Opposition Brief — Ronnie Keith Williams, Petitioner v. Florida

CASE NO. 17-7924

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

October 2017, Term

RONNIE KEITH WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

PAMELA JO BONDI

Attorney General

Tallahassee, Florida

LESLIE T. Campbell*

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Florida Bar No. 0066631

Office of the Attorney General

1515 N. Flagler Dr. - Suite 900

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Telephone (561) 837-5016

Facsimile (561) 837-5108

Capapp@MyFloridaLegal.com

Lesie.Campbell@MyFloridaLegal.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

[Capital Case]

[Restated]

1.

Whether this Court should exercise its certiorari

jurisdiction to review the Florida Supreme Court’s factbased decision that Petitioner, following an evidentiary

hearing, did not prove he has deficits in adaptive

functioning and denying the claim of intellectual disability

where the factual findings are supported by the record and

where the state court decision does not conflict with

precedent of this Court, another state supreme court, or

United States Court of Appeal nor does it present an

unsettled issue of law.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ....................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................... ii

TABLE OF CITATIONS .................................................................................... iii

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW .................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION .................................................................................................. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............................................. 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ..................................................... 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .......................................................... 20

CERTIORARI REVIEW IS UNWARENTED WHERE THE FLORIDA

SUPREME COURT’S FACT-BASED DECISION THAT PETITIONER,

FOLLOWING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, DID NOT PROVE HE

HAS DEFICITS IN ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONING AND DENYING THE

CLAIM OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY WHERE THE FACTUAL

FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND WHERE THE

STATE COURT DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH

PRECEDENT OF THIS COURT, ANOTHER STATE SUPREME

COURT, OR UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL NOR DOES IT

PRESENT AN UNSETTLED ISSUE OF LAW. (RESTATED) ...................... 20

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 34

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................... 35

ii

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES

PAGE

Cases

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) ...................... 11

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) .. 11, 13, 20,

21

Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825 (2009) ............................................................................. 21

Dufour v. State, 69 So.3d 235 (Fla. 2011) ................................................. 14, 19, 26, 31

Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tx. Crim. App. 2004) ........................................ 32, 33

Franqui v. State, 59 So.3d 82 (Fla. 2011) ................................................................... 12

Hall v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014)..... 13, 20, 22

Hodges v. State, 55 So.3d 515 (Fla. 2010) .................................................................. 16

Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016) .......................................................................... 2

Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016) ..................................................................... 11

Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d 435 (Fla. 2014) ................................................................... 12

Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) ..................................................... 20, 22, 32, 33

Mosley v. State, (Mosley), 209 So.3d 1248 (Fla. 2016) ............................................... 11

Nixon v. State, 2 So.3d 137 (Fla. 2009) ....................................................................... 12

Page v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 286 U.S. 269 (1932) ....................................... 21

Phillips v. State, 984 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2008) .............................................. 27, 19, 27, 31

Rockford Life Insurance Co. v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182 (1987)

................................................................................................................................... 21

iii

Salazar v. State, 188 So.3d 799 (Fla. 2016) .............................................. 12, 13, 19, 31

Snelgrove v. State, 107 So.3d 242 (Fla. 2012) ............................................................ 12

United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 225 (1925) ......................................................... 21

Williams v. State, 226 So.3d 758 (Fla. 2017) ...................................................... passim

Williams v. State, 792 So.2d 1207 (Fla. 2001) .............................................................. 2

Williams v. State, 967 So.2d 735 (Fla. 2007) ...................................................... 1, 2, 10

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257 ............................................................................................................. 1

Section 921.137, Fla. Stat........................................................................................ 1, 22

Section 921.137(4), Fla. Stat ....................................................................................... 12

Section 921.137(1), Fla. Stat ............................................................................... passim

Section 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat ................................................................................... 10

Section 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat ................................................................................... 10

Rules

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(e) ............................................................................................. 14

iv

CITATION TO OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of which Petitioner seeks discretionary review is reported as

Williams v. State, 226 So.3d 758 (Fla. 2017). Petitioner’s capital sentence, initially

affirmed in Williams v. State, 967 So.2d 735 Fla. 2007), has been vacated by Williams,

226 So.3d at 773.

JURISDICTION

Petitioner, Ronnie Keith Williams, (“Williams”), is seeking jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

Although this is the appropriate provision, the

requirements of same have not been met.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Respondent, the State of Florida (“State”), accepts Petitioner’s reference to the

Eighth, and Fourteen Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as

Section 921.137, Florida Statutes.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

