Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Andres Mata, Petitioner v. Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANDRES MATA, TDCJ-CID #1297972

PETITIONER

-

(Your Name)

vs.

LORIE DAVIS, Director, TDCJ-CID_ RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF. APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS NUMBER 17-10052

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Andres Mata, Pro Se

(Your Name)

TDJ-CID #1297972, Connally Unit, 899 FM 632

(Address)

KenMy, T,cs 78119

(City, State, Zip Code)

NA

(Phone Number)

QUESTION(S) PREsNTEfl

Whether a federal court of appeals' determination that a habeas

petitioner failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right is proper when the state court of appeals on

direct appeal determined that the petitioner's federal constitutional rights were violated.

11

LIST OF PARTIES

[Xi All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[I All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONSBELOW........................................................................................................1

JURISDICTION...................................................................................................................2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................................3

STATEMENTOF THE CASE ............................................................................................4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT..........................................................................6

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................... ..14

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Refusal to Grant Petition for

Discretionary Review With Justice Meyers Dissenting Stating

He Would Grant

APPENDIX B: Texas Court of Appeals Opinion

APPENDIX C: Federal District Court Denial of Habeas Petition and Denial

of COA With Magistrate Judge's Memorandum

APPENDIX D: Fifth Circuit Single Judge Denial of COA

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

PAGE

CASES

Blake v. State, 365 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex.Crim.App.1963) ....................9

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993) .........................10

Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) ...............8, 9

Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) ..................8

Cox v. State, 523 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) ......................9

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ..................................9

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) .............9 12

.,

13, 14

Fry v. Piller, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007) ...................................11

Hinojosa v. State, 788 S.W.2d 594, 600 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990,

pet. ref'd) ............................................................. 8

Jackson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 864, 868 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) ..................8

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) ........................7, 10

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) ..................................8

Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544, 550-51 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) ................9

STATUTES AND RULES

28 U.S.C. § 1746.......................................................14, 15

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) .......................................ii, 3, 6, 7, 10

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) .............................................3,i2, 14

28 U.S.C. § 22.54(d)(2) ..............................................3, 12, 14

S. Ct. R. 10(c) ............................................................7

'rEX R APP P 44 2(a) ......................................................12

.

.

.

.

.

Texas Rules of Evidence Handbook 597 (4th ed. 2001) .......................12

V

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[xi For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is

I)

[I reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[X] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix C to

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[I has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[xi is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix

to the petition and is

[I reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the

appears at Appendix

court

-

to the petition and is

[I reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[I is unpublished.

1.

to

JURISDICTION

[X] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was My 1, 2018

lix] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date:

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

,

and a copy of the

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including

in Application No.

(date) on ____________________ (date)

A______

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ I An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including

Application No.

(date) on

(date) in

A_______

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

A. U.S. Const. amend. VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State

and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which

district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be

confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

B. 28 U.S.C. § 2253

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals

from—

the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State

court; or

the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph

(1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.

C. 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of

the claim—

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural History

Petitioner ANDRES MATA (Mr. Mata) filed his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus on January 20, 2015, attacking his state-court conviction

of

aggravated sexual assault and his life sentence (Dkt. No. 3). The federa

l

district court denied the petition and.a certificate of appealability

(COA)

on December,-23, 2016 (Attached, Appendix C). On May 1, 2018, a single judge

of the court of appeals denied Mr. Mata's COA. application (Attached

Appendix D).

Statement of Facts

Mr. Mata was tried, by jury. in Texas district court for aggravated

sexual assault, which allegedly occurred at about 3:30 a.m on April 19,

2003 (1 CR 2-3). He was convicted and sentenced to a mandatory life

sentence (4 BR 53, 69). His defense was that the sexual encounter was

consensual (see e.g. 3 RR 64,,81; 4 RR 44, 50-51). He attempted to presen

t

evidence that. would support a defense that the complainant was involved

in

a scam to sue the apartment complex where the alleged offense took place,

but the trial court would not allow him to present that evidence (see e.g.

3 BR 206-07; 3 BR 236--37; 2 BR 8-9; 1 CR 22). The State presented only one

witness to. the sexual encounter,, Courtney Ellis (the complainant).1

Before the trial, the State filed a motion in liiiiine requesting that

the defense not mention any civil litigation in which the complainant was

1. (IR' refers to the state trial court clerk's record. 'R" refers to the state

reporter Is record (statamt of fats). Both 'tB' arri 'R" are ixe.ehI by a volinE

rinfrr

an folliI by a çege ru±er,. 'Mt. ND." refers to the docket aitry ru±er in the fed

eral

district cwrt.

