Amicus Curiae Brief — United States Forest Service, et al., Petitioners v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association, et al.

Nos. 18-1584, 18-1587

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

-----------------------------------------------------------------UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASS’N, et al.,

Respondents.

-----------------------------------------------------------------ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE, LLC,

Petitioner,

v.

COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASS’N, et al.,

Respondents.

-----------------------------------------------------------------On Writs Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Fourth Circuit

-----------------------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF AMERICAN FOREST

RESOURCE COUNCIL AND 16 OTHER

FORESTRY ASSOCIATIONS AS AMICI

CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

-----------------------------------------------------------------LAWSON E. FITE

Counsel of Record

SARA GHAFOURI

AMERICAN FOREST

RESOURCE COUNCIL

700 NE Multnomah St.

Suite 320

Portland, OR 97232

(503) 222-9505

lfite@amforest.org

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COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

LIST OF AMICI CURIAE

American Forest Resource Council

Federal Forest Resource Coalition

Intermountain Forestry Association

American Walnut Manufacturers Association

Colorado Timber Industry Association

Douglas Timber Operators

Montana Wood Products Association

Minnesota Forest Industries

Missouri Forest Products Association

New Mexico Forest Industry Association

Associated California Loggers

Associated Logging Contractors-Idaho

Associated Oregon Loggers

Great Lakes Timber Professionals Association

Montana Logging Association

Washington Contract Loggers Association

Ohio Forestry Association

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 permits Federal

agencies to grant rights-of-way across Federal land for

energy pipelines, with limited exceptions including

“lands within the National Park System.” 30 U.S.C.

§185(b)(1). The Forest Service granted such a right-ofway to the proposed Atlantic Coast pipeline crossing

through Virginia’s George Washington National Forest. The right-of-way intersects the Appalachian Trail

as it passes through the Forest.

The Appalachian Trail, as formalized by the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1241–1251 (the

Trails Act), is administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service. The Fourth

Circuit, contrary to the position of both the Forest Service and Park Service, the text of the statute, and basic

principles of federal public land law, held that this administration of the Trail causes the Trail to be “lands

within the National Park System.” Accordingly, it vacated the Forest Service’s grant of the right-of-way.

Does the designation of the National Park Service

as a Trail’s administrator effect a transfer of the underlying land from the Forest Service, and thereby

strip the Forest Service of its authority to issue a rightof-way through the National Forest?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ...........................

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................

3

ARGUMENT ...........................................................

4

I.

THE PARK SERVICE’S ADMINISTRATION

OF THE APPALACHIAN TRAIL DOES

NOT CONVERT THE TRAIL FOOTPRINT

INTO “LAND WITHIN THE NATIONAL

PARK SYSTEM” ..........................................

4

II. THE DECISION BELOW UPSETS SETTLED EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL FORESTS ...... 10

III.

THE DECISION BELOW WOULD IMPEDE FUELS REDUCTION WORK AND

OTHER MEASURES TO COMBAT THE

FOREST HEALTH CRISIS ......................... 18

IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT MISUNDERSTOOD THE STRUCTURE AND PROPER

CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL PUBLIC

LAND LAWS ................................................ 20

CONCLUSION .......................................................

26

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Abramski v. United States,

134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014) .............................................22

All. for the Wild Rockies v. Peña,

865 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2017) ..................................13

Am. Forest Res. Council v. Hammond,

No. CV 16-1599 (RJL), 2019 WL 6311896

(D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2019) .............................................24

Andrus v. Utah,

446 U.S. 500 (1980) .................................................25

Ark Init. v. Tidwell,

816 F.3d 119 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ............................ 12, 13

Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154 (1997) ............................................... 7, 8

Citizens for Better Forestry v.

U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

341 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2003) ....................................13

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Ilano,

928 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2019) ....................................19

Financial Oversight & Management Bd. for

Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Inv., LLC,

U.S. No. 18-1334 ......................................................23

Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of

Land Mgmt., Medford Dist.,

914 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1990) ..................................20

Herrera v. Wyoming,

139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019) ...............................................6

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Inhabs. of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell,

107 U.S. (17 Otto) 147 (1883) ....................................7

King v. Burwell,

135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) .............................................22

King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp.,

502 U.S. 215 (1991) .................................................22

Kleppe v. New Mexico,

426 U.S. 529 (1976) .................................................23

Maracich v. Spears,

133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013) .............................................22

Montanans for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos,

568 F.3d 225 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ..................................17

Nat’l Labor Relats. Bd. v. Jones &

Laughlin Steel Corp.,

301 U.S. 1 (1937) .......................................................7

Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club,

523 U.S. 726 (1998) ........................................... 11, 12

Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan,

44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) .....................................22

Simms v. Simms,

175 U.S. 162 (1899) .................................................23

United States v. Atl. Research Corp.,

551 U.S. 128 (2007) .................................................22

United States v. City and

County of San Francisco,

310 U.S. 16 (1940) ...................................................24

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

United States v. Gratiot,

39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840) .....................................23

United States v. Menasche,

348 U.S. 528 (1955) ...................................................7

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A.,

573 U.S. 302, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) .......................21

Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton,

479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ..................................21

Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

661 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2011) ................................13

