Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Syed K. Rafi, Petitioner v. Yale University School of Medicine, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 14, 2018

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Application No. 18 17A1294

INTHE

- upreme Court of the IL1utteb

SYED K. RAFT, PhD.

'tate

Petitioner,

and

YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE,

& Dr. RICHARD LIFTON.

33eprnibent.

BRIEF FOR PRO SE PETITIONER

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUITS

cL.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

If Government Requires or Induces A Private Party to Engage

in Law Enforcement, All Relevant Constitutional Restraints Do Apply?

Does The Federal Government's Authority To Impose Conditions

On Grant Funds, In Accordance With The Supreme Court's Decision In

South Dakota V. Dole 483 U.S. 203, 205-08 (1987), Allow Petitioner To

Sue The Federal Funds Receiving Respondents For The Alleged

Egregious Violation Of Petitioner's Constitutional Rights Under The

Fourteenth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, And Violation Of His Civil

Rights- Under The Legislation Enacted Pursuant To The Spending

Clause (Article L Section 8) Of The U.S. Constitution?

Yale School of Medicine and Dr. Richard Lifton (Respondents)- are

to be considered as "State Actors" for the purpose of Petitioner's claim

under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for the alleged egregious violation of his

Constitutional Rights under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments as

a naturalized citizen And Violation Of His Civil Rights— given the State

Of Connecticut's "Pervasive Entwining with", "Joint Enterprise",

"Symbiotic Relationship", And "performing A State-wide Vital Public

Function- as an integral part of Yale School of Medicine and its principal

Investigators, such as Dr. Lifton?

Did the District Court "Blunder" by Determining That Title VI

Claims Cannot Be Asserted Against Dr. Lifton, "As Title VT Is Only

Applicable to Programs Receiving Federal Assistance" (See, District

Court ECF # 78, Page 7, Para 3)— which the Circuit Court failed to

address?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................................................................iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................vi

OTHER AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................viii

WEBSITES REFERENCES.............................................................................ix

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ...................................................................x

STATUTES AND RULES.....................................................................................x

OPINIONS & JURISDICTION..........................................................................1

STATEMENT......................................................................................2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION..........................................6

QUESTION 1: ARGUMENTS............................................................11

If Government Requires or Induces A Private Party to

Engage in Law Enforcement, All Relevant Constitutional

Restraints Do Apply?

QUESTION 2: ARGUMENTS............................................................16

Does The Federal Government's Authority To Impose Conditions

On Grant Funds, In Accordance With The Supreme Court's

Decision In South Dakota V. Dole 483 U.S. 203, 205-08 (1987),

Allow Petitioner To Sue The Federal Funds Receiving

Respondents For The Alleged Egregious Violation Of Petitioner's

Constitutional Rights Under The Fourteenth Amendment, Fifth

Amendment, And Violation Of His Civil Rights—Under The

Legislation Enacted Pursuant To The Spending Clause (Article

I, Section 8) Of The U.S. Constitution?

QUESTION 3: ARGUMENTS

.19

Yale School of Medicine and Dr. Richard Lifton (Respondents)are to be considered as "State Actors" for the purpose of

Petitioner's claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 for the alleged

egregious violation of his Constitutional Rights under the

Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments as a naturalized citizen And

Violation Of His Civil Rights-- given the State Of Connecticut's

"Pervasive Entwining with", "Joint Enterprise", "Symbiotic

Relationship", And "performing A State-wide Vital Public

Function- as an integral part of Yale School of Medicine and its

principal Investigators, such as Dr. Lifton?

QUESTION 4: ARGUMENTS ............................................................37

Did the District Court "Blunder" by Determining That

Title VT Claims Cannot Be Asserted Against Dr. Lifton,

"As Title VT Is Only Applicable to Programs Receiving

Federal Assistance" (See, District Court ECF # 78, Page 7,

Para 3)-- which the Circuit Court failed to address?

CONCLUSION...................................................................................40

INDEX OF APPENDICES .......... ......................................................... 41

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc.,

293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002) ...............................................10

Bell v. New Jersey,

461 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1983) ........................................................18

Benny v. Pipes,

799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986)................................................10

Blum v. Yaretsky,

457 U.S. 991 (1982); ...................................................................28

Brentwood Acad. V. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n,

531 U.S. 288 (2001), 382 U.S. at 299). .................................. 27,29,37

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association,

535 U.S. 971 (2002) ...............................................22,24,25,26,33,36

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,

365 U.S. 715 (1961). .......................................... 22,24,25,26,29,33,36

Combs v. Bakker,

886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)..................................................10

Dougherty v. Barry,

604 F. Supp. 1424, 37 FEB 1169 (D.D.C. 1985)...............................6

Evans v. Newton,

382 U.S. 296 (1966) 382 U.S. at 299)............................................29

Hill v. City of Pine Bluff,

696, F. 3d 709, 116 FEB 407 (8TH Cir. 2012) ..................................6

Huff v. Notre Dame High School,

456 F. Sup. 1145, 1148 (D.Conn.1978). ......................... 22,24,26,27,36

Jackson v. Hayakawa,

682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir.1982) ............................................... 10

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,

419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) .............................................................28

Lebron v. Nat'l R. R. Passenger Corp.,

513, U.S. 374 (1995), 382 U.S. at 299). ...................................... 27,28

Lennon Canor (2016-08-01). The Journal of Law and Economics,

59, (3): 669-695.). ........................................................................ 4

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed.2d 482 1982),.. .22,24,26,28

Marsh v. Alabama,

326 U.S. 501 (1946). .............................................. 22,24,25,26,33,36

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius,

567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) .............................................18

Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman

451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ..............................................................17,18

Porter v. Morris, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

78060 *34 (D.Conn. July 19, 2011)......................................2 1,22,23

Prigg v. Pennsylvania

(1842) ........................................................................................4

Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp.,

52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683-84 (E.D. Va. 1999)......................................10

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,

457 U.S. 830 (1982)...................................................................35

South Dakota V. Dole

483 U.S. 203, 205-08 (1987). ....................................... 14,15,16,17,19

VII

Stefanoni, 101, F. Supp. 3d. at 179; quoting Hadges v.

Yankers Racing Corp., 918, F. 2d 1079, 1089

(2nd Cir. 1990)..........................................................................26

United States, et al., ex rel. Melissa Theis v. Northwestern

University, Dr. Charles L. Bennett, et al.,

No. 09 C 1943 (N.D. Iii., 2009))....................................................38

Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist.,

127 FEB 1661 (2nd Cir. 2015).......................................................5

West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42 (1988) .............................................................28,38.39

OTHER AUTHORITIES

PEER-REVIEWED PUBLISHED ARTICLES:

Rubenfeld, Jed:

Privatization, State Action, and Title IX:

Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate Due Process?

(October 21, 2016).

Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper

No. 588. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract2857153

or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2857153..............................................12,15

"The Federal Government's Authority to Impose Conditions

on Grant Funds", Brian T. Yeh, Legislative Attorney, March 23, 2017,

Congressional Research Service 7-5700;

www.crs.ov R44797:

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44797.pdf....................................................16

"Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations".

Bradford C. Mank. Kansas Law Review, Vol. 49, p. 321, 2001;

U of Cincinnati Public Law Research Paper No. 10-21,

Last revised: 27 Apr 2010 ....................................................................39

Viii

WEB SITE REFERENCES

Settlement Agreement Department of Justice, at

http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usaondil/legacy/20 15/06/ll/pr1030_O la_O.pdf;

Former Northwestern Physician To Pay The

United States. htt-os://www.justice.gov/usao-n. dil/pr/

former-northwestern-physician-pay-united-states-...............................38,39

http://medicine.yale.edu/facts/................................................................32,35

http://www.psychiatry.yale.edu...............................................................25,32

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.govibooks/NBK221231/ .................................. 26

https://www.ega.ct.gov/PS98/rpt%5Colr%5Chtm/98-R-1352.htm .................... 26

https://www.britannica.com/topie[Yale University).......................................29

https ://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AOriginal

Yale School of Medicine building Grove Street

New Haven Connecticut.jpg ............................................................................. 30

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.

