Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In Re Susan Rose, Petitioner

Supreme Court briefMay 21, 2018

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Case No

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

IN RE SUSAN ROSE, Petitioner.

On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus/Prohibition to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Court

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR ALTERNATIVE

PROHIBITION

TO THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT AND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH

Respondent

The Tenth Circuit Court

do Clerk of the Court for the

United State Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit

1823 Stout Street

Denver, Colorado 80257-1823

303-844-3157

https://www.calO.uscourts.gov/contact/clerk

Petitioner

Susan Rose, pro Se, filing

in forma pauperis

9553 s. Indian Ridge Drive

Sandy, Utah 84092

385-888-1637

susan rose@comcast.net

Utah United States District Court

Mr. D. Mark Jones

Clerk of the Court

351 South West Temple #1.100

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

801-524-6100

utdeefclerk@utd.uscourts.gov

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

RELIEF REQUESTED

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Should this Court issue an order mandating that the Tenth

Circuit Court adopt and issue an order to all U.S. District Courts

within the Tenth Circuit, to reciprocally recognize or enforce

only those state attorney discipline orders that are

grounded in United States Supreme Court-defined

Constitutional standards;

only those state attorney discipline orders that are

not relitigating exclusive federal questions in the

guise of lawyer discipline; or,

not relitigating U.S. Court orders governing U.S.

Court Bar members 'in-court" conduct?

Should this Court issue an mandamus order to Mr. D. Mark

Jones, Court clerk for the United States District Court of Utah, to

reinstate this lawyer as a U.S. Court Bar member?

PARTIES AND CORPORATION STATEMENT

RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS

JURISDICTION

OTHER RELEVANT PETITIONS

STATEMENT

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Why there is no other place to obtain relief

Uniform Constitutional Protections will be

afforded all U.S. Court Bar members

Protection of this Court's Appeal authority

and exclusive rule-making jurisdiction

All the foregoing facts show a bizarre pattern of the

extraordinary circumstance of a state eliminating U.S.

Constitutional protections

for all Utah citizens and lawyers.

The Relief sought is well within this Court's Appeal

and Supervisory authority.

There is no state interest involved in this Petition

Judicial economy.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX TABLE OF EXHIBITS

APPENDIX

March 7, 2018

lOth Cir. Order of Reciprocal Disbarment

Nov. 3, 2017 Order lifting stay and imposing disbarment

Sept. 6, 2017 Order denying discretionary review

Aug. 15, 2017 Utah Supreme Court Opinion disbarment

Aug. 15, 2011 U.S. District Court Order refusing to enforce

U.S. Court orders

44a

June 27, 2011 transcript relevant parts, jurisdiction hearing

50a

Affidavit of Lawyer Denver Snuffer as to no rule defined

pretrial screening panel

63a

Prosecutor's formal complaint, relevant parts

68a

U.S. District Court clerk denying license renewal

79a

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

cases

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Goal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)

Gohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)

Helveringv. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 399 (1938)

Hicks Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423,

99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988)

Hollingsworth v. Peny,

---

U.S.

---,

130 S.Ct. 705, 709-10 (2010)

In re Discipline of Brian Steffensen, 2016 UT 18 ¶9-10

2,4

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 48 fn. 79 (1967)

In re Integration & Governance of the Utah State Bar,

632 P.2d 845 (Utah 1981)

In re MacFarlane, 350 P.2d 631,636 (Utah, 1960)

In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968)

passim

Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Utah.

790 F.3d 1000. 1003 (10th Cir., 2015)

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp, 486 U.S. 847,

860, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1987)

MacArthur et al v. San Juan County,

395 F. Supp. 2d 891 (D. Utah 2005)

McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 266 U. S. 40 (1924)

McClellan v. Garland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910)

Middlesex v County Ethics Comm. v. Bar Assn.,

457 U.S. 423, 424 (1982)

II'

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969)

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-733 (1878)

Pub. Serv. Co. ofNM. v. Barboan, 857 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir., 2017)

Randall i' Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 528-529,

19 L.Ed, 285, 74 U.S. 523 (1868)

Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court,

746 F.2d 1429, 1436 (C.A.10 (Cob.), 1984)

passim

Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)

Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967)

State v. Briggs 199 P.3d. 935 26 (Utah 2008)

Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 222 (1978)

United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (199 3)

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uinth & Ouray Reservation v. Myton

(10th Cir. No. 15-4080, August 9, 2016)

Ward v. Village ofMonroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972)

(1995) (slip op., at 6)

World-Wide Volkwagen Coip. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)

Witte v. United States, 515 U. S.

