Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Maceo Gant, Petitioner v. Thomas Winn, Warden

fSupreme Court, U.S.

FILED

I

JUL 3 0 2018

No.

OFFICE OF THE CLER K

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MACEO GANT- PETITIONER

VS.

THOMAS WINN-RESPONDENT

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MACEO GANT#222084

PETITIONER IN PRO SE

SAGINAW CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

9625 PIERCE ROAD

FREELAND, MICHIGAN 48623

[ii

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the sixth circuit had warrant to assume

jurisdiction and consider petitioner's unresolved

challenges to his state court plea conviction, where the

district court never issued a final decision when it

disposed of some of the claims petitioner presented in his

habeas petition, but less than all of them.

[ii]

LIST OF PARTIES

The caption set out above contains the names of all the parties.

[iii]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE No.

OPINIONS BELOW

1

JURISDICTION

11

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1-8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

8-9

ARGUMENT

9-11

The sixth circuit did not have warrant to assume jurisdiction

and consider petitioner's unresolved challenges to his state

court plea conviction, where the district court never issued a

final decision when it disposed of some of the claims petitioner

presented in his habeas petition, but less than all of them.

12

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICES

The decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Michigan denying Petitioner habeas relief,

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

Petitioner's District Court Motion for a Certificate of Appealability

The District Court's Order Denying Petitioner's District Court Motion

for a Certificate of Appealability.

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

Petitioner's Sixth Circuit Motion for a Certificate of Appealability

APPENDIX E

Sixth Circuit's Order Granting Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability

APPENDIX F: Petitioner's Sixth Circuit Opening Brief.

APPENDIX G: Sixth Circuit's Judgment on Appeal.

[iv]

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

PAGE No:

CASES:

Arizonans for Official English vArizona, 520 U.S. 43; 117 S. Ct. 1055; 137 L Ed 2d

170(1997) ................................................................................................... 12

Bousley v United States, 523 U.S. 614; 118 S. Ct. 1604; 140 L Ed 2d 828 (1998)......9

Collins vMiller, 252 U.S. 364; 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L Ed 445 (1919)......................9, 10

Corcoran vLevenhagen, 558 U.S. 1 130 S. Ct. 8, 175 L Ed 2d 1 (2009).............9, 11

Holcombe vMcKusick, 61 U.S. 552; 15 L Ed 1020 (1857).....................................9

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 96 S. Ct. 1202, 47 L Ed 2d 435

(1976).........................................................................................................10

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v Doyle, 429 U.S. 274; 97 S. Ct. 568; 50 L

Ed2d 471 (1977)..........................................................................................11

Peter vZook, 803 F 3d 694 (4th Cir. 2015).........................................................11

Schlup vDelo, 513 U.S. 298; 115 S. Ct. 851; 130 L Ed 2d 808 (1995)......................9

Sears, Roebuck & Co., vMackey, 351 U.S. 427; 76 S. Ct. 895; 100 L Ed 1297 (1956)

............................................................................................9,10

Steel Co. v Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83; 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L Ed 2d 210

(1988).........................................................................................................10

PAGE NO.

STATUTES AND RULES:

28 U.S.C. §2253 ........................................................................................... 10

28U.S.C.1291 ........................................................................................... 10

S.CtR10(a) ................................................................................................ 12

{v]

CITATIONS OF OPINIONS AND ORDERS IN CASE

The district court opinion and order denying Petitioner habeas relief, Gant v

Winn, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64679 (E.D. Mich Apr. 28, 2017), is set forth as

Appendix A.

The district court order denying Petitioner a certificate of appealability is set

forth as Appendix C.

The order of the Sixth Circuit granting Petitioner a Certificate of

Appealability, Gant v Winn, No. 17-1581, (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2017)(order), is set forth

as Appendix E.

The Sixth Circuit judgment on appeal denying Petitioner relief, Gant v Winn,

2018 U.S. App LEXIS 13406 (6th Cir. May 22, 2018)(order), is set forth as Appendix

G.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This petition for certiorari follows the unpublished order of the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals, entered on May 22, 2018. In that order, the Sixth Circuit affirmed

the judgment of the District Court, but it did not have jurisdiction, under either 28

U.S.C. §2253(a) or 28 U.S.C. §1291, to issue a certificate of appealability or to

review the district court's decision, because the judgment of the District Court

denying Petitioner relief was not a final, appealable decision. Jurisdiction to review

the Sixth Circuit's order is conferred on this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

11

STATUTES INVOLVED

1. The statutes under which Petitioner appealed were 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c),

which provides:

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of

appeals from—

the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which

the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a

State court; or;

the final order in a proceeding under section 2255;

A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1)

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.

