Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Continental Motors, Inc., Petitioner v. Elizabeth Snider, et al.

No. _________

================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

-----------------------------------------------------------------CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

ELIZABETH SNIDER, et al.,

Respondents.

-----------------------------------------------------------------On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Third Circuit

-----------------------------------------------------------------PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

-----------------------------------------------------------------WILL S. SKINNER

LAURIE ALBERTS SALITA

MACKENZIE W. SMITH

SKINNER LAW GROUP

101 Lindenwood Dr.,

Suite 225

Malvern, PA 19355

salita@skinnerlawgroup.com

DOUGLAS E. WINTER

Counsel of Record

TRACI CHOI

BRYAN CAVE

LEIGHTON PAISNER

1155 F St., N.W.

Washington DC 20004

(202) 508-6000 tel.

dewinter@bclplaw.com

Counsel for Petitioner

Continental Motors, Inc.

================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the preemptive statute of repose created

by the General Aviation Revitalization Act, 49 U.S.C.

§ 40101, insulates the designer and manufacturer of a

37-year-old general aviation engine from liability for

an accident whose sole cause was a forging defect in a

new component part forged by another manufacturer.

ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Continental Motors, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Continental Motors Group, which is a subsidiary of AVIC International Holding (HK) Limited, a

Bermuda corporation that is publicly traded on the

Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Neither Continental Motors, Inc., nor Continental Motors Group has issued

shares to the public.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner, and defendant below, is Continental

Motors, Inc.

Respondents, and plaintiffs below, are Elizabeth C.

Snider, individually and as executrix of the estate of

Daniel A. Snider, and Lee W. Snider, a minor, by his

mother, Elizabeth C. Snider.

Sterling Airways, Inc., was a defendant below, but

has no interest in the outcome of the petition.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .....................................

i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING........................

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................

v

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI .........

1

OPINIONS BELOW ...............................................

2

JURISDICTION .....................................................

2

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............................................

2

STATEMENT..........................................................

3

A. Background ..................................................

5

B.

Facts and Procedural History ......................

12

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .....

18

The Question Presented Is Important ...............

28

CONCLUSION .......................................................

31

APPENDIX

United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit, Opinion, December 28, 2018 .............. App. 1

United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania, Memorandum and

Order, June 28, 2017 ...................................... App. 10

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Page

United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania, Memorandum and

Order, August 29, 2017 .................................. App. 32

United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit, Sur Petition for Rehearing, January

22, 2019 .......................................................... App. 71

General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994,

Public Law 103-298, Aug. 17, 1994, 108 Stat.

1552 (49 U.S.C. § 40101 note) ........................ App. 73

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 919

F.Supp. 340 (E.D. Cal. 1996) .....................................8

Bingham’s Trust v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 325 U.S. 365 (1945) ..................................19

Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 522 F.3d 948

(9th Cir. 2008)............................................................9

Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93

Cal.Rptr.2d 124 (Cal. App. 2000) .................. 9, 11, 19

Burton v. Twin Commander Aircraft, LLC, 254

P.3d 778 (Wash. 2011) ................................... 4, 19, 28

Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d

1155 (9th Cir. 2000) ........................................... 11, 20

Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 82 Cal.Rptr.2d

202 (Cal. App. 1999) ........................ 12, 20, 21, 25, 27

Carson v. Heli-Tech, Inc., 2003 WL 22469919

(M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2003)........................................20

Crouch v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 720 F.3d 333 (6th

Cir. 2013) ................................................. 4, 20, 22, 29

Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron,

Inc., 283 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002) ...... 4, 9, 19, 29, 30

Hinkle v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 2004 WL 2413768

(Mich. App. Oct. 28, 2004) ................................. 22, 23

Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 4 Cal.Rptr.3d

249 (Cal. App. 2003) ................................................12

Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 565

U.S. 625 (2012) ........................................................29

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Leyse v. Bank of America, N.A., 804 F.3d 316 (3d

Cir. 2015) .................................................................19

Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir.

2001) .......................................................................... 8, 9

Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp., 653 N.W.2d

543 (Iowa 2002) .......................................................27

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) ................19

Pridgen (I) v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d

422 (Pa. 2006) .................................................. passim

Pridgen (II) v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 916 A.2d

619 (Pa. 2007) .................................................... 21, 26

Robinson v. Hartzell Propellers, Inc., 454 F.3d

163 (3d Cir. 2006) ....................................................30

Schwartz v. Hawkins & Powers Aviation, Inc.,

2005 WL 3776351 (D. Wyo. Apr. 8, 2005)................. 11

Sheesley v. The Cessna Aircraft Co., 2006 WL

1084103 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006) ............. 12, 20, 21, 27

Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d

680 (3d Cir. 2016), petition for writ of certiorari pending, No. 16-323 .........................................30

Theobald v. Piper Aircraft, Inc., 309 F.Supp.3d

1253 (S.D. Fla. 2018) ...............................................20

United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) .................29

United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea

Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797

(1984) .........................................................................6

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................2

49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) ......................................................6

49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1) .................................................7