cgi?artic1e1265&contextfacpubs .......................................................... 40

https://www.yale.edu/about-yale/president-leadership/

governance-historic- documents /yale-corporation- laws..........................30,31

httys://www.yale.edu/about-yale/president-leadership/

governance- his toric- documents/ Yale- corporationlaws.............................................................................................30,31

http://news.yale.edu/2016/03/15/yale-s-taheri-cautions-

against-potential-negative-consecuences-state-1egislative-proposal ............32

http://fortune.com/2016/03/24/yale-endowment-connecticut/ ......................32

http://www.nhregister.com/health/20160929/connecticutsenate pre sident-pushes-for- anthem -yale-medicine-contractagreement&template=printart ............................................................32.

http: / /www.pressreader.com /usa /new -haven- registernew -haven-ct/201 60323/28149645540913 7.....................................................33

http://www.ctopen.org/tournamentinformation/...............................................33

http://nexusresearch.org/w-peontent/uploads/2015/06/Rich

Schools Poor Students.pdf. ............................................................................... 34

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

First Amendment to the Constitution..........................................8,11,12,17

Fifth Amendment to the Constitution....................................2-6,9,12-17,19

The Due Process Clause...........................................2,11,12,15

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution..........................2-5,7,8,14,15,39

The Spending Clause (Article I, Section 8) of the U.S. Constitution ....16,17,38

STATUTES AND RULES

28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1)...............................................................................6

28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)................................................................................6

28 U.S.C. 1254(1) .................................................................................1

42 U.S.C. 1983 ............................................................... 5,13,14,19,20,25

42 U.S.C. 2060d-4a], Sec. 606................................................................40

Title VT's Section 602 Regulations ...........................................................39

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ...........................................3 7,39,40

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 .......................................12

F.R.C.P. 12(b)(2)

F.R.C.P. 12(b)(5)...................................................................................10

Connecticut General Statutes §19a-32d through §19a-32g. ........................ 34

"Fugitive Slave Law" ............................................................................4.

"Blood Hound Law" ..............................................................................4.

Application No. 18- 17A1294

IN THE

'upreme court of the Muiteb 'tate

SYED K. RAFI, PhD.

Petitioner,

YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE,

& Dr. RICHARD LIFTON.

cponbcnt.

BRIEF FOR PRO SE PETITIONER

OPINIONS AND JURISDICTION

The Second Circuit issued its mandate on 04/24/2018 (Appendix A) denying pro

se appellant's motion for appointment of counsel, and dismissed the appeal stating,

because it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact, citing Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319,325 (1989), and 28 U.S.C.1915(e).

But the District Court opted to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5) (Appendix B).

This petition for Writ of Certiorari has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of

this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1254.

Pro Se petitioner filed an application for an extension of time within which to

file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, and on May 28, 2018, Justice

Ginsburg graciously extended the time to and including September 14, 2018

(Appendix C), within which time this petition is being filed.

STATEMENT

FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION:

Requires that "Due Process of Law", also known as "Due

Process Clause"- be part of any proceeding that denies a citizen

"life, liberty or property".

THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: SECTION 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject

to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and

of the state wherein they reside.

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any state deprives any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner has asserted at the District Court as well as at the Appeal Court

that respondents / defendants, Yale School of Medicine (YSM) and Dr. Richard Lifton

therein— violated his Civil Rights as well as his Constitutional provisions

under the Fourteenth Amendment, based on his extensive evidencing that

respondents in fact caused reckless and ceaseless "coercive job retaliations" at

Brigham and Women's Hospital (BWH) I Harvard Medical School (HMS) in collusion

with Dr. Cynthia Morton, and consequently his high-paying and in-demand

"professional" clinical diagnostic cytogenetics career ended. This alleged continuing

coercive retaliations (in-order to coerce Dr. Raft (petitioner) to return back to YSM in

order the facilitate the return of yet another faculty member avoiding law suit against

YSM by a disgruntled third party alleging racial discrimination for his removal from

the YSM- faculty position) egregiously violated his Constitutional Rights under the

Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments as a naturalized citizen and violated his Civil

Rights.

It Should Be Noted That the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

Guaranteed Civil Rights and Freedom to Move Even to The Slaves:

Looking back at this nation's history of human rights, after the abolishment of

slavery during 1865 via Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, it is indeed the

Fourteenth Amendment that guaranteed Civil rights and freedom to move even to

the slaves who moved to the Northern slavery- free States (which is akin to appellant,

Dr. Rafi's move during 2004 from Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut,

to Boston, Massachusetts State, to take up a position at Harvard Medical School,

given Dr. Morton's interest in his candidacy for a professional clinical cytogenetics

position at her diagnostic cytogenetic laboratory at Brigham and Women's Hospital,

HMS, Boston, Massachusetts), escaping from their possessive initial slave owners in

the State of Tennessee (which is akin to appellees, Dr. Lifton and Yale School of

Medicine in the State of Connecticut claiming back possession of Dr. Rafi (appellant),

disregarding his written plea to Dr. Lifton (appellees) to let him take up the position

at Dr. Morton's laboratory at HMS after having completed his professional medical

genetics training at Dr. Lifton's genetics department at YSM).

"As A Modern-Day White-Collar Slave, Dr. Rafi (Petitioner) Was Captured

and Held Indefinitely":

Just like the "slavery free Northern States" were required to capture and

return the escaped slaves back to their initial slave owners in the Southern States

- -

under "the Fugitive Slave Law", which was also called "Blood Hound Law" for the

dogs that were used to track down the runaway slaves (see, Lennon Canor (2016-0801). "Slave Escape, Prices, and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850". The Journal of Law

and Economics, 59, (3): 669-695.), "as a modern day white collar slave", Dr. Rafi

(appellant) was captured and held indefinitely by Dr. Lifton / YSM through

conspiratorial collusion with Dr. Morton at HMS, which compelled Dr. Morton to

recklessly and ceaselessly refuse consideration of any of Dr. Rafi's several dozen

professional clinical cytogenetics job applications at her diagnostic laboratory, at her

medical genetics research laboratory, and motivated her to negatively influence her

colleagues at HMS to prevent Dr. Rafi being hired by them instead.

As "a domino-effect", of this alleged illegal conspiratorial collusion between Dr.

Morton (HMS) and Dr. Lifton (YSM), Dr. Rafi became a "pariah" in his professional

field of clinical / diagnostic cytogenetics and medical genetics around the nation to

this day. It is important to note that even during the period of "Fugitive Slave Law",

the Supreme Court in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842) ruled that free

Northern States did NOT have to offer aid in the hunting or recapturing of the

escaped slaves from the Southern States.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution indeed provided for federal

government oversight to protect the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all citizens

(NOT excluding naturalized citizens, such as petitioner / appellant in this case!),

meaning that anyone could appeal to the federal government to protect the

Fourteenth Amendment rights, as appellant in this case is currently engaged in.

As the District Court has pointed out, plaintiff has requested

"appropriate equitable relief against the defendants as allowed by

.42

. .

U.S.C. § 1983." (See, Renewed Complaint at 35, ECF # 51; also see, ECF # 68, pages

14 through 34). But, the District Court has failed to consider in earnest

plaintiffs request for "appropriate equitable relief against the defendants

as allowed by .42 U.S.C. § 1983, additionally alleging Constitutional Rights..

violations under the Fourteenth Amendment (and under the Fifth

Amendment) for having forever denied the freedom to move to Boston (and

even to other places around the nation as well) as a professional clinical

cytogeneticist) to assume a professional position at Brigham and Women's

Hospital, Harvard Medical School-- after petitioner had successfully

completed his professional— American Board of Medical Genetics (ABMG)—

training at Yale School of Medicine at its Genetics Department—under the

Chairmanship of Dr. Richard Lifton (respondent/ defendant).

42 U.S.C. § 1983 also functions as an enforcement tool for retaliation

while acting under color of law. In Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist.,

127 FEB 1661 (2nd Cir. 2015), the court held that the plaintiff, a teacher in the

defendant school district, could bring a retaliation claim under Section 1983 against

the supervisor who, acting under the color of law, retaliated against him for opposing

discrimination (based on his ethnicity) in the terms of his employment. In Hill v. City

of Pine Bluff, 696, F. 3d 709, 116 FEB 407 (8TH Cir. 2012), the court recognized

that retaliation claims may be brought under Section 1983, (also see,

Dougherty v. Barry, 604 F. Supp. 1424, 37 FEB 1169 (D.D.C. 1985).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Seeking Answers to The Hitherto Unanswered Following Questions

since they are also serving as novel but sound legal bases for petitioner's

certain claims in this litigation. Perhaps due to their novelty in validating

petitioner's Constitutional Rights under the Fourteenth and Fifth

Amendments as a naturalized citizen, as well as Civil Rights violation

claims, the lower courts have utterly failed to consider their validity since

they defy conventional norms.