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

5 U.S.C. §§500 et seq. ....................................................6

10 U.S.C. §8721 ...........................................................20

16 U.S.C. §471 ...............................................................6

16 U.S.C. §§475 et seq. ..................................................5

16 U.S.C. §§528-531 ......................................................5

16 U.S.C. §533 .............................................................14

16 U.S.C. §535 .............................................................14

16 U.S.C. §1131 ...........................................................20

16 U.S.C. §1242 .............................................................6

16 U.S.C. §1244(a) .......................................................12

16 U.S.C. §1244(a)(1) ............................................ 5, 7, 8

16 U.S.C. §§1244(a)(1), (3), (4), (6)–(12), (15)–(26),

(28)–(29)...................................................................12

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

16 U.S.C. §1244(c) .......................................................12

16 U.S.C. §1246(a)(1)(A) ....................................... 5, 6, 9

16 U.S.C. §1246(a)(1)(B) ...............................................7

16 U.S.C. §1246(i) ..........................................................7

16 U.S.C. §1246(j) ..........................................................7

16 U.S.C. §1540(g)(1)(A)................................................7

16 U.S.C. §§1600-1614 ............................................ 5, 12

16 U.S.C. §1604(a) .......................................................12

16 U.S.C. §1604(b) .......................................................13

16 U.S.C. §1604(d)(1) ..................................................13

16 U.S.C. §§1604(e), (f ), (g), (m) ..................................13

16 U.S.C. §1604(f )(1) ...................................................14

16 U.S.C. §1604(f )(5) ...................................................17

16 U.S.C. §1604(i) ........................................................14

16 U.S.C. §1609(a) ................................................... 6, 11

16 U.S.C. §1609(b) .......................................................17

16 U.S.C. §1611 ...........................................................14

16 U.S.C. §§6591a-6591e ............................................18

30 U.S.C. §185(a) ....................................................... 5, 9

30 U.S.C. §185(b)(1) .................................................. 5, 6

30 U.S.C. §185(b)(3) ......................................................9

42 U.S.C. §4332 .............................................................6

43 U.S.C. §1392 (1970) ................................................20

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

43 U.S.C. §2601 ...........................................................20

54 U.S.C. §§100101-104909 ..........................................5

54 U.S.C. §100101(a) ...................................................14

54 U.S.C. §100101(b) ...................................................15

54 U.S.C. §100102(6) .....................................................8

54 U.S.C. §100501 .........................................................8

54 U.S.C. §100701 .......................................................14

54 U.S.C. §100706 .......................................................14

54 U.S.C. §100753 .......................................................15

54 U.S.C. §100902(a)(3) ..............................................14

54 U.S.C. §101511 .......................................................14

Controverted Lands Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83426, §2, 68 Stat. 270, 271 (1954) .............................24

Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, 51st Cong., 1st

Sess., ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, §§10, 14 (1889) ...........25

Pub. L. No. 94–588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) ...................12

Pub. L. No. 111–8, §410, 123 Stat. 524 (2009) ...........17

U.S. Const. Art. IV, §3, cl. 2 .........................................23

OTHER AUTHORITIES

36 C.F.R. Part 219 .......................................................13

36 C.F.R. §§219.11(b), (d) ............................................13

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

C.H. Vincent et al., Federal Land Ownership:

Overview and Data, Cong. Research Serv. R

42346 (Mar. 3, 2017), available at https://fas.

org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf ...................................16

Exec. Order No. 13855 of Dec. 21, 2018, 84 Fed.

Reg. 45 (Jan 7, 2019) ...............................................19

G.C. Coggins et al., Fed. Pub. Land & Res. Law.

(5th ed. 2002) ...........................................................22

Gov. E.G. Brown, Jr., Calif., Exec. Order B-52-18

(May 10, 2018) .........................................................19

Gov. E.G. Brown, Jr., Procl. of a State of Emergency, Oct. 30, 2015 .................................................19

Gov. G. Newsom, Procl. of a State of Emergency,

Mar. 22, 2019 ...........................................................19

H.R. Rep. No. 95–1165, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

(May 15, 1978) ...........................................................6

Interim Chief Vicki Christiansen, U.S. Forest Service, “Envisioning Healthy Forests for Families and Communities,” Mar. 26, 2018 ....................18

J. Mooallem, ‘We Have Fire Everywhere’: Escaping California’s Deadliest Blaze, N.Y. TIMES

MAGAZINE, July 31, 2019 .........................................19

3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution

§1322 (1833) ............................................................24

M. Farrand, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention 583 (1911) ...................................................25

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

National Park Service, National Historic Trails

& Routes, https://imgis.nps.gov/html/?viewer=

nht (last visited June 7, 2019) ................................11

Ore. Forest Res. Inst., Oregon Forest Facts 2019-20,

available at https://oregonforests.org/sites/default/

files/2019-01/OFRI_2019-20_ForestFacts_WEB.pdf .......16

Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third

of the Nation’s Land: A Report to the President

and to the Congress (1970) ......................................25

P.W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (1968) ........................................................ 22, 25

R. Keiter & M. McKinney, Public Land and Resources Law in the American West: Time for

Another Comprehensive Review?, 49 Envtl. L.

1 (2019) ....................................................................20

1 St. G. Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries:

With Notes of Reference to the Constitution

and Laws of the Federal Government of the

United States and of the Commonwealth of

Virginia, App. 283–86 (1803; 1969 reprint) ............22

THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (Earle ed. (1937)) ..................24

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Land Management Plan for

the Inyo National Forest (Sept. 2019), available at https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_

DOCUMENTS/fseprd664404.pdf ............................15

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

U.S. Forest Serv., Continental Divide National

Scenic Trail (CDT) Recommended Forest Plan

Components, Nov. 16, 2017; https://www.fs.fed.

us/sites/default/files/fs_media/fs_document/CDT_

RecommendedPlanDirection_updatedv11.22.