49 U.S.C. § 44704(c) ......................................................7

49 U.S.C. § 44704(d) ......................................................7

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726,

72 Stat. 731 ...............................................................6

General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994,

Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552, reprinted

in Note, 49 U.S.C. § 40101............................... passim

REGULATIONS

14 C.F.R. § 21.21 ...........................................................7

14 C.F.R. § 21.137 .........................................................7

14 C.F.R. § 21.145 .........................................................7

14 C.F.R. § 21.303(a) .....................................................7

14 C.F.R. §§ 33.11-33.39 ...............................................6

14 C.F.R. pts. 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and 35 ..................6

OTHER AUTHORITIES

140 Cong. Rec. H4998 (daily ed. June 27, 1994)

(statement of Rep. Fish) ............................................8

140 Cong. Rec. H4998 (daily ed. June 27, 1994)

(statement of Rep. Mineta) ................................... 9

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Gen’l Acct. Office, No. GAO-01-916, General Aviation Status of the Industry, Related Infrastructure, and Safety Issues (2001), available

at www.gao.gov/new.items/d01916.pdf ............. 10, 29

H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(I) (1994), reprinted in

1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638 ........................... 8, 10, 11, 29

H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(II) (1994), reprinted in

1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644 ................................... passim

S. Rep. No. 69-2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1925),

reprinted in Civil Aeronautics Legislative

History of the Air Commerce Act of 1926.................5

S. Rep. No. 85-1811 (1958) .................................. 5, 6, 30

1

No. _________

------------------------------------------------------------------

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

------------------------------------------------------------------

CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

ELIZABETH SNIDER, et al.,

Respondents.

------------------------------------------------------------------

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Third Circuit

------------------------------------------------------------------

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Without this Court’s intervention, an unprecedented interpretation of the General Aviation Revitalization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101, will stand despite its

conflict with the plain language of the statute, statements of Congressional intent, and decisions of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

and the Ninth Circuit, the Washington Supreme Court,

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and other federal

and state courts.

Continental Motors, Inc., thus petitions for a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in this case.

------------------------------------------------------------------

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit (App. 1) is reported at ___ Fed.

Appx. ___, 2018 WL 6828422. That court’s denial of

Continental’s motion for reconsideration (App. 71) is

not reported.

The district court’s opinion denying Continental’s

motion for the entry of judgment as a matter of law

(App. 10) is reported at 2017 WL 6336596. Its opinion

denying Continental’s motion for a new trial and to alter or amend the judgment (App. 32) is reported at

2017 WL 2813223.

------------------------------------------------------------------

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on December 28, 2018. The court of appeals denied a petition for

rehearing on January 22, 2019 (App. 71).

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

------------------------------------------------------------------

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This petition involves interpretation of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.

103-298, 108 Stat. 1552, reprinted in Note, 49 U.S.C.

3

§ 40101 (App. 73). No constitutional provisions are involved.

------------------------------------------------------------------

STATEMENT

The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994

(“GARA”), Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552, is a

preemptive federal statute of repose. GARA prohibits

any civil claim for damages against a general aviation

manufacturer if the accident said to have caused those

damages occurred more than 18 years after delivery of

the aircraft to its first purchaser, lessee, or person

engaged in the business of selling or leasing aircraft.

49 U.S.C. § 40101, Note § 2(a). In passing GARA, Congress made it “clear that, once a general aviation aircraft or component part crosses the specified age

threshold, and unless one of the specified exceptions

applies, the possibility of any act or omission on the

part of its manufacturer in its capacity as a manufacturer – including any defect in the aircraft or component part – ceases to be material or admissible in any

civil action. . . .” H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(II) at 6 (1994),

reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1648.

The GARA statute of repose will restart (“roll”) if

a new component part is added to the aircraft within

18 years of the accident; but a new repose period applies only if that part caused the accident – and only

to the entity that manufactured that part. GARA

§ 2(a)(2); H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(II).

4

The court of appeals, ignoring the plain language

and legislative history of GARA – as well as precedent

– declined to protect Continental Motors, Inc., the

manufacturer of the 37-year-old engine at issue. Contrary to the Washington Supreme Court’s holding –

and a cardinal rule of statutory construction – that

“[t]he meaning of ‘manufacturer’ under GARA is a

question of law to be decided by the court,” Burton v.

Twin Commander Aircraft, LLC, 254 P.3d 778, 791

(Wash. 2011), and ignoring the Ninth Circuit’s confirmation that GARA “creates an explicit statutory right

not to stand trial,” Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter

Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002), the

opinion under review approves the district court’s decision – despite undisputed evidence – to submit this

question to a jury. And the district court’s instruction

deemed Continental as the “manufacturer” merely because a third party’s defective part was installed in a

larger assembly of parts that Continental sold – in direct conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s observation that

“[GARA] cannot be reasonably construed as meaning

that the 18-year period of repose for the entire engine

is reset every time a single sub-part is replaced.”

Crouch v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 720 F.3d 333, 343 (6th

Cir. 2013).

As a result, an essential purpose of GARA – to

avoid putting general aviation manufacturers to the

expense of litigation and trial unless their products

caused harm within 18 years of entering service – has

been thwarted.

5

The Third Circuit’s opinion betrays a hostility to

this federal statute of repose – and to federal preemption – shown in its prior decisions, and subjects general

aviation manufacturers to a patchwork of jury-driven

regulation, contrary to the intent of GARA and the

comprehensive regulatory scheme that Congress has

enacted to ensure aviation safety.

Cases interpreting this rarefied statute are, not

surprisingly, sparse. This Court has never considered

GARA. As a result, despite the Third Circuit’s designation of the opinion under review as “non-precedential,”

the opinion not only errs in denying GARA protection

to Continental, but also affirms and endorses published district court orders that will be cited nationwide to the detriment of Congressional purpose and

the general aviation manufacturers GARA was passed

with near-unanimity to protect.

The petition for writ of certiorari should be

granted.