The Second Circuit has a cited Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989)

in its denial of appellant's motion for reconsideration (Appendix A, stating that "the

appeal is DISMISSED because it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." The

Circuit has also opted to cite 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) in its dismissal of petitioner's motion

for reconsideration. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), in its applicable part, states that the action

or appeal either: (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

APPELLANT'S RESPONSE, AS HAS BEEN PRESENTED AND ARGUED IN HIS

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, TO CIRCUIT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE

APPEAL CITING Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989) (Appendix D).

APPELLANT, DR. RAFI VERSUS APPELLANT, MR. WILLIAMS IN Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989)

"Unlike the prisoner- appellant, Williams in Williams v. Faulkner, 837

F.2d 304 (1988)- who had no constitutionally protected liberty interest in

remaining in a particular wing of a prison, appellant, Dr. Rafi in this case

(as a free naturalized citizen) is endowed with constitutionally protected

liberty and freedom to move (as enshrined in the Constitution under the

Fourteenth Amendment) to Harvard Medical School (HMS) to take up a position at

Morton's professional clinical cytogenetics laboratory, that too upon Dr. Morton's

initial invitation to do so, after he had successfully completed his professional ABMG

board training in clinical cytogenetics at Yale School of Medicine (YSM) during 2004,

and had expressly submitted a written letter to Dr. Lifton, Chairman of Genetics

Department (where Dr. Rafi did his training and worked) at YSM, indicating therein

his decision to move to HMS (Boston, MA) given the unethical and exploitative

training and work environment at his department's clinical cytogenetics laboratory.

But, Dr. Lifton, being the Chairman of Genetics Department, YSM, using his

professional and personal influence at HMS (where Dr. Lifton had worked prior to his

move to YSM), allegedly conspired with plaintiff's potential professional clinical

cytogenetics employer, Dr. Morton at Brigham and Women's Hospital (BWH), Boston,

MA (HMS), to prevent appellant from being hired by Dr. Morton, and thus coerced

Dr. Rafi to accept a position at appellees' Genetics Department instead, in order to

facilitate the re-hiring of Dr. Barbara Pober along with appellant, Dr. Rafi to

safeguard against a potential racial discrimination, retaliation, First Amendment

rights- violation law suit by a disgruntled Arab-Palestinian minority former genetics

department (YSM) faculty member, namely, Dr. Mazin Qumsiyeh, whose faculty

position was abruptly terminated by appellees.

When appellant refused to return to YSM, understandably with the consent of

YSM authorities, Dr. Lifton in his official and personal capacities was

instrumental in permanently sabotaging plaintiff's high-paying and indemand professional clinical cytogenetics employment opportunities that

plaintiff had initially secured at BWH during 2004, as well as multitudes of

subsequent such professional clinical cytogenetics and medical genetics research job

opportunities that plaintiff had applied for at BWH, and at HMS as a whole, ever

since. As a "domino effect" of this alleged on-going coercion and collusion, appellant's

professional job opportunities around the nation were also retaliated against.

Thus, Dr. Lifton I YSM ceaselessly and recklessly violated plaintiffs Civil

Rights and the Constitutional provisions as a naturalized citizen particularly under

the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Wherefore, the Supreme Court should grant this petition for Writ of

Certiorari, given the novelty of the following questions presented for its

consideration, to consider their validity in petitioner's case which has alleged

egregious and continuing violations of petitioner's Constitutional Rights under the

Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments as a naturalized citizen, as well as his Civil

Rights.

APPELLANT'S RESPONSES TO DISTRICT COURT'S "UNFOUNDED"

RULINGS UNDER F.R.C.P.12(B)(2) AND F.R.C.P.12(B)(5)

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(2) REQUIRES DISMISSAL

OF AN ACTION ONLY WHEN THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL

JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT.

Plaintiff, pro Se, has established firmly personal jurisdiction over the

defendant, given that Yale School of Medicine and Yale University are an integral

part of State of Connecticut. Plaintiff was an employee of Yale University at the Yale

School of Medicine when the alleged violations transpired in its entirety, and during

this alleged time of the coercive and retaliatory violations. Therefore, the question of

12(b)(2) claim about the principal defendant in this case, namely, Yale School of

Medicine and Yale University is preposterous.

Next, the Co-defendant in this case, Dr. Richard Lifton continued to serve as

senior tenured faculty when plaintiff, Dr. Rafi left Yale after completing his

professional training there. Yale orchestrated the alleged continuous violations of

Dr. Rafi's Constitutional and Civil Rights through Dr. Lifton, as Chairman of Yale

Genetics Department, and therefore, he is being sued only in his official capacity, as

he was an official agent of Yale.

Moreover, Dr. Richard Lifton, who has been alleged to have orchestrated the

continuous coercive and retaliatory violations as a senior faculty member of Yale and

on behalf of Yale, has been a long-term employee of Yale School of Medicine as

Sterling Professor of Genetics and Chairman of Genetics Department of Yale

University- School of Medicine. Although he currently resides in New York serving

as the President of Rockefeller University, he continues to serve at Yale as an Adjunct

Professor of Genetics, as has been unequivocally evidenced at the District Court by

plaintiff, proving the existence of a ground for jurisdiction over the Co-defendant Dr.

Lifton. See, Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683-84 (E.D. Va.

1999) (quoting Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)).

Therefore, plaintiffs claims arise out of those activities that were directed by

the defendants "collectively" at the State of Connecticut, and therefore, the exercise

of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally justifiable. See, ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital

Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

II.

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(5) DISMISSAL BY THE•

DISTRICT COURT ALLEGING INSUFFICIENT SERVICE OF PROCESS IS

UNFOUNDED IN THIS CASE.

Even if it is valid for argument sake, the law is settled in the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals that a defendant must object to the insufficiency of service before

filing any answer to a complaint. If a defendant fails to object before filing an

answer, any defects in service are deemed waived. See Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489,

492 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations and quotations omitted), see also Jackson v.

Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1982).

Therefore, petitioner requests granting of this petition for Writ of

Certiorari to check proper application of the rules and to prevent callous dismissals

of pro se petitions by lower courts, prior to any discovery to establish the credibility

of the cases, particularly in employment related cases, and thereby, denying trial

by jury requests.

QUESTION 1

If Government Requires or Induces A Private Party to Engage in Law

Enforcement, All Relevant Constitutional Restraints Do Apply?

QUESTION 1- ARGUMENTS:

This crucial claim of imposing an obligation to comply with constitutional

guarantees of due process and equal protection, based on government requiring or

inducing private Universities (including Yale) to engage in law enforcement, has NOT

been answered by the lower Courts in this case, and therefore, plaintiff urges this

Supreme Court to consider this legally sound and extensively researched claim that

has been advanced by a leading scholar of constitutional law, privacy, the First

Amendment, and criminal law at the Yale University Law School, as it confers "State

Actors" status to the defendants along with the University, for the purpose of

plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against them.

The District Court as well as the Appeal Court have not passed any judgment

concerning this claim of "State Actors"- by plaintiff based on the legal theory of

federal government administration in effect having imposed on the defendants, along

with the University an obligation to comply with constitutional guarantees of due

process and equal protection, by conferring on them "State Actor" status, as presented

below.

The Supreme Court ought to rule on petitioner's assertion that theyespondents

I appellees are to be considered as "State Actors" for the purpose of petitioner's Section

1983 claims and to raise the Constitutional violation claim under the Fourteenth and

Fifth Amendments, given the augmenting legal theory that has been advanced by Jed

Rubenfeld (a leading scholar of constitutional law, privacy, the First Amendment, and

criminal law at Yale University School of Law) which has been laid out in his peerreviewed article: "Privatization, State Action, and Title IX: Do Campus Sexual

Assault Hearings Violate Due Process?", wherein he extensively argues that "If

Government Requires or Induces A Private Party to Engage in Law Enforcement, All

Relevant Constitutional Restraints Apply".