__,

Constitutional provisions

U.S. Constitution Article III

U.S. Constitution Pt Amendment

passim

U.S. Constitution 511, Amendment

passim

Utah Constitution Article I sec. 3

Statutes

25 U.S.C. 1321-1326

23,24

28 U.S.C. 1651

28 U.S.C. 2071 and 2072

Judiciary Act of 1879 sec. 13

Treatises

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH JOURNAL,

1983, Vol. 1, pp. 1-108

APPENDIX A

INTRODUCTION

Recently prisoners returning from North Korea displayed their great

happiness at returning to United States soil. Their relief of arriving where

the United States Constitution protects them, their speech, their liberty and

property interests, was palpable.

This case demonstrates how a lawyer's Navajo Court and U.S. Court,

and even state court's, opposing counsel, highly favored by the Utah

Supreme Court or its appointed Prosecutor, can target any Utah lawyer for

their in-court speech, and civilly disbar them by "civil" burden shifting rules,

by default. ...unheard of in federal courts...yet upheld, validated by the

Tenth Circuit and U.S. District Court without a hearing, reciprocally.

Looking at those prisoners, I wondered why I, also a United States

citizen, for over ten years, as with all Utah lawyers, at least since 1985,

could not secure United States Supreme Court-defined U.S. Constitutional

protections 1) for my own liberty and property interests in my heavily vested

professional law license, 2) against patently unconstitutional state invasions

3) by the Utah Supreme Court, not the Utah State Bar, 4) resulting now, in

a reciprocal disbarment by the Tenth Circuit Court without a requested

hearing. World- Wide Voikwagen Coip. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)("A

judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State

and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere. Pennoyer v. Neil,' 95

U.S. 714, 732-733 (1878).")

The answer is so simple. This Petitioner and all Utah lawyers have no

where to go for U.S. Constitutional protections for their liberty and property

interests in their professional licenses, for three simple reasons. First, like

it or not, it is true, the Utah Supreme Court and its Prosecutor and its

appointees, not elected Bar Commissioners, have initiated, adopted,

interpreted and applied their own patently unconstitutional lawyer discipline

rules.

Second, the Utah Supreme Court disallows and refuses to rule

on United States Constitutional challenges to its rules during litigation, and

refers any challenges to their appointed ad hoc committee outside of

litigation. In re Discipline of Brian Steffensen, 2016 UT 18 ¶9-10.

Third, the

United States Courts 1) refuse to enforce their own jurisdiction and their own

lawyer regulation orders in behalf of state targeted U.S. Court Bar members,

and 2) refuse to hear any U.S. Constitutional challenges, and 3) will prohibit

lawyers from petitioning the U.S. Courts, by relying Middlesex v Gounty

Ethics Gornrn. v. Bar-Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 424 (1982) preemption doctrine,

interpreted as no interference at any time with state discipline proceedings.

Now here is the greatest slight of hand before this Gourt. It's a blame

game. Its simply not the targeted lawyer's responsibility to make the Utah

Supreme Court give U.S. Constitutional protections to Utah Bar members.

The Utah Supreme Court's order identifies, in error, about 35 times that this

lawyer "failed to" raise, "failed to" support, "failed to" argue.. .etc. to get

around not applying U.S. Constitutional standards to protect her from the

state. Here, the victim of the Utah Supreme Court's design is faulted for the

Utah Supreme Court not fulfilling their affirmative duty and oaths to uphold

the U.S. Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land (Utah Art. I sec. 3)...

an affirmative Utah Supreme Court duty independent of a victim lawyers'

arguments, evidence or filings... No lawyer has successfully challenged

Utah's rules unconstitutionality in any court since 1960. Why?

Because the Utah Supreme Court has sole inherent and Constitutional

power over ALL aspects of lawyer discipline including rule initiating, rule

adoption, rule interpretation, and rule application. The Utah Supreme Court

boasts of this omnipotent power independent of any Legislative or Executive

regulation. ¶60 at 024a. Targeted lawyers arguments or lack of

arguments do not alleviate the UTSCT of its responsibility to initiate,

adopt, interpret, and apply this Court's defined U.S. Constitutional

protections to this lawyer and all Utah/U.S. Court Bar members.

Therefore, it is impossible for the Utah Supreme Court to impartially

adjudge any U.S. Constitutional challenges to themselves, who are de facto

the law makers, judges, and prosecutors. Now Justice Lee, writing for the

majority, admits the Utah Supreme Court will not hear U.S. Constitutional

challenges to their rules during litigation. Steffensen, supra.

Who has deprived this Petitioner and all Utah lawyers of her U.S.

