Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Department of Homeland Security, et al., Petitioners v. Regents of the University of California, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 5, 2018

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Text

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BEFORE JUDGMENT

NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JOSEPH H. HUNT

Assistant Attorney

General

JEFFREY B. WALL

Deputy Solicitor General

HASHIM M. MOOPPAN

Deputy Assistant Attorney

General

JONATHAN Y. ELLIS

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

MARK B. STERN

ABBY C. WRIGHT

THOMAS PULHAM

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This dispute concerns the policy of immigration enforcement discretion known as Deferred Action for

Childhood Arrivals (DACA). In 2016, this Court affirmed, by an equally divided Court, a decision of the

Fifth Circuit holding that two related Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) discretionary enforcement

policies, including an expansion of the DACA policy,

were likely unlawful and should be enjoined. See

United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (per curiam). In

September 2017, DHS determined that the original

DACA policy was unlawful and would likely be struck

down by the courts on the same grounds as the related

policies. DHS thus instituted an orderly wind-down of

the DACA policy. The questions presented are as follows:

1. Whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA

policy is judicially reviewable.

2. Whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA

policy is lawful.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners are the Donald J. Trump, President of

the United States; Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney

General of the United States; Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and the United States.

Respondents are the Regents of the University of California; Janet Napolitano, President of the University of

California; the State of California; the State of Maine; the

State of Maryland; the State of Minnesota; the City of San

Jose; Dulce Garcia; Miriam Gonzalez Avila; Saul Jimenez

Suarez; Viridiana Chabolla Mendoza; Norma Ramirez; Jirayut Latthivongskorn; the County of Santa Clara; and

Service Employees International Union Local 521.

(II)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below .............................................................................. 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 2

Statutory provisions involved ...................................................... 2

Statement ...................................................................................... 2

Reasons for granting the petition ............................................. 14

I.

The questions presented warrant this Court’s

immediate review ......................................................... 15

II. The decisions below are wrong ................................... 17

A. DACA’s rescission is unreviewable under

the APA .................................................................. 17

B. DACA’s rescission is lawful .................................. 23

1. The rescission is reasonable in light of

DHS’s serious doubts about the legality of

the DACA policy ............................................. 23

2. The rescission is reasonable in light of

DHS’s additional and independent policy

concerns ........................................................... 27

3. The rescission is reasonable in light of

DHS’s correct determination that DACA

is unlawful ........................................................ 28

4. The rescission does not violate equal

protection or due process ............................... 30

III. The Court should grant certiorari before

judgment in all three cases ......................................... 32

Conclusion ................................................................................... 34

Appendix A — District court order denying FRCP

12(b)(1) dismissal and granting

provisional relief (Jan. 9, 2018) .................. 1a

Appendix B — District court order granting in part

defendants’ motion to dismiss under

FRCP 12(b)(6) (Jan. 12, 2018) .................. 71a

Appendix C — Notice of appeal (Jan. 16, 2018) .................. 91a

Appendix D — Court of appeals order (Jan. 25, 2018) ....... 96a

(III)

IV

Table of Contents—Continued:

Page

Appendix E — Memorandum on Exercising

Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect

to Individuals Who Came to the United

States as Children (June 15, 2012) .......... 97a

Appendix F — Memorandum on Exercising

Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect

to Individuals Who Came to the United

States as Children and with Respect to

Certain Individuals Who Are the

Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent

Residents (Nov. 20, 2014) ....................... 102a

Appendix G — Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred

Action for Childhood Arrivals

(Sept. 5, 2017) ........................................... 111a

Appendix H — Memorandum from Secretary Kirstjen

M. Nielsen (June 22, 2018) ..................... 120a

Appendix I — Statutory provisions .................................. 127a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) ........... 2, 3, 19

Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight

Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974) ........................................... 24

Casa de Maryland v. Department of Homeland Sec.,

284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (D. Md. 2018) ...................................... 8

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) .................. 17

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502

(2009) .................................................................................... 23

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) .......................... 28

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) ...................... passim

I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs,

482 U.S. 270 (1987)........................................................ 18, 21

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) ..................... 22

V

Cases—Continued:

Page

Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) ................................... 18

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) .................................... 23, 26, 29

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) ..........................3, 19, 22, 30, 31

Texas v. United States:

86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex.), aff ’d,

809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d,

136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) .................................................. 5

809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d,

136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) .............................5, 6, 24, 25, 29

Texas v. United States, No. 18-cv-68,

2018 WL 4178970 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018)............... 16, 25

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200

(1994) .................................................................................... 22

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) ............................ 31

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456

(1996) ........................................................................ 19, 28, 30

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)....................... 17

United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) ............... 6, 16

Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) ...................... 20

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579 (1952).............................................................. 17

Constitution, statutes, regulation, and rules:

U.S. Const.:

Art. III .............................................................................. 31

Amend. V (Due Process Clause) .................................... 30

Administrative Procedure Act,

5 U.S.C. 551 et seq................................................................. 5

5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2)....................................9, 17, 18, 19, 127a

5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) .................................................. 23, 128a

VI

Statutes, regulation, and rules—Continued:

Page

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,

21 U.S.C. 301 et seq. ............................................................ 20

Immigration and Nationality Act,

8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. .............................................................. 2

8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1)............................................................. 2

8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A) ....................................................... 3

8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017) .......................... 2

8 U.S.C. 1227(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017) .......................... 2

8 U.S.C. 1229b.................................................................... 3

8 U.S.C. 1252 .................................................9, 17, 21, 129a

8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(9) ................................................ 22, 138a

8 U.S.C. 1252(g) ..................................................... 21, 143a

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. ............................ 21

Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ............. 8, 12

6 U.S.C. 202(5) (2012 & Supp. V 2017) ................ 3, 19, 28, 29

28 U.S.C. 1254(1) ................................................................... 15

28 U.S.C. 1292(b) ............................................................. 11, 12

28 U.S.C. 2101(e) ................................................................... 16

8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14) ............................................................ 3

Fed. R. Civ. P.:

Rule 12(b)(1) .......................................................... 9, 10, 12

Rule 12(b)(6) ................................................................ 9, 12

Sup. Ct. R. 11 ......................................................................... 16

Miscellaneous:

S. 1291, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) .................................... 4

S. 1545, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) .................................... 4

S. 2075, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005) .................................... 4

S. 2205, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) .................................... 4

S. 3827, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010) ..................................... 4

VII

Miscellaneous—Continued:

Page

Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice

(10th ed. 2013) ..................................................................... 17

The White House, Remarks by the President on

Immigration (June 15, 2012), https://go.usa.gov/

xnZFY .................................................................................. 26

U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.:

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals:

Frequently Asked Questions (Mar. 8, 2018),

https://go.usa.gov/xngCd ........................................ 4, 5

Frequently Asked Questions: Recession of

DACA (Sept. 5, 2017), https://go.usa.gov/

xPVmE ......................................................................... 7

Guidance on Rejected DACA Requests

(Feb. 14, 2018), https://go.usa.gov/xPVmG .......... 7, 31

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BEFORE JUDGMENT

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States

Department of Homeland Security and other federal

parties, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the district court granting respondents’

motion for a preliminary injunction and denying the

government’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (App. 1a-70a) is reported at

279 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The order of the district court

granting in part and denying in part the government’s

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (App. 71a-90a) is

reported at 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304.

