Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Karen H. Scott, Petitioner v. District Hospital Partners, L.P., et al.

No.

========================================

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

____________

KAREN H. SCOTT PETITIONER

v.

DISTRICT HOSPITAL PARTNERS, L.P. & UHS OF

DELAWARE, INC. RESPONDENTS

_____________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

APPENDIX VOL. 1 OF 2

___________

Laurence A. Elgin

Counsel of Record

601 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

Suite 900 South Building

Washington D.C. 20004

lawnet.lae@gmail.com

========================================

i.

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE APPENDIX

OPINION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED

1-3

OTHER RELEVANT OPINIONS, ORDERS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF

LAW ENTERED IN CASE BY COURT AND

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY BELOW

3-54

ORDERS ON REHEARING AND EN BANC 54-56

STATUTE AND REGULATION

56-61

OTHER MATERIAL ESSENTIAL TO

UNDERSTANDING THE PETITION

61-75

OPINIONS IN WHICH THE LOWER COURT

RELIED UPON CASES REPEALED BY

CONGRESS WHEN IT ENACTED THE ADAAA

AND WAS SANCTIONED BY THE COURT OF

APPEALS

30-34

36--53

EEOC INVESTIGATOR MEDICAL OPINION

53-54

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO EEOC AT

INTAKE AND INTAKE NOTES AND

QUESTIONNAIRE ANSWERS

61-68

1

OPINION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

USCA Case #17-7061 Document #1720735 Filed:

03/06/2018 Page 1 of 2

Before: HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges,

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

JUDGMENT

This appeal was considered on the record from the

United States District Court for the

District of Columbia and the briefs filed by the

parties. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R.

34(j). The court has accorded the issues full

consideration and determined they do not warrant a

published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the

reasons stated below, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the orders of

the District Court entered on July 28,

2014 and December 29, 2016 be AFFIRMED.

Karen Scott, an African-American woman in her

fifties, sued George Washington University Hospital

and its owners, alleging that her hospital supervisor

terminated her and subjected her to a hostile work

environment because of her race and disability and in

retaliation for complaints about such discrimination.

(Scott’s complaint also makes fleeting references to

age discrimination, but she does not raise the issue in

her briefs on appeal.) The district court dismissed

Scott’s disability and retaliation claims; the court

properly found that Scott had failed to timely raise

either claim before the EEOC and that Scott’s alleged

difficulty breathing did not constitute a legally

2

cognizable injury under the Americans with

Disabilities Act. Scott v. Dist. Hosp.

Partners, L.P., 60 F. Supp. 3d 156, 161–64 (D.D.C.

2014). For the latter reason, the district court

also rightly dismissed Scott’s claim that she was made

to endure a hostile work environment on account of

her alleged disability. Id. at 164–65.

Finally, in light of federal statutes that provide

express remedies for wrongful termination, the

district court correctly found that Scott had failed

to state a common law wrongful discharge claim. Id.

at 165.

As to the surviving claims—hostile work environment

and wrongful termination, both on

account of race—the district court granted summary

judgment. Scott v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P.,

220 F. Supp. 3d 6, 11–16 (D.D.C. 2016). The district

court was right to do so. Based on our review of the

“vague,” “conclusory,” and often times “bizarre”

declarations that Scott belatedly submitted, we agree

that no reasonable jury could conclude that Scott’s

termination or any claimed workplace hostility was

racially motivated.

The district court carefully sifted through Scott’s

meritless claims and wrote two thoughtful, wellreasoned opinions. In so doing, however, the district

court “disregarded” Scott’s statements because

(among many other things) nearly all were “selfserving and uncorroborated, even though they

constitute the very type of testimony—given the

number of individuals implicated—for which

‘corroborating evidence should be readily available.’”

Scott, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (quoting Smith v. Lynch,

106 F. Supp. 3d 20, 37 (D.D.C. 2015), quoting Fields

v. Office of Johnson, 520 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 (D.D.C.

2007)). On this proposition, the district courts in

3

Smith and Fields erred and should not be followed;

we have said as much. See Johnson v. Perez,

823 F.3d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Because our

review is de novo, this minor legal error provides

no reason not to affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 36 of this Court, this disposition will

not be published. The clerk is directed to withhold

issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after

the disposition of any timely petition for rehearing or

petition for rehearing en banc. See FED. R.APP. P.

41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41.

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Ken Meadows

Deputy Clerk

OTHER RELEVANT OPINIONS, ORDERS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF

LAW ENTERED IN CASE BY COURT AND

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY BELOW

U.S. District Court

District of Columbia

The following transaction was entered on 3/21/2017 at

2:55 PM and filed on 3/21/2017

Case Name: SCOTT v. DISTRICT HOSPITAL

PARTNERS, L.P. et al

Case Number: 1:1v00600C3-CRC

MINUTE ORDER: Plaintiff has filed a [71]

Motion for Relief from Judgment under Fed. R.

4

Civ. P. P. 60(b). "Rule 60(b) allows a party to

seek relief from a final judgment, and request

reopening of his case, under a limited set of

circumstances including fraud, mistake, and

newly discovered evidence." Gonzalez v.

Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005). The Court finds

that none of these circumstances justify

granting relief from the Court's judgment here.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that

Plaintiff's [71] Motion for Relief from

Judgment is DENIED. Signed by Judge

Christopher R. Cooper on 3/21/2017. (lccrc1)

U.S. District Court

District of Columbia

1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 70 Filed 03/07/17 Page

1 of 1

ORDER

Plaintiff has filed a [66] Motion to Alter or Amend

this Court’s [65] Order. Reasons for granting such a

motion include “an intervening change of controlling

law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to

correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”

Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir.