Supreme Court-defined, U.S. Constitutional rights? Utah's most brilliant

minds, the Utah Supreme Court, who, since 1960, has been on public notice

of U.S. Constitutional standards and rejected, and violated them, knowingly,

willfully, and with unlimited state power. Further, the Utah Supreme

Court-designed system infects every system where a Utah Bar member has a

tandem license in any other jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court boldly

goes where no other courts have gone, to adjudge the "in court" filings,

pleadings, conduct of Utah Bar members working in jurisdictions outside

state jurisdiction, where no discipline in the non state jurisdiction has issued.

It is the Utah Supreme Court who says they will determine- in Utah state

courts- what is and what is not, "professional misconduct", for all Utah

lawyers, for all speech, filings, conduct, in all jurisdictions, ¶70 029a, where

there is no prior discipline, and here, where U.S. Court judges have denied

sanctions numerous times that Utah is relitigating. 46a, 58a 1. 1-5.

RELIEF REQUESTED

This Petition is not appealing the Utah Supreme Court's order. It is

simply requesting that this Court issue proposed orders, a) that will promote

uniformity and predictability in the U.S. Courts' Bar members protections,

within the lO" Circuit jurisdiction, b) that will aid the Court's appellate

jurisdiction, c) based on very exceptional circumstances of a state supreme

court willfully violating U.S. Constitutional standards, warranting protection

of all Utah/U.S. Court Bar members, c) that is fully within the exercise of the

Court's discretionary and supervisory powers, d) where no adequate relief

can be obtained in any other form or from any other court.

This Court is well justified to order the Tenth Circuit Court to

withdraw its reciprocal discipline order, and issue an order reinstating this

Petitioner to both U.S. District Court and Tenth Circuit Court Bar

membership roles. This bad faith, harassing, malicious prosecution is

politically motivated to protect Utah majoritarian interests, and lacks any

legal foundation for its initiation or U.S. Constitutional Due Process, void ab

initio. It is punishment for the Petitioner's exercise of 1 amendment speech

in petitions for redress for minority clients, in two underlying Navajo courtrooted cases. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Cohens v. Virginia, 6

Wheat. 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821), is clear: ("Questions may occur which

we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise

our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.").

There is no state interest offended by such an order to the Tenth

Circuit Court and/or U.S. District Courts. Petitioner requests any other relief

for this Petitioner the Court finds is fair equity and just under the law.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Should this Court issue an order mandating that the Tenth Circuit

Court adopt and issue an order to all U.S. District Courts within the

Tenth Circuit, to reciprocally recognize or enforce

only those state attorney discipline orders that are grounded in

United States Supreme Court-defined Constitutional

standards;

only those state attorney discipline orders that are

not relitigating exclusive federal questions in the guise of

lawyer discipline; or,

not relitigating U.S. Court orders governing U.S. Court

Bar members "in-court" conduct?

Should this Court issue an mandamus order to Mr. D. Mark Jones,

Court clerk for the United States District Court of Utah, to reinstate

this lawyer as a U.S. Court Bar member?

PARTIES AND CORPORATION STATEMENT

Parties are as captioned.

By Supreme Court rule 29.6, Petitioner states no corporations are involved.

RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS

All Writs Act 28 U.S.C. 1651

(a)The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may

issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions

and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

JURISDICTION

This Court has the authority and power to issue the requested relief

pursuant to: United States Constitution Article III, the Judiciary Act of 1789

sec. 13, Congress' Rules Enabling Act 28 U.S.C. 2071 and 2072, and U.S.

Supreme Court Rule 20. This Court has authority under the All Writs Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1651, to issue writs of mandamus/prohibition to the lesser court

of appeals and all U.S. Courts, in order to prevent its appellate jurisdiction

from being thwarted, to prevent is U.S. Constitutional standards being

undermined, and "to compel" a lower court "to exercise its authority when it

is its duty to do so." Roche v. Evaporated MilkA ssn., 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943);

McClellan v. Garland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910).

OTHER RELEVANT PETITIONS

In Re Rose, 17-8557, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Tenth Circuit

Court. Susan Rose v Office ofProfessional Conduct, 17-7003 petition for a

Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court. Denied.

STATEMENT

Non state nature of the Prosecutor's underlying original cases.

Both of the Prosecutor's underlying cases are based upon the underlying

Navajo Court jurisdiction controversy. U.S. Judge Jenkins identifies this

issue and the unfairness of prosecution by "snippets" taken out of the context

of the whole.

Any State court examination of an attorney's handling of federal

court litigation without benefit of the essential context of the

complete record invites error.....

