Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Craig Alexander, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefMay 29, 2018
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No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CG
NLE X AN b
PETITIONER
(Your Name)
vs
U5
S
RESPONDENT(S)
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ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
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C'c
Cc.
S44
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
•
Cc
•Ie&
(Your Name)
o33
Calcry
()
(Address)
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•
•
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(City, State, Zip Code)
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0
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(Phone Number)
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QUESTION(S) PRESENTED
Whether the Supreme Court should resolve spilt
decisions in the lower court - as to how far a
Judge must explain and/or elaborate on a
decision to grant or deny a Novant's petition
under §3582?
Whether a Defendant should be considered as
having a bad Criminal History score when
Defendant is only at category 3 without any
violence on a Criminal History Chart of I
thru VI?
Can a Judge continue to use old non—violent
disciplinary infraction even after a
Defendant has displayed several years of
clear conduct? At what point does his old
infractions stop haunting him?
LIST OF PARTIES
[arties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of
all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this
petition is as follows:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONSBELOW ........................................................................................................ 1
JURISDICTION.........................................................................
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED...; ........... ................ A-1
STATEMENTOF THE CASE .............................................................................................
.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .....................................................................
CONCLUSION.............................. ..........................................................................................14
INDEX TO.APPENDICES.
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APPENDIX
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision ......i2--13
APPENDIX B:
Sécoñd Circuit Court of Appeals granting similar
situation .................................... 12-13
..
APPENDIX C
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Case pending with the Supreme Court similar to
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APPENDIX 0
Defendant's petition.
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APPENDIX E
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APPENDIX F
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
PAGE(S)
CASES
United States v. Simmons,586 Fed. Appx. 663 (6th Cir 2014)...4
Kimbrough,2007 WL 4292040, at *12 2007 and 2010 amend ........5
Kimbrough v. United States,552 U.S. 85 2007 ..................5
Kimbrough v. United States,552 U.S., 97-99 128 S. Ct. 858, 169 L. Ed. 2d 482(2007) ..........................................6
Duncan v. Walker,537 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 150 L.
Ed. 2d251(2000) .............................................
United States v. Thomas,775 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2014) .........7
United States v. Alejandro-Montanez,778 F.3d 352 (1st Cir.
2015) .........................................................7
United States v. Ayala,'No-05--CR-008 (2008) WL 555525 at W.D.
VA Feb 26, 2008) ..............................................8
U.S. Dist LEXIS,6771 U.S. v. Holtsclaw, Jan 18, 2017 ........8
United States v. Sawyer,2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166316 .......10
Freeman v. United States,564 'U.S.
13 1 5., Ct. 2685, 2688
180 L. ED. 2d 519 ..........................................11
United States v. Neron Christie,736 F.3d 2013 U.S. App LEXIS
23073 (Second Cir.) ........................................12
United States v. Adaucto Chavez-Meza,854 F.3d 655; 2017.... 13
STATUTES AND RULES
18 U.S.C.3582(c)(2) and 28 U.S.C. 994(0)ir ...............
U.S.S.G
§1.B1.10(b)(2)(A) ............... .......... . ........ 1-3
U.S.S.G. App. C Amends 748, 752 (2011) .....................4
21 U.S.. §846, 841(a) and (b) .............................7
18 U.S.C. 3551 et seq .......................................11
18 U.S.C. §3553(a) ........................................12
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.
OPINIONS BELOW
{11' r cases from federal courts:
The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix
the petition and is
to
;or,
[ I reported at
{ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix
the petition and is
••
to'
; or,
[ ] reported at
{ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[1 is unpublished.
.
• { ] For cases from state courts:.
-
The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at
Appendix
to the -petition. and is
; or,
[ ] reported at
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
-'
The opinion of the
appears at Appendix
.
-
to the petition and is
; Or,
[ ] reported at
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
E. is unpublished.
•
)
.