1996). Having carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s motion,

the Court finds that none of these circumstances

justify modifying the Court’s judgment here, as

Plaintiff identifies no change in law, no new evidence,

and no clear errors in the Court’s

understanding or reasoning that would warrant

reconsideration to prevent manifest injustice.

Therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s [66] Motion to Alter or

Amend the Court’s judgment is DENIED.

5

/s/

___________________________

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Judge

DATE: March 7, 2017

Case No.1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 65 Filed 12/29/16

Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KAREN SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISTRICT HOSPITAL PARTNERS, L.P.

& UHS OF DELAWARE, INC.,

Defendants.

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying

Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby

ORDERED that [60] Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment shall be GRANTED.

This is a final, appealable order.

_______ /s/____________

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Judge

Date: December 29, 2016

Case No. 1: 13-cv-00600 (CRC) Document 64 Filed

12/29/16 Page 1 of 17

6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KAREN SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISTRICT HOSPITAL PARTNERS, L.P.

& UHS OF DELAWARE, INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Karen Scott, an African-American woman and former

Case Management Associate at George Washington

University Hospital, brings suit under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act, claiming that she was terminated

and subjected to a hostile work environment because

of her race.1 After discovery, it is clear that, in

November 2010, the hospital notified Scott that it

would be eliminating her position due to a

departmental reorganization. Open to dispute is

whether that reorganization was, indeed, the actual

reason for Scott’s termination. But there is simply no

reliable evidence that the termination, or any of the

hostile behavior Scott alleges, was based on her race.

Accordingly, the hospital is entitled to summary

judgment.

I. Background

Scott began work for the hospital on a temporary

basis in August 2006. Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ.

J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Ex. 1 ¶ 3. Roughly a year later,

Clial Beth Reinhart—the Case Management Director

at the hospital—interviewed Scott for a full-time Case

Management

_____________________

1 Scott brought other claims, as well, but those were

dismissed on the hospital’s motion. See Scott v. Dist.

7

Hosp. Partners, L.P., 60 F. Supp. 3d 156 (D.D.C.

2014) (“Scott I”).

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 2 of 17

Associate position. Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.

(“Def.’s MSJ”), Ex. 2. In a post interview response

sheet recommending that Scott be hired, Reinhart

gave Scott top marks in various experience, education,

job knowledge, and skills categories, and offered the

following general appraisal of her candidacy: “I have

worked with [Scott] since [October] 2006 and have

hands[-]on experience [with] the quality of her work.

She is highly qualified.” Id. Scott was hired for the

position the following month, in August 2007. Pl.’s

Opp’n, Ex. 1 ¶ 3. She would be supervised by

Reinhart, and would be tasked with the “effective

communication of information to and from insurance

representatives, physicians, patients, families, and the

healthcare team,” including the processing of

insurance claims. Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 1.

The working relationship between Scott and Reinhart

got off to a harmonious start. In a

glowing introductory evaluation completed in

November 2007, Reinhart gave Scott the highest

rating possible on nearly every performance

benchmark, and noted—among numerous other

positive remarks—that Scott “clearly strive[d] for

excellence in her work” and had been “key to the

[department’s] success.” Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 3. For her

part, Scott wrote: “I love my job [and] my upervisor!”

Id. This mutual admiration persisted. On an April

2008 evaluation, Reinhart again gave Scott nearperfect ratings and laudatory written feedback—

describing her as “responsible,” “reliable,”

“efficient[],” and “cheerful[]”—and Scott again

expressed exuberant satisfaction with her job and

supervisor (“I adore my job; and I love [Reinhart’s]

8

management style. She is very motivational!”). See

Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 4. There were fewer comments on

subsequent evaluations, but Scott’s ratings did not

taper until 2010, and even then they remained at or

above a “competent” level. Def.’s MSJ, Exs. 5–7.

Reinhart approved pay raises for Scott in 2008, 2009,

and 2010. See Def.’s MSJ, Exs. 8–9, 15.

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 3 of 17

Somewhere along the line, however, Scott’s

relationship with Reinhart soured. One possible

turning point was Reinhart’s purported response to

Scott’s complaint, in May 2009, that three of her coworkers were practicing witchcraft, causing black

dust or “goo” to emanate from the office’s air vents.

See Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 12 (“First Scott Dep.”) 123–37.

According to Scott, Reinhart’s initial reaction to this

complaint was to “start[] screaming and hollering.”

Id. At 132:11–15. Later, Reinhart offered to modify

Scott’s work station and to have maintenance check

the vents, but in Scott’s view that follow-up never

happened. Id. at 133:4–14. Scott complains of another

incident, in early 2010, where Reinhart supposedly

started opening filing cabinet drawers near Scott’s

desk, “screaming” about how things were not

properly organized, and telling Scott that she was

crazy. Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 10 (“Second Scott Dep.”) 132–

33. And several months later, in April 2010, Reinhart

supposedly “screamed at [her] again . . . for propping

open the door between the Case Management and

Nursing office,” which was secured with a code lock

that Scott contends was “malfunctioning.” Pl.’s

Opp’n, Ex. 1 ¶ 22. According to Reinhart’s divergent

version of events—which she recorded in an incident

report—Reinhart merely asked Scott why the door

was ajar. Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 11. (In the report, Reinhart

explains that the “door should never be propped open

as it has a coded . . . entrance key pad [with a code

known only by] employees who work in the case

9

management area.” Id.) Scott’s response to the

inquiry was “argumentative and confrontational”:

She cited the need for air circulation, suggested that

Reinhart should “call [her] attorney,” and initially

ignored Reinhart’s request that she go home for the

day in light of her defiant behavior. Id.

