency challenges to implied

findings under the same standards of review that govern sufficiency challenges to

jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact. Jistel v. Tiffany Trail Owners Ass 'n,

Inc., 215 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) (citing Roberson v.

Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989)). In the absence of findings, we will

affirm the judgment of the trial court if it can be upheld on any available legal theory

that finds support in the evidence. Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d

277, 278 (Tex. 1987).

N. Analysis

A. White has asserted complaints on appeal that either were not

preserved or have been waived.

White asserts many complaints that are unrelated to his appeal of a delinquent

tax case. White first argues that this court should grant his "Writ of Quo Warranto"

because of alleged bad acts by several county employees. White also complains of

alleged fraudulent acts by a now-deceased justice of the peace. Quo warranto

proceedings provide the exclusive means by which the public may protect itself from

unlawful occupancy of a public office. Norville v. Parnell, 118 S.W.3d 503, 505

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied). However, White's appeal arises out of a suit

over his failure to pay property taxes. None of his complaints in his brief about

alleged county employees' actions and a deceased justice of the peace were before

the trial court, nor was his quo warranto claim before the trial court. A judgment

3

must be based upon pleadings, and as the Texas Supreme Court has stated, "[A]

plaintiff may not sustain a favorable judgment on an unpleaded cause of action, in

the absence of trial by consent. . . ." Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682-83

(Tex. 1979) (quoting Oil Field Haulers Ass'n v. R.R. Comm 'n, 381 S.W.2d 183, 191

(Tex. 1964)). White's unpleaded complaints were not tried by consent and are

irrelevant. Therefore, they are not before this court. See id. White next complains

that he has a deceptive trade practices claim and a complaint about an arrest, but

these claims also were unpleaded and not tried by consent, are irrelevant to this tax

suit, and are not before this court. See id.

White further complains of alleged fraudulent acts by the law firm that

represented the Appraisal District in the suit, complains of unreasonable seizures

under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and claims that the

"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine applies in this case. To preserve a complaint

for appeal, the record must show that the complaint was made to the trial court by a

timely request, objection, or motion and that the trial court ruled on the request,

objection, or motion—either expressly or implicitly—or refused to rule and the party

objected to the court's refusal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

A pro se litigant is required to properly present his case on appeal, just as he

is required to properly present his case to the trial court. Valadez v. Avitia, 238

S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—E1 Paso 2007, no pet.) (citing Martinez v. El Paso

Cty., 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—E1 Paso 2007, pet. struck)). In addition, the

complaint raised on appeal must be the same as the complaint presented to the trial

court. See Gerdes v. Kennamer, 155 S.W.3d 523, 532 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi

2004, pet. denied). Furthermore, a party may not enlarge a ground of error on appeal

to include an objection not asserted at trial. See Pfeffer v. S. Tex. Laborers 'Pension

Tr. Fund, 679 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref d

n.r.e.).

With respect to the complaints outlined above, White has not preserved them

for appeal because he did not object or otherwise bring them to the trial court's

attention. TEX. R. App. P. 33.1(a). In addition, White never raised a "facial

challenge" to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution at trial. We

note that a facial challenge may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Karenev v.

State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). As a result, that issue is not

before us. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see also Karenev, 281 S.W.3d at 434. However,

an "as applied" challenge may be brought during or after a trial on the merits. State

ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). But in this case,

White has not briefed an "as applied" challenge. TEX. R. App. P. 38.1; see

Mathews v. State, 918 S.W.2d 666,667 n.2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, pet. ref d).

In addition, White's briefing on all of these complaints lacks a table of contents,

index of authorities, statement regarding oral argument, issues presented, summary

of the argument, and arguments that reference relevant parts of the record as well as

relevant case law, as required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.1. Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys.

Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181,184-85 (Tex. 1978). We also "know

of no authority obligating us to become advocates for a particular litigant through

performing their research and developing their argument for them." Tello v. Bank

One, NA., 218 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)

(quoting Jordan v. Jefferson Cty., 153 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004,

pet. denied)). Because White failed to adequately brief these issues, he has waived

them. See TEX. R. App. P. 38.1, 38.9; see also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life

Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994).