This is exactly what the Obama administration's Department of

Education did in 2011 when it instructed universities, on pain of losing federal

funding, to investigate, adjudicate, and punish all allegations of sexual assault. That

is, although the government also demanded that universities shrink due process

protections for the accused, by deputizing them to engage in law enforcement in

addressing allegations of sexual misconduct, the administration in effect

imposed on them an obligation to comply with constitutional guarantees of

due process and equal protection. (emphasis added).

See:

Rubenfeld, Jed:

Privatization, State Action, and Title IX:

Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate

Due Process? (October 21, 2016).

Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper

No. 588. Available at

https:H-oapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=285 7153

On April 4, 2011, the United States Department of Education's Office for Civil

Rights (OCR) sent a nineteen-page letter to American colleges and universities.

Opening with the government-standard but peculiar salutation, "Dear Colleague"

as if the sender were a fellow academic, or, since that was not so, as if academics were

fellow federal administrative agents—" (Id. at page 20, paragraph 3; emphasis

added).

'WHAT GOVERNMENT CANNOT ITSELF DO WITHOUT VIOLATING CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS, IT CANNOT INDUCE PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS TO DO. WHENEVER THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZES ITS LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS, CONSTITUTIONAL

RESTRAINTS APPLY IN FULL. THEY APPLY, THAT IS, NOT ONLY TO SPECIFICALLY

MANDATED ACTS, BUT TO THE PRIVATE PARTIES' DISCHARGE OF THESE POWERS IN

THEIR ENTIRETY". (Id. at page 69, paragraph 1).

Thus, appellant has had alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983- violation of his

Constitutional Rights under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, since to prevail

in a claim under section 1983, petitioner must prove the alleged conduct occurred

either under a federal law, or under color of state law, and this conduct deprived

petitioner of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed under federal law or the

U.S. Constitution.

Appellant has claimed that appellees are to be considered as "State Actors" for

Section 1983 claims under the legal theory that has been theorized and extensively

argued in his article. Appellant in his motions at the lower courts emphasizing

therein the egregious continuous violations of his Civil Rights and Constitutional

Right under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, has pleaded as follows:

It Should Be Noted That Fourteenth Amendment to The Constitution

Guaranteed Civil Rights and Freedom to Move Even to The Slaves.

"As A Modern-Day White-Collar Slave", Dr. Raft

(petitioner / appellant)

Was Professionally Captured and Held Indefinitely by Dr. Morton at Brigham and

Women's Hospital, HMS, Boston on behalf of Yale School of Medicine, and Dr.

Lifton.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution indeed provided for federal

government oversight to protect the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all

citizens (NOT, excluding naturalized citizens, such as petitioner / appellant

in this case!), meaning that anyone could appeal to the Federal government to

protect the Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Petitioner's naturalized citizenship unambiguously guarantees life, liberty

to choose, and freedom to move under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution, since "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject

to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside";

"The right to self-determination is an integral element of basic human rights

and fundamental freedoms". Therefore, appellant has claimed a cause of action

against the appellants Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983- for the alleged egregious violation of

his Constitutional Rights:

(1)

Under the provision of the Fourteenth and Fifth

Amendments for the alleged deprivation of his

citizenship rights, and

(ii) Under the provision of the Fifth Amendment, for the

long-standing egregious alleged deprivation of life and

liberty without due process of law.

The District Court as well as the Circuit Court in this litigation

have utterly failed to consider petitioner's claim that "If Government

Requires or Induces A Private Party to Engage in Law Enforcement, All

Relevant Constitutional Restraints Apply"- based on the peer-reviewed

research article by Professor Rubenfeld.

WhEREFORE, Supreme Court ought to consider this pivotal game-changing

assertion in this peer-reviewed legal research article by this eminent Constitutional

Law expert so that petitioner could additionally validate his claim under 42 U.S.C.

1983 affirming that respondents, either under a federal law, or under color of state

deprived petitioner of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed under federal

law and/or the U.S. Constitution.

QUESTION 2

Does The Federal Government's Authority To Impose Conditions On

Grant Funds, In Accordance With The Supreme Court's Decision In South

Dakota V. Dole 483 U.S. 203, 205-08 (1987), Allow Petitioner To Sue The

Federal Funds Receiving Respondents For The Alleged Egregious Violation

Of Petitioner's Constitutional Rights Under The Fourteenth Amendment,

Fifth Amendment, And Violation Of His Civil Rights-- Under The Legislation

Enacted Pursuant To The Spending Clause (Article I, Section 8) Of The U.S.

Constitution?

QUESTION 2- ARGUMENTS:

Secondly, the Spending Clause 1 (Article I, Section 8), of the U.S. Constitution

which has been widely recognized as providing the Federal government with the legal

authority to offer Federal grant funds to states and localities that are contingent

on the recipients refraining from violating the Civil Rights as well as the

Constitutional provisions.

The Supreme Court in its 1987 decision in South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203,

205-08 (1987) held that legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause must be

in pursuit of the "general welfare", and that any conditions attached to the

receipt of federal funds must NOT violate various Civil Rights as well as

provisions of the Constitution.

See, "The Federal Government's Authority to

Impose Conditions on Grant Funds", Brian T.

Yeh, Legislative Attorney, March 23, 2017,

Congressional Research Service 7-5700;

www.crs.gov R44797: Available at:

htti)s:Hfas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44797.pdf..

Therefore, in this instance, the Supreme Court ought to reassert its 1987

decision in South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203, 205-08 (1987) that legislation enacted

pursuant to the Spending Clause must be in pursuit of the "general welfare", and that

any conditions attached to the receipt of federal funds (Yale School of Medicine as

well as Dr. Lifton) must NOT violate various Civil Rights as well as provisions of the

Constitution.

CLAUSE 1 OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

Commonly known as the Spending Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the

U.S. Constitution has been widely recognized as providing the federal

government with the legal authority to offer federal grant funds to states

and localities that are contingent on the recipients engaging in, or

refraining from, certain activities.

However, the Supreme Court has articulated certain limitations on the

exercise of this power. In its 1987 decision in South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203, 20508 (1987) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17), which arguably

remains the leading case regarding the use of the federal government's conditional

spending power, the Court held that legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending

Clause must be in pursuit of the "general welfare."

IN ADDITION, THE DOLE COURT HELD THAT ANY CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO

THE RECEIPT OF FEDERAL FUNDS MUST:

Be unambiguously established so that recipients can

knowingly accept or reject them;

Be germane to the federal interest in the particular

national projects or programs to which the money is

directed;

NOT violate other provisions of the

Constitution, such as the First Amendment OR the Due

Process OR Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment;

and

Not cross the line from enticement to impermissible

coercion, such that states have no real choice but to

accept the funding and enact or administer a federal regulatory

program."

(Emphasis added).

FEDERAL GRANTS

The federal government may offer grants to nonfederal entities in furtherance

of national priorities. Federal grant programs must be authorized by legislation,

which establishes the terms and conditions for individual grant programs.

Federal agencies award grants by executing a grant agreement with the

recipient that incorporates the statutory requirements for the grant, as well as any

administrative requirements specified in conditions unambiguous and set forth prior

to acceptance.

As indicated above, under the relevant Supreme Court precedents, federal

grant conditions must be set forth unambiguously before a recipient enters into a

grant agreement with the federal government.

IN ITS 1981 DECISION IN PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL V.

HALDERMAN (4 51 U.S. 1 (1981); NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. BUS. (NFIB) V. SEBELI US,

567 U.S. 519, 132 S. CT. 2566 (2012)), THE SUPREME COURT EXPLAINED THAT THIS

RESTRICTION ARISES BECAUSE A GRANT IS "MUCH IN THE NATURE OF A

CONTRACT" BETWEEN THE STATES AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CQR BETWEEN A

PRIVATE INSTITUTION/ ENTITY AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT).

IN THE EVENT OF NONCOMPLIANCE

Federal agencies that administer grant programs may monitor recipients for

compliance with grant conditions and terminate and recoup funding in the event of

noncompliance. See, e.g., Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1983) (Requiring

States to honor the obligations voluntarily assumed as a condition of federal funding

before recognizing their ownership of funds simply does not intrude on their

sovereignty).

WHEREFORE, Supreme Court ought to re-assert its decision in South

Dakota V. Dole 483 U.S. 203, 205-08 (1987)- that the federal funds recipientrespondents must NOT violate provisions of the Constitution— to validate

petitioner's claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 alleging that respondents, either under

a federal law, or under color of state law, deprived his rights, privileges, or

immunities guaranteed under federal law andlor the U.S. Constitution.