Aside from these alleged incidents of “screaming,”

Scott complains about other kinds of unpleasant

treatment by her supervisor. Reinhart apparently

“threw mail” in Scott’s direction (it is unclear

whether the mail was thrown at Scott or merely on

her desk), see Second Scott Dep.

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 4 of 17

147:6–148:15; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 ¶ 11, and she made

comments at departmental meetings that Scott felt

were “belittl[ing],” Second Scott Dep. 142:17–143:16.

Reinhart also allegedly requested access to Scott’s

email account so that she could monitor

administrative communications while Scott was out of

the office, id. 101:5–17; permitted another employee

but not Scott—at least at first—to work overtime,

Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 ¶ 9; stopped telling Scott the time

and location of weekly department meetings, id. ¶ 15;

and “call[ed] Scott into her office for anything,

including minor matters and matters that were not

part of [Reinhart’s] responsibilities,” id. ¶ 23.2

The relationship between Scott and Reinhart had

clearly deteriorated, then, by November 2010, when

Scott was terminated. See Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 17.

However, the hospital does not suggest that Scott’s

firing was prompted by the relationship breakdown

with her supervisor, Scott’s bizarre accusations

against her colleagues, or any deficiency in Scott’s

performance.

Rather, the hospital claimed then—and maintains

now—that Scott was terminated due to the

10

hospital’s reorganization of its case management

department, which resulted in replacing Scott’s

position with one requiring a Registered Nursing

(“RN”) degree. See Def.’s MSJ, Exs. 16–17. As Scott

understands it, however, “there was no business

reorganization”; the stated plan was merely a

“ruse”—or pretext—for the termination. Pl.’s Opp’n,

Ex. 1 ¶¶ 29–30. In support of that view, Scott points to

two employment listings, posted online by the

hospital in July 2015, which advertise open Case

Management Associate positions for which no RN

degree is required. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Exs. 1A & 1B.

According to Scott, “[t]his proves that the so-called

business reorganization was a pretext[.]” Pl.’s Opp’n,

Ex. 1 ¶ 38.

__________________

2 Scott has also complained about not being approved

for tuition benefits, but she concedes that Reinhart

signed off on Scott’s application. Second Scott Dep.

30:15–21.

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 5 of 17

Scott’s characterization of the hospital’s actual

motivation behind her firing, however, has varied.

Between January 2011 and January 2013, Scott

brought a series of charges before the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),

challenging her termination on the grounds of race,

religion, age, and disability discrimination, and

eventually also alleging retaliation and hostile work

environment. See Scott v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P.,

60 F. Supp. 3d 56, 160–61 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Scott I”)

(summarizing EEOC charges). In April 2013, after the

EEOC dismissed Scott’s various charges, she filed a

five-count complaint in this Court, naming

as Defendants the hospital’s owner, District Hospital

Partners, L.P., and management company, UHS of

Delaware, Inc. (collectively, the “hospital”). Compl. ¶¶

11

4–5. Scott brought claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101; Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; and

wrongful termination under D.C. common law. In

particular, Scott alleged that the departmental

reorganization was “a false pretext for discharging

her in retaliation for [her] having insisted on an

accommodation” (propping open the door) for her

“disability” (shortness of breath, exacerbated by black

dust from the air ducts). Compl.

¶¶ 21, 32. However, in the same complaint, Scott also

alleged that her termination had been the

product of race-based discrimination. “Reinhart,” she

claimed, “systematically discriminated against [her]

and at least four others based on their race or

national origin, to assure that they were let go from

[the hospital] and replaced with non-minority

individuals”—“a white RN” in Scott’s case. Id. ¶ 32,

46. And she also alleged facts supposedly suggesting a

race-based hostile work environment—such as an

instance where Reinhart gave a white employee more

opportunities for overtime pay. Id. ¶ 24.

The hospital moved to dismiss all of Scott’s claims,

save her allegation of race-based termination. The

Court granted the hospital’s motion in part,

dismissing the disability-related

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 6 of 17

claims largely because Scott had failed to show that

her alleged breathing difficulty was a recognized

disability under the ADA. See Scott I, 60 F. Supp. 3d

at 164.3 However, noting that Scott’s allegations

related to her race-based hostile work environment

claim were “lacking in detail” but “just barely

sufficient to satisfy” her pleading burden, the Court

permitted that claim to proceed. Id. at 165.

Accordingly, discovery commenced on two claims: that

Scott’s termination was race-based, and that she had

12

been subject to a hostile work environment because of

her race.

The hospital has now moved for summary judgment

on these remaining claims. Regarding the termination

claim, the hospital contends that Scott has not

produced sufficient evidence to dispute its legitimate

explanation for her termination, i.e., that it resulted

from a departmental reorganization and the

consequent elimination of Scott’s position. And the

hospital argues that Scott cannot succeed on her

hostile work environment claim because the record

does not reveal her working conditions to have been

sufficiently severe or abusive, or that any of the

alleged hostility was racially motivated. Scott

responds by citing the two Case Management

Associate job postings discussed above, as well as

three declarations, including her own, that were

submitted following the close of discovery. With few

exceptions, the assertions contained in these

declarations are vague and conclusory; seemingly

unsupported by the declarant’s personal knowledge;

irrelevant to any material fact; or simply so bizarre as

to be beyond reasonable belief. As discussed in more

detail below, Scott has not produced evidence that

would permit a reasonable juror to conclude that she

was fired on account of her race. Nor has

__________________

3

The Court also dismissed Scott’s wrongful

termination claim because such a claim may

not be grounded solely on the violation of federal

statutes with their own express remedies. See

Scott I, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 165.

