Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jesus E. Tirrez, Petitioner v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, et al.

No. _________

================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

-----------------------------------------------------------------JESUS E. TIRREZ,

Petitioner,

v.

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE

and LINDA E. ACEVEDO,

Respondents.

-----------------------------------------------------------------On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The

Third Court Of Appeals At Austin, Texas

-----------------------------------------------------------------PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

-----------------------------------------------------------------LEONARD THOMAS BRADT

14090 Southwest Freeway, Suite 300

Sugar Land, Texas 77478

(281) 201-0700

Fax: (281) 201-1202

ltbradt@flash.net

Counsel of Record

Dated: August 7, 2018

================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Texas

decree that disbarment proceedings against attorneys

are civil and that the burden of proof in those proceedings is by a preponderance. Thirty-nine other

States consider such proceedings as quasi-criminal

with a clear-and-convincing burden of proof. Thus, unlike Texas, those States follow this Court’s holding in

In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), which held that disbarment is a punishment and the proceeding is quasicriminal.

The question presented is:

Do rules that decree that the disbarment proceedings are civil and that the burden of proof

is only by a preponderance, deprive Texas attorneys sued for disbarment Due Process and

the Equal Protection of the Laws?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .....................................

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................

iv

OPINIONS BELOW ...............................................

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .......................

1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ......

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................

2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .............

4

I.

Professional Licenses ...................................

5

II. In Re Ruffalo ................................................

6

III.

Burden Of Proof ...........................................

7

IV.

Texas Stands Virtually Alone ......................

9

V.

Importance Of Case .....................................

13

VI. Case Not Moot ..............................................

14

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ..............................

15

APPENDIX

Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, Memorandum Opinion, January 12, 2018 ................ App. 1

Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, Order,

February 7, 2018 ............................................ App. 19

Travis County District Court, 419th Judicial District, Judgment, March 30, 2016 .................... App. 21

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Page

Travis County District Court, 419th Judicial District, Order, November 3, 2015 ...................... App. 31

Texas Supreme Court, Order Denying Petition

for Review, May 4, 2018 ................................. App. 32

Texas Supreme Court, Order Denying Motion

for Rehearing, June 15, 2018 ......................... App. 33

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1978) .................. 7, 8

Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) ..............................6

Carter v. Folcarelli, 121 R.I. 667, 402 A.2d 1175

(1979) .......................................................................12

Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) ..............8

Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Brown, 143 Ohio

St.3d 333, 37 N.E.3d 1199 (2015) ...........................11

Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) ............6

Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123

U.S. 307 (1887) ..........................................................8

Dent v. State of W. Va., 129 U.S. 114 (1889) ..................5

Disciplinary Board v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d

433 (N.D. 1980) ........................................................11

Florida Bar v. Simring, 612 So.2d 561 (Fla.

1993) ........................................................................10

Gershenfeld v. Justices of the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, 641 F. Supp. 1419 (E.D. Pa.

1986) ..........................................................................6

Goodrich v. Supreme Court of State of S.D., 511

F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1975) .............................................9

Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) ............................................9

Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999) ..............9

Hunt v. Disciplinary Bd. of Alabama State Bar,

381 So.2d 52 (Ala. 1980) .........................................10

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

In re Ballew, 287 Ga. 371, 695 S.E.2d 573 (2010) ........ 10

In re Davis, 43 A.3d 856 (Del. 2012) ..........................10

In re Disciplinary Action against Bonner, 896

N.W.2d 98 (2017) .....................................................11

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Allotta,

109 Wash.2d 787, 748 P.2d 628 (1988) ...................12

In re Discipline of Drakulich, 111 Nev. 1556, 908

P.2d 709 (1995) ........................................................11

In re Fisher, 179 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1950) ....................9

In re Fleck, 419 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1969) ....................9

In re Gerard, 132 Ill.2d 507, 548 N.E.2d 1051

(1989) .......................................................................10

In re Ivy, 374 P.3d 374 (Ark. 2016) .............................10

In re Keast, 159 Mont. 311, 497 P.2d 103 (1972)........11

In re Leonhardt, 324 Or. 498, 930 P.2d 844 (1997) ....... 11

In re Liotti, 667 F.3d 419 (4th Cir. 2011)......................9

In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1992) ................9

In re Meeker, 76 N.M. 354, 414 P.2d 862 (1966).........11

In re Mills, 1 Mich. 392, 1850 WL 3353 (1850) ..........11

In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho 233, 296 P.3d 1080

(2013) .......................................................................10

In re Perez, 104 N.J. 316, 517 A.2d 123 (1986) ...........11

In re Richard, 826 So.2d 542 (La. 2002) ....................11

In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W.2d 672

(1933) .......................................................................11

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) ...................... passim