2017.pdf ...................................................................15

U.S. Forest Serv., Cut and Sold Report, Cumulative FY 2019, Nov. 25, 2019, https://www.fs.fed.

us/forestmanagement/documents/sold-harvest/

reports/2019/2019_Q1-Q4_CandS_SW.pdf .............16

U.S. Forest Serv., FY 1905-2017 National Summary

Cut and Sold Data and Graphs, https://www.

fs.fed.us/forestmanagement/documents/soldharvest/documents/1905-2017_Natl_Summary_

Graph.pdf ................................................................16

U.S. Forest Serv., History of Forest Planning, at

https://www.fs.usda.gov/main/planningrule/

history (last visited December 3, 2019) ..................17

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici curiae are associations that represent forest

products businesses that depend on healthy federal

forests for their livelihoods.

The American Forest Resource Council (AFRC) is

a regional trade association whose purpose is to advocate for sustained-yield timber harvests on public timberlands throughout the West to enhance forest health

and resistance to fire, insects, and disease. AFRC promotes active management to attain productive public

forests, protect the value and integrity of adjoining private forests, and assure community stability. It works

to improve federal and state laws, regulations, policies

and decisions regarding access to and management of

public forest lands and protection of all forest lands.

AFRC represents over 50 forest product businesses

and forest landowners throughout California, Idaho,

Montana, Oregon, and Washington. These businesses

provide tens of thousands of family-wage jobs in rural

communities.

Federal Forest Resource Coalition, Intermountain

Forestry Association, American Walnut Manufacturers

Association, Colorado Timber Industry Association,

Douglas Timber Operators, Montana Wood Products

1

All parties have consented in writing to the filing of this

brief. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.3(a). No counsel for a party authored this

brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary

contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of

this brief. No person other than amici curiae, their members, or

their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or

submission. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.6.

2

Association, Minnesota Forest Industries, Missouri

Forest Products Association, and New Mexico Forest

Industry Association are voluntary non-profit trade associations who work to promote long-term management of National Forests, provide opportunities for

open discussion and appropriate interchange of information concerning all facets of the forest products industry, and accumulate and disseminate information

regarding the forest products industry in order to foster the best interests of the industry and public. Amici

include the majority of purchasers of commercial timber from Federally-owned forests throughout the country.

Associated California Loggers, Associated Logging

Contractors-Idaho, Associated Oregon Loggers, Great

Lakes Timber Professionals Association, Montana Logging Association, and Washington Contract Loggers

Association, work to provide a strong, cohesive voice

before agencies, legislatures, the public, and the courts

on behalf of their members who are engaged in the

business of harvesting and transporting timber from

forest to mill across the West. They also work to enhance

safety and professional standards for their members

by offering educational and safety services programs.

Many of amici’s members work in or adjacent to

federal and forestlands, and the management of these

lands ultimately dictates not only the viability of their

businesses, but also the economic health of the communities themselves. With much of the National Forest

landscape in poor health, active management is badly

needed throughout the country to reduce the risk of

3

catastrophic wildfire as well as insect and disease outbreaks. Amici have a strong interest in maintaining

the ability of the Forest Service to conduct active management without judicial imposition of undue constraints. The effect of the decision below is not limited

to pipelines. It also affects amici’s interests because

it raises questions about thousands of existing and potential future rights-of-ways, easements, and sharecost agreements across federal and non-federal lands

on federally designated trails for other purposes. It

also abruptly changes the management regime that

has been applied to trails and adjacent lands under the

complex process of forest planning.

------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Fourth Circuit’s holding effectively transfers

a more than 2,000-mile corridor of land from the Forest

Service to the National Park Service. It does so in contravention of the plain text of the Trails Act and wholly

inconsistent with the existing legal structure and management framework of the National Forest System.

The court of appeals fundamentally misapprehended

the task before it. Federal lands are replete with overlapping jurisdictions, agencies, and statutory mandates, an artifact of the role these lands played in

building the Nation. Public land laws must be construed with an eye to this context, paying special attention to the varied types of agency power and

authority. The Fourth Circuit elided all of these concerns, facilely equating the Appalachian Trail, a “unit”

4

of the National Trails System, with “lands” within the

National Park System.

The effect of the ruling below is not limited to this

pipeline, or any pipeline, or this trail. It threatens to

impede the ability of land-management agencies to issue rights-of-way for other purposes and to disrupt the

process for forest management that is already complex—too complex, if one takes recent Congressional

enactments at their word. These include roads to access forest management project areas throughout the

193-million-acre National Forest System. At a time

where forest health is in a state of emergency, and the

need for active management is broadly recognized to

reduce risk of severe fire, the decision below could have

grave consequences. It should not stand.

For these reasons amici respectfully request that

the Court reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT

I.

THE PARK SERVICE’S ADMINISTRATION

OF THE APPALACHIAN TRAIL DOES NOT

CONVERT THE TRAIL FOOTPRINT INTO

“LAND WITHIN THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM.”

The Fourth Circuit vacated the Forest Service’s

grant of a special use permit enabling a pipeline to

cross under the right-of-way of the Appalachian Trail.

The court of appeals held that the administration of

the trail by the National Park Service operated as a

5

transfer of jurisdiction. It found the portion of the

George Washington National Forest hosting the trail

to be converted to “lands in the National Park System,”

where the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) does not permit

rights-of-way for pipeline projects. Pet. App. 55a, 57a;

30 U.S.C. §185(b)(1). This was despite the admonition

in the National Trails System Act that “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to transfer

among Federal agencies any management responsibilities established under any other law. . . .” 16 U.S.C.

§1246(a)(1)(A).

The National Park Service “primarily” administers the Appalachian Trail “in consultation” with the

Forest Service. See 16 U.S.C. §1244(a)(1). The court of

appeals found that the trail is therefore a “unit” of the

National Park System. Pet. App. 57a. This led the court

to conclude that the trail’s footprint constitutes “lands

within the National Park System” wherein pipeline

rights-of-way are prohibited. Id. (citing 30 U.S.C.