(1)

2

JURISDICTION

On January 9, 2018, the district court denied the government’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion, entered a preliminary

injunction, and certified its Rule 12(b)(1) decision for interlocutory appeal. On January 12, 2018, the district

court granted in part and denied in part the government’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and certified its decision for

interlocutory appeal. The government filed a notice of

appeal of both the January 9 and January 12 orders on

January 16, 2018 (App. 91a-95a). The Ninth Circuit

granted permission to appeal both the January 9 and

January 12 orders on January 25, 2018. App. 96a. The

court of appeals’ jurisdiction over the appeal of the preliminary injunction rests on 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The

court of appeals’ jurisdiction over the appeal of the certified rulings rests on 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1) and

28 U.S.C. 2101(e).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent statutory provisions are set forth in the

appendix to this petition. App. 127a-143a.

STATEMENT

1. a. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),

8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., charges the Secretary of Homeland Security “with the administration and enforcement” of the immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1). Individual aliens are subject to removal if, inter alia,

“they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been

convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set

by federal law.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387,

396 (2012); see 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017);

see also 8 U.S.C. 1227(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). As a

3

practical matter, however, the federal government cannot remove every removable alien, and a “principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396.

For any alien subject to removal, Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) officials must first “decide

whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396. After removal proceedings begin,

government officials may decide to grant discretionary

relief, such as asylum or cancellation of removal. See

8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), 1229b. And, “[a]t each stage” of

the process, “the Executive has discretion to abandon the

endeavor.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (AADC). In making

these decisions, like other agencies exercising enforcement discretion, DHS must engage in “a complicated

balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly

within its expertise.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,

831 (1985). Recognizing the need for such balancing,

Congress has provided that the “Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall be responsible for * * * [e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.” 6 U.S.C. 202(5) (2012 & Supp. V 2017).

b. In 2012, DHS announced the policy known as

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). See

App. 97a-101a. Deferred action is a practice in which

the Secretary exercises discretion to notify an alien of

her decision to forbear from seeking his removal for a

designated period. AADC, 525 U.S. at 484. Under DHS

regulations, aliens granted deferred action may apply

for and receive work authorization for the duration of

the deferred-action grant if they establish economic necessity. 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14). A grant of deferred

4

action does not confer lawful immigration status or provide any defense to removal. DHS retains discretion to

revoke deferred action unilaterally, and the alien remains removable at any time.

DACA made deferred action available to “certain

young people who were brought to this country as children.” App. 97a. The INA does not provide any exemptions or special relief from removal for such individuals.

And, dating back to at least 2001, bipartisan efforts to

provide such relief legislatively had failed.1 Under the

DACA policy, following successful completion of a background check and other review, an alien would receive

deferred action for a period of two years, subject to renewal. App. 99a-100a. The policy made clear that it

“confer[red] no substantive right, immigration status or

pathway to citizenship,” because “[o]nly the Congress,

acting through its legislative authority, can confer these

rights.” App. 101a.

DHS explained that information provided in the

DACA request process would be protected from disclosure for the purpose of immigration enforcement proceedings unless certain criteria related to national security or public safety were satisfied, or the individual met

the requirements for a Notice to Appear. USCIS, DHS,

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Frequently

Asked Questions (Mar. 8, 2018), https://go.usa.gov/xngCd.

DHS also stated, however, that this information-sharing

policy “may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at

any time without notice,” and that it “may not be relied

See, e.g., S. 1291, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); S. 1545,

108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); S. 2075, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005);

S. 2205, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007); S. 3827, 111th Cong., 2d Sess.

(2010).

1

5

upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.” Id. at 6.

Later, in 2014, DHS created a new policy of enforcement discretion referred to as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents

(DAPA). App. 102a-110a. Through a process expressly

designed to be “similar to DACA,” DAPA made deferred action available for certain individuals who had a

child who was a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. App. 107a. At the same time, DHS also expanded

DACA by extending the deferred-action period from

two to three years and by loosening the age and residency criteria. App. 106a-107a.

c. Soon thereafter, Texas and 25 other States

brought suit in the Southern District of Texas to enjoin

DAPA and the expansion of DACA. The district court

issued a nationwide preliminary injunction, finding a

likelihood of success on the claim that the DAPA and

expanded DACA memorandum was a “ ‘substantive’

rule that should have undergone the notice-andcomment rule making procedure” required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.

Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 671 (S.D.

Tex. 2015); see id. at 607, 647, 664-678.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction, holding

that the DAPA and expanded DACA policies likely violated both the APA and the INA. Texas v. United

States, 809 F.3d 134, 146, 170-186 (2015). The court of

appeals concluded that plaintiffs had “established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their procedural claim” that DAPA and expanded DACA were

invalidly instituted without notice and comment. Id. at

6

178. The court also concluded, “as an alternate and additional ground,” that the policies were substantively

contrary to law. Ibid. The court observed that the INA

contains an “intricate system of immigration classifications and employment eligibility,” and “does not grant

the Secretary discretion to grant deferred action and

lawful presence on a class-wide basis to 4.3 million otherwise removable aliens.” Id. at 184, 186 n.202. It also

noted that Congress had repeatedly declined to enact

legislation “closely resembl[ing] DACA and DAPA.”

Id. at 185.

After briefing and argument, this Court affirmed the

Fifth Circuit’s judgment by an equally divided Court,

United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per

curiam), leaving the nationwide injunction in place.

d. In June 2017, Texas and other plaintiff States in

the Texas case announced their intention to amend their

complaint to challenge the original DACA policy. D. Ct.

Doc. 64-1, at 238-240 (Oct. 6, 2017).2 They asserted that

“[f ]or the[] same reasons that DAPA and Expanded

DACA’s unilateral Executive Branch conferral of eligibility for lawful presence and work authorization was

unlawful, the original June 15, 2012 DACA memorandum is also unlawful.” Id. at 239.

