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Adolescent Development

and Juvenile J ustice

Laurence Steinberg

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Dcpartment oF Psycliology, Temlile University, Philiidellihiii, Pennsylvimia 191 22;

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Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol, 2009. 5:459-85

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Key Words

adolescence, crime, iieuroscience, law4 policy

Abstract

tllthough justice systcm policy and prac6ce cannot, arid should not, be

dictated solely by studies of adolescent developmem, the ways iii which

we respond to juvenile offendiiig should be informed liy the lessons of

developmental science. This review lregins with a brief overview of the

history, rationale, and workings of the American juvenile justice system.

Following this, I sruiimarize findiiigs from studies of brain, cognitive,

and psychosocial development iii adolescence that have implications for

tl'ie treatment of juveniles in the justice system. The xitility of develo1?imental science in this context is illust?rated by the application of these

research findings to three fundamental issues in contemporary justice

liolicy: the criminal culpability of adoleseents, adolescents' competence

to stand trial, and the impiict of punitive sanctions on adolescents' developmcnt and behavior. Taken together, the lessons of developmental

science offer strong support for the maintenance of a separate juvenile

justice system in which adolescents are ')udged, tried, and sanctioned iii

developmentally appropriate ways.

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redefiiie the offender as someone svho is riot

Coments

INTRODUCTTON.................. 460

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA:

ANOVERVIEW.................. 461

The Origiiis of the Juveiiile

JusticeSystem.................. 461

Critical Decisioii Poisits AJong

the Juvenile Justice Pipeline . . . . . 462

The Relevance of Developmental

Sciencc to Decisioii Making

in the Justice System . . . . . . . . . . . . 464

BRAIN, COGNITIVE, AND

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DEX7ELOPMENT IN

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ADOLESCENCE................. 465

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Adolescent Brain Developtnent . . . . . 465

Adolescent Cognitive

Development................... 467

Adolescent Psychosocial

Developmem................... 468

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JUVF,NILE JUSTICE ISSUES

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INFOI'VIED BY

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DEVELOPMENTAL

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SCIENCE........................ 471

CriminalCulpabilityofYouth...... 471

Cornpetence of Adolescems

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Impact of Punitive Sanctions on

Adolcsccnt Development

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SUA4A/IARY AND CONCLUDING

COMMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480

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INTRODUCTION

Few issues challenge a society's ideas about

both the nature of human development and

the nature of justice as much as serious juvenile

crime. Because we neither expect children to

be criminals nor expect crimes to be committed by children, the unexpected imersection

between childhood ;u'id crimiiiality creates

a dilemma that most people find difficult to

resolve. Indeed, the only ways o?it of this

problem are either to redefiiie the offense

as something less serious than a crime or to

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really a child (Zimring 1998).

For most of the twentieth century, American

society has most often chosen the first

approacl'i-redefining the offcnse-axid has

treiited most juvenile infractions as matters to

be adjudicated as delinquent acts within a separate juvenile justice systesn designed, at least

in theoi-y, to recognize the special needs and

immature status of young people and to therefore emphasize rehabilitation over punishment.

Indeed, for mllcll of the past century, states

believed that the juvenile justice s5rstem ssras a

vehicle to protect the public by providing a system tbat responds to children uil'io are maturiiig

intci adulthood. States recognized that conduct

alone-tl'iat is, the alleged crimiiial act-should

not be dispositive in deciding when to invoke

the heavy hand of the adult criminal justice system. Tliey recognized that by providing for accountability, treati'nem, and supervisioxi in the

juvenile justice system-and in the comnmnity

wihenever possible-they promoted short-term

arid long-term public safety.

During the last hvo decades of die hventieth century, there was a drami'itic shift in the

ssra5r juvenile crime was iriewed by policy makers and the public. Ratlier than choosing to define offenses committed byyouth as delinquent,

socict)r increasiiigly opted to deal with 5rousig

offenders more punitively in the iuvenile justice systen'i or to redeFine them as adults and

try them in ad?ilt crit'ninal court. This trei'id

was reflected in tl'ie grosving munber of juvenile ofFenses adjudicated iii adult criminal court,

wherc adolescents are exposed to a far more adversarial proceediiig tl'ian in juvenile co?irt; iii

the increasingly punitive response of the crimiiial justice system to juvenile offenders who are

found guilty; and in ssrhat some observers have

referred to as the "criminalizatioii" of the juvenile justice system itself through increased use

of punisl'u'nent, rather than rehabilitation, as a

legitimate juvenile justice goal (Feld 1993).

This transf-ormation of juvenile jusace policy arid practice raises difficult, but important,

questions for psychologists imerested in the

developmem arid well-being of young people.

Tliese q?iestions are variations of the n'iore

general question of wlietl?ier adolescents are

competence to stam[ trial, crimiii;d culpability,

arid response to vario?is types of sanctions and

fiinrlameiitiilly di fferem ('rom ;idults i n svays tlia t

Illtel'VetltlOnS.

warrant the differenti;il tre;itment of juveniles

svho L+realc the law. In particular:

rindersiand tbe court

AN OX7ERVIEW

proceeding, reason

svith relevant facts, and

tent defendants in adult court?

The Origins of the Juvenile

assist counscl

Should juveniles accused of crimes be

Justice System

Ci'iminal culp;ibility:

held to tbe same standards of blamewor-

Ecoiiomic recessions in the early nineteenth

century pushed children out of work iii

Arnerica's new factory system during the iiidustrial revolution. Coiicerns about poor children

ted similar crimcs?

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trial: the ability of a

defendant to

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA:

Do adolescents have i:lxe psychological capabilities iiecessai-y to function as compe-

tliiness as adults and p?mished in the same

ways as adult crimiiials XVI?O have commit-

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Comlietcnce to stancl

I-Iowi does exposing juveniles to especially

punitive sanctions affect their behavior,

developn'ient, arid memal healtli?

Tliese questions provide this review's focus.

More broadly, the purpose of this reviesv is to

imebo'rate developmental psychological consideratioiis into moral, legal, political, and practical analyses of juvenile crime. Because addressiiig this issue necessitates at least a rudimentary

understaiidixig of the rationale and ssrorkings of

the juvenile justice system, I begin not with a

discussion of the science of adolescent developmem, but rathcr with a short histor)y of i?ivenile

justice in America and a brief osrerviessr of the

process tl'irough which individuals are adjudicated withiii the system.

Following this brief introductioi'i to Ainerican juvenile justice, I then summarize fiiidiiigs

from recent studies of adolescent development

that bear oi'i wltether adolescents differ fron'i

adults iii ways that bave implications for justice system policy and practice. Beca?ise xiot all

aspects of adolescent developmem are pertinent to how young people are, or should be,

treated iii the justice system, I limit my discussioii to studies that are especially relevant to

these issues. Readers interested iii a broader arid

more comprehensive treatmem of adolescent

dcvelopment are enco?iraged to consult several recem reviesvs of this literature (Collins &

Steinberg 2006, Smetana et al. 2 006) as wiell as a

recemly ?ipdated liaiidbook on adolescent psycliology (Lerner & Steinberg 2009). I then look

specifically at what we knosv abo?it adolescents'

tbe extent to wliicli tin

individual is judged to

be responsible for a

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on the strcet led to the creation of iiistituiional

care for children. In Nesv York City, the Society

for Prevention of Pa?iperisin in 1824 became

the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile

Delinquents, arid in 1825 opened the iiation's

first House of Refuge. Bostoii followed a year

later and Philadelpl'iia iiil82 8. These I-Iouses of

Refuge wes-e designed to maimain class status

and prevem unrest (I(risberg & Austin 1993,

Platt 1977).

In 1899, Jane Addams arid her Hull House

colleag'ues established what is generally accepted as the nation's first juvenile court.

Juvenile court judges, in the early part of the

myentied'i century, svere a?ithorized to investigate the character and social background of

both predelinquem and delinquent children.

They examiiied personal motivation as 'ivell as

crin'iinal intent, seeking to identify the moral

reputation of problematic children (Platt l 977).

Ben Lindsey, of Deiwer, was the juvenile court

judge whose practice most closely matched the

rhetoric of the emerging juvenile court:

We shoukl miike it our business to study arid

Iaiow each particular case, because it will generallv demand treatment in some little respect

differem from any ot}ter case. . . . (a) Is d'ie

cbild simply mischievous or crimiiii'il iii ics

ten:lencies? (l)) Is the case simply air exceptional or isolated iristaxsce in which a really

good boy or girl has gone wroxsg for the first

time becarise too weak to resist a strong temptation? (c) Is the child a victim of iiicomlietent

v'zmri.tiiiiiyitdi'evienis.oig * :nvenileJustice

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Transfer: one

mecliaiiism tlirorigli

wliidi juveiiiles' cases

:ire referred to

criii'iinal (adult) corirt

Disposition: in the

juvenile justice system,

the outcome of air

;itljudication;

comparable to a

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semence in criminal

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liarents? Does the home or liarent iieecf cor-

ers Face todi'iy iii determiiiiiig (n) whether an

rectioii or iissistiiiice? (d) !X7hat of enviroxi-

adolescent's antisocial behavior is due to tran-

ment and association, which, of cowse, ma5r

embrace sulist:iiitivelv all of tlic points of

stucly? Hosv can the environment be improsred? Certainly by keeping the child out

of t)ic saloon arid away from evil examp)es.

(e) Is the child afflicted with what we call "the

n'ioving about fever" - that is, is he given to

playing "liookey" from scl'iool, or ")umming"

and running away; shoiiiing air entire lack of

sient immaturity or contextual disadvamage, as

oliposed to deep-seated crimiiial ch;iracter and

(b) ltow best to construct a response to a jusrenile's delinquent or criminal acts that will de-

ambition or desire to work and settle <losvn to

citcd iii Pliitt (R77)]

pansion of the scientific la'iowledge relevam to

court proceedmg:

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The problem for determination by the judge is

not I-Ias this boy or girl committed a specific

svrong )iut Wbat is lie, how has lie become

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what he is, and what Jiad best be iJone in his

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interest and in tbe interest of the state to save

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either issue. Owing to the dramatic increasc in

empirical research on riormative and nonnorthe late 1970s, there has beexi a remarkable ex-

Julian Mack, Chicago's second juvenile court

judge, similarly described the ideal juvenile

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no science available to inform coiisideratioii of

each of these matters.

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at the time of the court's founding, there was

mative adolescem development that began in

ence between IIOW and tl'ien, however, is that

regular habits? [Ben B. Lindsey, "The Bosr and

the Court," Cliirritics 13 (January 1905):352;

crease the likelihood of recidivism. Tlie differ-

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him from a downward career. It is al'iliarent

at once that the ordinary leg;'il eiridence iii a

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criminal co?irt is not the sort of evidence to be

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heard in such a proceeding. (Mack 1909)

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It is beyond tbe scope of this article to discuss the likely causes of the transformation of

the juvenile justice system away from the rel'iabilitative ideal espoused by its founders and

toward the more punitive regime that exists

today (but see Scott & Steinberg 2008 for a

discussioii). Howesrer, it is worth notiiig that

the early rltetoric on the rationale and purpose

of tJ'ie juvenile court is significant in two ways

that bear on contemporary debates about justice system policy and practice. First, it is clear

that the fo?mders of the juvenile justice system

began from tlte premise that adolescems are

developmentally different from adults in svays

that should affect our interpretation and assessment of their criii'iinal acts. The questions

raised by J?idges Lindsey and Mack are relevant

to the most vexing challenges that practition-

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Critical Decisioxi Points Along

the Juvenile Justice Pipeliiie

Juvenile justice is regulated mainly by state laiir,

which makes it difficult to generalize about the

system in ways that apply universally. Despitc

whatever differences exist across jurisdictions

in policies and practices, liowiever, the poims

of decision are essentially similar: referral, intake, detemion, transfer, adju<lication, disposition, and release (see Steiiiberg & Schwartz

2000).