B. White's complaints about service of the suit, service of pleadings,

and notice of the tax hearing are waived.

White asserts that he failed to receive service of process for the tax suit, failed

to receive the amended petition, and failed to receive notice of the tax hearing, which

he claims violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, section 19 of the Texas constitution. He

also claims that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. He argues that the

violation of his due process rights requires us to reverse the judgment of the trial

court. We disagree.

"A party waives complaints regarding service of process if he makes a general

appearance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120 (providing that entrance of general appearance has

same force and effect as if citation has been issued and served as provided by law)."

In re D.MB., 467 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied).

"A party enters a general appearance when it (1) invokes the judgment of the court

on any question other than the court's jurisdiction, (2) recognizes by its acts that an

action is properly pending, or (3) seeks affirmative action from the court." Id.

(quoting Exito Electronics Co. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. 2004) (per

curiam)). When a party personally appears and requests the trial court to take

affirmative action on his behalf, the party has generally appeared and waives any

complaint as to service. Id. (citing Mays v. Perkins, 927 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)). In addition, the county court at law has

subject-matter jurisdiction in this suit because the amount in controversy was within

the jurisdictional limits of the court. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.41(a) (West

2015); see also State v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 575 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Civ.

App.—Waco 1978, writ dism'd). Because White filed his motion to dismiss and

requested affirmative relief from the trial court, he entered a general appearance and

has waived any complaints about service of process. The Appraisal District also

pleaded for an amount within the jurisdictional limits of the county court at law,

which had jurisdiction over the matter. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 25.0003 (West

Supp. 2017).

In addition, in a suit for delinquent ad valorem taxes, under Rule 11 7a of the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, once a citation that complies with the rule has been

properly served, the party that served the citation along with any intervening parties

who do not serve citation may obtain a judgment for all taxes becoming delinquent

before the rendition of the judgment "without the necessity of further.

.

.

notice".to

any defendant. TEX. R. Civ. P. 117a(4); see also Mandel v. Lewisville Indep.

Appellees Sch. Dist., 499 S.W.3d 65, 74 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied).

Rule 117a contemplates that, after a citation is served, the party serving the citation

and other parties may plead new claims and seek more onerous relief without further

notice. Mandel, 499 S.W.3d at 74. Rule 117a explicitly places the burden on a

defendant to "take notice of, and plead and answer to, all claims and pleadings then

on file or thereafter filed in said cause by all.

.

.

parties therein." Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 117a(4)). We note that the Appraisal District

certified that it had served the amended petition on White in accordance with

Rule 2 1 a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a. White never

complained at trial about a lack of service of the amended petition. See TEX. R.

App. P. 33.1. In addition, although he also complained that he did not receive notice

of the tax hearing, he admitted on appeal that he received notice of the tax hearing.

White additionally complains that he could not appear because he was

incarcerated. Prisoners have a "reasonable right of access to the courts." Bullock v.

Drake, No. 11-98-00231-CV, 1999 WL 33748040, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland

Dec. 8, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer,

468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984)). A prison inmate's right to access the courts does not

entail the right to appear personally. Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411,414 (Tex.

7

App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421,423 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); see Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480-81 (5th

Cir. 1977). "A prisoner in Texas has a constitutional right of access to the courts,

but only a qualified right to appear personally at a civil proceeding." Dodd v. Dodd,

17 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

An inmate seeking affirmative relief who cannot appear for trial because of

incarceration must move for a continuance. Brewer, 737 S.W.2d at 423 (citing

Hobbs v. Hobbs, 691 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism'd)). A

prisoner cannot simply ignore a trial setting with impunity. Id. (citing Essex mt '1

Ltd. v. Woods, 646 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1983, no writ)). We

also note that a court may allow an inmate to appear by telephone, affidavit, or other

effective means. Judd v. Corey-Steele, No. 11-14-00049-CV, 2015 WL 1779056, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 16, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re Ramirez, 994

S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). "[T]he term

'hearing' does not necessarily contemplate either a personal appearance before the

court or an oral presentation to the court." Judd, 2015 WL 1779056, at *3 (alteration

in original) (quoting Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357,

359 (Tex. 1998)). Here, White never moved for a continuance and never requested

to appear in person or by some other means. See Judd, 2015 WL 1779056, at *3;

Brewer, 737 S.W.2d at 423. Because White failed to do those things, he has failed

to preserve the complaints for appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. We overrule all of

White's due process complaints.

