Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jack Eugene Turner, Petitioner v. Virginia
Supreme Court briefMay 30, 2018
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APPENDIX
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Appendix Page
Published Opinion of
The Supreme Court of Virginia
entered March 1, 2018 ...................................................................................... 1a
Published Opinion of
The Court of Appeals of Virginia
entered November 22, 2016 .............................................................................. 9a
Sentencing Order of
The Franklin Circuit Court
entered December 15, 2015 ............................................................................ 25a
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PRESENT: All the Justices
JACK EUGENE TURNER
OPINION BY
ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN
March 1, 2018
v. Record No. 161804
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Jack Eugene Turner appeals the decision of the Court of Appeals of Virginia upholding
his conviction for displaying a noose on a public place with the intent to intimidate, and placing
others in reasonable fear of death or personal injury, in violation of Code § 18.2-423.2. Turner
argues the display was not proscribed under the statute because, although visible from a public
road, it was located on his own property. Concluding that the noose display was on a public
place under our construction of the statute, we affirm the conviction.
I.
The material facts are undisputed. Turner owned and lived on property in Franklin
County adjoining a public road known as Lindsay Lane. Several other families also lived on
Lindsay Lane, some of whom were African-American. With the intent of intimidating his
African-American neighbors, Turner displayed a noose in a tree in his front yard from which he
hung a black, life-size mannequin. The display was located approximately 15 to 30 feet from
Lindsay Lane and clearly visible from this public road. The evidence also established that the
display directly tended to place certain of Turner’s African-American neighbors in reasonable
fear of death or bodily injury.
Based on these facts, Turner was indicted under Code § 18.2-423.2, and then tried and
convicted of this crime in a bench trial. Code § 18.2-423.2 states:
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A. Any person who, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of
persons, displays a noose on the private property of another without permission is
guilty of a Class 6 felony.
B. Any person who, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of
persons, displays a noose on a highway or other public place in a manner having a
direct tendency to place another person in reasonable fear or apprehension of
death or bodily injury is guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Because Turner’s noose display was located on his own property, subsection A of the statute was
not implicated by his actions. In regard to subsection B, as relevant to this appeal, Turner argued
unsuccessfully to the trial court in his pre-trial motion to dismiss, motion to strike the
Commonwealth’s evidence, and post-trial motion to reconsider, that because the display was on
his own “private property” it was not located on a “public place” as required for a violation of
subsection B. Code § 18.2-423.2(B). The term “public place” is not defined in the statute.
Affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals in a published opinion likewise rejected
Turner’s contention that privately owned property cannot constitute a public place for purposes
of Code § 18.2-423.2(B) and that his noose display was thus outside the scope of this provision.
Turner v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 46, 62-65, 792 S.E.2d 299, 306-08 (2016). In rejecting
Turner’s construction of the statute, the Court of Appeals substantially relied upon Hackney v.
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888, 891-93, 45 S.E.2d 241, 242-43 (1947), where this Court defined
the term “public place” under the disorderly conduct statute to include private property generally
visible by the public from some other location. Turner, 67 Va. App. at 63-65, 792 S.E.2d at 30708.
II.
A.
Turner argues in this appeal that the Court of Appeals, like the trial court, erroneously
construed the “public place” element of Code § 18.2-423.2(B) by holding that his noose display
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located on his own property but visible from Lindsay Lane was displayed on a public place for
purposes of the statute. 1 As this presents a purely legal issue of statutory construction, we
review the issue de novo. Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 382, 789 S.E.2d 608, 609
(2016); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 286 Va. 153, 156, 747 S.E.2d 799, 800 (2013).
We are guided in our analysis of Code § 18.2-423.2 by familiar principles of statutory
construction. When construing a statute, our “primary objective,” as always, is “to ascertain and
give effect to legislative intent” from the words of the statute. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285
Va. 187, 236, 738 S.E.2d 847, 875 (2013) (quoting Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630, 702
S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010)). In determining that intent, we are to give those words “their ordinary
meaning, unless it is apparent that the legislative intent is otherwise,” Phelps v. Commonwealth,
275 Va. 139, 142, 654 S.E.2d 926, 927 (2008) (citations omitted); and we “presume that the
General Assembly chose, with care, the words that appear in a statute.” Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 292 Va. 738, 742, 793 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2016) (citation omitted). Furthermore,
the “plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow,
or strained construction.” Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639
(2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1998)). We
also presume that, in choosing the words of the statute, “the General Assembly acted with full
knowledge of the law in the area in which it dealt.” Philip Morris v. The Chesapeake Bay
1
Raising a separate issue, Turner sought to argue to the Court of Appeals that he had an
absolute right under the First Amendment to display the noose in a threatening manner on his
own property. The Court of Appeals ruled that this argument was procedurally defaulted under
Rule 5A:20(e) because he “failed to cite any authority whatsoever in support” of the argument in
his opening brief. Turner, 67 Va. App. at 61, 792 S.E.2d at 306. Turner sought to raise the same
argument in his opening brief to this Court, referring only generally to the First Amendment.
Assuming without deciding that the argument is not procedurally defaulted, we need not address
it because Turner abandoned it altogether at oral argument.
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Found., 273 Va. 564, 576, 643 S.E.2d 219, 225 (2007) (citing United Masonry, Inc. v. Riggs
Nat’l Bank, 233 Va. 476, 480, 357 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1987)).
Additionally, because Code § 18.2-423.2 is a penal statute, it must be strictly construed
with regard to any reasonable ambiguity, meaning Turner is “entitled to the benefit of any
reasonable doubt concerning the statute’s construction.” Waldrop v. Commonwealth, 255 Va.
210, 215-16, 495 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1998) (citing Harward v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363, 365,
330 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1985)). This principle, however, “does not prevent consideration by the
courts of the general purpose and design” of the statute when construing it. Tiller v.