Referral. Emraiice into the pipeliiie begiiis

with a referral to the juvenile justice system or a

police arrest. Dependiiig upon the state, a child

may be too young or too old for the juvenile

justice system. Children who are too young are

most often diverted from the s)istem or sei'it to

the branch of juvenile court that has jurisdiction

over neglected and abused children. Children

ssrho are too old are tried as ad?ilts. A juvenile

may also be cltarged with air offense that results

a?itomatically in adult prosec?itioii. If the juvenile is charged as an adxilt, most states allow for

judges, ;ifter a hearing, to decide tlxat the c+'ise

should be ti-ansferred to juvenile court if the

public interest requires it, or if the juvcnile cax'i

prosre that lie or she is m'nenable to treatinem

in the juvenile justice system.

Intake. If the child enters the jrivenile justice

system after being arrested, referred by a private

lietitioner (such =ss a school or next-door iieiglilior), or traiisferrcd from criminal corirt, there

will be asi intake dccision. Slxould the case proceec'l, or sltould the juvenile be diverted? If the

latter, should it be an infonnal diversion, with-

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orit further involvement by thc juvenile court,

or s)iould tl'ie child be sent to a program, such

;is a community panel or teen corirt (aiid returned to juvenile court if he or she fails to obey

a comtrumity-ordered disposition)? Some cases

are diverted to other systems, such as the mental

health system. Some cases are dropped entirely

because intake of6cers decide tltat this particular combiiiation of yo?itlx arid offense does riot

belong iii the juvenile justice system. Many fac-

tors tlms enter into the decision to divert a case:

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Tlie youth's age, prior )iistory; tlxe seriousness

of the offense, arid the youth's explanation or

attitude will affect the intake decision.

Detemion. If the intake officer decides that

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the case should proceed to a hearing, the ofFicer

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must decide whetl'ier the cl'iild should l'+e sent

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home (witb or without supenrision) or should

be detaiiied, either in a maximum-security de-

tentioii center or in a detention iilternative.

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?Juveniles and *eir parents will need to explain

to an imake officer how pretrial superavision will

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occur, arid they will have to convince the oEFi-

cer that the juvenile will appear for trial. If the

child is detained, there will be a court appearance wit)iin 24-72 l'iours. Most states call this

first court appearance a detention hearing. Here

a j?idge or referee will decide whether to continue the detention status. Tliis is ?isuall5y the

first time that the child ii'ieets l'iis or her attor-

ney. Here the child must be able to discuss with

counsel the circumstances of the arrest and o?itof-court issues related to the detention decision

(S?IC?I as school attendance or the presence of an

interested adult in the juvenile's life).

Tr:.insfer. Most persons ?inder the age of 18

who are tried as adults are done so because of

statutory exclusion of their case Erom the juvenile justice system. State law may excl?ide them

becaxise of their isge-in Nesv York, for example, a 16-year-old will be tried as an adult for

any offense. Every state excludes some offenses

from juvenile court jurisdiction if a child is of a

certain age (for example, a state can decide tl'iat

1 s-year-olds svho are charged witl'i armed robbesy will have their cases begin in adult criminal court). Some states perii'iit prosecutors to

file the juvenile's case directly in the adult system, where tbe juvenile ii'iay or may riot have

an opportunit5y to have the case transferred to

juvenile co?irt. Every state also allows judges to

transfer children of a certaiii age-usually 14,

but in some instaxices, even yo?inger-to criminal court if they are clurgcd with an offense

as serious as a felony. States usually must prove

that the j'i'iveiiile is "iiot amenable to treatmem"

in the juvenile justice system. At transfer hearings, it is important that the juvenile is able, for

example, to discuss with co?insel his or her recem placement history and its reason for failure.

He or sl'ie should be able to understand options,

such as proposed lilacements, counseliiig programs, or plea agreements.

Adjudication. If the child contimies to be detained wid'iin the juvenile justice system, an adjudicatory hearing (comparable to the trial in

criminal cot'irt) must be held within 10-30 days.

(Altliough this is the general rule, in some states

juveniles charged 'uritlt high-profile crimes such

as murder will have a longer time to wait umil

their trials.) Den'iaiids 011 juveniles at adjudicatorv liearii'igs are many. Tliey will include the

s'ieed to understarid the nature of the charges

agaiiist r)hes'n and to consult with counsel. They

will havc to weigh the costs arid benefits of enterixig air admission (g'uilty plea). Tliey slio?ild

be ;ible to help counsel identify potential witnesses, la'iow whether an alibi or other defenses

are available, and consult svith counsel during

cross-examination of state witnesses.

Dispositioii. If the juvenile admits to tl'ie offense, or if the juvenile court finds by proof

beyond a reasonable do?ibt that the child has

committed the offense, the court will proceed to disposition (sentence). .Juveniles are

muw.innmali'evitrziyoig it JnveiiileJu.stir'e

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expected to assist co?uxsel in presenting disposition options to the juvenile court. Assistance

might include suggesi:ing dispositions or lielping the attorney arid experts develop clientspecific dispositions. ?Juvenilc dispositions

historicallv liaiie lreen aimed at providiiig treatment, rehabilitation, or supervision in a way

that best serves the needs of the juvenile, although in recent years some Iegisla?'ures also

have iiicluded iiicapacitation for priblic safety as

a valid rationale. Under any of the models, the

juvenile court will have a range of discretion. In

some states, the juvenile court has wide latitude,

from ordering tl'iat a child return home under supeiiyision (probation) to placiiig a child iii

maximum-security ixistimtioiis, laiown as traiiiiiig schools, reform SC??OO?S, or yo?ith devclopprobation or, if placement is warrai'ited, transfer custody of the child to the youth authority,

which will then determine tbe appropriate level

The Relevance of Developinental

Scieiice to Decision Making

in the Justice Systesn

Altliough there are few decision points in the

pipeline where the developmental sta?-us of tl'ie

juvenile is taken into accoruit explicitly, at each

decision juncture, information about the juvenile's stage of development sl'iould play air important role in the outcome of the decision. A

juvenile's developmental status is relevant widi

respect to the adjudication process because a

just and fair l'ieariiig requires the competem

participatioxi of tl'ie individual iii his or her deEesise. As noted earlier, at l'iotl'i the adjudication

aiicl transfer hearings, certain competencies are

expected to be in place, iiicluding those that

potentially affect tl'ie juvenile's ability to understand the charges, assist counsel, and emer pleas

of care.

(Scott & Grisso 2005). To the extent tbat these

rnent cemers. In other stiites, which use a "yoritli

autltori?'y" model, the court will either order

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lead to rearrest, detention, and another Iieariiig,

the o?itcome of which may be a new disposition.

Release. Most juvenile court dispositions are

for iiideterminate periods of time. However,

dispositions cannot be for a longer period t[iaii

an adult would serve for a similiir crime in

the criminal justice system. The court will

usually review the juvcnile's case csrery six to

competencies are based on capabilities that develop over the course of cliildliood and adolesceiice, an accurate understanding of how and

along what timetable these capabilities develop

is crucial to deciding whether an individual possesses the skills necessary to participate in the

process.

niiie momlis. Sometimes the reviews .rre for-

Under the Iaw, characteristics of tl'ie of-

mal heariiigs, whereas iii od'ier iiistances they

are informal reviews of reports provided by

probation officers or instimtional staff. Many

juveniles in placement, particularly those with

mental health needs or who have been placed

in inappropriate placemems, end IIP being returned to jt'ivenile court for a new disposition.

Most often, those juveniles are placed in detention pendiiig a new placement plan. I)Vhen

juveniles are released from iiistitutions, they are

placed on aftercare probation, wlxich is analogous to parole. A juvenile zsrlio is on probation

or on aftercare probatioxi status can have tl'iat

feiider ai'id the circumstances of tl'ie ofEense

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sta?'us resroked, or "violated," for new offenses

or for violating the terms of probation, such

2?5 associatiiig with gang men'ibers, truancy, or

missiiig curfew. A violation of probation may

464 Steiidicig

can mitigatc criii'iinal responsibility and lessen

the punishment that is ordered by the court.

A crime that is committed impulsively is punished less severely than one that is premeditated, as is a crime that is committed rin-

der coercive pressure froii'i otl'iers. Familiarity

with the expected developmemal timetables of

phenomena such as self-control, foresight, arid

susceptibility to peer pressure is therefore important for making detern'iinatioiis of cx'ilpability. In theory at least, an offender wilto, by virtue

of developmental immaturity, is impulsive,

shortsighted, and easily influenced by peers

shouid be prmislied less harshly than one who is

better able to comrol himself, anticipate tlxe fumre consequences of his bebavior, and resist the

antisociiil urgings of his friends (Steiiiberg &

Scott 2003).

Fiiially, decision makers in the system oftcn must assess the yo?iixgster's potential for

cliaiige arid risk for future offencling when m akiiig ti'ansfer oi' c'lispositicin decisic.ms (Mulvey &

Leistico 2008). Such cletertnii'iations of devel-

opmental lilasticity are especially important ;it

transfer liearings, because a youngster ssrho is

or seesns hardened rind ?inlikely to profit from

rehabilitation is more likely to be cliargcd as

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an adult than is one WIIO is or is seen as mal-

leable and amenable to intervention. Similarly,

a juvenile who is deemed to be at Iiigh risk of

recidivism, either because of a long prior record

of offending or other characteristics associated

with contimied and/or dangero?is criminal beliavioi' (e.g., fail?ire to respond to prior attempts

at i'el'iat'iilitatioii, a history of uncomrollable violcnce, or likelil'iood of inadeq?iate ;idult supervision in the community), will be snore likcly to

be sem to iiistitutioiial placemem.

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about the treatz'nent of juveniles who have entered the juvenile justice pipeline, therefore,

policy makers, practitioners, arid mental health

professionals need to lie familiar with the developn'iental changes that occur during childhood

arid adolescence in the capabilities and characteristics that are relevant to competence, culpability, and likely resposise to treatinem. Legislators need this iiiformation in order to create

age-related laws and stanites that are developmentally appropriate and scientifically reasonable; if, for example, we latow that the ability

to ?mderstand charges or enter pleas does not

generally develop ?intil a certain age, it makes

little sense to drasv age boundaries that would

subject developmentally incompetent individ?ials to court proceedings that necessitate their

p;irticipation iii order to satisty ordinary due

process requirements. 'Judges need this informatioii in order to make wise and fair decisions

iii tl'ie courtroom; if ssre knosv tltat the capac-

i?y to regulate one's own behavior is unlikely

to be pi-esem before a certain age, it is irnportam tliiit this inforn'iation lie t;ikeii imo account

at the time of seixtenciiig or disposition. Men-

tal health professionals need this information

in order to perform accurate assessments and

make appropriate tream'ient recommendations;

indiiriduals at differem stages of development

i'itay need very different sorts of intcrventions.

And attos-neys need this iiiformatioxi it'i order

to practice law more effectively; prosecutors

may consider a juvenile's developmental status

in deciding when it is apliropriate to charge

air iiidividrial as air adult, and defense attorneys

need to know l'iow best to interact with dients

who may not fully understand their situation.

Understanding the iiamre of psychological development ciuring adolescence, therefore, will

Iikely improve policyinaking, judicial decision

making, forensic evaluation, and legal practice.

