Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sam Louis Levine, Petitioner v. State Bar of Georgia

Supreme Court briefJun 4, 2018

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF SAM LOUIS LEVINE,

Petitioner,

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Georgia

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SAM LEvINE, PRO SE

1014 Havenridge Lane, NE

Atlanta, GA 30319

Phone: (404) 841-7090

sam@samlevine.com

June 4, 2018

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. This Court has often recognized and emphasized

that a law license is considered property and that an attorney

cannot be stripped of it in a manner that deprives or denies

him/her of due process. But a significant split has developed

among the Circuits as to whether or not and to what extent

the constitution, including the 5th & 14th Amendments are

applicable to bar disciplinary proceedings. In this case, the

Georgia Supreme Court issued an order disbarring Petitioner,

but did so not only in spite of a conflict of interest, but also in

a. manner that denied Petitioner of due process and an

opportunity to be heard, including Bar Counsel depriving

Petitioner copies of the bar case files, failing to engage in

interactive communications upon receipt of Petitioner's

request for accommodations related to his request for

alternative handling of the bar cases and stay of discovery during his divorce case and while Petitioner was in the

midst of numerous financial crises, the grant of a motion for

sanctions by the Special Master even though he had never

issued and order and Bar Counsel had

never made any informal or formal efforts whatsoever to

resolve the discovery matter, including sending a statutory

letter or filing a motion to compel and finally the total &

complete failure of the Special Master to rule on Petitioner's notice of appeal and motions to set aside & dismiss.

Thus, the specific question presented is:

What constitutes a denial of due process in bar disciplinary

proceeding?

11.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

All parties are listed in the caption.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

None of the petitioners is a nongovernmental

corporation. None of the petitioner's has a parent

corporation or shares held by a publicly traded company.

111.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ..........................ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................iii

APPENDIX.............................................................v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................................ix

OPINIONS BELOW ..................................................1

JURISDICTION ......................................................1

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED ......................2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...................11

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW OF

THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION BECAUSE IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT PROHIBITING DISBARMENT OF AN ATTORNEY IN A

MANNER THAT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS...........11

This Court Should Grant Certiorari To

Resolve the Conflict Between the Georgia

Supreme Court's decision and the Many

Decisions Of This Court Emphasizing

The Importance of Procedural Safeguards

For Attorneys in Bar Disciplinary Cases.... 11

iv.

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED

This Court Should Grant Certiorari To

Provide Clarification to Lower Courts

Regarding Treatment of Disbarment

Orders After a Lawsuit in Federal

Court Has Been Filed .................................19

Opportunity to Reclarify the Exceptions

to Rooker Feldman & Younger Doctrines

For Purposes of Extension Since An Order

Was Very Recently Issued By The Federal

District Court Inadvertently Failed To

Apply The Exceptions In An On Point

Case Before Its Court...............................20

Implications to Petitioner and The General

Public at Large of a State Supreme Court

Issuing a Disbarment Following The Filing

of A Lawsuit Where the Justices Were

Named as Party Defendants With a Conflict

of Interest..............................................22

CONCLUSION .........................................................23

APPENDIX

Opinion & Order Granting the State Bar's Motion

to Dismiss, United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia, May 25, 2018........App. 1

Order of Disbarment, Georgia Supreme Court,

March 5, 2018...............................................App. 2

Notice of Filing of Lawsuit v. Justices of Georgia

Supreme Court, Georgia Supreme Court,

February 11, 2018.............................................App. 3

Order denying Renewed Motions to Disqualify

Justices, to Proceed Informa Pauperis, for

Appointment of Counsel and for Payment of

Exculpatory Evidence from Divorce Case,

Georgia Supreme Court, January 30, 2018...........App. 4

Renewed Motion to Disqualify Georgia Supreme

Court Justices, Georgia Supreme Court,

January 19, 2018............................................App. 5

Motion to Proceed In forma Pauperis for Cause

and for Appointment of Counsel, Georgia

Supreme Court, January 19, 2018 ...................... App. 6

Notice of Filing of Letter Containing Flash

Drive with Video of Oral. Argument

Hearing, Georgia Supreme Court,

January 18, 2018............................................App. 7

Motion for Payment of Exculpatory Evidence

From Divorce Case, Georgia Supreme Court,

January11, 2018.............................................App. 8

Eighth Supplemental Motion to Dismiss,

Georgia Supreme Court, January 8,

2018 ....................... . ....................................... App. 9

Seventh Supplemental Motion to Dismiss,

Georgia Supreme Court, January 7,

2018............................................................App. 10

vii

APPENDIX Continued

Sixth Supplemental Motion to Dismiss,

Georgia Supreme Court, January 4,

2018 ................... .............................. ........... App. 11

Notice of Filing of Acts of Bad Faith by

Bar Counsel, Georgia Supreme Court,

January 2, 2018............................................App. 12

Fifth Supplemental Motion to Dismiss,

Georgia Supreme--Court, December 27

2017............................................................App. 13

Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss,

Georgia Supreme Court, December 27,

2017 ................ . ........................................... App. 14

First Supplemental Motion(s) to Dismiss,

Bar Complaint (Mattson 6866)

