Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Charles G. Kinney, Petitioner v. Michele Renee Clark

Supreme Court briefApr 23, 2019

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

I a-7j.3 "90, RI G INAL

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

CHARLES G. KINNEYAppellant,

FILED

PR232019

OFFICE

,,CLERK

MICHELE RENEE CLARK,

Appellee.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

(#18-56549)

US BAP (#18-1210 motion tore-open) into

US District Court (#2:18cv7321PSG)

US Bankruptcy Court, Central Dist. of Cal

#2:10-bk-41323-BR and 2:18iip00154BR

PETITION AND APPENDIX FOR A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHARLES KINNEY, Petitioner in pro se

5826 Presley Way

Oakland, CA 94618

charleskinney@hotmail.com

Phone 510-654-5133; FAX 594-0883

RECEJV

APR 26 2019

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The motion to re-open was because of crimes (e.g.

fraud) and judicial accessories-after-the-fact.

Crimes are being committed not only by listed

creditors, a contract-attorney/co-planner, and a

discharged debtor; but also by judges, justices

and federal officers who conceal the crimes and

thus become accessories-after-the -fact (since all

are felonies). 18 USC Secs. 152 and 157; Cal.

Penal Code Secs. 17, 31 and 33. The felonies and

the concealment have been occurring for years.

There is no immunity for: (1) judges and justices

who act as prosecutors of Kinney rather than act

as neutral arbitrators of disputes [e.g. they not

only concealed the fraud, but also knew there

was the clear absence of all jurisdiction to issue

any fee awards]; (2) listed, unsecured creditors

Marcus, discharged debtor Clark, and contractattorney Chomsky; and (3) officers who refuse to

enforce bankruptcy laws even though stopping

this type of fraud is one of their specific duties.

Michele R. Clark is the 2010 Chapter 7 no asset

discharged debtor. Her attorneys David Marcus

etc were listed creditors [who had Clark sign a

2007 hourly-fee retainer with a charging lien].

The contract-attorney is Eric Chomsky. Kinney

and Kempton were co-buyers of Clark's house in

2005, but creditors Marcus etc kept violating 11

USC Sec. 524(a)(2) by moving for more attorney

fees. The courts and others continue to conceal

ongoing fraud and ignore 11 USC Sec. 524(a)(1).

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The parties to this proceeding are those

specified and appearing in the caption to this

petition.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS .....ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..............iii

INDEX TO APPENDIX ...............iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.. 1

OPINIONS BELOW ..................22

JURISDICTION .....................22

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............31

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........32

SUMMARY OF LOWER COURT

PROCEEDINGS .....................32

STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............33

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE

WRIT OF CERTIORARI ...............34

Certiorari Should Be Granted Because Federal

Courts Continue to Ignore Federal and State

Law Which Violates Kinney's First Amendment

Rights; And The Method and Application of

111

"Alleged" Due Process by the Courts Severely

Impairs Meaningful Review of Important

Questions of Federal Law, And Severely Impairs

Rights Guaranteed Under The First, Fourth,

Fifth, Eighth And Fourteenth Amendments; And

Is In Conflict With Decisions Of This Court And

Other United States Court Of Appeals .....34

CONCLUSION .......................39

APPENDIX

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page numbers at top of page:

Sequential No.

In Document

Appendix A: Jan. 24, 2019 "final" decision by the

Ninth Circuit denying Kinney's right to proceed

with his appeal because it was "so insubstantial"

[Ninth Circuit 18-56549, Dk #2; Appendix A].. 1

Appendix B: Nov. 7, 2018 "joint" dismissal order

by District Court Judge Gutierrez as to Kinney's

removal, motion to re-open, and counter-claim

[USDC 18-07321, Dk #44; App. B] ..........3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Renda,

177 Ca1.App.4th 14 (Cal. 2009). 38

American Ry. Express Co. v. Levee,

263 U.S. 19 (1923) ..........25

Bauer v. Texas

341 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2003)... 35

BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,

536 U.S. 516 (2002) ..........36

Boddie v. Connecticut,

401 U.S. 371 (1971) .........25

Bosse v. Oklahoma,

580 U.S. 137 S.Ct. 1 (2016). 23, 38

Bostanian v. Liberty Savings Bank,

52 Cal.App.4th 1075 (Cal. 1997).. 22

Broadman v. Comm. on Jud. Perf.,

18 Cal.4th 1079 (Cal. 1998) ......10

Bulloch v. United States,

763 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1994).

Cadle Co. v. Flanagan,

271 F.Supp.2d 379 (D.Conn. 2003). 13, 26

Canatella v. State of California

304 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001). 25,35

Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson,

58 F.3d 89 (41h Cir. 1995) ........9

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm.,

558 U.S. 310 (2010) ............7

Cohen v. California,

403 U.S. 15 (1971) ............25

Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. US,

424 U.S. 800 (1976) ............38

De Long v. Hennessey,

912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1990)..

5,8

Devereaux v. Abbey

263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001) .....35

Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983) ...........12

Dodds v. Comm. on Judicial Perf.,

12 Ca1.4th 163 (Cal. 1994) .......9

Donovan v. City of Dallas,

377 US. 408 (1964) .............18

Evans v. Fraught,

231 Ca1.App.2d 698 (Cal. 1965)

Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indust.,

544 U.S. 280 (2005) .............10

Fink v. Shemty.

180 Ca1.App.4th 1160 (Cal. 2010). 7

vii

Fitzpartrick v. Bitzer,

427 U.S. 445 (1976) ............23

Fowler v. Guerin,

899 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2018) .....10

F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,

504 U.S. 621 (1992) ...........23

Giset v. Fair Political Practices Comm.,

25 Ca1.App.4th 658 (Cal. 2001). 24

Goncalves v. Rady Child. Hosp. San Diego,

865 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2017).... 18

Grannis v. Ordean,

234 U.S. 385 (1914) ............36

Griffin v. Illinois,

351 U.S. 12 (1956) .............37

Hafer v. Melo

502 U.S. 21 (1991) .............35

Hawaii ex rel Louie v. HSBC Bank Nevada,

761 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2014) .....24

Hernandez v. Sessions,

872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017) ......35

Hooten v. H Jenne III,

786 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1986) .......35

In re Castellino Villas AKF, LLC,

836 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2016) .....11

vii'

In re Gonzales,

830 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1987) ......24

In re Gruntz,

202 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) .....11

In re Hamilton,

540 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2008) ........23

In re Isaacs,

895 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 2018) ........38

In re Justices of Supreme Crt. of Pueto Rico

695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982) .......35

In re Kinney,

201 Cal.App.4th 951 (Cal. 2011). 7, 29

In re Marino,

577 B.R. 772 (9th Cir. 2017) .......9

In re McLean,

794 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015).