C. White waived his complaint about an alleged Equal Protection

• Clause violation under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution.

White claims that the trial court and the Appraisal District violated his rights

under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. To assert an equal protection claim, White must establish that he was

treated differently than other similarly situated parties and that he was treated

differently without a reasonable basis. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982);

Davis v. Tex. Dep 't of Criminal Justice, No. 11-13-00363-CV, 2015 WL 6681219,

at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 29, 2015, pet. denied).

White cites no relevant cases or applicable record cites to support his

argument. Because White failed to adequately brief these issues, he has waived

them. See TEX. R. App. P. 38.1, 38.9; see also Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at

284. Moreover, White's claim, even if not waived, still fails because he has not

advanced any claim supported by evidence. White does not explain how the trial

court or the Appraisal District violated his equal protection rights other than to

challenge the judgment against him for unpaid taxes. The trial court heard several

delinquent tax cases that involved other parties as part of the same tax hearing, and

all received the same hearing and review by the trial court. Accordingly, we overrule

White's equal protection complaint.

D. The Appraisal District adduced legally and factually sufficient

evidence of delinquent taxes, and White failed to rebut that prima

facie case with evidence.

In his brief, White challenges the evidence adduced at trial and claims that he

paid his taxes. We construe his complaint as a legal and factual sufficiency

challenge. In a legal sufficiency challenge, we review the evidence at trial to

determine whether it would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the

verdict under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005).

We must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting any

favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregarding any contrary

evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 821-22, 827. We may

sustain a no-evidence or legal sufficiency challenge only when (1) the record

discloses a complete absence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or

of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3)

the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4)

the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 810 (citing

Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38

TEX. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1960)). In contrast, in a factual sufficiency challenge,

we review the evidence to determine whether the evidence in support of a finding is

so weak as to be clearly wrong and unjust or whether the finding is so against the

great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and

manifestly unjust. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001).

In this case, the Appraisal District asserted that White had not paid his

property taxes or the accrued interest and penalties, which totaled $1,634.31. The

Appraisal District sued him to collect those amounts. Section 33.47(a) of the Texas

Tax Code provides:

In a suit to collect a delinquent tax, the taxing unit's current tax

roll and delinquent tax roll or certified copies of the entries showing the

property and the amount of the tax and penalties imposed and interest

accrued constitute prima facie evidence that each person charged with

a duty relating to the imposition of the tax has complied with all

requirements of law and that the amount of tax alleged to be delinquent

against the property and the amount of penalties and interest due on that

tax as listed are the correct amounts.

TAX CODE § 33.47(a). The Appraisal District offered, and the trial court admitted,

certified copies of tax records for White's property that showed the amount of tax

owed for specific periods, including all interest accrued and penalties imposed.

These exhibits are prima facie evidence of the delinquent taxes, penalties, and

interest due on the properties. See Reinmiller v. Cty. of Dallas, 212 S.W.3d 835,

836-37 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (citing Davis v. City ofAustin, 632

S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1982); Phfer v. Nacogdoches Cty. Cent. Appraisal Dist., 45

10

S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. denied)). After the taxing authority

establishes its prima facie case, under Section 33.47(a), the burden shifts to the

taxpayer to show, by competent evidence, that he has paid the full amount of taxes,

penalties, and interest or that there is some other defense that applies to his case.

TAX § 33.47(a); Reinmiller, 212 S.W.3d at 837 (citing Nat'l Med. Fin. Servs., Inc. v.

Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 150 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)).

Once the Appraisal District established its prima facie case, White was required to

come forward with evidence that would rebut the presumption. See Reinmiller, 212

S.W.3d at 837.

White did not appear in person at the tax hearing or make arrangements to

appear via telephone or through some other method to present evidence to rebut the

prima facie case. He did not file evidence with the county clerk and did not present

evidence at trial that would have challenged the prima facie case. In addition, the

documents that White did file with the county clerk are not evidence.

