Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Michael Anthony Tanzi, Petitioner v. Florida

Supreme Court briefJul 5, 2018

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DOCKET NO. __________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 2017

═════════════════════════════════

MICHAEL A. TANZI,

Petitioner

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

═════════════════════════════════

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

═════════════════════════════════

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A

Florida Supreme Court opinion affirming the denial of postconviction relief,

reported as Tanzi v. State, ___ So. 3d ___, 2018 WL 1630749 (Fla. Apr. 5,

2018).

Appendix B

Trial court’s Order Denying Successive Motion For Postconviction Relief,

referenced as Tanzi v. State, Order, Case No. 2000-CF-00573-A-K (Fla. 16th

Jud. Cir. Apr. 24, 2017).

APPENDIX A

Tanzi v. State, --- So.3d ---- (2018)

43 Fla. L. Weekly S173

2018 WL 1630749

Only the Westlaw citation

is currently available.

NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT

BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS.

UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT

TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Michael Anthony TANZI, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC17–1640

|

[April 5, 2018]

Synopsis

Background: Defendant moved to vacate

murder conviction and death sentence,

after defendant's convictions and sentence

were affirmed on appeal, 964 So.2d

106, and after the denial of his initial

postconviction motion and habeas petition

were affirmed on appeal, 94 So.3d 482.

The Circuit Court, Monroe County, No.

442000CF000573000AKW, Luis M. Garcia,

J., denied the motion. Defendant appealed.

[Holding:] The Supreme Court held that

error in having judge rather than jury make

necessary findings to impose death sentence

was harmless.

Affirmed.

Canady and Polston, JJ., concurred in result.

Quince, J., filed dissenting opinion.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for

Monroe County, Luis M. Garcia, Judge—

Case No. 442000CF000573000AKW

Attorneys and Law Firms

Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional

Counsel, Scott Gavin, Staff Attorney, and

Paul Kalil, Assistant Capital Collateral

Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort

Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,

Tallahassee, Florida, and Scott A. Browne,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa,

Florida, for Appellee

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

*1 Michael A. Tanzi appeals an order

denying a motion to vacate judgments of

conviction, including one of first-degree

murder, and a sentence of death under

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. 1

The underlying facts of this case were

described in this Court's opinion on direct

appeal. Tanzi v. State, 964 So.2d 106,

110–12 (Fla. 2007). Tanzi pled guilty to

the first-degree murder of Janet Acosta.

Id. at 111. He carjacked, kidnapped, beat,

sexually battered, robbed, and strangled

Ms. Acosta. Id. at 110–11. Following a

unanimous jury recommendation for death,

© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

1

Tanzi v. State, --- So.3d ---- (2018)

43 Fla. L. Weekly S173

the trial court sentenced Tanzi to death for

Ms. Acosta's murder. Id. at 111. The trial

court found seven aggravating factors 2 and

ten mitigating circumstances. 3 We affirmed

Tanzi's convictions and sentence of death.

Id. at 121. We also affirmed the denial of

Tanzi's initial postconviction motion and

denied relief on his habeas petition. Tanzi v.

State, 94 So.3d 482, 497 (Fla. 2012).

In this successive postconviction motion,

Tanzi argues that he is entitled to relief

pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––,

136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and

Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla.

2016), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct.

2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). We agree with

Tanzi that Hurst is applicable in his case.

See Mosley v. State, 209 So.3d 1248 (Fla.

2016). However, because we find that the

Hurst error in this case is harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt, we affirm the denial of

postconviction relief. As we stated in Davis

v. State, 207 So.3d 142, 175 (Fla. 2016), cert.

denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 2218, 198

L.Ed.2d 663 (2017):

*2 [T]he jury unanimously

found all of the necessary

facts for the imposition

of death sentences by

virtue of its unanimous

recommendations. .... The

unanimous

recommendations

here

are precisely what we

determined in Hurst to be

constitutionally necessary

to impose a sentence of

death.

We reject Tanzi's assertion that the Hurst

error was not harmless because the jury was

not given a mercy instruction. See Knight v.

State, 225 So.3d 661, 683 (Fla. 2017), cert.

denied, No. 17–7099, ––– U.S. ––––, –––S.Ct.