§§185(a), 185(b)(1)).

The court over simplified the governing statutory

scheme. Activities of the National Park Service are

guided by its Organic Act, 54 U.S.C. §§100101-104909.

The Forest Service works within three framework statutes: its Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§475 et seq.,

the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16

U.S.C. §§528-531, and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§1600-1614. Historically, the Forest Service’s Organic Act also

delegated to the President the authority to designate

forest reserves, now incorporated into the National

6

Forest System. Former 16 U.S.C. §471 (1964); see 16

U.S.C. §1609(a); Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686,

1691–93, 1702 (2019) (recounting creation of the Bighorn National Forest). Both the Trails Act and MLA

are function-based statutes which overlie the public

lands. And there are laws of more general applicability

such as the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.

§4332, and Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§500

et seq.

The court of appeals imposed its own superficial

understanding upon a multifaceted statutory scheme. It

started with the MLA’s preclusion of pipeline rights-ofway on “lands in the National Park System.” 30 U.S.C.

§185(b)(1). Relying on comments the Park Service submitted on the record, the court found that the Appalachian Trail “is a unit of the National Park System.” Pet.

App. 57a. The court inferred, without explaining, that

a “unit” of the Park System necessarily contains “lands

in the National Park System.” Ibid. The inference was

unwarranted. The Appalachian Trail is part of the National Trails System, not the Park System. 16 U.S.C.

§1242. Indeed, in deliberations on the National Parks

and Recreation Act of 1978, the last major legislation

in this arena, Congress referred to the separate “National Park and National Trail Systems,” plural. H.R.

Rep. No. 95–1165, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 58 (May 15,

1978) (emphasis added).

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in effect renders

much of the Trails Act superfluous, including the section which clarifies that trail administration is not a

transfer of general authority or jurisdiction, 16 U.S.C.

7

§1246(a)(1)(A); the detailed procedure for transfer of

such authority, 16 U.S.C. §1246(a)(1)(B); the proviso

that designated uses shall not supersede any other authorized uses, 16 U.S.C. §1246(j); the Forest’s Service’s

explicit role in administering the Appalachian Trail, 16

U.S.C. §1244(a)(1); and the retention by the Park Service and Forest Service of all other authorities for the

purposes of trail administration, 16 U.S.C. §1246(i).

The court of appeals thus violated a “cardinal principle

of statutory construction,” that a court must seek “to

save and not to destroy.” United States v. Menasche,

348 U.S. 528, 538–39, (1955) (quoting Nat’l Labor

Relats. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,

30 (1937)). It is a court’s duty “to give effect, if possible,

to every clause and word of a statute.” Menasche, 348

U.S. at 538–39 (quoting Inhabs. of Montclair Twp. v.

Ramsdell, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 147, 152 (1883)).

The treatment of section 1246(a)(1) of the Trails

Act stands out. Subsection (a)(1)(A)’s limitation on

transfers of underlying management authority is rendered superfluous, and its limitation of such transfers

to those complying with subsection (a)(1)(B), is written

out of the statute. This Court rejected a similar statutory reading in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173

(1997), holding that the Government’s reading of section 10(g)(1)(A) of the Endangered Species Act, 16

U.S.C. §1540(g)(1)(A), “is simply incompatible with the

existence of another section of the same Act.” The

Court found the related provision “would be superfluous—and, worse still, its careful limitation to §1533

would be nullified—” under that reading, and so

8

rejected it. Bennett, 520 U.S. 154 at 173. The decision

below is similarly unmoored, as it fails to take account

of the statutory scheme, misreads the language of the

statute, and nullifies a particular section and the careful limitations therein.

The Trail is not in fact a “unit” of the Park System.

Park System units, as defined by the Organic Act, “include any area of land and water administered by the

Secretary, acting through the Director, for park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.” 54 U.S.C. §100501; see 54 U.S.C. §100102(6). The

Park System does not explicitly include trails, which

are part of their own system. See USFS Pet. 21 (“the

Trail itself is a footpath on the surface of the land it

crosses”; Br. for United States at 17). The court erred

by assuming that reference to the Trail as part of the

Park System had legal significance.

The Fourth Circuit made other unwarranted inferences. Assuming the Trail is a unit of the Park System,

and noting that the Trails Act indicates the Appalachian Trail “shall be administered primarily as a footpath by the Secretary of the Interior,” 16 U.S.C.

§1244(a)(1), the court concluded the Trail is “land” administered by the Park Service. The court of appeals’

logical leap was not justified. A footpath is not park

land; it is only a designated use of the surface. The

MLA exception must be given an appropriately narrow

reading to fit within the layered statutory scheme.

The court of appeals failed to recognize the separate structure of the Trails Act, which is on equal

9

footing with the Park Service Organic Act. Instead, it

subsumed the Trails Act into the Organic Act. This violated the Trails Act’s instruction that “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to transfer

among Federal agencies any management responsibilities established under any other law for federally

administered lands which are components of the National Trails System.” 16 U.S.C. §1246(a)(1)(A). The

Trails Act explicitly provides that the Forest Service

retains its authorities both under the MLA and its own

foundational statutes.

The court of appeals’ further errors flow from its

fundamental mistake. It rejected the Government’s interpretation of the MLA because to do so “would give

the Forest Service more authority than NPS on National Park System land.” Pet. App. 57a. This is backwards, as the land belongs to the Forest Service. The

Fourth Circuit’s interpretation unduly restricts the

Forest Service’s own power and duty to manage Forest

Service land, giving undue power to the Park Service

instead.

