Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lloyd Gene Beam, Petitioner v. Michigan
Supreme Court briefJan 28, 2018
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Order of the Michigan Supreme Court Denying
Application for Leave to Appeal
(October 30, 2018) .............................................. 1a
Order of the Court of Appeals of Michigan
(January 25, 2018).............................................. 2a
Opinion and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion
for Relief from Judgment
(February 27, 2017) ............................................ 3a
Order of the Michigan Supreme Court
(October 18, 1994) ............................................ 12a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals of Michigan
(November 17, 1993) ........................................ 13a
Trial Transcript, Volume II, Excerpts
(October 14, 1988) ............................................ 18a
Trial Transcript, Volume III, Excerpts
(October 17, 1988) ............................................ 24a
Trial Transcript, Volume IV, Excerpts
(October 18, 1988) ............................................ 35a
Trial Transcript, Volume V Excerpts
(October 19, 1988) ............................................ 41a
Trial Transcript, Volume VI, Excerpts
(October 20, 1988) ............................................ 46a
Trial Transcript, Volume VII, Excerpts
(October 21, 1988) ............................................ 53a
App.1a
ORDER OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT
DENYING APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
(OCTOBER 30, 2018)
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT
LANSING, MICHIGAN
________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
SC: 157432
COA: 339818
Wayne CC: 88-001546-FC
Before: Stephen J. MARKMAN, Chief Justice, Brian
K. ZAHRA, Bridget M. MCCORMACK, David F.
VIVIANO, Richard H. BERNSTEIN, Kurtis T.
WILDER, Elizabeth T. CLEMENT, Justices.
On order of the Court, the application for leave
to appeal the January 25, 2018 order of the Court of
Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the
defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing
entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
App.2a
ORDER OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN
(JANUARY 25, 2018)
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF MICHIGAN
________________________
PEOPLE OF MI,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
________________________
Docket No. 339818
LC No. 88-001546-01-FC
Before: Michael J. TALBOT, Presiding Judge,
Michael J. RIORDAN, and
Thomas C. CAMERON, Judges.
The Court orders that the delayed application for
leave to appeal is DENIED because defendant has failed
to establish that the trial court erred in denying the
motion for relief from judgment.
The motion to waive fees is GRANTED, and fees
are WAIVED for this case only.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
Presiding Judge
App.3a
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
(FEBRUARY 27, 2017)
STATE OF MICHIGAN, THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
CRIMINAL DIVISION
________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
Defendant.
________________________
Case No. 88-01546
Before: Hon. Lawrence S. TALON, Circuit Court Judge.
For the following reasons enumerated herein,
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment is denied.
Following a jury trial, defendant, Lloyd Beam, was
found guilty of one count of first-degree murder,
MCL 750.316 and two counts of assault with intent
to murder, MCL 750.83, and one count of felonyfirearm, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to
life imprisonment for the murder conviction, concurrent
prison terms of 30 to 50 years imprisonment for the
assault convictions and two years’ imprisonment for
the firearm conviction.
App.4a
On November 17, 1993, the Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence.
On October 18, 1994 the Michigan Supreme Court
denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to
appeal. Defendant now files a motion for relief from
judgment pursuant to MCR 6.500, et seq. The Prosecution has not filed a response.
In order to advance an allegation in a Motion for
Relief from Judgment that could have been made in
a prior appeal or motion, defendant must demonstrate
“good cause” for failure to raise the grounds on appeal
and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged irregularities that support the claim of relief, pursuant to
MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b). The cause and prejudice standards
are based on precedent from the United States
Supreme Court.1 A court may not grant relief, if the
defendant alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on
appeal from the conviction of the sentence or in a
prior motion for relief from judgment; unless defendant
demonstrates good cause for the failure to previously
raise the grounds and actual prejudice from the alleged
irregularities that support the claim.2
The federal courts have recognized certain claims,
which are sufficient for establishing good cause. Government interference, the inability to obtain a factual
basis for the claim, and ineffective assistance of appel-
1 Wainwright v Sykes, 433 U.S. 72; 97 S. Ct 2497; 53 L.Ed.2d
594 (1977)
2 MCR. 6.508(D)(3); People v. Brown, 196, Mich. App. 153; 492 N.W
.2d 770 (1992), People v. Watroba, 193 Mich. App. 124; 483 N.W.2d
441 (1992)
App.5a
late counsel, are all sufficient, if adequately supported, to satisfy the good cause prong.
Specifically, defendant alleges 1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 2) trial court abuse of discretion, 3) newly discovered evidence, and 4) miscarriage
of justice exception—newly discovered evidence.
Trial Court Abuse of Discretion
The issue regarding trial court abuse of discretion
has previously been raised and decided by the Michigan
Court of Appeals. The law is quite clear that an appellate court’s decision regarding a particular issue is
binding on courts of equal or subordinate jurisdiction
during subsequent proceedings in the same case.3
Further, under MCR 6.508(D)(2), a defendant is not
entitled to relief if his motion “alleges grounds for
relief which were decided against the defendant in a
prior appeal or proceeding under this subchapter,
unless the defendant establishes that a retroactive
change in law has undermined the prior decision.”
Here, defendant does argue that a retroactive
change in law exists pursuant to People v Stevens, 498
Mich. 162, 170-71, 869 N.W.2d 233, 242 (2015). Stevens
establishes a new rule of criminal procedure. However,
newly promulgated rules of criminal procedure do
not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review,4
and Michigan law has regularly declined to apply
new rules of criminal procedure to cases in which a
defendant’s conviction has become final.5 As such,
3 People v. Peters, 205 Mich. App. 312, 316 (1994).
4 Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783 (2005)
5 People v. Maxson, 482 Mich. 385 (2008)
App.6a
this Court is precluded from review of this issue and
defendant is not entitled to relief from judgment
based upon a claim of trial court abuse of discretion.
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Defendant next claims that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to
object to the introduction of defendant’s pre-arrest
silence.