QUESTION 3

Yale School of Medicine and Dr. Richard Lifton (Respondents)- are to

be considered as "State Actors" for the purpose of Petitioner's claim under

42 U.S.C. 1983 for the alleged egregious violation of his Constitutional

Rights under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments as a naturalized citizen

And Violation Of His Civil Rights— given the State Of Connecticut's

"Pervasive Entwining with", "Joint Enterprise", "Symbiotic Relationship",

And "performing A State-wide Vital Public Function- as an integral part of

Yale School of Medicine and its principal Investigators, such as Dr. Lifton?

QUESTION 3- ARGUMENTS:

Plausible "State Actor"- Status Claim for The Defendants Based on

The State of Connecticut's "Pervasive Entwining", "Joint Enterprise",

"Symbiotic Relationship", And "A Vital Public Function- as an integral part

with the Defendants"19

CRITERIA AND FACTS:

It should be noted that Rafi (plaintiff / appellant / petitioner) has NOT tried

to seek remedy under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 without extensively arguing in favor of

plausible "State Actor"- status or under for the defendants, Yale School of Medicine

and Dr. Lifton (see, ECF # 68, pages 14 to 34). It should be emphasized that the

defendants in this case are Yale School of Medicine (YSM) and Dr. Richard Lifton.

Yale University per se has not been named as the defendant. Therefore, the

relevant Question here is whether Yale School of Medicine (YSM) along with its

federal as well as State of Connecticut- research and other grants- funds receiving

and utilizing principal investigators- such as Dr. Lifton could be considered as a

"State Actor" for plaintiffs 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 claims in this case.

It is apparent that the District Court has opted to favor the defendants by very

superficially narrating that YSM "works closely with the Connecticut Mental Health

Center".... (ECF # 78, page 27, para 3, line 3), while plaintiff, to the contrary, has

evidenced:

Intrinsically direct and permanent involvement of the State of Connecticut with

YSM-Connecticut Mental Health Center, (see ECF # 68, page 17, # IX; also see, pages

27, para 2, through page 28, para 3);

Direct long-lasting and on-going State Government's engagement and

collaboration with Yale medical school to enable state-wide delivery of mental health

and addictions services;

State dictating and/or influencing of YSM's administration and its faculty; and

(4) State legislature demanding more from Yale (See, ECF # 68, pages 14 (XI) thro'

28 (para 3), also See Exhibits # 9 &12, therein, also See, ECF # 64: Exhibits # 4 & 5

therein).

As has been effectively rebutted before by plaintiff (see, ECF # 68, pages 2934), District Court's concluding statement in its ruling (ECF # 78, page 27, para 3,

lines 5 through' page 28, para 2, line 2) referring to Porter v. Morris, 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 78060 *34 (D.Conn. July 19, 2011.. ."(finding that Yale New Haven Hospital

is not a "State Actor"for Section 1983 purposes based on its receipt of state funding)

.",

has no relevance, since plaintiff is NOT exclusively hinging his "State Actor" claim

based on defendant's receipt of state funding, given that his claim is based on a wide

ranging and intrinsic involvement of the State of Connecticut, as has been presented

in detail in his earlier response in ECF # 68 (pages 29, para 2 through' page 34, para

1).

The "State Actor" claim here is expansively also based on:

The State of Connecticut's "pervasive entwining" with the leadership of

the Yale University and with its School of Medicine per se (See, Brentwood Academy

v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 535 U.S. 971 (2002)); (See, ECF

# 68, pages 14 (XI) thro' 28 (para 3)),The State of Connecticut's long-standing and on-going "joint enterprise" and

"symbiotic relationship" with YSM and its University (See, Burton v. Wilmington

Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)); (See, ECF # 68, pages 14 (XI) thro'28 (para

3); also See Exhibits # 9 &12, therein; also See, ECF # 64: Exhibits # 4 & 5 therein;

also See, http://www.psychiatry.yale.edu);

(3)

YSM in the service of delivering public health education and health care at the

state level, "a vital public function", (See, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501

(1946)), and thus, far and beyond satisfying the federal judiciary's nearly unanimous

requirement of MORE involvement of State, in addition to (mere) financial assistance

to a private university or professional school, to render the actions of the institution

state action for purposes of § 1983, per Defendants' own statement (as quoted above)

quoting from Huff v. Notre Dame High School, 456F. Sup. 1145, 1148 (D. Conn. 1978)

(Burns, J.)" (See, ECF # 68, Exhibit # 14, therein: page 3, paragraph 3, Huff v. Notre

Dame High School, 456 F. Sup. 1145, 1148 (D. Conn. 19 78)).

However, in the case of Porter v. Morris, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78060 *3..4

(D. Conn. July 19, 2011), as the Judge has additionally alluded to, referring to Lugar

v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed.2d 482 (1982), that

under the second part of the test to determine when the actions of a private party

may be attributed to the state so as to make the private party subject to liability

under section 1983, the party ........"or obtained aid from state officials".., (See,

Exhibit # 15, in ECF # 68, page 1, last paragraph; and page 2, paragraph 1).

The District Court judge Bolden's extrapolation in Rafi's case (See, ECF # 65,

page 7, paragraph 2) of Judge Droney's passing statement that, "Yale New Haven

Hospital is affiliated with Yale University and Yale University School of Medicine."—

meaning it to be a judgment per se on the status of Yale School of Medicine "as nonState actors"- is wrong, given Judge Droney's clear remark that, "Plaintiff (Porter)

alleges no facts to suggest that any defendant satisfies the requirements to be

considered a state actor or is acting pursuant to any right created by the State of

Connecticut"(See, Exhibit # 15, in ECF # 65, page 2, paragraph 2, lines 2 & 3).

UNLIKE IN PORTER V. MORRIS, PLAINTIFF, RAFI IN THIS CASE HAS ALLEGED

FACTS THAT SUPPORT HIS CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE, YSM AND DR.

LIFTON, ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS STATE ACTORS:

Given that Plaintiff in this case, "does NOT merely hinging on the State as well

as Federal financial assistance (XII through XVI- see below) to defendants to stake

his claim that YSM and Dr. Lifton, are indeed State Actors", but has indeed

irrevocably based his claim on MANY MORE EVIDENCING, as has been extensively

presented and argued by plaintiff in his second response at the District Court: ECF

# 68, pages 14 (XI) thro' 34), which additionally affirm:

Direct and intimate State Government's involvements in the very

establishment of YSM as well as Yale University (The medical school (YSM)

was in fact chartered by an act of the Connecticut State Legislature in 1810

(http://www.columbia.edu/—mdtl/Yalehistory.i3d .

State's continued ex-officiis governance up to this time;

Direct long-lasting and on-going State Government's engagement

and

intrinsic collaboration with Yale medical school to enable state-wide delivery

of mental health and addictions services;

State dictating and/or influencing of YSM's administration and its faculty;

State legislature demanding more from Yale; and

State of Connecticut ownership of the annual "Connecticut Open" tennis

tournament at the Connecticut Tennis Center at Yale University-all not only in accordance with United States Supreme Court decisions in Lugar

v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 9225 937,102 S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed.2d 482 (1982), but

additionally, satisfying varied requirements in additional United States Supreme

Courts' decisions in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic

Association, 535 U.S. 971 (2002); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.

715 (1961); and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), further, in accordance with

the federal judiciary's nearly unanimous requirement of MORE involvement of State,

in addition to (mere) financial assistance to aprivate university or professional school,

to render the actions of the institution state action for purposes of § 1983, per

Defendants' own statement (as guoted above) guotinR from Huff v. Notre Dame High

School, 456 F. Sup. 1145, 1148 (D. Conn. 1978) (Burns, J.)" (See, ECF # 68, Exhibit

# 14, page 3, paragraph 3, Huff v. Notre Dame High School, 456 F. Sup. 1145, 1148

(D.Conn.1978)).

As emphasized above, the defendants in this case are Yale School of Medicine

(YSM) and Dr. Richard Lifton. Since Yale University per se has not been named as

the defendant in this case, therefore, the most relevant question here is whether YSM

per se could be considered as a "State Actor" for the purpose of plaintiffs 42 U.S.C.

1983 claims in this case.