BRAIN, COGNITIVE, AND

PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

IN ADOLESCENCE

LVhen lawmakers focus ot? juvenile justice policy, the distinction between adolescence ai'id

adulthood, rat?ier than that betxveen childhood

and adolescence, is of primary interest. Hossrever, most studies of adolescent developmem

l'iave compared adolescents wid'i children, and

oiilv in recent years }ias scientific interest focused intensely on the psychological transition

between adolescence and adulthood, largely in

response to new research sliowiiig continued

braiii mamration tliro?igh the end oE the adolescent period. This work has provided support

for the uniqueness of ;idolescence its a st:sge of

Iife that is also distinct from adulthood widi re-

spect to several aspects of brain and psychosocial development.

Adolescent Brain Development

Although most of the developmental research

on cognitive and psychosocial 'functioning during adolescence involves psychological studies,

recent work in developmemal iieuroscience is

beginning to shed light on the xieural underpinnings of psycl'iological development across

adolescence arid ;iclultliood. In tlte p;ist several vears, a ncw perspective on risk taking

zri'rm.rmiwdi'cviez:+s:oig it fimeiiijeJiistice

465

Sociocmotional

s5rstem: the braiii

svstem govci'iiiiig the

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arid emotional

iiiforinatioii and thc

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arid prinishmcnt

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(iiichiding aiitisocial risk taking) during adolescence has emerged, one that is inforii'ied by advaiices in developmental neuroscience (Casey

et al. 2008, Steiiiberg 2008). According to this

vietv, risky behavior iii adolescence is the product of the interaction behveen changes iii two

distinct neuro}iiological systems: a socioemotional system, which is localized in limbic and

paralimbic areas of the brain, iiicludiiig the

amygdala, ventral striamm, orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefromal cortex, and superior temporal sulcus; arid a cognitive control system,

which is mainly composed of the lateral prefroiital and parietal cortices arid those parts of

the anterior cingulate cortex to which they are

interconnected (Steiiiberg 2007).

Accordiiig to tbis duiil-systems model, ac'lolescent risk taking is hypotliesized to be stimulated by a rapid arid dramatic illlcreaSe Ill

dopamiiiergic activity within the socioemotional system around the time of p?iberty, uihich

is presumed to lead to increases in reward seeking. However, this increase in reward seeking

precedes the structural maturatioii of the cognitive control system and its connections to areas

of the socioemotioiial system, a maturational

process that is gradual, ?infolds over the co?irse

ofadolescence, and permits more advanced selfregulatioii and impulse control. The temporal

gap between the aro?isal of the socioemotional

system, which is an early adolescem developmem, ;'ind the full n'iaturation of tlxe cognitive

control system, which occurs later, creates a 1ic-

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riod of heightened irulnerability to risk taking

during middle adolescence (Steinberg 2008). As

one writer has characterized it, the l'irocess may

be akin to "starting tl'ie engines tvitl'io?it a skilled

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Neurobiological evidence in support of this

dual-systems model is rapidly accumulating. A

growiiig literature, derived primarily from rodent studies but with implications for human

development, iiidicates that tl'ie remodeling of

the dopamiiiergic system within the socioemotional neturork iiivolves an initial postnatal rise

arid then, starting in prcadolescence, a subseq?ient reduction of doliamine receptor density

in the striatum arid prefront.'il cortex; this pat466

Stcinlieg

tern is more pronounced among males than females (Sisk & Foster 2004, Sisk & Zelir 2005,

a'eicher et al. 1995). As a result of this remodel-

ing, dopamixiergic ;ictivity in the pi-efromal cortex increases significantly in early adolescence

and is higher during this period than before

or after. Beca?ise dopamine plays a critical role

in the brain's reward circuitry, the increase, reduction, and redistributioii of dopamiiie receptor concemratioii around priberty, especially iii

projections from the limbic system to the prefromal area, is likely to increase reward-seekiiig

behavior arid, accordiiigly, sensiitioii seeking.

There is eq?ially compelliiig neurobiological evidence for changes iii braiii structure

arid function c'luring adolescence aiicl early

adulthood that f-acilitate improvements iii selfregulation that permit individ?ials to moduliite

their incliiiations to seek rewards, although this

development is presumed to unfold along a different timetable arid to be intlependent of p?iberty (see Paus 2005 for a summary). Because

of synaptic pruniiig and the continued myelination of prefromal brain regions, resulting iii

improved connectivity among cortical areas arid

betsveen cortical and subcortical areas, there are

improvements over tl'ie co?irse of adolescence

in many aspects of executive function, such as

response inhibition, planning, weighiiig risks

and rewards, arid the simult;ineo?is consideration of multiple so?irces of information. Tliere

is also improved coordiiiation of affect arid cognitioii, reflected in improved emotion reboulation, wbich is facilitated by the increased COI?nectivity behveen regions associ;ited with the

socioemotioiial and cognitive cont?rol systems.

Tl'ie development of the cognitive control

system, which is manifested chiefly in improvecl

connectiviiy across brain regions, must be distiiiguished from the well-publicized mamration

of the frontal lobes because of synaptic pruning. Altho?igli both processes result in improved

thinkiiig abilities, they occur at different times

in :sdolescence ='ind have different implicatioxis

for cognitive development. Whereas increases

in coiinectivity take place tliro?ighorit adolescence arid well into adulthood, the decline

in gr;sy matter density that reflects syn;aptic

pruning takes place in preadolescence arid early

adolescence and is more or less coxi'iplete by age

16. Coiisequently, perforrn;mce on tasks that activate the frontal lobes contimies to improve

through middle adolescence but not beyond

age 16 on tasks of moderate difficulty (Conldin

et al. 2007, Crone & van der Molen 2004,

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coordiiiation behveen arid among multiple cortical arid subcortical brain regions, is not attained until later in developmem.

The ?ipshot of dirts develolimental neuroscience is that changes in the socioemotioiial systen'i at piiberty may promote reckless, sensation-seeking behavior iii early and

yniddle adolescence, ssrlii}e the regions of the

prefromal cortex tl'iat govens cogssitisre control

cominue to mature osrer the course of adoles-

9 50

cci'ice and into young adulthood. This temporal

gap behveen the increase ixi seiisatioii seekiiig

around p?iberty and the later development of

mature self-regulatory comlietence may com-

bine to make adolescence a time of inlierently

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immature judgmem. -I-11115, despite the fact d'iat

iii many ways aclolescents may appear to be as

intelligent as ;idults (at least as iiidexed ty performance on tests of informatioxi processiiig

and logical reasoning), their ability to regulate

their behavior in accord witl'i these advanced intellecmal abilities is n'iore limited. As the next

sectioxi makes clear, research 011 adolescent cogiiitive and psychosocial development is consisteiit with this neurobiological profile.

Adolescent Cognitive Development

The application of inforn'iation about normative adolescem development to liolicy and practice in the justice system necessitates differentiating between cognitive arid psycliosocial

development, which appear to follow differem

developmental trajectories (Steinberg 2008).

Briefly, on relatively less-demanding tasks that

are mainlv or exclusively cognitive iii nature,

and where improvement in i'idolescence is likely

due to synaptic prtuiing of the frontal lobes,

adolescems evince adult Ievels of competence

by age 16. In contrast, 011 more challenging

t:isks that iiivolve the coordiiiation of affect

arid cognition, and on many measrires of psycliosocial maturit)r, performance continues to

improve well imo young' adulthood, most likely

because this improvement is mediated try imliroved connectivity across brain regions, a relatively later development. As I discuss below, this

temporal disjunctioii has created a great deal of

coiifusioxi with regard to wlicre we should drassr

the legal bo?mdarv between adolescence and

adultl'iood, because different developmental literatures suggest different chronological ages.

Tlie most important cognitive capacities involved iii decision making are understanding

(i.e., the ability to comprehend information relevant to the decision) and reasoniiig (i.e., the

ability to use this informatioxi logically to make

a clioice). Tlxese capacities increase thro?igli

childhood into adolescence. Behveen late cltild-

hood and middle tsdolescence (rouglily bet?veen

the ages of 11 arid 16), indiiiiduals show marked

improvements in reasoxiing (especially deductive reasoning) and in both the efficienc1y arid

capacity of iiiformatioii processiiig (Hale 1990,

Kail 1997, Keatiiig 2004, Overton 1990). Research has demonstrated conclusively that, as kl

result of gains in these areas, individuals become more capable of abstract, multidimensional, deliberative, and hypothetical thiiiking

as they develop from late childhood into middle adolescence (Kuhn 2009). These abilities

reach an asymptote sometime around 16, and

by this age, teens' capacities for understaiidixig

and reasonixig in t'naking decisions, at least in

controlled experimems, roughly approximate

those of adults. Tliis comparability bettveen

middle adolescems and adults is not limited to

L+asic cognitive abilities such as memory or verbal fluency or to performance on tasks of logical reasoning. Studies of capacity to grant informed consent to receive medical treatment or

participate ;is a research subject, for example,

show little improvement Lieyond age 16 (Belter

& Grisso 1984, Grisso & Vierliiig 1978,

Gustafson & McNamar:i 1987, Weithorn &

Campbell 1982).

zemi.iiuirmii'c:iiezrts:oig * JiivtiiikJirstit'e

467

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The notion that adolescems and adults

Monalian 2007). Resistance to peer influence

demonstrate comparable capacities for ?inderst;'inding and reasoniiig should xiot be taken to

meaxi that they also demonstrate comp;irable

levels of mahirigi of judgmem, however. As m5r

colleag'ues and I have argued elsewhere, maturity of judgment is affected both by cognitive

capa}iilities as well as psychosocial ones, and altho?igh tlte former show adult levels of n'iamrit1i by 16, tlxe l;atter do riot (Steii'iberg et iil.

2009). A0 a result, adolescents may be less aL+le

to deploy tlteir cognitive capacities as effectively

as adults in exercisiiig judgment in their everyday lives when decisions are influenced by emotioxial and social variables. Tl'ie development of

these psycliosocial factors is described in the

increases between adolescence arid adulthood

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(witl'i resistance to amisocial iiifluence decreiis-

ing d?iriiig this time, espcciall>i ;imoxig bo>is, b?it

resistance to other forms of peer iiifuence increasing), but similar patterns ;after age 14 (witli

resistance to a{I forms of peer iiifluence increasing). Because the main justice policy and practice questions concern differences between adolescents and adx'ilts, especially during the latter

part of the adolescent period, it is this increase

in resistance to peer influence from age 14 on

that is of particular interest.

New lierspectives 011 adolescem "cognition-incoritext" emphasize that adolescent tliinkixig iii

everyday settings is a function of social arid

emotional, as well as cognitive, processes, and

that a full accorim of lyouthful judgmem must

Recent studies of thc i'ieriral underpinnings

of resistance to peer influence iii ;idolescence indicate that improvements in tl'iis capacity m;iy

be linked to the developn'iem of greater con-

exarniiie the interaction of all of thesc iiiflu-

gioiis, which likely facilitates the better coordixiation of affect and cognition (Grosbras

(-,371

171

as individuals begin to form air iiidependent

sense of self arid develop greater capacity for autonoinous decision mal<iiig. Studies of agc differences arid age changes iii resistance to peer

influence suggest somewl'iat differem patterns

vis-A-vis iintisocial versus neutral or prosocial peer pressure prior to middle adolescence

ences (Scott et al. 1995, Steiiiberg & Cauffmaii

1996). Even wlten adolescent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthfiil decision making may still differ from that of adults

due to psycliosocial immaturitv. Indeed, research indicates t?hat psychosocial maturatioii

proceeds more slowly than cogni(ive developmem and that age differences in judgment may

reflect social and emotional differences between

adolescents and adults that contiiiue well be-

yond n'iid-adolescence. Of particular relevrince

to the liresent discussion are iige differences

in susceptibiligy to peer iiifl?ience, future orientatioii, reward sensitivity, and the capacit1y

for self-regulation. Available research iiidicates

that adolescems and adults differ significamly

with respect to each of these amibrites.