A. Background

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958. For nearly a

century, Congress has recognized that the aviation industry is “unique among transportation industries in

its relation to the Federal Government,” S. Rep. No. 851811 at 5 (1958), and that the laws and regulations

governing aviation safety should be “uniform” across

the United States. S. Rep. No. 69-2, 69th Cong., 1st

Sess. 8 (1925), reprinted in Civil Aeronautics Legislative History of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 at 29.

6

To this end, Congress enacted the Federal Aviation

Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, which confirmed that “the Federal Government bears virtually

complete responsibility for the promotion and supervision of this industry in the public interest.” S. Rep. No.

85-1811 at 5. The Act’s “cradle to grave” system of regulatory oversight has produced “an industry whose

products are regulated to a degree not comparable to

any other.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(II) at 5-6 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1647. Even the

pharmaceutical industry is “not subject to anywhere

near the degree of federal supervision over the lifespan

of the product.” Id. at 6 n.10.

To fulfill its statutory obligation to “promote safe

flight of civil aircraft in air commerce,” 49 U.S.C.

§ 44701(a), the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)

has issued a comprehensive set of design and production regulations applicable to aircraft and their engines. See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao

Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797,

805, 814 (1984); 14 C.F.R. pts. 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and

35. These regulations prescribe, among other things,

airworthiness standards covering every aspect of an

engine’s design and construction, from ignition and lubrication systems to fuel and induction systems. See 14

C.F.R. §§ 33.11-33.39.

An aviation engine manufacturer must complete a

three-step certification process to market its engines

in the United States:

7

First, the manufacturer must obtain a type certificate, which signifies that the FAA has determined the

engine “is properly designed and manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations and [the

FAA’s] minimum standards.” 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1);

see 14 C.F.R. § 21.21.

Second, the manufacturer must acquire a production certificate, which is the FAA’s determination

that the manufacturer has “a quality system that ensures that each product and article conforms to its approved design and is in a condition for safe operation.”

14 C.F.R. § 21.137; see 49 U.S.C. § 44704(c); 14 C.F.R.

§ 21.145.

Third, upon finding that the aircraft and its engine conform to the type certificate and are ready for

safe operation, the FAA issues an airworthiness certificate. See 49 U.S.C. § 44704(d).

The FAA also pervasively regulates suppliers and

after-market manufacturers that produce and sell replacement parts for type-certificated products. As a

general rule, a manufacturer seeking to produce replacement parts for installation on type-certificated

products must obtain a Parts Manufacturer Approval.

See 14 C.F.R. § 21.303(a).

The General Aviation Revitalization Act of

1994. This comprehensive federal regulatory framework led Congress to enact, in 1994, a unique statute

of repose for general aviation manufacturers: “a legal

recognition that, after an extended period of time, a

[general aviation] product has demonstrated its safety

8

and quality, and that it is not reasonable to hold a

manufacturer legally responsible for an accident or injury occurring after [significant] time has elapsed.”

Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 919 F.Supp.

340, 342 (E.D. Cal. 1996), quoting 140 Cong. Rec.

H4998, 4999 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of

Rep. Fish).

Between 1978 and 1994, American production of

single-engine airplanes and their engines declined

ninety-five percent. H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(I) at 2

(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638, 1639. Employment in the general aviation industry plummeted

by as many as 100,000 jobs. Id.

Concluding that “the tremendous increase in the

industry’s liability insurance costs” had caused the “serious decline” in the manufacture and sale of American

aircraft and parts, H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(I) at 1 (1994),

reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638, 1638, Congress

amended the Federal Aviation Act with the General

Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (“GARA”), Pub. L.

No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552.

GARA is a “classic statute of repose.” Lyon v.

Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2001). It prohibits civil damages actions “arising out of an accident

involving a general aviation aircraft” (i.e., civilian aircraft with fewer than 20 passenger seats, not operated

in scheduled commercial service), if brought “against

the manufacturer of the aircraft or . . . of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part” if the accident occurred more than 18 years after the aircraft’s

9

delivery to its first purchaser, lessee, or person engaged

in the business of selling or leasing aircraft. GARA §§ 2

and 3.

“GARA expressly preempts inconsistent state

laws.” Pridgen (I) v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d

422, 425 (Pa. 2006). It “supersedes any State law to

the extent that such law permits a civil action” to be

brought after the 18-year period. GARA § 2(d); see Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 124,

132 (Cal. App. 2000) (“GARA cannot be interpreted by

reference to state law”). GARA thus “eliminates the

power of any party to bring a suit for damages against

a general aviation aircraft manufacturer, in a U.S. federal or state court, after [the 18-year] period” expires.

Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 522 F.3d 948, 953

(9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he statute acts not just as an affirmative defense, but instead ‘creates an explicit statutory

right not to stand trial.’ ” Id. at 951, quoting Estate of

Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110.

Congress intended GARA to ease the devastating

financial burdens that tort litigation imposes on American general aviation manufacturers by “limiting the

number of lawsuits aircraft manufacturers must defend.”

140 Cong. Rec. H4998, 5003 (daily ed. June 27, 1994)

(statement of Rep. Mineta). Congress was “deeply

concerned” about “enormous product liability costs”

and litigation expenses, and “believed that manufacturers were being driven to the wall because, among

other things, of the long tail of liability attached to

those aircraft, which could be used for decades after

they were first manufactured and sold.” Lyon, 252 F.3d

10

at 1084, citing H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(I) at 1-4 (1994),

reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638, 1638-41; see Pridgen I, 905 A.2d at 430-31. By ameliorating the impact

of that “long-tail liability,” GARA would foster the regeneration of essential domestic enterprises, create

employment opportunities, and favorably affect the

U.S.-foreign trade balance. See H.R. Rep. No. 103525(I) at 2 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638,

1638-39. Indeed, the General Accounting Office reported that, in the five years after GARA’s passage, the

American general aviation industry created 25,000

new jobs. Gen’l Acct. Office, No. GAO-01-916, General

Aviation Status of the Industry, Related Infrastructure,

and Safety Issues (2001), available at www.gao.gov/

new.items/d01916.pdf.