The court also found the Chief of the Forest Service is not a “head of an appropriate agency” within the

meaning of MLA section 185(a), defined as “the head of

any Federal department or independent Federal office

or agency . . . which has jurisdiction over Federal lands.”

30 U.S.C. §185(b)(3) (emphasis added). The court reasoned that the Forest Service was merely “managing”

land underlying the Trail and lacked “administration”

responsibilities over the Trail. Pet. App. 58a. Again,

this inverts the proper structure. The Forest Service

10

has jurisdiction over the portion of the George Washington National Forest overlaid by the Trail, which is

not taken away by the Trails Act.

Because the Trails Act does not purport to transfer

land from the Forest Service to the Park Service, the

court of appeals wrongly found that the Forest Service

lost its general authority under the MLA to issue a

right-of-way.

II.

THE DECISION BELOW UPSETS SETTLED

EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL FORESTS.

Not only is the Fourth Circuit’s decision inconsistent with the Trails Act, it sets up a regime that

would seriously disrupt the process of forest planning

and plan implementation, transferring lengthy crosssections of National Forest lands to the Park Service

without regard for the underlying land-use framework.

This would upset the settled expectations of those who

rely on lands designated for timber production under

the relevant Forest Plan. It would also undercut expectations of other stakeholders to the forest planning

process. Extreme structural change should not be implied from the superficial resemblance between a

“trail” and “lands.”

As the Court has recognized, the National Forest

System “itself is vast. It includes 155 national forests,

20 national grasslands, 8 land utilization projects, and

other lands that together occupy nearly 300,000 square

miles of land located in 44 States, Puerto Rico, and the

11

Virgin Islands.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club,

523 U.S. 726, 728 (1998). In section 11 of the Forest and

Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974,

as amended by NFMA, Congress declared that “the

National Forest System consists of units of federally

owned forest, range, and related lands throughout the

United States and its territories, united into a nationally significant system dedicated to the long-term benefit for present and future generations, and that it is

the purpose of this section to include all such areas into

one integral system.” 16 U.S.C. §1609(a) (emphasis

added). The Fourth Circuit’s approach would frustrate

this statutory purpose, moving toward fragmentation

of authority and management.

While not all the trails administered through the

Secretary of the Interior pass through National Forest

System lands, most do. Fifteen of these trails stretch

almost 38,000 miles across 32 states, and affect 60 different National Forests, Grasslands, Scenic Areas, and

Management Units. Maps prepared by the Park Service show where trails cross National Forest System

Lands. National Park Service, National Historic Trails

& Routes, https://imgis.nps.gov/html/?viewer=nht (last

visited June 7, 2019).

For example, the North County National Scenic

Trail crosses eight different states, and 872 of its 4,600

miles are within National Forest System units, from

Vermont’s Green Mountain National Forest to the Sheyenne National Grassland in North Dakota. It crosses

through the Chippewa and Chequamegon-Nicolet National Forests in Minnesota and Wisconsin, which are

12

foundational to those states’ forest economies. Similarly, the Lewis and Clark National Historic Trail

crosses 13 National Forest System Units in its journey

from Ohio’s Wayne National Forest to the Columbia

River Gorge National Scenic Area in Oregon and

Washington. Transferring these trails to the Park Service would create massive lines of disruption across

the publicly-owned landscape.

There are 30 National Scenic or Historic Trails

designated by the Trails Act. 16 U.S.C. §1244(a). An

additional 24 trail routes are identified for study. 16

U.S.C. §1244(c). Of the 30 currently-designated trails,

24 are primarily administered by the Secretary of the

Interior through the Park Service. 16 U.S.C. §§1244(a)(1),

(3), (4), (6)–(12), (15)–(26), (28)–(29).

National Forests are multiple-use areas, “as authorized by a layered set of national forest management laws reaching back more than a century.” Ark

Init. v. Tidwell, 816 F.3d 119, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Planning and administration of the National Forests is governed by NFMA, Pub. L. No. 94–588, 90 Stat. 2949

(1976); 16 U.S.C. §§1600-1614. Section 6 of NFMA directs the Forest Service to “develop, maintain, and, as

appropriate, revise [Forest Plans] for units of the National Forest System.” Ibid. §1604(a). A Forest Plan is

a general planning tool that establishes the overall

management direction for a forest. See Ohio Forestry

Ass’n, 523 U.S. at 729. “These plans operate like zoning

ordinances, defining broadly the uses allowed in various forest regions, setting goals and limits on various

uses (from logging to road construction), but do not

13

directly compel specific actions, such as cutting of trees

in a particular area or construction of a specific road.”

All. for the Wild Rockies v. Peña, 865 F.3d 1211, 1214–

15 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Citizens for Better Forestry

v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 2003));

accord Ark Inst. v. Tidwell, 816 F.3d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir.

2016).

NFMA “establishes both substantive and procedural requirements for the development and implementation of forest management plans under the Act

. . . including the requirement that each forest plan

comply with [Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act’s] multiple-use mandate. . . .” Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

661 F.3d 1209, 1222 (10th Cir. 2011). The statute directs that the agency “use a systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of

physical, biological, economic, and other sciences.” 16

U.S.C. §1604(b) (emphasis added).

Forest Plan development requires administrative

process in excess of simple notice-and-comment; plans

must be available to the public for at least three

months and the agency must hold public meetings or

“comparable processes at locations that foster public

participation in the review of such plans or revisions.”

16 U.S.C. §1604(d)(1). NFMA also provides highly

detailed substantive guidance. 16 U.S.C. §§1604(e), (f ),

(g), (m). If that were not enough, the Forest Service has

issued further detailed planning regulations. 36 C.F.R.