How many motions are "too many" can only be determined in the

full context of the case in which they were filed. Any State court

examination of an attorney's handling of federal court litigation

without benefit of the essential context of the complete record

invites error.

See 47a.

Most importantly, Judge Jenkins' reasoning applies to ALL non Utah

litigation- based prosecutions by a Utah state prosecutor, for Utah lawyers

working in non-Utah jurisdictions, as in Alaska or other states, or in U.S. tax

law, social security law, military tribunals, Indian courts, international

courts, even regulating political activity of Utah lawyers for an undefined

"professional misconduct" that the UTSCT claims to have regulatory power

over. See, 1[70. The Utah Supreme Court boasts of such almighty omnipotent

authority under Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5a, while eliminating 8.5(b)'s

restraints on Utah's state courts... the UTSCT reading the rule liberally for

the state, and strictly against the targeted victim lawyer, a common practice.

Cascading chain of events explaining the case:

On March 7, 2018, the Tenth Circuit Court issued a reciprocal

disbarment order (Appendix "001a") -based upon; (State Court events)

a November 3, 2017 Utah state district court order lifting a stay on a

disbarment order (003a)- based upon; 3) a September 6, 2017 Utah Supreme

Court ("UTSCT") disbarment order, (004a) -based upon; 4) the UTSCT

Prosecutor (not state Bar) and Utah state courts prosecution by filing a 2007

state court complaint (068a)- based upon; 5)

the Prosecutor's jurisdictional

statement that a prior "screening panel" (as rule defined and plainly read),

had held a "hearing" that in fact was non existent (063-067a)- based upon;

(Exclusive United States Court and Navajo Court issues)

the U.S. Court opposing counsel' and UTSCT Prosecutor using the

state system to relitigate United States District Court Judge Jenkins' and

Tenth Circuit Court orders (044a) denying sanctions against Petitioner, that

became non appealable final orders, for the "same issues" (058a) Judge

Jenkins ruled upon, of how this Petitioner zealously advocated for Navajo

Nation civil authority over non Indians for acts arising in the Navajo Nation-and also based upon, 7) Petitioner's zealous advocacy for resident Navajo

mother and child, against a state court trying to define Navajo court

jurisdiction as not existing over non Indian alleged grandparents who never

gave proof of their alleged legal relationship with the child. (011a ¶18-19).

(U.S. District Court Clerk event)

In 2015, while the original state court disbarment order was on a stay,

the U.S. District court, without a hearing, based on its own ex parte

communication with the prosecutor, determined it would not renew this

Petitioner's membership in the U.S. Court's Bar until the state Bar status

was resolved. 079a

'Opposing counsel Carolyn Cox faxed an unnotorized complaint to the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor

brought the informal complaint in the Office of Professional conduct's name so her identity was

hidden from the Petitioner and screening panel for pretrial witness questioning.

Three absolute proofs this Petitioner's filings in the two

underlying Navajo Court-rooted cases did not warrant "state"

prosecution.

First, Judge Bruce S. Jenkins of the United States District Court,

having the full record of the state's underlying federal case, ruled 4 times,

and the lOthi Circuit Court 1 time, refusing opposing counsel's sanctions

motions, that the opposing counsel did not appeal. 045a-046a, 053a 1. 20 [loth

cir. denying sanctions]. Opposing counsel just went into a more favorable

venue to destroy an opposing counsel's most valued possession, her name and

reputation.

Second, compare this Petitioner's pro Navajo Nation civil jurisdiction

arguments memorialized in Judge Jenkins monumental order in MacArthur

et a] v. San Juan County et a], 391 F. Supp. 2d 895, 962 D. Utah 2005) (not

attached, 250 pages or so) with Pub. Serv. Co. of NM. v. Barboan, 857 F.3d

1101 (10th Cir., 2017) now adopting them. This Petitioner's reasoning that

Congress trumps judicial doctrines, that Executive Bureau of Indian Affairs

Self Determination Act judicial program contracts that eliminate state

authority in the Navajo Nation altogether, are not frivolous..... albeit they run

Utah's now proven disregard of the Indian Nations within its borders.

Third, the Tenth. Circuit Court, Judge, now Justice Gorsuch, identifies

in 2016, that Utah has a 40 year record of disregarding Indian Nation

sovereignty and disregarding and relitigating federal court orders. Ute Indian

Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Myton (10th Cir., 2016, and Ute

Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Utah, 790 F. 3d 1000 (10th

Cir., 2015) and Barboan, supra.

The UTSCT has knowingly and willfully initiated and adopted

patently unconstitutional rules of lawyer discipline eliminating

innocence as a defense.