The United States and Michigan Constitutions
guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel.6
For a defendant to establish a claim that he was denied
his state or federal constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel, he must show that his attorney’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that this was so prejudicial to
him that he was denied a fair trial.7 As for deficient
performance, a defendant must overcome the strong
presumption that his counsel’s action constituted
sound trial strategy under the circumstances.8 As for
prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.”9
Because strategy is a tactical decision on the
part of counsel, this Court will indulge a strong pre6 U.S. Const, Am. VI; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687; 104 S. Ct 2052;
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); People v. Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 303;
521 N.W.2d 797 (1994).
8 People v. Mitchell, 454 Mich. 145, 156; 560 N.W.2d 600 (1997).
9 Id. at 167.
App.7a
sumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. These
standards require no special amplification in order to
define counsel’s duty to investigate.10
Ineffective assistance of counsel can take the
form of a failure to call witnesses or present other
evidence, only, if, the failure deprives the defendant
of a substantial defense.11 A defense is substantial, if
it might have made a difference in the outcome of the
trial.12 Decisions regarding what evidence to present
and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed
to be matters of trial strategy.13 This Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding
matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s
competence with the benefit of hindsight.14 In order
to overcome the presumption of sound trial strategy,
a defendant must show that his counsel’s failure to
prepare for trial resulted in counsel’s ignorance of,
and hence failure to present valuable evidence that
would have substantially benefited the defendant.15
The rule that a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel does not mean the defendant is
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel to the
extent that he is assured of a successful defense and
10 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668; 104 S. Ct. 2052; 80 L.
Ed.2d 674 (1984).
11 People v. Hoyt, 185 Mich. App. 531 (1990); People v. Julian,
171 Mich. App. 153, 158-159 (1988).
12 People v. Kelly, 186 Mich. App. 524 (1990).
13 Mitchell, supra at 163.
14 People v. Barnett, 163 Mich. App. 331 (1987).
15 People v. Caballero, 184 Mich. App. 636 1990).
App.8a
acquittal.16 Finally, in making the testimonial record
necessary to support a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the testimony of trial counsel is essential.17
The absence of such testimony limits this Court’s
review to what is contained in the record.18
In this case, defendant has failed to overcome the
heavy burden of proving that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. The record does not demonstrate
that defense counsel’s performance was unreasonable
and his trial strategy and determinations will not be
substituted with the judgment of this Court. This
Court finds that defense counsel performed competently
in his representation of defendant at his trial. Therefore,
defendant’s claims are found to be without merit.
Newly Discovered Evidence
Defendant alleges the existence of newly discovered
evidence, in the form of recently received affidavits
from witnesses Simone Penn and Rose Mary Robinson.
Defendant proffers that this evidence serves as a
basis of an evidentiary hearing, evidence of defendant’s
actual innocence and constitutes grounds for reversal
and new trial.
Michigan’s Supreme Court has determined for a
new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, a defendant must show that: (1) “the evidence
itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered;”
(2) “the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative;”
(3) “the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have
16 People v. Bohn, 49 Mich. App. 244 (1973).
17 Mitchell, supra at 168
18 People v. Darden, 230 Mich. App. 597 (1998).
App.9a
discovered and produced the evidence at trial;” and
(4) the new evidence makes a different result probable
on retrial. People v. Cress, 468 Mich. 678, 692 (2003).
Moreover, People v. Grissom, 492 Mich. 296, (2012)
held there must be an exculpatory connection between
newly discovered evidence and significantly important
trial evidence to satisfy the Cress test.19
It is equally well established that “motions for a
new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence
are looked upon with disfavor, and the cases where
this court has held that there was an abuse of discretion in denying a motion based on such grounds are
few and far between.”20 The rationales underlying
such disfavor are premised on both “the principle of
finality” and “the policy of the law . . . to require of
parties care, diligence, and vigilance in securing and
presenting evidence.”21 Specifically: in fairness to both
parties and the overall justice system, the law requires that parties secure evidence and prepare for
trial with the full understanding that, absent unusual
circumstances, the trial will be the one and only
opportunity to present their case. It is the obligation
of the parties to undertake all reasonable efforts to
marshal all the relevant evidence for that trial. Evidence will not ordinarily be allowed in installments.22
People v. Cress sets forth the showing a defendant
must make in order to satisfy the exception to this
rule and struck a balance between upholding the
19 People v. Grissom, supra at 312-13.
20 People v. Rao, 491 Mich. 271 (2012).
21 Id.
22 Id.
App.10a
finality of judgments and unsettling judgments in the
unusual case in which justice under the law requires a
new tria1.23
In this case, whether defendant is entitled to a
new trial on the basis of his proffered evidence is
governed by Cress, and specifically his case is resolved
by applying the interrelated first and third parts of
the Cress test, which require that defendant demonstrate that the evidence is “newly discovered” and
that he could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial.24 However, after a review of the submitted evidence and
applying the Cress test, this Court finds that the affidavits will not satisfy the four part test for newly discovered evidence as set forth above and defendant
has not carried his burden of satisfying this test and
thus is not entitled to a new trial.
The presented affidavits are not of such a nature
as to render a different result on re-trial, as there
was other significant testimony proffered against the
defendant, as well as other independent indicia and
material evidence that was sufficient to prove the
guilt of the defendant.
Based on the foregoing, this Court does not find
that the submitted affidavits satisfy the definition of
newly discovered evidence or supports the defendant’s
claim. As such, this Court finds that the allegations
and evidence presented in this motion are insufficient
to warrant an evidentiary hearing, new trial or relief
from judgment.
23 Id.
24 Cress, supra at 692
App.11a
Miscarriage of Justice Exception—Newly Discovered
Evidence, Actual Innocence
Defendant next argues actual innocence and that
he can show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of
the new evidence. However, defendant cannot succeed
on this claim based on the analysis previously presented
in this opinion regarding the issue of newly discovered
evidence. As such, defendant’s claim is without merit.
Defendant has not shown “good cause” under MCR
6.508(D)(3), nor has he proven actual prejudice.
Therefore, for all the aforementioned reasons stated,
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment is hereby
DENIED.
Lawrence S. Talon
Circuit Court Judge
Dated: Feb 27, 2017
App.12a
ORDER OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT
(OCTOBER 18, 1994)
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT
LANSING, MICHIGAN
________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
SC: 98582
COA: 111109
LC: 88-001546
Before: Michael F. CAVANAGH Chief Justice,
Charles L. LEVIN, James H. BRICKLEY,
Patricia J. BOYLE, Dorothy Comstock RILEY,
Robert P. GRIFFIN, Conrad L. MALLETT, JR.,
Associate Justices.