On September 5, 2017, rather than confront litigation challenging DACA on essentially the same grounds

that had succeeded in Texas before the same court for

the DAPA and expanded DACA policies, DHS decided

to wind down DACA in an orderly fashion. App. 111a119a. In the rescission memorandum, then-Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke explained

that, “[t]aking into consideration the Supreme Court’s

Citations to the district court docket are to Regents of the University of California v. DHS, No. 17-cv-5211.

2

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and the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in the ongoing litigation,”

as well as the Attorney General’s view that the DACA

policy was unlawful and that the “potentially imminent”

challenge to DACA would “likely * * * yield similar results” as the Texas litigation, “it is clear that the June

15, 2012 DACA program should be terminated.” App.

116a-117a. The Acting Secretary accordingly announced that, “[i]n the exercise of [her] authority in establishing national immigration policies and priorities,”

the original DACA memorandum was “rescind[ed].”

App. 117a.

The rescission memorandum stated, however, that

the government “[w]ill not terminate the grants of previously issued deferred action * * * solely based on the

directives in this memorandum” for the remaining twoyear periods. App. 118a. The memorandum also explained that DHS would “provide a limited window in

which it w[ould] adjudicate certain requests for DACA.”

App. 117a. Specifically, DHS would “adjudicate—on an

individual, case by case basis—properly filed pending

DACA renewal requests * * * from current beneficiaries that have been accepted by the Department as of the

date of this memorandum, and from current beneficiaries whose benefits will expire between the date of this

memorandum and March 5, 2018 that have been accepted by the Department as of October 5, 2017.” App.

117a-118a.

DHS has also made clear that the “informationsharing policy has not changed in any way since it was

first announced, including as a result of the Sept. 5,

2017” DACA rescission. USCIS, DHS, Guidance on Rejected DACA Requests (Feb. 14, 2018), https://go.usa.gov/

xPVmG (DHS Information-Sharing Guidance); see

8

USCIS, DHS, Frequently Asked Questions: Rescission

of DACA (Sept. 5, 2017), https://go.usa.gov/xPVmE.

e. Shortly after DHS’s decision to rescind DACA,

respondents brought these five related suits in the

Northern District of California challenging the rescission of DACA. Collectively, they allege that the termination of DACA is unlawful because it is arbitrary and

capricious under the APA; violates the APA’s requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking as well as the

Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.; denies

respondents equal protection and due process; and permits the government to use information obtained through

DACA in a manner inconsistent with principles of due

process and equitable estoppel. See App. 21a-22a. Similar challenges were filed in the Eastern District of New

York and in the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Batalla

Vidal v. Nielsen, No. 16-cv-4756 (E.D.N.Y. filed Sept.

19, 2017); NAACP v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1907 (D.D.C.

filed Sept. 18, 2017). A summary of the proceedings in

the Northern District of California (Regents) follows in

this petition. A summary of the proceedings in the other

district courts can be found in the government’s petitions

in those cases, filed simultaneously with this one.3

2. In Regents, the government filed the administrative record in October 2017. Litigation ensued in which

respondents obtained orders from the district court directing a vast expansion of the administrative record, in

addition to immediate discovery. See, e.g., D. Ct. Doc.

79 (Oct. 17, 2017). The government sought review of

The government largely prevailed in a similar challenge to the

rescission filed in the District of Maryland. See Casa de Maryland

v. Department of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (2018). An

appeal of that decision is pending before the Fourth Circuit.

3

9

those orders in a mandamus petition in the court of appeals, which a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit denied.

875 F.3d 1200 (2017). After granting a stay of the district court’s orders, 138 S. Ct. 371 (2017), this Court

granted the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017)

(per curiam). On remand, the district court stayed its

orders requiring expansion of the administrative record

and authorizing discovery “pending further order.”

D. Ct. Doc. 225, at 1 (Dec. 21, 2017).

While the litigation over the record proceeded, the

government filed a motion to dismiss all five suits under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). D. Ct.

Doc. 114 (Nov. 1, 2017). At the threshold, the government argued that respondents’ claims are not reviewable because DHS’s decision to rescind DACA is committed to agency discretion by law, see 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2);

and because judicial review of the denial of deferred action, if available at all, is barred under the INA prior to

the issuance of a final removal order, see 8 U.S.C. 1252.

The government also argued that respondents’ arbitraryand-capricious claims fail because DHS rationally explained the decision to wind down the discretionary

DACA policy given the Acting Secretary’s conclusion

that the policy is unlawful and the imminent risk of its

being invalidated in the Texas case. Finally, the government argued that respondents’ other claims are

without merit because the rescission of DACA is exempt

from notice-and-comment requirements; does not violate principles of equal protection or due process; and

does not change or affect the policies governing the use

of aliens’ personal information.

10

Respondents opposed the government’s motion to

dismiss and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,

seeking to prevent the government from rescinding the

DACA policy. D. Ct. Doc. 111 (Nov. 1, 2017); D. Ct. Doc.

205 (Nov. 22, 2017).

3. On January 9, 2018, the district court denied the

motion to dismiss to the extent it was based on Rule

12(b)(1), and entered a preliminary injunction requiring

the government to “maintain the DACA program on a

nationwide basis.” App. 66a; see App. 1a-70a.

The district court first ruled that the rescission of

DACA was not committed to agency discretion by law.

The court acknowledged that an agency’s decisions “not

to prosecute or initiate enforcement actions are generally not reviewable as they are ‘committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.’ ” App. 27a (quoting Chaney,

470 U.S. at 831). But it concluded that the rescission of

DACA was different because it involved a “broad enforcement polic[y],” rather than an “ ‘individual enforcement decision’ ”; it rescinded a policy of enforcement

discretion, instead of announcing a new one; and the

“main” rationale for rescinding the prior policy was its

“supposed illegality,” which the court concluded it was

authorized to assess. App. 28a-30a (citation omitted).

The court also concluded that the INA did not preclude

review because “plaintiffs do not challenge any particular removal but, rather, challenge the abrupt end to a

nationwide deferred-action and work-authorization program.” App. 30a-31a.

The district court then ruled that respondents were

entitled to a preliminary injunction, concluding that

they had demonstrated a likelihood of success on their

claims that the rescission of DACA was arbitrary and

capricious. App. 41a-62a. The court acknowledged that

11

“a new administration is entitled to replace old policies

with new policies so long as they comply with the law,”

App. 2a, and the court did not dispute that DACA was a

discretionary non-enforcement policy that was neither

mandated nor specifically authorized by statute. It

nonetheless concluded that respondents were likely to

succeed because “the agency’s decision to rescind

DACA was based on a flawed legal premise” and because the government’s “supposed ‘litigation risk’ rationale” was an invalid “post hoc rationalization” and,

“in any event, arbitrary and capricious.” App. 42a.