8,38

In re Miles,

430 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) .......23

In re Murchison,

349 U.S. 133 (1955) ..............37

In re Schwartz,

954 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1992) .......10

In re Thomas,

508 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 2007) .......3

Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cty & Muni. Empi,

585 U.S.

(2018) ............34

John v. Superior Court

61 Ca1.41h 91 (Cal. 2016) ...........1

Johnson v. DeGrandy,

512 U.S. 997 (1994) ...............30

Johnson v. Home State Bank,

501 U.S. 78 (1991) ...............9

Johnson v. United States,

135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) .............6

Kalb v. Feuerstein,

308 U.S. 433 (1940) ..............11

Keith v. Kinney,

961 P.2d 516 (Cob. App. 1997)..

Keith v. Kinney,

140 P.3d 141 (Cob. App. 2006).

Kempton v. City of Los Angeles,

165 Cal.App.4th 1344 (Cal. 2008). 16, 27

Kinney v. Clark,

12 Ca1.App.5th 724 (Cal. 2017)

Kinney v. Keith,

128 P.3d 297 (Cob. App. 2005)..

4, 22

Kinney v. Overton,

153 Cal.App.4th 482 (Cal. 2007).. 27

Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.,

359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004).. 10, 11

Lacey v. Maricopa County,

693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir 2012) ......36

Levin Metals v. Parr-Richmond Term.,

799 F.2d 1312(9th Cir. 1986) ......17

Long v. Shorebank Develop. Corp.,

182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999) ......10

Maritime Electric v. United Jersey Bank,

959 F.2d 1194 (3rd Cir. 1991).

McCarthy v. Madigan,

503 U.S. 140 (1992) ............38

Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line v. Calvert,

347 U.S. 157 (1954) ...........25

Moitahedi v. Vargas,

228 Cal.App.41h 974 (Cal. 2014). 18, 24

Moore v. Kaufman,

189 Ca1.App.4th 604 (Cal. 2010).

Moy v. United States,

906 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1990) .......25

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers,

377 U.S. 288 (1964) .............36

Nat. Inst. of Fam. & Life Adv. v. Becerra,

585 U.S.

(2018) ............34

Ogunsalu v. Superior Court,

12 Cal.App.5th 107 (Cal. 2017) .....7

Olson v. Cory,

35 Cal.3d 390 (Cal. 1983) .........24

Orner v. Shalala,

30 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 1994).. 8,38

Paramount Pictures Corp. v Davis,

228 Ca1.App.2d 827 (Cal. 1964).

Patrick v. Burget,

486 U.S. 94 (1988) .............23

Pennhurst St. S. & H. v. Halderman,

465 U.S. 89 (1984) .............23

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,

491 U.S. 1 (1989) ..............23

Pennzoil v. Texaco, Inc.,

481 U.S. 1 (1987) .............12

People v. Partee,

21 Cal.App.5th 630 (Cal. 2018).

Peralta v. Heights Medical Center,

485 U.S. 80 (1988) ............37

Plaza Hollister Ltd. Ptsp v. Cty of San Benito,

72 Cal.App.4th 1 (Cal. 1999) 24, 37

PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler,

22 Cal.4th 1084 (Cal. 2000) .........9

xii

Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson,

25 Cal.3d 124 (Cal. 1979) .........9

Riley v. Nat. Fed. of the Blind of NC. Inc.,

487 U.S. 781 (1998) .............35

Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cty. of Los Angeles,

761 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2014) .....6

Saltarelli & Steponovich v. Douglas,

40 Cal.App.4th 1 (Cal. 1995) .....24

Sinochem Intl. v. Malaysia Intl. Ship Corp.,

549 U.S. 422 (2007) ..........11, 37

Sloman v. Tadlock,

21 F.3d 1462 (9th Cir. 1994) .....35

Smith v. Bennett,

365 U.S. 708 (1961) ...........37

Smith v. Robbins,

528 U.S. 259 (2000) ............12

Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan,

874 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1989) .....36

State Univ. of New York v. Fox,

492 U.S. 469 (1989) .............5

Supreme Ct. of Virginia v. Consumers Union

446 U.S. 719 (1980) ............35

Thomas v. Collins,

323 U.S. 516 (1945) .............25

xlii

Trope v. Katz,

11 Ca1.4' 274 (Cal. 1995) ..........9

United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn.,

389 U.S. 217 (1967) .........24, 36

United States v. Frega,

179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) ......26

United States v. Hooten,

693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1982) .......35

United States v. Inzunza,

638 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2009) .....26

United States v. Murphy,

768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985) ......35

U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,

489 U.S. 235 (1989) ..............24

Verizon Maryland v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,

535 U.S. 635 (2002) .............30

Williams v. Pennsylvania,

U.S._, 136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016)...18

Wolfe v. George,

486 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2007) .......6

Young v. Tr-City Healthcare Dist.,

210 Cal.App.4th 35 (Cal. 2010) .....24

Zarcone v. Perry,

572 F.2d 52 (2nd Cir. 1978) ....... 35

xlv

CONSTITUTION and STATUTES

U.S. Const., Amend. I

. 34

U.S. Const., Amend. IV ......34

U.S. Const., Amend. V .......34

U.S. Const., Amend. VIII......34

U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.....34

U.S. Const., Article VI, Sec. 2

11 U.S.C. Sec. 350 ............25

11 U.S.C. Sec. 362 ............14

11 U.S.C. Sec. 506 ......15, 24

11 U.S.C. Sec. 524 ......8, 17, etc

11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1) 3, 4, 8, etc

11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2). 3, 4, 8, etc

18 U.S.C. Sec. 152 ......2, 26, 32, 39

18 U.S.C. Sec. 152(2) + ....... 13, 26

18 U.S.C. Sec. 157 .........2, 26, 39

18 U.S.C. Sec. 157(3) ........13, 26

18 U.S.C. Sec. 158 .............39

18 U.S.C. Secs. 1346 & 1951 ......26

18 U.S.C. Secs. 1961 etc .........27

28 U.S.C. Secs. 1254(1) & 1257(a). 22

28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331 and 1343.. 12, 31

28 U.S.C. Secs. 1441 and 1443.. 12, 32

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1452 ........12, 16, 32

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651 ............5, 27

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1739 ..............10

28 U.S.C. Sec. 2101(c) ............22

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983

. 30,32

FRBP 3001, 3002 & 6009 .........24

FRBP 5010 ....................25

Cal. Const. Art. \TJ, Sec. 3.........28

Cal. Civil Code Sec. 1717 .........9

Cal. Civil Code Sec. 3483 ........28

Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. Sec. 391 1, etc

Cal. CCP Sec. 525 ...............28

Cal. CCP Sec. 1033.5(a)(10) .......9

Cal. CCP Sec. 916(a) .............28

Cal. CCP Sec. 1060 ...............27

Cal. Penal Code Sec. 17. 2, 4, 13, 17

Cal. Penal Code Sees. 31 & 32. 4,27

30A Amer. Juris., Judgmts, 43, 44, 45. 11

xvi

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Charles Kinney requests that a "writ of

certiorari" issue to review the "final" judgment by

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal on Jan. 24,

2019 that refused to allow Kinney's appeal to

proceed [App. A (NC #18-56549, Dk #2)] as to the

US District Court's "joint" dismissal order by

Judge Gutierrez on Nov. 7, 2018 [App. B (USDC

18-07321, Dk #44)] for Kinney's motion to re-open.

That order also dismissed his counterclaim (NC

#18-56552) and removal (NC #18-56551).

The "Big Lie" Turned Into a "Crime"

In 2008, Kinney did not fit the vexatious litigant

("VL") criteria because he didn't have 5 losses in 7

years as an in pro se plaintiff; see Cal. Code of

Civil Procedure ("CCP") Sec. 391; John v. Superior

Court, 63 Ca1.4th 91, 93-95 (Cal. 2016).

Judicial officers needed to create the "big lie" that

Kinney was a VL so as to promote Judge Grimes

to a Justice and get Carolyn Cooper's cooperation.

From 2008 to 2010, state judges and justices were

acting as prosecutors not neutral adjudicators.

These included Boren [2009-2010], Cheney [20092010], Grimes [2007-2008], Lavin [2008], and

Rothschild [2008-2010]. Non-judicial participants

included Cooper, Clark and their attorneys.

When Clark declared bankruptcy, the state judges

and justices didn't want the "big lie" to unravel

[e.g. since Kinney didn't have enough "losses" yet],

so they became accessories-after-the-fact to conceal

felonies by listed creditor Marcus and his helper

Chomsky]. The judicial participants now included

state and federal judges such as Boren [2014],

Chen [2018], Cheney [2017], Gee [2019], Gutierrez

[2016, 2018], Johnson [2017], Lavin [2012],

McElroy [2013], Rothschild [2017], Scheper [many

times], and the Ninth Circuit [many times]. They

were all acting as prosecutors of Kinney [e.g.

especially when they created new pre-filing VL

orders based on false or misleading facts].

After 2012, these judicial "prosecutors" were also

committing felonies [e.g. ignoring 11 USC 524(a)

and 18 USC Sec. 152 or 157 violations]; they were

now accessories- after-the-fact. The non-judicial

participants [e.g. Chomsky, Clark, Marcus and

Takeuchi] were also committing felonies [e.g. up

to 5 years in jail; see Cal. Penal Code Sec. 17].

Here, USDC Judge P.S. Gutierrez and the Ninth

Circuit have been concealing felonies committed

by Clark, Marcus and Chomsky for years.

If the facts are examined fairly, it can be shown

Kinney is not a VL under state or federal law. For

example, Judge Lavin's 2008 VL ruling refers to

cases where Kinney was only the attorney for

defendants Schmidt and Chiu (so CCP Sec. 391

does not apply). The 2017 ADA class action

settlement with Los Angeles shows Kinney's

claims against Cooper and the City had merit as

to obstructions on public rights of way. Kinney's

Clean Water Act cases and the 2012 Cal. Coastal

Commission's discovery of an unpermitted storm

basin in Three Arch Bay show his Laguna Beach

cases had merit. Kinney has never been allowed a

trial or hearing on the merits of these issues with

testimony under oath and cross-examination (or an

appeal before impartial judges). All of this can be

easily fact-checked [e.g. via a Pacer account].