This Petition will identify the U.S. Constitutional standards and law

that the UTSCT was on notice of, and then, identify how the UTSCT has

step-by-step eliminated them from this Petitioner and all Utah lawyers. It

will address a. No Utah Prosecutor Burden of Proof; b. No Utah

5th

Amendment privileges or client privilege defenses; c. No Utah quasi criminal

protections; d. No Utah Impartial Triers; e. the Utah State Bar is a silenced

victim; f. No Utah clear and convincing evidence standards; g. No Utah

prosecutorial misconduct defenses; h. no Utah double jeopardy protections.

No Utah Prosecutor Burden of Proof

In 1960, UTSCT Justice Wade identified that the UTSCT's adoption of a

mere civil standard eliminates the Prosecutor's burden of proof, eliminating

even a preponderance of evidence standard, as here, by civil burden shifting

rules.

In re MacFarlane, 350 P.2d 631,636 (Utah, 1960)(J. Wade dissent

If the presumption shifts the burden of proof in a disciplinary

proceeding the same as in a civil action, then neither clear and

convincing proof, nor a preponderance of the evidence or even

substantial evidence is required to disbar an attorney where such

a presumption is involved.

No Utah U.S. 5TH Amendment privileges or client privilege

defenses.

In 1967, Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967)

this highest of Courts put the UTSCT on notice that any lawyer seeking

protection of the 50 Amendment, as this Petitioner did, (See, ¶30 15a)

while also refusing to violate her clients' privileges, had a right to do so where

a sanction would be "costly". This Petitioner has paid the ultimate

professional price for so doing by "civil" default.

1967's In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 48 fn. 79 (1967); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266

U. S. 34, 266 U. S. 40 (1924). (applying the privilege civilly.) put the TJTSCT

on notice that quasi criminal cases, civil cases, administrative and criminal

cases allow the 5th Amendment privilege to be exercised.

No Utah quasi criminal protections.

In 1968, this Court could not more explicitly inform all states that lawyers'

licenses deserve "quasi criminal" U.S. Constitutional 51h Amendment Due

Process. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) ("These are adversary

proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 87

S.Ct. 1428, 1446, 18 L.Ed.2d 527.") Additionally, knowledge of the

punishment being sought prior to answering was essential.

In 1980, the UTSCT knowing of Ruffalo, abolished adversarial

trials for lawyers altogether. In re Strong, 616 P.2d 583, 585 (Utah

1980)("Thus, the preservation of the integrity of the Courts and the

safety of the public must rise above the strict technical rules of

evidence that govern the usual adversary proceeding between

individuals. This is not a proceeding to determine conflicting claims of

right where one party prevails over the other. This proceeding is

commenced by an accusation being made of misconduct where no

specific relief is demanded or requested.")

ii.

UTSCT rule 14-5 Rule 14-501(c) reads: "(c)

....

Formal

disciplinary and disability proceedings are civil in nature."

No Utah Impartial Triers

In 1868, the Utah territory was on notice that impartial triers were essential

to constitutional conformity. Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 528-529, 19

L.Ed. 285, 74 U.S. 523 (1868).

In 1972, this Court put the UTSCT on notice that U.S. Constitutional Due

Process of having impartial triers begins at the beginning, any trial de novo

not withstanding. Ward v. Village ofMonroeviile, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) ("A

statutory provision for the disqualification of interested or biased judges did

not accord petitioner sufficient safeguard, and it is of no constitutional

relevance that petitioner could later be tried de novo in another court, as he

was entitled to an impartial judge in the first instance"). 2

UTSCT Rule 14-506 eliminates any impartial judges by making

them consider their post-judgeship professional livelihood or

prosecution.

UTSCT rule 14-506(a) provides for the Prosecutor to prosecute all Utah

Bar members as he subjectively believes has committed professional

misconduct.

14-506(c) puts all state judges on notice that if they rule against

Prosecutor -favored law firms, their professional future is at risk.

a lawyer is subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not

only for conduct as a lawyer but also for misconduct that

occurred while the lawyer was a judge and would have

been grounds for lawyer discipline provided that the

Li1jeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp, 486 U.S. 847, 860, 108 S.Ct.

2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1987)(" to promote public confidence in the integrity

of the judicial process does not depend upon whether or not the judge actually

knew of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, so long as the public

might reasonably believe that he or she knew.")

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)("The proper

constitutional inquiry was not "whether in fact [the justice] was influenced,"

Id., at 825, 106 S.Ct. 1580, but "whether sitting on [that] case '"would offer

judge to lead him not to hold the

a possible temptation to the average

balance nice, clear and true," ibid. While the "degree or kind of interest

sufficient to disqualify a judge '[could not] be defined with precision,'" Id.,

at 822, 106 S.Ct 1580, the test did have an objective component.")