Georgia Supreme Court, December 25, 2017.....App. 15

First Supplemental Motion to Dismiss,

Bar Complaint (Divorce/Service Dog 6891)

Georgia Supreme Court, December 25, 2017.....App.16

Motion to Dismiss Bar Complaint

(Mattson 6866), Georgia Supreme

Court, December 25, 2017.................................App. 17

Motion to Dismiss Bar Complaint

(Divorce/Service Dog 6891), Georgia

Supreme Court, December 25, 2017......................App. 18

Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Georgia

Supreme Court Justices, Georgia Supreme

Court, December 8, 2017 ................................ App. 19

Motion to Recuse/Disqualify Georgia Supreme

Court Justices, Georgia Supreme Court,

November 17, 2017........................................App. 20

viii.

APPENDIX Continued

Exceptions to Review Panel's Report &

Recommendations, Georgia Supreme Court

November 20, 2017 ........................................App. 21

Motion to Set Aside Sanctions Order, Georgia

Supreme Court, June 6, 2017.........................App. 22

Notice of Appeal of Sanctions Order, Georgia

Supreme Court, May 15, 2017 .. . ..... ................. App. 23

Special Master's Order Granting Bar's Motion

Motion for Sanctions, April 13, 2017.................App. 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Cohen v. Hurley,

366 U.S. hF (1961)

In re Ruffalo,

390 U.S. (Ohio) 544 (1968)

In re Schlesinger,

404 Pa. 584, 1F2 A.2d 835 (1961) ............................not cited

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,

353 U.S. 232 (1957) .................................................

Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,

353 U.S. 252 (1957) ...................................................not cited

Hannah v. Larche,

363, U.S. 420 (1960)

Malloy v. Hogan,

378 U.S. 1(1964)

Spevak v. Klein,

385 U.S. 511 (1967)

Greene v. McElroy,

360 U.S. at 507-8 (1959) ............................................not cited

Kennedy v. Martinez,

372 U.S. 144 (1963)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

Trop v. Dulles,

356 U.S. 86 (1958)

Gideon v. Wainwright,

372 U.S. 335 (1963) ......................................................

Boyd v. United States,

116 U.S. 616 (1886) ......................................................

Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn,

45F U.S. (N.J.) 423 (1982) ...............................................

Miller v. Washington State Bar Association,

679 F2d 1313 (1982) .........................................................

Hensler v. Grievance Four Grievance Committee,

790 F.2d 390 (1986) ..........................................................not cited

Savina Home Indus v. Secretary of Labor,

594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir.) (1979) .....................................not cited

Mississippi State Bar v. Young,

509 So.2d 210, 212 (Miss. 1987)

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell,

463 Pa. 472, 345 A.2d 616, 620 (1975) ....................................not cited

Sacandy v. Walther,

262 Ga. 11, 12 (1992)

Garrison v. Louisiana,

3F9U.S. (1964) ..................................................................not cited

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

Matthews v. Eldridge,

424U.S.at 335 ...............................................................

Weems v. Board of Indus Ins.,

Wash. Ct of App. (2014) .................................................

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,

556 U.S. 868 (2009)..........................................................

Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806 (1975) .......................................................... not cited

Klopfer v. North Carolina,

386 U.S. 213 (1967)..........................................................not cited

Johnson v. Zerbst,

304 U.S. 458, 304 U.S. 474 <1938) ......................................not cited

Mitchum v. Foster,

407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972) ...............not cited

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson,

154 U.S. 447, 456 (1894) ....................................................not cited

Anonymous Attorneys v. Bar Association of Erie County,

41 N.Y. 506, 362 N.E.2d 592 (1977) ......................... .............. not cited

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

Murphy v. Waterfront Comm 'n,

378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964)................................................not cited

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966)..................................................not cited

ICC v. Brimson,

154 U.S. 447, 478-480 (1894)............................................not cited

McCarthy v. Arndstein,

266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) .....................................................not cited

Kastigar v. United States,

406 U.S. 441 (1972) .........................................................not cited

Ullman v. United States,

350 U.S. 422 (1956) .........................................................not cited

xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

Griffin v. Illinois,

351 U.S. 12 (1956) ............................................................not cited

Barker v. Wingo,

407 U.S. 514 (1972) ..........................................................not cited

State of New Jersey v. Michael Cahill,

New Jersey Sup. Ct., Docket No. 068727 (2011) ...................not cited

Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971)

Young v. Pierce,

DC Tex 544 F.Supp 1010....................................................not cited

Steward v. Baldwin County Board of Education,

908 F.2d 1499, 1507-8 (11th Cir.) 1990...................................not cited

In Re Best,

229 P.3d 1201 Mont. 59 (2010).............................................not cited

Smith v. State,

247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981) ........................................ not cited

Nathaniel Griggs v. State,

Ga. Ct. App. A14A1991 (2016)

xiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

U.S. Constitution

U.S. Const. art. III............................................................