See

Rodriquez v. Tex. Farmers Ins. Co., 903 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

1995, writ denied) (pleadings are not competent evidence and uncertified copies of

pleadings are not evidence). Again, pro se litigants are held to the same standard as

licensed attorneys. Mansfield State Bank, 573 S.W.2d at 184-85. White, who chose

to represent himself, bore the burden to come forward with evidence to challenge

the prima facie case adduced by the Appraisal District that he owed property taxes

along with interest and penalties, as outlined in the Appraisal District's exhibits. See

Reinmiller, 212 S.W.3d at 836-37. Having considered White's challenge to the

judgment of the trial court, we hold that the Appraisal District adduced legally and

factually sufficient evidence of delinquent taxes, interest, and penalties, which White

failed to rebut. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entered

judgment in favor of the Appraisal District. We overrule White's sufficiency-ofthe-evidence complaints.

11

V.

This Court's Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

PER CURIAM

December 14, 2017

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.

12

11111 court of Appeals Mandate

THE STATE OF TEXAS

To THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF ECTOR COUNTY, GREETINGS:

BEFORE our Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District of Texas, on December 14,

2017, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

Victor Dewayne White

11th Court of Appeals No. 11-17-00059-CV and

County Court at Law Case No. CC-1 0,1 28-T

Ector County Appraisal District

was determined; and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

"This court, has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is

no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court's

opinion, the judgment ojthe trial court is in all things affirmed."

WHEREFORE WE COMMAND YOU To observe the order of our said Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh District of Texas, in this behalf, and in all things to have it duly

recognized, obeyed and executed.

WITNESS, the HON. JOHN M. BAILEY,

Justice of this said Court, with the seal

thereof annexed at the City of Eastland,

on July 25, 2018.

>k0q144c)

SHERRY WILLIAMSON, CLERK

BILL OF COSTS

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DISTRICT, AT EASTLAND

No. 11-17-00059-CV

Victor Dewayne White

V.

Ector County Appraisal District

(No. CC-1 0,128-T IN COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF ECTOR COUNTY)

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS:

Filing unknown

-

()1JRTS OF APPEAL:

CHARGES

TYPE OF FEE

-

$0.00

$0.00

MOTION FEE

FILING

BY

DATE

PAID/NOT

PAID

10/03/2017

04/17/2017

EXEMPT

INDIGENT

NICK NICHOLAS

N/A

TRIAL COURT FEE:

Clerk's Record.- $656.00

Reporter's Record $40.40

-

Balance of costs owing to the Eleventh Court of Appeals, Eastland, Texas: 0.00

Court costs in this cause shall be paid as per the Judgment issued by this Court.

I, Sherry Williamson, CLERK OF THE ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF TEXAS, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of

the cost bill of THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS,

showing the charges and payments, in the above numbered and styled cause, as the same

appears of record in this office.

WITNESS, the HON. JOHN M. BAILEY,

Justice of this said Court, with the seal

thereof annexed at the City of Eastland,

on July 25, 2018.

cn

)r

SHERRY WILLIAMSON, CLERK

111

ADDENDUM B

siis 7-J/O

Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

July 3, 2018

Scott S. Harris

Clerk of the Court

(202) 479-3011

Mr. Victor Dewayne White

Prisoner ID #1835870

2664 FM 2054

Tennessee Colony, TX 75886

Re: Victor Dewayne White

v. Ector County Appraisal District

Application No. 18A18

Dear Mr. White:

The application for an extension of time within which to file a petition

for a writ of certiorari in the above-entitled case has been presented to

Justice Alito, who on July 3, 2018, extended the time to and including

October 1, 2018.

This letter has been sent to those designated on the attached

notification list.

Sincerely,

Scott S. Harris, Clerk

Jacob A. Levitan

Case Analyst

'a

Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

NOTIFICATION LIST

Mr. Victor Dewayne White

Prisoner ID #1835870

2664 FM 2054

Tennessee Colony, TX 75886

Clerk

Supreme Court of Texas

Post Office Box 12248

Austin, TX 78711

Scott S. Harris

Clerk of the Court

(202) 479-3011