The only reason given by the Ninth Circuit was

that Kinney's appeal was "so insubstantial" that

Kinney could not proceed with it. The only case

cited was In re Thomas [App. A, 1]. However, the

case In re Thomas, 508 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2007),

does not apply to attorney fee orders deemed void

pursuant to ii U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1).

Insubstantial vs. Substantial

Here, adverse economic impacts on Kinney of the

ongoing violations of bankruptcy law and fraud

exceed $500,000 due to 13+ void attorney fee

awards for already-discharged pre- and postpetition debts that were shifted onto Kinney by

the 2010 Chapter 7 no asset discharged-debtor

Michele Clark and her listed, unsecured creditor

attorneys David Marcus etc (with help by contract

attorney Eric Chomsky as a co-planner of the fee

motions and accessory-after-the-fact). $500,000+

is not an "insubstantial" financial issue.

The bankruptcy law being violated [11 U.S.C. Sec.

524] was created: (1) to enjoin the exact activity

that continues to be pursued by listed unsecured

creditor attorneys Marcus etc [Sec. 524(a)(2)]; and

(2) to void any resulting state or federal court

attorney's fee awards or orders [Sec. 524(a)(1)]

because the fee motion and resulting award order

concede that debtor Clark is still personally liable

to her own listed creditor attorneys Marcus etc.

All the courts involved here have refused to follow

explicit bankruptcy laws; see Kinney v. Clark, 12

Cal.App.5th 724 (Cal. 2017) for examples of their

ongoing refusal to follow the bankruptcy laws.

These bankruptcy laws have been violated over 13

times. These same violations are also bankruptcy

fraud "crimes" which is a felony because of the

potential for 5 years in jail [18 U.S.C. Sec. 152 and

157]. These felonies continue to be willfully

concealed by Chomsky and others. Those who

conceal are accessories-after-the -fact (which is

also a felony) [Cal. Penal Code Sees. 17, 31 and

32]. Those are not "insubstantial" legal issues.

The VL law is being mis-used as justification for

allowing listed-creditors Marcus etc to continue to

violate bankruptcy law and commit crimes against

listed-creditors Kinney and his co-buyer Kim

Kempton (now deceased) [who purchased Clark's

house in 2005], and to compel silence upon them

by denying their constitutional rights [e.g. 1st, 4th ,

5th , 8th and 14th Amendments]. Those are not

"insubstantial" retaliation issues.

Even though an attorney fee "cost" order is void

under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1), and even though

Clark's listed, unsecured-creditor attorneys David

Marcus etc are prohibited by 11 U.S.C. Sec.

524(a)(2) from filing any motion which results in

attorney's fee award "cost" orders (based on the

false premise that Clark still has personal liability

for fees), the unsecured-creditor attorneys Marcus

etc keep filing attorney fee motions on behalf of

2010 Chapter 7 discharged debtor Michele Clark.

The Vexatious Litigant Laws

Here, the courts ignore bankruptcy law and then

justify their actions by mis-using VL law [e.g. Cal.

CCP Secs. 391-391.8] and mis-stating the facts.

Listed-creditors Marcus etc continue to violate

bankruptcy law against listed-creditors Kinney

and his co-buyer Kim Kempton (now deceased).

Here, the courts continue to compel silence upon

Kinney and deny him all rights to redress of

grievances [e.g. by denying the right to appeal].

The VL law is also being used by state and federal

courts to impose excessive fines on Kinney

contrary to the 8th Amendment (see US Supreme

Court decision in the Timbs case decided 2/20/19).

The state VL law allows a Calif. court to make a

person a VL [e.g. when a federal court has made

that person a VL], but without safeguards to keep

a VL order from being overbroad. State Univ. of

New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482-486 (1989). In

contrast to "narrowly tailored" federal VL orders,

all Calif. VL orders are "broadly" applied.

The federal VL law arises from the All Writ Act

(28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651) and under federal law all VL

orders must be "narrowly tailored" in scope. De

Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146-1149 (9th

Cir. 1990). However, in Kinney's situation, the

federal VL orders against him are being broadly

applied to all of his federal cases [e.g. Clean Water

Act citizen-lawsuit cases] and applied to include

non-parties [e.g. neighbor Carolyn Cooper].

Challenges To The VL Laws

The Calif. VL law has been challenged before.

Wolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2007) did

consider the VL law, but that case had no facial

challenge, and the VL law has been substantially

changed [e.g. to allow a Court of Appeal Presiding

Justice to decide whether an appeal has "merit"].

In 2014, the constitutional framework of VL laws

was extensively clarified in Ringgold-Lockhart v.

County of LA, 761 F.3d 1057, 1060-1067 (9th Cir.

2014). Based on this case, the Cal. VL law does

not satisfy the clarified constitutional standards.

Since substantial changes have occurred to Calif.

VL law after the 2007 Wolfe decision [e.g. in Jan.

2012], and since the Ringgold-Lockhart decision

explains some issues of the VL law that the Wolfe

decision never considered, the 2007 Wolfe decision

is no longer controlling as to the current VL law.

No court has ever considered the unconstitutional

vagueness of the current Calif. VL law. Johnson

v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2557-2563 (2015).

For example, given how the Calif. courts tally up

losses under the Cal. VL law and given that Cal.

requires an appeal within 60 days of whenever a

defendant is dismissed, a plaintiff can become

labeled as a VL in one case with 6 defendants by

"losing" against 5 defendants, but "winning" the

case against the 6th defendant. Fink v. Shemtov,

180 Ca1.App.41h 1160, 1170 (Cal. 2010).

Cal. VL law has also changed a party who is a

"defendant" into a "plaintiff'; that shows how

arbitrarily the VL law is being applied Ogunsalu

v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.App.5th 107 (Cal. 2017).

As for facial challenges to the Cal. VL law,

Kinney contends every application of that VL law

is unconstitutional because it is: (1) hopelessly

vague [e.g. as to wording such as "litigation",

"finally determined against", "merit", "reasonable

expenses" for security; "presiding justice"]; and (2)

an "ongoing chill upon speech that is beyond all

doubt protected makes it necessary in this case to

invoke the earlier precedents that a statute which

chills speech can and must be invalidated where

its facial invalidity has been demonstrated".

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,

558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010). There is no doubt that

the VL law, and acts by judges and justices using

this law, are chilling Kinney's protected speech.

As for as-applied (factual) challenges to the Cal.

VL law, Kinney contends the VL law was and is

misapplied to him, contrary to specific language

and criteria of the statute [e.g. because in Nov.

2008 Kinney was not a party and, as an in pro se

plaintiff, did not have 5 out of 7 losses in the last 7

years; and because Kinney was not a party in

Dec. 2011 when In re Kinney, 201 Cal.App.4th 951,

was issued by Cal. Court of Appeal, Second App.

Dist. ("COAT') "Presiding Justice" Boren who did

not yet have subject matter jurisdiction to do so].

No court has ever addressed these issues.

The federal VL law has been challenged too. It

must be applied narrowly per the De Long case,

but that is not happening as to Kinney.

Ongoing Bankruptcy Law Violations

11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1) "voids" a court judgment

if the ruling decides that 2010 Chapter 7 "no

asset" discharged-debtor Clark still has personal

liability to a listed-unsecured creditor [e.g. Marcus

etc]. That ruling is void regardless of the court's

rationale used to justify that decision. As to a

void order, a collateral attack or appeal (de-facto

or not) is unnecessary; and the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not apply. Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d

1307, 1309-1310 (10th Cir. 1994).

11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2) prohibits any unsecuredcreditors from employing any means to obtain any

judgment, order or sanction that determines a

discharged Chapter 7 "no asset" debtor still has

personal liability to that creditor. In re McLean,

794 F.3d 1313, 1321-1325 (11th Cir. 2015). Sec.

524(a)(2) is known as the discharge injunction.

For 8+ years, listed unsecured-creditor attorneys

David Marcus etc have filed 13+ attorney fee

motions on behalf of discharged Chapter 7 "no

asset" debtor Michele Clark, based on pre-petition

contracts, with help from contract-attorney Eric

Chomsky.

Their goal was to shift over $500,000 of pre- and

post-petition attorney's fees [incurred by Clark]

onto listed unsecured-creditors Kinney and/or

Kempton, the co-buyers of Clark's house in 2005.

However, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2) prohibits all of

those attorney fee motions. In re Marino, 577

B.R. 772, 782-784 (9th Cir. 2017).