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 7 of 17

she shown that any hostility on the part of her

supervisors was racially motivated. The Court

will, accordingly, grant summary judgment for the

hospital.

13

II. Legal Standards

A court must grant summary judgment if the movant

“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact,” such that “judgment as a matter of

law” is proper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is

one that could affect a suit’s outcome under the

relevant law, and a genuine dispute is one that a

reasonable juror could resolve in favor of the

nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[A] party seeking summary

judgment . . . bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of [the record]

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). But “after adequate

time for discovery and upon motion,” a court must

enter summary judgment “against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Id. at 322.

While a party may, of course, cite to affidavits or

declarations in support of its motion or opposition, see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), such materials must “be

made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would

be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant

or declarant is competent to testify on the matters

stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). It follows that

“affidavits based upon [mere] belief are inadequate”

at this litigation stage, Harris v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d

442, 446 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Londrigan v. FBI,

670 F.2d 1164, 1174 (D.C. Cir.

1981)), and that “‘sheer hearsay’ . . . ‘counts for

nothing’ on summary judgment,” Greer v.

Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(quoting Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign

14

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 8 of 17

Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

While evidence need not be “in a form that would be

admissible at trial, the evidence still must be capable

of being converted into admissible evidence.” Gleklen,

199 F. 3d at 1369. Moreover, self-serving allegations

that are “generalized, conclusory and

uncorroborated” do not establish a triable factual

issue, at least where one would reasonably expect to

see corroboration. Smith v. Lynch, 106 F. Supp. 3d 20,

38 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Akridge v. Gallaudet Univ.,

729 F. Supp. 2d 172, 183 (D.D.C. 2010)). These

requirements all further the overriding objective of

summary judgment, which is “to prevent unnecessary

trials.” Gleklen, 199 F.3d at 1369.

III. Analysis

Scott claims that her termination was racially

motivated, and that she was subject to a

hostile work environment because of her race, all in

violation of Title VII. The Court will consider each

claim in turn.

A. Race-Based Termination

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for “an employer . . . to

discharge any individual . . .because of such

individual’s race[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The parties

have devoted considerable portions of their briefs to

the question of whether Scott has established a prima

facie case of discrimination under the familiar

McDonnell Douglas framework. See McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). But

because the hospital has “assert[ed] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for Scott’s discharge, “the

question whether [Scott] actually made out a prima

facie case is ‘no longer relevant’ and thus

‘disappear[s]’ and ‘drops out of the picture.’” Brady v.

15

Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.

Cir. 2008) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 510, 511 (1993); Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)).

Accordingly, the Court “need not—and

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 9 of 17

should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually

made out a prima facie case under McDonnell

Douglas.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. Rather, that

“framework falls away[,] and the court must

decide one ultimate question: ‘Has the employee

produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable

jury to find that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason [for the termination] was not

the actual reason[,] and that the employer

intentionally discriminated against the employee[?]’”

DeJesus v. WP Co. LLC, 841 F.3d 527, 532–33 (D.C.

Cir. 2016) (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at

494). That “ultimate question” has two dimensions:

the first focused on whether the proffered reason is

genuine, the second on whether the actual reason was

discrimination.

As for the authenticity of the stated basis for

termination: The hospital maintains that

Scott was terminated because “the Case Management

Department was reorganized [in November 2010],

resulting in the elimination of the Case Management

Associate position.” Def.’s MSJ 3.

Supporting that rationale is a one-page document,

apparently drafted by Reinhart, dated

November 2010, and entitled “Project Plan for Case

Management Services.” Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 16. The

document notes that due to “the increase in electronic

systems, the need for the case

management associate functions has decreased,” and

that “[w]ith the increase of [f]ederal and

16

state regulatory oversight for quality/utilization

reimbursement, there is a need for an expert RN

Case Manager to assure compliance to our payor

regulations.” Id. The document then makes

clear that this “RN Case Manager” will replace “the

Case [M]anagement Associate Position (Karen

Scott),” thus resulting in that position’s

“[e]limination.” Id. Finally, the document

emphasizes once again that the proposed change

addresses the need for “a higher level of expertise in

utilization management processes,” in particular an

“advanced knowledge in [f]ederal and District of

Columbia regulations as [they] relate[] to the revenue

cycle.” Id. The only other record evidence suggesting

that the reorganization was the basis for Scott’s

discharge

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed

12/29/16 Page 10 of 17

is the notice of termination itself. In a letter to Scott,

the hospital’s Assistant Director of Human

Resources explained that Scott’s position was being

eliminated because “[t]he hospital [was] in the

process of reorganizing and redesigning the way it

delivers its services.” Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 17.

Needless to say, these rather opaque statements raise

significant questions as to the scope, nature, and

rationale of the supposed reorganization. First, was

this truly a department-wide organization as the

hospital describes, see Def.’s MSJ 16 (referencing the

hospital’s “decision to reorganize an entire

department”), or was the “reorganization” limited to

the elimination of a single position, as the Project

Plan document suggests, see Def.’s MSJ, Ex. 16

(referencing only the elimination of Scott’s position)?

Second, what is the rational connection between the

skills and knowledge signaled by the RN credential—

the purported reason why Scott was no longer

17

qualified for her post—and the need for someone with

“a higher level of expertise in utilization

management processes” and “advanced knowledge” of

local and federal healthcare regulations?