On order of the Court, the delayed application
for leave to appeal is considered, and it is DENIED,
because we are not persuaded that the questions
presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Boyle, J., not participating.
App.13a
OPINION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN
(NOVEMBER 17, 1993)
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 111109
LC No. 88-1546
Before: Clifford TAYLOR, P.J., Thomas J.
BRENNAN and Lynda L. HEATHSCOTT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by jury of one count of
first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, two
counts of assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83;
MSA 28.278, and one count of felony-firearm, MCL
750.277b; MSA 28.424(2). He appeals by right raising
a multitude of claims, none of which merits reversal
of his convictions.
Circuit Judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
App.14a
All of the convictions arise from shootings that
occurred in April 1987 at a drug house located in
Detroit. The theory of the defense was that defendant
was merely present on the evening in question; he
denied any actual involvement in the shootings. Defendant was granted a new trial following post-conviction
proceedings of the first trial, and the appeal now
before us concerns convictions resulting from a second
trial.
The trial court’s limiting of defense counsel’s
cross-examination of witness McAdory was not an abuse
of discretion. Evidence of McAdory’s prior convictions
was not admissible because the convictions did not
involve dishonesty, false statement, or theft. MRE
609(a); People v. Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 605-608; 420
N.W.2d 499 (1988), amended 429 Mich. 1216 (1988),
reh den sub nom People v. Pedrin, 430 Mich. 1201
(1988). Further, evidence of McAdory’s drug convictions
could not properly be used to show his bias or motivation to fabricate because the convictions are unrelated to the case under scrutiny. People v. Yarbrough,
183 Mich. App 163, 165; 454 N.W.2d 419 (1990). We
specifically note that the trial court gave defense
counsel plenty of latitude by allowing McAdory to be
questioned about any bargain he may have made
involving the unrelated criminal charges in exchange
for his testimony in this case. Accordingly, the trial
court did not prevent defendant trying to show the
witness’s bias or motive to fabricate.
We disagree with defendant’s characterization of
the trial court’s conduct, and see no instance of improper
questions or comments. Compare People v. Conyers,
194 Mich. App. 395, 404-405; 487 N.W.2d 787 (1992).
App.15a
We also disagree that the fleeting reference to
defendant’s mugshot as the means by which defendant
was identified warrants a new trial. This testimony
was not the subject of a defense objection below, and
we see no manifest injustice that will result from our
refusing to consider the issue further. People v.
Spearman, 195 Mich. App. 434, 445-446; 491 N.W.2d
606 (1992), lv den 441 Mich. 927 (1993).
Defendant objects for the first time on appeal to
the jury’s communication with court deputies. These
communications appear to have encompassed housekeeping matters only; no prejudice to defendant
occurred. In any event, defendant took no exception
to the arrangement below and so has not properly
preserved the issue. People v. France, 436 Mich. 138,
144, 162; 461 N.W.2d 621 (1990).
The prosecutor’s argument to the jury concerning
his burden of proof did not deny defendant a fair
trial. People v. Wilson, 196 Mich. App. 604, 609-610;
493 N.W.2d 471 (1992), lv den 442 Mich. 851 (1993).
Defendant also takes issue with the prosecutor’s
elicitation of a court reporter’s testimony concerning
the accuracy of the transcript of defendant’s first trial
on these charges. He characterizes the reporter’s testimony, elicited by the prosecutor in response to defendant’s contention that the transcript of the first trial
was inaccurate, as improper rebuttal on a collateral
matter. We disagree. This rebuttal testimony was introduced to disprove defendant’s testimony by directly
impeaching it, and so was within the trial court’s discretion to admit. People v. Kelly, 423 Mich. 261, 281;
378 N.W.2d 365 (1985); People v. Bettistea, 173 Mich.
App. 106, 126; 434 N.W.2d 138 (1989), lv den 437 Mich.
App.16a
868 (1990), cert den ___US ___; 111 S. Ct 1595; 113
L.Ed.2d 658 (1991).
Defendant also claims that he was deprived of
the effective assistance of counsel through a series of
mistakes which could not be explained by a sound trial
strategy. However, with the exception of the res gestae
witness issue that is addressed below, mention of
these alleged mistakes was not made at the Ginther1
hearing, for which purpose this matter was remanded
by this Court. We have nevertheless reviewed the
mistakes defendant claims his attorney made, and
conclude that they were either not mistakes or else
derived from sound, albeit unsuccessful, trial strategy.
We do not second-guess counsel on such matters. People
v. McFadden, 159 Mich. App. 796, 800; 407 N.W.2d 78
(1987), lv den 429 Mich. 853 (1987). Counsel was not
ineffective. People v. Tommolino, 187 Mich. App. 14,
17; 466 N.W.2d 315 (1991), lv den 439 Mich. 897 (1991).
Finally, defendant claims that he was denied a fair
trial because the prosecutor failed to produce or
inform defense counsel of the name and existence of
critical res gestae witnesses, and also contends that
his attorney was ineffective because he failed to
pursue the matter. We disagree. Based on the record
before us, the trial court properly concluded that the
prosecutor fulfilled his duty with regard to “Cynthia”
and the man in the brown coat. People v. Lawton, 196
Mich. App. 341, 349-350; 492 N.W.2d 927 (1992), lv
den 442 Mich. 927 (1993). We will not second-guess
counsel’s decision not to pursue these witnesses, a
decision that was valid in light of the defense presented.
1 People v. Ginther, 390 Mich. 436; 212 N.W.2d 922 (1973).
App.17a
Affirmed.
/s/ Clifford W. Taylor
/s/ Thomas J. Brennan
/s/ Lynda L. Heathscott
App.18a
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, VOLUME II, EXCERPTS
(OCTOBER 14, 1988)
STATE OF MICHIGAN, IN THE RECORDER’S
COURT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT
________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
Defendant.
________________________
Case No. 88-01546
Jury Trial Volume II
Before: Honorable Terrance K. BOYLE,
Judge of the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit.
[October 14, 1988 Transcript, p. 220]
Witness Officer Peter Gernand
Q.