GARA’s legislative history underscores the unique

reasons for its existence:

Studies indicated that “nearly all defects are

discovered during the early years of an aircraft’s life” and only a small percentage of general aviation accidents are caused by design

or manufacturing defects. Furthermore, products in the aircraft industry are highly regulated “to a degree not comparable to any other

[industry].” Manufacturers are required to report any incidents indicating product defects

to the FAA, which has the responsibility for

ordering corrective action if defects are revealed

after an aircraft design is approved. Moreover,

the older an aircraft gets, the more likely it is

to have had a number of owners and to have

undergone modifications, overhauls and other

11

maintenance procedures. This makes it increasingly difficult as time passes to determine whether the manufacturer or some

other person who used or repaired the aircraft

was primarily responsible for a mechanical

failure.

Burroughs, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d at 131, citing H.R. Rep. No.

103-525(I) and (II).

GARA is also a conscious and careful balancing of

interests that “is designed to limit excessive product

liability costs, while at the same time affording fair

treatment to persons injured in general aviation accidents.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(I) at 1 (1994), reprinted

in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638, 1638.

To maintain that balance, GARA has four exceptions. See GARA § 2(b). None applies here.

There is also a “rolling” provision, which is central

to the issues presented. Under GARA § 2(a)(2), the repose period will restart (“roll”) “with respect to any new

component, system, subassembly, or other part which

replaced another component, system, subassembly, or

other part originally in, or which was added to, the aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused such death,

injury, or damage, after the applicable limitation period beginning on the date of completion of the replacement or addition.”

Thus, the repose period will roll only if “the revised

part . . . caused [the] death, injury, or damage.” Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d 1155, 1158

(9th Cir. 2000); see Schwartz v. Hawkins & Powers

12

Aviation, Inc., 2005 WL 3776351, at *4 (D. Wyo. Apr. 8,

2005); Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 4 Cal.Rptr.3d

249, 257 (Cal. App. 2003). And the new repose period

applies “only to the entity that manufactured the replacement part.” Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp.,

82 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 209 (Cal. App. 1999); see Sheesley

v. The Cessna Aircraft Co., 2006 WL 1084103, at *4

(D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006) (GARA “only restarts the repose

period for claims against the manufacturer of the new

part that actually caused the crash”). This “provid[es]

some certainty to manufacturers . . . while preserving

victims’ rights to bring suit for compensation in certain

particularly compelling circumstances.” H.R. No. 103525(II) at 6, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1648.

B. Facts and Procedural History

The Accident Aircraft and Engine. Petitioner

Continental Motors, Inc., formerly known as Teledyne

Continental Motors, Inc., designs and manufactures

engines for general aviation aircraft. On October 22,

1968, the FAA issued a type certificate authorizing

Teledyne to manufacture and sell a six-cylinder engine

known as the TSIO-520-H.

In 1973, Cessna Aircraft Company manufactured

a T210L single-engine aircraft equipped with a TSIO520-H engine (the “accident aircraft”). Teledyne shipped

the engine to Cessna in March 1973. Cessna sold the

accident aircraft to its first purchaser in April 1973

(App. 11).

13

The Accident. More than 37 years later, on June

21, 2010, the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest

Service was conducting an aerial survey of tree defoliation in Pennsylvania. The Forest Service had contracted with Sterling Airways, Inc., to provide the

accident aircraft and its pilot (App. 11).

The aircraft’s engine failed minutes before a

scheduled landing at Piper Memorial Airport in Lock

Haven, Pennsylvania. The pilot and his two passengers, including Forest Service employee Daniel Snider,

died (App. 11).

The Engine Part at Issue. The TSIO-520-H is a

six-cylinder combustion engine. Combustion (burning)

releases energy from a fuel-air mixture. The hot gases

push a piston through each cylinder assembly, rotating

the crankshaft and, through a system of power train

gears, the propeller.

As its name underscores, a cylinder assembly is a

compilation of parts. The FAA-approved design for the

TSIO-520-H cylinder assembly consists of more than

40 discrete parts, some of which are manufactured by

third parties.

One of those parts, the exhaust valve guide, is

manufactured by Roderick Arm & Tool, a third-party,

FAA-approved components supplier. All parties to this

lawsuit agreed that the exhaust valve guide in the

accident engine’s No. 2 cylinder assembly fractured,

which, in turn, caused the engine to fail. The essential

dispute at trial was why that part failed.

14

The Aircraft Owner and Operator. Sterling

Airways had last overhauled the engine on May 7, 2004,

after 4,276 hours of operation. All six cylinder assemblies were replaced with new ones. The new No. 2 cylinder assembly included the Roderick-manufactured

exhaust valve guide that failed (App. 19-20).

In 2007, the engine’s No. 3 and No. 5 cylinder assemblies exhibited low compression, which could reduce engine power. A maintenance facility replaced

the exhaust valve guides in these assemblies with new

ones manufactured by another third party, Engine

Components International. Sterling did nothing about

the other four cylinder assemblies, including the No. 2

assembly, or the exhaust valve guides installed in

those assemblies (App. 21).

The accident occurred three years later.