Commonwealth, 193 Va. 418, 423, 69 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1952) (citing Donnelley v. United States,
276 U.S. 505, 512 (1928)). Therefore, “we will not apply ‘an unreasonably restrictive
interpretation of the statute’ that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein.” Alger v.
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 565 (2004) (quoting Armstrong v.
Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 581, 562 S.E.2d 139, 144 (2002)).
B.
Applying these principles, we conclude that Turner’s noose display located in his front
yard and clearly visible from a public road unmistakably falls within the purview of the Code §
18.2-423.2(B) element proscribing a noose display located on a public place.
1.
Under its express terms, Code § 18.2-423.2(B) is not limited to public property, Turner’s
contentions to the contrary notwithstanding. (Throughout this case, Turner has erroneously used
the terms “public place” and “public property” interchangeably.) Comparing the statute’s two
proscribed locations for displaying a noose, we see in subsection A that the General Assembly
has spoken in terms of “property,” specifically “private property” (prohibiting the display of a
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noose on the private property of another without permission) whereas in subsection B it chose to
speak in terms of a “place,” specifically a “public place.” “We have repeatedly stated that when
the General Assembly uses two different terms in the same act, it is presumed to mean two
different things.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458, 628 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2006)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, because we presume that the
word “place” under subsection B means something different than the word “property” under
subsection A, the term “public place” under Code § 18.2-423.2(B) (emphasis added) is not
limited in scope to public property—a term nowhere found in the statute. In other words, under
subsection B, whether a noose display is on privately or publicly owned property is not
determinative of whether it is located on a public place. If the General Assembly had intended to
limit the proscription of a noose display to public property under subsection B (in contrast to a
particular category of “private property” in subsection A), it could have easily so provided in lieu
of the language it actually used. 2 Since the General Assembly did not see fit to do so, we will
not write into subsection B words of limitation that were not included. “It is the function of the
2
Indeed, the General Assembly has repeatedly demonstrated that it knows how to make a
proscription apply specifically to public property when that is desired. See, e.g., Code § 10.12209 (making it “unlawful to post or erect any historical marker, monument, sign or notice, on
public property or upon any public street, road or highway in the Commonwealth” unless a
certain supporting written certificate has been issued “attesting to the validity and correct record
of the historic event, incident or fact set forth in the marker”); Code § 18.2-282.1 (making it
“unlawful for any person to point, hold, or brandish a machete or any weapon, with an exposed
blade 12 inches or longer, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons and in a
manner that reasonably demonstrates that intent,” and providing that if the violation occurs
“upon public property within 1,000 feet of” any public, private, or religious elementary, middle,
or high school, including buildings and grounds, he is guilty of a Class 6 felony); Code § 18.2323.01 (making it “unlawful for any person to dispose of a dead body . . . (i) on private property
without the written permission of the landowner or (ii) on public property”); Code § 33.2-802
(making it “unlawful for any person to dump or otherwise dispose of trash, garbage, refuse, litter
. . . or other unsightly matter on public property”).
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judiciary to interpret statutes. Rewriting them is the function of the legislature.” Owens v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 638, 179 S.E.2d 477, 481 (1971) (quoting Caldwell v.
Commonwealth, 198 Va. 454, 459, 94 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1956)). 3
Turner, in misapprehending this distinction between subsections A and B, bases his
principal argument upon an erroneous premise. He asserts that because he would not be in
violation of subsection A if he displayed a noose on someone else’s private property with
permission, he necessarily could lawfully display it on his own private property—regardless of
his intent to use it to intimidate his neighbors and its direct tendency to place them in reasonable
fear of death or bodily injury. The fallacy is in Turner’s failure to recognize that a noose display
placed on private property, whether with or without permission, remains subject to independent
scrutiny under subsection B, including consideration of the “public place” element. Code § 18.2423.2(B).
2.
In Hackney, this Court defined the term “public place” in a similar statutory context, as
indicated above. There, the defendant, while standing on his porch, uttered “loud, boisterous,
vile and abusive language” directed at a person passing along a nearby highway, and was
convicted of disorderly conduct. 186 Va. at 889-90, 45 S.E.2d at 241-42. On appeal, it was
conceded that the language defendant used constituted disorderly conduct within the usual
definition of that term. Defendant argued, however, that “before any party can be convicted of
disorderly conduct . . . he must be physically present in the highway or other public place,”
3
See also Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va. 283, 295 n.11, 805 S.E.2d 775, 781 n.11
(2017); Newberry Station Homeowners Ass’n v. Bd. of Supervisors, 285 Va. 604, 626-27, 740
S.E.2d 548, 560-61 (2013) (McClanahan, J., concurring).
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which, according to defendant, excluded him. Id. at 890, 45 S.E.2d at 242. The disorderly
conduct statute provided at that time, in relevant part: “If any person behaves in a riotous or
disorderly manner in any street, highway, public building, or any other public place . . . he shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. (emphasis added).
The Court in Hackney relied on the following common definitions in deciding the
meaning of the term “public place” in the disorderly conduct statute:
Webster’s International Dictionary, 2d Ed., defines “place” as “a portion
of space occupied by a body;” “any particular spot or locality.” The same
authority defines “public” as “open to the knowledge or view of all; generally
seen, known, or heard; without privacy, concealment, etc.” “A place so near and
so open that persons traveling the highway can see card or dice playing thereat is
abstractly and per se a public place.” 6 Words and Phrases, p. 5807. Bouvier’s
Law Dictionary defines “public place” as “Any place so situated that what passes
there can be seen by any considerable number of persons, if they happen to look.”
Id. at 891-92, 45 S.E.2d at 242-43. Thus concluding that a public place in the context of the
disorderly conduct statute included private property generally visible by the public from some
other location, the Court held that defendant’s subject conduct on his porch had been committed
in a public place and affirmed his conviction. Id. at 893, 45 S.E.2d at 243.