Did anywhere in the house you recover any spent
shotgun rounds?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
Anywhere in the house—And by spent rounds I’m
indicating shells that have already been fired.
A.
That’s correct.
Q.
And did you find any spent rounds anywhere in
the house for a 22 rifle?
A.
No, sir.
App.19a
MR. DONALDSON: No further questions.
THE COURT: Mr. Rice?
MR. RICE: I was just looking, your Honor.
RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RICE:
Q.
Now, in the basement, isn’t it true that you found
some drug paraphernalia in addition to the blood
that you spoke about in the basement? Would you
look at your report on page two, the last paragraph?
A.
Yes, sir, it was found in the basement.
Q.
Okay. And where was this blood—this narcotic
paraphernalia found in the basement?
A.
On the table.
Q.
Was that close to that chair that we’re—
A.
Just west of the chair.
Q.
And the blood was right there also?
A.
It was on the chair cushion on the floor there.
MR. RICE: I have no further questions of this witness,
your Honor.
MR. DONALDSON: I have no further questions.
THE COURT: I just have a couple. Do you have Defense
18?
Is that the item you’ve referred to as the copper
jacket?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. What exactly is that?
App.20a
THE WITNESS: Some bullets are made out of lead
and some are made out of lead with a copper outer
coating, real thin layer of coat. That is the copper
from the outer part of the bullet that separates
from the lead when it’s fired. Some are covered
all the way with copper jacket. Some are half
copper jacket and half lead depending on the
type of ammunition you buy.
THE COURT: Did you recover what I would call slugs,
that is the projectiles from a bullet?
THE WITNESS: That is part of a projectile from a
bullet.
THE COURT: Okay. I see. It is part of the slug itself?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It’s just separated from the
lead part.
THE COURT: Okay. Give that back to you. Just so
the Jury understands, let me say something. If I
say anything wrong, you correct me, okay?
THE WITNESS: Okay, sir.
THE COURT: If we distinguish between three types
of weapons, a fully automatic, a semi-automatic
and let’s say a revolver, and that’s my purpose, and
secondly so the Jury understands what the make
up of any live round is, let me start by saying
the live round for my purposes consists of a
projectile part, what we would call a slug, which
lay people commonly call a bullet. Maybe I guess
professional people do as well.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. It also consists of a cartridge
casing in which the explosive materials are that
App.21a
once the pin strikes it causes that projectile to go
out of the weapon, is that correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. If you were then to have a
revolver, if you pulled the trigger and fired the
projectile outside, the shell casing spent would stay
inside the gun, correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. If you then had an automatic
weapon, whether semi-automatic or fully automatic, when you fired the projectile out of the
gun the shell casing ejects from the weapon itself?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. The only difference then between
that exhibit that you’ve described as nine
millimeter semi-automatic is that if it were fully
automatic, if you depress the trigger it would
continue to fire rapidly?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
THE COURT: In other words, you pull the trigger
once and if you kept your finger on the trigger if
it carries 26 bullets, 26 bullets would be fired out
of the gun?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
THE COURT: A semi-automatic would allow you to
pull the trigger and one shot would come out,
but as rapidly as you could pull the trigger shots
would continue to come out?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
App.22a
THE COURT: Okay. Now, one final question. On that
semi-automatic pistol or firearm, you indicated
there were 25 live rounds in the magazine and
one live round in the chamber?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
THE COURT: Does the magazine hold 26?
THE WITNESS: You could put 25 in, it’s marked as
25. It’s marked and it’s pretty well packed tight,
and usually they put one in the gun, they load
this up, this rack, and they put another one back
in here so they have a total of 25 here plus one
in the gun.
THE COURT: You’re saying when you found that gun,
that gun was fully loaded?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And it would appear not to have been
fired?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
THE COURT: Okay. Second question. Was that gun
operable if you know?
MR. DONALDSON: Your Honor—
MR. RICE: There’s a witness that’s gonna testify—
THE COURT: Oh, okay.
MR. RICE: —about that.
THE COURT: Okay. Good. Then I don’t have to ask
you that question. I think that’s all I have.
MR. RICE: Your Honor, one thing that I would like
to correct is that on a fully automatic weapon,
App.23a
there’s a squeezing operation in the back of the
weapon—I just happen to be a gun dealer.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. RICE: There would be a squeezing operation
that slides in in the back that you’d have to
squeeze along with the trigger—
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. RICE: —before it would be fully automatic.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DONALDSON: I have no objection to that.
THE COURT: All right, fine. We just did it to make
sure you understood the terms that were being
used. Okay. And you agree with everything?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Good. I have nothing further.
Do you have anything further of the witness?
MR. DONALDSON: No, your Honor.
MR. RICE: I don’t.
THE COURT: Okay. You’re excused. Thank you very
much for being here.
(Witness excused.)
MR. DONALDSON: Call his partner, Officer Mark.
PAUL MARK sworn by the Court,
was examined and testified as follows:
[...]
App.24a
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, VOLUME III, EXCERPTS
(OCTOBER 17, 1988)
STATE OF MICHIGAN, IN THE RECORDER’S
COURT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT
________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
Defendant.
________________________
Case No. 88-01546
Jury Trial Volume III
Before: Honorable Terrance K. BOYLE,
Judge of the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit.
[October 17, 1988 Transcript, p. 347]
Witness Julie Glenn
A.
No.
Q.
You can have a seat again, ma’am.
Did you see anybody besides John Frazier, Mennen
Hollonquest and Michael McAdory at that home
at the time of the shooting?
A.
No.
Q.
All right. You heard the voice of Richie Rich?
A.
Yes.
App.25a
Q.
All right. Did you have any conversation with
Mr. Frazier as far as what had occurred to him
on that date?
A.
When I came—
MR. RICE: I’m going to object.
Q.
(By Mr. Donaldson, continuing): Just answer the
question. Did you have a conversation?
A.
Yes.
Q.
All right. Emotionally how was he at that point?
Was he excited or—
MR. RICE: I’m going to object, the leading form of
the questions, your Honor, “emotionally how was
he”, and let her testify.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DONALDSON: I’ll rephrase the question.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
Q.