––––, ––– L.Ed.3d ––––, 2018 WL 1369193

(U.S. Mar. 19, 2018).

Additionally, we reject Tanzi's Hurstinduced Caldwell 4 claim. See Reynolds v.

State, No. SC17–793, slip op. at 26–36 (Fla.

Apr. 5, 2018).

Accordingly, the Hurst violation in this case

is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and,

as in Davis, does not entitle Tanzi to relief.

Thus, we affirm the denial of postconviction

relief. 5

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE,

LEWIS, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in

result.

QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.

QUINCE, J., dissenting.

I cannot agree with the majority's finding

that the Hurst error was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. As I have stated

previously, “[b]ecause Hurst requires ‘a jury,

not a judge, to find each fact necessary

to impose a sentence of death,’ the error

cannot be harmless where such a factual

© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

2

Tanzi v. State, --- So.3d ---- (2018)

43 Fla. L. Weekly S173

determination was not made.” Hall v.

State, 212 So.3d 1001, 1036–37 (Fla. 2017)

(Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part) (citation omitted) (quoting Hurst v.

Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 619,

193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) ); see also Truehill

v. State, 211 So.3d 930, 961 (Fla.) (Quince,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),

cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 3,

199 L.Ed.2d 272 (2017). The jury did not

make the specific factual findings that Hurst

requires a jury to find in order to impose

some of the most serious aggravators at issue

in this case. Therefore, I dissent.

All Citations

--- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 1630749, 43 Fla. L.

Weekly S173

Footnotes

We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

1

The trial court found the following aggravating factors: (1) that the murder was committed by a person previously convicted

2

3

4

5

of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment or on felony probation; (2) that the murder was committed during the

commission of a kidnapping; (3) that the murder was committed during the commission of two sexual batteries; (4) that

the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest; (5) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (6)

that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (7) that the murder was committed in a cold,

calculated, and premeditated (CCP) manner. Tanzi, 964 So.2d at 111 n.1. “The court gave each aggravator ‘great weight’

except the HAC aggravator, which the court gave ‘utmost weight.’ ” Id.

The court found the following mitigating circumstances: (1) that Tanzi suffered from “axis two” personality disorders; (2)

that he was institutionalized as a youth; (3) that his behavior benefited from psychotropic drugs; (4) that he lost his father

at an early age; (5) that he was sexually abused as a child; (6) that he twice attempted to join the military; (7) that he

cooperated with law enforcement; (8) that he assisted inmates by writing letters and that he enjoys reading; (9) that his

family has a loving relationship for him; and (10) that he had a history of substance abuse. Tanzi, 964 So.2d at 111 n.1.

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).

We also reject Tanzi's claim that the change in law following Hurst and Perry v. State, 210 So.3d 630 (Fla. 2016), entitles

him to have his previously denied postconviction claims revisited.

End of Document

© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

3

APPENDIX B

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA

LOWER KEYS, CRIMINAL DIVISION

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 2000-CF-00573-A-K

v.

MICHAEL A. TANZI,

Defendant.

I

ORDER DENYING SUCCESSIVE MOTION TO VACATE

JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant's "Successive

Motion

to

through

counsel

Criminal

Vacate

Judgments

on

Procedure

Defendant's

motion

3.851(f)(5)(B),

of

Conviction

January

12,

2017,

under

Florida

3.851.

The

State

filed

a

2017.

As

on

March

3,

and

Sentence"

filed

Rule

of

response

to

required

by

rule

this Court held a case management conference on

March 31, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. to determine whether an evidentiary

hearing

should be

held and hear argument

on

any purely legal

claims.

On May 16,

2000,

Michael

Tanzi was

charged by indictment

with the first-degree murder of Janet Acosta.

(Rl/13-14). He was

also

carjacking

charged

weapon,

by

amended

information

kidnapping to facilitate a

with

with

felony with a weapon,

a

armed

robbery and two counts of sexual battery with a deadly weapon.

(R7/1235-37).

wanted

to

kidnapping

On

January

31,

plead

guilty

to

and

armed

written guilty plea,

2003,

Tanzi

first-degree

murder,

(Rll/1886).

robbery.

announced

Tanzi

that

he

carjacking,

submitted

a

which indicated that the plea had not been

induced by any promises.