U.S. Const. art IV, § 4, ci. 1................................................

Billof Rights....................................................................

5th Amendment.................................................................

7th Amendment ................................................................

8thAmendment ................................................................

9th Amendment.................................................................

13thAmendment................................................................

14th Amendment .................................................................

18t Amendment .................................................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

Georgia Constitution

Ga Const. art. 1 Bill of Rights..........................................

Federal Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1251.. ................................................................ not cited

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).............................................................

(

42 U.S. Code § 12101..........................................................

42 U.S.C. § 1981................................................................

42 U.S.C. § 1983................................................................

Georgia Statutes

O.C.G.A. 15-19-30..............................................................not cited

O.C.G.A. § 50-21-2 .............................................................. not cited

O.C.G.A. 9-11-1 ..................................................................not cited

xvi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

O.C.G.A. 9-12-16 .............................................................

O.C.G.A. 9-12-40..............................................................

O.C.G.A. 23-2-51 ..............................................................

O.C.G.A. 23-2-53 ..............................................................

O.C.G.A. 23-2-54 ..............................................................

O.C.G.A. 9-11-26 .............................................................

O.C.G.A. 9-11-37 .............................................................

O.C.G.A. 9-15-14 .............................................................

O.C.G.A. 51-7-80 .............................................................

O.C.GA. 51-6-1 ...............................................................

O.C.G.A. 51-5-8 ................................................................

O.C.G.A. 51-5-9................................................................

xvii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

O.C.G.A. 48-1-6 ...............................................................

O.C.G.A. 9-11-6...............................................................

O.C.G.A. 9-11-11.1............................................................

O.C.G.A. 9-10-110.............................................................

O.C.G.A. 24-4-401 ........................................... ........... . ......

O.C.G.A. 24-4-6.................................................................

O.C.G.A. 24-4-1...................................................................

O.C.G.A. 24-4-2.................................................................

O.C.G.A. 17-8-24 ................................................................

O.C.G.A. 24-4-21.................................................................

O.C.G.A. 24-4-27..................................................................

O.C.G.A. 17-9-4 ............ ........................

................................

xviii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

Georgia Bar Rules

BarRule 1.2......................................................................

BarRule 1.3 .....................................................................

BarRule 1.4 ....................................................................

BarRule 1.7 ....................................................................

BarRule 1.10...................................................................

BarRule 1.15 ...................................................................

BarRule 3.1 ....................................................................

BarRule 3.2 ....................................................................

Bar.Rule 3.3 ....................................................................

BarRule 3.4 ......................................................................

BarRule 3.5 .......................................................................

BarRule 3.8 .........................................................................

xix

Page

BarRule 4.1 ..........................................................................

BarRule 4.4 ..........................................................................

BarRule 5.1 .........................................................................

BarRule 5.2 ........................................................................

BarRule 5.4 .........................................................................

BarRule 8.3 .........................................................................

BarRule 8.4 .........................................................................

xx.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

BarRule 9.3 ...................................................................

BarRule 9.5 ....................................................................

BarRule 4-104 ..................................................................

BarRule 4-108 ..................................................................

ABA Model Disciplinary Procedure Rules

Rule3 ..............................................................................

Rule10 .............................................................................

Rule11 .............................................................................

Rule18 ..............................................................................

Georgia Bar Disciplinary Procedure Rules

Rule4-201 ...........................................................................

Rule4-202 ...........................................................................

Rule4-203 ............................................................................

xxi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page

Rule4-204 ......................................................................

Rule4-204.4 ....................................................................

Rule4-209.1 .....................................................................

Rule4-209.2 .....................................................................

Rule.4-209.3 ....................................................................

Rule4-210 ........................................................................

Rule4-211.1 .....................................................................

Rule4-212 ........................................................................

Rule4-213 .........................................................................

Rule4-217 .........................................................................

Rule4-218 ...........................................................................

Rule4-221..........................................................................

Sam Louis Levine respectfully petitions for writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the Georgia

Supreme Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion and order of the Georgia Supreme Court can

be found at App. 2 and the opinion and order of the United

,States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

granting the Bar's Motion to Dismiss can be found at App. 1.

JURISDICTION

Petitioner seeks review of the decision of the

Georgia Supreme Court entered on March 5,

2018. This Court's jurisdiction rests on 28

U.S.C. § 1257(a).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Const., Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment

provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived

of life, liberty or property without due process of law

U.S. Const., Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment

provides, in pertinent part: "The enumeration in the

Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed

to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1. Section

1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part,

"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any state deprive any person

of life liberty or property, life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

U.S. Const., First Amendment. The First Amendment

provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no

law. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;

or the right of the people

to petition the Government

for a redress of grievances."

U.S. Const., Seventh Amendment. Guarantee of the

right to a jury trial.

O.C.G.A. 9-11-1, known as the Georgia Civil Practice

Act, governs all civil cases in Georgia to which the Bar

Are subject to.