Given the evidencing and arguments in ECF #68 (page 15, para 1, thro'

page 23, para 3), for:

The State of Connecticut's 'pervasive entwining" with the leadership of

the Yale University and with its School of Medicine per se (See, Brentwood Academy

v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 535 U.S. 971 (2002)); (See, ECF

# 68, pages 14 (XT) thro' 28 (para 3));

The State of Connecticut's long-standing and on-going "joint enterprise" and

"symbiotic relationship" with YSM and its University (See, Burton v. Wilmington

Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)); (See, ECF #68, pages 14 (XI) thro'28 (para

3); also See Exhibits # 9 &12, therein, also See, ECF # 64: Exhibits # 4 & 5 therein;

also See, http:llwww.psychiatry.yale.edu); and

(3)

YSM in the service of delivering public health education and health care at the

state level, "a vital public function as an integral part of YSM and its

principal senior investigators, such as Dr. Lifton (See, Marsh v. Alabama, 326

U.S. 501 (1946))—it is clear that YSM and Dr. Lifton could be construed as a "State

Actors".

The States and their local subdivisions retain the primary responsibility for

health

under

the

U.S.

Constitution

(See,

htti)s://www.ncbi.nlm nih.gov/books/NBK221231 . Connecticut's official activities to

protect and promote the public health of its citizens arguably date to 1878, and the

Connecticut's Department of Public Health (DPH) is charged with protecting the

public health (CGS § 19ala et seq.).

See, https://www.eva.et.gov/PS98/rpt%5Colr%5Chtm/98-R-1352.htm:

Also See, Exhibit # 13, ECF # 68-1).

II.

IT IS CLEAR THAT "[T]HE STATE HAS SO FAR INSINUATED ITSELF INTO A

POSITION OF INTERDEPENDENCE WITH THE [PRIVATE PARTY] THAT IT MUST BE

RECOGNIZED AS A JOINT PARTICIPANT IN THE CHALLENGED ACTIVITY":

Under the "entwinement test", the alleged private conduct in this

case certainly qualifies as "state action". (Stefanoni, 101, F. Supp. 3d. at 179;

quoting Hadges v. Yankers Racing Corp., 918, F. 2d 1079, 1089 (2nd Cir. 1990).

Thus, the above evidencing and arguments (ECF # 68, pages 14 (XI) thro'

28 (para 3), also See Exhibits # 9 &12, therein, also See, ECF # 64. Exhibits # 4 & 5

therein) in favor of assigning "State Actor" status to YSM, are in accordance with

United States Supreme Courts' decisions in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary

School Athletic Association, 535 U.S. 971 (2002); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,

365 U.S. 715 (1961); and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), as well as in accordance

with the US Supreme Court decisions in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102

S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed.2d 482 (1982), and Huff v. Notre Dame High School, 456 F. Sup. 1145,

1148 (D. Conn. 1978) (Burns, J.)". (See, ECF # 68, Exhibit # 14, page 3, paragraph 3,

Huff v. Notre Dame High School, 456 F. Sup. 1145, 1148 (D.Conn.1978)).

The District Court has opted to argue (ECF # 78, page 28, para 2), quoting the

Supreme Court decision in Lebron v. Nat'l R. R. Passenger Corp., 513, U.S. 374 (1995),

as if "one size fits all" for the purpose of establishing that a private

institution is sufficiently connected to government actors to convert the

entity into a government actor for purposes of Section 1983 liability. The

Court has gone on to conclude that because the amended complaint does not satisfy

each prong of the Lebron test, and therefore, Yale cannot be considered a state actor.

Therefore, the Supreme Court ought to reassert its rulings in Rafi

(plaintiff/ appellant / petitioner) case that Yale and Dr. Lifton (respondents

/ appellees / respondents) were acting under the color of the law given

Defendants' "entwinements" with the State of Connecticut (Brentwood Acad.

V. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), and the policies of

Yale School of Medicine (with or without the University per se) are so

impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the

constitutional limitations placed upon State Action." 382 U.S. at 299).

IN ACTUALITY, THERE IS NO SUCH HARDLINE TEST TO DETERMINE THE KIND

OF GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT NECESSARY TO FIND THAT A NONGOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYER ACTED UNDER COLOR OF LAW:

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the ultimate question in

such cases is whether "the seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated

as that of the State itself'. See, Brentwood Acad. V. Tennessee Secondary Sch.

Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,

419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).

But the District Court has opted to argue (ECF # 78, page 28, para 2), quoting

the Supreme Court decision in Lebron v. Nat'l R. R. Passenger Corp., 513, U.S. 374

(1995), as if "one size fits all" for the purpose of establishing that a private

institution is sufficiently connected to government actors to convert the entity into

a government actor for purposes of Section 1983 liability.

The Court has gone on to conclude that because the renewed complaint does

not satisfy each prong of the Lebron test, and therefore, Yale cannot be considered

a state actor.

THE SUPREME COURT AS WELL AS LOWER COURTS HAVE USED "A VARIETY

OF APPROACHES TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION' (WEST V. ATKINS, 487 U.S. 42(1988)).

Whether the defendant was performing a traditionally exclusive

public function (Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419, U.S. 345 (1974): "We

have, of course, found state action present in the exercise by private entity

of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." 419 U.S. at 352);

Whether the defendant received "significant encouragement" from

the state or felt the ramifications of the state's exercise of its "coercive

power," (Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982);

Whether the defendant participated in a joint activity with the

government (Lugar v. Edmonton Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). "[A] private

party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed

property is sufficient to characterize that party as a "state actor....."); p,

Whether the defendant had a "symbiotic relationship" with the

government (Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).

IT IS CERTAINLY NOT "ONE SIZE FITS ALL" FOR THE PURPOSE OF

ESTABLISHING THAT A PRIVATE INSTITUTION IS SUFFICIENTLY CONNECTED TO

GOVERNMENT ACTORS TO CONVERT THE ENTITY INTO A GOVERNMENT ACTOR FOR

PURPOSES OF SECTION 1983 LIABILITY:

Most recently, the Supreme Court found that a defendant was acting

under the color of the law when there was "entwinement" of the state and

the defendant (Brentwood Acad. V. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Assn, 531

U.S. 288 (2001).

"[C]ONDUCT THAT FORMALLY 'PRIVATE' MAY BECOME SO ENTWINED WITH

GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES OR SO IMPREGNATED WITH A GOVERNMENTAL

CHARACTER AS TO BECOME SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

PLACED UPON STATE ACTION." 382 U.S. AT 299).

In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) a Fourth Amendment equal

protection case, the Court noted that: "[clonduct that formally 'private' may

become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a

governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations

placed upon state action." 382 U.S. at 299).

RAFI (PRO SE PLAINTIFF / APPELLANT / PETITIONER) IN THIS CASE HAS

EXTENSIVELY EXHIBITED AND ARGUED (SEE, ECF # 68, PAGES 14-34) THAT

DEFENDANT / APPELLEE I RESPONDENTS: YALE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (YSM) AND

DR. LIFTON, WITH OR WITHOUT YALE UNIVERSITY PROPER, QUALIFIES AS A "STATE

ACTOR":

Given:

Yale was originally chartered by the colonial legislature of Connecticut as the

Collegiate School (See, https://www.britannica.com/toplc/Yale-University).

In 1810 the Connecticut (State) General Assembly established the medical

institution of Yale College, giving Yale University and the Connecticut Medical

Society shared jurisdiction over the training of physicians.

In fact, the Original Yale School of Medicine building was purchased with a

grant by the Connecticut State Legislature

See:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wikiiFile%3AOriginalYa1e_School_of_Medicin

e_building_Grove_Street_New_Haven_Connecticut.jpg).

During 1833, the State Hospital, precursor to the New Haven Hospital, was

established, and during 1884, the hospital's name was changed to New Haven

Hospital (See, Exhibit # 4, ECF # 63). In fact, the original hospital building was

named "State Hospital", and only in 1884, the hospital's name was changed to "New

Haven Hospital" to reflect the name that was widely being used by the residents of

New Haven (See, Exhibit #5; ECF # 63).

The term, "Yale College" was changed to Yale University in 1887, and the name

of the medical school automatically changed, too. The current name, Yale School of

Medicine was adapted (by the State Legislature) in 1918 (Exhibit # 4; ECF # 63).

It is important to note that the ties between Yale School of Medicine and the

State of Connecticut were never ever severed, and the State remains "intrinsically

involved" up to this time, and the State is also "intrinsically involved" in the overall

governance of the University at the highest level up to this time.

