Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Daniel J. Taylor, aka Danny J. Taylor, aka Billy J. Taylor, aka Germaine L. Taylor, aka Joseph Taylor, Petitioner v. United States

NO.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DANIEL J. TAYLOR

Petitioner

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BELL & HOBBS

»~ Re

R. Dee Hobbs, Tennesse¢ BPR #40482

Appointed Counsel for Daniel J. Taylor

P.O. Box 11308

Chattanooga, TN 37401

Email: bell.hobbslaw@gmail.com

(423) 266-6461/ Fax 756-8521

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether a violation of due process results from the denial of a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea without making any meaningful inquiry into the factual basis supporting

the motion or creating a record to support the denial.

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the

proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this Petition is as follows:

Daniel J. Taylor, Petitioner

United States of America, Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. .. . sswinswessnassasweusousaevssvsenssaesvvencuieessvunccitss il

LIST OF PARTIES scssccusssvssccnsssrarwawsnsveucsare caaaavepw dee daa vasieiie de aesisis sae Vaneau er eamweeseueent ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS wiisisscssiscnssasasscnspvciavecageesbounas ancapaae st eniageasssesceypeocesecesersons lll

INDEX TO APPENDICES. ............cccccceceeeneeeseeeneneeeeeeeeeeeneceeeeneaeaeeeeeeeesaeseeeeeeseenss ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. .........cccccceeecnceeeeececeeeeeeeeseeueneeneueseceseeeeneneneneeeaeseeeuens iv

PRAYER. vnasaseiin os snmneeonmnassanaweeceas pare aenunmicensinsaiawe ka sMeRaW RIA RU RLS SUSUE NEUSE NEN SWAT SRT Tua 1

OPINION BELOW. .. sssicsvsswwcssess sawcacesaannaeuracnny canena seaeeeeesauieinn Nene easiawa sniewabekeeToua @easees 2

JURISDICTION. ......... .siasassisiionssisneendadenaasivinn say eSaeseresoaNbaReanw AbaKeenpeRNsasaaeeesbenoeeorecness 3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED. .............0c:cceecececeeceeerececerectencucueeeeness 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........ccccscececeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeceeesueneesseneseaeueaeeueaevas 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION sssssscsssccananaoaweavenasunmneesiuasvaacssaevavneanenesees 7

Review is necessary because a due process deprivation occurs when a trial court

fails to hold an evidentiary hearing, or at least make meaningful inquiry, regarding a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea. This is an important question of federal law, invoking

both Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections, which requires instruction from this Court

to district judges handling such motions.

CONCLUSION... ...ccccccececeeneneseneeeeeeeuseeeseeeseeseaeneneneseceeeseetsneeseeeneneeseuseseeueweess 11

INDEX TO APPENDICES

DECISION OF SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS. .............cccccececeseeecececseeceseeens 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

United States v. Alexander,

948 F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir. 1991)... ccc ceccecccscsscscsscseecsesecsceseeacesseeressesecseeacescsesacseravsceacenensense 9

United States v. Bashara,

27 F.3d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir. 1994)... cc ceesccsesessesescsesceseseseesesecesescsreccsecsucarseavscsaavacacenears 8,10

United States v. Bazzi,

94 F.3d 1025, 1027 (6th Cir: 1996)... cesmawiaesssceessssasessssmeisesaresirtstoiasiciesetatetiRNANEUNANCRTAES SNES 8

United States v. City of Warren,

138 F.3d 1083, 1085 (6th Cir. 1998). ccccscccsessssenevssnnasunsnsnsvassestessincdeneeswasectelanassavsussussipsusamnseeicn 7

United States v. Culp,

608 Fed. Appx. 390 (6th Cir. 2015)... ccccescessesesessessscsescecescsesceessecssaceccstcacsaracseanacasacuseasacavenees 8

United States v. Fofana,

50 Fed. App'x. 725, 728 (6th Cir. 2002) ......:.cccsccssssesseseseseseesesessesecsesscsscscesesssacsceavssscesnscevscacees 10

United States v. Haygood,

549 F.3d 1049, 1052 (6th Cir. 2008)...............<evssivsvsusssaissuisaswuasesvsncsuescstestsccaeveccsaiitestbustieers 8, 10

United States v. Hunt,

205 F.3d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 2000)...................saileasaeppuyantysseecaparsavanisvers Gaaxsatayejacsmmeeeincseecarecenroners 7

United States v. Joslin, °

434 F.2d 526, 531 (D.C.Cir. 1970) eee eeessscssesessesesesessscecesesseecsscsccassecsteucsavasessacsvenescavacsteneeaeas 10