Part 219. Among the regulatory requirements is to

identify which lands are suitable, or not, for timber

production, and calculation of the maximum amount of

14

timber which may be produced there consistent with

sustained-yield principles. 36 C.F.R. §§219.11(b), (d).

Each Forest Plan is to “form one integrated plan for

each unit of the National Forest System.” 16 U.S.C.

§1604(f )(1) (emphasis added).

The Forest Service’s governing statutes also provide ample authority to issue rights-of-way for road access and to conduct forest management across the

National Forest System. The National Forest Roads

and Trails Act authorizes “permanent or temporary

easements for . . . road rights-of-way . . . over national

forest lands and other lands administered by the Forest Service.” 16 U.S.C. §533. Further, the Secretary of

Agriculture is “authorized to provide for the acquisition, construction, and maintenance of forest development roads within and near the national forests and

other lands administered by the Forest Service in locations and according to specifications which will permit

maximum economy in harvesting timber.” 16 U.S.C.

§535. The Forest Service may conduct land management activities, including those that produce commercial timber, consistent with its governing land use

plans. 16 U.S.C. §§1604(i), 1611.

By contrast, if National Forest land were considered part of the Park System, the available management

authorities are not as extensive. The Park Service does

not have a mandate for multiple use but for resource

preservation. 54 U.S.C. §§100101(a), 100701, 100706.

Accordingly, the provisions of the Park Service Act regarding roads and rights-of-way are narrow, 54 U.S.C.

§§101511, 100902(a)(3), and timber management is

15

severely restricted. 54 U.S.C. §100753. The Park Service Act’s authorities must be narrowly construed “and

shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and

purposes for which the System units have been established. . . .” 54 U.S.C. §100101(b).

National Scenic and Historic Trails already play a

significant role in forest planning, as management of

such trails in the context of a Forest Plan is a subject of

ongoing debate. The Forest Service works to situate

trails within the context of its multiple-use mandate.

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Land Management Plan

for the Inyo National Forest, at 95-99, 108 (Sept. 2019),

available at https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_

DOCUMENTS/fseprd664404.pdf (setting forth Plan

components regarding management of the Pacific

Crest National Scenic Trail). At the same time, the

flexibility and discretion afforded to the Forest Service

ensures that the mere presence of a trail will not undermine its overall mission to manage the land. Using

its authorities, for example, the Forest Service constructed “A Framework with Built-in Flexibility” for

management of the Continental Divide National Scenic Trail. U.S. Forest Serv., Continental Divide National Scenic Trail (CDT) Recommended Forest Plan

Components, Nov. 16, 2017; https://www.fs.fed.us/sites/

default/files/fs_media/fs_document/CDT_RecommendedPlanDirection_updatedv11.22.2017.pdf Under that

framework, “[i]ndividual [Forest Service] units may develop additional plan components, remove those that

are not applicable, [and] adjust them to respond to local conditions and public input.” Ibid. None of this flexibility—in managing a dynamic, ever-changing forest

16

landscape—would be available if trails were abruptly

transferred to the Park Service.

The National Forests are extremely important to

rural Americans. The National Forest System’s 193

million acres make up 30% of the landholdings of the

Federal Government, and thus about 8.5% of the Nation’s land area. C.H. Vincent et al., Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data, Cong. Research Serv. R

42346 (Mar. 3, 2017), at Summary; available at https://

fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf. Since Federal ownership is concentrated in the West, National Forests unsurprisingly make up nearly 20% of the area of the

States west of the 100th Meridian. Id. at 21. And they

constitute 22% of Colorado, 25% of Oregon, and nearly

39% of Idaho. See ibid. at 7-10.

From this System, the Forest Service sold over 3.2

billion board feet (bbf ) of commercial timber in the last

Fiscal Year. U.S. Forest Serv., Cut and Sold Report, Cumulative FY 2019, Nov. 25, 2019, https://www.fs.fed.

us/forestmanagement/documents/sold-harvest/reports/

2019/2019_Q1-Q4_CandS_SW.pdf. It is generally held

that each million board feet harvested supports at

least 11 direct or indirect forest products industry jobs,

Ore. Forest Res. Inst., Oregon Forest Facts 2019-20, at

22; available at https://oregonforests.org/sites/default/

files/2019-01/OFRI_2019-20_ForestFacts_WEB.pdf. The

timber provided by the Forest System therefore supports, in itself, over 35,000 living-wage jobs in rural

communities. As recently as 1990, total annual sales

exceeded 9 bbf, which would in turn support about

100,000 jobs. U.S. Forest Serv., FY 1905-2017 National

17

Summary Cut and Sold Data and Graphs, https://www.

fs.fed.us/forestmanagement/documents/sold-harvest/

documents/1905-2017_Natl_Summary_Graph.pdf.

Communities and companies near National Forests have a keen interest in the forests’ administration.

Congress recognized the connection, directing Forest

Service offices “shall be so situated as to provide the

optimum level of convenient, useful services to the

public, giving priority to the maintenance and location

of facilities in rural areas and towns near the national

forest and Forest Service program locations in accordance with the standards in section 2204b-1(b) of Title

7.” 16 U.S.C. §1609(b) (citing the Agricultural Act of

1970).

Forest planning is a complex process and one that

takes significant time. The agency did not complete the

first cycle of plans until 1995, nineteen years after

NFMA’s passage. U.S. Forest Serv., History of Forest

Planning, at https://www.fs.usda.gov/main/planning

rule/history (last visited December 3, 2019). Although

the Forest Service must formally revise the plans at

least once every 15 years, Congress has repeatedly extended the 15–year deadlines in recognition of the

complexity of the process. Ibid. §1604(f )(5); e.g., Pub. L.