Peer ixifluence. Substantial research evidence

supports the convemional ssrisdosn t}xat teens

are more oriented toward peers and responsive

to peer influence than are aclults (Steinberg &

4 68 .?;teirrlierg

nectivi?y benveen cortical and sulicortical re-

et al. 2007, Paus et al. 2008), although it should

be noted that this conclusion is based on smd-

ies of individual differences in lirain morphology and function among sai'iie-aged adolescents

ssrho differ iii their self'-reported resistance to

peer pressure and not to cross-sectional or longimdinal studies that link age differences in

resistance to peer influence to age differences

in brain structure or function. Nevertlieless, it

is reasonable to spcculate that t]ie social anc?

arousal processes that may undermiiie logical

decision mal6ng during adolescence, when connectivity is still maturing, do not have the same

impact duriiig adulthood. Oiie recem beliavioral study found, for instance, that adolescems, college rmdergraduates, and ad?ilts performed similarly on a risk-takiiig task ssrhen

performing the task alone, but that the presence of same-aged friends doubled risk taking an'iong the adolescems ;iitd increased it

50% among the undergraduates, hut had no

impact on the adults (Gardner & Stciiiberg

2005).

Peer iiiffuence ;iffects adolescent judgment

both directly arid indirectly. In some comexts,

adolescems might make choices in response to

direct peer liressure, as when they are coerced

to t;ike risks that they ii'iight otlierivise avoid.

More indirectly, adolescents' desire for peer approval and consequem fear of rejection affects

their choices even witho?it direct coercion. The

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increased salience of peers iii adolescence likely

makes approval seekiiig especiallly important iii

group situations. Thus, it is not surprising, perhaps, that adolescents are far more likely than

are adults to commit crimes in groups (Zimring

1998). Peers also may provide models for behavior that adolescents believe will assist them

to accomplish their osvs'i ends. For example,

there is son'ie esridence that duriiig early ;snd

middle ;irlolescence, teens who engage in certain typcs of antisocial behavior, such as fightixig or driiiking, may en)oy higher status among

their peers as a consequence. Accordingly, some

adolescents may engage in antisocial conduct to

impress their friends or to coxiform to peer expectatioiis ; indeed, iii one of the most iii&iemial

acco?ims of so-called adolescence-limited of-

feitders (tltat is, iiidividuals wilio commit crimes

tluring adolescence but not before or ;ifter), imitation of higher-status peers is hypothesized to

be a prime motivation for antisocial behavior

(Moffitt 1993).

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Future orientation. Fumre orientation, the

capacity and inclination to protect events imo

the Frstisrc, may also influence judgment lieca?ise

it affects the extent to which individuals con-

,jo

sider tlte long-term conseq?iences of tl'ieir actions in making c)ioices. Over the co?irse of ;idolescence arid into young adulthood, ixidividuals

become more fu?-ure oriemed, witl'i increases iii

their coiisideratioii of future consequences, its

their concern about the futi'ire, axid in their abil-

itv to plan ahead (Greene 1986, Nurmi 1991,

Steinberg et al. 2008b).

There are several pla?isible explanations for

this age g=sp iii future orientation. Ill part, adolescents' weaker future orientation may reflect

their more lin'iited life experience (Gardner

1993). To a >io?mg person, a short-term coiisequence may have far greater salieiice than one

five years in the future. The latter may seem

very remote simply because five years represents a substantial portion of her life. Tl'iere is

also evidence linking the differences behveen

adolescems and adults in future orientation to

Adolescence-litnited

offenders: amisocial

iiidividrials svliosc

offending begins rind

ends driring

adolescence

age differences in brain structure and function,

especially in the lirefrontal cortex (C;mffrnan

et al. 2005).

Reward sensitivity. Research evidence also

suggests that, relative to adults, adolescents

are more sensitive to rewards and, especially,

to immediate ressraards, a difference that may

explaiii ;ige differences in sensation seeking

and risk takiiig (Galvan et al. 2007, Steinberg

et al. 2008a). Altho?igli it had once been believed that adolescents arid ad?ilts differ in risk

perception, it now appears that age differences iii risk takiiig are more likely mediated

by age differences in reward sensitivi?y than

Liy age differences iii sensitivity to the potential adverse consequences of a risk'ly decision

(Cauffman et al. 2008, Millstein & I-IalpernFelsher 2002). Thus, adolescents and aduJts

may perceive risks similarlv (botli in tl'ie lab and

in the real world) but evaluate ressrards differently, especially when the benefits of the risky

decision are weighed against the costs. So, for

example, in deciding svhedser to speed wl'iile

driving a car, adolescents and aclults ii'iay estimate tlte risks of this behavior (e.g., being

ticketed, getting into an accident) similarly; but

adolescents may weigh the potcntial rewards

(e.g., the thrill of driving fast, peer a1>proval,

gettiiig to one's destiiiatioii sooner) more Iieavily than adults, leading to Iowier risk ratios

for teens-and a higher likelihood of engaging

in the (rewardiiig) actiiiity. Tlius, what distinguishes adolescents from adults in this regard

is not the fact that teens are less knowledgeable

about risks, but rather that they attach greater

value to the rewards that risk taking provides

(Steinberg 2004).

The lxeiglitened saliei'ice of rewarcls to adolescents, relative to adults, is seen in age

niriw.ttuiiuali'cviem.org * Juvaiil4rrstix'c

469

that drawing from tliei'ii will lead to gaiiis over

time, ai'id nsro of the decks are "bad"; drawing

from them will procl?ice net losses. Beca?ise a

few cards in tlie"bad" decks offer vcry higl'i rewards, though, a person who is especially sensi-

the widely held stereotype tltat adolescents are

more reckless than adults is supported bv research oss developmental cltai'iges in impulsivity

and self-n'ianagement osrer the course of adolesceiice (Galvaii et al. 2007, Leshem & Glicksolin 2007). In generisl, studies sliovv gradual

but steadly iiicreases iii the capaci?'y for selfdirection throrigli <iclolescence, witb gains continuing tliro?igli the high scltool years ;md into

young ;idultliood. Similarly, impulsivity, :is a

general trait, decliiies liyiearly between adolescence and adulthood (Steinberg et al. 2008a).

tive to rewards will lie drawn to the "bad" decks,

An illustration of beliaviori'il research that

even if he or she kecps losing money as a result. At tl'ie beginniiig of the task, people tend

to draw raiidomly from all four decks, but as

the task progresses, normal adults pick ii'iore

frequently from the good decks. Children arid

younger adolescents (as ssrell as adults with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex) do

poorly on this task (Crone et al. 2005, Croiic

& van der Molen 2004, Hooper et al. 2004).

Performance improves with age, with the most

dratnatic improvement taking plrice during

middle adolescence. Tliis likely reflects a decrease iii susceptibility to choosing based on

the prospect of an immediate, attractive reward.

sheds Iight on age differences in imp?ilse control is the study of performance on a task knosvn

as the Tower of Loiidon. Ill this test, the subject is presented with an arrangement of colored balls, stacked in a certain order, and several empty vertical rods onto wliicli the taIls can

be moved. The subject is then presented with a

picture of a differem configuration of balls and

;isked to turn tlxe original configuration imo the

new one by moving one ball ;it a rime, using tl'ie

fewest number of mosres (Berg & Byrd 2002).

Tliis task requires thinlang ahead, because ex-

differences ii'i performance on the Iowa

Gambling Task, in which sulijects are given fo?ir

decks of cards, face dosxrn, and are instructed to

turs?i osrer cards, one zit a tiii'ie, from any deck.

Each card l'ias information aborit how mucl'i

monev the subject has won or lost bv selecting that card. Two of the decks are "good," iii

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Furtl'ier evidence th:it adolescents tend to value

immediate ressrards more than adults do is seen

iii age differences iii performance on tests of delay discouming, iii which individuals are asked

to chose betiveen a smal}er immediate reward

(e.g., receiviiig :$Ooo tomorrow) and a larger delayed one (e.g., receiving $1000 iii one year)

(Steinberg et al. 2008b). Heiglitened ressrard

sensitivity, indexed by self-report or task performaiice, is especially proxiounced during early

arid middle adolescence, when reward circuitrli

in the brain is undergoing extensive remodeling. Tliere is some evidence from both human

and animal studies that this may be linked to

pubeml maturation (Dahl 2004).

Self-regulation. In addition to age differences

in susceptibility to peer influence, future orientation, and reward sensitivity, adolescents and

adults ;ilso differ with respect to their ability to

control impulsive beliaiiior and choices. Thus,

4 7 o Steirrkiyr

tra moves rrmst be ?ised to undo a mist;ike. In

several studies, our research group found tl'iat

early arid middle adolescents performed sirnilarly to adults when the problem presemed was

an easy one (i.e., one tlxat corild be solved in

mvo or three moves), but that they did riot lilan

ahead as much }15 late ;idolescems and young

adults on the harder problems; unlike the oldcr

subjects, the younger individuals spent 110 more

time before mal<iiig their first move 011 die complex problems than they did 011 t?he simple ones

(Steiiilierg et al. 2 008a). Tliese findings are consistem witb casual obsei'vatioxis of teeiiagers in

the real world, which also suggest that they are

less Iikely than are ad?ilts to think ahead before

acting.

Taken together, these findings from selfreport and behavioral studies of psychosocial

developmem it'idicate that individuals become

more resistant to peer influence and oriented

to the future, arid Iess drawn to immediate re-

wards and impulsive, as tliely mature from adolescence to ;idultliood. A]tho?ig'h the science of

adolescem brain development is still in its iiifaiicy, findings iiidicate that much of this maturation cominues well beyond the age by ivhiclx

inclividuals eviiice ac'lrilt levels of performance

on tests of cognitive capiicityy. -As I discuss in

tl'ie next section, tlte contirmed maturation of

cognitive competence through age 16 2?11(l the

contimictl maturation of psycliosocial competence into young adulthood have importam imlilicatioiis for hosv we sriesv assd respossd to the

crimiiial behavior of juveniles.

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JUVENILE JUSTICE ISSUES

INFORMED BY

DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE

Criininal Culpability of Youth

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The adti[t justice system lires?imes tl'iat defeiiclants who are fo?ind guilty tire responsible for

their own actions, slio?ild be held accountable,

and siiould be punished accordii'igly. Because of

il'ie relative immaturi?y of miiiors, however, it

may not be juscified to hold them as accountable as one might hold adults. If, for example,

adolescents below a certain age cannot grasp

the long-tern'i coiiseq?iences of their actions

or cannot control their impulses, one cannot

hold them fully accountable for their actions.

In other words, we cannot claim that adolescems "ought to know better" if, in fact, the ev-

ideiice iiidicates that they do not laiosv better,

or more accurately, cannot la'iossr lietter, because

they lack tl'ie abilities needed to exercise mature

judgment. It is important to i'iote that culpability cannot really be researched directly. Because

air individual's culpabilitlr is something tl'iat is

judged by someone else, it is largely in the eye

of the lieliolder. I/Vhat can be studied, however,

are tl'ie capabilities and characteristics of individuals that make them potemially blameworthy, such :ss their ability to behave intemionally

or to knosv rigl'it from ssrrong.

I use the tertn "culpability" iii this review as a

shorthand for several imerre4ated phenomena,

includiiig responsibility, accormtability, blamewortliiiiess, and punisliability. Tltese iiotioiis

are relevam to the acljudication of an individ-

?ial's guilt or innocence, because air individual

who is not responsible for his or lter actions by

definition cannot be guilty, and to the determiiiation of a clispositioii (in jinrenile corirt) or

sentence (in criminal court), iii that individuals

who are found g'uilty but }ess than completely

blameworthy, owiiig to airy immber of mitigatiiig circumstances, merit propoi-tionately less

punishment than do guilty iiidividuiils who are

fully blamewortlty.