The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall

indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing

required by paragraph (2);

and

2. 28 U.S.C. §1291, which provides:

The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of

appeals from all final decisions of district courts of the United

States, the United States District Court of the Canal Zone, the

District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin

Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the

Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the

jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of

this Title [28 U.S.C. §1292(c) and (d) and 12951

111

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State of Michigan arrested and charged, the PetitionerAppellant, Maceo

Gant, ("Petitioner"), with three counts of first degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich

Comp Laws 750.520(1)(a) and Mich Comp Laws 750.520b(2)(b) one count of second

degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich Comp Laws 750.520c(1)(b) and being a fourth

time habitual felony offender, Mich Comp Laws 750.12; after the victim's mother

accused him of sexually molesting his young step-daughter. Petitioner received

appointed counsel, who subsequently recommended that he plead no contest to

some charges in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges.

Petitioner, following his arrest, informed his attorney that he had a long

history of mental health problems and requested that counsel investigate his

mental health history. MRFJ, pp. 8-10, R.E. 7, #7. In fact, Petitioner "informed his

counsel on at least two occasions that he suffered long term mental health

problems, had been hospitalized before in a psychiatric ward, and had been taking

psychotropic medications." MRFJ, p. 8, R.E. 7, #7. Counsel refused to do so.

Instead, counsel pressed on with plea negotiations and with an insistence that

Petitioner enter a no contest plea. At the August 2012 plea hearing, counsel

admitted, "I did advise my client of our discussions at sidebar and the plea

negotiations with regards to this case. He's been fully aware

-

he's been made fully

aware of the plea negotiations that have been placed on the record and my efforts

with those." Plea Hr'g Tr, pp. 9-10; R.E. 7, #2.

[ii

Following his attorney's advice, Petitioner pled no contest to a plea

agreement for one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of

second-degree criminal sexual conduct for the dismissal of the remaining charges.

Plea Hr'g Tr, pp. 3, 6 R.E. 7, #2. The plea agreement also included a

recommendation for the court to Petitioner sentence within the sentencing guideline

range of 225 months to 375 months or life. Plea Hr'g Tr, p. 3, R.E. 7, #2. On

September 19, 2012, the state court sentenced Petitioner to a term of life

imprisonment on Count 3 and a term of not less than 114 months and more than

fifteen years on Count 4.

Petitioner appealed his convictions by right. On appeal, he informed

appellate counsel about evidence of his mental health history and requested

appellate counsel to raise a claim of ineffective assistance against his trial counsel

for failing to investigate that history of mental illness. MRFJ, pp. 8-10, R.E. 7, #7.

Instead, his appellate attorney filed a motion for resentencing and an evidentiary

hearing in the trial court. MRFJ, pp. 8-10, R.E. 7, #7. Even though the trial court

granted appellate attorney's request for an evidentiary hearing, appellate counsel

failed to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the hearing, or on

appeal, when given an opportunity to do so. MRFJ, pp. 8-10, R.E. 7, #7.

Appellate counsel argued during the evidentiary hearing "there was no

indication that the defense attorney even discussed the guidelines with Gant [and]

there's nothing on the record, other than to say 'We understand that this is the offer

and there's nothing else going on." 05-24-2013, Mt Trans at 6:20-22; RE 7; #4.

[21

Appellate counsel went on to state that she did not "believe that Gant believed that

he would be sentenced within that range. I don't think that was explained to him."

05-24-2013, Mt Trans at 74-7 RE 7; #4. Even assuming, for the sake of argument,

that appellate counsel was unaware of the aforementioned memorandum composed

by trial counsel, she could not disavow knowledge of it when the prosecutor went on

the record stating that trial counsel had indeed submitted such a document. 05-242013, Mt Trans at 11:9-14; RE 7 #4.

Continuing the colloquy, appellate counsel stated that she "appreciated the

prosecutor's remark" and that "[tihe reason we are here is because the trial attorney

didn't do what she was supposed to do." 05-24-2013, Mt Trans at 12:8-9; RE 7 #4.

The state trial court practically invited appellate counsel to state an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, but counsel declined to do so. The court denied

Petitioner relief on March 18, 2013. MRFJ, pp. 8-10, R.E. 7, #7.

After exhausting his claims with the state courts, Petitioner filed a timely

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, with the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. He raised four basic

claims in his petition. First, he alleged that his trial counsel performed ineffectively

by failing to investigate and present evidence of his mental health problems, which

could have supported an insanity defense or mitigated his sentence. Second, he

alleged that his trial counsel performed ineffectively by incorrectly informing him

about the nature of the charges he faced and the length of his potential sentence.