O.C.G.A. 9-11-37, Official Code of Georgia which specifies

the process that must occur before a motion for sanctions

can be filed and also the requirements that must be met

before a motion for sanctions can be granted.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED Continued

O.C.G.A. 9-11-38 gives parties to a civil action the right

to a jury trial.

U.S.C.R. 6.4, Uniform Superior Court Rule, which specifies

all formal efforts to resolve a discovery dispute begin with

the sending of a letter giving the other party ten (10) days

to produce the requested discovery.

O.C.G.A. 23-2-59, Acquisition of Antagonistic Rights by one

in a confidential relationship (i.e. power of attorney/abuse of

vulnerable adults/ elder abuse).

O.C.G.A. 51-7-9, malicious use of privilege.

Other pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions

are set forth in the appendix to this petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State Bar of Georgia filed three bar complaints

in fall of 2014/spring 2015 against Petitioner who has been

working as a lawyer by himself in good since 2004 and has

multiple documented disabilities on record with the

Georgia Supreme Court since 1997after Petitioner

requested and received ADA accommodations during the

bar exam, which he passed on his seventh attempt almost

nine years after graduating from law school. Throughout

the bar disciplinary process, the Bar egregiously denied

Petitioner of due process, equal protec-tion, committed

fraud on the court, abused his discretion, power and

authority and engaged in prosecutorial misconduct that

could only be described as outlandish.

The first bar complaint was filed by a judge in a civil

case because 1) Petitioner asked for a continuance (his

first) of the trial calendar civil trial because the day of the

pre-trial hearing, the attorney who was supposed to be lead

counsel decided at the last moment that he did not want to

be lead counsel and 2) the judge also made it a point to

base her bar complaint against Petitioner on the fact that

Petitioner had brought his medically necessary service dog

to the pretrial hearing.

The second bar complaint was filed by a client

(Mattson-6866) who hired Petitioner to try and negotiate

settlement of and informally resolve five (5) student loan

lawsuits before an answer was due. Petitioner and his

client agreed on a flat fee$1,750 and further agreed that if

Petiti-oner was unable to secure an extension of time to

answer the suit(s), Petitioner would refer his client to

another attorney with sufficient time to answer and defend

the lawsuits.

If Petitioner had been hired to actually answer and

represent his client in defense of the lawsuits, Petitioner's

fee to represent his client would have been considerably

more than $1,750.

Petitioner diligently and promptly contacted

opposing counsel to try and negotiate an extension of time

to file an answer, which opposing counsel agreed to over

the phone and by email. Petitioner's efforts to obtain a

written agreement about the extension of time to file an

answer were unsuccessful and when the time came for

Petitioner to notify his client that efforts to obtain an

extension of time to file an answer were unsuccessful and

to refer him to another lawyer to file an answer and

represent him in the litigation, Petitioner found himself in

the midst of and embroiled in his divorce where he was

denied financial support, attorney fees, was experiencing

constant disconnection of utilities, including power, phone

and internet, under a constant barrage of process servers

related to pre and post-divorce matters, dealing with

multiple lawsuits filed against and by Petitioner, collection

activity and other forms of financial distress.

Plaintiff would have effected a referral of his client

to another attorney to answer the lawsuits and defend his

client in the litigation, but the financial turmoil and

distress brought on by Petitioner's divorce case, being

forced to represent himself in his divorce, the denial of

attorney fees and request for fin-ancial support, including

disconnection of utilities and other economic injuries

significantly interfered with and obstructed the business

operations of Petitioner's law practice. Petitioner would not

have accepted the case if he felt he could not competently

and diligently represent his client or if he felt that his

divorce case would interfere with his representation or

handling of the matter. The default judgment and wage

garnishment temp-orarily experienced by Petitioner's client

were both set aside for good cause and excusable neglect

and the client experienced no harm.

Petitioner also apologized to his client several

times and paid his client back the retainer fee plus

interest. This was the first time that Petitioner had ever

experienced an issue related to a missed deadline in a case

while practi-cing law and it was an honest mistake.

The third bar complaint alleging mental unfitness

was filed by Petitioner's estranged brother, Ken Levine,

also an attor ney and with whom Petitioner had very low

contact, shortly after Mr. Levine had assumed the role of

and was later dismissed in his capacity as Petitioner's

temporary financial power of attorney and was filed

maliciously and retaliation after Petitioner filed a bar

complaint against his brother for misappropriating,

converting and depriving Petitioner of his medically

necessary service dog after Being in violation of a court

order in Petitioner's divorce case and in the course of doing

so, violated several Georgia Code Sections, including

O.C.G.A. governing the acquisition of antagonistic rights

because of the confi-dential attorney-agent/client-principal

relationship as well as O.C.G.A. 51-5-9 governing malicious

use of priv-ilege in court or administrative proceedings.

This frivolous bar complaint was further

compounded when Petitioner's own mother, Carol "Cookie"

Levine, also an attorney, not only acquired antagonistic

rights from Petitioner while he was in a confidential

relationship with her in a post-divorce matter, but

proceeded to misuse, abuse and misappropriate such

confidential information in a manner and method adverse

to Petitioner's interests and committed fraud on the court.