In re Shigon, 462 Pa. 1, 329 A.2d 235 (1974) .............12

In re Sinnott, 2005 VT 109, 891 A.2d 896 (2005) .......12

In re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1988) ...............9

In re Thompson, 343 S.C. 1, 539 S.E.2d 396

(2000) .......................................................................12

In re Varbel, 182 Ariz. 451, 897 P.2d 1337 (1995) ......... 10

In re Wiles, 289 Kan. 201, 210 P.3d 613 (2009) ..........11

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ...............................7

In re Young’s Case, 154 N.H. 359, 913 A.2d 727

(2006) .......................................................................11

Iowa Supreme Court Disciplinary Bd. v. Bieber,

824 N.W.2d 514 (Iowa 2012) ...................................10

Kapelus v. State Bar of California, 745 P.2d 917

(Cal. 1988) ...............................................................10

Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States,

579 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1969 (2016) ........................14

Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Stanton, 233 W.Va.

639, 760 S.E.2d 453 (2014) .....................................12

Ligon v. Stilley, 2010 Ark. 418, 371 S.W.3d 615

(2010) .......................................................................10

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) ............................9

Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Sugarman, 273 Md.

306, 329 A.2d 1 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.

974 (1975) ................................................................12

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Matter of Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094 (3rd Cir. 1975).........9

Matter of Neary, 84 N.E.3d 1194 (Ind. 2017) .............10

Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283 (Wyo. 1989) ..............12

North Carolina State Bar v. Talford, 356 N.C.

626, 576 S.E.2d 305 (2003) .....................................11

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Au, 107 Hawaii

327, 113 P.3d 203 (2005) .........................................10

People v. Radinsky, 182 Colo. 259, 512 P.2d 627

(1973) .......................................................................10

Perry v. Sidermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)......................6

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29

(1971) (abrogated on different grounds, Gertz

v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)) ................8

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) .....................9

Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118

(1943) .........................................................................8

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.

232 (1957) ..................................................................6

State Bar of Texas v. Evans, 774 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.

1989) ........................................................................12

State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of the Nebraska Supreme Court v. Rokahar, 267 Neb.

436, 675 N.W.2d 117 (2017) ....................................11

State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assn. v. Mayes, 66

P.3d 398 (Okla. 2003) ..............................................11

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Johnson, 946

A.2d 1256 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) ...............................6

Statewide Grievance Committee v. Friedland,

222 Conn. 131, 609 A.2d 645 (1993) .......................10

The Mississippi Bar v. Collins, 119 So.3d 1039

(Miss. 2013) .............................................................11

Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand,

Ltd., 460 U.S. 533 (1983) .........................................13

Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) ........................14

Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) .............................8

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIV ....................................... 2, 5, 6

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ........................................................2

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ............................................................3

RULES

Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure 3.08(A) ..... 3, 12

Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure 3.08(C) ..... 3, 12

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

OTHER AUTHORITIES

https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section

=Past_Issues&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.

cfm&ContentID=40828 (last accessed July 14,

2018) ........................................................................15

https://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/

AboutUs/AboutUsFAQs/default.htm#many (last

accessed July 14, 2018) ...........................................13

Petitioner’s Attorney Profile on the Texas Bar website, https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?

Section=Find_A_Lawyer&template=/Custom

source/MemberDirectory/MemberDirectoryDetail.

cfm&ContactID=228255 (last accessed July

14, 2018) ..................................................................14

1

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES:

Petitioner, Jesus E. Tirrez, respectfully petitions

for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the

Third Court of Appeals at Austin, Texas (Appendix C).

------------------------------------------------------------------

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order Granting Counter-Defendant and ThirdParty Defendant’s (Respondents’) Motion To Dismiss

Baseless Cause Of Action and Request for Sanctions

is unpublished and is at App. 31. The Judgment of

Partially Probated Suspension is unpublished and is

at App. 21. The opinion of the Third Court of Appeals

at Austin, Texas, denying Petitioner’s appeal is unpublished and is at App. 1. The order of the Third

Court of Appeals at Austin, Texas, denying the motion

for rehearing is unpublished and is at App. 19. The

Order of the Supreme Court refusing the petition for

review is unpublished and is at App. 32. The Order

of the Texas Supreme Court denying rehearing of the

refusal of the petition for review is unpublished and is

at App. 33.