1.
court
JURISDICTION
cases from federal courts:
The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case
was
Nb.XCk
I, 1Ot8
petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.
[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of
Appeals on the following date:
, and a copy of the.
order denying rehearing appears at Appendix
.
.
[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
to and including
(date) on
(date)
in Application No. _A______
.-.
.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 Ti. S. C. § 1254(1).
[ ] For cases from state courts:
The date On which the highest state court decided my case was
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix
[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:
and a copy of the order denying rehearing
appears at Appendix
[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
to and including
(date) on
(date) in
Application No.
A_______
________________
.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).
I
)
.
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Fifthe Amendment;. to the United States Constitution provides
in relevant part "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.
Fourteenth Amendment; to the United States Constitution
provides in relevant part "No state
shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or
immunities o,f citizens of the United
state; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law,
•
nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the "Equal Protection of
the laws".
J
A-i
STATEMENT OF CASE
NOW COMES, Craig Alexander (herein after referred to as
"Defendant"), who's proceeding, via, pro se representation,
and respectfully moves this Honorable Court to direct modification
of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.3582(c)(2) and U.S.C.
§994(o). Based upon -Retroactive
-
Amendment: 782, 750 and 706
to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, applicable to cocaine
•base, ("crack")offenses f"U.S.S.G" §1B1.10(b)(2)(A)J.
The Defendant's base offense level has been lowered to 30,
whereas the Sentencing Court held Defendant Alexander responsible
for more than 2.8 kilograms of cocaine base: which makes him
eligible under Amendment 750 resulting in a base offense level of
34, combined with a three point enhancement for organizer/leader
and a two point enhancement for obstruction of justice, the
defendant's sentencing guideline range is 324 to 405, based on
a total offense level of 39.
On or about 19, 2001, Defendant, Craig Alexander, was named
in a three Count Indictment charging him as follows:
Count 1: Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess
with Intent to Distribute more than
0 grams of a mixture and substance
Containing Cocaine Base (Crack
Cocaine), in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§846, §841(a)(1) and §841(b)(1)(A)
(iii); and
Count 2 & 3: Possession with Intent to Distribute
more than 50 grams of a mixture and
Substance Containing Cocaine Base
(Crack Cocaine) and Aiding and
Abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§841(a)(1) and §841(b)(1)(A)(iii),
and 18 U.S.C. §2
On September 19, 2001, Defendant was found guilty by a jury
on all three counts of the indictment. At presentence report(PSR)
1
was prepared finding Craig Alexander responsible for more than
2.8 kilograms of cocaine base, resulting in a base offense level
of 38. Five additional levels were added to his base offense
level under U.S.S.G §3B1 .1 (a) for his alleged role as a leader
and organizer of a criminal activity that involved five or more
participants or was otherwise extensive, and obstruction of
justice resulting in a total offense level of 43: combined with
criminal history category of III. Alexander's sentencing guideline
range of imprisonment was calculated to be life. On January 11,
2002, Alexander was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on
each count, to be served concurrently.
Alexander appealed and on January 17, 2002, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. Alexander filed a
motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 on December 25, 2004, which was
denied by the District Court on July 30, 2005. The Fifth Circuit
denied Alexander's Certificate of Appealability on the District
Court's denial on his §2255 motion on August 8, 2005.
On February 25, 2008, your Defendant filed a motion for
reduction of sentence under section §3582(c)(2). The government
filed a response in opposition. The District Court then denied
Alexander's motion on April 22, 2008.
On December 7, 2011, the Defendant filed a motion to reduce
his sentence under §3582 pursuant to Amendment 750. The government
filed a motion in opposition to the Defendant's motion for
reduction of his sentence,
in which the government erroneously
calculated your Defendant's applicable guideline range, including
held him accountable for at least 4.1395 kilograms of cocaine
2
base, and then requested that the Court deny the motion because
Amendment 750 does not alter the Defendant's original sentencing
range..