United States v. McCoy,

155 Kedy Appx. 199, 203 Gth Cir. 2005) .......... sosscsssnnsasscamnacsanscasasacancemnanssaatecuncese ranean aRrOReneets 11

United States v. Spencer,

836 F.2d 236, 238 (6th Cir. 1987)... swscsressuscesveccasesascescsusteuasesbenssenvasssbasecsuscessesioscaitianuaacesemenees 9

United States v. Triplett,

828 F.2d 1195, 1198 (6th Cir, 1987)... eeeessssesscssecssesssceceseseeecseeseesssacsecacsecstsneacsesesasvsceavacees 10

Constitution and Statutes

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ULS. CONST. amend. VI oo. cceecsesssseeseesssseeseessessceseseeseseseeasseeasseceueeasecenscsseaccascecsacauaceasecseeaceaseaees 4

18 U.S.C. § 2119 ececssesesecsetessseeseseseceseesceseesseesseesesesenesscsesacsssscssecssevsesesassacsasaesaveceavaceeeeaceaves 4

28 U.S.G. § 1254(1)....... cxcsswmasnnensnancosssanasssacnas:ssntnsneea iat casio sSOOSN 8 seco SAARC SUE SIS apE EET 3

Rules

Supreme Court Rule 29 . scsssvessusssenmnessnnsanenendiskavsastobns vis weisecei css ucssviccecvettctioststtccucacesssisvisivilssteasies 12

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 ... cacsvascesccusnsscusssaseoasiaviubtencsabusuasueb onbuleseaeatoneheenicareieeneeess 9

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) .....scessscssssssseseeseseesceescescusceecacsecsrcassecaceceaseneeseeaees 8

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Daniel J. Taylor respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

judgment below.

OPINION BELOW

A copy of the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is

attached as Appendix A to this Petition and is styled United States v. Daniel Taylor, No. 17-5302

(6"" Cir. January 3, 2018).

JURISDICTION

On January 3, 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered its ruling

affirming the district court. United States v. Daniel Taylor, No. 17-5302 6" Cir. January 3,

2018). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. CONST. amend. V, which states in pertinent part:

No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which states in pertinent part:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and

public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall

have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by

law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be

confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his

defence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural background. On April 26, 2016, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District

of Tennessee returned an indictment charging the Petitioner, Daniel J. Taylor (“Mr. Taylor” or

“Petitioner”) with one count of carjacking in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Several weeks

later, Mr. Taylor executed the written plea agreement at issue in this case. He proceeded to enter

a guilty plea on October 24, 2016. Very soon afterward, however, he moved the trial court to

allow him to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial based on a not guilty plea. In

particular, the Petitioner contended that his attorney had not provided adequate representation

and had misstated to Mr. Taylor important aspects of both the plea agreement itself and its

impact.

A hearing on Mr. Taylor’s motion to withdraw his plea took place on January 19, 2017.

Mr. Taylor was represented by the same counsel about whom he had complained. He was not

given a chance to testify. The District Court ruled that the motion should be denied; however,

there is literally no order in the record which incorporates that ruling. After the hearing, Mr.

Taylor’s appointed counsel moved to withdraw. Finding good cause to substitute counsel, the

district judge entered an order appointing the undersigned on February 3, 2017.

A sentencing hearing was subsequently held on March 10, 2017. At the outset of the

hearing, the Petitioner renewed his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, contending among other

things that the earlier hearing was deficient; however, the District Court denied the renewed

motion. Mr. Taylor was then sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 156 months followed by a

term of supervised release of three years.

Mr. Taylor filed a Notice of Appeal on March 14, 2017. On January 3, 2018, the Sixth

Circuit issued its opinion which affirmed the holdings of the District Court. Mr. Taylor now

seeks relief from this Court.

Factual background. Although the Petitioner had been indicted in April of 2016, the

plea agreement in issue was not executed until October 24, 2016. Throughout this time, and as

acknowledged by his appointed counsel, Mr. Taylor had maintained his innocence. Very soon

after the execution of the plea agreement, Mr. Taylor stated his desire for his counsel to move to

withdraw the plea agreement, but the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was not filed by his

attorney until some forty-six days after the agreement was executed.

As evidence of Mr. Taylor’s desire to withdraw from the plea agreement, he refused to

meet with his counsel and a probation official for a presentence meeting just a matter of days

after the execution of the plea agreement. The record makes it clear that he expressed

dissatisfaction at this time with both the plea agreement and his counsel.