The General Assembly did not alter this construction of the term “public place” in
response to Hackney, which has stood for more than 70 years, and we perceive no valid reason
for not applying it to the same term under Code § 18.2-423.2 (B) in a similar context in the
present case. In this regard, we are mindful that “considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in
the area of statutory construction, where [the legislature] is free to change this Court’s
interpretation of its legislation.” Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977). 4
4
Turner urges us to adopt a more limited definition of the term “public place” found in
Black’s Law Dictionary: “Any location that the local, state, or national government maintains for
the use of the public, such as a highway, park or public building. Black’s Law Dictionary 1426
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3.
This construction of Code § 18.2-423.2(B) is also consistent with the general purpose and
design of the statute, which is to criminalize and deter what amounts to a true threat
communicated by the display of a noose, i.e., the intention to intimidate another by such display
and thereby reasonably place another in fear of death or bodily injury, as occurred here. Id. See
United States v. Dutcher, 851 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2017) (addressing a “true threat” as a
criminal offense and affirming the conviction); United States v. Houston, 683 Fed. Appx. 434,
438 (6th Cir. 2017) (same); United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 219-221 (4th Cir. 2016)
(same). We thus, again, decline Turner’s prompting to exclude all private property from the
scope of subsection B of the statute through an unreasonably restrictive interpretation that would
greatly diminish this provision’s reach and deterrent effect upon the making of such threats. We
decide, instead, to apply from Hackney the obvious and rational meaning of the term “public
place” as used in Code § 18.2-423.2(B) to include private property generally visible by the
public from some other location, which was undisputedly the case with the site of Turner’s noose
display in his front yard.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding
Turner’s conviction under Code § 18.2-423.2.
Affirmed.
(10th ed. 2014). In light of Hackney, we decline to do so. We also note that this definition is at
odds with the general purpose and design of Code § 18.2-423.2, as addressed supra.
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PUBLISHED
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, AtLee and Senior Judge Clements
Argued at Lexington, Virginia
JACK EUGENE TURNER
v.
Record No. 2039-15-3
OPINION BY
JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
NOVEMBER 22, 2016
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
A. Joseph Canada, Jr., Judge Designate
C. Holland Perdue III (Raine & Perdue, PLC, on briefs), for
appellant.
Christopher P. Schandevel, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Jack Eugene Turner (“Turner”) appeals the December 8, 2015 decision of the Circuit
Court for the County of Franklin (the “circuit court”) convicting Turner of one count of
displaying a noose with the intent to intimidate, in violation of Code § 18.2-423.2. Turner’s
three assignments of error are that the circuit court erred in (1) denying Turner’s motion to
dismiss because the circuit court failed to find that the displaying of a noose on private property
was protected free speech under the Constitution of the United States; (2) denying that Turner
lacked a constitutional right to express his freedom of speech by displaying a noose on his own
property; and (3) finding Turner guilty of displaying a noose with the intent to intimidate, in
violation of Code § 18.2-423.2.
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I. Background
On Wednesday, June 17, 2015, around 5:00 p.m., Traze Witcher (“Witcher”) was
returning home from her job as a nurse at Trinity Mission of Rocky Mount. Shortly after she
turned on to her street, Lindsey Lane in Rocky Mount, Franklin County, Virginia, she spotted an
all-black, life-size dummy hanging by a noose from a tree in the yard (“the noose display”) of the
second house, 108 Lindsey Lane.1 Witcher testified that, to her, it appeared as if a black man
was being hanged “from a rope from a tree in [Turner’s] yard.” Only hanging fifteen to thirty
feet from the side of the road, the noose display was visible to anyone traveling on Lindsey Lane.
Turner resides and owns the property at 108 Lindsey Lane. He resides next door to John
and Keena Mitchell (“John” or “Keena” or collectively “the Mitchells”).2 Keena is Witcher’s
sister; John is Witcher’s brother-in-law. The Witchers and the Mitchells are the only
African-American families residing on Lindsey Lane. The Mitchells live with their two male
children in the first house on Lindsey Lane. The Mitchells’ home sits approximately thirty to
forty feet from Turner’s home, and a fence does not separate the properties.
Immediately after seeing the noose display, Witcher turned around and drove directly to
the Mitchells’ house. Witcher testified that she was so fearful upon seeing the black dummy
hanging from the noose in Turner’s yard that all she could do after arriving at the Mitchells’
home was blow the car horn until Keena and John came outside. Witcher drove Keena and John
to see the noose and black dummy display. Upon seeing the display, John went to the Franklin
County Sheriff’s Department (the “Sheriff’s Department”) and reported the sight.
1
Lindsey Lane is a long gravel road with approximately a dozen homes located along it.
The only option for residents to access their property is by traveling this road past Turner’s
property.
2
At the time Turner presented the noose display, Witcher had lived on Lindsey Lane for
over ten years. The Mitchells had lived on Lindsey Lane for two years.
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The following day, Captain Paul Caldwell (“Captain Caldwell”) of the Sheriff’s
Department began investigating John’s report. Captain Caldwell arrived at Turner’s residence
around noon on Thursday, June 18, 2015. Captain Caldwell asked Turner about the object
hanging from the tree in Turner’s yard. Turner stated that it was a “scarecrow.” When Captain
Caldwell commented that there was no reason for a scarecrow without a garden, Turner implied
it was to scare away people. Turner explained that he was a “raciest” and that he “did like blacks
but not niggers.”3 At this point, Captain Caldwell told Turner that the noose display was a
“violation” and would be seized after Captain Caldwell spoke with the Commonwealth’s
Attorney. Then, Captain Caldwell and another officer photographed the dummy as it hanged in
the noose.4 After taking photographs, the noose display was removed and taken to the Sheriff’s
Department.
Prior to this incident, little contact occurred between Turner and the Witchers and the
Mitchells. On one occasion, in December 2013, the Mitchells received a letter from Turner
apologizing for the type of person he was and for not giving them a chance to let him find out
what kind of neighbors they were. On a separate occasion, Turner called the police on the
Mitchells to report them for a “humming noise” that he often complained emitted from the
Mitchells’ property. Yet, prior to June 17, 2015, neither John nor Keena Mitchell feared Turner.