In what was to become an epic denial of due process,

the Georgia Bar initiated their investigation against Petitoner based on hearsay, false and inaccurate information,

lack of evidence,, without having done a diligent

investigation, without probable cause and without any

possibility of meeting their burden of proving their claims

and allegations by clear and convincing evidence.

Rather than dismiss the bar complaints or referring

them to the Lawyer or Consumer Assistance Program, the

Bar chose instead to prosecute Petitioner in a manner akin

to the Duke Lacrosse case together with all of the trappings

of bad faith, fraud on the court and prosecutorial

misconduct.

During the course of the investigation, including at

critical stages of the proceedings, Bar Counsel failed to

advise Petitioner of his right to counsel. During one in

person meeting between Bar Counsel and Petitioner, Bar'

Counsel, without counsel present for Petitioner, tried to

convince Petitioner to consent to a voluntary suspension of

his law license claiming Petitioner was unfit to practice law

and extorted and threatened him that if he did not consent

to the suspension that he (Bar Counsel) would Petition the

Georgia Supreme Court for an emergency suspension of his

law license.

When Petitioner requested evidence proving that

there was a basis for his law license to be suspended, Bar

Counsel never responded and never produced any

information supporting or warranting any type of suspension, emergency or otherwise, of Petitioner's law licence.

PIV

Had Bar Counsel had any evidence supporting an

emergency of Petitioner's law license, he would have

produced it and sought the emergency suspension, but he

did not.

Even though not obligated to disprove the Bar's

allegations, Petitioner furnished the Bar with records,

including from his doctor Certifying Respondent's fitness to

work as a lawyer, a polygraph test Report addressing the

Bar's allegations that Petitioner lied to his client And the

Bar about getting an extension of time to file an answer as

well as emails, letters and phone call logs to prove and

establish Petitioner's diligent communication with his

clients.

Bar Counsel through the Investigative Panel,

illegally used subpoenas to try and obtain Petitioner's court

sealed, confidential and HIPAA medical records without

proper notice to Petitioner and without Petitioner's

knowledge until almost a week had passed by.

In response to this, Petitioner filed a bar complaint

against Bar Counsel that was handled in house instead of

referring out and then dismissed while both Bar Counsel

and the OGC were under a conflict of interest (see Bar

Rules 1.7 and 1.10).

In response to this and outstanding discovery, Bar

Counsel, with a conflict of interest because of the bar

complaint filed against him by Petitioner, knowing that

Petitioner was in the middle of his bankruptcy case and

dealing with impending foreclosure of his home and

without making any attempt or effort by letter, phone or

email or by motion to compel, to get Petitioner to respond

to the Bar's discovery, filed a motion for sanctions, which

was granted by the Special Master in Petitioners absence

as an unavailable Witness dealing with the foreclosure of

his home.

Without a hearing on willfulness and without a single

order by the Special Master giving a deadline for Petitioner

to respond, the Special Master struck Petitioner's answers

to the bar complaints reasoning on Pg. 11, Para. 1 of his

order attached as App. 24, that "......issuing an order to

compel compliance with the State Bar's Discovery would be

a useless act and would only further delay these Cases."

Moreover, in the Special Masters and State Bar's own

cases cited in support of the right to strike Petitioner's

answer, an order compelling a response to the discovery

was first issued before

an order striking a

complaint/answer was issued and even then, the court and

courts in general routinely hold a hearing on the issue of

willfulness, which was not done.

The Special Master also refused to rule on or act on

Petitioner's Notice of Appeal or his motion to set aside the

sanctions order. In fact, the Special Master did not rule on

one single motion Petitioner filed. Not one even though

Petitioner filed close to a dozen motions.

Prior to the Special Master issuing the sanctions order,

Petitioner tried to get the Bar to agree to handle the bar

matters alternatively, but the bar refused. The Bar also

refused to agree to stay discovery before the issuance of the

sanctions order, refused Petitioner's request to give him

copies of the bar case files, refused to respond to

Petitioner's discovery, refused to provide dates to Petitioner

to depose various witnesses and opposed and objected to all

of Petitioner's efforts to have the Special Master issue

witness subpoenas, which the Special Master ultimately

ignored.

10.

When Petitioner requested that the Investigative Panel

reexamine the bar cases to evaluate newly discovered

evidence, it was ignored. When Petitioner objected to

several members of the Review Panel, it was ignored and a

decision recommending disbarment without the requisite

quorum.

Because of conflicts of interest on the part of the

Georgia Supreme Court related to political campaign

contributions, including from The Coordinating Special

Master and Review Panel Chairman to half of the members

of the Georgia Supreme Court, prior adverse rulings

related to the Bar cases dating back to Petitioner's divorce

and continuing through the Bar Disciplinary Proceedings,

Petitioner filed both a motion to disqualify and renewed

motion to disqualify the members of the Georgia Supreme

Court.