The starting poim iii a discussioxi of criminal culpability is a priiiciple known as penal

proportionality. Simply put, penal proportion-

I)enal

proportionality: tlxe

principle in Americaii

crimin.il law linkiiig

the severity of

p?iiiishmem t'or a

crune to the criminal's

culpability

Mitigatioii: in

criminal Iaw, the

lessening of criminal

responsibility

alitlr holds that criminal p?mishment sl'iould be

determined by tsvo criteria: the harm a person

causes am:l l'iis blameworthiness iii causing that

l'iarm. The law recognizes that different svrongful acts cause different levels of harm tltrough a

complex system of offense gradiiig under wliidi

more serious crimes (rapc, for example) are

punished presumptively more severely than less

serious crimes (shopliftiiig, for example). Beyond this, though, two people who engage in

the same wroxigfu} conduct may differ in their

blameworthiness. A person may be less culpable tliaii other crimiiials-or not culpable at

all-becarise he inadvertendy (radier than purposely) causes the harm, because he is subject

to some endogenous deficieng or incapacity

that impairs his decision making (such as mental illness), or because he acts in response to an

extraordii'iary external pressure-a g'uii to the

head is the classic example. Less-lilameworthy

offenders deserve less punisltrnent, arid some

persons who cause criminal harm deserve no

punishment at all (Scott & Steinberg 2008).

Tlie concept of mitigation plays air import;int role in the law's calculation of bl;ime arid

punishment, although it gets little attention in

tl'ie debate about youth crin'ie. Mitigation applies to persons engaging in harmful conduct

wl'io are blamewortby enough to meet tl'ie minimum threshold of crimiiial responsibility but

who deserve less punishment than a typical offexsder vrould receive. Through mitigation, the

criminal law calculates culpability and punishment aloxig a comimmm and is not limited to

the options of fill responsibility or coxi'iplete

mmu.munmliwieui*:mg * Juvenil4u.itite

47'

person who kills in response to provocation or

xinder extreme emotional disturbance may be

derstand the nature and consequences of their

wrongful acts or to control their conduct. In

modern times, this category has been reserved

mostly for offenders who suffer from memal illiiess, mental disability, and otl'ier iieurological

impairments. The crimiiial law defenses of insaiiity, dimiiiislied capacig4 extreme et'itotioiial

disturbance, and insrolumtsry act recognize that

psvcliological and biological iiicaliacities cai'i

uiiciermine decision making in ways that reduce

or negate the culpabiliiy of criminal choices.

Individuals in the second grouli are ordiiiary

?iersons whose crimiiial conduct is less culpable

because it is a response to extraordiiiary exter-

guilty only of manslaughter and not of murder.

iial circumstances: These cases arise wlieii the

Under standard homicide doctriiie, mitigat-

actor faces a difficult choice, rind his response

of engaging in the criminal conduct is reasonable under the circumstances, as measured by

the likely response of air ordinary law-abiding

person iii that sihiatioii. Thus, under staiidard self-defensc doctrine, a person who kills

a threatening assailant is excused from liability

if =i reasonable person in his place wo?ild have

felt that his life was in danger. Similarly, the tle-

excuse. Indeed, criminal lawi incorporates calibrated measures of culpability. For example,

the law of homicide operates tlirougli a grad-

ing scheme under wl'iich punishment for killing

another person varies dramatically depending

on the actor's blameworthiness. Thus, the actor

who kills intentionally is deemed less culpable

iflie does so witho?it liremeditation because his

choice reveals less consideration of the harmful

coiiseqriences of his ;.ict, axid the ;'ictor who iiegligemly causcs anotlier's death is guilty of a less

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serious crime tliaii one ?VI?O iiitends to kill. A

iiig circun'istances and mental states are transIated into lower-grade offenses that ssrarrant less

punisht'iiem.

u'bat makes the conduct of one person less

blameworthy than that of another person who

causes the san'ie liarin? Generally, a person

ssrho causes crimiiial harm is a fiilly responsible

moral agem (and deserves tull puiiishment) if, in

choosing to engage in the wrongful conduct, be

has the cap,+city to make a rational decision arid

a "fair opportunity" to choose not to engage

fenses of duress, necessity, and provocation are

available to actors who can explain their criminal conduct in terms of unusual external pres-

in tlte harmful conduct. Under dirts view, the

sures that constrained their ability to choose.

actor whose thinking is substantially impaired

or whose freedom is significantly constrained

is less culpable than is the grpical offender arid

deserves less punishmem-hosv much Iess depends on the extent of the impairment or coercioii. Under Arnerican criminal lag two srery

different kinds of persons can show that their

criminal conduct was less culpable than that of

the offender ssrho deserves full punisbmentthose who are very differem from ordinary persons due to impairn'ients that contributed to

In the preceding section, l described aspects

of psychological development in adolescence

that are relevant to youthful choices to get involved in criminal activity arid that may distinguisli young offenders from tlxeir adult counterparts. Although vouths in mid-adolescence have

cognitive capacities for reasoning and uiiderstanding that approximate those of ackilts, even

at age 18 adolescems are immat?ire in their psychosocial and emotional developmem, axid this

likely affects their decisions ;ilyout imiotvemem

in crime iii ways tl'iat distinguish them from

ad?ilts. Teenagers are more susceptible to peer

tl'ieir crimiiial cltoices and those who are ordi-

nary persons whose offenses are responses to

extraordixiary circumstances or are otherwise

aberrant conduct (Scott & Steinberg 2008).

Althougli it seems paradoxical, adolescents,

in a real sense, belong to botl'i groups. In the first

gro?ip are indiiriduals with endogenous traits

or conditions that undermine their decision-

makiiig cap;icity, impairing their aLiility to llll4 7 2 .';teurbcrg

influence than are adults and tend to focus more

on rewarcls and less on risks in making choices.

They also tend to focus on short-term ratlter

than long-term consequences and are less ca-

pable of anticipatiiig future conseqriences, and

they are more imprilsive and volatile in their

en?iotioiial responses. IzVhen ssre consider these

devclopmental factors within the conventional

criminal law framework for assessing blaii'iewortliiiiess, tl'ie unsurprising conclusion is that

adolescem offenders are less culpable than are

ad?ilts. The mitigating conditions generally recognized tri the crimiii:il law-dii'niiiislied ciipacit1r arid coercisre circumstances-are relevam to

criminal acts of adolescents arid often cliaracter-

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ize the actions of juvenile offenders. This does

riot excuse adolescents from criminal respoiisibility; lyut it rei'iders r)hesn less blameworthy anrl

less deserving of adult punishment.

Although in gei'ieral lawmakers luve paid

mixiii'nal attemion to the mitigating cliaracter of adolescents' diminished decision-making

,o bD

capacities, sosne legislatures and courts have

recognized that immature judgment reduces

culpaL+ility. Most notably, in its consideratioii of tlte constitutionali?y of the juvenile

cleath pen;ilt5r, the Supreme Court has focused

011 this ratioiiale for mitigation. In Roper v.

Siyywo'ixs, the 2005 case that abolished tlte juvenile death peiialqr, the Court adopted the developmemal argut'nent for mitigation that fol-

ln.-i

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Kennedy, writing for the majority, described

three featiires of adolescence tbat distin,o?iiish

young offenders from their adult counterp;irts in ways that rnitig;ite culpability-features

that are familiar to the reader at this poim.

Tlie first is the diminished decision-making

cap;icitv of youths, which rnav comribute to a

criiniiial choice that is "not as morally repre-

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liensible its that of adults" beca?ise of its de-

velo?imental nature. The Court pointed to the

tendency of adolescents to engagc in riskv beliavior mid rioted tl'iat imn'iaturity and an "underdeveloped sense of responsibility" often result iii "iinpetuo?is and ill-considered decisions"

by youths. Second, the Court pointed to the increased vulnerability of youths to external coercion, iiicluding peer presmre. Finally, the Co?irt

emplxasized that the unformed nature of adolescent identit5y made it "less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime was evidence of

irretrievably depraved cliaracter." Adolescents

are less blamewortl'iy than are adults, the Court

suggested, because the traits that comrilyute

to criminal conduct ;ire transient, and beca?ise

most adolescents will outgrow their tendency to

get involved in crime as they mature. Altliougli

the Court did riot elaborate, sve have seen that

Ro1>er v. ,Siyniitoyzs:

the U.S. Supreme

each of these attributes of adolescence corre-

Court case that

sporids to a coiiventioiial source of mitigation

in criminal law (Roper v. Simyyzoyis 2005).

Does this argumcnt apply to the conduct

of iinmamre adults? Altliouglx most impulsive

young risk takers mature into adults with different values, some adult criminals are imp?ilsive,

sensation-seeking risk takers ssrho discount fumre consequences and focus on the here and

iiliolislied the juveiii)e

death pei'ia1t5y

now. Are these adolescent-like adults also less

culpable tltan other adult offenders and deserving of reduced puiiishmem? I thiiik not. Unlike

the typical adolescem, tl'ie predispositions, sialues, imd preferences tl'iat motisiate the adult offer'iders are siot developmemal but characterological, ai'id they are unlikely to change merely

with the passage of time. Adolescent traits that

contrilmte to crimiiial conduct are iiormative of

adolescence, but they are riot typical iii adulthood. In air adult, these traits are often part of

the personal identity of axi individual who does

not respect the values of the criminal law and

who deserves punishment when he or she violates its prohibitions (Scott & Steinberg 2008).

Cornpetence of Adolescents

to Stand Trial

Before discussing adolescems' competence to

stand trial, it is ivorth underscoring the distinctioii betiveen competence and culpability-ttvo

srery different constructs that are often confusecl, even by those with expertise iii critninal lawi Competence to stand trial refers to the

ability of an individual to fiinction effectively

as a defendant in a criminal or delinq?iency

proceediiig. In conti-ast, determinations of culpability focus on the defendant's blameworthiness iii engagiiig in the crimiiial conduct and

on wltether arid to what extent he will be held

responsible. Although many of the same incapacities that excuse or mitigate criminal responsibility may also render a defendant incompetent, the turo issues are ai'ialytically distinct and

urunv.annuali'cvie'r:is.oyg * Juveyiile Justice

473

separate legal inqriiries, and r)hey focus 011 the

defendant's mental state at tsvo different points

Dnsky v. Uuited

States: the U.S.

Sripreme Court case

tbat est;iblished

criteriii ['or

competence to staiitl

trial

I'n i'c Gaydt: the U.S.

Supreme Corirt case

that determined that

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j?iveniles aclj?idicated

iii juvei'ii1e court sverc

cntitletl to many of tl'ie

si'ii'ne procedural

lirotectioiis :is iiclults

adj?idicated ii'i crimiii;'il

COllrt

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incompetencc: a Iack

of compctence to

stand trial due to

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iiorrnal cognitive or

psycliosoci;il

immaturity, as opposed

in time (t)ie time of the crime and the time of

the co?irt procecding).

The reason that competence is required of

defenclants in crimiiial pi-oceedings is simple:

!Vhen the state asserts its poiver against >sn in-

cliiridual with the goal of talang away ltis liberty,

the accused must be capable of participating

ingf'ul

svay iii the proceeding zigainst

111 azl 111 e arl n 111

him. If a defendant is so mentally ill or disabled

that he cannot participate adequately, then the

trial lacks tundamema] fairness that is required

as a part of due process ?inder the Fourteenth

Amendn'ient to the U.S. Constitution (Scott &

Grisso 2005).