4

a

party (1 CR 22; 2 1R 8-9). This included a civil lawsuit for "tons of

money" filed by the complainant against the apartment complex where the

alleged offense took place and Mr. Mata. 'Defense counsel objected and made

a bill of exception, arguing that such a restriction of evidence violated

Mr. Mata's right to confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution (3 RR 206-07; 3 RR 236-37). The judge overruled

(3 RR 206-07; 3 BR 236-37).

Defense counsel sought to introduce evidence that the complainant

filed a civil lawsuit against Mr. Mata and the apartment complex seeking

tons of money (1 CR 22; 2 RR 8-9; 3 BR 206-7; 3 RR 236-37). Counsel

informed the judge during his objections and his bill of exception that

"[d]uring the pendency of this litigation—this case, I have observed a

representative from her attorney, Frank Branson's office has been here the

entire time as well as one of the two people she's suing in this case,

which is the apartment complex" (3 BR 206-07). "The Court has been around

longer than I have and the Court is obviously aware of the elite personal

injury lawyer that Mr. Branson is" (3 RR 236-37). "I'll represent to the

Court that I've been contacted by the apartment complex's attorneys I've

seen them here today, and I've seen Mr. Branson's representatives here

today" (3 RR 236-37).

Defense counsel sought permission to cross-examine the complainant

"and possibly other witnessese about what their involvement is and what Mr.

Branson's office has done to prosecute the lawsuit against the apartment

complex and Mr. Mata" (3 RR 236-37). The judge denied defense counsel's

request (3 RR 206).

5

-

During closing arguments, the element of consent was a hotly contested issue

(see e.g. 4 RR 31-32; 4 RR 40-43; 4 RR 44). What's more is that the prosecutor assured the jury that there was no "motivation to come and frame him"

and no civil lawsuit to "get a huge judgment of money" against him and the

apartment complex (4IR 46-47). Defense counsel immediately objected

stating that such argument was a violation of the State's own motion in

limine and that the prosecutor's argument was improper (4 RR 46-47). The

judge overruled the objection (4 RR 46-47).

C. Direct Appeal

The Texas court of appeals determined that the trial court violated Mr.

Mata's Sixth Amendment. right of confrontation when it denied him permission

to cross-examine the complainant regarding the civil lawsuit but that

sufficient harm was not shown for reversal of the conviction (Attached

Appendix B, pp. 4-5). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Mr.

Mata's petition for discretionary review with Justice Meyers dissenting and

stating he would grant the petition (Attached Appendix A). This Court

denied certiorari review. See Mata v. Texas, 555 U.S. 845 (2008).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The United States court of appeals has decided an important question of

federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has

decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant

decisions of this Court, in that a single judge of the court of appeals

determined that Mr. Mata did not make a substantial showing of the denial of

a constitutional right under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), notwithstanding the

fact that the state court of appeals on direct appeal determined that the

trial court violated Mr. Mata's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. See

1.1

S. Ct. R. 10(c).

Section 2253(c)(2) requires only a substantial showing of the denial of

a constitutional right. Once a defendant on state direct appeal has persuaded the state court of appeals that the trial court deprived the defendant of a federal constitutional right, § 2253(c)(2) has been satisfied.

This case is of national importance because the AEDPA and 2253(c)(2)

are not meant to serve as a complete bar to appeal a federal district

court's denial of a habeas petition, but that's precisely what happened

here: the lower courts used AEDPA and § 2253(c)(2) to serve as a complete

bar to an appeal of the district court's ruling. When a state appellate

court determines that a trial court has deprived the defendant of a federal

constitutional right, a COA should issue under 28 U.S.C.. § 2253(c.)(2).

ARGUMENT

Question Restated

Whether a federal court of appeals' determination that a habeas

petitioner failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right is proper when the state court of appeals on

direct appeal determined that the petitioner's federal constitutional rights were violated.

A prisoner is entitled to a COA if he makes "a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

Here, the state court of appeals on direct appeal determined that the

trial, court deprived Mr. Mata of the right to confront and cross-examine the

only witness present at the time this alleged rape took place, the

complainant, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, but a single judge of the federal court of appeals determined

7

that Mr. Mata did not even make even a substantial showing of the denial of

a constitutional right (see Attached Appendix B, Opinion of State Court of

Appeals and Appendix D, Fifth Circuit Single Judge Order Denying COA).

To keep this simple, here's how the state appellate court ruled:

In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred

by limiting his cross-examination of Ellis. Specifically, appellant contends the trial court erred by refusing appellant the

opportunity to cross-examine Ellis concerning a civil suit

against appellant and the apartment complex in which Ellis lived.

We agree.

Prior to trial, the State filed a. motion in limine seeking to

exclude any mention of civil litigation in which Ellis was a

party. Before the close of the evidence, appellant requested the

opportunity to introduce evidence of the lawsuit to show bias.

The trial court stated it would "keep the motion in limine the

way it is," but allowed appellant to make a bill of exceptions.