The Litigation. On May 31, 2012, Elizabeth

Snider, individually and as executrix of the Estate of

Daniel Snider and on behalf of Lee Snider, a minor,

filed this lawsuit against Sterling and Continental in

the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. The

Complaint alleged causes of action sounding in negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, strict liability,

and breach of warranty. The action was removed to the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (App. 33).

The Essential Allegations and Evidence. Because the undisputed evidence showed that the accident engine was 37 years old at the time of the accident

– and that none of GARA’s exceptions applied – the

15

GARA statute of repose vitiated any claims against

Continental arising from this accident unless Snider

could prove that the installation of a new part that

caused the accident “rolled” the statute of repose as to

the manufacturer of that part.

The relevant allegations and evidence were

straightforward and few:

(1) Snider contended that the 2004 replacement of the Continental-branded No. 2

cylinder assembly in the aged engine

“rolled” the GARA repose period.

(2) The only allegedly defective part in that

assembly was the exhaust valve guide.

(3) Roderick Arm & Tool – a third-party, FAAapproved components supplier – forged

that exhaust valve guide and sold it to

Continental.

(4) After testing random samples of Roderick

exhaust valve guides for hardness, Continental incorporated the exhaust valve

guide into the cylinder assembly without

altering its material composition or hardness.

(5) Snider’s experts testified that the exhaust

valve guide suffered from deficient forging – a manufacturing defect introduced

by Roderick. This “lack of hardness” supposedly caused the guide to wear, which

led to its fracture and, in turn, the engine

failure and the accident (App. 30).

16

(6) Snider did not contend that the exhaust

valve guide (or any other cylinder assembly component or the cylinder assembly

itself ) was defectively designed.

(7) Snider did not contend that any act of assembly by Continental caused or contributed to the failure.

(8) Snider did not contend that any other

parts in the No. 2 cylinder assembly – or,

indeed, the engine – were defective or a

cause of the accident.

(9) Snider chose not to sue Roderick (App.

2).

The Jury Instructions and Verdict Form. Despite the undisputed provenance of the exhaust valve

guide and the undisputed fact that only the exhaust

valve guide caused the accident, the district court instructed the jury, over Continental’s objection, that the

larger “cylinder assembly” was the allegedly defective

part at issue – and that the jury should decide whether

Continental was the “manufacturer” of the assembly

for purposes of GARA. The jury instructions used the

words “cylinder assembly” 14 times, but never mentioned the exhaust valve guide. The district court also

provided a verdict form, again over Continental’s objection, identifying the allegedly defective product as

the “cylinder assembly” (App. 53-54).

The district court thus foreclosed the jury from

finding that Roderick had manufactured the defective

component part – and instead forced the jury to make

17

the legal determination that Continental was the

“manufacturer” of a new component part for purposes

of GARA’s “rolling” provision, and thus liable for Mrs.

Snider’s damages.

The Verdict. The jury found, as instructed, that

Continental manufactured the No. 2 cylinder assembly; that the No. 2 cylinder assembly was defective;

that Continental sold the No. 2 cylinder assembly

without proper instructions or warnings for its safe

use; and that these events were the cause of the accident. The jury found that Sterling breached its contract with the Forest Service and was negligent, but

that this misconduct was not a factual cause of the accident (App. 12).

The district court entered judgment in favor of

Ms. Snider and against Continental in the amount

of $2,753,048.49, plus statutory “delay damages” of

$443,550.51 (App. 12).

Continental brought a timely appeal.

The Opinion Under Review. The court of appeals explicitly found that the exhaust valve guides

“were manufactured by a third-party” – and that “Mrs.

Snider’s evidence showed that a defective exhaust

valve guide in the cylinder assembly failed” (App. 3) –

but denied GARA protection to Continental:

Although, as the district court recognized, “the

cylinder assemblies incorporated exhaust valve

guides” that were manufactured by a thirdparty, nevertheless the “exhaust valve guides

(which were assigned Continental Part No.

18

636242) were designed by Continental and

manufactured specifically for Continental[.]”

Continental then tested the hardness of the

exhaust valve guides and individually reamed

each guide to specifically fit a particular Continental cylinder assembly. Based on this

testimony, there was sufficient evidence for

the jury to conclude that Continental “manufactured” the replacement cylinder assembly

notwithstanding the precursor parts that Continental obtained from a third-party. Continental’s replacement cylinder assembly was

installed approximately six years before the

accident, so we agree with the district court’s

conclusion that GARA’s eighteen year limitation did not bar suit against Continental (App.

4-5; footnotes omitted).

On January 22, 2019, the court of appeals denied

Continental’s petition for rehearing (App. 71).

------------------------------------------------------------------

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The opinion under review abandons long-standing

principles of statutory construction and judicial review,

misreads GARA, and conflicts with consistent precedent, including decisions of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the Washington Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,

and lower appellate courts.

First, as the Washington Supreme Court has held,

“[t]he meaning of ‘manufacturer’ under GARA is a

19

question of law to be decided by the court.” Burton, 254

P.3d at 791; see Pridgen I, 905 A.2d at 434-37. By ignoring precedent and approving the district court’s decision – despite undisputed evidence – to submit this

question to the jury, and then reviewing only the sufficiency of the evidence, the opinion also departed from

cardinal principles of statutory construction and judicial review. See, e.g., Bingham’s Trust v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, 325 U.S. 365, 371 (1945); Leyse v.

Bank of America, N.A., 804 F.3d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 2015).