(By Mr. Donaldson, continuing): Could you describe
his emotional state at that point in time?
A.
Well, he wasn’t really upset, but he said he was
bleeding, he had been shot and, you know, told
me to come calling the police. He wasn’t hollering
or all excited or anything.
Q.
All right. And did he indicate to you how he
sustained those injuries?
MR. RICE: I’m going to object, your Honor. That
would be hearsay.
THE COURT: You gonna need to do a little more
with your foundation.
MR. DONALDSON: Very well, your Honor.
App.26a
Q.
(By Mr. Donaldson, continuing): Mr. Frazier was
bleeding on or about his person?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. And he indicated that he needed help?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And he indicated that he needed you to call the
police to get him some help?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you indeed went to get him the help?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Because he couldn’t do it himself—
MR. RICE: My Lord, your Honor—Excuse me. When
are you gonna get on the witness stand?
THE COURT: No, but she’s already testified to that.
He’s summarizing what she had already testified
to.
I’m gonna save some time. When Mr. Frazier went
downstairs, he had not been injured in any way?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: When he came upstairs, about how much
time had elapsed between the time of your hearing
shots and your seeing him upstairs?
THE WITNESS: About two minutes.
THE COURT: About two minutes. When you first saw
him he was bleeding?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, I’m gonna allow it. I mean,
I’m gonna rule that—
App.27a
So the Jury understands, ordinarily you’ve heard
throughout this thing, we don’t like attorneys
leading witnesses, you know, because when you
lead witnesses you’re trying to tell witnesses
more or less what you expect them to testify to,
and we don’t want to have that. We just want to
hear what the witness actually saw or heard.
There’s another rule that says you really shouldn’t
have hearsay testimony. So we’re not really too
interested in what she heard Johnny Frazier say
because that ordinarily would be hearsay. We’re
interested only in hearing from Mr. Frazier what
he actually saw or heard, which I trust we’ll do
later in the trial.
But there is an exception to that, and if a person
makes an excited utterance, if a person is under
such a state of startling event where they’re very
excited and they don’t have time to fabricate,
they don’t have time to even think about what
they’re saying, they’re more or less reporting
what they see, then that’s an exception.
So I’m gonna allow the witness to testify as to
what Mr. Frazier told her under these circumstances.
MR. RICE: Your Honor, let the record reflect my
objection.
THE COURT: Yeah, of course. Go ahead, Mr.
Donaldson.
Q.
(By Mr. Donaldson, continuing): What if anything
did he say relative to his being shot?
App.28a
A.
He said, “Come call the police, I been shot”. And
so I asked him, “Who shot you?” He said, “Peanut
and Richie Rich”.
Q.
All right. Had you ever seen Peanut or Mr. Lloyd
Beam over at that Hazlett address on a prior date?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And about how long before the April 3rd date
was that if you remember?
A.
About a week, between a week and a week and a
half.
[...]
[October 17, 1988 Transcript, p. 448]
Witness John Frazier
A.
I guess so. I don’t know what him and Mike was
talking about. All I can testify to is what we was
talking about.
Q.
Well, do you know if they talked that day?
A.
I don’t know.
MR. RICE: I don’t believe I have any further questions
of this witness.
MR. DONALDSON: I have no redirect, your Honor.
THE COURT: I just have a couple questions. Mr.
Frazier, you have a little bit of difficulty with
speech—
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: —in responding to questions.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
App.29a
THE COURT: Did you have that before you were shot
or is that a result of having been shot?
THE WITNESS: I had it way before I got shot.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Since I was three years old.
THE COURT: Okay. You don’t have any problem however understanding the questions, it’s just a
problem with getting the speech together to
respond?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. You’re saying that you never
sold dope out of the house?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I never sold any out there.
THE COURT: You say Michael McAdory did?
THE WITNESS: Selling it for someone.
THE COURT: Selling it for someone else. Mark?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. What about Hollonquest, was he
selling for Mark too?
THE WITNESS: He wasn’t selling for Mark.
THE COURT: Was he selling it at all?
THE WITNESS: I don’t think so.
THE COURT: Okay. You’re saying to the best of your
knowledge Michael McAdory was selling out of
your own residence there. Do you rent that place?
THE WITNESS: We was buying, me and my mother
was buying it.
App.30a
THE COURT: Who?
THE WITNESS: Me and my mother was buying it.
THE COURT: You and your mother were buying it,
but she didn’t stay there?
THE WITNESS: No, sir.
THE COURT: You stayed there?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. So to the best of your knowledge,
Michael McAdory was the only person selling out
of the house and he was selling for this person
named Mark?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And what you received for that was
you got occasional free dope?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. The traffic primarily door traffic;
in other words, people come to the side door?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. And you’re saying on prior
occasions Richie Rich had sold out of the house
as well?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Same arrangement; I mean, for money
or for dope?
THE WITNESS: Same arrangement. Sometimes it was
just once in a while, that’s all.
THE COURT: But you’d get a little free dope out of it?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
App.31a
THE COURT: So we understand exactly what you’re
saying now, I’m not talking about the night of
the shooting itself on April 3rd, but I’m talking
about the one and a half, two weeks before that
when there was an incident between the Beams
and Michael McAdory.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. As far as you were concerned,
and I want your sense of it, as far as you were
concerned, you’re telling us you didn’t think you
were in difficulty with the Beams, that it was
only Michael McAdory that was in difficulty?
THE WITNESS: Not even Mike. It supposed to have
been Mark, because before he shot me I asked him
why, you know. He said y’all shot up my mama
house. Mike didn’t have nothing to do with it, I
didn’t have nothing to could with it, and Quest
didn’t either. It was Mark and them, you know.
THE COURT: So you’re saying—
THE WITNESS: We got shot for nothing.
THE COURT: Okay. You’re saying you think that
there was something going on between the Beams
and Mark?
THE WITNESS: Right.
THE COURT: Who actually was the supplier for the
dope that was sold?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. But did you overhear either one
of the Beams tell Mr. McAdory that they were
coming back within two weeks and that he’d better
be gone or he’d have his mickeys shot or shot off?
App.32a
THE WITNESS: I didn’t hear that personally.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, somebody brought over you
said—I mean, somebody brought Mr. Hollonquest
a 32 revolver and somebody brought over a semiautomatic nine . . .