------------------------------------------------------------------

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Texas Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

timely-filed Motion for Rehearing of the refusal of the

Petition for Review on June 15, 2018. App. 33. This

2

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

This petition is timely filed.

------------------------------------------------------------------

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides in relevant part: “No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;

nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws.” U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIV.

------------------------------------------------------------------

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case presents fundamental recurring questions of constitutional dimensions over which the

Texas courts are at variance with a prior decision of

this Honorable Court (and with the decisions of the

Supreme Courts of thirty-nine other states). The decision in this case directly impacts the substantive

rights of Petitioner and 98,670 other lawyers in

Texas.

In 1968, this Honorable Court determined that disbarment is a punishment or penalty imposed upon the

lawyer. The Court further determined that disbarment

3

proceedings are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.1

Since this Court’s decision in Ruffalo, thirty-nine

other states have addressed whether disbarment proceedings are quasi-criminal and what the burden of

proof to be used in those proceedings is. Those thirtynine states have determined that the proceedings are

quasi-criminal and that the burden of proof is clearand-convincing.

Texas stands virtually alone in this arena. In 1989,

the Texas Supreme Court determined that disbarment

proceedings are civil. And, in 1991, the Texas Supreme

Court promulgated Rule 3.08(A) and (C), Texas Rules

of Disciplinary Procedure, which provide that disciplinary actions are civil in nature and that they must

only be proven by a preponderance.

Petitioner was sued for disbarment.

Petitioner answered the disbarment suit. He counterclaimed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commission for Lawyer Discipline and brought a thirdparty action against Linda Acevedo, Chief Disciplinary

Counsel of the State Bar of Texas, seeking to have

Rules 3.08(A) and (C) declared unconstitutional and

their enforcement enjoined.

The Commission for Lawyer Discipline and Linda

Acevedo moved to dismiss Petitioner’s Counterclaim

1

See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).

4

and Third-Party Action as baseless. This motion was

granted.

The disbarment suit was tried. Petitioner was

found to have violated the Disciplinary Rules. Punishment was assessed at 24 months suspension, with the

first three months active and the remaining 21 months

probated. He was also required to pay $18,743.17 in

attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.

Petitioner timely appealed to the Third Court of

Appeals at Austin, Texas.

By memorandum opinion, the Third Court of

Appeals at Austin denied him relief. App. 1. Petitioner

moved for a rehearing, which was denied without

written opinion. App. 19. Petitioner petitioned for

discretionary review to the Texas Supreme Court. The

Texas Supreme Court denied the petition for review

without written opinion. App. 32. The Texas Supreme

Court denied the motion for rehearing without written

opinion. App. 33.

------------------------------------------------------------------

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Supreme Court of Texas holds differently

from all Federal Circuits and the Supreme Courts of

thirty-nine other states on whether disbarment proceedings are quasi-criminal and whether the burden of

proof to be used is clear-and-convincing.

5

Further, the Texas courts have again shown themselves to be unwilling to enforce this Court’s pronouncements regarding Constitutional rights. Ignoring this

Court’s holding in Ruffalo, in 1989, the Texas Supreme Court pronounced that disbarment proceedings

are civil. And in 1991, the Texas Supreme Court again

refused to abide by this Court’s holding in Ruffalo by

promulgating Rule 3.08(A) and (C), Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

This case involves a Texas attorney’s Due Process

and Equal Protection rights in the context of a disbarment proceeding. Simply put, if a disbarment is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer and if the

proceedings are of a quasi-criminal nature, then how

can rules that classify the proceeding as civil and require that the allegations only be proven by a preponderance not deprive the Petitioner of Due Process?

And, since thirty-nine other states (and all Federal

Circuits) classify the disbarment proceedings as quasicriminal, requiring that the allegations be proven by

clear-and-convincing evidence, how do these rules not

also deny Petitioner the Equal Protection of the Laws?

I.

Professional Licenses

A professional license is a property interest, but

one subject to state regulation.2 Indeed, possession of

a professional license or public employment generally

constitutes “property” protected by the Fourteenth

2

Dent v. State of W. Va., 129 U.S. 114, 121–122 (1889).