As the Ninth Circuit pronounced, GARA “creates

an explicit statutory right not to stand trial,” Estate of

Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110, and its primary purpose is

averting litigation expenses through early judicial determination of its applicability. Consistent with statutory intent, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has

recognized that GARA’s use of the word “manufacturer” should be interpreted to “comport with the federal policy of ameliorating . . . long-tail liability,”

Pridgen I, 905 A.2d at 432 n.10 – in other words, in

a way that protects general aviation entities from

“long-tail liability”: “GARA cannot be interpreted in a

way that would eviscerate its effect.” Burroughs, 93

Cal.Rptr.2d at 138. When, as here, the only alleged defect is in the physical manufacture/forging of the part

– and not its design – the “ordinary, contemporary,

common meaning” of “manufacturer” is the physical

manufacturer: Roderick. Perrin v. United States, 444

U.S. 37, 42 (1979). Snider was able to sue Roderick, but

did not.

20

Second, GARA – not a plaintiff or a court – identifies the replacement “component, system, subassembly

or other part” at issue. As the Sixth Circuit has observed: “GARA § 2(a)(2) refers to the specific ‘part

which replaced another . . . part . . . and which is alleged to have caused such death, injury, or damage.’ ”

Crouch, 720 F.3d at 343 (emphasis added), quoting

GARA § 2(a)(2); see Caldwell, 230 F.3d at 1158; Carson

v. Heli-Tech, Inc., 2003 WL 22469919, at *4 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 25, 2003). And this “rolling” provision “only restarts the repose period for claims against the manufacturer of the new part that actually caused the

crash.” Sheesley, 2006 WL 1084103, at *4; see Campbell, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d at 209; H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(II) at

7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1649;

Theobald v. Piper Aircraft, Inc., 309 F.Supp.3d 1253,

1266 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (GARA § 2(a)(2) “applies only to

the manufacturer of the new parts” and “requires . . .

evidence that it was these new parts that caused” the

accident).

The legislative history compels this interpretation. The House Judiciary Committee Report states:

“Since the bill provides for a ‘rolling’ statute of repose,

victims and their families will have recourse against

new component part manufacturers for a part installed

subsequent to delivery in the event of a crash attributable to a structural defect or similar flaw in a new

component part.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(II) at 6 (1994),

reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1647 (emphasis

added).

21

Thus, for example, in Campbell, plaintiffs contended that GARA’s “rolling” provision exposed Cessna

to liability when vacuum pumps Cessna had installed

in the original aircraft were replaced. “The trial court

disagreed, interpreting the replacement parts provision as applying only to the entity that manufactured

the replacement part.” 82 Cal.Rptr.2d at 209 (emphasis

added). Invoking the legislative history, the California

court of appeal affirmed.

Third, the “rolling” provision does not extend to

the manufacturer of a larger part or assembly or system in which a new component part is installed. Campbell, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d at 209; Sheesley, 2006 WL 1084103,

at *4. Neither a plaintiff nor a court can redefine an

aircraft component as a larger assembly to avoid application of GARA’s statute of repose. In the words of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court: “GARA’s period of repose is not displaced with respect to entire aircraft systems, such as the fuel system, by the replacement of

component parts of such system.” Pridgen (II) v. Parker

Hannifin Corp., 916 A.2d 619, 623 n.3 (Pa. 2007). But

that is exactly what happened here. The district court,

with the court of appeals’ blessing, foreclosed the application of GARA and predetermined the outcome of

the jury verdict by improperly characterizing the allegedly defective component as the broader “cylinder assembly” instead of the sole part the evidence showed to

be defective: the exhaust valve guide.

By this reasoning, Cessna, which incorporated

Continental’s engine into its aircraft, would have no protection under GARA because Continental incorporated

22

Roderick’s exhaust valve guide into its engine. Other

courts have repeatedly and consistently rejected this

faulty paradigm, holding that the installation of a replacement part into an assembly, system, engine, or

aircraft does not vitiate GARA protection for the manufacturer of that assembly, system, engine, or aircraft.

“Case law . . . focuses on the component that allegedly

caused the crash, not the larger part that encompasses

many smaller components, one of which was the allegedly deficient component.” Hinkle v. Cessna Aircraft

Co., 2004 WL 2413768, at *8 (Mich. App. Oct. 28, 2004).

As the Sixth Circuit has observed: “Section 2(a)(2) cannot be reasonably construed as meaning that the 18year period of repose for the entire engine is reset

every time a single sub-part is replaced.” Crouch, 720

F.3d at 343. “[W]e would effectively permit plaintiffs to

circumvent the GARA statute of repose by allowing

plaintiff to bring suit against any manufacturer of a

part when a sub-part (that is the actual cause of the

accident) was replaced or added to it, even if the original part was over eighteen years of age.” Hinkle, 2004

WL 2413768, at *8; see Crouch, 720 F.3d at 343; H.R.

Rep. No. 103-525(II).

Here, the undisputed evidence showed that the exhaust valve guide was the part that caused the engine

failure. The undisputed evidence showed that the exhaust valve guide was a single, discrete component

part of the No. 2 cylinder assembly – which, as its name

confirms, is an assembly of parts. The undisputed evidence also showed that the exhaust valve guide was a

discrete part that could be installed on its own in

23

cylinder assemblies, as Sterling’s maintenance provider did in 2007, when it replaced the exhaust valve

guides in two of the engine’s cylinder assemblies with

ones designed and manufactured by an after-market

seller. And there was no allegation or evidence that the

cylinder assembly itself was defectively designed or assembled.

For these reasons, the Michigan Court of Appeals

rejected the outcome below in Hinkle:

We further reject plaintiff ’s contention that

because the engine driven fuel pump is an integral part of the engine, Teledyne should be

held liable for the failure of the fuel pump.