It was only after the denial of both as well as the

failure of the Court to timely rule on Petitioner's motions(s)

to dismiss, denial of Petitioner's request to allocate state

funds to obtain exculpatory evidence that Petitioner could

not afford, grant of the Bar's motion opposing and objecting

to Petitioner's filing of a transcript of the Review Panel

hearing with the court and complicity in misconduct and

false filings by the Bar, Special Master and Review Panel,

that Petitioner felt that he had no other choice but to file a,

lawsuit against The Georgia Supreme Court Justices,

which was not done lightly.

Three weeks later the Georgia Supreme Court ignored

the documented conflicts of interest and issued and

published in a newspaper their order disbarring Petitioner,

containing false, misleading and inaccurate statements,

including claiming that Petitioner lied to his client, failed

to offer evidence of disabilities to the Bar during the case

and most disparaging of all that Petitioner is not mentally

fit and lacks the requisite character to be a lawyer.

Thus, Petitioner was completely and totally denied an

opportunity to be heard, which goes against every principle

of fairness, fair play, substantial justice and which is an

essential part of due process. The State Bar failed in their

responsibility and mandate to ensure and make sure that

procedural safeguards, which are absolutely essential,

were in place during the disciplinary process, especially

given that Petitioner's law license represents Petitioner's

livelihood, how he makes a living, both of which are at

-stake and cannot be stripped in a manner that deprives

Petitioner of due process.

For these reasons, the Writ should be granted and the

decision of the Georgia Supreme Court overturned.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

DECISION DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE THIS COURT'S

HOLDINGS AND SUPREME PRECEDENTS THAT AN

ATTORNEY CANNOT BE DISBARRED IN A MANNER

THAT DENIES DUE PROCESS.

As Petitioner explains, the rulings run contrary to

decades of this Court's precedent that a law, license is

considered property and that it cannot be taken away in

any way that violates due process. An opportunity to be

heard

to conduct discovery, depose witnesses, appeal

adverse rulings and have motions ruled on

are all

essential to being heard. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117

(1961). Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232

(1957).

In addition, the Supreme Court has noted in general

that the opportunity to be heard is one of several hallmarks

of due process rights for lawyers and that states are

required to provide a system of lawyer regulation that

comports with what can be characterized as the minimal

requirements of due process. Mildner v. Gulotta, 405

F.Supp. 182 (1976) where Judge Weinstein concluded,

albeit reluctantly, that its' disciplinary procedure is

constitutionally infirm in denying attorneys the due

process and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Judge Weinstein further noted, in what mirrors the

instant matter, that (paraphrasing) adjudicative

authorities and bodies "decide facts without hearing and

seeing witnesses, deny counsel the opportunity to orally

argue the merits, and often fail to give reasons for their

decision to disregard compelling and critical evidence.

In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden

State Bar Ass'n, 45F U.S. (N.J.) 423 (1982), the court

clarified important criteria used to determine whether not

a party had due process: 1) counsel, 2) discovery, 3)

opportunity to question and cross examine witnesses.

In 1989, a subcommittee of the ABA Committee

charged with maintaining and updating the Model

Enforcement Rules, known as the Clerk Commission,

issued a report that further expounded upon the right and

necessity of an attorney in a bar disciplinary proceeding

being able to confront and cross examine adverse

witnesses, just as a judge in Georgia is entitled to in

proceedings before the Georgia Judicial Qualifications

Commission.

The Clark Commission Report also noted that not

only are criminal and civil cases intertwined, but also

indigent criminal and civil litigants share an important

attribute: they are likely to be equally bewildered by legal

proceedings, and unequipped to adequateli protect their

interests.

Here, the fact that Respondent has legal training and

is also an attorney does not insulate him from this

bewilderment, particularly due to his documented

disabilities, having no support system, his forced placed

indigency and having had to address too many matters at

the same time.

While the state is always the prosecutor in criminal

cases, the state is often the plaintiff in numerous types of

civil and criminal cases, such as abuse/neglect, termination

of parental rights, regulatory and licensure matters. Even

when the state is not present, the proceedings are routinely

characterized by severe power imbalances, such as the vast

disparity in representation between landlords and tenants,

or the psychological power an abuser wields over a victim

in a protection order proceeding. The instant case is no

exception.

Gideon recognized that "in our adversary system of

criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too

poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless

counsel is provided for him" and that it was an "obvious

truth" that providing counsel to those too poor to afford it is

"fundamental and essential to a fair trial." Surely these

statements equally apply to adversarial civil proceedings

where basic human needs are at stake.

The critically important needs of litigants in basic

human needs cases, such as Petitioner's right to make a

living, should not be seen as a luxury only afforded in good

times. Personal liberty should not be deprived to an

individual because he is not in a position to financially

afford counsel. As stated above, anyone, including an

attorney, can be a vulnerable individual who needs and is

entitled to counsel to ensure that his constitutional rights

are not violated, included having his law license taken

away with due process.

Notwithstanding that bar disciplinary proceedings

are "quasi-criminal" in nature as well as the holding in

Hannah v. Larche, 363, U.S. 420 (1960) that there is no

due process guarantee in matters before non-adjudicatory

bodies, subsequent court decisions have held that when an

agency acts to adjudicate or make binding determinations

which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, due

process safeguards apply. These same due process

safeguards also apply to matters that amount to and rise to

to the level of civil forfeiture of property such as

Petitioner's law license. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1

(1964); Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).