Yale University's By-Laws, as approved by the Yale Corporation, dated

December 5, 2015, affirms that Yale's Governing Body, known legally as "The

President and Fellows of Yale College"—or, more simply, as "The Corporation",

"comprises of the Governor of State of Connecticut (ex-officiis), the Lieutenant

Governor of the State of Connecticut (ex-officiis), along

with the President of Yale

University (see ECF # 64: Exhibit # 5—Annex: https://www.-Vale.edu/aboutvale/president- leadership Igovernance- historic -documents /yale-corporation-laws).

In 1792, by act of the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut, the ten

Successor Trustees were joined by eight Trustees ex-officiis: The Governor and

Lieutenant Governor, and "six senior assistants in the Council of this State." In 1819

the six senior assistants were replaced by the six senior State Senators. The

attendance of the Senators at Corporation meetings was, however, perfunctory and

unreliable. In 1871, therefore, the State Legislature agreed to divest them of their

membership and granted the Yale alumni the right to elect, instead, six of their own

member. ..(see ECF # 64: Exhibit # 5—Annex: https://www.yale.edu/aboutyale/president-leadership/governance-historic-documents /yale-corporationlaws).

VIII. THUS, YALE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AND YALE UNIVERSITY ARE IN FACT "COSPONSORED AND CO-GOVERNED BY THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT UP TO THIS TIME"

In addition to the above ex-officiis governance of Yale Corporation by

the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor of the State of Connecticut,

Plaintiff has evidenced (See ECF # 62-1: p. 33, and Exhibit # 3), that the

Connecticut Mental Health Center (CMHC) is in fact a direct State

Government's engagement and collaboration with Yale medical school

(YSM), to enable state-wide delivery of mental health and addictions

services to uninsured and underinsured people, a collaboration in public

service.

The Connecticut Mental Health Center celebrated its 50th anniversary in

2016, was founded in 1966, and is one of the oldest community mental health centers

in the United States. An enduring direct collaboration between the State of

Connecticut Department of Mental Health & Addiction Services and the Yale School

of Medicine's Department of Psychiatry, and the Connecticut Mental Health Center

provides recovery-oriented mental health services for 5,000 people in the Greater

New Haven area each year.

The Connecticut Mental Health Center also serves as a center for scientific

advancement in the understanding and treatment of mental health and substance

abuse disorders. (See, Exhibit # 9: https://medicine.yale.edu/psychiatry/care/cmhcf).

Further, the Connecticut Mental Health Center is one of three major

institutions of Yale Medical School's Department of Psychiatry along withthe United

States Department of Veterans Affairs- Connecticut Healthcare System, and the

Yale-New Haven Psychiatric Hospital

(See, Exhibit # 9, herewith;

http://www.psychiatry.yale.edu).

Further, the Connecticut State General Assembly passes legislations dictating

or influencing the administration of Yale School of Medicine and its faculty, as well

as controlling Yale School of Medicine's services (Yale medical group), teaching,

conduct of research, and its finances, given Yale University's State tax free status:

See Exhibit # 10, herewith: http://news.ya1e.edu/20 16/03/15/yale-s-taheri-cautionsagainst-potential-negative-conseg uences- state -legislative-proposal;

also

See,

http://fortune.com/2016/03/24/-vale-endowment-connecticut/.

Additionally, State of Connecticut Senate President recently acted to influence

Yale Medicine, which includes, more than 1,400 clinical faculty at the Yale School of

Medicine, demanding .contract agreement with another health care provider (See,

http://www.nhregister.com/healthi20 160929/connecticut-senate-president-pushesfor-anthem-yale-medicine-contract-agreement&template=printart; also See, See,

Exhibit # 10, herewith). Further, State lawmakers sought more from Yale: Two

Democratic leaders in the General Assembly made a case Tuesday for Yale University

to invest part of the annual increase in its endowment in local job growth and

educational opportunities or write the state a check for $78 million. The State law

makers pointed out that "not all private universities are in fact private universities,"

since the tax subsidies that they receive exceed anything received by public colleges

and universities, estimating that the per student taxpayer subsidy at Yale to be 3

times that of the University of Connecticut

(See, Exhibit # 11, herewith: also see,

page 1, paragraphs 7 & 8 at: http://www.pressreader.com/usa/new-haven-register new-haven-ct/20160323/281496455409137 (also See, Exhibits # 10 & 11).

XI.

The State of Connecticut is so pervasively and integrally intertwined with Yale

School of Medicine and Yale University, even the annual "Connecticut Open"

tennis tournament at the Connecticut Tennis Center at Yale in New Haven, CT is

owned

the

State

Connecticut:

See,

http://www.ctopen.org/tournamentinformation/).

ALL THE ABOVE, ITEMS, #1 THROUGH # XT- EVIDENCING—AFFIRM:

THAT THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE IN THIS CASE, YALE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

AS A "STATE ACTOR", IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

DECISIONS IN BRENTWOOD ACADEMY V. TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCHOOL

ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 535 U.S. 971 (2002); BURTON V. WILMINGTON PARKING

AUTHORITY, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); AND MARSH V. ALABAMA, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).

XII. PLAINTIFF HAS GONE FURTHER TO ADDITIVELY EVIDENCE THAT YALE

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE RECEIVES CONSIDERABLY LARGE AMOUNTS OF FINANCIAL

ASSISTANCE FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT PER SE, AS WELL AS FROM THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: See, District Court ECF # 62-1, Exhibits 1 to 2), as indicated below

in items, # XII through # XVI:

Yale Medical School (along with the University) was tax exempted by the State

of Connecticut to a tune of $2.5 billion according to the 2013 grand list (See ECF #

62-1, Exhibit # 1);

The tax subsidies (tax-free status) that Yale receives from the State of

Connecticut are far greater (3- 10 times more!) than the so-called public colleges and

universities receive in the State of Connecticut, according to the Nexus Research &

Policy Center. Under a 182-year-old State Law, academic property of Yale is exempt

from State taxes (See, Exhibit # 11, herewith: http://nexusresearch.org/wpcontent/

uploads/20 15/06/ RichSchoolsPoorStudents.pdf);

The Connecticut Stem Cell Research Grants-in-Aid Program to Yale School of

Medicine was established by the Connecticut General Assembly in June 2005 when

it passed Connecticut General Statutes §19a-32d through §19a-32g. These stem cell

research grants are part of the $100 million Stem Cell Research Fund which was

created by legislation that signed by the Governor of the State of Connecticut into

law in 2005 making Connecticut just the third state in the nation to offer public

funding for human stem cell research. The Connecticut Stem Cell Research Advisory

Committee is chaired by Connecticut State's Public Health Commissioner. For the

number of these Connecticut State's stem cell research grants that were awarded to

Yale School of Medicine specifically each year, starting from 2006, see Exhibit # 12,

herewith; also See, ECF # 62-1, Exhibit # 2.

The sum of federal government grants given to Yale during 2014 alone

was $507.1 million or 75.3 percent of all Yale's grant and contract income in

2015: See, http://yaledailynews.com/blog/20 15/11/03/med-school- income-soars-asfederal-funding-falters/); and thus,

Yale School of Medicine ranking sixth among medical schools

receiving Federal Government funds from the National Institutes of

Health (NIH), and second in NIH dollars per faculty member

(http://medicine.yale.edu/facts .

ALL OF THE ABOVE ITEMS # I THROUGH # XVII- EVIDENCING OF FACTS AND

FIGURES, COLLECTIVELY UNASSAILABLY AFFIRM THAT:

YALE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE PER SE, WITH OR WITHOUT THE YALE

UNIVERSITY PROPER, CERTAINLY QUALIFY AS A "STATE ACTOR"- FOR THE

PURPOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S. C. § 1983, AND IN THE SAME LIGHT,

THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIONS OF DR. RICHARD LIFTON (TENURED AND

ENDOWED PROFESSOR AND CHAIRMAN OF THE GENETICS DEPARTMENT AT YALE

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AND YALE UNIVERSITY.') ARE TO BE CONSTRUED AS "STATE

ACTIONS"- FOR THE PURPOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S. C. § 1983.

It is indeed naïve to argue that the receipt of hundreds of millions of

dollars of federal research grants annually by Yale School of Medicine as a

whole, as well as by Dr. Lifton, is akin to a private school for children with

special needs received public tuition funds with related government

regulations, as in the case of Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).