Finding that respondents had satisfied the remaining equitable requirements for an injunction, App. 62a66a, the district court ordered the government, “pending final judgment” or other order, “to maintain the

DACA program on a nationwide basis on the same

terms and conditions as were in effect before the rescission on September 5, 2017.” App. 66a. The court specifically directed that the government must “allow[]

DACA enrollees to renew their enrollments.” Ibid.4

The district court sua sponte certified its order for

interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), to the ex-

The district court identified certain “exceptions” to its injunction

—namely, “(1) that new applications from applicants who have

never before received deferred action need not be processed;

(2) that the advance parole feature need not be continued for the

time being for anyone; and (3) that defendants may take administrative steps to make sure fair discretion is exercised on an individualized basis for each renewal application.” App. 66a-67a. The court

also specified that “[n]othing in [its] order” would prohibit DHS

from “remov[ing] any individual, including any DACA enrollee, who

it determines poses a risk to national security or public safety, or

otherwise deserves, in its judgment, to be removed.” App. 67a.

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tent it denied the “questions interposed by the government in its motion to dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(1).”

App. 70a.

4. On January 12, 2018, the district court issued a

further order granting in part and denying in part the

government’s motion to dismiss to the extent it was

based on Rule 12(b)(6). App. 71a-90a. The court declined to dismiss respondents’ arbitrary-and-capricious

claims “[f ]or the same reasons” stated in its January 9

order. App. 72a. It declined to dismiss the equalprotection claim, concluding that respondents’ allegations “raise a plausible inference that racial animus towards Mexicans and Latinos was a motivating factor in

the decision to end DACA.” App. 87a; see App. 83a-87a.

And it declined to dismiss the claim that DHS violated

substantive due process by allegedly “chang[ing] its

policy” on the use of personal information “provided by

DACA recipients,” reasoning that such a change would

“ ‘shock[] the conscience.’ ” App. 79a-81a (citation omitted). The court dismissed respondents’ remaining

claims, including with respect to notice-and-comment,

the Regulatory Flexibility Act, procedural due process,

equitable estoppel, and equal protection based on a fundamental right to a job. App. 72a-79a, 81a-83a, 87a. The

court again sua sponte certified its order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). App. 89a.

5. Days later, the government filed notices of appeal

of the district court’s orders, App. 91a-95a, petitioned

the Ninth Circuit for interlocutory appeal of the district

court’s decisions resolving the government’s motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), and filed a petition

for a writ of certiorari before judgment in this Court.

13

The court of appeals granted the government’s petition for interlocutory appeal and consolidated the appeals. App. 96a; see 18-15133 C.A. Doc. 3 (January 26,

2018). On February 26, 2018, this Court denied the government’s certiorari petition “without prejudice,” stating that it “assumed that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case.” 138 S. Ct. 1182.

But while briefing in the Ninth Circuit was completed

on April 17 and oral argument was held on May 15, the

court of appeals has not yet issued a decision as of the

printing of this petition.5

6. In June 2018, current Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen issued a memorandum in response to the district court in NAACP v. Trump, supra,

providing further explanation of DHS’s decision to rescind DACA. App. 120a-126a. Secretary Nielsen concluded that “the DACA policy properly was—and

should be—rescinded, for several separate and independently sufficient reasons.” App. 122a. First, the

Secretary agreed that “the DACA policy was contrary

to law” and explained that “[a]ny arguable distinctions

between the DAPA and DACA policies” were not “sufficiently material” to convince her otherwise. Ibid.; see

App. 122a-123a. Second, the Secretary reasoned that,

in any event, “[l]ike Acting Secretary Duke, [she]

lack[s] sufficient confidence in the DACA policy’s legality to continue this non-enforcement policy, whether the

courts would ultimately uphold it or not.” App. 123a.

On October 17, 2018, the government informed the court of appeals that, “in order to ensure review by the Supreme Court during

its current Term,” it intended to file a petition for a writ of certiorari

before judgment if the court of appeals did not issue its judgment

by October 31. 18-15068 C.A. Doc. 198.

5

14

She noted that “[t]here are sound reasons for a law enforcement agency to avoid discretionary policies that

are legally questionable.” App. 122a-123a. Third, the

Secretary offered several “reasons of enforcement policy to rescind the DACA policy,” regardless of whether

the policy is “illegal or legally questionable.” App. 123a.

The Secretary also explained that, although she “do[es]

not come to these conclusions lightly,” “neither any individual’s reliance on the expected continuation of the

DACA policy nor the sympathetic circumstances of

DACA recipients as a class” outweigh the reasons to

end the policy. App. 125a. The government promptly

informed the court of appeals of Secretary Nielsen’s

memorandum. 18-15068 C.A. Doc. 184 (June 22, 2018).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

These cases concern the Executive Branch’s authority to revoke a discretionary policy of non-enforcement

that is sanctioning an ongoing violation of federal immigration law by nearly 700,000 aliens. The DACA policy

is materially indistinguishable from the related policies

that the Fifth Circuit held were contrary to federal immigration law in a decision that four Justices of this

Court voted to affirm. No one contends that the policy

is required by federal law. And, in fact, consistent with

the view of the Department of Justice, DHS has decided

that the policy is unlawful and should be adopted only

by legislative action, not unilateral executive action.

Yet as a result of nationwide preliminary injunctions issued by the District Courts in the Northern District of

California and the Eastern District of New York, DHS

has been required to keep the policy in place, now more

than a year since the agency’s decision.

In denying the government’s previous petition for a

writ of certiorari before judgment “without prejudice,”

15

this Court “assumed that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case.” 138 S. Ct. 1182

(2018). That has not happened. Although the court of

appeals heard oral argument on May 15, 2018, it has yet

to issue its decision. And while no one, respondents included, contends that the legality of DACA’s rescission

will be finally resolved without this Court’s review, absent prompt intervention from this Court, there is little

chance the Court would resolve this dispute for at least

another year.

Accordingly, the government today is filing petitions

for writs of certiorari before judgment to the Second,

Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, each of which has before it a

decision concluding that the rescission of DACA either

is or likely is unlawful. As explained below, those decisions are wrong and they warrant this Court’s immediate review. The government presents each of these petitions to ensure that the Court has an adequate vehicle

in which to resolve the questions presented in a timely

and definitive manner. The government respectfully

submits that the Court should grant each petition for a

writ of certiorari before judgment, consolidate these

cases for decision, and consider this important dispute

this Term.

I. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

COURT’S IMMEDIATE REVIEW

WARRANT

THIS

Congress has vested this Court with jurisdiction to

review “[c]ases in the courts of appeals * * * [b]y writ

of certiorari * * * before or after rendition of judgment

or decree.” 28 U.S.C. 1254(1) (emphasis added). “An

application * * * for a writ of certiorari to review a case

before judgment has been rendered in the court of appeals may be made at any time before judgment.”