The dockets for cases in state and federal courts

confirm that judges continue to issue decisions

that concede discharged-debtor Clark is still

personally liable to her own unsecured-creditor

attorneys David Marcus etc for their legal work.

Each time creditor Marcus files an attorney's fee

"cost" motion to shift Clark's legal bills onto

Kinney, Marcus concedes (admits) that his client,

discharged-debtor Clark, still has some "personal

liability" to him (Marcus) for his legal work [which

violates 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2)]. Cal. Civil Code

Sec. 1717; Cal. CCP Sec. 1033.5(a)(10); Cen-Pen

Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 92-94 (4th Cir. 1995);

Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84

(1991); Trope v. Katz, 11 Ca1.4tF 274, 279-289 (Cal.

1995); PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, 22 Cal.4th

1084, 1092-1094 (Cal. 2000); Reynolds Metals Co.

v. Alperson, 25 Cal.3d 124, 127-129 (Cal. 1979).

The 13+ attorney fee "cost" orders were issued

after Clark's 2010 bankruptcy. Those 13+ orders

resulted in over $500,000 in attorney's fees owed

by Kinney to Clark. By issuing those 13+ orders,

the state courts have engaged in willful judicial

misconduct. Dodds v. Commission on Judicial

Performance, 12 Ca1.4th 163, 166-172 (Cal. 1994);

Broadman v. Comm. on Judicial Performance, 18

Cal.4th 1079, 1091-1113 (Cal. 1998).

Challenges To "Void" Orders

Kinney is challenging all "void" orders that were

issued contrary to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a) [which

have resulted in the "taking" of Kinney's property

and excessive fines]. Thus, Kinney's grievance

cannot be a de- facto appeal of a valid order

because no appeal is ever necessary from a void

order and because full faith and credit can never

be given to a void order. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1739.

Each of Kinney's complaints is a "federal claim

alleging a prior injury [caused by listedcreditors attorneys Marcus] that a state court

failed to remedy". Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d

1112, 1118-1119 (9th Cir. 2018); Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 284 (2005); Long v. Shorebank Development

Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554-561 (7th Cir. 1999); In re

Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1992). The

courts ignored violations by Marcus of 11 U.S.C.

Sec. 524(a)(2). The attorney fee orders were void,

but were also a "taking" of Kinney's property.

Kinney is not filing appeals for any legal wrongs

committed by a state court. Rather, those appeals

are about legal wrongs committed by debtor

Clark (an adverse party) and by her listed,

unsecured-creditor attorneys Marcus etc (a

non-party). Marcus filed motions even though

his "puppet" Clark knew that was prohibited by

federal law. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d

1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004); 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2).

'1€

Under bankruptcy law, all legal work performed

by listed-creditor attorneys Marcus etc for debtor

Clark is deemed to be fully-discharged prepetition debt in Clark's Chapter 7 "no asset"

bankruptcy. Debts cannot be shifted onto another

creditor (Kinney). In re Castellino Villas, A.K.F.

LLC, 836 F.3d 1028, 1033-1037 (9th Cir. 2016).

State courts have never accepted 11 U.S.C. Sec.

524(a) restraints and ignored that bankruptcy law

has completely preempted state law.

In re

(9th

Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1078-1084

Cir. 2000).

Here, state courts have issued "final" attorney fee

award orders to Clark, but those "final" orders are

still automatically void under Sec. 524(a)(1).

Some courts have argued that these bankruptcy

and VL issues are "inextricably intertwined" with

"final" state and federal court decisions.

That is an unsupportable argument since a void

order cannot be "inextricably intertwined" with a

valid ruling because a void order is not accorded

any dignity in the judicial system, and because

void orders can be attacked at any time without

violating the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Sinochem

Intern. Co. v. Malaysia Intern. Shipping Corp., 549

U.S. 422, 430-431 (2007); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308

U.S. 433, 438, 60 S.Ct. 343, 345-46, 84 L.Ed. 370

(1940); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136,

1141 (91h Cir. 2004); 30A American Jurisprudence,

Judgments, Secs. 43, 44, 45 (1958).

Some courts have argued that Kinney cannot go to

federal court to challenge void state court orders

[e.g. made void by 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1)]. 28

U.S.C. Secs. 1331, 1343, 1441, 1443, and/or 1452.

That is an unsupportable argument since district

courts have jurisdiction over bankruptcy law and

since Rooker-Feldman and other preclusionary

rules do not apply to a facial challenge of the Cal.

VL law. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-488 (1983).

Since all state court attorney fee awards in favor

of Clark were "void" after July 2010 [e.g. because

those decisions had to presume that dischargeddebtor Clark still had "personal liability" to her

own listed unsecured-creditor attorneys Marcus],

nothing could be "inextricably intertwined" with

those "void" orders. Pennzoil v. Texaco, Inc., 481

U.S. 1, 8-17 (1987). No valid order ever existed.

Some courts have argued that Kinney's VL status

was due to his frivolous actions that had no merit,

but those are vague terms that are being applied

to Kinney without any testimony under oath and

allowing cross-examination to determine the true

facts [see Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 269-276

(2000) for "frivolous" and "without merit", and

how those are determined]. The VL law is not

relevant to Kinney's bankruptcy "creditor" rights.

Ongoing Bankruptcy Fraud

Each time listed unsecured-creditor attorneys

Marcus etc file a motion for attorneys fees on

behalf of discharged-debtor Clark, they admit that

11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2) is being violated.

In claiming that Clark still owes them for legal

fees is false and deceptive, the post-2010 motions

for attorney fees means creditors Marcus etc (and

attorney Chomsky) have Committed bankruptcy

fraud. [e.g. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 152(2) {".. knowingly

and fraudulently makes a false oath or account

or Sec. 157(3) {".. makes a false or fraudulent

representation, claim, or promise .."}].

The intentional acts by creditors Marcus etc are

"crimes" with a potential for 5 years in jail; that

means the crimes are felonies under Cal. law [Cal.

Penal Code Sec. 171. These intentional acts by

creditors Marcus and attorney Chomsky are also

predicate acts for RICO. Cadle Co. v. Flanagan,

271 F. Supp.2d 379, 383-391 (D. Conn. 2003).

Lies and Misdirection For 8+ Years

Creditors Marcus and contract-attorney Chomsky

have lied to state and federal courts for years

about their status and the consequences of their

actions. Those willfully false and deceptive acts

are further evidence of bankruptcy fraud "crimes".

For example, as of July 2012, Marcus represented

to LASC Judge Scheper that Marcus could pursue

attorney fee claims (based on emails to and from

the trustee) even though qnlx the trustee could

pursue those claims under the Bostanian case.

On Aug. 17, 2012, Chomsky admitted attorneys

Marcus etc were listed as unsecured creditors in

Clark's 2010 Chapter 7 "no asset" bankruptcy.

However, on Oct. 6, 2016, Chomsky said attorneys

Marcus etc "was a secured creditor" to the Ninth

Circuit which resulted in an attorney fee award to

Clark in Ninth Circuit #14-60081 [Dk #96]. That

order is void pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1).

On Jan. 2, 2019, Chomsky said discharged-debtor

"Clark is a secured judgment creditor" to Alameda

County Superior Court Probate Dept. That was

false since Clark was the 2010 Chapter 7 debtor.

Clark's docket for #2:10-bk-41323 shows attorneys

Marcus never filed any motion to prove they had a

"secured" claim [e.g. under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 5061.

In March 2011, the bankruptcy court issued an

"appear and defend" order to Clark during a CMC

conference, but that was not a proper relief from

stay motion under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362 [with notice

to all creditors] as Marcus/Chomsky have argued.

In Oct. 2012, the US Bankruptcy Court issued an

abandonment order as to pq1A the trustee, but

Marcus/Chomsky have argued that gave them the

"right" to recover attorney's fees for pre- and postpetition legal work (contrary to bankruptcy law).

Courts Refuse To Follow The Law

At all times, state and federal courts have refused

to analyze and protect the rights of listed creditor

Kinney. They have ignored inactions by creditors

Marcus [e.g. failure to prove in state court that

their charging lien was valid per the Mojtahedi

case; failure to prove in federal court that they

had a "secured" interest per 11 U.S.C. Sec. 506].

Instead, the courts kept granting attorney fee

award orders to discharged-debtor Clark for legal

work by listed-creditors Marcus etc, and kept

ignoring restrictions imposed by bankruptcy law.

Federal courts kept refusing to consider Kinney's

removals, civil rights cases, and appeals [e.g. by

making sua sponte dismissals, arguing these are

de- facto appeals of state court fee award orders,

and/or applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine].