6

Amendment.3 The cases make it clear that professional

licenses are a very valuable property right.4

II.

In Re Ruffalo.

In 1968, relying solely on the record in state court,

and in order to ascertain whether Mr. Ruffalo had been

accorded due process, this Court determined that “Disbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer.”5 And the

attorney is entitled to procedural due process.6 This

Court went on to hold that “These are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.”7

Because the Due Process that Mr. Ruffalo was not

afforded was in the state court proceedings, it was

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.

3

Perry v. Sidermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Schware v.

Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); U.S. CONST.,

AMEND. XIV.

4

An attorney has a constitutionally protected interest in his

license to practice law. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531

U.S. 12, 25 n.4 (2000); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979);

Gershenfeld v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 641 F. Supp. 1419, 1423 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (law license); Statewide

Grievance Comm. v. Johnson, 946 A.2d 1256, 1261 (Conn. App.

Ct. 2008) (holding that license to practice law is property interest

that cannot be suspended without due process).

5

Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550.

6

Id.

7

Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 551.

7

III. Burden Of Proof

Unfortunately for Petitioner, in Ruffalo, this Court

did not address the burden of proof to be used in a disbarment proceeding. But this Court has addressed the

burden of proof on many other occasions.8

As observed by the Court regarding burdens of

proof: “Generally speaking, the evolution of this area of

the law has produced across a continuum three standards or levels of proof for different types of cases. At

one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties. Since

society has a minimal concern with the outcome of

such private suits, the plaintiff ’s burden of proof in

such suits is a mere preponderance of the evidence.

The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly

equal fashion.”9

But a disbarment proceeding is not a simple monetary dispute. It involves fundamental and substantial

constitutionally-protected property interests – the lawyer’s professional license and his reputation. It cannot,

therefore, be a civil proceeding.

This Court has held that, in a criminal case, the

burden of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, because

“the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude

that historically and without any explicit constitutional

requirement they have been protected by standards of

8

See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan,

J., concurring).

9

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1978).

8

proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.”10 Petitioner does not

argue that his disbarment was a criminal case or that

the burden of proof should have been beyond a reasonable doubt.

The intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the words “clear,” “cogent,”

“unequivocal,” and “convincing,” is less commonly

used, but nonetheless “is no stranger to the civil law.”

One typical use of the standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal

wrongdoing by the defendant.11 The interests at stake

in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than

mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly

reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff ’s

burden of proof. Similarly, [the Supreme] Court has

used the “clear, unequivocal and convincing” standard

of proof to protect particularly important individual interests in various civil cases.”12

These civil cases have included deportation,13 denaturalization,14 commitment proceedings,15 defamation in

10

Id.

See, e.g., Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123

U.S. 307, 316 (1887).

12

Addington, 441 U.S. at 423–424.

13

Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).

14

Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960);

Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 159 (1943).

15

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1978).

11

9

broadcast,16 defamation of public figure,17 punitive damages,18 and termination of parental rights.19 Loss of a

professional license should be held to fall within that

category of cases, with the accompanying clear-andconvincing burden of proof.

IV. Texas Stands Virtually Alone

Against the backdrop of the burden of proof to be

used, every Federal Circuit that has addressed the issue, especially since Ruffalo, has determined both

that the proceedings to disbar an attorney are quasicriminal or that the burden of proof is by clear and convincing evidence.20

The Supreme Courts of thirty-nine other states

have also recognized that disbarment proceedings are

quasi-criminal in nature or that the burden of proof is

16

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (abrogated on different grounds, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418

U.S. 323 (1974)).

17

Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,

491 U.S. 657 (1989).

18

Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999).

19

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); M.L.B. v.

S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

20

See, e.g., In re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383, 388 n.9 (5th Cir.

1988); In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Fisher,

179 F.2d 361, 369 (7th Cir. 1950); In re Liotti, 667 F.3d 419 (4th

Cir. 2011); In re Fleck, 419 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1969); Matter of

Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094 (3rd Cir. 1975); Goodrich v. Supreme

Court of State of S.D., 511 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1975).

10

clear and convincing, even if the proceedings are characterized as civil.

These thirty-nine states require proof by clearand-convincing evidence in order to disbar an attorney:

Alabama,21 Alaska,22 Arizona,23 Arkansas,24 California,25 Colorado,26 Connecticut,27 Delaware,28 Florida,29

Georgia,30 Hawaii,31 Idaho,32 Illinois,33 Indiana,34 Iowa,35

21

Hunt v. Disciplinary Bd. of Alabama State Bar, 381

So.2d 52 (Ala. 1980).