In the case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

(1963), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth

Amendment's guarantee of counsel is a fundamental right

essential to a fair trial and, as such, applies the states

through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

Furthermore, in Kennedy v. Martinez, 372 U.S. 144

(1963), the court held that during times of exigency, due

process safeguard cannot be curtailed. In Trop v. Dulles,

356 U.S. 86 (1958), held that in deciding whether a statue,

in this case, one imposing attorney discipline, is penal in

nature for purposes of whether right to counsel attaches,

the court determined that if the statue imposes a disability

for the purposes of punishment that is to reprimand the

alleged wrongdoer or to deter others, it has been considered

penal.

Moreover, under the ABA Clark Commission Report,

"quasi-criminal" matters for purposes of right to counsel,

extend to forfeitures of property, the imposition of various

disabilities, including the loss of a professional license,

which is what is at stake here. Savina Home Indus v.

Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir.) (1979) (where

the court noted that administrative civil penalties

constitute "quasi-criminal sanctions."

In the case of Sacandy v. Walther, 262 Ga. 11, 12

(1992), the court held that Georgia Courts have the power

to appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants, which

was statutorily recognized by the 1979 Georgia Indigent

Defense Act.

So, whether by the 6th Amendment or by the Due

Process clause, Petitioner here was denied his right to

counsel, which prevented him from defending himself

because of the absence and lack of procedural safeguards.

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.

16.

With respect to Respondent's disabilities, the court

in Weems v. Board of Indus Ins., Wash. Ct of App. (2014)

seemed to imply or intimate that appointment of counsel

for one in need was in the nature of an accommodation

under ADA and permitted to be granted by the court.

Here, Respondent was denied the right by Bar

Counsel William J. Cobb and the Special Master, Patrick

Head, to confront adverse witnesses to conduct discovery,

to issue witness subpoenas and to take depositions. When

Petitioner sought intervention from the Special Master,

Petitioner was ignored. The Special Master also failed to

rule on Petitioner's motions even though he was required to

rule on them within 90 day under O.C.G.A. 15-6-21.

In the instant case, Petitioner was deprived of all

three, which was Precipitated by the Bar's intentional and

orchestrated effort to deprive and deny Petitioner his right

and opportunity to be heard and his overall right to due

process.

On multiple occasions, the U.S. Supreme Court has

Described disciplinary proceedings as being quasi-criminal

in nature because the lawyer has certain procedural and

See In Re

substantive rights to ensure due process.

Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 554 550-51, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20

L.Ed.2d 117, 121-23 (1968); Mississippi State Bar v. Young,

509 So.2d 210, 212 (Miss.1987); Office of Disciplinary

Counsel v. Campbell, 463 Pa. 472, 345 A.2d 616, 620

(1975).

Also in Ruffalo, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that

disbarment proceedings are "of a quasi-criminal nature."

Presumably, some if not all constitutional protections

would therefore attach.

In the instant case, Petitioner was expressly accused

of, among other things, perjury and by implication accused

of mail and wire fraud given that Petitioner sent his

responses and communications to State Bar officials by

email, United States Mail and e-filed then through the

Georgia Supreme Court online e-file system.

When Petitioner emailed Bar Counsel copying an at

the time high Ranking DOJ Attorney as well as the

Georgia Attorney General inquiring as to why the Bar had

not reported the alleged perjury to the U.S. Attorney and

the Georgia Attorney General for criminal prosecution

since the Bar was so insistent that Petitioner lied to the

Bar about getting a time extension in the Mattson bar case,

Bar Counsel, ignored the email and at no time ever

responded.

Moreover, since these "quasi-criminal" proceedings

directly involve the deprivation of life and liberty, they can

be allied with criminal proceedings. In the case of Boyd v.

United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the high court held

that fourth and fifth amendment (including right against

self-incrimination and substantive, and procedural due

process) constitutional guarantees were applicable to

quasi-criminal proceedings.

Given the above case rulings, the rights that

normally attach to purely criminal proceedings, also attach

to quasi-criminal proceedings such as bar disciplinary

cases.

Several other U.S. Supreme Court cases address due

process rights of lawyers. In Sevack v. Klein, a New York

case that preceded Ruffalo by one year, the Supreme Court

held that the Fifth Amendment (via the 14th Amendment)

self-incrimination clause extends its protection to lawyers

in disciplinary cases and further states that lawyers cannot

be disbarred (or otherwise disciplined) solely based on their

own admissions.

In the instant case, the based part of their prosecution

against Petitioner on privileged, SLAPP violating and

extrajudicial statements made during his divorce case. The

Bar claimed and characterized Petitioner's statements as

"misconduct." However, Bar Counsel never cited any, bar

rules in support of the claim of misconduct and had he done

so, such a rule would have be void for vagueness. In

Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the Supreme Court

reversed a disciplinary sanction against a lawyer where the

prosecution was based on an unconstitutional bar rule.