As for Witcher, in April 2015 she borrowed Keena’s van only to have Turner flip his middle
finger at her as she passed his property. Then, Turner said “[you] people are nothing but
ignorant” and called Witcher a “stupid B.”
3
Turner pronounced the word “raciest” as the spelling reflects in this opinion and noted
in the record. It is understood that he meant racist.
4
The dummy’s neck was wrapped in duct tape and the rope had been tied around the
neck and one of the dummy’s arms. The dummy’s feet were hanging several feet off the ground.
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At trial, John testified that after seeing the noose display he was especially upset because
nine African-Americans had been killed in South Carolina earlier the same day at the
“Charleston Church Shooting.”5 He specified that the noose display caused him to fear for his
family’s safety. John’s wife, Keena, testified that upon seeing the noose display she feared for
herself and her children. In the days after seeing the noose display, John stated that before he
would leave for work in the morning he would check to make sure no one was standing in his
yard. Also, each day he questioned whether he was going to return home from work with
something thrown at his house or a message spray painted on his home. John attributed his
feelings to seeing the noose display on Turner’s property.
After the incident, the Mitchells no longer allow their sons to walk past Turner’s house
because the Mitchells are uncertain of what Turner is capable of doing. John explained that “if
[Turner] can hang a noose I don’t know what he is going to do.” Although the Mitchells did not
directly interact with Turner again after the noose display, Turner continuously hung a
confederate flag in a window of his home facing the Mitchells’ house.6
On August 3, 2015, a Franklin County grand jury issued an indictment against Turner
that on or about June 17, 2015, Turner “unlawfully and feloniously did display a noose on a
public place in a manner having a direct tendency to place another person in reasonable fear or
apprehension of death of [sic] bodily injury and with the intent of intimidating a person or group
of persons.” Turner was arrested for violating Code § 18.2-423.2.
5
The “Charleston Church Shooting” is a reference coined by the media and is commonly
used to refer to a mass shooting resulting in nine deaths that took place at the Emanuel African
Methodist Episcopal Church in downtown Charleston, South Carolina, on June 17, 2015.
6
Although not part of our analysis, the record reflects that while Turner was out on bond
awaiting his sentencing hearing, he placed a handmade cardboard sign against his house that
read, “Black nigger lives don’t matter, got rope.”
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Prior to trial, Turner filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the conduct for which he was
charged was protected free speech granted by the First Amendment of the Constitution and that
he did not violate Code § 18.2-423.2 because the noose display was exhibited on private
property, which is not property of another, a highway, or public place. On August 20, 2015, the
circuit court took Turner’s motion to dismiss under advisement and continued the case for a
bench trial on September 22, 2015.7
At trial, Turner pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. The circuit court overruled
Turner’s motion to dismiss and found that he hanged the noose in a public place because it was
up in a tree where it was visible from the road. The circuit court further found the noose display
was hanged to specifically intimidate others. Thus, the circuit court found Turner guilty of
violating Code § 18.2-423.2. On December 8, 2015, Turner appeared in the trial court for
sentencing. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the circuit court heard argument on Turner’s motion
to reconsider the finding of guilt. This motion was denied. Afterward, the circuit court
sentenced Turner to five years’ incarceration with four years and six months suspended.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
“Under well-settled principles of appellate review, [this Court] consider[s] the evidence
presented at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.”
Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 625, 629, 688 S.E.2d 154, 156 (2009) (quoting Bolden v.
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008)). “This principle requires this
Court to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and
regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to
7
At the hearing regarding Turner’s motion to dismiss, Turner announced that he was not
arguing the constitutionality of the statute; rather, his argument is that he was unconstitutionally
seized.
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be drawn therefrom.’” Beck v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 259, 262, 784 S.E.2d 310, 311
(2016) (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980)).
“It is the prerogative of the trier of fact to ‘resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Sierra v.
Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 770, 776, 722 S.E.2d 656, 658 (2012) (quoting Brown v.
Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 178, 185, 692 S.E.2d 271, 274 (2010)).
“A factfinder’s resolution of conflicting facts, as well as competing inferences, receives
‘the highest degree of appellate deference.’” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 23
n.2, 660 S.E.2d 687, 689 n.2 (2008) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 605, 608,
633 S.E.2d 229, 231 (2006)). This Court does “not ask whether we, as appellate judges, believe
‘the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Thomas, 48 Va. App. at
608, 633 S.E.2d at 231 (quoting Stevens v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 234, 249, 616 S.E.2d
754, 761 (2005) (en banc)). Rather, we ask only whether “any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stevens, 46 Va. App. at
249, 616 S.E.2d at 761. Furthermore, “[t]he judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is
entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.” Crislip v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 66, 69, 554
S.E.2d 96, 97 (2001) (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 170, 172, 342 S.E.2d 642,
643 (1986)). Finally, questions of both constitutional interpretation and statutory construction
are reviewed de novo. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 240, 738 S.E.2d 847, 877
(2013).
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B. Whether Turner’s actions constitute “True Threats” which are not protected by the
First Amendment
“The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free trade in
ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find
distasteful or discomforting.”
—Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003).
In 2009, the General Assembly enacted Code § 18.2-423.2, which provides as follows:
A. Any person who, with the intent of intimidating any person
or group of persons, displays a noose on the private property of
another without permission is guilty of a Class 6 felony.
B. Any person who, with the intent of intimidating any person
or group of persons, displays a noose on a highway or other
public place in a manner having a direct tendency to place
another person in reasonable fear or apprehension of death or
bodily injury is guilty of a Class 6 felony.
(Emphasis added). In his first two assignments of error, Turner argues that his conviction under
Code § 18.2-423.2(B) should be reversed because, notwithstanding the provisions of that statute,
he had “an absolute right under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, however
reprehensible or offensive, to burn a cross, fly any flag or to hang a noose in/on [his] own private
property.”