For his third claim, Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel performed ineffectively

[3]

by sending a memorandum to the sentencing judge at resentencing and reading

inflammatory statements from that memorandum into the record then. Petitioner

argued in his fourth claim that his appellate attorney performed ineffectively by

failing to raise those issues on direct appeal and that appellate counsel's deficient

performance constituted cause to excuse the procedural default of his ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claims.

The District Court only acknowledged two of Petitioner's claims in the

judgment it entered to deny him relief. It resolved two of Petitioner's habeas claims

and left the other two unresolved. In the end, the District Court denied Petitioner

habeas relief by concluding that the state court reasonably found that he did not

make the requisite showing of prejudice. In addition, because the District Court

found that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was meritless, it

concluded that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of appellate claim lacked merit as

well. Gant v Winn, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64679 (E.D. Mich Apr. 28, 2017).

Petitioner alerted the District Court that its judgment was not final. After

timely filing his notice of appeal with the District Court, Petitioner followed it up

with a motion for certificate of appealability and an application to proceed on appeal

in forma pauperis. He listed the following as the first issue he wanted the District

Court to certify for appeal:

Did the District Court's failure to make an individualized

determination of each claim raised in the petition in

considering whether or not to grant a certificate of

appealability, where the court only addressed two of

Petitioner's four claims, result in an abuse of discretion?

[41

See Appendix B. Although the District Court did acknowledge Petitioner's request,

it did not certify it or any of the other fifteen he presented. See Appendix C.

On appeal, Petitioner filed a motion for a certificate of appealability in the

Sixth Circuit contesting the District Court's failure to dispose of all the grounds he

asserted in his habeas petition. His specific contention was that he "raised four

basic claims in his petition" but "[tihe court

.

.

.

only acknowledged two of them."

Petitioner informed the Sixth Circuit as to how, "[o]n page 1 of the [district] court's

opinion, the court stated: '[tihe petition raises two claims: petitioner's trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to (1) challenge the charges or seek a lesser sentence

based [on] petitioner's mental illness, and (2) raise claim (1) on direct appeal."

(Emphasis added). He then provided the following assertions in support of his

contention

Worse than that, the court entered an order denying Petitioner

a COA without making an individualized determination of each

claim Petitioner raised in his petition. The District Court's

order denying the COA was stated in general terms, so a jurist

could conclude that the District Court did not make a

determination on any of Petitioner's claims whatsoever. At the

very least, the court's order can only be interpreted as silent on

two of Petitioner's claims, whichever ones they were. What is

beyond debate is that the District Court failed to make an

individual determination on all four of Petitioner's claims. In

that case, reasonable jurists could debate whether the District

Court's order was debatable or wrong, in light of Murphy [v

Ohio, 551 F 3d 485, 492 (6th Cir. 2009)] and Slack [v McDaniel,

529 US 473, 120 5 Ct 1595, 146 L Ed 2d 542 (2000)].

(Emphasis added). See Appendix D.

The Sixth Circuit granted Petitioner's request but restricted briefing to three

specific issues. The Court instructed Petitioner to file a brief that addressed:

[51

whether trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to

investigate his history of mental health problems and pursue

an insanity defense;

whether appellate counsel perform ineffectively by failing to

argue that trial counsel unreasonably failed to investigate his

mental health problems and raise an insanity defense; and

whether the District Court err by failing to address his

claims that (a) trial counsel performed ineffectively by

incorrectly informing him about the charges and penalties that

he faced and making prejudicial and inflammatory statements

to the sentencing judge and (b) appellate counsel performed

ineffectively by failing to raise these issues on appeal.

Gant v Winn, No. 17-1581, slip op. at 4 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2017)(order).

Petitioner filed the brief. Within the jurisdictional statement section,

Petitioner, in spite of his declarations to the contrary, make it known that, "There

remain[ed] a question whether the judgment appealed from is 'final' within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1291, because the District Court disposed of less than all of

Mr. Gant's asserted grounds in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus." See

Appendix F.

Petitioner later presented the following argument when he briefed the third

issue, practically notifying the Sixth Circuit that it lacked jurisdiction, and urging

the court for a remand so that the District Court could resolve those claims:

The Court has instructed Mr. Gant to brief this issue as to

whether the District Court erred by failing to address the

merits of his two remaining claims for relief. In support for

granting the certificate of appealability on this issue, the Court

referenced its decision in Tinsley v Million, 399 F3d 796, 811812(6th Cir. 2005).