[...]
. . . selling dope there at the house, isn’t it true
that Mr. Hollonquest was selling mixed jive for a
guy named June Bug?
A.
I wouldn’t know; it’s possible.
Q.
You do know that mixed jive was sold there in
that house, didn’t you?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
And you’re saying—
A.
But it wasn’t—I said possibly could have been
doing it.
Q.
You’re saying that you don’t know whether he
was or he wasn’t?
A.
Yes.
Q.
But somebody was selling mixed jive in that
house, isn’t that right?
A.
I wouldn’t know.
Q.
Did you know a person that they called June Bug?
A.
Yes, I know a person they call ‘em.
Q.
And he was a dope man, wasn’t he, the person
they call June Bug was a dope man, wasn’t he?
A.
Yeah, he was.
App.33a
Q.
And he was bringing dope to that house, wasn’t
he?
A.
He used to bring dope. He wasn’t bringing no
dope there to my house.
MR. RICE: I have no further questions.
MR. DONALDSON: I have nothing further.
THE COURT: Yeah, I think I’m gonna keep my mouth
shut too. We don’t want to get into a whole history
of transactions here, it’ll take us even further
afield.
I want to thank you very much, Mr. Frazier, for
being here. We’re going to recess now—Wait just
a second. Eddie, you can have him wait right there
in the audience.
I have another matter that I have to take care of
at 9:00 o’clock in the morning, so I think you
should be here at about 9:25 and we’ll get started
about 9:30. Okay? Have a good night’s rest.
Oh, again, let me caution you, don’t talk about
this case to anybody, don’t let anybody talk about
it in your presence. Okay? And we’ll see you
tomorrow morning at 9:30.
(Jury excused at 4:45.)
Unless I hear some objection from somebody, the
bench warrant on Mr. Frazier is gonna be dismissed.
MR. DONALDSON: I have no objection.
MR. RICE: I don’t have any objection. I didn’t request
it in the first place.
THE COURT: I know you didn’t.
App.34a
You’re free, Mr. Frazier, to go, and I’m sorry for
the inconvenience in bringing you down. It may
have been a misunderstanding, but we just wanted
to make sure . . .
App.35a
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, VOLUME IV, EXCERPTS
(OCTOBER 18, 1988)
STATE OF MICHIGAN, IN THE RECORDER’S
COURT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT
________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
Defendant.
________________________
Case No. 88-01546
Jury Trial Volume IV
Before: Honorable Terrance K. BOYLE,
Judge of the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit.
[October 18, 1988 Transcript, p.477]
Witness Officer James Metiva
A.
That’s correct.
Q.
Where was that injury if you recall?
A.
The right shoulder.
Q.
You see any other apparent injury?
A.
No, I didn’t.
Q.
Did you proceed into the home itself?
A.
Yes.
App.36a
Q.
And what if anything did you observe in the
home?
A.
Two other males lying on the floor.
Q.
Did you later determine the identity of those
persons?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And was one of those persons Mennen Hollonquest?
A.
He was.
Q.
And where was he situated, where was he on the
floor?
A.
Mr. Hollonquest was in the living room, his head
was facing north, feet south, and he had a—lying
in a pool of blood coming from his head.
Q.
Would you please approach the diagram, Officer?
Now, that’s People’s Exhibit Number 1. Does that
fairly and accurately depict the floor plan of the
first floor of the Hazlett address?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And where was it that you first saw Mr. Frazier?
A.
This being the back door, I entered here, he was
at the steps here.
[...]
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. DONALDSON:
Q.
You indicated you went next door to call homicide?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And is it the responding officer’s duty to investigate homicides upon arriving at the scene?
App.37a
A.
Initially, yes.
Q.
But what is the purpose in calling the homicide
unit?
A.
To handle the rest of the investigation. We do
not handle it from a precinct level.
MR. DONALDSON: I have no further questions, your
Honor.
MR. RICE: No further questions.
THE COURT: Before I ask the witness—I only have
one question. Before I ask that, has there been
any testimony from any of the evidence techs with
respect to the actual physical dimensions of that
first floor?
MR. DONALDSON: No, your Honor.
MR. RICE: No, it’s not drawn to scale.
THE COURT: Yeah, I understand. And that’s—I didn’t
think we had that.
Let me ask you this question, and answer it only
if you really have a—First of all, let me ask you
a question about yourself. Do you think that you
have fairly good judgment about spacial distances?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have enough of an
independent recollection of that particular house
on Hazlett that you still recall about what the
dimensions of particularly the living room was?
THE WITNESS: An estimate?
THE COURT: Yeah, estimate.
THE WITNESS: Maybe.
App.38a
THE COURT: Like say take from—You can see where
that diagram has a division between the living
room and the dining room?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: So from the spot right in the middle
there—In other words, if we just took the width
dimension, what I’m saying is the east/west
dimension of the living room itself, about how
far would that be?
THE WITNESS: Approximately 12 by 16.
THE COURT: Twelve by sixteen for the entire room,
entire living room?
THE WITNESS: Roughly.
THE COURT: Okay. And so the Jury can get some idea
about what that is, if you looked at that wall and
then you told me—you tell me when to stop
when you think I’ve gone the east/west dimension
of that living room to 12 feet.
THE WITNESS: Right about there.
THE COURT: Okay. So from about where I am to that
wall is about the width of that room?
THE WITNESS: Yeah.
THE COURT: And the length of that room would be
about a third longer than that?
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: Okay. Second question is, you know
where Mennen Hollonquest was found, where his
body was found?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
App.39a
THE COURT: Okay. And where his head was. You also
know where the slug was found or seen?
THE WITNESS: When I saw it, yeah. I came back.
THE COURT: I understand. But assuming it was in
the same place when you came back, how far was
that slug from Mennen Hollonquest’s head?
THE WITNESS: Maybe eight inches.
THE COURT: Okay. Again, just to get the dimensions
of the room, and I’m going to the diagram now,
we’re saying from here to here is roughly about
12 feet and from here to here is roughly about 16
feet, so a six foot man literally if he were laying
this way would take up about half of the space?
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Right.
THE COURT: All right. That’s all I have.