(R7/1242-44; Rll/1886-87).

After considering this evidence and the parties' arguments,

the jury returned a unanimous recommendation of death.

(R8/1430;

R26/1821-22).

Following

followed

the

jury's

(Rl0/1804-32;

a

Spencer

hearing,

the

recommendation

and

sentenced

Tanzi

R12/2197-2213).

In doing so,

imprisonment--great

weight;

during

to

death. 1

the court found that

the State had proven seven aggravating factors:

of

court

the

under a sentence

course

of

a

kidnapping--great weight; during the course of sexual batteries-great weight 2 ; avoid arrest--great weight; pecuniary gain--great

weight;

heinous,

atrocious

cold,

calculated

and

or

cruel

(HAC) --utmost

premeditated

weight;

(CCP)--great

and

weight.

(Rl0/1805-17).

The trial court also sentenced

sentences

for

the

carjacking,

( Rl 0I18 31) . ( Rl 0I18 O3) .

1

Tanzi to consecutive life

kidnapping

and

robbery.

The course of a felony was counted as two aggravating

circumstances because it was based on two separate felonies.

That aggravator remains valid; it was error, however, to count

it as two separate aggravating circumstances. See Tanzi v.

State, 964 So. 2d 106, 117 (Fla. 2007).

2

2

In

mitigation,

disorders--some

the

court

small weight;

his

found

personality

Tanzi's

history of

substance abuse--

some weight; his institutionalization in his youth--some weight;

his positive response to treatment with psychotropic medication-some weight;

the loss of his father--some weight;

sexual abuse

as a child--some weight; his attempts to join the military--some

weight;

his

cooperation with the police after his arrest--some

weight;

his

assistance

other inmates

family'~

some weight; and his

weight.

to

and love

of reading--

loving relationship with him--some

(Rl0/1817-30). The court also considered and rejected as

mitigation the assertion that Tanzi was under the influence of

an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at

crime,

the

assertion

that

Tanzi' s

capacity

to

conform

his

to

the time of the

appreciate

the

conduct

the

criminality

of

his

conduct

or

requirements

of the

law was

substantially impaired.

to

(Rl0/1817-

30).

The

Florida Supreme Court affirmed Tanzi' s

sentence of death.

Tanzi v.

cert.

U.S.

denied,

postconviction

552

relief

in

State,

postconviction

2d 10 6

1195

(2008).

Tanzi

this

Court,

and

evidentiary hearing on his motion,

denying

964 So.

relief.

3

this

The

conviction and

(Fla.

2007) ,

thereafter

sought

after

Court

Florida

conducting

an

issued an order

Supreme

Court

affirmed the denial of postconviction relief on April 19,

2012.

Tanzi v. State, 94 So. 3d 482 (Fla. 2012).

On

motion

January

for

12,

2017,

Tanzi

filed

the

postconviction

relief

pursuant

instant

to

successive

Florida

Rule

of

Criminal Procedure 3.851. Tanzi raised two related claims in his

motion based on Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016):

CLAIM 1: MR. TANZI'S DEATH SENTENCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

UNDER THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENTS IN LIGHT OF HURST

V. FLORIDA AND HURST V. STATE.

CLAIM 2: HURST V. STATE, PERRY V. STATE, AND THE RECENT

ENACTMENT OF A REVISED SENTENCING STATUTE REQUIRE THIS

COURT TO REVISIT MR. TANZI' S PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED BRADY

AND STRICKLAND CLAIMS AND DETERMINE WHETHER THE EVIDENCE

PRESENTED TO SUPPORT EACH CLAIM UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE IN

THE OUTCOME OF THE PENALTY PHASE IN LIGHT OF NEW LAW.

WHEN THE PROPER ANALYSIS IS CONDUCTED, THERE IS A

REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF A DIFFERENT OUTCOME. RULE 3.851

RELIEF IS REQUIRED.

The

State

Florida,

argued

applies

in

its

response

that,

retroactively to Tanzi' s

although

case,

Hurst

v.

see Mosley v.

State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016), any Hurst error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.