16

28 U.S.C. 2101(e). This Court will grant certiorari before judgment “only upon a showing that the case is of

such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 11.

These cases satisfy that standard.

An immediate grant of certiorari is necessary to obtain an appropriately prompt resolution of this important

dispute. Even if a losing party were immediately to

seek certiorari from a decision of one of the courts of

appeals, this Court would not be able to review that decision in the ordinary course until next Term at the earliest. In the interim, the government would be required

to retain a discretionary non-enforcement policy that

DHS and the Attorney General have correctly concluded is unlawful and that sanctions the ongoing violation of federal law by more than half a million people.

And the very existence of this litigation (and resulting

uncertainty) would continue to impede efforts to enact

legislation addressing the legitimate policy concerns

underlying the DACA policy.

Such a delay is untenable and unnecessary. This

Court is already familiar with the relevant issues in

light of its consideration on plenary review of United

States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam). And

as the same district court that heard the Texas case has

recently held (and as explained below), the reasoning of

the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas holding DAPA and

the DACA expansion unlawful equally applies to DACA

itself. See Texas v. United States, No. 18-cv-68,

2018 WL 4178970, at *38 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018). Only

this Court can resolve the conflict in the lower courts

and provide much-needed clarity to the government and

DACA recipients alike.

17

More than eight months ago, this Court recognized

the need for an “expeditious[]” resolution of this dispute

in its order denying without prejudice the government’s

earlier petition. 138 S. Ct. 1182. The Court has granted

certiorari before judgment to promptly resolve other

important and time-sensitive disputes. See, e.g., Dames

& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981); United

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686-687 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 584

(1952); cf. Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court

Practice § 4.20, at 287-288 (10th ed. 2013) (collecting

cases where “[t]he public interest in a speedy determination” warranted certiorari before judgment). It

should follow the same course here.

II. THE DECISIONS BELOW ARE WRONG

Review is also warranted because the decisions below are incorrect. DHS’s decision to rescind DACA—a

policy of enforcement discretion—is a classic determination that is “committed to agency discretion by law,”

5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), and therefore unreviewable under

the APA. Even if DHS’s prospective denial of deferred

action were reviewable, that could only be at the behest

of an individual alien after a final order of removal was

entered against the alien. See 8 U.S.C. 1252. In any

event, the decision to rescind the DACA policy is not

arbitrary and capricious, does not violate equal-protection

or due-process principles, and is not otherwise unlawful.

A. DACA’s Rescission Is Unreviewable Under The APA

1. a. The APA precludes review of agency actions

that are “committed to agency discretion by law.”

5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). “Over the years,” this Court has interpreted that provision to apply to various types of

18

agency decisions that “traditionally” have been regarded as unsuitable for judicial review. Lincoln v.

Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993). Section 701(a)(2) precludes review of an agency’s decision not to institute enforcement actions, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831

(1985); an agency’s refusal to reconsider a prior decision

based on an alleged “material error,” I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987)

(BLE); and an agency’s allocation of funds from a lumpsum appropriation, Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 192. Such exercises of discretion, the Court has explained, often require “a complicated balancing of a number of factors

which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.”

Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831.

With respect to an agency’s enforcement discretion

in particular, an agency may “not only assess whether a

violation has occurred,” but “whether agency resources

are best spent on this violation or another”; whether enforcement in a particular scenario “best fits the agency’s overall policies”; and whether the agency “has

enough resources to undertake the action at all.”

Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831. In addition, the Court has

noted that when an agency declines to enforce, it “generally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to

protect.” Id. at 832. In this way and others, agency enforcement discretion “shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long

been regarded as the special province of the Executive

Branch.” Ibid.

b. DHS’s decision to discontinue the DACA policy

falls comfortably within the types of agency decisions

19

that traditionally have been understood as “committed

to agency discretion.” 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). Like the decision to adopt a policy of selective non-enforcement,

the decision whether to retain such a policy can “involve[] a complicated balancing” of factors that are “peculiarly within [the] expertise” of the agency, including

determining how the agency’s resources are best spent

and how the policy fits with the agency’s overall policies.

Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831. Likewise, a decision to abandon an existing non-enforcement policy will not, in itself, bring to bear the agency’s coercive power over any

individual. Indeed, an agency’s decision to reverse a

prior policy of civil non-enforcement is akin to changes

in policy as to criminal prosecutorial discretion, which

regularly occur within the U.S. Department of Justice

both within and between presidential administrations,

and which have never been considered amenable to judicial review. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.

456, 464 (1996).

This presumption of nonreviewability applies with

particular force when it comes to immigration. As this

Court has recognized, the “broad discretion exercised

by immigration officials” has become a “principal feature of the removal system.” Arizona v. United States,

567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012); see 6 U.S.C. 202(5) (2012 &

Supp. V 2017). And, unlike in the ordinary criminal context, a decision not to enforce tolerates not merely past

misconduct but a “continuing violation of United States

law.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490 (1999). Thus, in the absence

of a statutory directive “otherwise circumscribing” the

agency’s discretion, Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833, the Secretary’s decisions establishing DHS’s enforcement priorities for the Nation’s immigration laws are beyond a

20

court’s authority to review. There is no such directive

here.

c. The district courts’ reasons for finding DHS’s decision reviewable are unavailing.

First, it makes no difference that the rescission of

the DACA policy addressed a “broad enforcement

polic[y],” App. 28a, instead of an individual enforcement

decision. See Batalla Vidal App. 29a-30a. Agency decisions about how its “resources are best spent” or how

certain enforcement activity “best fits the agency’s

overall policies,” Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831, are just as

susceptible to implementation through broad guidance

as through case-by-case enforcement decisions. See,

e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 601-603

(1985). And Chaney itself concerned the programmatic

determination whether to enforce the Federal Food,

Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq., with respect to drugs used to administer the death penalty.

See 470 U.S. at 824-825.

Nor does it matter that DHS has eliminated a policy

of non-enforcement, rather than adopted one. App. 29a30a; Batalla Vidal App. 30a. A decision whether to retain a non-enforcement policy implicates all of the same

considerations about agency priorities and resources

that inform the decision to adopt such a policy in the

first instance. And because the rescission does not, by

itself, initiate removal proceedings, “like the FDA’s

non-enforcement decision in Chaney, there are no

agency proceedings here to provide a ‘focus for judicial

review,’ and DACA’s rescission does not itself involve

the exercise of coercive power over any person.”

NAACP App. 33a (citation omitted).

Finally, DHS’s decision is not reviewable simply because it rests on the agency’s view of the legality of the

21

DACA policy, among other independent reasons. App.