On March 4, 1993, Petitioner, Ronnie Keith Williams (“Williams”), was

indicted for first-degree murder for the January 26, 1993 attack upon Lisa Dyke

which resulted in her death on February 14, 1993. His first conviction and death

sentence were reversed. Williams v. State, (Williams I) 792 So.2d 1207 (Fla. 2001)

(finding substitution of deliberating juror improper). On retrial, the jury convicted

Williams of first-degree murder, finding both premeditated and felony murder proven

(ROA.4 382; ROA.7 13; ROA.19 1523-34)1 and recommended death by a vote of ten

to two. (ROA.5 399). On April 16, 2004, the court followed the jury’s recommendation

and sentenced William to death (ROA.5 413-28).

On direct appeal, the Florida

Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Williams v. State, (Williams II)

967 So.2d 735, 767 (Fla. 2007), rev. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1709 (2009). During the

pendency of Williams postconviction appeal, this Court issued Hurst v. Florida, 136

S.Ct. 616 (2016) and the parties were permitted to file supplemental briefs. Rejecting

Williams’ collateral issues including the claim of intellectual disability, but not

addressing the claim of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel, the Florida

Supreme Court vacated Williams’ death sentence and ordered a new sentencing.

Williams v. State, (Williams III), 226 So.3d 758, 773 (Fla. 2017).

The Florida Supreme Court, on direct appeal, set forth the following facts.

On March 4, 1993, a grand jury indicted Williams on one

count of first-degree premeditated murder for the murder

of Lisa Dyke. The charges against Williams arose as a

1 References to the appellate records will appear as “ROA” for the direct appeal

and “PCR” for the postconviction appeal followed by the volume and page number(s)

2

result of the death of Dyke nineteen days after she was

stabbed multiple times with a knife in a Wilton Manors

apartment complex. The evidence presented at trial

established the following:

On Tuesday, January 26, 1993, at approximately 8:30 a.m.,

a call was made to 911 from a woman who identified herself

as Lisa Dyke. Dyke stated that she had been stabbed in her

heart and back, and she was more than seven months

pregnant. When the operator inquired of Dyke as to who

stabbed her, she responded with a name that sounded to

the operator like “Rodney.” Dyke then informed the

operator that her attacker was a black male and, although

she did not know his last name, she could provide a phone

number from which that information could be obtained.

Dyke provided the phone number and stated that it

belonged to the girlfriend of the man who had stabbed her.

When Dyke opened her door for the police, Officer Brian

Gillespie observed an eighteen-year-old black female who

was nude, bloody, and wet, “as if she tried to take a

shower.” Dyke was holding clothing in front of herself in an

attempt to cover her nudity. According to Gillespie, Dyke

was upset and beginning to lose consciousness. Gillespie

observed stab wounds on Dyke's upper torso and back and

noticed that there was blood “pretty much everywhere.” As

she lay on the couch, Dyke stated repeatedly to Gillespie

that she did not want to die. While the paramedics were

treating Dyke, Gillespie asked who had stabbed her.

Through the oxygen mask that covered Dyke's face, and

over the sounds of numerous police and paramedic radios,

Gillespie heard Dyke say the name “Rodney.” FN2 When

Gillespie asked Dyke who Rodney was, Dyke replied,

“Ruth's sister's boyfriend.” Dyke gave Gillespie the

telephone number of “Ruth's sister.” Dyke then made the

unsolicited statement to Gillespie, “He raped me.” Soon

after, the paramedics transported Dyke to the hospital.

Hospital personnel were unable to perform a rape

examination or collect evidentiary samples for analysis

before Dyke was rushed into surgery.

FN2. However, Detective Daniel James, who was also at

the scene, testified that he heard Dyke say the name

“Ronnie.”

3

While processing the crime scene, Detective Bob Cerat

noticed that there were no signs of forced entry into the

apartment. In the bedroom, Cerat discovered a knife that

was stained with the same reddish substance that

appeared throughout the apartment. Cerat collected the

knife, as well as other items from the scene that were

stained with the reddish substance. Cerat and another

detective lifted or photographed latent fingerprints from

the scene.

Detective Anthony Lewis determined that Ruth Lawrence

rented the apartment where the stabbing had occurred. He

met with Ruth, and she stated that Lisa Dyke had been

babysitting Ruth's nine-month-old son in the apartment.