Plaintiff has simply presented no evidence to

support her claim that the engine was the

cause of the accident rather than the engine

driven fuel pump. Certainly, the fuel pump is

an integral part of the engine, as is the engine

an integral part of the plane itself. Were we to

adopt plaintiff ’s reasoning . . . , we would effectively permit plaintiff to circumvent the

GARA statute of repose by allowing plaintiff

to bring suit against any manufacturer of a

part when a sub-part (that is the actual cause

of an accident) was replaced or added to it,

even if the original part was over eighteen

years of age. Case law, however, focuses on the

component that allegedly caused the crash,

not the larger part that encompasses many

smaller components, one of which was the allegedly deficient component. 2004 WL 2413768,

at *8.

24

The complications arising from the opinion under

review should be obvious. As the record shows, aircraft

owners, maintenance facilities, and repair stations can

and do install after-market exhaust valve guides in

Continental’s cylinder assemblies. The opinion under

review would allow plaintiffs to end-run GARA and

hold engine manufacturers liable for manufacturing

defects introduced by third parties simply because a

component part was installed in a larger component or

assembly or, indeed, the engine. But that is contrary to

the explicit and plain language of the statute, which

limits the “rolling” provision to the component part

“which is alleged to have caused such death, injury, or

damage. . . .” GARA § 2(a)(2).

Finally, even if the plain text of GARA did not foreclose further inquiry into the identity of the manufacturer of the replacement part at issue, the opinion

erred by holding that conduct unrelated to the deficient forging of the defective part could vitiate GARA

protection for Continental, which did not forge the

part. The opinion blesses submission of the salient

question of law – the identity of the manufacturer of

the defective component part – to the jury based on the

collateral (and, notably, undisputed) facts that “the

exhaust valve guides (which were assigned Continental Part No. 636242) were designed by Continental

and manufactured specifically for Continental[.] Continental then tested the hardness of the exhaust valve

guides and individually reamed each guide to specifically fit a particular Continental cylinder assembly”

(App. 4-5; quotations omitted).

25

None of these facts is germane to the GARA analysis.

Part Numbers. Continental, like many manufacturers, assigns part numbers to component parts

manufactured by third-party suppliers. That does not

magically transform Continental into the part’s manufacturer, particularly when the actual manufacturer,

Roderick, not only forged the part but also assigned it

a part number. As plaintiff ’s expert admitted, each engine part “is given a part number” for an obvious reason: “so they know which part goes where in the

engine. . . .” If Cessna, which assembled and sold the

accident aircraft, had assigned a part number to Continental’s engine, that would not transform Cessna

into the engine’s manufacturer. Indeed, in Campbell,

plaintiffs argued that Cessna was the manufacturer of

a defective part that had been replaced less than 18

years prior to an accident. The name “Cessna” was

stamped on the part’s dataplate, which also stated

“Manufactured by Aeritalia Settore Strumentazione.”

The California court of appeal held: “[W]e are not persuaded that the mere appearance of the name Cessna

on the part raises an inference that it was the manufacturer of the part so as to create a triable issue of fact

on the question.” Campbell, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d at 209.

Design and Purchase. The fact that Continental

provided design specifications for the exhaust valve

guide is also irrelevant: Snider conceded that there

was no design defect. And a central concern of GARA

is that products whose useful and safe designs have

been proved by lengthy use should be protected. As the

26

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed: “[I]t would

undermine Congress’s purposes to hold that GARA’s

rolling provision is triggered by the status of original

aircraft manufacturer, type certificate holder, and/or

original designer alone.” Pridgen II, 916 A.2d at 623;

see Pridgen I, 905 A.2d at 436 (“status as type certificate holder and/or designer” is not “in and of itself sufficient to implicate GARA’s rolling provision. . . .”).

Likewise, the fact that Roderick manufactured the

exhaust valve guide for Continental cannot transform

Continental into the manufacturer of that part, especially when Roderick forged the part and failed to meet

Continental’s specifications. Continental merely purchased this part from its source. And the record showed

that other companies manufactured after-market exhaust valve guides for installation in Continental cylinder assemblies (App. 21, 24-25).

In Pridgen I and II, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court held, consistent with other jurisdictions and congressional intent, that state law – in that case, Section

400 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts – could not be

applied to subvert GARA protection by applying the

rolling provision to “entities who are not actual manufacturers of the relevant replacement parts.” Pridgen

I, 905 A.2d at 432; Pridgen II, 916 A.2d at 623.

Testing and Assembly. The fact that Continental tested samples of Roderick-manufactured exhaust

valve guides and incorporated valve guides into the cylinder assembly by reaming is also meaningless. Continental’s testing is common sense (and FAA-required)

27

quality control. And there was no evidence that reaming rendered (or could have rendered) the guide defective. Any seller of a product that consists of multiple

parts must connect those parts, whether by screws,

bolts, nails, adhesion or, in this case, reaming. That act

does not change the identity of the manufacturer of the

part. And the court of appeals’ theory is particularly

disingenuous when there is no evidence (or even a contention) that reaming caused, created, or contributed

to the alleged defect in the exhaust valve guide.