Counsel then stated, among other things, that Ellis had filed a

lawsuit against appellant and the apartment complex where she

lived and that evidence of the lawsuit would show a motive to

"overdramatize to capitalize on the fact that she was raped at

this apartment complex."

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

a defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. See

U.S. Const. amend. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406

(1965). The trial court violates a defendant's right of confrontation when it limits appropriate cross-examination. Carroll v.

State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). A party should

be allowed to show all facts that tend to demonstrate bias,

interest, prejudice, or any other motive, mental state, or status

of the witness that, fairly considered and construed, might even

remotely tend to affect the witness's credibility. Hinojosa v.

State, 788 S.W.2d 594, 600 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet.

ref'd). Evidence to show bias or interest of a witness covers a

wide range and "encompasses all facts and circumstances, which

when tested by human experience, tend to show that a witness may

shade his testimony for the purpose of helping to establish one

side of the cause only." Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 497 (quoting

Jackson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 864, 868 (Tex.Crim.App.1972)). Any

motive that operates on. the mind of.: a 'witness during testimony is

material to the trial because of its effect on the witness's

credibility. See Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex.

Crim.App.1977). Nevertheless, the scope of appropriate crossexamination is not unlimited. Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 498. A

trial court may limit the scope of cross-examination to prevent

harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, harm to the

[1

witnesses, and repetitive or marginally relevant interrogation.

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 676, 679 (1986); Carroll, 916

S.W.2d at 498.

Cross-examination regarding a civil suit maybe appropriate to

show an interest or bias on the part of the witness. See Davis

V. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); Carroll, 916 S.W.2rat 498;

Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544, 550-51 (Tex.Crim.App.1991);

Blake v. State, 365 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex.Crim.App.1963). Thus,

when a witness has a pending civil suit against the defendant

arising out of the same incident, evidence of the pending suit is

admissible to show the pecuniary interest and bias of the

witness. See Cox v.. State, 523 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Tex.Crim.App.

1975).

Here, Ellis filed a civil lawsuit against appellant and the

apartment complex where she lived regarding the incident at

issue. Thus, Ellis had an economic motive to shade her testimony

against appellant and appellant should have been able to crossexamine Ellis on the general nature of the lawsuit. See id.

Such cross-examination would not have confused the issues, harmed

or harassed Ellis, was not repetitive, and was more than marginally relevant to show bias. We conclude, therefore, that the

trial court erred in failing to allow appellant to cross-examine

Ellis regarding the civil suit against appellant and the apartment complex.

[T]he trial court improperly excluded [this evidence] at the

State's request in violation of appellant's constitutional right

of confrontation.

(Attached Appendix B, pp. 2-4, 6.)

Indeed, the state appellate court was correct because the trial court

did violate Mr. Mata's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine

the complainant. The fact that the only witness to the act alleged to

support the criminal complaint and the only witness, who directly denied

that the act of intercourse was consensual, sued the apartment complex for

tons of money clearly reflected on the complainant's pecuniary interest and

bias. The right to cross-examine for the purpose of affecting a witness's

credibility is twofold: A defendant may ask a witness any question to

which the answer may have a tendency to affect her credibility; if she

denies anything that would show a motive for, or animus to, testify against

the defendant, it may be shown by other witnesses and by independent facts.

When the trial court improperly denies the opportunity to ask a

question and receive the witness's answer for fact-finder consideration,

the trial court concomitantly denies the right to establish facts that

illustrate the true circumstances bearing on the issue by extrinsic proof.

In such a case the accused's right to effective confrontation is thoroughly

frustrated. Hence, Mr. Mata makes a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right and he therefore qualifies for aCOA under 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336.

Moreover, sufficient harm is shown for a federal court to vacate the

state-court conviction and sentence. This Court has held that a federal

habeas court may not grant relief on trial errors unless the petitioner

demonstrates that the error "had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). As shown below, Mr. Mata can meet this burden and

show that this constitutional violation had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.

In this case, the State argued that this was not a consensual sexual

encounter (4 RR 31-32). Defense counsel responded that the State did not

prove that this was not a consensual encounter (4 RR 40-44). The

prosecutor then struck a foul,blow; and according to the opinion of the

state court of appeals, "it was an intentional misstatement regarding

evidence which the trial court improperly excluded at the State's request

in violation of appellant's constitutional right of confrontation. As

10

such, it was improper and we conclude the trial court erred by overruling

appellant 's objection" (Attached Appendix B, p. 6). Here's what happened:

What in the world can possibly be her motivation to come frame

him? Do you think he's got a lot of money? Do you think she's

going to go after him in a civil suit—

Judge-and get a huge judgment against him?

Judge. I apologize. That is a violation of the State's own

motion in limine. Improper argument.

All right.

I'm just responding to his argument.

I'll overrule the objection.

(4 RR 46-47).