MR. RICE: Yeah, but your Honor, the testimony isn’t
that way. The testimony is that the head was
laying approximately here and the feet were down
here.
THE COURT: No, I understand. But I want to give
the Jury an idea of dimensions, that’s all, and
that would be correct. If the diagram were to scale,
which it’s not, I mean you’d really see about this
kind of length and proportionately about this
kind of length for a human body. Okay?
Anything further from the attorneys?
MR. DONALDSON: No, your Honor.
App.40a
MR. RICE: I do.
RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RICE:
Q.
Was there an Officer Herlotha Fields at the scene
while you were there?
A.
There was a scout ten-one at the scene, he
helped us preserve the witnesses. I don’t remember
if he was working that unit or not.
Q.
Were you the first unit there or—
A.
We were the first one there.
Q.
And how long after you got there was it that the
other unit got there?
[...]
App.41a
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, VOLUME V EXCERPTS
(OCTOBER 19, 1988)
STATE OF MICHIGAN, IN THE RECORDER’S
COURT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT
________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
Defendant.
________________________
Case No. 88-01546
Jury Trial Volume V
Before: Honorable Terrance K. BOYLE,
Judge of the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit.
[October 19, 1988 Transcript, p. 596]
Witness Michael McAdory
A.
During his active drug business.
Q.
You never sold any drugs, period, is that right?
A.
That’s right.
Q.
Okay. And you never have, is that right?
A.
That’s right.
Q.
Okay. And the only thing that you’ve ever done
as far as you know was looked out for that drug
house, and when this incident occurred you were
App.42a
through with the dope business and stopped, isn’t
that correct?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
What do you mean by that? You didn’t stop?
A.
I hadn’t sold any drugs, but I had been around
drug activity after the shooting of me and Johnny
Frazier.
Q.
So you didn’t really learn a lesson by getting
shot over that dope house, you continued to remain
around drug activity, is that right?
MR. DONALDSON: I would say that’s a bit argumentative, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I think I’ll sustain it.
MR. RICE: Well, I’ll rephrase it.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. RICE: Thank you.
Q.
(By Mr. Rice, continuing): Now, you just testified
that you were around drug activities after you
got shot and got out of the hospital, is that right?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Okay. Now, when this incident occurred you
were supposed to be in school, isn’t that right,
sir?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
As a matter of fact, you turned 17 just a few
weeks after the shooting occurred while you were
still in the hospital, isn’t that right?
A.
I was home from the hospital when I turned 17.
App.43a
Q.
You turned 17 on April the 22nd, 1987, isn’t that
right?
A.
That’s right, sir.
Q.
Okay. And you were supposed to be in school but
you were over the dope house watching out the
window, is that right?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Now, you say that you continued after getting
shot to be around drug activity?
MR. DONALDSON: Your Honor, I’m going to object
at this point in time. I don’t understand whether
it’s relevant or not that this particular defendant
did or did not continue to be involved in the drug
trade after this particular incident. It’s clear what
Counsel’s trying to do is just paint him as a bad
person as opposed to trying to enlighten the Jury
as far as what occurred on the date in question,
and I’d ask that the Court instruct him to cease
this line of questioning.
MR. RICE: Well, your Honor—
THE COURT: Wait, wait, all right. Go ahead, Mr. Rice.
MR. RICE: I’m just simply dealing with his credibility.
THE COURT: Yeah, I know what you’re doing. But I
think it’s gone about as far, Mr. Rice—I mean,
Mr. Donaldson didn’t object except for the bench
conference in terms of the area and I allowed you
full sway and the witness has responded to it
and I think that’s about as much as you can get
out. I’m not telling you—restricting your cross, but
I think you have pretty much what you were after,
don’t you?
App.44a
MR. RICE: Well, your Honor, we’ve got his denial that
first he says that he was selling drugs for Frazier
and then he changes that after he realizes what
the—
THE COURT: No, the witness consistently has said as a
specific fact he never sold drugs if you talk about
the act of selling drugs, but he admits complicity
in being paid as a look out in drug transactions,
and he told ’ya after the time of the shooting
in this case he has indeed again been around
drug activity but he has not personally sold
drugs. Now, he’s been consistent with respect to
that. Now, what more do you want from him? He
admits that after the incident he’s been around
drug activity.
MR. RICE: Well, your Honor, if we could show that
that’s false, then I think that we should be able
to bring that out before the Jury. We have evidence
to show that that’s false.
THE COURT: No, you don’t.
MR. RICE: What—Your Honor, could we approach the
bench?
THE COURT: Sure. Tell you what, we’ll go into
chambers. You stay right where you are. Hopefully
we’ll be back in two or three minutes.
(Discussion in chambers.)
I’m gonna have to ask the Jury to step into the
Jury Room for a second. Hopefully it’ll be about
two minutes. But I have to ask you to leave.
(Jury excused at 12:02.)
App.45a
The record should reflect we had an in-chambers
discussion, and I think probably—Well, I’ll just
state the summary of it and then I’ll let the
attorneys say whatever they wish. The summary
of it really is the position of the Prosecutor is a
motion in limine was made—Let’s state the facts
again.
The facts are this witness has been convicted on
two drug cases for which he received a term of
probation.
[...]
App.46a
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, VOLUME VI, EXCERPTS
(OCTOBER 20, 1988)
STATE OF MICHIGAN, IN THE RECORDER’S
COURT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT
________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
Defendant.
________________________
Case No. 88-01546
Jury Trial Volume VI
Before: Honorable Terrance K. BOYLE,
Judge of the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit.
[October 20, 1988 Transcript, p. 702]
Witness John Frazier
A.
I don’t know her whole name.
Q.
We never heard anything about—
A.
I don’t know her whole name.
Q.
You never told the Prosecutor—
A.
They planned to kill is in cold blood anyway.
Q.
You never told the Prosecutor this, did you?
A.
I just found it out.
Q.
You just found it out?
App.47a
A.
Yeah.
MR. RICE: I have no further questions.
MR. DONALDSON: I have nothing further, your Honor.
TEE COURT: I guess just with some trepidation I
want to ask one question.
Mr. Frazier, you indicated that on a prior incident
before the day of the shooting that they came
over, they robbed Michael McAdory, they took a
12 gauge shotgun, they also took a 22 rifle?