No. 111–8, §410, 123 Stat. 524 (2009). Montanans for

Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 568 F.3d 225, 227 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J.).

The Fourth Circuit’s approach would balkanize

the National Forest System in direct opposition to

NFMA. It would short-circuit the measure of stability

18

achieved in the two decades since the first cycle of

Plans.

III. THE DECISION BELOW WOULD IMPEDE

FUELS REDUCTION WORK AND OTHER

MEASURES TO COMBAT THE FOREST

HEALTH CRISIS.

Petitioners describe significant adverse consequences from the decision below along the Eastern

Seaboard, particularly to the development of energy

infrastructure. Br. of United States 36–41; Br. of Atl.

Coast Pipeline 41–50. They also point out the barriers

the decision could impose on land management in the

East.

Should the decision stand, moreover, and other

courts follow the Fourth Circuit’s misadventure, the

consequences on forest health, rural economies, and

public safety could be severe. The National Forests are

in a state of crisis. As the Chief of the Forest Service

remarked, “The challenges to forest health . . . are

as great as any the Forest Service has faced in our

113-year history.” Remarks of Interim Chief Vicki

Christiansen, U.S. Forest Service, “Envisioning Healthy

Forests for Families and Communities,” Mar. 26, 2018.

These challenges include “growing severity and duration of wildfires and fire seasons” and a total of 80 million acres at risk and in need of active management.

Ibid. Due to these growing threats, Congress has enacted several statutory provisions since 2014 to expedite forest treatments. 16 U.S.C. §§6591a-6591e.

19

Congress recognized that the current system has not

been sufficient to manage the pace and scale of the forest health crisis. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Ilano,

928 F.3d 774, 777–78 (9th Cir. 2019).

Successive Governors of California have declared

emergencies relating to forest mortality and wildfire

risk. Gov. E.G. Brown, Jr., Procl. of a State of Emergency, Oct. 30, 2015; Calif. Exec. Order B-52-18 (directing agencies to “double the statewide rate of forest

treatments”); Gov. G. Newsom, Procl. of a State of Emergency, Mar. 22, 2019. Similarly, the President has directed Federal agencies to use their authorities to

increase active management. Exec. Order No. 13855 of

Dec. 21, 2018, 84 Fed. Reg. 45 (Jan. 7, 2019). “Active

management of vegetation is needed to treat . . . dangerous conditions on Federal lands. . . .” Ibid. The past

year has seen some of the worst fires in recent memory,

underscoring the urgency of fuels reduction across the

landscape. See J. Mooallem, ‘We Have Fire Everywhere’:

Escaping California’s Deadliest Blaze, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 31, 2019.

The decision below could raise questions about

thousands of existing and potential future rights-ofway, easements, and share-cost agreements across federal and non-federal lands on these now-numerous federal designated trails. Most of those thousands of

existing and future agreements are subject to periodic

amendment, renewal, maintenance, or establishment

to serve necessary public and private sector infrastructure and management actions. The disruptive consequences of the decision start with a pipeline but do not

end there.

20

IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT MISUNDERSTOOD THE STRUCTURE AND PROPER

CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL PUBLIC

LAND LAWS.

The particular structure of public land laws is an

important interpretive tool, and one which the court of

appeals failed to deploy. Congress recognized “the public land laws of the United States have developed over

a long period of years through a series of Acts of Congress which are not fully correlated with each other. . . .”

Former 43 U.S.C. §1392 (1970). The layers of public

land law have been characterized as a “briar patch”

containing “a diverse assortment of old and new laws

that have created a conflicting maze of legal mandates,

property rights, and environmental requirements.” R.

Keiter & M. McKinney, Public Land and Resources

Law in the American West: Time for Another Comprehensive Review?, 49 Envtl. L. 1, 30 (2019).

Public land statutes operate in at least three dimensions; they can be area-specific, agency-specific, or

function-specific. As to the former, Congress has reserved areas of the public domain for particular purposes. These include wilderness areas set aside for

public use and enjoyment, 16 U.S.C. §1131, or for Naval

petroleum reserves, 10 U.S.C. §8721. They also include

areas reserved for sustained-yield timber production,

43 U.S.C. §2601, within a “self-sustaining timber reservoir for the future.” Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land

Mgmt., Medford Dist., 914 F.2d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir.

1990). The Park Service and Forest Service governing

21

laws are good examples of the second category, and the

Trails Act of the third.

Traditional rules of statutory construction, particularly when attempting to make sense of an interlocking and multifaceted statutory structure, can quickly

lead a court astray, and did so here. The general rule

that courts should strive to reconcile potentially conflicting statutes is of “special significance” in the public

land context. Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842,

881 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Wilderness Society held the MLA’s

25-foot restriction on special use permit width for pipeline construction activities did not also constrain issuance of right-of-way for pipeline pumping stations.

Ibid. at 876 (vacating permit for construction of TransAlaska Pipeline due to non-compliance with construction width limitation). The court remarked that “[w]hile

the question of a pumping station right-of-way may

appear similar to that of construction [permits], close

examination reveals the similarity to be merely superficial.” Ibid.

The thicket of public land laws is “hardly a model

of neat organization and uniform planning.” Ibid. This

lack of organization also means that a court will find

“ ‘the presumption of consistent usage readily yields to

context,’ and a statutory term may mean different

things in different places[,]” particularly when a statute “is far from a chef d’oeuvre of legislative draftsmanship.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 n.3 (2015)

(quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 573

U.S. 302, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441–42 (2014)). Moreover,

statutory structure is just as significant as the words

22

used. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2492. “Statutes must ‘be

read as a whole.’ ” United States v. Atl. Research Corp.,

551 U.S. 128, 135 (2007) (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s

Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)). Courts must “interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context, ‘structure, history, and

purpose.’ ” Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259,

2267 (2014) (quoting Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct.