As referenced above, a hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was held on

January 19, 2017, and during the hearing Mr. Taylor’s counsel acknowledged to the trial court

that his client believed his attorney had not provided adequate representation and had induced

him to plead guilty. Despite this revelation, however, and despite the request for an evidentiary

hearing, the lower court conducted no inquiry at this time into either the adequacy of counsel’s

representation of Mr. Taylor, the relationship between the client and his attorney, or the

circumstances behind the execution of the plea agreement. Instead, the trial court simply denied

the motion, but no order to this effect, stating either the denial of the motion or the reasons for

such denial, was ever entered.

Soon thereafter the Appellant’s appointed counsel moved to withdraw and was in fact

replaced by the undersigned after a hearing on the Motion to Substitute Attorney was held on

January 31, 2017. During this hearing, Mr. Taylor’s then-counsel stated that part of the basis for

the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas was an ineffective assistance claim. He added the

following:

So it was kind of odd arguing for the motion to withdraw, being that Mr. Taylor

believed that I was part of the reason for the fact that he pled guilty when he was

saying that now he wishes not to plead guilty and the reason that he did plead

guilty is because he feels that I was ineffective in representing him. So then I was

arguing that motion, so — and certainly I tried to argue the motion to the best of

my abilities, but I could see where Mr. Taylor would be confused, in the light of

the fact that he was making the claim that I was ineffective — and then I was

arguing to have the plea withdrawn.

Although the trial court had denied the motion to withdraw the plea agreement, it then

determined that cause existed to substitute counsel and entered an order to that effect on

February 3, 2017.

The sentencing hearing followed on March 10, 2017. At the outset of the hearing, the

undersigned renewed Mr. Taylor’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Mr. Taylor again raised

the issue of the effectiveness of the very same counsel who had not only moved the trial court to

withdraw the plea due in part to ineffectiveness but also argued this same motion. The Petitioner

again raised the irregularity of allowing that counsel to handle the proceeding and asked for an

evidentiary hearing, but the trial court declined to hear any evidence on the matter or make any

further findings regarding this issue. Instead, the lower court summarily denied the renewed

motion without explanation and proceeded to sentence Mr. Taylor.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The denial by the district court of Mr. Taylor’s motion to withdraw his plea was an abuse

of discretion which has resulted in violations of both Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections.

While the Petitioner acknowledges that the district court conducted a facial hearing on his

written motion to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial, this record establishes that the trial

judge did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, or otherwise make a meaningful inquiry about his

claims, and thus could not properly consider the established factors relevant to such a motion

before rejecting his complaints.

Accordingly, this Petition addresses the issue of whether due process is violated by the

failure of a trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or meaningful inquiry on a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea when the motion, at least on its face, states a basis for such relief. The

present case gave the Sixth Circuit an opportunity to provide direction and guidance in such

situations. Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit simply concluded that the trial court had not abused

its discretion in deciding not to allow the withdrawal of the guilty plea. Should the Court grant

this Petition, an important due process right can be adequately protected.

It is acknowledged that the Sixth Circuit properly determined that the denial of a motion

to withdraw a plea is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Hunt, 205

F.3d 931, 936 (6" Cir. 2000). Of course, an abuse of discretion exists when a reviewing court has

“a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment”. United

States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1085 (6" Cir. 1998).

With respect to a request to withdraw a guilty plea, Rule 11(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure states:

A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. ...

(2) after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if:

(B) the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal...

There is ample Sixth Circuit precedent regarding the circumstances under which a

defendant has a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing his guilty plea. For instance, this Court of

Appeals identified in United States v. Bashara, 27 F.3d 1174, 1181 (6" Cir. 1994), and again in

United States v. Haygood, 549 F.3d 1049, 1052 (6™ Cir. 2008), certain factors for a trial judge to

consider in deciding whether a voluntary plea may be withdrawn prior to sentencing:

(1) the amount of time between the plea and the motion to withdraw it;

(2) the presence or absence of a valid reason for the failure to move to withdraw

the plea earlier in the proceedings;

(3) whether the defendant has asserted or maintained his innocence;

(4) the circumstances of the entry of the plea;

(5) the defendant's nature and background;

(6) the defendant's prior experiences with the criminal justice system; and

(7) any potential prejudice to the Government if the motion to withdraw is

granted.

See also United States v. Culp, 608 Fed. Appx. 390 (6" Cir. 2015).

It has long been recognized that these factors are non-exclusive, that no single factor is

controlling, and that it is not necessary for a majority of these factors to militate in favor of the

defendant seeking to withdraw a plea. United States v. Bazzi, 94 F.3d 1025, 1027 (6" Cir. 1996).