See id. One might expect to see an affidavit or

deposition testimony from those behind the

reorganization, resolving some of these headscratching ambiguities. The record contains

nothing of the sort.

The record does contain, however, two July 2015

employment listings for open Case Management

Associate positions at the hospital—no RN degree

required. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Exs. 1A & 1B. This, of

course, casts some suspicion on the hospital’s 2010

case management reorganization, purportedly

grounded in the need for RN case managers rather

than non-RN case management associates.4 No doubt,

the existence of the 2015 ads does not require

concluding

___________________

4

In her affidavit, Scott also alleges that she was

replaced by a “young white man” who lacked an RN.

See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 33–34. But this allegation

has no clear basis in personal knowledge, and it

directly contradicts Scott’s complaint, which alleged

that she was replaced with a “white RN.” Compl. ¶ 32.

The Court will therefore disregard this recent

allegation as unsubstantiated.

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed

12/29/16 Page 11 of 17

that the 2010 plan was pretextual. Perhaps the

hospital struggled to find RN-qualified case

managers after implementing the 2010 plan, and

decided to revert to the old case management

structure. See Def.’s Reply Supp. MSJ (“Def.’s

Reply”) 4 (“[D]epartmental staffing changes . . .

may have been implemented over the course of the

intervening four and a half years.”) Or maybe the

hospital’s 2010 plan sought merely to increase the

18

number of RN case managers, not to eliminate totally

non-RN case management associates.5 These

explanations are possible. But the 2015 ads, combined

with the numerous, unexplained gaps in the hospital’s

reorganization rationale, certainly create a genuine

dispute as to whether the hospital’s stated reason for

Scott’s termination was indeed the actual reason.

That conclusion does not end the inquiry, however.

Scott must point to evidence showing not only that

the hospital’s stated basis for her termination was

pretextual, but also that the real reason was

unlawful—namely, that it was the product of racial

discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (plaintiff employee must

show “both that the [employer’s stated] reason was

false, and that discrimination was the real reason”).

Scott has attempted to carry this burden by pointing

to assertions in three declarations, all of which were

completed after the filing of the hospital’s summary

judgment motion. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Exs. 1–3. The

Court notes these declarations are marked by signs of

unreliability, including assertions

_______________

5

The hospital also notes that the positions advertised

in the 2015 listings required a bachelor’s degree,

which Scott does not have. See Def.’s Reply 4. But

that is irrelevant to the stated rationale for the

reorganization, which is that additional case

managers with RN degrees were needed. See Def.’s

MSJ, Ex. 16. Indeed, “shifting and inconsistent

justifications are ‘probative of pretext.’” Geleta v.

Gray, 645 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting

EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 853 (4th

Cir. 2001)). Separately, the hospital argues—

without citation—that Scott “cannot establish a

foundation for the admission of these documents

into evidence.” Def.’s Reply 4. But the proper

foundation could be established at the time of

19

trial. See Gleklen, 199 F.3d at 1369 (any facts

“capable of being converted into admissible

evidence” may be considered at summary judgment).

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 12 of 17

contradicting those made within the same affidavit,

compare Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 ¶ 8 (asserting that “all”

case management unit social workers were white

“except one”) with id. ¶ 16 (asserting that “all” such

workers were white, without exception); assertions

that repeat—near-verbatim—assertions made in

other affidavits, compare Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 ¶ 7 with

Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 2 ¶ 7; and assertions that contain in

brackets what appear to be leading instructions from

Scott’s counsel to the affiants, see, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n,

Ex. 1 ¶¶ 7, 10, 13.

The lengthiest declaration is Scott’s own. See Pl.’s

Opp’n, Ex. 1. In it, she alleges that Reinhart took a

number of racially-motivated adverse actions against

African-American employees at the hospital: in

particular, that Reinhart “systematically, one by one,

got rid of black, or . . . dark-skinned, Utilization

Review Nurses, and also the black department

secretary,” id. ¶ 17; that Reinhart “moved all the

black nurse[s]” in a nearby department “across the

street,” id. ¶ 21; that Reinhart “started to track

where every black employee was at all times” and

“ordered all . . . black employees to put [their] purses

[including their house keys] in supposedly

locked drawers,” id. ¶ 12; and that as a result, black

employees “complained of thefts from purses and

homes” and “woke up in the morning with strange

bruising on their thighs,” id.

Under the standards applicable on summary

judgment, these statements must be

20

disregarded on numerous grounds.6 First, nearly all of

the above statements are self-serving and

uncorroborated, even though they constitute the very

type of testimony—given the number of individuals

implicated—for which “corroborating evidence should

be readily available.” Smith,

__________________

6

The hospital argues that “[a]lleged maltreatment of

others cannot be the basis of [Scott’s] disparate

treatment claim.” Def.’s Reply 6. Not so: “A plaintiff

may support an inference that her employer’s stated

reasons . . . were pretextual by citing a number of

possible sources of evidence, including ‘the employer’s

better treatment of similarly situated employees

outside the plaintiff’s protected group [and] the

employer’s pattern of poor treatment of other

employees in the same protected group as the

plaintiff[.]” Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,

812 F.3d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 13 of 17

106 F. Supp. 3d at 37 (quoting Fields v. Office of

Johnson, 520 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 (D.D.C. 2007)).