In Tinsley, the state prisoner argued a separate claim of

ineffective assistance for failing to give an opening and closing

argument during the penalty phase of his capital case. Neither

[6]

the state appellate court, nor District Court decisions

addressed that claim. On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit

remanded the case to the District Court and required the

District Court to determine that claim for consideration in the

first instance.

Tinsley's result is similar to the result in Clisby v Jones, 960

F2d 925 (11th Cir. 1991):

Clisby did not address a petition that was dismissed without

examination of the merits. Rather, it was decided in the

context of a petition that had been denied on the merits, but

with not all of the claims being addressed in the district

court's ruling.

Long v United States, 626 F3d 1167-1169 (11th Cir. 2010). The

Eleventh Circuit, exercising its supervisory powers, remanded

the case to the District Court so that it could address the

unresolved claim. Clisby, 960 F2d at 936. Mr. Gant requests

this Court to adopt the Clisby and Tinsley solutions, and

remand this case so that the District Court could properly

address his unresolved claims.

The Clisby and Tinsley approaches represent the better

practice. Those approaches take into account "[tihe havoc a

District Court's failure to address all claims in a habeas

petition may wreak in the federal and state court systems,"

Cushy, 960 F 2d at 938 n 17, and the "[plolicy considerations

[which] clearly favor the contemporaneous consideration of

allegations of constitutional violations grounds in the same

factual basis." Id, at 936. It is a better resolution of matters;

moreover, because "a one-proceeding treatment of a petitioner's

case enables a more thorough review of his claims, thus

enhancing the quality of the judicial product." Id, (quoting

Blake v Kemp, 758 F 2d 523, 543 (11th Cir. 1986)(Tjoflat, J.,

dissenting).

See Appendix F.

The Sixth Circuit refused Petitioner's request on that issue. Instead, the

Sixth Circuit not only accepted jurisdiction of the case, it also addressed Petitioner's

two unresolved claims on the merits without permitting the District Court to do so.

[71

On page 2 of its slip opinion, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged how "[t]he

district court did not address Gant's two remaining ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claims." The court, on page 7 of its slip opinion, then relied on Angel v

Kentucky, 314 F. 3d 262, 264 (6th Cir. 2002), in support of its justification for

addressing Petitioner's unresolved claims. There, the court concluded that,

"[alithough the district did not address [these] claim[s], we may affirm the District

Court's judgment on any basis supported by the record, particularly, where the

underlying facts are undisputed." In addition to that, the court, on pages 8 through

9, reasoned that it had the jurisdiction to "affirm the denial of habeas relief' on

Petitioner's unresolved habeas claims "because the underlying trial counsel

arguments are meritless." Gant v Winn, 2018 U.S. App LEXIS 13406 (6th Cir. May 22,

2018)(order).

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Sixth Circuit's jurisdiction was limited only to a final decision from the

District Court. Before a District. Court's judgment denying relief can be final for

appeal purposes, it must resolve all the claims a Petitioner presents in a habeas

petition. Here, Petitioner, a state prisoner, presented four claims in his federal

habeas petition to the District Court for relief. The District Court addressed only

two of those four claims in its order denying relief, leaving the other two unresolved.

The judgment of the District Court, therefore, was not a final judgment.

Although not obliged, Petitioner alerted both courts to the lack of finality in

the District Court's judgment. Rather than cease the adjudication of Petitioner's

appeal and remand the matter to the District Court, the Sixth Circuit not only

accepted jurisdiction of the case, it also addressed Petitioner's two unresolved

claims on the merits without permitting the District Court to do so. This Court, for

the sake of finality, must set aside the unwarranted Sixth Circuit judgment, and

order the Sixth Circuit to remand the case to the district for proper resolution of

Petitioner's habeas claims within one District Court judgment.

Corcoran v

Levenhagen, 558 U.S. 1, 3; 130 5 Ct 8, 175 L Ed 2d 1 (2009)("The Seventh Circuit

should have permitted the District Court to consider Corcoran's unresolved

challenges to his death sentence on remand, or should have itself explained why

such consideration was unnecessary"); Bousley v United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623;

118 S Ct 1604; 140 L Ed 2d 828 (1998)(remanding Schiup [vDelo, 513 U.S. 298; 115

S.Ct. 851; 130 L Ed 2d 808 (1995)] issue when District Court failed to address it).

ARGUMENT

The Sixth Circuit did not have warrant to assume jurisdiction

and consider Petitioner's unresolved challenges to his state

court plea conviction, where the District Court never issued a

final decision when it disposed of some of the claims Petitioner

presented in his habeas petition, but less than all of them.