The federal courts have now applied overly-broad

pre-filing orders to Kinney [e.g. Ninth circuit #1780256; USDC #3:18-cv-1041] and blocked Kinney's

cases and appeals based on those pre-filing orders.

The federal courts are now so bold that Judge

Chen included a non-party in his 2018 pre-filing

order [i.e. Los Angeles next-door-neighbor cooper

who falsely reported Kinney and Kempton to the

State Bar to stop them from having federal ADA

and state nuisance laws applied to cooper's

unpermitted, encroaching fences that were built

on the public right-of-way (and which still exist)].

Scope of the RICO Enterprise

When Judge Chen included non-party cooper in

his 2018 VL pre-filing order [USDC 3:18-cv-1041,

he conceded the RICO "enterprise" against Kinney

was broad in scope (see recent SOTUS petition).

Kinney's civil rights case before Judge Chen was

directed only at violations of bankruptcy law, but

Cooper was NOT involved in matters related to

bankruptcy law. Cooper was involved in: (1) the

promotion of LASC Judge Grimes to a Justice; (2)

the cover-up by COA2 Justices Rothschild and

Chaney by willful misuse of the Evans case [for

Cooper's and Grimes' benefit]; (3) the cover-up by

the City of Los Angeles as to Kinney's rights in

public right-of-ways [for Cooper's benefit]; an d (4)

Cooper's false complaint to the State Bar as to

Kinney and Kempton [to silence them as to Judge

Grimes, the Evans case, and rights-of-way issues].

Cooper was a high-level City of LA employee; and

Judge Grimes' husband was an influential real

estate developer in LA (and a frequent contributor

to Judges' campaigns), so secret communications

would have been easy. David Marcus' law firm

was involved in denials of Kinney's rights as to

streets in Laguna Beach (via the Overton case)

and LA (next to Cooper's house) even though

Kinney "won" Kempton v. City of Los Angeles, 165

Cal.App.4th 1344 (Cal. 2008). After that "win" in

Aug. 2008, LASC Judge Lavin made Kinney a VL

in Nov. 2008 for LASC #BC374938 [the fraud case

where Marcus was Clark's attorney], even though

Kinney in pro per did not have 5 losses in 7 years.

Judge Lavin cited cases in which Kinney was the

attorney for defendants (e.g. Schmidt and Chiu).

Because of Justice Boren's unilateral acts, Kinney

was never allowed to appeal Lavin's VL order.

The History In This Case

On May 22, 2018, Kinney filed: (1) a removal of

one of Clark's attorney fee motions under 28

U.S.C. Sec. 1452; (2) a motion to re-open Clark's

bankruptcy; and (3) a counter-claim and thirdparty complaint. Levin Metals v. Parr-Richm.

Term., 799 F.2d 1312, 1315-16 (91h Cir. 1986).

On June 6, 2018, US Bankruptcy Judge Barry

Russell dismissed all 3 filings. The appeals to

BAP and then USDC were summarily dismissed.

On July 17, 2018, District Court Judge Gutierrez

dismissed all those matters. [App. B, 3].

On Aug. 1, 2018, Kinney filed 3 appeals to the

Ninth Circuit for the dismissal orders.

On Jan. 24, 2019, the Ninth Circuit refused to

allow Kinney's appeals #18-56549, 18-56551 and

18-56552 to proceed forward [App. A, 1].

The courts mentioned that Kinney was subject to

a pre-filing order for these appeals even though

the appeals were from Article I US Bankruptcy

Court orders, not from Article III US District

Court orders [see Ninth Circuit #17-80256 order

issued on Jan. 19, 2018]. This is part of the

retaliation and cover-up to silence Kinney. The

Ninth Circuit has played this game before; see

SCOTUS petition for Ninth Circuit #18-16402 and

District Court Judge E.M. Chen's dismissal and

2018 pre-filing order in USDC #3:18-cv-1041.

For 8+ years, listed unsecured-creditors attorneys

Marcus etc have filed motion(s) for more attorney

fees in LASC #BC354136 on behalf of Chapter 7

"no asset" discharged-debtor Clark.

In each situation, Los Angeles County Superior

Court ("LASC") Judge Barbara Scheper has issued

attorney fee "cost" order(s) against listed creditor

Kinney and in favor of debtor Clark and her listed

creditor attorneys Marcus etc by ignoring: (A) that

the limits of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1) and (2) apply

here; and (B) that attorneys Marcus etc have

never complied with the Goncalves and Mojtahedi

cases in state court as to their automatic conflict

of interest "charging lien" contained in their 2007

hourly-fee retainer with client Clark.

Given these events, these judges and justices are

operating on a collaborative basis with respect to

punishing Kinney, so Kinney has been unable to

determine which judges and justices should be

disqualified. Williams v. Pennsylvania,

U.S.

136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016); 14th Amendment.

The courts are punishing Kinney for conducting

litigation, and imposing penalties on him, because

he is exercising his federal rights [e.g. under the

5th Amendment] that a federal court itself would

not penalize. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S.

408, 412-414 (1964). That violates the Supremacy

Clause. U.S. Const. Art. VI, Sec. 2.

Kinney's grievances arise from the intentional acts

of a non-party, attorneys Marcus etc, who have

represented Clark from 2007 onward, and who

were listed as "unsecured" creditors in Clark's 2010

Chapter 7 "no asset" bankruptcy.

The state courts fail to remedy that prior injury by

non-parties Marcus etc; and federal courts refuse

to accept jurisdiction over violations of bankruptcy

law and ongoing bankruptcy fraud.

Each time listed-unsecured-creditor attorneys

Marcus etc file a motion for attorney's fees on

behalf of discharged-debtor Clark, they admit that

11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2) is being violated because

Clark has no obligations to any listed creditor

[e.g. Marcus, Kinney, or Kempton] since Clark is a

discharged Chapter 7 "no asset" debtor.

Each time a court awards attorneys fees to Clark

and her listed-creditor attorneys Marcus etc, that

court admits that FEDERAL law is being

violated since U.S.C. Sec. 524(a) applies to the

motion and order because debtor Clark must still

have personal liability to creditor Marcus under

the 2007 hourly-fee retainer as a prerequisite to

the granting of any order.

Each time a court awards attorneys fees to Clark

and her own listed-creditor attorneys Marcus etc,

that court admits that STATE law is being

violated by those attorneys because they never

proved the validity of their 2007 hourly-fee

retainer with the attorney's or charging lien.

Goncalves v. Rady Children's Hospital San Diego,

865 F.3d 1237, 1255 fn. 5 (9th Cir. 2017) [citing

"Mojtahedi v. Vargas, 228 Cal.App.4th 974, 176

CaLRptr.3d 313, 316 (2014)"].

Judges Have No Immunity

State and federal judges and justices, and state

and federal officers [e.g. bankruptcy trustee], who

issued, affirmed or ignored orders, judgments or

sanctions against co-buyers Kinney and Kempton,

knew the orders were "void" under FEDERAL

law [e.g. knew there was the clear absence of all

jurisdiction and thus no immunity as explained in

USDC 3:18-cv-1041-EMC, Dk #44; see SCOTUS

petition for Ninth Circuit 18-16402]; they include:

Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge

Barbara Scheper in #BC354136 [Clark's lack of

title vs. her unrecorded, secret easement given to

neighbor Cooper] and Judge Steven Kleifield in

#BC374938 [Clark's fraud and non-disclosure];

Calif. Court of Appeal, Second Appellate

Dist., Justices Roger Boren, Frances Rothschild,

Victoria Cheney, and Jeffrey Johnson [and others

as shown by dockets];

Alameda County Superior Court Judge

Delbert Gee in Kimberly Kempton's probate

estate #RP13686482 [e.g. as to Clark's "claims"];

former Cal. Attorney General Kamala

Harris and current Cal. Attorney General Xavier

Becerra [who ignored letters from Kinney];

Cal. State Bar tribunal hearing officers Pat

McElroy, Honn, Purcell and Epstein [in the 20122014 disbarment proceedings for Kinney];

US Trustee, Central District of California

(Los Angeles), Peter C. Anderson [who has the job

of uncovering bankruptcy fraud and abuse];

US Bankruptcy Court, Central Dist. of Cal.,

Judges Richard Neiter and Barry Russell;

US District Court Judges Philip S.