It is a foundational right that “[t]he First Amendment, applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.’” Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). “If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). “The First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive
conduct as well as to actual speech.” Black, 538 U.S. at 358. However, protections afforded by
the First Amendment are not absolute.
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The Supreme Court of the United States has “long recognized that the government may
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.” Id. True threats are
among the certain categories of speech that a state may prohibit without violating the First
Amendment. Id. at 359. “‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals.” Id. Even where the speaker does not “actually
intend to carry out the threat,” a “prohibition on true threats protects individuals from fear of
violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from the
possibility that the threatened violence will occur.” Id. at 360. Intimidation in the
“constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a
threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm
or death.” Id.
Code § 18.2-423.2, Virginia’s noose statute, is substantially similar to Virginia’s
cross-burning statute, Code § 18.2-423, that was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Virginia v. Black. 538 U.S. at 347-48. Pursuant to Virginia’s cross-burning statute, it
is a felony “for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of
persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other
public place.” Id. at 348; Code § 18.2-423. The statute further provides that “[a]ny such burning
of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons,” a
provision that has no equivalent in Virginia’s noose statute. Black, 538 U.S. at 348; Code
§§ 18.2-423, 18.2-423.2.
Black consolidated three cases involving convictions based on Code § 18.2-423.
Appellant Black burnt a cross on the private property of another with permission during a Ku
Klux Klan (the “Klan”) rally in Carroll County, Virginia. Black, 538 U.S. at 348, 350. The
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other two appellants, Richard Elliott and Jonathan O’Mara, were not affiliated with the Klan and
had burnt a cross on the private property of an African-American man in the City of Virginia
Beach, Virginia. Id. at 350. The Supreme Court of Virginia held Code § 18.2-423
unconstitutional on its face. Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 764, 779, 553 S.E.2d 738, 746
(2001). However, the Supreme Court of the United States considered and rejected the Supreme
Court of Virginia’s judgment that Virginia’s “cross-burning statute is unconstitutional because it
discriminates on the basis of content and viewpoint.” Black, 538 U.S. at 360. Disagreeing, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the First Amendment permits a state to “choose to
prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.” Id.
at 363. Thus, Virginia can “outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because
burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation.” Id. “Instead of prohibiting all
intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in
light of cross burning’s long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.” Id.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that a state may “choose to prohibit only those forms
of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.” Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
Turner quotes Black v. Commonwealth—which the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed in Virginia v. Black—for the general proposition that people have the right to “use
symbols to communicate,” and thus they may “reverently worship the cross or burn it as an
expression of bigotry.” 262 Va. at 778-79, 553 S.E.2d at 746. However, in Virginia v. Black,
the Supreme Court held that the “fact that cross burning is symbolic expression . . . does not
resolve the constitutional question.” 538 U.S. at 361. Here, the fact Turner hanged a dummy in
a noose in his front yard as a form of “symbolic expression . . . does not resolve the
constitutional question” either. Id. Rather, we look to whether the public display of a noose
evokes a “long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.” Id. at 363.
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“During this country’s ‘lynching era’—the five decades between the end of
Reconstruction and the beginning of the Great Depression, between 1880 and 1930—at least
2,462 African American men, women, and children died at the hands of southern mobs.” Lu-in
Wang, The Complexities of “Hate”, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 799, 833 (1999). “The mob inflicted death,
death that was the result of extraordinary, sadistic cruelty.” Id. at 834. “Almost all of their
killers were white.” Id. at 833. We know from historical accounts that victims were often
tortured before being executed, sometimes “by being slowly roasted over a fire,” other times “by
having limbs or sexual organs amputated.” Id. at 834. After an execution, members of the mob
might distribute “pieces of the charred remains . . . as souvenirs to the mob whose members
desired a keepsake as a remembrance of the notable happening.” Id. “In short, the phenomenon
of lynching exhibited American society in its most ferocious and inhuman manifestation.” Id.
“[L]ynching had a powerful terroristic effect on the target population.” Id. at 835. “The
use of violence was aimed not just at the individual victim but at the black community generally,
and the gruesome details of each event were publicized widely through the press and word of
mouth.” Id. at 835-36. “As a result, southern blacks lived with the knowledge that any one of
them could be a victim at any time.” Id. at 836. Therefore, we conclude that the public display
of a noose evokes a “long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.” Black, 538
U.S. at 363. As a result of lynching’s history as a clear signal of impending violence, we hold
that the Commonwealth may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages through the
display of a noose in the same manner and for the same reason it may regulate the message
conveyed by the burning of a cross. Id. at 360.
Virginia’s statute prohibiting the display of a noose, Code § 18.2-423.2, contains the
same “intent of intimidating any person or group of persons” element contained in the
cross-burning statute, Code § 18.2-423. Moreover, Virginia’s noose statute does not contain the
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prima facie evidence provision contained in the cross-burning statute that the plurality in Black
found to be unconstitutional. 538 U.S. at 347-48, 367. Furthermore, the General Assembly
inserted an additional element in the noose statute not found in the cross-burning statute—in
order to convict a defendant for hanging a noose under Code § 18.2-423.2(B), the
Commonwealth is required to prove that the noose was displayed “in a manner having a direct
tendency to place another person in reasonable fear or apprehension of death or bodily injury.”
Because of this added element, we hold that the scope of Code § 18.2-423.2 only encompasses
the exhibition of a noose that represents a “true threat.” See Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
“Intimidation” rises to the level of a “true threat” in cases where, as here, the person
communicating the threat “directs [the] threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of
placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” Id. Thus, pursuant to Black, we hold that
displaying a noose in the manner Code § 18.2-423.2 proscribes constitutes a “true threat,” and,
like cross burning, it is undeserving of First Amendment protection. Considering the evidence
presented at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Turner intended to intimidate
others via his noose display. In short, while the First Amendment protects Turner’s right to be a
racist and even to convey his racist beliefs to others, the protections of our Constitution do not
permit him to threaten or intimidate others who do not share his views. Therefore, when his
“speech” took the form of actions intended to threaten, intimidate or place others in reasonable
fear of bodily harm, his symbolic “speech” was not entitled to constitutional protection.