In 1960, thc Supreme Co?irt announced a

legal standard for trial competence in Dus% v.

Uiiited States that has since been adopted uiiiformly by Aaneric;.in co?irts. According to Dusk)i,

when the issue of a defendaiit's competence is

raised in a criminal trial, the court's determination should focus on "whetlier the defendam

0 ,"

has sufficient present aliilit)y to consult with

his laivyer with a reasonable degree of rational rutderstanding-and whether he has a ratioiial, as well as factual, ?inderstanding of the

proceedings against liim." Thus, there are nvo

piirts to the competence requirement: The de-

:.(S:,

fendam rmist Lie able to consult with her attor-

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disability

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iiey about plaiiniiig aiicl makiiig decisions in lxer

defense, and she must understand the charges,

the meaning, and liurpose of the proceedings

and the consequei'ices of conviction (Scott &

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Grisso 2005).

Tlie requirement that criminal defendants

be coxnpetent to stand trial had no place iii

delinquency proceedings iii the traditional juiienile co?irt. In a system in which the government's annormced purpose was to rehabilitate

arid not to punish errant youths, tl'ie proceclriral protections accorded adult defendants includixig the req?iirement of adjudicative

competence-were thought to be unnecessagi.

This all changed svi* sr 7? Gmdt, which led to

an extensive restructuring of delinq?iency proceedings to conforn'i to the requiremems of

coxistimtional due process. Tod;iy, it is generally

?.0

474

Stcinbcrg

accepted that requirements of drie process anrl

fundan'iental fairness are satisfied only if yo?itlis

facing charges in juvenile co?irt are comlietent

to stand trial.

Until the 1990s, the issue of juveniles' trial

competence involved a straigMorxvard incor-

poratioii into delinquency proceediiigs oF a

procedural protection that was rclevai'it to a relatively small mirnber of mentally impaired adult

defeiidams, where it was assumed to apply similarly to a small number of mentally incapacitated yo?iths. The regulatory reforms that begaii in the late 1980s changed the situation by

increasiiig the punishmem stakes faciiig many

yo?mg offenders and by eroding the boundai'y

betiveen the adr'ilt and jwenile systems. Tlie importaiice of this issue was riot recognized immerliately, hosvever. As legislatures across the

co?imry began to enact laws that dran'iatically

altered the landscape of juvenile crime polic)r,

the procedural issue of whether developmentally immature youngsters charged with crimes

might be less able to participate in criminal

proceedings than are adult defendants-what

is referred to in this article as developmemal

incompetence-was xiot cemral to the liolicy

debates.

Giveii that develolmiental incompetence

largely escaped the attemion of co?irts arid l)olicy makers ?mtil recendy, it is ivortli asking directly whether the constitutional prohibition

iigainst crimiiial adjudicatioii of incompetent

defendants must be applied to tlxis fonn of incapacity. The answer is surely "yes." The competence requirement is functional at its core,

speaking to questions about the impact of cogiiitive deficiencies on trial participation. Functionally it makes no difference if the defendant

cannot understand tlxe proceediiig slxe faces or

assist her attorney, whether due to mental illness or to immaturity (Scott & Grisso 2005).

In either case, the fairness of the proceeding is

undermined. In short, d'ie same concerns that

support t}ie pi-ohibition against ti'ying crimiiial

defendants swho are incompetent due to memal

impairment apply with equal force when iminature youths are subject to criminal proceediiigs.

In the context of the recesit changes iii juvenile

justice policy, it has becomc important to have

a better ?mderstaiiding of how the capacities of

children and ;idolescents to particip;ite iii criminal proceedings compare with those of adtilts.

In pursriit of this end, I first examine tl'ie specific

abilities tl'iat are required for adjudicative con'ipetence under the legal standard. I t?'ien turn to

the research directly comparing the abilities of

juveniles arid adults.

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Tl'iree broad t1rpes of abilities are implicated

under the Dus'4y standard for competence to

staxid trial: (g) a factual understanding of the

liroceediiigs, (Xi) a rational understanding of the

proceediiigs, and (C) tl'ie ability to assist couiisel (Scott & Grisso 2005). Courts applying the

standard are directed to wieigli each factor, but

otherwise they exercise suL+stantial discretion

ii'i decidirig hosv mudi comlietence is enough.

Examiiiing each compoiiem of competence uncler the Dttsky stanchird and considering hosv the

capacities of juvenile defendams are likely to

comliare widi those of adults is iiistructive.

Fac?'ual understandiiig focuses on the defendant's laiosvledge arid awareness of the charges

and his understanding of available pleas, possible penalties, the general steps in tlxe adjudicatioii process, the roles of vario?is participants

in the pretrial and trial process, and his rig'lits

as a defenrlam. Intellecmal immaturity in juveniles may undermine factial ?mderstanding,

especially given that youths gexierally have less

experience and more {imited ability to grasp

concepts such as rights. Juvenilcs also may be

more likely dtan are adults to have extensiiie

cleficits in their basic knowledge of the trial l)1-0cess, such that more tliaii lirief instruction is

needed to attaiii compecence.

Tlie rational ?inderstanding requiremem of

D'rtsley has been interpreted to mean that defendants nmst comprehend the implications, releVallcei or sig'iiificaiice of what they understand

factually reg;irding tbe ti-ial process. Deficits

in rational understanding typically involve distorted or err-oneous beliefs that nullify factual

understanding. For example, air immature defendant may know that he has a right to re-

maiii silent, yet believe that the j?idge can take

this "right" away at any time by demanding a

respoi'ise to q?iestioiis. ((Vhen asked what I'ie

thought the "right to remain silent" meam, my

12-year-old son said, "It means that you don't

have to say anythiiig until the police ask you

a questioii.") Intellectual, ei'notioiial, and psychosocial itnrnamrity may undermine the ability of some adolescents to grasp accurately the

meaniiig ancl significance of matters that they

seem to understand factually.

Fiiially, the requiremem that the defendant

in a criminal proceeding must have the capacity to assist co?msel encompasses t}iree t57pes

of iibilities. Tlie first is tbe ;ibili?'y to receive

and communicate inforn'iation adequately to allow counsel to prepare a defense. Tliis ability

may be compromised by impairmems in attei'ition, memory; arid coiiceiitratioii, deficits that

migl'it undermine the deferidant's ability to respond to instructions or to provide import;uit

iiifonnation to his attorney; such as a colterent account of the events surrounding the offense. AS I rioted above, these cap;icities contim'ie to improve through age 16, accordiiig

to snidies of cognitisre development. Second,

the ability to assist counsel requires a rational perspective regarding the attorney axid her

role, free of notions or attitudes that could

impair the collaborative relationship. For example, a young defendant may develop a belief that rill ad?ilts involved in the proceeding are allied against him, perhaps after seeing

defense attorneys imd prosecutors chatting together o?itside tl'ie courtroom. Third, defendants must have the capiicity to n'iake decisions

about lileading arid the waiver or assertion of

other constitutional rights. These decisions involvc not only adeqriate factual arid rational

understanding, but >ilso the ability to consider

alternatives and make a choice in a decision-

making process. Immature youths s'nay Iack

capacities to process information and exercise

reason adequately iii makiiig trial decisions, especially when the options are complex and their

consequences far reaching.

As juveniles' competence to stand trial

began to emerge as an important isme in

the mid-1990s, the need for a comprel?iensive

study comparing the ;ibilities of aclolescents

zrinrar.mimtriiwier:tc.wg * :]'u'rieiril4ir.itice

475

and ad?ilts in this rcalm became apparent. Before this time, a few small studies had Iooked

at particular capacities iii juveniles that svere

importam at different stages in the justice

proccss. 'k-losvesrer, no comprehensive research

li;id compared the specific capiicities of juveniles arid zidults that are directly imlilicated iii

assessments of adjudicative competence. In

resporise to tli:it iieecl, the A4acArtlmr Foundatioii Researcl'i Nettsrcirk on Adolescent DesrelQ

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opment arid .Juvenile ?ustice sponsorcd a largescale smc'ly of indiiiiduals liehveen the ages of 11

and 24-half of whom svere iii the custody of the

justice system arid }ialf of wllol]l had never been

detained-designed to examine emliirically the

relatioiisliip bettveen developmental imii'iamrit)r rind the abilities of young defendants to

participate in their trials (Grisso et al. 2003).

The study also probed age differences in psychosocial ixiffuences on decision making in the

criminal process.

Based on pzirticipants' responses to a struc?'ured interview tli:it had been used in previous studies of competence to stand trial among

memally ill :idults, arid for ivliich norms had

been established to c{efixie clinically significant "impairment," tlic researchers found that

competence-related abilities improve significaiitly be?ween the ages of 11 arid 16. On average, youths aged l I to 13 demonstrated significantly poorer understanding of trial matters,

as wiell as poorer reasoniiig and recogiiitioii of

tbe relevance of information for a legal defense,

than did 14- and 15-year-olds, who in turn performed significantly more poorly than iiidividrials aged 16 arid older. l-here were 110 differences benveen the 16- and ?7-5iear-olds and

tl'ie young adults. The study produced similar

results when adolescents and adults svere c;ste-

gorized according to their scores above arid below the cut-oJ:f scores indicating impairment.

Nearly one-third of ll- to 13-year-olds and

abo?it one-fifth of 14- and 15-year-olds, but

only 12 % of iiidividuals 16 and older, evidenced

impairment at a level comparabJe to mentally

ill adults who had been found iiicompetent to

stand trial wiitli respect to either their ability tO

reason witlt facts or understand the trial proccss.

476 Stcinbcrg

Individual perforn'iai'ice did not differ significantly by gender, etlinicity, or, in the detained

groups, as a function of tlte extem of individuais'

prior justice system experience. This last finding is important because it indicates tl'iat tlierc

are consponesits of irnma turity independem of a

lack of relevant experience that may coiitrihute

to elevated rates of iiicompetence ainoiig

j?rvcniles.

A tlifferent structured imerview sv=is used to

probe hosv ps5ichosocia'i iiifluences ;iffect decision makiiig by assessing particip;ints' choices

iii three hypothetical legal sit'uations involving ts poiice imerrogation, consultation with a

defense attorney, and the evaluation of a proffered plea agreen'iem. Significiim :sge differences were foui'id in responses to police iiiterrogation arid to the plea agreement. First,

youths, including 16- to 17-year-olds, svere

much more likely to recommend waiving constitutional rights during air interrogation than

svere ;idults, with 55% of 1l- to 13-yeiir-olds,

40o/o of 14- to 15-'1year-olds, and 30% of 16-

to ?7-year-olr3s choosing to "talk arid ;idmit"

involvemem in an alleged offense (ratlier than

"remaiiiing silent"), but 011117 l 5% of the young

adults makiiig this choice. There were also significant age differences in response to the plea

agreemem. Tliis vignette svas scyled so as not to

clearly F.isror accepting or rejecting the state's

offer, uihicli probably acco?mted for the fact

that young adults svere evenl5y divided in their

responses. In contrast, 75o/o of tl'xe Il- to 13year-olds, 65 o/o of the 14- to 15-year-olds, and

60o/o of the 16- to 17-year-olds recommended

accepting the plea offer. Together, tbese results

suggest a much stronger tendency for adolescents than for young ;'idults to make choices

iii compliance with the perceived desires of

a?ithority figures (Grisso et al. 2003).