THE DEFENDANT IS ELIGIBLE FOR A REDUCTION OF
SENTENCE BECAUSE THE AMENDMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY
LOWERED HIS GUIDELINE RANGE.
Section §3582(c)(2) provides:
['in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or its own motion, the court
may reduce the term of imprisonment after considering.the
factors set forth in section §3553(a) to the extent that they
are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2).
In U.S.SG. §1B1.10, the Sentencing Commission has
indentified the amendments [Amendments: 706, 711, 750 and 7821
that a court may apply retroactively pursuant to this authority,
and articulated the proper procedure for implementing the amendments
in a concluded case. The version of section §131.10 applicable
in this case has became effective November 1, 2011 and 2014, and
added Amendments 750 and 782 to the list of amendments to be
applied retrocatively.Id.
The revised version of this Guideline emphasizes, that a
defendant may take advantage of the relief section §3582(c)(2)
offers if the amendment(s) has the effect of lowering the
defendant's Guideline Range.Id.
3
In 2011 the Sentencing Commission again retroactively lowered
the base offense level for most offenses involving crack cocaine:
At least 8.4 kilograms would yield a 38, while 2.8 to 8.4
kilograms corresponded to a 36. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amends 748,
750 (2011).
However, the Sentencing Commission has now authorized the
Federal Court's to review crack cocaine sentences retroactively
under §3582(c)(2) and the revised sentencing guidelines beginning
in November of 2015. See: United States Sentencing Commission:
Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary) (July 18,
2014) 20140718_RFP_Amendents Retroactively. pdf. This makes
Amendment 782 retroactive. See Also: United States v. Simmons,
586 Fed. 663 (6th Cir. 2014).
Thus, Mr. Alexander, Defendant is eligible for a sentencing
reduction under Amendment 782. Whereas, calculating Defendant's
lowered applicable guideline range, it yields an offense level of
39,with acriminál history category III and Guideline range of
One hundred and eighty-eight to two hundred and thirty-five
months 324 months to 405 imprisonment", under the application of
Amendments 782, 750 and 706.
REASON FOR GRANTING PETITION.
I. THERE EXIST A FUNDAMENTAL BASIS TO MODIFY
THE TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT UNDER THOSE
FACTORS ARTICULATED UNDER 18 U.S.C.
§3553(a).
We need not pause to find whether there is a ["fundamental
basis"] to modify the terms of imprisonment your Defendant suffers
under the sentencing guidelines and statutory frameworking of 21
U.S.C. §841, et seq.. What Congree.has said pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
4
§3553(a) is "The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but
not greater than necessary, to comply with the purpose set forth
in paragraph (2) of this section. Th,e court, in determining the
particular sentences imposed, shaiLconsider, the kinds of
sentences available-, (a)(3) and the kind of sentencing range
established for the applicable category of offenses committed by
the defendants as set forth in the sentencing guidelines, (a)(4).
Mr. Alexander suffer from a Life sentence, which is greater
than necessary, but Amendments 782 and 750, et seq, now entitles
him to relief.
Several factors warrant rediiction of the defendant's sentence
in the instance case as authorized by the relevant statute and
guideline. First among them is the clear applicability of the
amended, retroactive guideline to Alexander's case. The United
States Sentencing Coihmission, supported by a wealth of study,
legal analysis, and consultation with judicial and other sources,
has concluded that the original enhancement of the offense level
was unduly severe, particularly in comparison with the lesser
sentences imposed as to defendant involved with 'much larger
quantities of powder cocaine. Pursuant to the statutory process,
-
the November 1, 2007 and 2011 amendments to §2D1.1 was submitted
to Congress and became effective on those dates. See: Kimbrough,
2007 WL 4292040, at *12 (noting significance of Congress' "tacit
acceptance of the 2007 and 2010 amendments"). [Kimbrough v.
United States,552 U.S. 85-2007))).].