Gutierrez, Edward Chen, and Vince Chhabria

[and others as shown by dockets];

Ninth Circuit Judges Bea, Bybee, Gould,

Levy, Owens, Paez, Silverman, Thomas, and

Wallace [and others as shown by dockets]; and

(j) the Justices of this Court [due to inaction].

Likewise, these same people (who issued, affirmed

or ignored orders, judgments or sanctions against

co-buyers Kinney or Kempton) knew the orders

were "void" under STATE law due to failures by

Clark's attorneys David Marcus etc to comply

with the Goncalves and Mojtahedi cases as to

proving their 2007 hourly-fee retainer and its

automatic conflict-of-interest attorney's (aka

charging) lien were valid and enforceable as of

Dec. 2008 onward before attorneys Marcus could

recover attorney's fees from their client Clark and

before attorneys Marcus could shift attorney's

fees owed by Clark onto co-buyers Kinney and

Kempton via the 2005 purchase contract.

COA2 Justice Jeffrey Johnson is the same Justice

who was named in a 1/4/19 Calif. Comm. on Jud.

Performance's Notice of Formal Proceedings (and

the same Justice who concurred with Kinney v.

Clark in 2017). Justice Johnson filed an Answer

on 1/22/19. Justice Johnson could be ready to

"blow the whistle" on Justices Rothschild and

Cheney [e.g. as to LASC Judge Grimes and the

Evans case], so it was time to get rid of him. This

shows that a "culture of silence" exists in COA2.

Likewise, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski had

been harassing staff and others for 3+ decades. In

response to publicity, Judge Kozinski retired in

Dec. 2018. This shows that a "culture of silence"

exists in the Ninth Circuit.

In 2017, the COA2 Justices gave examples of

bankruptcy law violations, but ignored ongoing

violations of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a); see Kinney v.

Clark, 12 Cal.App.5th 724 (Cal. 2017) [e.g. see pgs.

728-731 as to an attorney fee order issued in July

2012 in favor of Clark based on Marcus' motion for

pre-petition fees when the trustee had the sole

authority to seek those fees because Clark's

Chapter 7 discharge didn't occur until Aug. 2012].

Judge Scheper's July 2012 attorney fee order is

contrary to Bostanian v. Liberty Savings Bank, 52

Cal.App.4th 1075, 1078-1087 (Cal. 1997) and void

In addition,

under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1).

Marcus' motion violates 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2).

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision(s) sought to be reviewed are the:

Jan. 24, 2019 "final" decision by the

Ninth Circuit denying Kinney's right to proceed

with his appeal because it was "so insubstantial"

[Ninth Circuit Dk #2; Appendix A, page 1]1.

Nov. 7, 2018 dismissal order by US

District Court Judge Gutierrez [App. B, 3].

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

Title 28, United States Code ("U.S.C."), Secs.

1254(1), 1257(a), and/or 2101(c).

Citation method is Appendix ("App."), exhibit

letter, and sequential page number.

Here, the US District Court improperly dismissed

Kinney's matters related to bankruptcy [App. B].

Next, the Ninth Circuit improperly denied Kinney

any right to continue with his appeal [App. A].

As noted in prior petitions, the courts have not

followed and are still not following bankruptcy

law (or state law) as to listed creditor Kinney [e.g.

see his petitions 18-1096, 18-1095, 18-906, 18-908,

17-219, 16-252, 16-606, and 16-1182 to name just

a few]. Bosse v. Oklahoma, 580 U.S.

, 137

S.Ct. 1, 196 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016).

The courts made rulings that violated Kinney's

federal constitutional rights [e.g. 1st Amendment]

and federal civil rights under color of authority or

official right [e.g. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983], so judicial

and sovereign immunities were limited or

eliminated [e.g. for prospective injunctive relief].

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976);

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89, 102-106, 123 n. 34 (1984); Patrick v.

Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101-104 (1988); Pennsylvania

v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 57 (1989); F.T.C. v.

Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631-638 (1992).

Ruling(s) that Kinney was attempting to appeal

are void under bankruptcy law which completely

pre-empted all state court matters filed after to

July 2010 [e.g. LASC BC354136 and BC374938].

Maritime Electric Co., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank,

959 F.2d 1194, 1203-1204 (3rd Cir. 1991); In re

Hamilton, 540 F.3d 367, 370-376 (6th Cir. 2008); In

re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1087-1089 (9th Cir. 2005);

In re Gonzales, 830 F.2d 1033, 1034-1036 (91h Cir.

1987); Hawaii ex rel Louie v. HSBC Bank Nevada,

N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 2014).

Kinney's appeal should have been allowed, and

judges and justices should have vacated all "cost"

orders in favor of discharged-debtor Clark. Young

v. Tr-City Healthcare Dist., 210 Cal.App.4th 35,

41-42 and 49-53 (Cal. 2010); Plaza Hollister Ltd.

Ptsp. v. County of San Benito, 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 1322 (Cal. 1999); Giset v. Fair Political Practices

Comm., 25 Cal.App.4th 658, 701 (Cal. 2001).

Once Clark filed a Chapter 7 no asset bankruptcy

petition in 2010, Clark was no longer obligated

for attorney's fee owed to Marcus etc, or under the

2005 purchase contract with co-buyers Kinney etc.

Listed-unsecured-creditor attorneys Marcus etc

never proved their lien was valid or secured. 11

U.S.C. Sees. 506; FRBP 3001, 3002 and 6009; U.S.

v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 238-240

(1989); Saltareffi & Steponovich v. Douglas, 40

Cal.App.4th 1, 3-7 (Cal. 1995); Mojtahedi v. Vargas,

228 Cal.App.4th 974, 976-980 (Cal. 2014).

The rulings by COA2 and Cal. Supreme Court

were abuses of discretion as to void orders made

by LASC Judge Scheper. Olson v. Cory, 35 Cal.3d

390, 400-401 (Cal. 1983).

The denial of Kinney's appeal rights [e.g. his

petition for review of void orders] violated his First

Amendment rights. United Mine Workers v.

Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967);

Mov v. United States, 906 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir.

1990); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).

Any issues regarding Clark's bankruptcy or her

discharge are still controlled by bankruptcy law,

and all courts must follow that law. American

Railway Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19, 20-21

(1923); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 17-18

(1971); Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v.

Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 159-161 (1954).

The powers of the state appellate court are limited

by explicit limitations in state statutes, explicit

limitations found in decisions by the state

supreme court, and/or by civil and constitutional

rights of the appellants. Canatella v. State of

California, 304 F.3d 843, 847-854 and n.6 and 14

(9th Cir. 2001).

The courts have again denied Kinney's First

Amendment rights with respect to bankruptcy law

violations and to overbroad applications of \TL

laws [e.g. by denying his right to appeal]. Boddie

v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-383 (1971).

Kinney's Cases/Appeals Had Merit

Kinney's cases and appeals had "merit" [e.g. given

ongoing fraud]. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 350; FRBP 5010.

Kinney was a "creditor" contrary to Bankruptcy

Court Judge Neiter's Oct. 18, 2012 abandonment

order; that order does not give Clark any "right" to

shift discharged debt or attorney's fees onto

Kinney. Kinney as a "creditor" has standing to

protest ongoing violations of bankruptcy law by

debtor Clark, creditor Marcus, and Chomsky.

These felonies also violate 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1346

and/or 1951, and create new civil rights and RICO

claims [e.g. since creditor attorneys Marcus etc

and contract-attorney Chomsky have operated a

RICO "enterprise" to extort money from Kinney

via void attorney fee awards]. United States v.

Inzunza, 638 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2009); United

States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, listed unsecured-creditor attorneys Marcus

etc and Chomsky are violating 18 U.S.C. Secs. 152

and/or 157 with respect to: (i) making false oaths

under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 152(2); (ii) making false

declarations under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 152(3); (iii)

presenting false claims under 18 U.S.C. Sec.

152(4); (iv) receiving material property from

debtor Clark under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 152(5); and/or

(v) repeatedly making false or fraudulent

representations under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 157(3).

Ongoing Crimes

Under federal law, contract-attorney Chomsky

(who was hired after July 2010) is the second

person necessary to create and participate in a

RICO "enterprise" as to bankruptcy fraud for the

improper enrichment of listed-creditor Marcus;

and that is a predicate act for a civil RICO action.

18 U.S.C. Secs. 1961 etc; Cadle Co. v. Flanagan,

271 F. Supp.2d 379, 383-391 (D. Conn. 2003).

Under state law, a felony results from a law that

has more than 1 year of jail time. Thus, contractattorney Chomsky has been and continues to be

an accessory-after-the-fact and co-planner of new

felonies with listed unsecured-creditor attorneys

David Marcus et al [e.g. due to their exposure to 5

years in jail via 18 U.S.C. Sec. 152 or 157]. Cal.