30a; Batalla Vidal App. 30a; NAACP App. 42a-43a. An

otherwise unreviewable agency action does not “become[] reviewable” because “the agency gives a ‘reviewable’ reason.” BLE, 482 U.S. at 283. In BLE, the ICC’s

decision not to reconsider a prior decision was therefore

unreviewable, even though the agency based that denial

on an interpretation of its legal obligations under the

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. 482 U.S. at

276, 283. And in Chaney, the Food and Drug Administration’s decision not to enforce the misbranding prohibition did not become reviewable even though it was

based, in part, on the agency’s understanding of its authority to initiate such proceedings. 470 U.S. at 824.

The same is true here.

2. At a minimum, Congress has foreclosed district

courts from adjudicating collateral attacks on DHS’s

discretionary enforcement decisions and policies in the

manner pursued by respondents.

Under 8 U.S.C. 1252, judicial review of DHS enforcement decisions is generally available, if at all, only

through the review procedures of removal orders set

forth in that section. In particular, Section 1252(g)

states that “[e]xcept as provided in this section * * * no

court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim

by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or

action by the [Secretary of Homeland Security] to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this subchapter.”

Section 1252(g) is “designed to give some measure of

protection to ‘no deferred action’ decisions and similar

discretionary determinations, providing that if they are

reviewable at all, they at least will not be made the bases for separate rounds of judicial intervention outside

22

the streamlined process that Congress has designed.”

AADC, 525 U.S. at 485. That design is also reflected in

8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(9), which channels into the review of

final removal orders “all questions of law and fact * * *

arising from any action taken * * * to remove an alien

from the United States.” See AADC, 525 U.S. at 483

(describing Section 1252(b)(9) is an “unmistakable ‘zipper’ clause”); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct.

830, 839-841 (2018) (plurality opinion); id. at 853-857

(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment).

Even in instances where the statutory text less

clearly precludes review, this Court has held that, when

it is fairly discernible that Congress intends a particular

review scheme to be exclusive, a plaintiff is not permitted to circumvent that exclusive scheme by filing a

preemptive district-court action, but must instead present his or her claims or defenses in the manner and to

the extent permitted by that review scheme. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207-209

(1994). The rescission of the DACA policy is precisely

the sort of “ ‘no deferred action’ decision[],” AADC,

525 U.S. at 485, and “part of the process by which

[the alien’s] removability will be determined,” Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (plurality opinion), that Congress intended to channel through the INA’s careful review scheme. Respondents cannot escape that scheme

simply by filing suit before the agency has initiated an

enforcement proceeding against the individual respondents. Respondents’ claims, “if they are reviewable at

all,” must be litigated in removal proceedings, not through

“separate rounds of judicial intervention” in federal district court. AADC, 525 U.S. at 485.

23

B. DACA’s Rescission Is Lawful

Even if DHS’s decision to rescind DACA is reviewable under the APA, it is plainly valid. Under the APA,

the decision must be upheld unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). That standard

of review requires only that the “agency ‘examine the

relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation

for its action.’ ” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (citation omitted). “[A] court is

not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). DHS’s decision to begin

an orderly wind-down of an indisputably discretionary

policy of non-enforcement based on serious doubts

about the legality of the policy, as well as the legal and

practical implications of maintaining such a policy without statutory authority, easily passes that test. The district courts’ contrary conclusions are unpersuasive.

1. The rescission is reasonable in light of DHS’s serious

doubts about the legality of the DACA policy

DHS reasonably rested its decision on the legal and

practical implications of maintaining a policy of nonenforcement (original DACA) that is materially indistinguishable from policies (DAPA and expanded DACA)

that were struck down by the Fifth Circuit in a decision

affirmed by this Court. Particularly in the face of the

threat by Texas and other States to challenge DACA,

that rationale alone provides a permissible reason for

initiating an orderly wind-down of the policy.

a. As an initial matter, the district courts in Regents

and Batalla Vidal erred in concluding that “[t]he Attorney General’s letter and the Acting Secretary’s memorandum can only be reasonably read as stating DACA

24

was illegal and that, given that DACA must, therefore,

be ended.” App. 56a (emphasis omitted); see Batalla

Vidal App. 110a. As the court in NAACP correctly recognized, DACA’s rescission is based on concerns that go

beyond the ultimate legality of DACA. Such concerns

are evident from the original rescission memorandum.

NAACP App. 56a; see Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)

(courts should uphold agency action based on any

ground that “may reasonably be discerned” from the

decision). And any doubt on that score is eliminated by

Secretary Nielsen’s subsequent statement that “regardless of whether the DACA policy is ultimately illegal, it was appropriately rescinded by DHS because

there are, at a minimum, serious doubts about its legality.” App. 123a.

b. That rationale is eminently reasonable. In Texas

v. United States, the Fifth Circuit concluded that DAPA

and expanded DACA were unlawful on both procedural

and substantive grounds. 809 F.3d 134, 178 (2015), aff ’d,

136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); see id. at 147 n.11 (including the

“DACA expansions” within the opinion’s references to

“DAPA”). The entirety of the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning

applies equally to the original DACA policy. With respect to procedure, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the

memorandum creating DAPA and expanding DACA

was not exempt from notice-and-comment as a statement of policy based entirely on how the original DACA

policy had been implemented. See id. at 171-178.

As a matter of substance, the Fifth Circuit held that

DAPA and expanded DACA were contrary to the INA

because (1) “[i]n specific and detailed provisions,” the

INA already “confers eligibility for ‘discretionary re-

25

lief,’ ” including “narrow classes of aliens eligible for deferred action,” Texas, 809 F.3d at 179 (citation omitted);

(2) the INA’s otherwise “broad grants of authority”

could not reasonably be construed to assign to the Secretary the authority to create additional categories of

aliens of “vast ‘economic and political significance,’ ” id.

at 183 (citation omitted); (3) DAPA and expanded

DACA were inconsistent with historical deferred-action

policies because they were not undertaken on a “ ‘countryspecific basis * * * in response to war, civil unrest, or

natural disasters,’ ” nor served as a “bridge[] from one

legal status to another,” id. at 184 (citation omitted);

and (4) “Congress ha[d] repeatedly declined to enact

the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (‘DREAM Act’), features of which closely resemble DACA and DAPA.” Id. at 185 (footnote omitted). Every one of those factors also applies to the original DACA policy. Indeed, the Southern District of

Texas recently determined, “guided by [that] Fifth Circuit precedent,” that the INA could not “ ‘reasonably be

construed’ ” to authorize the maintenance of that policy.