The amended guidelines of 2007, 2011 and 2014 were made
5
retroactive for the purpose of granting relief in cases like the
instant case in which the defendant's offense of conviction was
enhanced on the now-superseded cocaine guidelines. "This court
should also consider the sentence it would have imposed had the
amendment been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced".
Id.
In the instant case, it is not unreasonable to find
-
that
given the Court's position at sentencing, the defendant was
sentenced to Life, but this Honorable Court may now, taken into
account the Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,[sic]
(Amendments 782 and 750) and extending such position under the
balancing factors articulated pursuant to 133353 and 13994(0), the
Supreme Court should direct the District Court to reduce your
Defendant's sentence between 324-405 months of imprisonment as
now applicable to Alexander's case by common law. See: Kimbrough
v. United States,552 U.S. 85, 97-99 128 S. Ct. 858, 169 L. Ed. 2d
482 (2007).
Defendant gains further support under Duncan v. Walker,533
U.S. 167, 174, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 150 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2000), where
the United States Supreme Court noted that a statute should
be construed so that no word shall be superfluous, void or
insignificant. In applying this reasoning to the instant motion,
Defendant contends that courts has statutory authority to modify
the term of imprisonment under §3582(c)(2), given the authority
vested by mandate of §3553(a) to the extent applicable., where
such reduction is consistent with applicable policy statement
issued by the Sentencing Commission, under Amendments 706, 750,
ri
and 782, and applying such terms nunc pro tunc, there is no doubt
that the Court would have imposed a substantially lower term of
imprisonment had the Amendments been in effect at the time of
sentencing.
Additionally, Defendant's conduct subsequent to his
commission of the offense is consistent with the rehabilitative
goals of the sentencing guidelines.
Sixteen years ago, a jury convicted Defeidant [Mr. Alexander]
-then twenty-seven(27)years old
-
on three counts: cocaine base
(crack) offenses, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §846, §841(a) and (b).
In light of Amendment 706 and 750 along with the newly
promulgated Amendment 782 to the U.S.S.G. which become effective
November 1, 2014 and applies retroactive to reduce most drug
quantity base offense levels by two levels, a district court may
accept motions for retroactive application prior to November 1,
2015 provided that: ........any potential sentencing reduction not
take effect until November 2015. United States Sentencing Guidelines
Manual §1B1.10, cmt., application n.6. See United States Y. Thomas,
775 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2014); and United States v. AlegandroNontanez,778 F.3d 352 (1st Cir. 2015).
Thus, Defendant, Mr. Alexander, is eligible for a reduction
as set forth herein.
Defendant [Mr. Alexander] respectfully prays the Supreme
Court remand defendant for resentencing under Amendment 782, [750
"FSA".J, 714, 711 and 706 to his sentence, and sus sponte modify
Defendant's Life sentence. Under the New Sentencing Guidelines to
[the new ratio under the FSA"] to Amendment 750 and 782,
Defendant's total offense level is now 39 and his criminal history
7
category is III, which yields a sentencing guideline range of 324
months to 405 months. Therefore, Defendant humbly ask that this
Honorable Court would remand sentencing to what is just,
accordingly. As it is clear that this Honorable Court has
sentencing discretion to direct relief sought in the instant
§3582(c)(2) Motion.
Petitioner, would like the Court to take notice that the
United States Probation Office and the United States Government
both agreed that Petitioner is eligible for a sentence reduction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2).