...

misconduct was not the subject of a judicial disciplinary

proceeding as to which there has been a final determination by

the Supreme Court.

the UTSCT cannot impartially adjudge its own prosecution's

design;

Rule 14-503(i) provides for the Prosecutor to meet with the

UTSCT exparte.

The chair and senior counsel shall annually consult with the

Board and the Supreme Court regarding the level of activity

and general standing of disciplinary matters and

procedures.

The Utah State Bar is a silenced victim

In 1981, the UTSCT silenced the Utah Bar's ability to challenge the

Prosecutor or the UTSCT's lawyer discipline actions via integration of the

Bar. In re Integration & Governance of the Utah State Bar, 632 P.2d 845

(LTtah 1981).

In 1983, the American Bar Association put the UTSCT on notice that an

integrated Bar silenced lawyers who have an "great claim of freedom from

government intervention." AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH JOURNAL,

1983, Vol. 1, pp. 1-108). It discovered the three problems every Utah lawyer

faces: 1) the Utah State Bar is a private non profit organization so any Utah

public records requests fall on deaf ears with the Prosecutor refusing to

disclose the initial screening panel records, 2) it operates as a public agency

in that the UTSCT says it is "integrated" with it, and 3) it is a compulsory

membership organization. This article concluded that 'integrated' bars

should be terminated. That they can be replaced with a private voluntary

association, and administrative agencies that are independent of the

organized bar. The entire Court system has a strong interest in maintaining

freedom of speech, argumentation, and client relations.

The UTSCT ignored the Utah legislature's brief in opposition to

integration and in opposition to eliminating legislative and Executive

involvement in lawyer discipline.

No Utah Clear and Convincing Evidence standard

In 1984, the Tenth Circuit Court identified to all state courts that the clear

and convincing evidence standard of Gault applies to state invasions of

lawyers license interests, in Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F. 2d

1429, 1436 (C.A.1O (Cob.), 1984)

Finally, a disciplinary proceeding requires clear and convincing

evidence to sustain a finding of fact. See Rule 251 A. Razatos

asserts that this fact indicates a weightier liberty interest than

that at stake in Raddatz, where the suppression hearing required

only a preponderance of the evidence. We agree, and we believe

that the clear and convincing evidence test functions to safeguard

that interest.

The UTSCT Rule 14-517(b) uses a "preponderance of evidence"

standard, that in reality the UTSCT knows does not exist, see

MacFarlanci, supra.

Utah eliminates prosecutorial misconduct as a defense

The UTSCT -by rule- has A. not delegated any authority over the

Prosecutor and his processes to lower Utah courts, or the Bar's

Commissioners; B. has no rule for pre deprivation writ relief; C. no

rule mandating the UTSCT rule on Due Process or Jurisdictional issues

prior to final judgment, and even not then (Steffensen, supra: D. no

rules provide for interlocutory appeals when the Prosecutor or lower

court judges or pre trial screening panels violate the UTSCT rules; E.

no rules providing the UTSCT will be read strictly as plainly written

for the lawyer, and instead are read liberally for the Prosecutor and

strictly against the lawyer under a civil standard; F. no rules for relief

from improperly constituted pretrial screening panels; G. no relief

from screening panels who make no findings of fact or identify

supporting evidence (as here) allowing the Prosecutor to file a

complaint of his own drafting, in the name only of the screening panel

of which he was the secretary and administrator and potential

prosecutor of its lawyer members; H. No rules for a state lower court to

prosecute a prosecutor for subornation of perjury.

No Utah Double Jeopardy protections

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject

for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U. S. Const.,

Amdt. 5. The Clause serves the function of preventing both "successive

punishments and.

successive prosecutions." United States v. Dixon, 509 U.

S. 688, 696 (1993), citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969). The

protection against multiple punishments prohibits the Government from

"punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally for the

same offense."' Witte v. United States, 515 U. S.

(1995) (slip op., at 6)

(emphasis omitted), quoting Helveringv. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 399 (1938).

There is no question that U.S. District Court Judge Jenkins ruled

multiple times, and the Tenth Circuit Court one time, "acquitting" this

Petitioner of charges of misconduct, in final non appealable orders, that the

Prosecutor's counsel admitted the state was retrying for the "same issues."

57a 1. 24-25 to 58a 1. 1-5.

Ruffalo and Razatos, understood lawyer discipline, as punishment

requiring quasi criminal protections. Utah refuses to do so.