Texas, 2018 WL 4178970, at *38 (citation omitted); see

id. at *45-*47 (finding no material differences between

DAPA and DACA).6

In light of these similarities, DHS could permissibly

rescind the DACA policy based on the agency’s doubts

about the legality of the policy and its likely fate in the

courts. As Secretary Nielsen explained, “[a] central aspect of the exercise of a discretionary enforcement pol-

The Southern District of Texas nevertheless declined to issue a

preliminary injunction enjoining the DACA policy in light of, among

other things, Texas’s delay in seeking injunctive relief. See Texas,

2018 WL 4178970, at *57-*62.

6

26

icy is a judgment concerning whether DHS has sufficient confidence in the legality of such policy.” App.

123a. The “sound reasons” to insist upon such confidence “include the risk that [legally questionable] policies may undermine public confidence in and reliance on

the agency and the rule of law, and the threat of burdensome litigation that distracts from the agency’s

work.” Ibid. The arbitrary-and-capricious standard

does not allow a court “to substitute its judgment” for

such a “rational” explanation by a law-enforcement

agency. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42-43.

c. Contrary to the district courts’ conclusions, DHS

did not fail to sufficiently consider the reliance interests

of DACA recipients. See App. 58a; Batalla Vidal App.

113a-114a; NAACP App. 106a-108a. When President

Obama announced DACA in 2012, he explained that it

was a “temporary stopgap measure,” not a “permanent

fix.” The White House, Remarks by the President on

Immigration (June 15, 2012), https://go.usa.gov/xnZFY.

And, by its own terms, DACA made deferred action

available for only two-year periods, which could “be terminated at any time at the agency’s discretion.” App.

104a. By choosing a gradual and orderly administrative

wind-down of the policy rather than risk an immediate

disruptive court-imposed one, DHS ensured that existing DACA grants would be permitted to expire according to their stated two-year terms and even permitted a

limited window for additional renewals. In any event,

as Secretary Nielsen explained, although the agency

was “keenly aware that DACA recipients have availed

themselves of the policy in continuing their presence in

this country and pursuing their lives,” it reasonably

found that any asserted reliance interests did not “outweigh the questionable legality of the DACA policy” or

27

the other factors the agency considered. App. 125a. As

she observed, “[t]hat is especially so because issues of

reliance would best be considered by Congress, which

can assess and weigh a range of options.” Ibid. The

APA provides no basis to second-guess that judgment.

2. The rescission is reasonable in light of DHS’s

additional and independent policy concerns

DHS’s decision to rescind DACA is independently

supported by several additional enforcement-policy

concerns. Secretary Nielsen explained that “regardless

of whether * * * the DACA policy [is] illegal or legally

questionable, there are sound reasons of enforcement

policy to rescind the DACA policy.” App. 123a. Those

reasons include the agency’s determination that

(1) “DHS should enforce the policies reflected in the

laws adopted by Congress and should not adopt public

policies of non-enforcement of those laws for broad classes and categories of aliens under the guise of prosecutorial discretion”; (2) “DHS should only exercise its

prosecutorial discretion not to enforce the immigration

laws on a truly individualized, case-by-case basis”; and

(3) “it is critically important for DHS to project a message that leaves no doubt regarding the clear, consistent,

and transparent enforcement of the immigration laws

against all classes and categories of aliens,” especially

given that “tens of thousands of minor aliens have illegally crossed or been smuggled across our border in recent years.” App. 123a-124a. Respondents may disagree with these assessments, but they cannot be dismissed as irrational.

The NAACP court criticized these reasons as nothing more than the Secretary’s “attempt to disguise * * *

objection[s] to DACA’s legality as * * * policy justification[s] for its rescission,” NAACP App. 100a, and too

28

“cursory” to serve as an independent basis for DHS’s

decision, id. at 102a-103a. That description, however,

runs directly counter to the Secretary’s explanation

that her policy concerns provided a “separate and independently sufficient” reason for her conclusion that the

DACA policy “properly was—and should be—rescinded.”

App. 122a. The presumption of regularity (and principles of inter-Branch comity) require courts to presume

that executive officials—and certainly Cabinet officials

—are acting in good faith “in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (citation omitted); cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

807 (1982). Neither the fact that the Secretary’s policy

concerns may also inform her view on DACA’s legality,

nor the succinctness of her explanation, provides remotely sufficient evidence to overcome that presumption.7

3. The rescission is reasonable in light of DHS’s correct

determination that DACA is unlawful

Finally, DHS’s decision is also independently supported by its conclusion, informed by the Attorney General’s advice, that indefinitely continuing the DACA policy would itself have been unlawful. As detailed above,

the Fifth Circuit had already concluded that the DAPA

and expanded DACA policies were invalid in a decision

The NAACP court also reasoned that the Secretary’s “messaging” rationale (the third enforcement-policy reason) was an impermissible “post hoc rationalization.” See NAACP App. 94a-95a. But

the court itself acknowledged that the purpose of that proposition

of administrative law is “simply to prevent courts from considering

‘rationales offered by anyone other than the proper decisionmakers.’ ” Id. at 92a (citation omitted). There is no dispute that Secretary Nielsen is a “proper decisionmaker[]” for matters of immigration enforcement policies and priorities. Ibid.; see 6 U.S.C. 202(5)

(2012 & Supp. V 2017).

7

29

that four Justices of this Court voted to affirm. See

pp. 24-25, supra. And the Attorney General expressed

his agreement with the conclusion reached by the Fifth

Circuit in a decision that applies equally to the original

DACA policy. See App. 116a. DHS’s conclusion is correct: DACA is unlawful. Regardless, it cannot be that

DHS’s decision to rescind DACA on the basis of the Fifth

Circuit’s decision, this Court’s equally divided affirmance,

and the Attorney General’s opinion was the type of “clear

error of judgment,” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (citation

omitted), that would make it arbitrary and capricious under the APA.

In Regents and Batalla Vidal, the district courts concluded that DHS could not rely on an assessment of

DACA’s legality unless it is correct as a matter of law.

See App. 42a; Batalla Vidal App. 91a-92a. Relying on

the Secretary’s broad discretion in “[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities,”

6 U.S.C. 202(5) (2012 & Supp. V 2017), and DHS’s “long

and recognized practice” of granting deferred action on

a programmatic basis, those courts concluded that

DACA is lawful. App. 45a; see App. 42a-48a; Batalla

Vidal App. 102a-104a. But the Fifth Circuit rejected

those precise considerations when offered in support of

the DAPA and expanded DACA policies. See Texas,

809 F.3d at 183.

In NAACP, the district court declined to pass on the

legality of DACA, but concluded that DHS did not adequately explain its own view. NAACP App. 49a-52a.

But, as explained above, the Fifth Circuit’s Texas decision provides a robust analysis of the legality of DAPA

and expanded DACA in a manner that applies with full

force to the original DACA policy. See pp. 24-25, supra.