22

In re Ivy, 374 P.3d 374 (Ark. 2016).

23

In re Varbel, 182 Ariz. 451, 897 P.2d 1337 (1995).

24

Ligon v. Stilley, 2010 Ark. 418, 371 S.W.3d 615 (2010).

25

Kapelus v. State Bar of California, 745 P.2d 917 (Cal.

1988).

26

People v. Radinsky, 182 Colo. 259, 512 P.2d 627 (1973).

27

Statewide Grievance Committee v. Friedland, 222

Conn. 131, 609 A.2d 645 (1993).

28

In re Davis, 43 A.3d 856 (Del. 2012).

29

Florida Bar v. Simring, 612 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1993).

30

In re Ballew, 287 Ga. 371, 695 S.E.2d 573 (2010).

31

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Au, 107 Hawaii 327,

113 P.3d 203 (2005).

32

In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho 233, 296 P.3d 1080 (2013).

33

In re Gerard, 132 Ill.2d 507, 548 N.E.2d 1051 (1989).

34

Matter of Neary, 84 N.E.3d 1194 (Ind. 2017).

35

Iowa Supreme Court Disciplinary Bd. v. Bieber, 824

N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2012) (convincing preponderance).

11

Kansas,36 Louisiana,37 Michigan,38 Minnesota,39 Mississippi,40 Missouri,41 Montana,42 Nebraska,43 Nevada,44

New Hampshire,45 New Jersey,46 New Mexico,47 North

Carolina,48 North Dakota,49 Ohio,50 Oklahoma,51 Oregon,52

36

In re Wiles, 289 Kan. 201, 210 P.3d 613 (2009).

In re Richard, 826 So.2d 542 (La. 2002).

38

In re Mills, 1 Mich. 392, 1850 WL 3353 (1850).

39

In re Disciplinary Action against Bonner, 896 N.W.2d

98 (2017).

40

The Mississippi Bar v. Collins, 119 So.3d 1039 (Miss.

2013).

41

In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W.2d 672 (1933).

42

In re Keast, 159 Mont. 311, 497 P.2d 103 (1972).

43

State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of the Nebraska

Supreme Court v. Rokahar, 267 Neb. 436, 675 N.W.2d 117

(2017).

44

In re Discipline of Drakulich, 111 Nev. 1556, 908 P.2d

709 (1995).

45

In re Young’s Case, 154 N.H. 359, 913 A.2d 727 (2006).

46

In re Perez, 104 N.J. 316, 517 A.2d 123 (1986).

47

In re Meeker, 76 N.M. 354, 414 P.2d 862 (1966).

48

North Carolina State Bar v. Talford, 356 N.C. 626, 576

S.E.2d 305 (2003).

49

Disciplinary Board v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D.

1980).

50

Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Brown, 143 Ohio St.3d

333, 37 N.E.3d 1199 (2015).

51

State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assn. v. Mayes, 66 P.3d 398

(Okla. 2003).

52

In re Leonhardt, 324 Or. 498, 930 P.2d 844 (1997).

37

12

Pennsylvania,53 Rhode Island,54 South Carolina,55 Vermont,56 Washington,57 West Virginia,58 and Wyoming.59

But not Texas.60 The Supreme Court of Texas remains intransigent, unrepentant and defiant, standing

virtually alone in refusing to abide by this Court’s

holdings in Ruffalo. Even when presented with every

possible opportunity to correct the error of its ways in

this appeal.

Ignoring and without mentioning Ruffalo, in

1989, the Texas Supreme Court held that disbarment

proceedings are civil in nature.61 Then, to compound

the error, in 1991, the Texas Supreme Court promulgated Rule 3.08(A) and (C), Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Title 2, Subt. G, App. A-1.

Rule 3.08(A) provides that “Disciplinary Actions are

civil in nature.” Rule 3.08(C) provides that “Disciplinary

53

In re Shigon, 462 Pa. 1, 329 A.2d 235 (1974).

Carter v. Folcarelli, 121 R.I. 667, 402 A.2d 1175 (1979).

55

In re Thompson, 343 S.C. 1, 539 S.E.2d 396 (2000).

56

In re Sinnott, 2005 VT 109, 891 A.2d 896 (2005).