In

Hurst

v.

Florida,

136

S.

Ct.

616

(2016),

the

United

States Supreme Court declared the portion of Florida's capital

sentencing scheme

requiring the

judge,

rather than a

jury,

find

necessary

impose

a

of

each

fact

unconstitutional

(2002),

in

light

to

of

Ring

v.

and remanded the case to the

4

sentence

Arizona,

536

U.S.

to

death

584

Florida Supreme Court to

determine whether the error was harmless. On remand, the Florida

Supreme

Court

held

that

"before

a

sentence

of

death

may

be

considered by the trial court in Florida, the jury must find the

existence of the aggravating factors proven beyond a reasonable

doubt,

that

the

aggravating

death,

and that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating

circumstances." Hurst v.

The

court

recognized,

factors

State,

are

202 So.

however,

sufficient

3d 40,

that Hurst

53

to

(Fla.

error is

impose

2016).

capable of

harmless error review.

Id.

at 67.

In order to be harmless,

State

that

there

is

must

establish

no

reasonable

the

possibility

that the Hurst error contributed to Tanzi's death sentence.

at

68;

see also

Davis v.

State,

207

2016)

and King v.

State,

So.

3d

Jan.

26,

2017),

reh'g denied,

3d 142,

So.

,

SC14-1949,

Id.

173-75

(Fla.

2 0 1 7 WL 3 7 2 0 81

(Fla.

2 0 1 7 WL

(Fla.

9 61818

Mar. 13, 2017).

This Court finds that the Hurst error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt in this case. First, there is no doubt that any

rational jury would have found all of the aggravators utilized

by the trial court in sentencing Tanzi this case. Several of the

aggravators

were

based

aggravating

factors

of

directly

on

in

course

the

Tanzi's

of

guilty

a

pecuniary gain were directly based upon Tanzi' s

first

degree murder,

carjacking,

5

plea.

The

kidnapping

and

guilty plea to

kidnapping and armed robbery.

(Rll/1886).

Therefore,

uncontestable.

time

he

these

aggravators

Tanzi

was

Further,

committed

qualified for

the

on

are

felony

established

probation

and

at

the

the

murder

and

therefore

unquestionably

under

sentence

of

imprisonment

or probation

aggravator.3 The remaining aggravators are uncontrovertable under

the

facts

of

this

course

of

case,

which

included

felony

aggravator

Tanzi's

detailed

confession.

The

a

kidnapping and two sexual batteries.

established

by

Tanzi's

perform oral

sex on him,

confession

was

The sexual batteries were

to

forcing

along with DNA of Tanzi

pocket

victim's

the

examiner testified that a

the

and DNA from semen found

matched to Tanzi

of

supported by both

jeans.

found

(Rl0/1808-09).

victim

to

in the van

on the

inside

The

medical

laceration to the lower part of the

victim's labia as well as bruising to the tissue under the skin

surrounding the victim's vagina were sustained while the victim

was alive and were consistent with a

sexual battery.

(T.

82) .

the

a

That

the

murder

occurred

during

course

of

879-

sexual

3 As the trial court noted in the sentencing order, "On February

1, 1999, the Defendant, who was represented by counsel, entered

a plea of guilty to the felony offense of breaking and entering

in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony.

He was

sentenced to an 18-month term of imprisonment to be followed by

two years of probation. Six months of the incarcerative portion

of his sentence were suspended." (Rl0/1806).

6

battery is simply uncontestable based upon the physical evidence

and Tanzi's confession.

The

detailed

things,

avoiding

arrest

confession

in

aggravator

which

he

was

based

upon

acknowledged,

Tanzi's

among

other

that he would be caught if he let her go and that he

could not leave any "witnesses." See Rl0/1810-11.

The heinous,

powerful

facts,

and

atrocious and cruel aggravator was based upon

uncontroverted

evidence.

Under

Janet Acosta's murder was heinous,

any

view

of

the

atrocious and cruel.

The medical examiner testified that the victim suffered multiple

blows to her face and head which caused swelling of the brain.

The

victim

was

bound

and

gagged,

sexually

violated,

threatened by Tanzi to cut her ear from ear if she

cooperate.