Analysis of participants' responses to the

vignettes also indicated differences between

the youngest age group ancl older subjects in

risk perception arid future orientation. Participants svere asked to explain their choices,

including their perceptions abo?it positivc

and negative consequences of various options;

qriestions probed the subjects' assessmem of tl'ie

serio?imess of risks (the perceived negative COIIseq?iences) and the likelihood of risks materializing. Analyses indicated age differences ror ;ill

of these dimensions of "risk perception," ssrith

the 11- to 13 -year-olds less able to see risks tliaii

16- to 1 7-year-olds and young iidults. Sin'iilarlv,

tri comparison wit)i older adolescents, fewer

l1- to 13-iyear-olds mentioned the long-range

consequences of their decisions, wliicli suggests

that future orientation differences exist that are

consistent with those described above.

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petence is substantially elevated in early and

tnid-adolescence; it also means that policy makers and practitioners must address developmeiital incompetence as it affects the treatment of

juveniles iii court (Scott & Grisso 2005).

It is important to emlihasize that the pattern of age differences iii studies of legal decision making more closely resembles dtat seen

in studies of cognitive development (where few

age differences are ap?iarem ;ifter 16) tl'ian ixi

studies of psychosocial dcvelopment (svl'iere agc

Tlte study's findings are consistem witl'i

differences are observed in late adolescence and

those of earlier studies that examined vario?is

sometimes in youi'ig adultl'iood). This suggests

that determiiiations of where to drasv a legal

boundary between adolescence arid adulthood

must be domain specific. In matters in which

cognitiiie abilities predominate, arid where l)sYchosocial factors are of miniii'ial importance

(that is, iii si?'u;itioiis ssrhere tlte iiifluence of ;sdolescems' imp?ilsivigi', susceptibility to peer pressiu-e, reward sensitivity, ai'id relatively weaker

tumre orientation is mitigated), adolescems

older than 15 sho?ilcl probably be treated like

adults. In situations iii which ps5rchosociril factors are substantially more important, drauiiiig

the boundary at air older age is more appropriate. This is why my colleagues and I have

argued that it is perfectly reasonable to have

a lower boundary for adolescents' a?itonomous

access to abortion (a situation in which mandatory waiting periods limit the impact of

impulsivity arid shortsiglitedness arid where

coiisultatioii with ;idults likely co?inters immaturity of judgn'iem) than for judgn'ients of crimiiial respoiisibilitly (because adolescems' crimes

are often impulsive and iiifluenced by peers)

(Steiiilierg et al. 2009).

dimcnsions of youtlis' functioniiig iii the justicc system. For example, an important study

of youtlis' arid ;'idults' capacities to understand

Miranda rights in the early 1980s found that,

compared with adults iii the criminal justice

system, ?4-ye.sr-o{ds iii juvenile detention were

less able to ui'iderstaiid the n'ieaiiiiig and importance ofMirtmdtt warnings (Grisso 1981 ). Ot}ier

studies using smaller sai'iiples also have found

age differences across the adolescent years with

regard to knos*rledge of legal terms and the legal process in delinquency and crimittal proccediiigs (e.g., Cooper 1997). Finally, a series of

snidies found significant age differences across

the adolescent years in "strategic thinking"

about pleas; older adolescents svere more Iikely

than younger subjects to make choices that reflected calculations of probabilities and costs

based on information provided (e.g., PetersonBadali & Al'iramovitch 1993).

In light of what is known abo?it psychologiciil mati'iration in early arid mid-adolescence,

thesc findiiigs are not surprisiiig. Indeed, givet'i

tbe abilities required of defendants iii criminal proceedings, it wo?ild be p?izzliiig if yoritlis

and adults performed similarly on competencerelated measures. Tl'iis research lirosiides posverful and tangible evidence that some youtl'is

Eacing crin'iinal charges may function less capably as criminal defendams than do their ad?ilt

counterparts. Tliis does riot mean, of course,

that all youths should be automatically deemed

incompetent to stand trial any more than wo?ild

>s psycliiatric diagnosis or low IQ score. It

does mean, however, that the risk of iiicom-

Impact of Punitive Sanc6ons 011

Adolescent Development and Behavior

As noted above, the iiicreasingly punitive orientation of the justice system toward juvenile

offenders has resulted in an increase iii the num-

lyer of iusreniles tried and sanctioned as adults

and in the use of harsher sanctions iii respond-

iiig to the delinquem behavior of juveniles

who have been retaiiied in the juvenile justice

'vnm.aiiiumli'czriews:org i+ Juveiiilc?iu.*'tice

477

Lifc-co?irse-

persistent offenders:

aiitisociiil iiidividuals

ssahosc oEEcnding

Liegiiis tieEore

atlcilescencc arid

pcrsists iiito adiiltliooJ

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crimii'iology, the

relation between age

arid crime, showing

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sible for their actions and deter fiiture crime

ecution and prinishment and on the ?ise of

)iunitive saiictioiis more generally suggests,

hosvever, that diese policies and practices may

actually iiicrease recidivism arid jeopardize thc

development and mental health oF juveni)es

(Fagan 2008). Consequently, there is a growing

consensus among social scientists that policies

arid pri'ictices, such as settiiig the mininmm age

of criiniiial corirt jurisdiction below 18 (as about

one-third of all states currently do), transferring

juveniles to the adult system for a wide range of

crimes, includiiig nonviolent crimes, relyiiig ori

incarceration as a primai'y means of crime con-

(L+oth their ossrn ;rnd that of others) without ad-

trol, and exposing juvenile offenders to pui'iitive

programs such as boot camps, likely do more

liarn'i than good, cost taxp;iyers much more

tliaii they need spend on crime prevention,

arid ultiii'iately hose a threat to public safety

(Greenwood 2006).

In order to rmderstand wh5r this is the casc,

it is irnportaiit to l'iegiii with a distinction

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between adolescence-limited and life-co?irse-

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persistent offenders (Moffitt 1993). Dozens

of longiiudin;il studies have shov*rn that the

vast majority of adolescems who con'imit an-

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system. Researcli on tbe impact of adult pros-

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tisocial acts desist from such actiirity as tltey

mature into adulthood and that only a small

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percentage-bei.iveen rxsre arid ten percent, according to most studies-become chronic offenders. Thus, nearly rill juvenile offenders are

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adolescent limited. This observwioxi is borne

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478

versely affecting their mental health, 1isycliological development, and s?iccessfiil transition

imo adult roles. If the sanctions to which juvenile offenders are exposed create psychological

disturbance, s?-urn: the development of cogni tive

growth and psycl'iosocial maturity, arid intcrfere

with die compTetioii of schooling and entrance

into the labor force, these policies :ire likeliy to

exaccrbate ratl'ier dian ameliorate many of the

vei'y factors that lead juveniles to commit crimes

iii the first place (memal illness, difficulties iii

school or svork, and, as reviewed abosre, PSYCIIOlogical immaturity).

It is clear that sanctioniiig adolescents as

aclults is co?imerproductiiie. One g'roup of researchers examining this q?iestion compared a

group of 2700 Florid:i 5routlis transferred to

criminal corirt, mostly based on prosecutors'

discretioiiary authority ?inder Florida's clirectfile statute, with a matcl'ied group of youths

retained iii the juvenile system (Bisliop &

Frazier 2000). In another study, the researchers

compared 15- and 16-year-olds charged with

robbet7 ;u'id burglary ixi several counties iii

metropolitan Nessr York and iii demograpliically similar co?mties in Nesv Jersey; Tlie legal settings differed iii that Nesv York juveniles

age 15 and older who are charged with robber)y arid burglary are a?itomatically dealt witl'i

in the adult system under that state's legislative

waiver statute, whereas ixi New J ersey; transfer

is rarely ?ised, and the juvenile court retains jurisdictioii over ;ilmost all youtI'is charged with

out in inspection of what criminologists refer

to as the age-crime curve, which shows that the

iiicidence of criminal activity increases between

preadolescence and late adolescence, peaks at

about age 17 (sliglitly you?nger for xionviolent

crimes arid slightly older for violem oiies), and

declines thereafter. These findings, at both the

individual arid aggregate level, have emerged

from many studies tl'iat have been conducted

iii c'lifferent historical epochs ;ind ;iround the

Tlie New York-New.Jersey study found that

youths convicted of robbery in criminal court

were rearrested ai'id iiicarcerated at a higher

rate than those who ssrere dealt with iii the juveiiile system, but that rates were comparable

for burglary, a less serio?is crime. The study

world (Piquero et al. 2003),

also examined the min'iber of days ?mtil rear-

Ill view of the fact that most juvenile offenders mature out of crime (and that most will desist wlietlier or not they are caught, arrested,

prosecuted, or sanctioned), one must tl'ierefore

ask hosv to bcst hold deliiiqrient yo?itli respoii-

rest and found a similar pattern; the youths sentenced for robber5r in crimiiial court reoiTenderJ

sooner than did their juvenile court-t counterparts. Recidivism ssras riot affected by sentence Iengtli; longer sentences tvere riot more

Stcinlreig

these crimes (Fagan 1996).

cfEcc6src at reducing recidivisn'i than wcre

shorter semei'ices. Results of the Florida study

iilso support the conclusion that juvenile saiictioiis may reduce reciclivism more effectively

than crimiiial p?inishment. Tltis study measured only rearrest rates ;md found losver rates

for youths who were retainerl in juvenile court

Iows policy ii'iakers to assess accurately the impact on recidivism rates of particular programs

to determine whether the economic costs are

justified. In a real sense, these developments

have revived rehabilitation as a realistic goal of

juvenile justice interventions.

discussion of the enormous literatiire evaluat-

In general, successful programs are tbose

that attend to the lessons of development;il

psyclxology, seeking to provide yoring offenders with supportive social contexts and to assist them in acq?iiriiig the slalls necessary to

change problem behavior and to attain psycliosocial maturity. In )iis comprehensive metaanalysis of 400 juvenile pro grams, Lipseir (199 s )

found that an'ioiig the most effective programs

in both cotmnunity arid iiistitutioiial settiiigs

svere tlicise that focused on iii'iproiiiiig social developrnent skills in the areas of interpersonal

relations, self-control, ac-adeii'iic performance,

;ind job skills. Some effective programs Eocus

directly on developing skills to avoid antisocial

behavior, often through cogni6ve belxavioral

therapy. Other intervemions that have been

shown to have a positive effect on crime reduction focus on strengthening family support,

includiiig Multisystemic Therapy, Functional

Family Therapy, and Multidimensional Treat-

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iiig t)ie effects of various sarictions ;md imerventions is beyond t?'ie scope of this review, rind

rnent Foster Care, all of wliicli are botlt effective arid cost efEective (Greenwood 2006). It is

this literaturc has t'ieen sun'imarized many times

-,,

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(Greemsrood 2006, Lipsev 1999). I-Iere I liigli-

also clear from these resriews tli;it prmitive sanctions administered witliiii the juvenile system

have iatrogenic effects similar to those seen in

studies of juveniles tried as adults. Punislimentoriemed approaches, such as "Scared Straight"

or military-sgile boot camps, do riot deter future crime and may evcn inadvertently promote reoffending. Nor do these programs appear to deter other adolescents fi-om offendiiig

than for yo?itlis wilio were transferred. The

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follow-up period iii this study was relatively

brief-less th;'in hvo years. During this period,

transferred youth werc si'iore likely to be rearrested, committed ii'iore offenses per year, and

reoffended sooner than did juveniles iii the juvenile system. As in the Nesv York-Nesv Jersey

study, longer sentences c'!id not ltave a deterrent

eft-ect.

Witliiii die iuvenile systen'i, of course, tbere

is wide variation in the types ai'id severity of

sanctions to wliidt offenders are exposed. Some

youths are incarcerated in prison-like ti-ainiiig

schools, whereas others receive loosely supervised cotnnmnity probation-neither of svliids

is effecrive at changing antisocial behavior. An

important question therefore is, wl'iat cass the

juvenile system offer young offenders that will

lie effective at reducing recidivism? A detailed

liglit a Eessr m;iiii priiiits.