Notwithstanding the above huge federal government grants, YSM also

receives:

Funding for research from the State of Connecticut;

Huge state government tax-subsidies which are 3-10 times that of the

so-called public colleges and Universities receive in the State of Connecticut;

State tax exemptions to a tune of 2.5 billion to YSM and Yale University;

Connecticut State Assembly advances state research priorities in the

field of stem cell research through Grants-in-Aid public funds programs at YSM;

The stem cell research advisory committee being chaired by Connecticut

State Public Health Commissioner;

Connecticut State Government having established YSM per se in 1810,

as well as Yale University;

State's continued ex-officiis- governance up to this time;

Direct long-lasting and on-going State Government's engagement

and collaboration with Yale University (YTJ) and its medical school to enable

state-wide delivery of mental health and addictions services;

State dictating and/or influencing of YSM's administration and its

faculty;

State legislature demanding more from Yale; and

State of Connecticut ownership of the annual "Connecticut Open" tennis

tournament at the Connecticut Tennis Center at Yale University-are altogether indeed more than sufficient enough to transform YSM into

a "State Actor" for the purpose of Section 1983 liability, NOT ONLY in

accordance with United States Supreme Court decisions in Brentwood

Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 535 U.S. 971

(2002); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); and

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), BUT ALSO IN ACCORDANCE WITH

The federal judiciary's nearly unanimous requirement of MORE involvement

of State, in addition to (mere) financial assistance to a private university or

professional school, to render the actions of the institution state action for

purposes of § 1983, as indicated in Huff v. Notre Dame High School, 456 F.

Sup. 1145, 1148 (D.Conn.1978).

See, ECF # 68, page 19, para 2 thro'page 34;

also See, Renewed Complaint, pages 30 through' 33, items 2.2 through' 2.5.

THE SUPREME COURT HAS CLEARLY EMPHASIZED THAT MERELY BECAUSE

THE DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS DO NOT QUALIFY UNDER ONE CRITERION DOES NOT

MEAN THAT THE ACTION WAS NOT TAKEN UNDER COLOR OF LAW (BRENTWOOD

ACAD. V. TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCH. ATHLETIC ASSN, 531 U.S. 288 (2001):

"[T]he facts justify a conclusion of state action under the criteria of

entwinement, a conclusion in no sense unsettled merely because other criteria of state

action may not be sati sfied by the same facts:

"IF ONE CRITERION IS SATISFIED, THE REQUIREMENT CAN BE MET'

Wherefore, the Supreme Court ought to reassert its above rulings in

Rafi's case as well finding that Yale and Dr. Lifton (respondents / appellees)

were acting as "State Actors and/or under the color of the law"-.- given their

"entwinement" with the state (Brentwood Acad. V. Tennessee Secondary Sch.

Athletic Assn, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), and the policies of Yale School of Medicine

(with or without the University per se) are so impregnated with a governmental

character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon.

state action." 382 U.S. at 299).

QUESTION 4

Did the District Court "Blunder" by Determining That Title VI Claims

Cannot Be Asserted Against Dr. Lifton, "As Title VI Is Only Applicable to

Programs Receiving Federal Assistance" (District Court ECF # 78, Page 7, Para

3)-- which the Circuit Court failed to address?

QUESTION 4- ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner, Dr. Rafi asserts that along with Yale School of Medicine, Dr. Lifton

is certainly responsible for assuring compliance with applicable federal laws and

statues pertaining to the utilization of federal government funds that were allocated

to him based on his research proposals, as the Principal Investigator as well as senior

investigator of multitudes of federally funded research projects to him.

In a recent case involving abuse of federal government research grants at the

Northwestern University by another similar federal grants recipient (Principal

Investigator) scientist, Dr. Bennett (See, United States, et al., ex rel. Melissa Theis v.

Northwestern University, Dr. Charles L. Bennett, et al., No. 09 C 1943 (N.D. Ill.,

2009)). In this case, it is alleged that the defendants (Northwestern University and

Dr. Bennett) submitted false claims to the United States when the Principal

Investigator (Dr. Bennett) directed and authorized the spending of grant funds on

goods and services that did not meet applicable NIH and government grant

guidelines.

The allegations were investigated by the U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services Office of Inspector General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the

National Institutes of Health, and the U.S. Attorney's Office. The government

contends that it has certain civil claims against Northwestern arising out of

Northwestern's improper submission of claims to NIH for grant expenditures for

items that were for the personal benefit of the Principal Investigator of the grant

money (Dr. Bennett). Although the University settled the case by paying nearly $ 3

million, the government (US Department of Justice) ALSO pursued the case against

the Principal Investigator, Dr. Bennett (who is also a physician scientist just like Dr.

Lifton!), and reached a settlement agreement, wherein, Dr. Bennett shall pay to the

United States.:

See, Settlement Agreement Department of Justice,

at http ://www.justice. gov/sites/default/files/usaondilllegacyl2Ol5/061111pr1030 Ola O.pdf; Former Northwestern Physician To

Pay The United States https ://www.justice. gov/usao-ndil/pr/formernorthwestern-physician-pay-united-states-475000-settle-cancer-research).

THIS CASE CERTAINLY ESTABLISHES THE FACT THAT PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS

AND SUPERVISORS OF THE FEDERAL RESEARCH FUNDS RECIPIENTS ARE ALSO HELD

ACCOUNTABLE BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF

INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE NATIONAL

INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, AND THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.

Therefore, given that the alleged retaliatory violations by federal government

funds recipients (Yale School of Medicine as well as Dr. Lifton) which are as such

actionable under Title VI, can also be actioned as such under Section 1983 for the

federal funds-recipients' violation of petitioner's constitutional provisions under the

Fourteenth Amendment.

TO ENFORCE TITLE VI-SECTION 602 REGULATIONS: PETITIONER COULD SUE Dr.

LIFTON UNDER § 1983 TO ENFORCE THE SAME TITLE VI REGULATIONS.-

The alleged conspiracy and the consequent on-going coercion,

intentional discriminatory and retaliatory violations and reprisals by

Federal government funds recipient respondents is actionable as such

under Title VI, and it can also be actioned under Section 1983 for the

recipients' violation of petitioner's Constitutional provisions under Title VI.

"Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations".

Bradford C. Mank. Kansas Law Review, Vol. 49, p. 321, 2001;

U of Cincinnati Public Law Research Paper No. 10-21, Last revised: 27 Apr

2010; https://scholarship.law.uc.,edu/cgi/viewcontent.

cgi?article 1265&contextfac_pubs).

III. THE SUPREME COURT OUGHT TO ASSERT THAT TITLE VI CLAIMS CAN

BE ASSERTED AGAINST DR. LIFTON AS WELL UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

AMENDMENTS [42 U.S.C. 2060D-4A], SEC. 606.

The Supreme Court began accepting an expansive definition of rights,

privileges, or immunities and held that the act does cover the actions of

state and municipal officials, even if they had no authority under state

statute to act as they did in violating someone's federal rights.

To prevail in a claim under section 1983, the plaintiff must prove two

critical points, as plaintiff has extensively established in this litigation:

A person subjected the plaintiff to conduct that

occurred under a federal law, or under color of state law;

and

This conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights,

privileges, or immunities guaranteed under federal law

or the U.S. Constitution.

Wherefore, the Supreme Court ought to correct lower Courts'

"blunder" that federal funds receiving principal investigators such as dr.

Lifton could NOT be sued under § 1983 to enforce the same Title VI regulations.

CONCLUSION

Given the above four novel and pivotal questions in this petition, and

the relevant extensive arguments and sound legal theories thereof, that are

often based on this Supreme Court's assertions, as has been quoted and

argued above for each of the questions raised in this petition, the Supreme

Court ought to consider this petition for Writ of Certiorari, in the interest

justice.

WHEREFORE Given All the Above Crucial Assertions That Impact

Application of Statutory Laws and Clauses of The Constitution, Pro Se

Petitioner Respectfully Requests to Grant This Petition for Writ of

Certiorari to Uphold Rule of Law and Justice for All, Not Excluding

Naturalized Citizens, Such as The Petitioner.

Respectfully submitted.

t(J/

Syed Ii/Rafi, PhD.

Pro SeJPetitioner

September 14, 2018

"Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails,

and where any one class is made to feel that society is an organized conspiracy

to oppress, rob and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe".

Frederick Douglass

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.