"To be appealable the judgment must be not only final, but complete." Collins

vMiller, 252 U.S. 364, 370; 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L Ed 445 (1919). "At common law, a

writ of error did not lie to review a judgment that failed to adjudicate every cause of

action asserted in the controversy." Sears, Roebuck & Co., vMackey, 351 U.S. 427,

423 n 3 76 S. Ct. 895; 100 L Ed 1297 (1956); citing Holcombe vMcKusick, 61 U.S.

552, 554; 15 L Ed 1020 (1857). The rule has always been that "[a] case may not be

brought [to the Supreme Court] by appeal or writ of error in fragments." Collins,

[91

supra, 252 U.S. at 370. This Court has held that finality in a habeas proceeding

"requires that the judgment to be appealable should be final not only as to all the

parties, but as to the whole subject matter and as to all causes of action involved."

Id, 252 U.S., at 365. "The rule generally followed in federal courts was that in a

case involving a single plaintiff and a single defendant, a judgment [is] not

appealable if it disposed of some, but less than all, of the claims presented." Sears,

351 U.S. at 423 n 3.

The District Court order in this case was not a final decision. As stated above

Petitioner presented four separate claims in his habeas petition. However, the

District Court only acknowledged two of Petitioner's claims in the judgment it

entered to deny him relief. On page 1 of the court's opinion, District Court stated:

"[tihe petition raises two claims: petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to (1) challenge the charges or seek a lesser sentence based [on] petitioner's mental

illness, and (2) raise claim (1) on direct appeal." The District Court left Petitioner's

two other claims unresolved.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit had a continuing duty to ensure it possessed

appellate jurisdiction over every case it reviewed, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Wetzel,

424 U.S. 737, 740; 96 S Ct 1202, 47 L Ed 2d 435 (1976), and at any point in a case

that jurisdictional issues arose. Steel Co. v Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,

93; 118 S Ct 1003, 140 L Ed 2d 210 (1988). The jurisdiction of a Sixth Circuit was

limited, in a habeas corpus proceeding, to appeals from "final decisions of the

District Courts." See 28 U.S.C. §2253 and 28 U.S.C. §1291. Because the decision of

[10]

the District Court was not a final decision, the Sixth Circuit failed to carry out that

duty, in spite of Petitioner bringing the jurisdictional defect to the court's attention

on more than one occasion. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v Doyle, 429

U.S. 274, 278; 97 S Ct 568; 50 L Ed 2d 471 (1977)(observing that appellate courts

are obliged to inquire into jurisdictional issues sua sponte whenever doubt arises as

to existence of jurisdiction).

Consequently, the Sixth Circuit's adjudication of Petitioner's appellate issues

is void for want of jurisdiction, regardless of the fact it issued a certificate of

appealability. See e.g., Peter v Zook, 803 F 3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2015)("And just as

the label attached to a District Court order does not end our inquiry into finality,

the issuance of a certificate of appealability cannot by itself establish that the

District Court actually has resolved every claim between the parties"). What is

more, the Sixth Circuit, just like any other court of appeals, had no warrant to

dispose of Petitioner's unresolved habeas claims before the District Court could. See

e.g., Corcoran, 558 U.S. at 3 (the Court ruled that the Seventh Circuit erred by

disposing of the inmate's unresolved challenges to his death sentence before

allowing the District Court the opportunity to do so).

[iii

CONCLUSION

When the District Court disposed of some, but less than all, of Petitioner's

claims, it "has so far departed from the accepted and unusual course of judicial

proceedings," and when the Sixth Circuit accepted jurisdiction to review that non

final decision, it "sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an

exercise of the Court's supervisory power." S.Ct R 10(a). The Sixth Circuit should

have remanded the case to the District Court for proper resolution of all of

Petitioner's habeas claims, as Petitioner requested it to do. It lacked jurisdiction to

do anything else. Consequently, this Court, for the sake of finality, must set aside

the unwarranted Sixth Circuit judgment and order the necessary remand in order

to cure the jurisdictional defect present in this case. Arizonans for Official English v

Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73; 117 S Ct. 1055; 137 L Ed 2d 170 (1997)(In these situations

the assumes jurisdiction of the appeal, "not on the merits, but merely for the

purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.")

Dated:

c (- 1

Respectfully submitted,

Maceo G nt 222084

Saginaw Correctional Facility

9625 Pierce Road

Freeland, Michigan 48623

[121

CERTIFICATE THAT PETITION COMPLLIES

WITH LENGTH LIMITATIONS

I, MACEO GANT, am proceeding in pro se in this appeal. I certify that that

the preceding complies with the type-volume limitations of Rule 33(2)(b) of the

Supreme Court Rules, because it contains 3,338 words of Century 12-point type, as

indicated by the word count of the Microsoft Word 2010 word processing software

used to prepare it.

[131