In 1978, this Court ruled a "civil" label doesn't get around the double

jeopardy clause of the 5th Amendment.

the State has engaged in a novel redefinition of trial and

appellate functions in a quasi-criminal proceeding,

intentionally designed to avoid the constraints of the

Double Jeopardy Clause. .... our Constitution is not so fragile an

instrument that its substantive prohibitions may be evaded

by formal designations that fail to correspond with the

actual functions performed.

Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 222 (1978)(J. Marshall dissent)

For the purposes of applying the Due Process Clause to a

State's proceedings, state law provides strong guidance, but

is not dispositive, as to the classification of the proceeding

or the relief imposed as civil or criminal. The critical

features are the substance of the proceeding and the character of

the relief that the proceeding will afford.

Hicks Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721

(1988)

WHY THIS PETITION SHOULD BE ACCEPTED

Accepting this Petition is well justified for the following reasons: A) no other

place to obtain the requested relief, B) the requested relief fosters uniform

U.S. Supreme Court-defined U.S. Constitutional protections of U.S. Courts

and U.S. Bar members from arbitrary and unconstitutional state invasions of

U.S. Court Bar members, when opposing counsel disagrees with federal

judges or Navajo judges denying opposing counsel sanctions who gets the

same relief in a state court; C) will protect the United States Court's appeal

authority and exclusive Congressionally assigned U.S. Court jurisdictional

authority [here, Navajo Nation jurisdiction definitions and exclusive U.S.

Court lawyer regulation authority], and D) addresses an very extraordinary

circumstance of federal courts reciprocally endorsing such intentional state

void unconstitutional processes; E) is all within this Court's supervisory

powers.

Why there is no other place to obtain the requested relief.

In Utah, the Legislature and Executive branches have no

authority over lawyer discipline to enforce standards on the UTSCT or

prosecutor. See, ¶60 at 24a. b.

The UTSCT has not delegated any

authority over their prosecutor and his processes to anyone, to any office, to

any agency, to any other appointees. c. The U.S. Courts were told the lie

that Due Process (the only Due Process is U.S. Constitutionally compliant3)

would be afforded to the Petitioner prior to any discipline, and the Court

relied upon this false and quite impossible assurance by counsel claiming to

represent the Utah State Bar; without divulging to the federal courts that the

Bar was never involved in the prosecution, and only the UTSCT could

possibly be the party of interest as having all inherent and constitutional

power (60 at 24a). See. 48a. The UTSCT willfully affords no adversarial

trial for Utah lawyers to have a"full opportunity" to know of the instances of

State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d. 935 (Utah 2008)(" ¶ 26 Nevertheless, the protections

in the federal Constitution provide a constitutional floor, which, if Utah's

Constitution or laws provide a lesser level of protection, renders interpretation of

Utah Constitution unnecessary.26 In other words, if the challenged state action

violates the federal Constitution, we need not reach the question of whether the

Utah Constitution provides additional protection; we may instead resolve the case

with reference only to the federal Constitution."

specific conduct to support the initial charges, based on snippets of negative

comments made without prior notice or hearings by Judges Kimball and

Judge Anderson, much less know the specific punishment or discipline the

Prosecutor seeks, or know what supports the appropriate mens rea for

discipline, much less prepare a "full opportunity" defense. 74a- 78a, Strong,

supra.

The U.S. District Court would not allow me to renew my

membership in 2015, based on the disbarment order that was on a stay. 79a.

The U.S. Courts read Middlesex as meaning absolutely no interference

with states regulating lawyers, under any circumstances that could possibly

cause Utah's Supreme Court embarrassment, even when the state supreme

court, unlike New Jersey in Middlesex, repeatedly refuses to entertain U.S.

Constitutional challenges to its proceedings.

Uniform Constitutional Protections will be afforded all U.S. Court

Bar members. The Tenth Circuit Court rejects its own ruling in Razatos,

supra, with its reciprocal discipline here, made without a requested hearing.

U.S. Court Bar members cannot rely on Razatos protections from state

invasions in Congressionally identified non-state jurisdiction issues.

Protection of this Court's appeal authority and exclusive rule

making jurisdiction.

US. Court Judge Jenkins identifies important federalism questions.

Who regulates U.S. Court lawyers, particularly in behalf of U.S.

Court opposing counsel disappointed in- repeated sanctions motions being

rejected in federal courts.

4 Well, who gets to say as to the conduct before the

5 federal court? Does the state court act as some kind of

6 appellate body? We have reciprocal devices where, if

7 someone loses the power to practice in federal court for an

8 appropriate reason, there's an automatic loss in stake.

9 There's a similar process if somebody loses the right to

10 practice in state court. There's an automatic loss of the

11 opportunity to practice here.