57

In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Allotta, 109

Wash.2d 787, 748 P.2d 628 (1988).

58

Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Stanton, 233 W.Va. 639, 760

S.E.2d 453 (2014).

59

Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283 (Wyo. 1989).

60

Or Maryland. See, e.g., Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 318, 329 A.2d 1 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.

974 (1975).

61

State Bar of Texas v. Evans, 774 S.W.2d 656, 657 n.1

(Tex. 1989).

54

13

Actions must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”

To further compound its error, the Supreme Court

of Texas refused to review the decision of the Austin

Court of Appeals which, while recognizing Ruffalo, determined that under Texas Supreme Court precedent,

the disbarment proceedings are civil and the burden

of proof is only by a preponderance. See App. 32 and

App. 33.

Petitioner suggests that the time is well past for

this Court to remind the Texas courts that, once this

Court has ruled on an issue, that holding remains the

law, unless this Court shall set it aside, and the lower

courts are not free to ignore this Court’s holdings.62

V.

Importance Of Case

There are 98,671 lawyers in Texas.63 This Court’s

decision will impact the substantive Due Process

rights of a very large number of attorneys in Texas.64

Prospectively, this Court’s decision will also impact the

substantive Due Process rights of lawyers who are

sued for disbarment in the other states that have not

62

Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd.,

460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983).

63

Source: https://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/

AboutUs/AboutUsFAQs/default.htm#many (last accessed July

14, 2018).

64

And to the extent that Maryland had decided this issue incorrectly, it will also impact those lawyers.

14

specifically addressed the burden of proof to be used in

disbarment proceedings.

VI. Case Not Moot

Even though Petitioner has fully served the punishment meted out on him, the case is not moot. Nor is

the punishment that Petitioner is condemned to suffer

from these proceedings at an end.65

The claims brought by Petitioner fall within the

“exception to the mootness doctrine for a controversy

that is capable of repetition, yet evading review.”66 A

dispute qualifies for that exception only “if (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there

is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining

party will be subjected to the same action again.”67

Petitioner argues that he falls within that exception because he fully served the two-year suspension

imposed on March 30, 2016, before the Texas Supreme

Court denied review on May 4, 2018. He is also subject

to being sued for disbarment any time that someone

65

See Petitioner’s Attorney Profile on the Texas Bar website,

which will list the punishment assessed in perpetuity. https://www.

texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Find_A_Lawyer&template=/

Customsource/MemberDirectory/MemberDirectoryDetail.cfm&Contact

ID=228255 (last accessed July 14, 2018).

66

Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579

U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

67

Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 439–440 (2011) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

15

should file a complaint against him. As are the 15-30

lawyers each month who are subjected to disbarment

and disciplinary proceedings in Texas under the incorrect burden of proof.68

------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

This Court should grant this petition because the

holding of the Third Court of Appeals and consequently, the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court

of Texas outlined in this petition: (1) are decisions and

rules that decided an important federal question in a

way that conflicts with another state court of last resort; and (2) decided an important question of federal

law that has not been, but should be, settled by this

Court, and have decided an important federal question

in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this

Court.

68

Source: https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section

=Past_Issues&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=40828

(last accessed July 14, 2018).

16

This Honorable Court should grant Petitioner, Jesus E. Tirrez, general relief.

Respectfully submitted,

LEONARD THOMAS BRADT

14090 Southwest Freeway,

Suite 300

Sugar Land, Texas 77478

(281) 201-0700

Fax: (281) 201-1202

ltbradt@flash.net

Counsel of Record

DAVID CHRISTOPHER HESSE

#24049081

112 West 8th Avenue,

Suite 617

Amarillo, Texas 79101

(806) 350-6785

Fax: (806) 350-6786

Chris@PanhandleCriminal

Defense.Attorney

STANLEY L. SCHWIEGER

#17880500

600 Austin Avenue,

Suite 12

Waco, Texas 76701

(254) 752-5678

Fax: (254) 752-7792

wacocrimatty@yahoo.com

O. RENE FLORES

#24012637

208 W. Cano Street

Edinburg, Texas 78539

(956) 383-9090

Fax: (956) 383-9050

floreslaw1@aol.com

17

TRACY DEE CLUCK

#00787254

12600 Hill Country Blvd.,

Suite R-275

Austin, Texas 78738

(512) 329-2615

Fax: (512) 329-2604

tracy@tracyclucklawyer.com

Of Counsel to Petitioner