The Georgia Supreme Court's ruling is wholly at odds

with these longstanding decisions as well as decisions in

various Circuits.

II.

THE CIRCUITS NEED CLARIFICATION HOW

TO ADDRESS THE ISSUANCE OF DISBARMENT

ORDERS AFTER A LAWSUIT IS FILED.

Although there have been countless Supreme Court

decisions concerning the circumstances under which an

attorney in a bar disciplinary proceeding my seek relief in a

federal court under the exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman

and Younger Doctrines, never has the court addressed

whether or not a State Supreme Court has the authority

and standing to issue a disbarment order following the

filing of a lawsuit in in federal court naming the Justices as

party defendant and to what extent, if any, would the State

Supreme Court be obliged to stay the state bar proceeding

either because of the pending federal litigation and/or

because of a conflict of interest due to being named parties

to the federal lawsuit. This case provides the Court an

ideal opportunity to address this wide reaching issue and

provide much needed guidance to the lower courts as

evidenced by the Federal District Court's recent decision in

Sam Levine v. State Bar of Georgia, 1:17-cv-04593 attached

as App. 1.

III. OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS COURT TO CLARIFY

THE EXCEPTIONS TO ROOKER-FELDMAN AND

YOUNGER DOCTRINES IN BAR CASES, INCLUDING PETITIONER'S IN THE WAKE OF THE IMPENDING APPEAL OF THE FEDERAL COURT'S

FAILURE TO APPLY THE EXCEPTIONS AND

GRANTING THE BAR'S MOTION TO DISMISS

While it is the Order of Disbarment from the Georgia

Supreme Court and not the Order of the Federal District

Court in Sam Levine v. State Bar of Georgia, Case No.;

1:17-cv-04593 that is before this Court, this Court's

clarification and restatement of the exceptions to the

Rooker Feldman and Younger Doctrines could assist and

aid the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in

deciding Petitioner's appeal once it is filed as the Federal

District Court dismissed Petitioner's case without reference

to or applying the exceptions to Rooker & Younger even

though Petitioner filed and present the court with a

voluminous amount of evidence of due process violations,

denial of an opportunity to be heard, bad faith, harassment

and fraud on the court.

Notwithstanding the above, the court held in Miller

v.. Washington State Bar Association, 691 F.2d 430 (1982)

(9th Cir.), that abstention was not only not required, but

that federal court scrutiny was warranted when

constitutional rights are implicated and when a party such

as Plaintiff faces irreparable and immediate injury with

the loss of his law license and livelihood.

21.

In addition, while the attorney disciplinary process

is a matter of state concern, limits have been placed upon

the exercise of this power when it exceeds the broad

confines of due process. Schware v. Board of Bar

Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).

The U.S. Sup. Ct. in Sprint Communications, Inc. v.

Jacobs, 134 S.Ct. 584 (2013), stated that Federal courts

should abstain from deciding cases only in "exceptional"

circumstances & federal courts have a virtually unflagging

obligation to hear cases within their jurisdiction. The

unanimous ruling emphasizes that abstention based on

Younger is not appropriate merely because a state court is

considering a case involving the same subject matter.

The court in Sprint also cited as in Middlesex, that

Younger abstention is required in only one of 3

circumstances when there is an ongoing state judicial

proceeding, which implicate important state interests, &

the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to

raise constitutional challenges. Since Middlesex County

Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457, U.S.

423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982).

Here, Petitioner did not have an opportunity to be

heard and was on the receiving end of countless acts of bad

faith by the Bar during the bar disciplinary proceeding, so

he sought relief in federal court under the criteria laid out

in in Wrightman v, Texas Supreme Court, U.S. Ct. App.

No. 9510895 (5th Cir.) 1996.

However, before Petitioner could get the relief he

desired, the Georgia Supreme Court issued an order

disbarring Petitioner even though Petitioner had just three

weeks prior named each of the Justices as party defendants

to a lawsuit over due process violations.

An attorney cannot be disbarred in a manner that

deprives him or denies him of due process nor can it be

done without independent proof of wrongdoing on his part.

Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961). The holding in

Cohen is the very reason That Petitioner exercised his

remedy of seeking judicial intervention to begin with.

IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION

AND ITS CIRCUMSTANCES AND TIMING

WARRANT REVIEW

The initiation of the bar disciplinary cases against

Petitioner to begin with along with Bar Counsel's

overreaching efforts to improperly and without any

evidence strip Petitioner of his law license that he worked

very hard for, the irregularities and denial of Petitioner's

due process rights at every stage and step of the bar

disciplinary proceedings as well as the timing and

circumstances of the disbarment order are such that

without review by this Court, this type of misconduct by

public officials, which is a matter of national concern, will

go unchecked as and become worse as prosecutorial

misconduct is on the rise.

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Respectfully submitt

Sam Levine, Petitione

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Law Office of Sam

, NE

1014 Havenridge Lane

Atlanta, Georgia 30

(404) 841-7090

sam@samlevine.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.