2191, 2209 (2013). But the Fourth Circuit used none of

these interpretive guides, preferring a vacuum.

The historical development of the public lands also

favors reversal. The Federal Government is by far the

largest landowner in the United States, owning “about

650 million acres, or about 28% of all land in the country.” G.C. Coggins et al., Fed. Pub. Land & Res. Law. 1

(5th ed. 2002). This includes, for example, about half

the national softwood timber inventory. Ibid. at 12.

Federal lands were first acquired after the Revolution,

at Congress’s suggestion that the States cede their

western land claims “for the common benefit of the union.” 1 St. G. Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: With

Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the

Federal Government of the United States and of the

Commonwealth of Virginia, App. 283–86 (1803; 1969

reprint). The ultimate purpose of the first western cession was to retire the debt incurred to finance the Revolution. Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)

212, 224 (1845).

Federal ownership of public lands was one of the

distinctions between the Articles of Confederation and

the Federalism of the Constitution. P.W. Gates, History

23

of Public Land Law Development 3 (1968). Indeed, the

controversy over western land ownership was a primary reason the Articles of Confederation were not

ratified until 1781. U.S.C.A. Articles of Confederation

Historical Notes (West) (stating Maryland “instructed

her delegates . . . not to agree to the confederation until

matters respecting the western lands should be settled

on principles of equity and sound policy”).

To that end, the new Constitution vested extremely broad power in the Legislative Branch to administer the public territory. The Property Clause

provides: “The Congress shall have power to dispose of

and make all needful rules and regulations respecting

the territory or other property belonging to the United

States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so

construed as to prejudice any claims of the United

States, or of any particular state.” U.S. Const. Art. IV,

§3, cl. 2.2

The Court has repeatedly declared Congress’s

Property Clause power to be “without limitation.”

Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976); United

States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840).

Therefore, “neither the courts nor the executive

2

The Territory Clause, a subset of the Property Clause, has

been given similarly expansive interpretation. “Congress has the

entire dominion and sovereignty, national and local, Federal and

state, and has full legislative power over all subjects upon which

the legislature of a state might legislate within the state.” Simms

v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899). The Territory Clause is also

a subject of this Term. Financial Oversight & Management Board

for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, U.S. No. 18-1334,

consolidated with Nos. 18-1475, 18-1496, 18-1514 and 18-1521.

24

agencies, could proceed contrary to an Act of Congress

in this congressional area of national power.” United

States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,

29-30 (1940). For example, the President’s general

authority to declare a National Monument under the

Antiquities Act of 1906 does not empower a President

to unilaterally rescind a Congressional reservation of

territory for a particular purpose, such as timber production. Am. Forest Res. Council v. Hammond, No. CV

16-1599 (RJL), 2019 WL 6311896, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov.

22, 2019). Instead, a change of a parcel’s fundamental

purpose must be accomplished by legislation that

clearly and unambiguously transfers jurisdiction rather than other incidents of it. See, e.g., Controverted

Lands Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-426, §2, 68 Stat. 270,

271 (1954) (directing departments of Agriculture and

the Interior to “exchange administrative jurisdiction”

of subject lands).

The expansive interpretation of the Clause gains

strength from historical sources. See, e.g., 3 J. Story,

Commentaries on the Constitution §1322 (1833) (“The

power of congress over the public territory is clearly

exclusive and universal; and their legislation is subject

to no control; but is absolute, and unlimited.”). Not only

did the new Federal lands strengthen the new country,

but the nationalization of them helped tamp down factional battles. Madison thus found the Property Clause

to establish “a power of very great importance. . . .”

which “was probably rendered absolutely necessary by

jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently known to the public.” THE FEDERALIST

25

No. 43 (Earle ed. (1937) at 281-82). Among these jealousies, ultimately rejected by the Convention, were

Gouverneur Morris’s efforts to constrain formation of

states from the territory in the West, fearful that westerners would not be “equally enlightened, to share in

the administration of our common interests.” Gates,

supra, at 74 (quoting M. Farrand, 1 The Records of the

Federal Convention 583 (1911)).

As the Nation spread westward, additional Federal lands were acquired and many were sold, granted,

or otherwise used to encourage settlement. Public

Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation’s Land: A Report to the President and to the Congress, x, 1-7, 19 (1970). New states were seeded with

land grants to be held in trust for the benefit of public

education, leading to today’s “land-grant” universities.

See, e.g., Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, 51st Cong., 1st

Sess., ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, §§10, 14 (1889) (granting

lands upon admission to Washington, Montana, and

the Dakotas); Gates at 804-05. By such “solemn agreement[s],” the Federal Government “agreed to cede

some of its land to the State in exchange for a commitment by the State to use the revenues derived from the

land to educate the citizenry.” Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S.

500, 507 (1980).

By failing to apprehend the need to consider the

particular Trail segment as part of interlocking management systems, the court of appeals erred. The

Fourth Circuit’s judgment flies in the face not only of

the text of the applicable statutes, and the structure of

forest management laws and regulations, but also the

26

ingrained structure of public land laws, and of the role

of public lands in our Federal system.

------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, amici respectfully request

that the Court reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

December 6, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

LAWSON E. FITE

Counsel of Record

SARA GHAFOURI

AMERICAN FOREST

RESOURCE COUNCIL

700 NE Multnomah St.

Suite 320

Portland, OR 97232

(503) 222-9505

lfite@amforest.org