Ultimately,

These circumstances led

the court to conclude in its

sentencing order,

that

her

the

moments

failed to

Tanzi strangled the victim to death over

the course of more than twenty minutes.

in

and

before

death,

must

have

suffered great terror as well as pain." See Rl0/1812-14.

Under

any conceivable view of the facts,

the

"it is obvious

victim

the murder of Janet Acosta

was heinous, atrocious, and cruel.

Finally,

aggravator,

as

the

to

the

court

cold,

reviewed

calculated

the

and

overwhelming

supporting this aggravator in the sentencing order:

7

premeditated

evidence

Ms. Acosta's murder was the product of cool and calm

reflection and was not prompted by emotional frenzy,

rage or uncontrollable impulse.

Photographs of the abduction site showed the victim's

quiet place. The area was adjacent to the Japanese

Gardens Park located just off the MacArthur Causeway.

The Defendant could have just taken the victim's van

and fled. By the time the victim could have gotten

help, the Defendant and the vehicle would have been

long gone. Therefore,

the decision to kidnap the

victim as well as steal her van showed a deliberate

act prompted by the Defendant's desire to possess more

than the van. The motive for kidnapping the victim

became apparent very soon thereafter.

Rather than expelling his [sic] bound the victim along

the way, 40 miles later in Florida City, the Defendant

forced the victim to perform oral sex on him. He told

her that he needed a sexual favor and she was the only

person

there;

she

was

the

perfect

person.

Significantly, he also said, "No one is going to find

out." Obviously, this statement showed very early in

the crime that the Defendant had already decided to

kill the victim.

The Defendant's full intentions were made manifest

after he drove an additional 30 miles to Tavernier. In

an Ace Hardware store there, he purchased a package of

razor blades and a roll of duct tape. The purchases

were for the sole purpose of facilitating the murder

of the victim.

The razor blades were needed to cut the ropes from the

victim's body rather than taking the time to untie

her. The Defendant could then dispose of the body more

quickly. The duct tape was· not needed to restrain the

victim since she was already effectively restrained by

the ropes and tied to the back seat. In fact, the

Defendant was able to leave the van three times

without being concerned about her. He got out to use

the ATM and make the purchases in Tavernier and to use

the ATM in Marathon. The sole purpose of the duct tape

was to muffle the victim's screams.

8

The Defendant drove south another 50 miles to carry

out his true intentions. He turned off U.S. Highway 1

onto Crane Boulevard on Sugarloaf Key and looked for a

remote thickly wooded area. When he did not find a

site that provided enough cover, he returned to U.S. 1

and drove back to the north a few miles to Blimp Road

on Cudjoe Key. The Defendant drove west 1.9 miles

until he came to a secluded boat ramp. There he found

a place where the mangroves grew thickly enough to

enable him to carry out the murder of the victim

without being seen or heard.

The Defendant told police off ice rs that he had been

curious about Blimp Road and what it looked like down

the road. In the past, he had seen a blimp there. Now,

on his way to kill the victim, the Defendant was

wondering about the appearance of things further out

on Blimp Road. Clearly, the Defendant was unconcerned

about the life of another human being that he was

about to end.

The cold and calculated nature of the murder is shown

by the

Defendant's purchase in Tavernier of the

specific tools needed to carry out his already formed

intention.

And it is further demonstrated by the

Defendant's time-consuming search for the right place

to put his plan into action. He rejected Sugarloaf Key

because he could not find a place that provided enough

cover and was distant enough from residential areas

and people who might interfere with his plans. And

obviously, it is made clear by the act itself. The

Defendant had to continue to strangle the victim for

25 minutes before she quit shaking.

From the Japanese Gardens Park up to and including the

doing of the murder itself, the Defendant had a great

deal

of

time

to

ref le ct

upon

the

act

he

was

contemplating. He could have changed his course of

conduct at any time, yet he continued until Janet

Acosta was dead.

(Rl0/1814-17).

9

Again,

case,

under

any

conceivable

view

of

the

facts

in

this

the CCP aggravator was proven beyond and to the exclusion

of any reasonable doubt.