Penal Code Secs. 17, 31 and 32; People v. Partee,

21 Cal.App.5th 630, 633-642 (Cal. 2018).

Overview of Retaliation

All of these judicial officers knew that:

In the 1998 to 2000 time frame, Kinney was

the attorney for commercial fisherman Van Scoy as

to Shell Oil's excessive toxic selenium discharges

into SF Bay, but Van Scoy's claims against a state

agency were never sent back to state court after the

Ninth Circuit agreed the Regional Water Quality

Control Board had 11th Amendment immunity.

In the 2002 to 2006 time frame, Kinney never

got the Orange County Superior Court and the

Court of Appeal, Fourth App. Dist. ["COAT], to

make CCP Sec. 1060. determinations in a 2001

case filed by Three Arch Bay Community Services

District ("TABCSD") against Kinney [e.g. for

ongoing nuisances caused by TABCSD; and for an

encroaching fence built by Overton; see Kinney v.

Overton, 153 Cal.App.4th 482 (Cal. 2007)].

In the 2007 to 2010 time frame, LASC Judge

Elizabeth Grimes, LASC Judge Luis Lavin, LASC

Judge Richard Fruin, Jr., and Justices in the

COA2 retaliated against Kinney [e.g. by ignoring

Kempton v. City of Los Angeles, 165 Ca1.App.4th

1344 (Cal. 2008); when making Kinney a \TL].

There were 100% directly-inconsistent decisions

by Judge Grimes and COA2 as to the failure by

seller Michele Clark to give "clean" or clear title to

co-buyers Kinney etc because Clark gave an

undisclosed and unrecorded easement to the nextdoor neighbor Carolyn Cooper for two encroaching

fences. This was an intentional misapplication of

the Evans case [Evans v. Fraught, 231 Cal.App.2d

698, 705 (Cal. 1965)] as to "clean" title vs. Clark's

unrecorded easement; and the COA2 still refuses

to correct that error. Moore v. Kaufman, 189

Cal.App.4th 604, 614-617 (Cal. 2010).

LASC Judge Lavin ruled Kinney was a VL on Nov.

19, 2008 without supporting facts [e.g. Kinney was no

longer a party]; and COA2 Justice Boren unilaterally

dismissed Kinney's appeal(s) from 2009 onward

regarding that 2008 VL order [even though Cal.

Const., Art. VT, Sec. 3, requires a 3 justice panel to

make a decision; and any pre-filing order is subject

to a mandatory injunction under CCP Secs. 525 and

916(a), so the VL order is not final until an appeal

occurs]. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis, 228

Ca1.App.2d 827, 837-838 (Cal. 1964).

LASC Judge Fruin ignored Cal. Civil Code Sec.

3483 for a fence built by neighbor Cooper in a

public right-of-way on a street abutting Kinney's

LA property; and Kinney's 2008 published opinion.

D. In the 2010 to 2012 time frame, LASC Judge

Scheper, the COA2 (including Justice Roger Boren),

and US Bankruptcy Court Judge Richard Neiter

ignored state and bankruptcy law as to Kinney.

LASC Judge Scheper granted a 7/10/12 attorney's

fee award to Clark contrary to bankruptcy law.

Justice Boren of the COA2 issued In re Kinney, 201

Cal.App.41h 951 (Cal. 2011) for which the facts were

misstated and in which Kinney was not a party.

Judge Neiter issued the Oct. 18, 2012 abandonment

order in which he "held" that Kinney was not a

"creditor" in Clark's 2010 Chapter 7 bankruptcy

which is blatantly false because Kinney was

specifically listed by Clark, and his "status" as a

creditor cannot be changed by an abandonment

order issued after Clark's Aug. 2012 discharge.

In the 2013 to 2017 time frame, LASC Judge

Scheper, the COA2, the COA4, the district courts,

and the Ninth Circuit ignored both state law and

federal bankruptcy law in regards to Kinney.

After Nov. 2008, the intentional misapplication

of the Vt law [e.g. by imposing VL law upon an

attorney who was not a party] was being used to

"justify" compelled silence imposed on Kinney.

After 2012, the intentional misapplication of

bankruptcy law by state and federal courts [e.g. by

saying Kinney was not a listed creditor] was used

to "justify" compelled silence on Kinney.

Kinney's losses were caused by the intentional

misapplication of law [e.g. the Evans case; the Vt

law used against an attorney] or by misstatements

of fact [e.g. which ignored Kinney was listed as a

bankruptcy "creditor" by debtor Clark, and was not

a party in several cases even though Kinney was

treated as a party by Justice Boren].

The retaliation against Kinney has been

justified by the improper use of the VL law which

then led to Cal. State Bar disbarment proceedings.

No opponent or judicial officer has ever cited

legal authority that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 civil right

claims against a state actor [e.g. acting as a

prosecutor under color of authority] can be totally

precluded by simply labeling Kinney's appeals as

de- facto appeals of prior state court decisions [e.g.

since federal civil rights laws are separate and

district from the state laws or rights].

No opponent or judicial officer has ever cited

legal authority that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 civil right

claims against a state or federal actor [e.g. acting as

a prosecutor under color of authority] can be totally

precluded by the use of Rooker-Feldman or other

preclusion doctrines [e.g. since there has never been

a trial or hearing on the merits of any issue with

testimony under oath and cross-examination].

For example, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not

apply when a Judge or Justice does an "executive

action" such as unilaterally denying Kinney a right

to appeal based on a VL law [e.g. for LASC

#BC354136]. Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public

Service Commission, 535 U.S. 635, 644 n. 3 (2002).

If Kinney is not a party in the particular case [e.g.

LASC Case #BC374938], the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not apply to a federal court lawsuit

filed by Kinney [e.g. a civil rights case]. Johnson v.

DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006 (1994).

The 2005 purchase of Clark's Los Angeles

Fernwood property by buyers Kinney and Kempton

was made irrelevant to ongoing retaliation by

bankruptcy-debtor Michele Clark and her listed

creditor attorneys Marcus etc (and by COA2

Justices, Cal. Supreme Court Judges and federal

court Judges) after Clark declared Chapter 7

bankruptcy on July 28, 2010.

The 2005 real estate contract "fee" clause is

unenforceable by buyers Kinney or Kempton (and

by seller Clark) because all debts and obligations of

seller Clark under that 2005 purchase contract

with buyers Kinney and Kempton, and under her

2007 hourly-fee retainer with attorneys Marcus etc,

were completely eliminated so all "attorney's fee"

clause(s) are unenforceable from July 2010 onward

by operation of bankruptcy law.

These acts are damaging Kinney's ongoing

interstate businesses [e.g. in Colorado]. Keith v.

Kinney, 961 P.2d 516 (Cob. App. 1997); Kinney v.

Keith, 128 P.3d 297 (Cob. App. 2005); Keith v.

Kinney, 140 P.3d 141 (Cob. App. 2006).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This Court has jurisdiction to address violations of

state or federal iy by state or federal courts [e.g.

Cal. Court of Appeal; Cal. Supreme Court, District

Courts; Ninth Circuit].

The federal courts have exclusive and original

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, 1343,

1441, 1443 and 1452, and under 42 U.S.C. Sec.

1983 etc, to consider violations of federal

constitutional rights [e.g. 1st Amendment rights]

and to consider violations of other federal laws

[e.g. violations of the Commerce Clause; of the

"honest services" law; of the Hobbs Act; of 11

U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1) and (2); and of bankruptcy

fraud which is a crime under 18 U.S.C. Secs. 152

etc]. However, the courts are ignoring all that.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This petition involves courts who deny Kinney's

attempts to appeal orders by using overbroad \TL

laws against Kinney and who violate bankruptcy

law; and federal courts who refuse to enforce

bankruptcy laws as to shifting debts onto Kinney

that are deemed fully discharged as to Chapter 7

debtor Clark [e.g. by dismissing Kinney's appeal].

SUMMARY OF LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS

In May 2018, Kinney filed a removal of Clark's

state court motion for more fees, a motion to reopen Clark's bankruptcy, and a counter-claim.

In June 2018, Bankruptcy Court Judge Russell

dismissed all matters.

On July 17, 2018, District Court Judge Gutierrez

dismissed all matters. [App. B, 3].