52a

3 THE COURT: Well, okay. But just think about it.

4 The effort of the parties in federal court were to seek

5 sanctions. That was denied.

6 MR. SAUNDERS: That's true.

7 THE COURT: They failed to appeal that particular

8 determination.

9 MR. SAUNDERS: That's true.

10 THE COURT: They made an effort on the appellate

11 level to seek monetary sanctions, which was denied

23 THE COURT: The State Bar is not an appellate

24 court.

25 MR. SAUNDERS: That's correct

56a

1 THE COURT: And the propriety of somebody

2 practicing in the federal system is separate and apart-3 MR. SAUNDERS: That's right.

4 THE COURT: --from practicing in the state system.

9 THE COURT: You see, we have here--as I mentioned

10 earlier, if the State Bar is concerned about conduct here,

11 there's a method in our local rules for having that matter

12 referred to a court committee.

24 THE COURT: Oh, but where the--where the question

25 of sanctions--where the question of sanctions has been

57a

1 raised and passed upon-2 MR. SAUNDERS: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. But not the

3 question-4 THE COURT: --for the same conduct kind of

5 complaint to a state--the arm of the state?

6 MR. SAUNDERS: Our answer is yes, because it

7 reflects on the fitness to practice in Utah courts. The

8 decision-9 THE COURT: Well, it also--it also reflects on the

10 fitness to practice in the federal court.

58a

K The UTSCT via its prosecutor, not the Utah State Bar, is using

lawyer discipline as a means of usurping and silencing lawyers, in litigating

Indian law issues, that are prohibited to states by Congress (25 U.S.C. 13211326) unless certain conditions are met, non applicable here. And by using

an unconstitutional process to boot. Judge, now Justice Gorsuch, has

identified as settled facts and law, that the UTSCT and its courts have been

illegally hailing Indians into state court in (as in the UTSCT's claimed "state

court" matter Petitioner was seeking to protect her Navajo clients from) by

harassing, void, bad faith attempts to define Indian Nation jurisdiction that

relitigates federal court orders, and is usurping U.S. Courts' and Indian

Nation exclusive jurisdiction to define Indian Nation jurisdiction over non

Indians for FORTY years. Ute and Myton, supra. Now the UTSCT uses

lawyer discipline to destroy this Petitioner's name, reputation and honor

without a specific clear instance of misconduct identified warranting

the complaint, rather than uphold Congress' prohibitions to Utah acting

within Indian Nations. 25 U.S.C. 1321-1326. Pennoyer v. Neff95 US 714, 24

L ed 565 (1877)(cases lacking jurisdictional authority are void.)

All the foregoing facts show a bizarre pattern of the

extraordinary circumstance of a state eliminating U.S.

Constitutional protections for all Utah citizens and lawyers. ALL

Utah lawyer prosecutions are illegal, unconstitutional, and legally void, by

intent and design of the UTSCT since 1960. Reciprocal discipline validates

Utah's supremacy in interpreting law in place of this Court's and Congress'

Supremacy and express designs the UTSCT is violating. Pennoyer, supra.

The relief sought is well within this Court's appeal and

supervisory authority. See, Hollingsworth v. Pen

---

U.S.

---,

130 S.Ct.

705, 709-10 (2010). This Petition warrants this United States Supreme

Court exercising its supervisory authority though a) the Tenth Circuit Court

issued no decision that can be strictly analyzed as in Hollingsworth, and b)

that this Court's ability to analyze the Circuit Court's order is limited.

The public interest in finding lawyers protected in the use of the

1 amendment for redress of grievances is essential to all U.S. Court

operations. b. This lawyer and all U.S. Court Bar members, within the

Tenth Circuit Court, have a great claim of interest in having uniform U.S.

Constitutional standards by which their professional licenses can be

protected from state unconstitutional processes.

There is no state interest involved in this Petition.

Judicial economy. Uniformity and predictability in the law, reduces

Court dockets, fosters freedom in advocacy, and prevents Courts creating

tribunals of men/women, instead of tribunals of the law.

All the foregoing identifies why Utah lawyers in U.S. Courts have no

U.S. Constitutional protections that result in punishments of economic

imprisonment of an undeterminable length of time, and destruction of

persons' names, reputations, and honor, without justification. Sounds

similar to North Korea at least three prisoners escaped from.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the relief respectfully requested should be

granted.

So signed this 171h day of May, 2018.

Is! Susan Rose

CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT

I certify to this Court that the above document contains

5801 words by ms word count in Century Schoolbook 13 pt. font.

Is! Susan Rose May 17, 2018.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.