Those assertions therefore cannot “create genuine

issues of material fact[.]” Id. such as the number of

employees Second, many of the assertions are so

vague and conclusory that they cannot be trusted. For

instance, it is not clear during what time period

Reinhart allegedly took these adverse actions, and

specifics—such as the number of employees affected—

are lacking. Relatedly, due to their vagueness, the

Court cannot ascertain whether the assertions, most

of which describe the experiences of other employees,

are based on hearsay or Scott’s own personal

knowledge. (Some of the alleged

incidents may even have occurred after Scott’s

termination.) Finally, some of Scott’s allegations

are simply so bizarre—including the notion of a

conspiracy on the part of Reinhart to burgle the

21

homes of African-American employees by requiring

that they keep their purses in unlocked drawers—that

they are beyond the pale of reasonable belief.7

Excluding Scott’s broad-brush assertions regarding

Reinhart’s treatment of other African-American

employees, the Court is left with the assertions set

forth in declarations from two of the hospital’s former

employees. The first is from Beverly Boykin, an

African-American who worked in the Case

Management Department under Reinhart’s

supervision from September 2007 through May 2008.

See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 2 ¶ 3. Boykin primarily complains

that Reinhart gave two white social workers at the

hospital flexible working hours arrangements, but

was not

________________

7

A handful of the assertions in Scott’s declaration

relate specifically to her own treatment by Reinhart.

See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 9, 11–12, 13, 15, 23. By and

large, these assertions are both milder and more

specific (though still far from detailed) as compared to

Scott’s assertions regarding Reinhart’s treatment of

all African-American employees. For instance, Scott

alleges that Reinhart “stopped telling [her] when and

where . . . weekly meetings were being held,” id. ¶ 15,

and that Reinhart would “call[] [Scott] into her office

for anything, including minor

matters,” id. ¶ 23. However, as discussed below, see

infra section III.B, these incidents generally do not

evidence racial motivation. Scott does allege that

Reinhart gave a white employee more favorable

overtime opportunities, but that employee apparently

had a different position, and Scott acknowledges later

being given those same overtime opportunities. See id.

¶ 8–9.

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 14 of 17

22

similarly flexible with Boykin’s schedule. See id. ¶¶ 5–

6, 10. As the hospital points out, however, because

these employees have different job titles and duties,

they are not similarly flexible with Boykin’s schedule.

See id. ¶¶ 5–6, 10. As the hospital points out, however,

because these employees have different job titles and

duties, they are not similarly situated to Boykin, and

therefore cannot properly ground an inference of

discrimination. See Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail

Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that,

to rely on comparator evidence to show pretext, a

plaintiff must show that “all of the relevant aspects”

of the relevant “employment situation[s] were nearly

identical”). Other assertions in Boykin’s affidavit,

moreover, suggest that her treatment by Reinhart

was personal—not based on race. See, e.g., Pl.’s

Opp’n, Ex. 2 ¶ 5 (“I spoke with several other AfricanAmerican co-workers and

one white co-worker about [Reinhart] going through

my email, [and] they told me she’d never done that to

them.”); id. ¶ 11 (“[Reinhart] had not given the rest of

the staff the same orders she was giving me.”).

Scott submits a final declaration from Wayne Monk,

Sr., an African-American former pharmacy technician

at the hospital. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 3 ¶¶ 3, 6. He

recounts an incident where he walked near the

nurses’ lounge, an area where Reinhart was present,

to see the progress of some remodeling. Id. ¶¶ 7–8.

Monk claims that Reinhart approached him and “said

in a very nasty, malicious[,] and offensive tone: ‘You

people don’t belong here.’” Id. ¶ 9. Monk spoke to

Human Resources about the remark—which he

interpreted as being directed at African-Americans—

and two days later, he “received a card” from

Reinhart, apologizing for offending him and

explaining that “it was not her intent to do so.” Id. ¶¶

18–19. For a number of reasons, these allegations

simply cannot make it a matter of genuine dispute

whether Scott was terminated based on her race.

Given that Monk was in an area designated for

23

nurses, and that there were numerous AfricanAmerican nurses as alleged by Scott and Boykin, it is

highly likely that Reinhart’s comment referenced

non-nurses rather than African-Americans. Even

under the

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 15 of 17

unlikely assumption that the comment was racially

tinged, it was isolated, directed at an employee other

than Scott, and spoken on an unidentified past date.

Its evidentiary value is therefore highly attenuated.

All in all, the admissible and reliable evidence

suggesting that Scott’s termination was based on her

race is slim to nonexistent. And on the other side of

the scale, there is strong, affirmative evidence that

Reinhart harbored no racial animus towards Scott. As

previously discussed, Scott obtained her permanent

position in 2007 at Reinhart’s recommendation—and

a glowing recommendation at that. See Def.’s MSJ,

Ex. 2. In evaluations over the next few years,

Reinhart praised Scott’s work, often giving her the

highest of marks on various performance

benchmarks. See Def.’s MSJ, Exs. 3–7. Scott, in turn,

lauded her supervisor. Def.’s MSJ, Ex.

3–4. And Reinhart raised Scott’s hourly wage in 2008,

2009, and 2010. See Def.’s MSJ, Exs. 8–9, 15. No

reasonable juror—on this record—could conclude that

the same supervisor who recommended Scott for hire,

praised Scott, and raised Scott’s salary, then went on

to fire Scott because of her race. Because Scott has

not pointed to evidence that would create a genuine

dispute as to whether “discrimination was the real

reason” for her termination, St. Mary’s Honor Ctr.,

509 U.S. at 515, the Court will grant summary

judgment for the hospital.

B. Hostile Work Environment

24

The Court next considers Scott’s claim that she was

subject to an unlawful hostile work environment.