The trial court's exclusion of this defensive evidence regarding the

impending lawsuit had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict because it effectively precluded Mr. Mata

-

from presenting his defense that the sex was consensual and that this was

some sort of scam for tons of money—and the State capitalized on this

constitutional violation by misleading the jury to believe that there was

no lawsuit when in fact there was a lawsuit.

Finally, the state court's harmless error determination was objectively unreasonable. See Fry v. Piller, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007) ("when a

state court determines that a constitutional violation is harmless, a

federal court may not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable." (emphasis in original)).

On the one hand, the state court's harmless error determination was an

objectively unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

11

evidence presented in the state court proceedings because the judge's ruling

had the effect of preventing Mr. Mata from adequately presenting his case.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). "[W]hen the judge's ruling has the effect of

preventing one of the parties from adequately presenting its case, the

judge's discretion may be deemed 'unreasonable' and reversible." Texas

Rules of Evidence Handbook 597 (4th ed. 2001) (citation omitted).

On the other hand, the state-court harmless error determination was

based on an unreasonable application of federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986), because

the state courts placed too little weight on the importance of the complainant's testimony and too much weight on the third, fourth, and fifth factors

set out in Van Arsdall, at 684, when the third, fourth, and fifth factors

carried no weight at all in the State's favor. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The state court of appeals conducted the following harmless error

review:

Having concluded that the trial court erred, we must reverse the

judgment unless we can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that

the error did not contribute to the conviction. See TEX.R .APP .P.

44.2(a). When making such a determination, we must first assume

that the damaging potential of the cross-examination was fully

realized, see Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. With that assumption

in mind, we review the entire record and consider the following

factors: (1) the importance of the witness's testimony in the

prosecution's case; (2) whether the testimony was zcumulative; .(3)

the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting

the testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of

cross-examination otherwise permitted; and, (5) the overall

strength of the prosecution's case. Id. Finally, we determine

whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

We will address each of these considerations in turn. Without

question, Ellis's testimony was vital to the State's case. As

the complaining witness, she was the only witness to testify

directly about the charged crime. Thus, without her testimony the

State could not have established the elements of - the offense.

And, because she was the only witness to testify directly about

12

the sexual assault, her testimony was not cumulative. With

respect to evidence corroborating Ellis's testimony, the record

shows (1) the DNA analysis on the vaginal smear collected from

Ellis matched a DNA sample from appellant; (2) Vicki Sheahan, a

resident in the apartment complex saw appellant near the parking

garage two hours before Ellis was assaulted; and (3) when appellant was arrested, he had the ring taken from Ellis during the

assault. Other than Ellis's testimony regarding the civil lawsuit, the trial court did not limit the extent of appellant's

cross-examination. Finally, the overall strength of the State's

case was strong. After considering the relevant factors, we

conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Attached Appendix B, pp. 4-5.)

The State appellate court's harmless error determination was objectively unreasonable for these reasonsThe complainant's testimony was so important to the prosecution's case that without it, the prosecution had no evidence

that the sex was without the complainant's consent (see e.g.

Attached Appendix B, p. 5).

The improperly excluded evidence was not cumulative (see e.g.

Attached Appendix B, p:. 5).

The State presented no evidence that corroborated the

complainant's testimony on the material point that the sex

was without consent (see e.g. Appendix B, p. 5).

The trial court otherwise did not permit Mr. Mata to present

other witnesses regarding the lawsuit about what their

involvement was and what elite personal injury lawyer Frank

Branson's office had done to prosecute the lawsuit against

both Mr. Mata and the apartment complex (see 3 RR 206-07; 3

RR 236-37; 1 CR 22; 2 RR 8-9).

The overall strength of the State's case was so weak that the

State could not establish the elements of the charged offense

without the complainant's testimony (see e.g. Attached

Appendix B, p. 5).

Hence, the state-court harmless error determination was based both on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceedings and an unreasonable application of

federal law, as determined by this Court in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475

13

U.S. at 684. see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2).

CONCLUSION

The Fifth circuit erred when it denied Mr. Mata's COA application. Mr.

Mata has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

The confrontation clause violation in his trial had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. And the

state-court harmless error determination was objectively unreasonable.

The Petition for Writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

/)

ANDRES MATA, Pro- Se

TDCJ-CID #1297972

Connally Unit

899 FM 632

Kenedy, Texas 78119

Date:

DECLARATION

"I, ANDRES MATA, TDcJ-CID #1297972, presently incarcerated in

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions

Division, at the Connally Unit, in Karnes County, Texas, declare

under the penalty of perjury under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing statements are true and correct and that I placed this

Petition in a postpaid package in the prison mailing system on

this day.

"EXECUTED on this the .2 day of Jh..L4

4JcL4__g /VWc

ANDRES MATA

14

,

2018 ."