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh, they took a 30-30 carbine.
THE COURT: Oh, 30-30 carbine?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. So it was not—They did not take
the rifle that was the exhibit here in Court? You
remember there was an exhibit here in Court, a
22 rifle that was sound by the police—Oh, there
it is, that rifle there.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. That rifle was still under
my mattress.
THE COURT: Under your mattress.
THE WITNESS: Then they took the other thing.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. RICE, CONTINUING:
Q.
When you testified before, you never said anything
about them taking a 30-30?
A.
Yes, I did. I said I was sleep on the couch.
Q.
Did you testify—
A.
And when they took us upstairs.
App.48a
Q.
Excuse me—
A.
It’s in the paper.
Q.
It is?
A.
Somewhere.
Q.
I want you to show it to me then. Okay. Your
testimony starts on page three.
A.
It started when he dropped the object on the
floor to give me a signal.
Q.
Just a moment, there’s no question on the floor.
You seem awfully anxious to testify.
A.
No, that’s when it began.
Q.
Well, I want you to show me where in your testimony, anywhere in your testimony that you said
anything about anybody taking a 30-30 rifle
from your house.
(Pause.)
A.
You right, it don’t say that.
Q.
Beg your pardon?
A.
You right, it don’t say that.
Q.
Maybe it’s in that statement that you wrote out
in your own handwriting. Would you look at that
and see if you see it in there?
A.
It’s not in there.
Q.
It’s not in there either?
A.
No.
Q.
And neither in that transcript or this statement,
is it?
App.49a
A.
No, no, I didn’t see it.
MR. RICE: I have no further questions.
THE COURT: Mr. Donaldson?
RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. DONALDSON:
Q.
I’m gonna ask you to look at page 17 of your
transcript, the transcript of your testimony at the
prior trial, and read through that page. I have a
couple questions about that.
A.
Seventeen?
Q.
Yeah.
(Pause.)
THE COURT: No, maybe we can clean it up this way,
unless there’s some disagreement.
MR. DONALDSON: Well, I’m gonna ask him what he
was referring to there. That’s the purpose of—
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
MR. DONALDSON: That’s all. One way or the other,
that’s why I’m gonna ask him the question. One
of those times when a lawyer’s gonna ask a
question he doesn’t have any idea what the answer
is.
MR. RICE: It’s called fishing expedition.
Q.
(By Mr. Donaldson, continuing): In that transcript,
you indicated to Defense Counsel in your cross
examination that it was right after the object
was dropped to the floor, is that right?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Okay. Page 17, doesn’t that refer to that time
frame?
App.50a
A.
Are you referring to when Mike got robbed?
Q.
When the item got dropped to the floor, yes.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Okay. And is that what page 17 that I just
showed you is talking about?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Okay. When you say somebody has a gun in that,
the other guy came in with a gun, are you talking
about a handgun or what are you talking about?
MR. RICE: I’m going to object to this, your Honor.
THE WITNESS: We talking about the 357.
THE COURT: No, I’ll allow it.
Q.
(By Mr. Donaldson, continuing): And he gave the
answer that I wasn’t sure which it was, whether
he was talking about the carbine or the 357. You
talking about a handgun?
A.
Right.
MR. RICE: Wait a minute, excuse me, wait. What are
you saying? I was talking with the Judge and you
were intervening. What did you say?
MR. DONALDSON: What did I say?
MR. RICE: Yeah, I wanna know—He’s around here
saying that this man said something about a
carbine and there’s nothing in this transcript
that says that.
THE COURT: He didn’t say that. He said you made a
reference to a gun, what was the gun being
referenced to, a revolver or a long gun, and the
witness said a 357 handgun.
App.51a
MR. RICE: All right.
MR. DONALDSON: I was just clarifying for my own
edification or understanding of what the testimony
was.
All right. I have no further questions, your Honor.
MR. RICE: No further questions.
THE COURT: Okay. I just have one. In your testimony
here in Court when you were on the stand previously, you did indicate that on that occasion
when Mr. McAdory was robbed that they asked you
where the carbine was, they asked where the
carbine was, and your response was that it was
on the couch downstairs. Is that what you said?
THE WITNESS: I just couldn’t find it in the paper,
so—
THE COURT: But that was your testimony when you
were here previously?
THE WITNESS: Yes, it was, that’s what I thought.
THE COURT: And they removed that carbine from
the house on that occasion?
THE WITNESS: Right.
THE COURT: Okay.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. RICE:
Q.
Don’t leave now. Did you say anything wherein
you testified before about being asked where the
carbine was?
A.
I wasn’t asked. He asked me where it was at.
App.52a
Q.
The question is, when you testified on June the
15th, 1988, did you say anything about being asked
by anyone where a carbine was?
[...]
App.53a
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, VOLUME VII, EXCERPTS
(OCTOBER 21, 1988)
STATE OF MICHIGAN, IN THE RECORDER’S
COURT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT
________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
v.
LLOYD GENE BEAM,
Defendant.
________________________
Case No. 88-01546
Jury Trial Volume VII
Before: Honorable Terrance K. BOYLE,
Judge of the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit.
[October 21, 1988 Transcript, p. 848]
Speaker, Judge Terrance Boyle
. . . has had to rule on motions or objections by
Counsel. I must do so in accordance with the law
and the rulings do not reflect any personal opinion
about the facts in the case. Such rulings are not
evidence and you must not give any weight either
to the rulings or to the number of rulings.
Neither my comments nor my instructions are
evidence and they should not be taken as any
indication of the Court’s opinion as to how you
should determine the facts. If you have come to
believe during the course of the trial that the
App.54a
Court is telling you how to decide this case, then
you must disregard that opinion. You are the sole
judges of the facts and you alone have the solemn
duty and obligation to decide this case based
exclusively on the evidence presented in this
case.
Any statements or arguments of the attorneys
are not evidence but are only intended to assist
you in understanding the evidence and the theory
of each party. The questions which attorneys ask
witnesses are not themselves evidence. It is the
answers of witnesses which provide evidence.
You should disregard anything said by an attorney
which is not supported by the evidence or by your
own general knowledge and experience. However,
you should use your own general knowledge and
experience in judging . . .
[...]
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.