Title VII—in addition to prohibiting discriminatory

hiring, termination, and compensation—“strike[s] at

the entire spectrum of disparate treatment . . . in

employment,” such that an employee may not

lawfully be “requir[ed] . . . to work in a

discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.”

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)

(quoting Meritor

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 16 of 17

Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).

As reflected in the language of the standard, to

establish a successful claim, an employee must show

that the work environment in question was both

discriminatory and actually abusive. “[C]ourts have

routinely held that hostile behavior, no matter how

unjustified, cannot support a hostile work

environment claim unless that behavior is linked to

the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.” Slate

v. Pub. Def. Serv. For the D.C., 31 F. Supp. 3d 277,

303 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Na’im v. Clinton, 626 F.

Supp. 2d 63, 73 (D.D.C.2009); Kline v. Springer, 602

F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 (D.D.C. 2009)). Put another way,

under these circumstances, “it must be clear that the

[alleged] hostile work environment was the

result of discrimination based on” race. Lester v.

Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2003).

As detailed above, Scott alleges that Reinhart took a

number of hostile and potentially abusive actions

against her, such as: “screaming” at Scott for seeking

to prop open a secured door and for failing to properly

organize her files; “throwing” mail on Scott’s desk;

and making “belittling” comments at departmental

meetings (or failing to disclose the time and location

of those meetings). But there is no evidence that any

25

of these allegedly hostile encounters had a racial

dimension.8 Accordingly, even assuming that the

incidents Scott alleges are severe or abusive enough to

be unlawful, Scott has not shown that this “behavior

[wa]s linked to [her]

membership in a protected class,” i.e., to her race.

Slate, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 303. The Court will,

accordingly, grant summary judgment to the hospital

on this claim.

________________

8

Scott’s assertion that Reinhart gave more overtime

hours to a white employee does implicate race, see

Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 ¶ 9, but Scott has not demonstrated

that the employee is a proper comparator. See Burley,

801 F.3d at 301.

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 64 Filed 12/29/16

Page 17 of 17

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons outlined above, the Court will grant

the hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment. An

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

/s/

________________________________

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Judge

DATE: December 29, 2016

04/20/2015

Case

Name:

SCOTT v. DISTRICT HOSPITAL

PARTNERS, L.P. et al

26

Case

1:13-cv-00600-CRC

Number:

Filer:

Docket Text:

MINUTE ORDER: Plaintiff Karen Scott has

moved, for a second time, for the Court to

vacate its July 28, 2014 Memorandum Opinion

and Order granting in part the Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's motion, however,

raises no factual or legal issue that was not

otherwise addressed in her Opposition to

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or her first

Motion to Alter Judgment. Accordingly, [32]

Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment is

DENIED; [35] Plaintiff's Motion for

Reconsideration of the Court's March 20, 2015

Minute Order granting Defendants' Motion for

Extension of Time is GRANTED; and [34]

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition is

hereby STRICKEN.. Signed by Judge

Christopher R. Cooper on 4/20/2015. (lccrc1, )

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 23 Filed 09/23/14

Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA KAREN SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00600 (CRC)

DISTRICT HOSPITAL

27

PARTNERS, L.P. et al.,

Defendants.

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 23 Filed 09/23/14

Page 1 of 4

ORDER

Plaintiff Karen Scott sued her former employer, the

George Washington University Hospital, alleging

discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work

environment on the basis of disability and race, all

under federal law, and wrongful termination under

District of Columbia common law. The Court

dismissed Scott’s claims for disability discrimination

and retaliation because she failed to raise them before

the EEOC and failed to state a claim for disability

discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Scott has moved for

reconsideration of the Court’s Order, which the Court

will deny.

“A motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to

Rule 59(e) is also subject to the Court's discretion and

‘need not be granted unless the [Court] finds that

there is an intervening change of controlling law, the

availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a

clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’” Lemmons

v. Georgetown University Hosp., 241 F.R.D. 15, 22

(D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d

755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). It is “‘not simply an

opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which

a court has already ruled, nor is it a vehicle for

presenting theories and arguments that could have

28

been advanced earlier.’” Id. (quoting Fresh Kist

Produce, LLC v. Choi Corp., 251 F. Supp. 2d 138, 140

(D.D.C. 2003)).

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 23 Filed 09/23/14

Page 2 of 4

With one exception, Scott’s motion merely reasserts

her previous arguments or unpersuasively attempts to

distinguish cases the Court cited in its opinion. Scott’s

motion does present one colorable argument,

however: that the ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”),

Pub. L. No. 110-325 (2008), broadens the definition of

disability and arguably calls into question cases on

which the Court relied.

An ADA disability is “a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more

major life activities[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The

Court found that Scott’s complaint does not allege a

“substantial” impairment because she claims only to

have suffered shortness of breath in one locale: an

extremely dusty office room. Memorandum Opinion

at 9–10. The Court relied on Haynes v. Williams, 392

F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2004), which in turn relied on

a pair of Supreme Court cases, Sutton v. United Air

Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 492–94 (1999), and Toyota

Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams Motor, 534

U.S. 184, 198 (2002), for the proposition that an

“impairment does not substantially limit a major life

function ‘[i]f the impact of an impairment can be

eliminated by changing the address at which an

individual works.’” Memorandum Opinion at 9– 10

(quoting Haynes, 392 F.3d at 483). Congress passed

the ADAAA after Haynes, and in so doing criticized

the Supreme Court cases on which Haynes relies as

applying an unduly narrow definition of substantial

impairment. See Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2 (2008).