With regard to Turner’s second assignment of error in which he argues that he had an
absolute right under the First Amendment to use symbolic or offensive conduct however
reprehensible or offensive and with the intent to intimidate if he did so upon his own property,
we conclude that he has procedurally defaulted that issue. Pursuant to Rule 5A:20(e), an
appellant’s opening brief must contain “[t]he principles of law, the argument, and the authorities
- 11 -
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relating to each question presented.” “Statements unsupported by argument, authority, or
citations to the record do not merit appellate consideration. We will not . . . correct deficiencies
in a brief.” Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). Turner
failed to cite any authority whatsoever in support of his argument that the First Amendment
offers blanket protection for threats made on his private property, thus he failed to comply with
the provisions of Rule 5A:20(e), and we will not consider his arguments on appeal. Moreover, in
concluding that the First Amendment does not offer the sort of blanket protection that Turner
seeks, Justice Holmes famously observed in Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), that
falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater is not protected speech under the First Amendment
and we can think of no principled constitutional reason why that should change if you happen to
own the theater and Turner has offered none.
C. Public Place: Code § 18.2-423.2
The meaning of the words “public place,” in the context of Code § 18.2-423.2, is a
question of first impression in the Commonwealth.8 Code § 18.2-423.2(B) prohibits displaying a
noose “on a highway or other public place.” (Emphasis added). Turner alternatively argues that
his conviction should be overturned because Code § 18.2-423.2 “does not ban the conduct
complained of . . . as it occurred solely on Turner’s property” and therefore not in a “public
place.” Further, Turner argues that the circuit court’s “finding that [his] property was a public
place is erroneous and not supported by even the most expansive definition of public property.”
8
Code § 4.1-100 defines “public place,” as “any place, building, or conveyance to which
the public has, or is permitted to have, access, including restaurants, soda fountains, hotel dining
areas, lobbies, and corridors of hotels, and any highway, street, lane, park, or place of public
resort or amusement.” However, “Code § 4.1-100 limits its definitions of terms, including
‘public place,’ to Title 4.1, applying the provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.
There is no nexus in statute or case law between the provisions of Titles 4.1 and 18.2 to
substantiate the argument to transmorph the definition of non-identical terms in one to the other.”
Crislip, 37 Va. App. at 70, 554 S.E.2d at 98.
- 12 -
21a
When interpreting and applying a statute, this Court assumes “that the General Assembly
chose, with care, the words it used in enacting the statute, and we are bound by those words.”
PKO Ventures, LLC v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 286 Va. 174, 183, 747 S.E.2d
826, 831 (2013). “Moreover, when the General Assembly has used specific language in one
instance, but omits that language or uses different language when addressing a similar subject
elsewhere in the Code,” a reviewing court “must presume that the difference in the choice of
language was intentional.” Zinone v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 282 Va. 330, 337, 714
S.E.2d 922, 925 (2011). Here, the General Assembly used the word “property” in subsection
(A), and “place” in subsection (B). Code § 18.2-423.2. Accordingly, we “must presume” that
the General Assembly meant something other than public property when it proscribed the
displaying of a noose in a “public place” in subsection (B). Zinone, 282 Va. at 337, 714 S.E.2d
at 925; Code § 18.2-423.2(B) (emphasis added).
“The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to
legislative intent. The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over
any curious, narrow, or strained construction.” Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395,
507 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1998). A common dictionary definition of the word “public” is “a place
accessible or visible to all members of the community.” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 1836 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added). The same dictionary defines the word “place”
as “physical environment” or “physical surroundings.” Id. at 1727. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “public place” as “[a]ny location that the local, state, or national government maintains
for the use of the public, such as a highway, park, or public building.” Public Place, Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). These definitions alone do not provide much guidance.
Yet, while the definition of “public place” may be a case of first impression under the
current Code, the Supreme Court of Virginia previously defined the term in Hackney v.
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Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888, 45 S.E.2d 241 (1947), in the context of the Code of Virginia then
in effect. In Hackney, the Supreme Court decided “whether loud, boisterous, vile and abusive
language uttered by a man standing on his porch to a person passing along the highway within
thirty feet of the speaker constitutes disorderly conduct within the meaning of chapter 296 of the
Acts of 1946.” Id. at 889-90, 45 S.E.2d at 241-42. The Court held that it did. In doing so, the
Supreme Court provided us a framework of how to define “on a highway or other public place”
because it had to determine the meaning of the phrase within the Code section at the time, “[i]f
any person behaves in a riotous or disorderly manner in any street, highway, public building, or
any other public place . . . , he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. at 890, 45 S.E.2d at 242
(emphasis added).
As we have done here, the Hackney Court began its analysis with the commonly
understood definition:
Webster’s International Dictionary, 2d Ed., defines “place” as “a
portion of space occupied by a body;” “any particular spot or
locality.” The same authority defines “public” as “open to the
knowledge or view of all; generally seen, known, or heard; without
privacy, concealment, etc.” “A place so near and so open that
persons traveling the highway can see card or dice playing thereat
is abstractly and per se a public place.” 6 Words and Phrases, p.
5807. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines “public place” as “Any
place so situated that what passes there can be seen by any
considerable number of persons, if they happen to look.”
Id. at 891-92, 45 S.E.2d at 242-43. Then, the Court reasoned that
[t]he use of offensive language on one’s own premises does not
constitute a violation of . . . Penal Law unless that person
communicates it to the public; for example, shouts offensive
language from a window on a public street and thus annoys and
disturbs some person or persons who are within hearing of the
voice.