Simply put, by not conducting any evidentiary hearing regarding the facts behind Mr. Taylor’s

motion to withdraw his plea agreement, or at least some studied inquiry as to his allegations, the

district court failed to make a sufficient and meaningful inquiry into several of the factors

mentioned above. How, then, could it be appropriately decided whether he had a fair and just

reason to withdraw his plea? What discussion can be found in the record of any prejudice to the

Government had the motion been granted? Was there a reason he did not seek to withdraw the

agreement sooner? The record contains no discussion regarding these or other factors, and the

refusal by the trial court to make a meaningful inquiry in this matter through an evidentiary

hearing was an abuse of discretion. Should the Court grant this Petition, important guidance can

be offered trial courts dealing with this type of situation.

Mr. Taylor, of course, recognizes that a defendant does not have an absolute right to

withdraw a guilty plea. United States v. Spencer, 836 F.2d 236, 238 (6" Cir. 1987). On the other

hand, if such relief could never be appropriate, Rule 11 would not exist. The reason behind the

Rule 11 provisions for the withdrawal of a guilty plea is to allow a “hastily entered plea made

with an unsure heart and a confused mind to be undone”. United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d

1002, 1004 (6™ Cir. 1991).

It is noteworthy that Mr. Taylor’s former counsel acknowledged his client had

maintained his innocence both before and after executing the plea agreement. The Petitioner

raised issue with his relationship with his counsel, complained of the effectiveness of his

attorney’s representation, and stated, as stated by the attorney himself, that his lawyer had

induced him to plead guilty. Meanwhile, Mr. Taylor’s counsel at the time admitted that it “was

kind of odd arguing for the motion to withdraw, being that Mr. Taylor believed that I was part of

the reason for the fact that he pled guilty...” Further, there was determined in the hearing to

substitute counsel to be a sufficient basis for the attorney to withdraw in light of these particular

circumstances, yet even then the trial court declined to hear proof on the circumstances behind

the withdrawal of counsel.

This record, then, confirms that the trial court made no meaningful inquiry into the claims

Mr. Taylor had raised regarding his attorney and the effectiveness of his lawyer’s representation

relative to the plea agreement. In light of what clearly should be a concern for any trial court in

circumstances similar to this case, a defendant certainly has a due process right to have these

factors addressed in an evidentiary hearing, or in some other sort of meaningful inquiry, before a

request to withdraw a plea agreement is ruled upon.

The Sixth Circuit has determined that a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing

on a motion to withdraw his guilty plea if the motion “merely contradicts the record, (is)

inherently incredible, or (is) simply conclusory.” United States v. Fofana, 50 Fed. App'x. 725,

728 (6th Cir. 2002). The record in this case, however, does not reflect that the trial court made

any determination to that effect. Meanwhile, a defendant may be entitled to an evidentiary

hearing when there are “factual matters at issue which bear directly on the controversy.” United

States v. Triplett, 828 F.2d 1195, 1198 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Joslin, 434 F.2d 526, 531

(D.C.Cir. 1970). This record simply does not go as far as to reflect why the trial court ruled as it

did. The factual matters at issue, which involved among other things a fundamental

constitutional right, namely the representation Mr. Taylor was receiving, were relevant to the

controversy but were brushed aside by the district court. What resulted was an abuse of

discretion, which in this matter amounted to a denial of due process.

In addition, certain elements of the Sixth Circuit Bashara/Haygood standards mentioned

above were either ignored or at least misapplied by the trial court. For instance, the government

conceded that no potential prejudice existed by allowing the withdrawal of the plea agreement.

10

Also, the amount of time elapsing between the plea and the Petitioner’s stated desire to withdraw

his guilty plea did not constitute significant delay. While time alone does not provide an

adequate basis for denying a motion to withdraw a plea, United States v. McCoy, 155 Fed. Appx.

199, 203 (6" Cir. 2005), Mr. Taylor had in fact directed his counsel much earlier to move the

trial judge to set the plea aside and move forward with a trial.

Under all of the circumstances that are reflected in this record, it is evident that the

district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea without

making a meaningful inquiry into the Petitioner’s claims, especially his contention regarding the

effectiveness of his counsel. In its subsequent ruling, the Sixth Circuit missed an opportunity to

provide guidance for the protection of a most important constitutional requirement — the right to

trial by jury on a not guilty plea. This Court can remedy these omissions by granting the Petition

of Mr. Taylor.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Daniel J. Taylor respectfully prays that this Court

grant certiorari to review the judgment of the Sixth Circuit in this case.

This 29" day of March, 2018.

BELL & HOBBS

Olden

R. Dee Hobbs, Tenhessee BPR #10482

Appointed Counsel for Daniel J. Taylor

P.O. Box 11308

Chattanooga, TN 37401

Email: bell.hobbslaw@gmail.com

(423) 266-6461/ Fax 756-8521

11