The Duke and Nielsen memoranda make clear that

30

DHS agrees with the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the

DAPA and expanded DACA policies were unlawful under the INA and sees no meaningful distinctions. See

App. 122a (“Any arguable distinctions between the

DAPA and DACA policies are not sufficiently material

to convince me that the DACA policy is lawful.”); App.

117a. The law requires nothing more.

4. The rescission does not violate equal protection or

due process

The district courts also erred in failing to dismiss respondents’ claims that DHS’s actions violate equalprotection or due-process principles.

a. In Regents and Batalla Vidal, the district courts

declined to dismiss respondents’ claim that the rescission violates equal-protection principles incorporated in

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See

App. 83a-87a; Batalla Vidal App. 147a-157a.8 But that

claim is foreclosed by this Court’s decision in AADC,

which imposed a general bar on discriminatory-motive

claims in the immigration-enforcement context. Such

claims, the Court explained, “invade a special province

of the Executive—its prosecutorial discretion.” 525 U.S.

at 489; see Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463-465. And in the

immigration context, this concern is “greatly magnified” because such claims “permit and prolong a continuing violation of United States law,” and also potentially

implicate foreign-policy concerns. AADC, 525 U.S. at

490. Although the district courts relied heavily on thencandidate Trump’s “campaign rhetoric” unconnected to

DACA or DACA recipients, App. 85a; Batalla Vidal

The NAACP court declined to reach the equal-protection challenge to the rescission in light of its statutory holding. See NAACP

App. 67a.

8

31

App. 152a-153a, neither court suggested that such

statements trigger AADC ’s sole potential exception, reserved for “a rare case in which the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be overcome.” 525 U.S. at 491. Indeed,

even apart from AADC, the President’s statements are

wholly insufficient to suggest that Secretaries Duke and

Nielsen were motivated by racial animus in deciding to

rescind a policy sanctioning the ongoing violation of federal immigration law by 700,000 aliens, especially given

the serious questions about its legality.

b. The Regents court also found that the respondents

adequately stated a claim under substantive due process

based on DHS’s alleged change in its informationsharing policy for personal information gathered from

DACA requestors. App. 79a-81a. But there has been

no such change and respondents have failed to plausibly

allege otherwise. See DHS Information-Sharing Guidance; see also Batalla Vidal App. 159a-160a (dismissing

a similar claim on that basis); NAACP App. 71a-72a

(same). Nor would any change to the scope of exceptions to the information-sharing policy violate substantive due process, especially given DHS’s express reservation of rights to do so. See pp. 4-5, supra.9

The district courts also erred in enjoining the rescission of

DACA on a nationwide basis. For the reasons given by Justice

Thomas in his concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,

2424-2429 (2018), such relief exceeded the Article III power of the

court to remedy the concrete and particular injuries of the parties

before it; is inconsistent with longstanding equitable principles; and

undermines the sound administration of the federal court system.

9

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III. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BEFORE

JUDGMENT IN ALL THREE CASES

To ensure an adequate vehicle for the timely and definitive resolution of this dispute, the Court should

grant the government’s petitions in Regents, Batalla

Vidal, and NAACP, and consolidate the cases for further review.

A. This petition in Regents presents both of the

questions presented and all of the relevant claims, including that the rescission of DACA is arbitrary and capricious; denies respondents equal protection and due

process; and violates the APA’s requirement for noticeand-comment rulemaking. Although the district court’s

preliminary injunction rests only on respondents’

arbitrary-and-capricious claim, the district court addressed the remaining claims in its orders denying the

government’s motion to dismiss all of respondents’

claims on reviewability and merits grounds. By virtue

of the Ninth Circuit’s acceptance of the interlocutory

appeals of those orders and consolidation, a grant of

certiorari before judgment would bring before the

Court the entire case. Accordingly, this petition should

be granted.

B. As fully explained in the NAACP petition, the related cases before the D.C. Circuit also raise both questions presented. Respondents in those cases likewise

claim that the rescission is arbitrary and capricious; denies respondents equal protection and due process; and

violates the APA’s procedures concerning notice-andcomment rulemaking. In NAACP, however, respondents do not present some of the more tangential claims

against the rescission, including, for example, that the

rescission violates principles of equitable estoppel. The

district court, moreover, did not pass on any constitutional

33

challenges to the rescission. Nevertheless, the Court

should also grant certiorari in NAACP because that court

invited Secretary Nielsen’s supplemental memorandum,

and it is the only district court to have passed on the effect

of that memorandum on the questions presented.

C. Finally, as fully explained in the Batalla Vidal petition, the consolidated cases before the Second Circuit

at issue in Batalla Vidal in many ways replicate the consolidated cases before the Ninth Circuit at issue here.

The respondents in each set of cases present essentially

the same challenges to the rescission of DACA, and the

district courts entered identical nationwide preliminary

injunctions based exclusively on respondents’ arbitraryand-capricious claims. Because an order vacating the

injunction issued in Regents would have no practical

consequence unless the injunction in Batalla Vidal was

similarly vacated, the Court should at least hold the Batalla Vidal petition pending resolution of the other petitions. But to ensure that no developments in the lower

courts between the filing of this petition and the Court’s

resolution of the case undermine the Court’s ability to

provide a definitive resolution of this overall dispute,

the government respectfully submits that the Court

should also issue a writ of certiorari to the Second Circuit.

* * * * *

In 2012, DHS adopted a temporary, stop-gap policy of

enforcement discretion, allowing some 700,000 aliens to

remain in the United States even though existing laws

provided them no ability to do so. After a change in administrations, DHS announced that it was ending that policy based on serious doubts about its legality and the practical implications of maintaining it. Secretary Nielsen has

since made clear that DHS’s decision also rests on policy

considerations wholly apart from any legality concerns. It

34

is plainly within DHS’s authority to set the Nation’s immigration enforcement priorities and to end the discretionary DACA policy. By order of two district courts,

however, DHS has been required to maintain that policy

on a nationwide basis for over a year, even while efforts

by the President and others to provide a sound legal basis

for the policy through the legislative process have failed.

More than eight months ago, this Court recognized that

this dispute called for an expeditious resolution. That is

even more evident today. The Court should grant review

in these cases and ensure that it can provide a timely and

definitive resolution of the dispute this Term.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment

should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Solicitor General

JOSEPH H. HUNT

Assistant Attorney

General

JEFFREY B. WALL

Deputy Solicitor General

HASHIM M. MOOPPAN

Deputy Assistant Attorney

General

JONATHAN Y. ELLIS

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

MARK B. STERN

ABBY C. WRIGHT

THOMAS PULHAM

Attorneys

NOVEMBER 2018

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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