Until the 1990s, ii'iost researchers who study

juvenile deliiiquency programs rniglit ivell liaiie

asissvered tl'iat tl'ie system had litde to offer

in thc way of effective therapeutic interventioiis; the domiiiam sriesv held by social scientists in the 1970s arid 1980s was that "nothiiig

svorks" to reduce recidivism with yo?ing offeiiders. Today the picture is considerably brigl'iter,

in large part due to a substantial body of researcli produced over the past 1 s years sliowiiig

that many juvenile programs, in both con'inuts'iit1r and iiistitutional settings, have a substamial

crime-reduction effec?; for the most promisiiig

programs, that effect is in the range of 20%

to 30%. An increased focus on researcl'i-based

programs and 011 c:ireFul ou tcome evaluation al-

(Greenwood 2006).

The dearth of evidence supportiiig the effectiveness of tough sanctions in deterring yo?itlifiil criminal activity t+ecomes less puzzliiig when

we corisider the respoxise of young offenders to harsl'i punisl'iment in light of developmemal knowledge alioiit adolescence discussed earlier. Teeiiagers 011 the street deciding

whether to l'iold up a convenience store maly

simplv be Iess capable than ad?ilts, due to their

zrnrrw.rnumnli'c:iinris.oig i+ JuvtnileJir.stitc

479

psycliosocial iri'imat?irity, of considering tl'ic

sanctions the1y tsiill fiice. Tl'+?is, the desrclopmental influences on decision making that mitigate culpability ;ilso may make adolescents less

responsive to the threat of criminal sanctions

(Scott & Steinberg 2008).

Ill addition, adolescence is a fonrvrsiive period of development. In mid ancl late aclolescence, individuals normally make substantial

pD0

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progress in acqriiring assd coordiiiatiiig skills

that are essential to filling tl'ie convemional

roles of adulthood. First, they begin to develop

basic educational and vocational skills to eii-

able them to function iii the workplace as productive members of socicqr. Second, tliev .1150

acq?iire the social skills necessary to establish

st:ible intimate rekitionsliips and to cooper;'itc

in gro?ips. Fiiiallv, they imist begiii to learn

to behave respoiisilily witlio?it external supervisioii and to set meaniiigful personal goals for

tlxemselves. For most individuals, the process

of completing these developmental tasks extends into early adultbood, but making substantial progress durmg the formative stage of

adolescence is important. Tliis process of development toward ?isychosocial maturity is one

of reciprocal interactioxi lietixreen the individ-

C7%

rial rind her sociitl coi'itext. Sever:il emrironn'iei'i-

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tal conclitions are particularly important, such

as the presence of an a?ithoritative parent or

g'u;'irdian, association witl'i prosoci;il peers, and

particip;ition iii educational, extracurricular, or

employi'nent activities that facilitate the development of autonorno?is decision making and

critical thinking. For the youth in the j?istice

system, the correctional setting becomes the

enviromnem for social development and ma1r

af€ect whether he acquires the skills necessary

to function successful)y in conventional adu)t

roles (Steinberg et al. 2004).

Norm;'itive teenagers ssrlio get involved in

crime do so, in p;irt, becmse their choices :ire

driven by developmental infuences typical of

adolescence. In theory, they sbould desist from

criminal behavior and mature into reasonably

responsible adults as they attaiii psvchosocial

maturity-and most do, especially as they enter into adult svork arid family responsibilities.

4A'o Stcinbcrg

Whetlier yo?it?hs stsccess(?isllsr make tl'ie traiisitioii to adulthood, l'iowever, depencls in 1?iart

on wlietlier their social context provides ol)portunit1r structures for the coii'ipletion of the

developmental tasks described above. The correctional envi.i'onment ma5r inlluer'ice the trajectories ofnormative ;idolescems iii the justice

systesn iii important wa5rs. Factors such ;is the

availability (or lack) of good educationaI, ski?l

buildiiig, and reliabilitative programs; tlxe attimdes and roles of adult supervisors; axid the

identity and bel'iavior of other offenders shape

the social comext of youths iii both the adult

arid thc juvenile systems. Tlxese fiictors may affect tl'ie inclination of young offenders to desist or persist in their criminal :ictivities ancl

ii'iay facilitate or impede their developn?iem into

adults svho can function adeq?iately iii societyin the svorkplace, in marriiig'e or other ii'itimate

ui'iions, and ;is citizei'is.

SUMt'ViARY AND CONCLUDING

COMMENTS

Tlie overarching question I pose iii this ;irticle

is wlietber research on adolesccnt development

indicates that adolescents and ackilts differ iii

ways that warram their differential trei'it.mem

when tlxey violate the law. More specifically,

I ask how this research inforn'is debate about

three fundamental questions that continue to

chiillenge the justice system: (g) Sliould adolescents be lteld to adult standards of crimi-

nal culpability and, ;iccordingly; exposed to the

same punisl'irnent as adults; (b) Do adolescents

possess tl'ie necessary capabilities to function as

competem defendants in an adversarial court

proceeding; and (C) How are juvenile offenders

:iffected by the sorts of punitive sanctions that

became increasinglly popular during the l:iast

several decades?

It is IIOW incomrovertilile that psycl'iological devclopment contirmes througho?it adolescence iutd iiito young adulthood in svays tltat isre

relevant to rill three ques6oiis. Although basic

cognitive coii'ipetence matures by the time individuals reaclx age 16, many of the social axicl

emotional capacities that influence ;adolescents'

relevant research indicates that some adoles-

Iike cap;ibilities but that others (generally those

15 arid younger) may not. Research on the impact of punitive sanctions on adolescent development ancl behavior, although t'iot explicitly

developmental iii nature, indicates that trying

adolescents as adults or exposing them to especially harsh sanctions does little to deter offendiiig and may indeed have i;itrogenic effects.

Although justice system policy and liractice

camiot, arid shorild not, be dictated solely by

studies of ;idolescent development, the ways in

which sve respond to juvenile offending slio?ild

at the vex-y least be informed by the lessons

of developmental sciencc. Taken together, the

lessons of developmenta} science of'Fer stroxig

support for tl'ie maimenaiice of a sep:irate juvenile justice system in which adolescems are

judged, tried, arid sanctioned iii developn'ientiilly appropriate ways. Using developmental

science to inform juvenile justice policy is riot

a p;macea that will solsre the problen'i of youth

crime. Adolescents will always get in trouble,

sometin'ies very serio?is trorible, and son'ie will

contiiiue to offend, despite tl'ie state's best efforts to respond to tl'ieir crimes in wasrs tl'iat will

i'leter fiumre offending. At the same time, the frsmre prospects of sosne youths will be harmed

by :s system that holds them to adult levels of

accorintability Eor their crimes under our traiisfer rules. No one policy regime will yield good

outcomes for all young off'enders, but lookiiig

to developmental research to guide our decision

making provides a solid framesvork for policies

ai'id practices that will enhance public safety iii

the long i-un by promoting healthy adolescent

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cents (generally, those 16 and older) have adult-

development.

judgn'ient ancl decision making, especially outside the psychologist's laboratotay, contimie to

inamre into late adolescence and beyond. Comp;ircd to individuals in their n'iid to late ttventies,

adolescems even as O?CI as 18 are more impulsive, less oriet'ited to the future, and n'iore sus-

celitible to the influence of their peers. In additioii, because adolescence is ;ilso period d?iring

which indivitluals are still acquiriiig the psycho-

:)-,

logical c;ipacities they will need to successfully

trai'isition imo adrilt 11%(ll'k and family roles, it is

import;int that the sanctions to wliicl'i i?ivenile

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:,,

oEFenders are exposed not adversely affect their

developii'iem. Recent research on the neural

underpinnings of these developmems does riot

cliaiige the pomiiit of adolescent immaturity

painted b)r behavioral research, but it does add

detail and s?ipport to the argument that makes

the stoi-y more compelling. It is one tl'iing to say

tbat adolescents don't control their impxilses,

stand ?ip to pecr pressure, or think through the

consequences of their actions as well as adults;

it is quite another to say that doii't because they

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Because American criminal law clearly Iirovides that diminished judgmcm ii'iitig>ites crimiiial responsibility, it is reasonable to argue

that adolescents are inheremly less blameworthy than their elders in ssrays sho?ilcl affecc deci-

sions aLio?it crimiiial p?inishment; as a class, adolescents are inlierently Iess blameworthy than

;idults. The picture that emerges from an aiialysis of the capacities necessary for competence

to stand trial is riot the same, however. Here the

:'1

S'UNUl4ARY POINTS

I. During the past tivo decades, policies rind practices concerning the treatment of juvenile

offenders iii the United States became incrcasingly pui'iitive, as evidcnced by the increase

in the iminber of juveniles tried as adults i'ind the expanded use of harsh sanctions within

both the juvenile and crimiiial justice systems. Tliis was a break from the traditional

model of juvenile justice, which emphasized rehabilitation rather than p?inishment as its

core purpose, that had prevailed for most of the hventietli cermiry.

;io'aaw.tniinudi'evuqr':<.oig a JirvemleJrtstice

48z

2. In order to make well-inforn'ied decisions about the treamxent of juveniles who have

entered tfie juvenile justice pipeliiie, therefore, policyinakers, practitioners, and memal

liealtli professionals need to be familiar with the development;'il changes that occur during

childhood and adolescence in the capabilities and characteristics that are relevant to

their competence to stand trial, their criminal culpabiliiy, and their likely response to

treattnent.

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3. Braiii maturatioii continues well into 5roung adulthood, arid a{tho?igli individ?iafs, oIl

average, perform at adult levels on tests of basic cogiiitive ability by the time they are

16, most do riot zittaiii adult-like levels of social >snd emotional maturity rintil very late iii

adolescence or early in adulthood. Coii'ipared to :idults, adolescents are more susccptible

to peer iiifluence, less oriented to tl'ie futiire, more sensitive to short-term rewards, arid

n'iore impulsive.

4. This research on adolescent braiii, cognitive, and psychosocial developmentsupliorts the

sricw that adolescents are fundamentally different from adults in ways that warram t?heir

differemial treamiem in tlxe justice system. An analysis of factors that mitigate crin'iinal

respoiisibiligr 'i'inder the law ii'idicates that adolescents are iriheremly less c?'ilpa ble than are

adults and should therefore be punished iess severely. In addition, studies of competence

to stand trial ii'idicate that those who are under 16 are more likely to be iiicompetent than

are adults, raising questions alio?it the appropriateness of tryiiig yo?mger adolescems iii

criminal co?irt.

s. Studies of the impact of punitive sanctions on aclolescent development and behavior,

inctuding prosecuting and sanctioning adolescems as adults, indicate that they do not

deter adolescents from breaking the law ;snd may in fi'ict iiicrease recidivism. Ill comrast,

family-based interventions ?iave been shown to be bodi effective ;ind cost effective.

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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Tlie author is riot aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this

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ACKNOW'LEDGMENTS

Work on this review was supported by the J olin D. and Catlieriiie T. MacArtlmr Founclatioii. I am

gratefial to Elizabetlt Ca?iffmaii, Tlioii'ias Grisso, Elizabetli Scott, arid Robert Scl'iwartz for their

pcrmissioii to draw 011 our collaborative svork in the preparation of this review.

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501)

Discusses svhy

iidolcscents, by virtuc of

dciaelcilimental

intmit(ltrity, arc

inhercntly less culpablc

than iidtilts. Cited

imiltiple times by U.S.

Stipreine Court iii its

decision to abolish

juvenile dei'itli peiialt)a.

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485

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.