Furthermore, the United States Government did not oppose a
reduction in sentence. The District Court has relied on Petitioner's
Post-conviction conduct to deny Petitionerany relief. While the
Court should consider post-conviction conduct violations conduct,
Alexander's post-conviction violations are no more egregious than
other defendants who have received reductions. Petitioner has
already been punished for his post-conviction conduct. Theychave
been handled adininistrately by the institutions in which he was
confined. See, United States v. Ayala,No-05-CR-008 (2008) WL
555525 at W.D. VA.Feb •26, 2008). No bar to sentence reduction
because such conduct may be dealt with administrately through
loss of good time and/or privileges. See also 2017 U.S. Dist LEXIS,
6771 U.S. v. Holtsclaw, Jan 18, 2017.
There is nothing in nature in myparticularcrack cocaine
offense or my post conviction conduct that cause for:a more
severe sentence than the one called for under the new sentencing
guidelines. Petitioner would like too point out that the
infractions that were committed were very minor infractions
LV
especially considering the harsh environment that I have been
placed. Condemned to à.life sentence for a non-violent drug
offense at a very young, age of 27. Alexander had little motivation
to obtain positive conduct. Petitioner is not trying to justify
any negative actions on his part, he would just like to address
to the Court that he is. not,a bad person or a threat to society,
and ask this Honorable Court to render justice in his sentence.
Prior to Alexander's 'present conviction as well as during
his incarceration may it please the Court that Mr. Alexander has
never been charged or convicted of a crime of violence. This alone
substantiates the fact that Mr. Alexander needs rehabilitation not
incarceratiOn..Pursuant to 3553(a) factors.
In Petitioner's Order from the District Court, the District
Court states, "Defendant received a sentence of Life. This
sentence was fair in light of factors in Title 18 U.S.C. Section
3553(a)". There is nothing fair about a life sentence when there
has been a retro-active change in law. The District Court has
continued to use thesame out-dated 100 to 1 ratio that has long
ago been deemed bias and unfair.
Criminal History: The District Court relies on Petitioner's
criminal history, offense conduct or relevant conduct to deny
him relief. Alexander has-only two prior state convictions, D,
Delivery of Controlled Substance (less than a gram) and Theft of
a Person. Both convictions occurred 1992 when defendant was 19
years of age. Alexander was never incarcerated for more than one
year for either offense. Two points resulted from defendant being
placed on probation for those two offenses thus placing Alexander
in a criminal history category of (3).
This alone shows that defendant does not have an extensive
criminal history.
Post Conviction Conduct: In Petitioner's post conviction
conduct, Petitioner would like the Court to take notice of the
98 vocation, educational and recreational programcertificates
that he has successfully completed, (See Exhibit A) which outweighs
the 26 minor infractions that he has in his 16 years of
incarceration.
Relevant Conduct: Although each factor in Section 3553(a)
does not have to be proven, the District Court has relied on
offenseconduct or relevant conduct that does not reflect the
record. There is nothing in the record showing defendant has any
extreme offense conduct or relevant conduct that the District
Court is relying on. Defendant received a 3 level enhancement for
a manager role under 3B1.1(b) in a small four person conspiracy.
The District Court failed to consider as a whole the 3353(a)
factors. The District Court cannot pick from the 3553(a) factors
and disregard other factors from the provision. See, United
States v.Sawyer,2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 166316).
Defendant contends that the District Court abused its
:.:; r.
discretion by falling to consider all the 3553(a) factors in
making its determination. See, 3553(a)(6). "Any pertinent factors
of policy statement, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct". The 3553(a) factors clearly
states: "To provide just punishment for the offense by considering
10
the kind of sentence available and the sentencing range, the need
to avoid unwarranted disparities.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 3351 et seq.,
calls for the creation of Sentencing Guidelines to inform judicialdiscretion in order to reduce unwarranted disparities in federal
sentencing. The Act allows retroactive amendments to the
Guidelines for cases where the guidelines becomes a cause of
inequality, not a bulwark against it. Section 3582(c)(2) permits
defendants sentenced based on a sentencing range that ha's been
modified to move for a reduction sentence. Alexander's crackcocaine range is a prime example of unwarranted disparities that
section 3582(c)(2) is designed to cure.