29

In Sutton, the Supreme Court held that individuals

are not disabled under the ADA if corrective measures

can mitigate the effect of their disabilities. 527 U.S. at

475. It therefore upheld the dismissal of ADA claims

brought by two severely myopic pilots because they

could correct their vision with glasses. 527 U.S. at

475. In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, the Court held

that “major life activities” means only activities that

are of central importance to most people’s daily life,

thus concluding that a factory worker whose carpal

tunnel syndrome prevented him from performing the

manual tasks required of his job was not disabled

because he could still attend to

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 23 Filed 09/23/14

Page 3 of 4

personal hygiene and carry out household chores. 534

U.S. at 201–202. The ADAAA’s findings and purposes

sections state that Sutton and Toyota Motor

Manufacturing “narrowed the broad scope of

protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus

eliminating protection for many individuals whom

Congress intended to protect[.]” Pub. L. No. 110-325 §

2. Thus, the act provides that the definition of

disability “shall be construed in favor of broad

coverage of individuals[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).

While the ADAAA requires the Court to interpret the

ADA broadly, to plead disability under the act, an

individual still must suffer from a “substantial”

impairment. Haynes sets forth a much narrower

limitation on the definition of “substantial” than

Sutton or Toyota Motor Manufacturing. The plaintiff

in Haynes provided no evidence that he suffered from

his condition— itchiness that disrupted his sleep—

when not working in a specific building. 392 F.3d at

483–84. The circuit held that a condition that only

arises in a specific locale is not an ADA disability,

reasoning that if the court were to hold otherwise it

“would transform the ADA into an occupational

safety and health statute.” Id. at 483. Because the

30

holding in Haynes is far narrower than Sutton and

Toyota Motor Manufacturing, its reasoning remains

sound despite the changes created by the ADAAA.

Haynes, therefore, is still valid law that the Court

must apply.

Assuming for the sake of argument that Haynes has

been invalidated by passage of the ADAAA, Scott’s

ADA claims still must be dismissed for the

independent reasons provided in the Court’s opinion.

First, Scott cannot bring ADA claims in this Court

because she failed to provide proper notice to the

EEOC. Memorandum Opinion at 5–8. Second, Scott

did not adequately plead disability discrimination for

two other reasons unrelated to Haynes: her claim

relied on speculative assertions not supported by her

factual allegations and her alleged impairment is

shared by the general public. Memorandum Opinion

at 8–9. Accordingly, it is hereby

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 23 Filed 09/23/14

Page 4 of 4

ORDERED that [20] Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)

is DENIED

SO ORDERED.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Judge

Date: September 23, 2014

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 15 Filed 07/28/14

Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

31

FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA KAREN SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00600 (CRC)

DISTRICT HOSPITAL

PARTNERS, L.P. et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying

Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Courts I, III, IV, and V of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or in

the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt.

No. 6] is granted in part and

denied in part. It is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File

a Surreply [Dkt. No. 10] is granted. It

is further

ORDERED that Counts I, III, and V of the

Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED

/S/_______________________________

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Court Judge

Date: July 28, 2014

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 14 Filed 07/28/14

Page 1 of 12

32

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA

KAREN SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00600 (CRC)

DISTRICT HOSPITAL

PARTNERS, L.P. et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Karen Scott, an African-American woman in

her fifties, worked at George Washington University

Hospital from 2007 to 2010. After she was fired in the

wake of an altercation with her supervisor, Scott filed

a series of three unsuccessful discrimination charges

with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission. She has now brought suit in this Court

against the hospital and its owners, alleging

discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work

environment on the basis of disability and race, all

under federal law, and wrongful termination under

District of Columbia common law. The hospital has

moved to dismiss all of Scott’s claims aside from race

discrimination. The Court will dismiss Scott’s

disability and retaliation claims because she failed to

raise them in a timely fashion before the EEOC and,

alternatively, because she has failed to allege that she

has a legally recognized disability. The Court will also

dismiss her wrongful termination claim for failure to

state a claim. But the Court will let stand, for now at

least, Scott’s claim of hostile work environment based

on race, which she has pled in barely sufficient detail

to survive the hospital’s motion to dismiss.

33

I. Background

Scott, a Licensed Practical Nurse, worked as a case

management associate at the George Washington

University Hospital from August 2007 to November

2010, mainly processing

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 14 Filed 07/28/14

Page 2 of 12

insurance claims. Compl. ¶¶ 6–8, 30. Scott’s direct

supervisor, Beth Reinhart, who is white,

recommended her for the position, and the two

worked together amicably at first. Id. ¶¶ 10–11, 14.

But that apparently changed following an altercation

in April 2010, when Reinhart allegedly “upbraided”

Scott for propping open the door to her shared office

space due to what Scott perceived as dusty air coming

from the ventilation system. Id. ¶ 22.1 Scott further

alleges that Reinhart responded to Scott’s complaints

about the air with “sudden, unexpected outbursts and

tirades” and that she stopped authorizing Scott’s

overtime hours. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. Scott also claims that,

around this time, Reinhart fired several non-white

employees and replaced them with white employees.

Id. ¶¶ 24–25. When Scott complained about Reinhart’s

conduct to supervisors, she says she was fired under

the pretext of a reorganization plan that replaced

Scott’s position with one requiring a registered nurse

degree. Id. ¶¶ 29–30.

Case 1:13-cv-00600-CRC Document 14 Filed 07/28/14

Page 2 of 12

Scott challenged her termination in three sets of

charges against the hospital with the EEOC.

Proceeding pro se, Scott filed her first charge on

January3, 2011. Where asked to identify the bases for

the alleged discrimination on the standard EEOC

charge form, Scott checked the boxes adjacent to the