On Jan. 24, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied

Kinney the right to continue his appeal with a "so

insubstantial" rationale [App. A, 1].

This petition addresses the: (1) ongoing retaliation

against Kinney by forcing his silence; (2) ongoing

federal law violations to his detriment as a listedcreditor; (3) "taking" of his property [e.g. over

$500,000]; and (4) damaging of his existing

interstate commerce businesses. This was done

by ignoring Kinney's rights as a listed creditor in

Clark's 2010 Chapter 7 "no asset" bankruptcy.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The state courts may not exercise jurisdiction

inconsistent with the Constitution of the United

States, the Calif. Constitution, or applicable

statutes under state or federal law. The federal

courts may not ignore its jurisdiction to adjudicate

ongoing violations of bankruptcy law and fraud.

In July 2010, Clark filed a Chapter 7 "no asset"

bankruptcy petition; she listed Kinney and

Marcus as creditors. As a result, all pre-petition

contracts [e.g. 2005 real estate purchase contract

between seller Clark and buyers Kinney etc; and

2007 hourly-fee retainer between client Clark and

attorneys Marcus] are unenforceable as to fees.

As admitted in the 2017 state court opinion, after

Clark's bankruptcy in 2010 and discharge in 2012,

the courts have continued to grant attorney's fee

"cost" award orders in favor of debtor Clark and

creditor Marcus (and against creditor Kinney)

based on pre-petition contracts [e.g. for postpetition legal work by Marcus] which are

automatically void under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1).

Discharged-debtor Michele Clark and her listed

unsecured-creditor attorneys David Marcus etc

have continued to file motions for attorneys fees

based on pre-petition contracts that are prohibited

by 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2).

On 11/7/18, Judge Gutierrez ignored this [App. B].

On 1/24/19, Kinney's appeal was not allowed to

continue in the Ninth Circuit [App. A].

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

Certiorari Should Be Granted Because Both

State and Federal Courts Continue to Ignore

Federal and State Law Which Violates

Kinney's First Amendment Rights; And The

Method and Application of "Alleged" Due

Process By The Courts Severely Impairs

Meaningful Review of Important Questions

of Federal Law, And Severely Impairs Rights

Guaranteed Under The First, Fourth, Fifth,

Eighth And Fourteenth Amendments; And Is

In Conflict With Decisions Of This Court And

Other United States Court Of Appeals.

The judges and justices have compelled silence

upon Kinney in direct violation of the Janus,

NIFLA and Riley decisions and in direct violation

of bankruptcy law given Kinney's undisputed

status as a "listed" creditor. Janus v. American

Federation of State, County and Municipal

(2018);

Employees, Council 31, 585 U.S.

National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v.

(2018); Riley v. National

Becerra, 585 U.S.

Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,

487 U.S. 781, 796-797 (1988).

The judges and justices have acted as prosecutors of

Kinney, not as neutral arbitrators of disputes,

when they denied his appeal rights. The courts

have also violated Kinney's federal constitutional

and civil rights, the "honest services" law, and the

Hobbs Act.

Supreme Court of Virginia v.

Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 736 and n. 15

(1980); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991);

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (91 Cir.

2001); Canatella v. State of California, 304 F.3d

843, 847-854, n. 6 and 14 (9th Cir. 2002); Bauer v.

Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 356-360 (5th Cir. 2003); In re

Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695

F.2d 17, 24 (18t Cir. 1982); United States v.

Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1523-1539 (7th Cir. 1985);

Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 54-57 (2nd Cir. 1978).

The courts were retaliating against Kinney (as

done by In re Kinney and Kinney v. Clark rulings).

That has caused irreparable injury, and injury to

his property, interstate businesses, cases, appeals,

and past clients. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983; Hernandez

v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017).

The courts' actions were done to restrict Kinney's

First Amendment rights [e.g. as to his appeals], to

restrict his fair access to the courts, and to

retaliate against him. Hooten v. H Jenne III, 786

F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hooten,

693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Sloman V.

Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1470 (9th Cir. 1994);

Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310,

1313-1320 (9th Cir. 1989); Lacey v. Maricopa

County, 693 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2012).

Kinney has the right "to petition the Government

for a redress of grievances" including a right to a

review by appeal which is being consistently

denied to Kinney without just cause in both state

and federal courts. That First Amendment Right

is "one of the most precious of the liberties

safeguarded by the Bill of Rights". BE & K

Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)

[quoting United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar

Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)].

A standard of strict scrutiny should be applied to

procedural barriers made by rule or statute, as

applied in appellate courts, which chill or penalize

the exercise of First Amendment rights, and act to

limit review by a higher court. "The consideration

of asserted constitutional rights may not be

thwarted by simple recitation that there has not

been observance of a procedural rule with which

there has been compliance in both substance and

form, in every real sense." NAACP v. Alabama ex

rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 297 (1964).

Fundamental to the 14th Amendment's right to

due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.

Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).

When a person is deprived of his rights in a

manner contrary to the basic tenets of due

process, the slate must be wiped clean in order to

restore the petitioner to a position he would have

occupied if due process had been accorded to him

in the first place. Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr.,

I,485 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1988).

Although a particular court is not required to

provide a right to appellate review, procedures

which adversely affect access to the appellate

review process, which the court has chosen to

provide, requires close judicial scrutiny. Griffin v.

Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). This applies to the

state courts in California and to federal courts.

An appeal cannot be granted to some litigants and

capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others

without violating the federal Equal Protection

Clause. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).

Certiorari should be granted to provide guidance

on the method and manner in which the federal

and state courts apply, restrict or summarily deny

the right of access to the courts and force silence

on "difficult" attorneys and pro se litigants.

As to actions by the courts, an appearance of

impropriety, whether such impropriety is actually

present or proven, weakens our system of justice.

"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic

requirement of due process." In re Murchison,

349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).

The courts have ignored that post-2010 award

orders were all "void" [e.g. 11 U.S.C. 524(a)(1)]; and

"void" orders cannot support subsequent decisions.

Sinochem Intl. Co. v. Malaysia Intl. Ship Corp., 549

U.S. 422, 430 (2007); Plaza Hollister Ltd. Ptsp v.

Ctv of San Benito,72 Ca1.App.4th 1, 13-22 (Cal.

1999); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Renda, 177

Cal.App.4th 14,19-23 (Cal. 2009).

The courts have ignored Kinney's right to be free

from retaliation, and the obligation of federal

courts to determine all issues. In re Isaacs, 895

F.3d 904, 910-911 (6th Cir. 2018); In re McLean, 794

F.3d 1313, 1321-1325 (11th Cir. 2015); Bulloch v.

United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121-1122 (10th Cir.

1994); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146

(1992); Colorado River Water Conservation District

v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-818 (1976).

The Bosse decision requires courts to follow the

law, but none have done that as to "creditor"

Kinney. Bosse v. Oklahoma, 580 U.S.

137

S.Ct. 1 (2016); Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307,

1309-1310 (10th Cir. 1994).

CCP Sec. 391(b) states: "Vexatious litigant' means

a person who. ..(i) In the immediately preceding

seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or

maintained in propria persona at least five

litigations

that have been (i) finally

determined adversely to that person... [i.e.

AFTER completing an appeal]...(2).. .repeatedly

relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria

persona,... (or) (3) In any litigation while acting

in propria persona' repeatedly files... motions"

[example and emphasis added].

...

Since Kinney's appeals were all prematurely

dismissed or prevented, none of his cases after

Jan. 2009 were "finally determined" [e.g. App. B, 438

5]. Attorneys with clients [e.g. Lavin's 2008 order],

and client "puppets" with attorneys [baseless and

willfully inflammatory In re Kinney phrasing], are

excluded from VL laws. Kinney was never a VL so

all pre-filing orders are void [e.g. clear absence of

all jurisdiction]. This creates First Amendment

retaliation claims [e.g. the State Bar also used

unjustified VL labels to disbar Kinney].

CONCLUSION

The following (and petition) should be granted.

This Court should void all orders, judgments and

sanctions issued after July 28, 2010 in favor of

Chapter 7 discharged-debtor Clark as to any debts

owed to her unsecured-creditor attorneys Marcus

[11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1)].

This Court should rule that unsecured-creditor

attorneys Marcus and contract-attorney Chomsky

have repeatedly violated 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2)

by filing motions for attorney's fees for Clark.

This Court should advise the US Attorney's Office

and FBI of this fraud (18 U.S.C. Secs. 152, 157

and 158).

Dated: 4/16/19

By: Is!______

Charles Kinney

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.