*

*

*

Courts have repeatedly rejected attempted definitions of “manufacturer” that restrict application of

GARA, protecting even those who played no role in design or manufacture, including successors to the original manufacturer and agents of the manufacturer who,

for example, merely tested parts. See, e.g., Pridgen I,

905 A.2d at 436; Campbell, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d at 209;

Sheesley, 2006 WL 1084103, at *4. The Pennsylvania

Supreme Court rejected application of Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 400 to hold a GARA-protected entity liable for replacement parts it did not manufacture

but “that they hold out as their own,” noting that “other

courts have rejected similar efforts to apply state-law

theories in a way that would circumvent GARA.” Pridgen I, 905 A.2d at 436-37, citing Mason v. Schweizer

Aircraft Corp., 653 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Iowa 2002). Although the Court noted there was no “creditable allegation” that the components at issue “were actually

supplied by the defendant,” 905 A.2d at 436, it did not

reach the question whether Section 400 would apply in

28

those circumstances. GARA § 2(d) answers that question: the statute “supersedes any State law to the extent that such law permits a civil action . . . to be

brought” after the repose period.

Which brings us full circle: GARA’s rolling provision is restricted, by the statute’s plain language, to

the manufacturer of the new part that actually caused

the accident. And when the only alleged defect and evidence concerns the physical manufacture of the part –

forging – the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of “manufacturer” is the physical manufacturer:

here, Roderick. Continental should not pay the price

for a plaintiff ’s failure to sue the correct party.

The Question Presented Is Important

Statutes should mean what they say. Congress

passed GARA to protect manufacturers of aged general

aviation aircraft, engines, and other products while allowing suits against the manufacturers of new replacement parts that cause harm. The court of appeals

effectively rewrote that statute’s preemption of state

products liability regimes to impose liability on Continental, which did not manufacture the allegedly defective part at issue.

The Decision Splits Authority on the Interpretation of GARA. State high courts and the Ninth

Circuit have held that “[t]he meaning of ‘manufacturer’ under GARA is a question of law to be decided

by the court,” Burton, 254 P.3d at 791, and that GARA

“creates an explicit statutory right not to stand trial.”

29

Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110; see also Pridgen I,

905 A.2d at 435-36. The Sixth Circuit has held, consistent with the statute’s plain text, that the “rolling”

provision applies only to the part that caused the accident and only to the manufacturer of that part. See

Crouch, 720 F.3d at 343. The opinion under review conflicts with these decisions – and with Congressional intent – by deferring a question of law to the expense of

trial and resolution by jury that GARA was enacted to

avoid.

The Question Merits Review. The scope of

GARA’s preemption of state-law tort claims is important because the viability of the general aviation industry depends on the statute’s protections. See H.R.

Rep. No. 103-525(I) at 2 (1994), reprinted in 1994

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638-39; Gen’l Acct. Office, No. GAO-01916, General Aviation Status of the Industry, Related

Infrastructure, and Safety Issues (2001), available at

www.gao.gov/new.items/d01916.pdf. This Court has

granted review in cases asking whether federal law

preempts states from regulating the design of vehicles

engaged in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Kurns v.

Railroad Friction Products Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 633-37

(2012) (Locomotive Inspection Act preempts the field of

locomotive equipment design); United States v. Locke,

529 U.S. 89, 111 (2000) (Title II of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act preempts the field of tanker design

and construction). This case presents an even more

compelling case for certiorari, because the aviation industry is “unique among transportation industries in

its relation to the Federal Government.” S. Rep. No.

30

85-1811 at 5 (1958). Not only is civil aviation a

uniquely national mode of transportation, but the federal government’s supervision of civil aviation exceeds

that of virtually any other industry. See H.R. Rep. No.

103-525(II) at 6, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644,

1648.

This case is also an ideal vehicle to address the

question presented. Whether GARA preempts statelaw claims against a general aviation manufacturer for

a manufacturing defect in another manufacturer’s

product is a question of law, and resolution of that

question would be dispositive.

If allowed to stand, the Third Circuit’s approach to

GARA will vitiate the statute’s careful balancing of the

interests of accident victims and general aviation manufacturers by tipping the scale fully to the plaintiff ’s

bar. Absent further review by this Court, the opinion will

invite judges to place decisions about whether statelaw tort claims are preempted in the hands of lay jurors.

This is not the first time the Third Circuit has

shown hostility toward GARA and federal preemption

of aviation safety. In Robinson v. Hartzell Propellers,

Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2006), that court of

appeals declined – in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court – to allow

an interlocutory appeal from a district court decision

denying GARA protection to an aviation manufacturer.

Compare Estate of Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110; Pridgen

I, 905 A.2d at 434 n.14. And in Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 2016), petition for

31

writ of certiorari pending, No. 16-323, that court declined to observe this Court’s instruction on federal

preemption. These decisions and the opinion under review collectively unhinge a federal statutory scheme

designed to foster domestic manufacturing while promoting air safety. These decisions deprive GARAprotected manufacturers of appellate review in the

absence of a costly trial, permit lay-jury opinions to

trump FAA regulations, make it impossible for manufacturers to depend on uniform standards of care, and

then subject manufacturers to liability for replacement

parts they did not manufacture and for accidents they

did not cause. This case affords this Court the opportunity to reinstate and further define GARA’s scope to

prevent the erosion of its protections.

------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court should grant the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

WILL S. SKINNER

LAURIE ALBERTS SALITA

MACKENZIE W. SMITH

SKINNER LAW GROUP

101 Lindenwood Dr., Suite 225

Malvern, PA 19355

salita@skinnerlawgroup.com

DOUGLAS E. WINTER

Counsel of Record

TRACI CHOI

BRYAN CAVE

LEIGHTON PAISNER

1155 F St., N.W.

Washington DC 20004

(202) 508-6000 tel.

dewinter@bclplaw.com

Counsel for Petitioner

Continental Motors, Inc.