In every case the Judge must exercise discretion to impose
an appropriate sentence. This discretion in turn, is framed by the
sentencing Giiidelines,.and that guidelines must be consulted in
the regular course. Section 3582(c)(2) empowers District Court
Judges to correct sentences that depend on framework that later
prove unjustified. There is no' reason to deny Section 3582(c)(2)
relief to defendant who lingers in prison pursuant to sentences
that would not have been imposed but for a since rejected,
excessive range. See, Freeman v. United States,564U.S.,,13
1 S. Ct. 268, 2688, 180 L. Ed. 2d 2d 519). Simply stating
certain 3553 factors that are not indifferent to other defendants
with the same criminal history, offense conduct or post-conviction
conduct and enforce a a harsher sentence than required is clearly
an improper application of the law and use of erroneous legal
standards.
The sentencing Commission has clarified the type of drug
11
quantity that required to trigger a term of life imprisonment.
Therefore, the District Court abuse of discretion and
interpretation of the guideline is based upon an error of law
and clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence it relies on
concerning Movant's Criminal History, Offense Conduct and Post
Sentencing Conduct. None of these factors are of such aggravating
nature to warrant an upward departure from the guidelines to
continue to enforce a life term sentence. Petitioner asserts
that he is not a risk or danger to the community.
Defendant would specifically like this Court to take notice
that, the United States Attorney Office has agreed with Defendant's
request for a sentence reduction and recommends that the
Defendant be resentenced to the top end of his new guideline
range which is 405 months. (See enclosed Exhibit B). In closing
Defendant requests to be resentenced to 324 months, the low end
of his new guideline range.
II
As stated previously the District relies on Defendant's
Criminal History Category' as well as post conviction conduct
and relevant conduct. Petitioner ask that this Court review cases
similar to Movant's record and conduct and order the District
Court to apply the 3553(a) factors to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities. See United States v. Neron Christie,736 F.3d 2013
U.S. App LEXIS 23073 second circuit). In U.S. v.Christie,
Chris tie's Criminal History Category is a Category (5)five much
greater than Defendant's Category (3)three. Unlike Christie,
defendant's criminal history does not involve firearms nor does
12
defendant have any violence pre or post-conviction. Christie was
awarded with a redction dispite a greater Criminal History and
a firearm offen se .
III
In the Government's response, although agreeing that
Petitioner (alexander) is eligible for a reduction and did not
oppose a reduction in sentence. Government miscalculated the time
frame for Defendant's latest incident report. Government states
that Defendant's last infraction was committed December 2016,
which is incorrect, (See pages 3 of Exhibit B). This major
miscalculation carry a great weight when the District Court
rendered its decision for Petitioner's motion. Petitioner's last
incident report was on November 4, 2013.(See Exhibit C). This is
extrerneiysignificant because Defendant has displayed good conduct
incident free, for nearly five years in his last 171years of
incarceration.
IVPetitioner's claim is that the District Court abused its
discrectiôn by simply stating it considered the relevant 18 U.S.C.
3353(a) factors, offense conduct, criminal history and postsentencing conduct without elaborating. In addition the District
Court also issued a standard AO-247 form stating the same without
elaborations.
Circuits are split on degree of explanation necessary to
satisfy 3582. Several circuits have found that elaborations are
required when deciding a motion under 3582. See United States v.
Adaucto Chavez-Meza,854 F.3d 655; 2017) also See United States v.
Christie,736 F.3d 191, 195 (2nd Cir. 2013). A problem arises from
13
the fact that its impossible to ensure the District Court did
not abuse its discretion if the order shows only that the District
Court exercised its discretion rather than showing how it
exercised its discretion without further elaborations.
In closing Defendant ask that this Court hold his petition
in abeyance until a decision is render on United States v. AdauctChavez-Neza,854 F.3d pending with the United States Supreme
Court.
Respectfully Submitted,
Date:
2'
4k
,2018
_________________
Craig Al e xander
O?5O35
Reg. No.
F.C.C.-Coleman USP-i
P.O. Box 1033
Coleman, Fl. 33521
14
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.