Id. at 893, 45 S.E.2d at 243 (emphasis added). Extrapolating from the language in Hackney, we
hold that the use of offensive language by use of a symbol on one’s own premises constitutes a
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violation of the law when that symbol is used as a means to communicate it to the public, and
thus disturbs persons who are within the viewpoint of the communication, display, or message.
In the case at bar, we conclude that the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting the
noose statute is to prohibit people from displaying nooses to communicate “true threats” as
defined in Black. A “prohibition on true threats protects individuals from fear of violence and
from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that
the threatened violence will occur.” Black, 538 U.S. at 360. We conclude that using the
definition for “public place” endorsed in Hackney to define the phrase in Virginia’s noose statute
furthers the General Assembly’s purpose in prohibiting the display of nooses where such display
is accompanied by the intent to intimidate and conducted in a manner having a direct tendency to
place people in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury. Thus, we adopt the definition for the
term “public place” that gives effect to this legislative intent as announced in Hackney.
It is without doubt that the location of the noose and dummy in Turner’s front yard—
where it was “clearly visible” from the street—qualifies as a “public place” under the definition
in Hackney. The facts, taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrate that
Turner admitted to Captain Caldwell that the noose and dummy were utilized as a “scarecrow”
meant to “scare people away.” Witcher and the Mitchells testified that the noose and dummy
were “very visible” and “clearly visible” to them from the street, and were hanging in “plain
sight” where you “couldn’t miss it if you tried.” Moreover, when Witcher and the Mitchells saw
the noose display, they feared for their safety and for the safety of their families.
III. Conclusion
As Justice Robert Jackson reminded us, “the very essence of constitutional freedom of
press and of speech is to allow more liberty than the good citizen will take. The test of its
vitality is whether we will suffer and protect much that we think false, mischievous and bad, both
- 15 -
24a
in taste and intent.” Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1950). A
constitutional limit to that allowance has been reached when an idea becomes a threat that causes
reasonable people to fear leaving their homes.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that Code §18.2-423.2 is constitutional as applied in
this case and further that the evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court’s conclusion that
the offense occurred in a public place. Under circumstances in this case the use of an
intimidating and threatening display on one’s own premises constituted a violation of the law
because Turner displayed a noose and dummy in a place and manner to communicate threats to
others with the intent to place members of the public in fear of violence and bodily harm. We
therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court convicting Turner of displaying a noose
with the intent to intimidate, in violation of Code § 18.2-423.2.
Affirmed.
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·, .'
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(
SENTENCING ORDER
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN
FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
STANDARDS CODE: 067C
Hearing Date: DECEMBER 8, 2015
Judge: A. JOSEPH CANADA, JR.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
v . ..::J~AC=.:K:.:..E=:;U::..:G::..:E::.N:.=E:....:T-=U.:...:R::..:.N=:;ER~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---" Defendant
This case came before the Court for sentencing of the defendant, who appeared in person with his
attorney, C HOLLAND PERDUE, III, APPOINTED
The Commonwealth was represented by .::D~W.:...:I.::G.:...:H..:.T....;:G:.:..,,;..:R.:;U.::.D.::.D_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
On SEPTEMBER 22, 2015
Offense Tracking
Number
the defendant was found guilty of the following offenses:
Virginia Crime Code
Code Section
(For Administralive Use Only)
VIO·5339·F6
067GM1500003679
Offense Dale: 06117/2015
18.2-423.2
DescrIDtlon:NOOSE:DISPLAY ·PUBLlC·INTIMID8
Offense Date:
Description:
Offense Dale:
Description:
Offense Dale:
Description:
Offense Dale:
Description:
Offense Dale:
Description:
Offense Date:
Description:
Offense Date:
Description:
Case Number
CR15057315·00
FELONY
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Offense Dale:
DescrlDtlon:
Offense Date:
Description:
Offense Dote:
Description:
Offense Dote:
Description:
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[X] The presentence report was considered and is ordered filed as a part of the record in this case in accordance
with the provisions of Code § 19.2-299.
[ ] No presentend'report was ordered.
Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 19.2-298.01, the Court has considered and reviewed the applicable
discretionary sentencing guidelines and the guidelines worksheets. The sentencing guidelines worksheets and
the written explanation of any departure from the guidelines are ordered filed as a part of the record in this case.
Before pronouncing the sentence, the Court inquired if the defendant desired to make .a statement and if the
\lo
defendant desired to advance any reason why judgment should not be pronounced.
l~l \4CArJ
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-6Mdz')
FORM CC-1393 MASTER 7{07
Page 1 of 4
;?1
26a
/ - ..
C6MMONWEALTH OF VIRGnC-'~ v. .=:.JA. !.:C:.!.K:. : E~U:. ;:G:.:E:!. .!N.:.E. . :. .TU: :. :R~N. :. :E:.:. R:. . .-_ _ _(··_·_ _ _ _ _--J,Defendant
The court SENTENCES the defendant to:
Case No.,_ _...;:C.:...R..:;.1.:...50...;:5.:...73.:...1...;:5-,.O..:;.O_ _
Description NOOSE:DISPLAY·PUBLlC-INTIMID8
[X] Incarceration with the Virginia Department of Corrections for the term of: _5_ years
months _ _ days
[ ] FINE.
The defendant is ordered to pay fine(s) in the amount of $_ _ _ _ _ _.
[ ] COSTS. The defendant is ordered to pay all costs of this case.
[ ] RESTITUTION. The defendant is ordered to make restitution in the amount of$_ _ _ _ _ _as set forth below.
[ ] DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION: The defendant's driver'S license has been suspended
[] indefinitely.
[ ] for a period of __ years __ months _ _ days
[ ] RESTRICTED DRIVER'S LICENSE: A restricted driver's license was issued by separate order.
[x] The court SUSPENDS _4_ years _6_ months _ _ days of incarceration
fine
INDEFINITELY
upon the condition(s) specified in Suspended Sentence Conditions.
Description _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Case No. '
[ ] Incarceration with the Virginia Department of Corrections for the term of: _ _ years
months _ _ days
[ ] FINE.