Tanzi

notably

failed

which

these

aggravators

motion

for

postconviction

Court

during

372081

challenge

were

based

relief,

the

case

(affirming

as

harmless

HAC,

CCP,

King

did

evidence

of

the

circumstances-which

overwhelming

also

to

did

and

management

essentially

challenge

not

or

any

of

the

facts

either

in

his

successive

in

argument

hearing.

any

Hurst

and

not

See

avoid

contest

2017

where

direct

Notably,

sufficiency

the

of

WL

"the

appeal-was

uncontroverted. fl) •

the

this

aggravating

arrest

on

before

King,

error

upon

Tanzi

evidence

supporting these aggravators on direct appeal. 4

Had the

jury would

jury been instructed,

have

found

each

of

the

this Court is convinced the

aggravating

factors

relied

upon by the court to impose a death sentence in this case.

In

addition,

the

to

weigh

aggravators

the

jury was

repeatedly

proven

told by

against

before making its recommendation.

the

trial

mitigation

court

presented

1811

("Should you find

sufficient aggravating circumstances do exist,

it will then be

your

duty

to

that

outweigh

determine

the

whether

See T.

the

mitigating

circumstances

aggravating circumstances. fl;

4

(T.

1813)

exist

("You

Tanzi did challenge the trial court's assessment of the course

of a felony aggravator twice in the sentencing order.

10

should

weigh

aggravating

the

mitigating

circumstances,

based

these

on

and

against

circumstances

your

advisory

considerations.").

sentence

jury's

The

the

must

be

unanimous

recommendation leaves no doubt that it viewed the aggravation as

outweighing the mitigation presented.

The

Court

repeatedly found

notes

that

the

Florida

Hurst

errors

harmless

in cases

with unanimous jury recommendations. See

King

2017 WL 727167,

So.

3d

v.

State ,

2017

Knight v . St ate ,

201 7) ; Kaczmar v.

Jan.

31,

at *23

is

"precisely

9,

what

has

like this

one

Truehill v. State,

at *19

(Fla.

Feb.

23,

2017);

(Fla.

Jan.

26,

2017);

372081,

at

So.

3d

2 0 1 7 WL 4 113 2 9 ( F1 a . Jan . 31 ,

State,

Feb.

~

Court

WL

2017); Hall v.

(Fla.

Supreme

So.

[the

2017 WL 410214

3d

State,

2017).

*19

so.

(Fla.

2 0 1 7 WL 5 2 6 5 0 9 ,

3d

The jury's unanimous recommendation

Florida

Supreme

Court]

determined

in

Hurst to be constitutionally necessary to impose a

sentence of

death."

the

Davis,

207

So.

3d

recommendation

and

the

powerful

aggravators,

at

175.

Thus,

evidence

given

jury's

establishing

the

the Court finds the Hurst error is harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt in this case.s

5

The Hurst error does not resurrect Tanzi' s previously denied

Brady or Strickland claims. Hurst represents a trial error that

should be viewed and balanced against the evidence presented in

the penalty phase.

11

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Successive Motion to

Vacate Judgments of Conviction and Sentence is hereby DENIED.

THE

CLERK

OF

THE

CIRCUIT

COURT

IS

HEREBY

DIRECTED

to

promptly serve a copy of this order, along with a certificate of

service,

upon

the

parties

listed at

the

end of

this

order as

required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3. 851 ( f) ( 5) ( F) .

DEFENDANT IS HEREBY NOTIFIED that he has 30 days from the

date of this order in which to file an appeal,

should he choose

to do so.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tavernier, Monroe County,

a!J_':ay of April,

2017.

Florida,

this

A true and correct copy of this order

has been furnished to the parties listed below.

L~

C-ircui t Judge

Copies furnished to:

.......-P aul Kalil (kalilp@ccsr.state.fl.us)

Assistant CCRC

Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - South

One East Broward Boulevard, Suite 444

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

12

V'M ark Wilson (mwilson@keyssao.org)

Chief Assistant State Attorney

530 Whitehead Street, Suite 201

Key West, Florida 33040

!/'S cott A. Browne (scott.browne@myfloridalegal.com)

E-service: capapp@myfloridalegal.com

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

3507 East Frontage Road, Suite 200

Tampa, Florida 33607-7013

13

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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