The defendant is ordered to pay fine(s) in the amount of $_ _ _ _ _ _.
[ ] COSTS. The defendant is ordered to pay all costs of this case.
( ] RESTITUTION. The defendant is ordered to make restitution in the amount of$
as set forth below.
( ] DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION: The defendant's driver's license has been suspended.
( ] for a period of _ _ years __ months _ _ days
[] indefinitely.
[ ] RESTRICTED DRIVER'S LICENSE: A restricted driver's license was issued by separate order.
fine
[ ] The court SUSPENDS _ _ years __ months _ _ days of incarceration
upon the condition(s) specified in Suspended Sentence Conditions.
for a period of
Case No.
Description _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
[ ] Incarceration with the Virginia Department of Corrections for the term of: _ _ years _ _months _ _ days
[ ] FINE.
The defendant is ordered to pay fine(s) in the amount of $._ _ _ _ __
[ ] COSTS.
The defendant is ordered to pay all costs ofthis case.
[ ] RESTITUTION. The defendant is ordered to make restitution in the amount of$
as set forth below.
[ ] DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION: The defendant's driver's license has been suspended.
[ ] for a period of _ _ years __ months _ _ days
[] indefinitely.
[ ] RESTRICTED DRIVER'S LICENSE: A restricted driver's license was issued by separate order.
fine
[ ] The court SUSPENDS _ _ years __. months _ _ days of incarceration
upon the condition(s) specified in Suspended Seritence Conditions.
for a period of ' .
Page 2 of 4
FORM CC-\393 MASTER 7/08
27a
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
C" JACK EUGENE TURNER
(
, Defendant
~~~~~~~~~---------------------'
Consecutive/concurrent:
IX) These sentences shall run consecutively with all other sentences.
[ ] These sentences shall run concurrently with all other sentences.
[ ] These sentences shall run consecutively/concurrently as described:
Suspended Sentence Conditions:
[X] Good Behavior: The defendant shall be of good behavior . INDEFINITELY
[ ] from the defendant's
release from confinement [x] .:..F..:..R:..::O:..:..:M::...D:.E::;C~E::M.:.:.B:::.:E::Rc..!...:::.8!!....:2:.=O:.!.15:::....-__________________________
[X] Supervised Probation: The defendant is placed on probation under the supervision of a Probation Officer
to commence [] upon sentencing
lX.I upon release from incarceration
for _ _ years _ _ months _ _ days [X] indefinite or unless sooner released by the court or by the
Probation Officer. The defendant shall comply with all the rules and requirements set by the Probation
Officer. Probation shall include substance abuse counseling and/or testing as prescribed by the Probation
Officer.
] Community-Based Corrections System Program pursuant to Virginia Code § 19.2-316.2 or 19.2-316.3:
The defendant shall successfully complete the _-:--':":"'":"'--:::-:-:-__-:-:____--:--:---=-=__---:____.,---:--______
program. Successful completion of the program shall be followed by a period of intensive probation
of
.
, followed by a period of supervised probation
of ___________________________________
[ ] The defendant shall remain in custody until program entry.
] Registration pursuant to Code § 9.1-903 for offenses defined in § 9.1-902 is required.
[X] The defendant shall provide a DNA sample and legible fingerprints as directed.
[ ] Special conditions:
[ ] The defendant shall make restitution as follows:
$
00 _______________________________________________
for case number(s):
$
00 ___------------------------------------------
for case number(s):
00 ________________________________
$
for case number(s):
$
00 _________________________________________________
for case number(s):
FORMCC·1393 MASTERS/OS
Page 3 of 4
~q
28a
,"
,..... .
.
(
{
' "
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA \,.. -=J=-:.AC::;.:K~EU:::.;G:::;E:::..N.:.:E:....:T~U;.:..:R::..:N=ER~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I' Defendant
Post-incarceration supervision following felony conviction pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-10 and 19.2-295.2:
[ ] Post-Incarceration Supervised Probation: The defendant is placed on supervised probation to commence
• unless released earlier by the
upon release from incarperation for a period of
court. The defendant shall comply with all the rules and requirements set by the Probation Officer.
[ ] Post-Incarceration Post-Release Supervision: In addition to the above sentence of incarceration, the court
imposes an additional term of
of incarceration. This term is suspended and
• is imposed which is to commence
a period of post-release supervision of
upon release from incarceration.The defendant shall comply with all the rules and requirements set by the
Probation Officer.
[><] AFTER PRONOUNCING SENTENCE, THE COURT ADVISED THE DEFENDANT OF THE RIGHT TO PETITION FOR AN
APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA, AND OF THE RIGHT TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, AND
TO HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL. THE COURT APPOINTED C. HOLLAND PERDUE, III
TO REPRESENT THE DEFENDANT IF AN APPEAL IS PURSUED.
.
[X] The defendant was remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
[] The defendant was allowed to depart.
The defendant shall be given credit for time spent in confinement while awaiting trial pursuant to Virginia
Code § 53.1-187.
ENTERthis~~day
~"~I:"'
,
ge
DEFENDANT IDENTIFICATION:
Name: JACK EUGENE TURNER
Alias: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
SSN: 234-11-6561
DeB: .J~_J_~.J 1963
Sex: ~
SENTENCESU~ARY:
Total Incarceration Sentence Imposed: ...:5~Y:..:E;;.:,~.=..:.:S=---_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Total Sentence Suspended:
4 YEARS 6 MONTHS
INDEFINITE
Total Supervised Probation Term:
Total Postrelease Term Imposed and Suspended:
Total Fine Imposed $ .00
• Total Fine Suspended $....:...0;:....:0'--_ _ __
FOR CLERK'S USE ONLY:
[ ] Conviction reported to applicable Board _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~, Clerk
.. •.. •..•.. •• ..·DATE.... •............
FORM CC-1393 MASTER 1/09
By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~, Deputy Clerk
Page 4 of 4
30
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.