Dyke had been living with Ruth for approximately two

weeks. Dyke was connected with Ruth because Dyke was

dating Ruth's brother, Julius, and Julius was the father of

Dyke's unborn baby. The detective discovered that Ruth's

sister was named Stefanie Lawrence, and the name of

Stefanie's boyfriend was Ronnie Williams. At the time of

the attack, Stefanie and Ronnie had been dating for

approximately six months. Stefanie lived with her father

and Julius, and her telephone number was the number

that Dyke provided to police and the 911 operator to

identify her attacker. Ruth testified at trial that when she

left the apartment that morning to go to school, there was

no blood in the apartment where Dyke was found, and

Williams had never before bled in her apartment.

Subsequent investigation revealed that on the night before

the crime, Ruth had participated in a three-way telephone

call with Stefanie and Williams during which Ruth

informed Stefanie of a disagreement between Ruth and

Williams. Dyke was listening to the conversation on

another extension in Ruth's apartment. During that call,

Ruth prompted Stefanie to break her relationship with

Williams, and Stefanie proceeded to do so during the phone

conversation. Stefanie then advised Williams that he was

not to return to Ruth's apartment again. According to

Stefanie, Williams was upset, and he repeatedly stated

that they could resolve the problem. After the call ended,

Stefanie did not speak to Williams again, but he paged her

four or five times that night. Stefanie did not respond to

4

the pages, and the last page from Williams was around

midnight.

Stefanie Lawrence agreed to assist the police in locating

where Williams lived. Officer David Jones went to the

house identified by Stefanie and encountered Williams's

sister, Clinita Lawrence,FN3 who informed Officer Jones

that she had transported Williams to a mental health crisis

facility earlier that day when she noticed that he was

acting bizarrely. Officer Jones proceeded to the crisis

center and located Williams. Officer Jones observed that

Williams had several fresh bandages on both of his hands.

Williams was transported to the police station, and Officer

Jones advised him of his Miranda rights.

FN3. Clinita Lawrence is not related to Stefanie, Ruth, or

Julius Lawrence.

When Dyke regained consciousness after her surgery, she

wrote a note to a nurse indicating a desire to speak to the

authorities. Detective Daniel James spoke to Dyke in the

intensive care unit. Dyke agreed to respond to Detective

James's questions by nodding her head for “yes” and

moving her head from side-to-side for “no” because she was

unable to speak with the tubes which had been placed in

her mouth. Detective James produced a photographic

lineup of six individuals and asked Dyke if she recognized

the person who attacked her. Dyke tapped on the photo of

Ronnie Williams with her finger.

At the police station, Williams admitted to Officer Jones

that he knew Dyke, but stated that he had not been in

Ruth's apartment at the time Dyke was stabbed. With

regard to the bandages on his hands, Williams stated that

he had cut his fingers on a knife as he was washing dishes.

He mentioned that he was having problems with his

girlfriend, and that Dyke had been “kind of the go-between

person.” When Williams was informed that Dyke had

identified him as the person who stabbed her, Williams

requested an attorney, and the interview was terminated.

At that time, Williams was arrested for the attack on Dyke.

On January 28, 1993, when Detective James returned to

check on Dyke's condition and to photograph her wounds,

5

he realized that some of the wounds appeared to be bite

marks. James photographed bite marks on Dyke's chest,

arm, breast, and the back of her shoulder. Dyke also

indicated a bite mark in her groin area, but James was

unable to photograph that area because Dyke was again

taken into surgery to deliver her baby by cesarean section.

Dyke died on February 14, 1993, nineteen days after the

stabbing.

At trial, forensic pathologist Ronald Wright noted that

Dyke had sustained six stab wounds in her back, some of

which penetrated her lungs, which caused bleeding into the

chest cavity and collapse of the lungs. Further, one stab

wound had penetrated Dyke's sternum and was at least

four inches deep. Wright opined that the original stab

wound would have been deeper, but it was impossible to

determine the exact depth because Dyke's wounds had

been healing for nineteen days before her death. The doctor

noted that Dyke had defensive wounds on her hands and

bite marks on her body. Dr. Wright ultimately concluded

that the cause of Dyke's death was multiple stab wounds

which, over a period of nineteen days, produced a fatally

high level of toxicity in Dyke's body.Dr. Wright further

reviewed the photos of the cuts on Williams's hands, and

concluded that the cuts were consistent with slippage-a

phenomenon that occurs when a person hits a hard surface

(such as a sternum) with a hiltless knife (such as that

which was recovered from the apartment), and the hand

slides down the knife, producing a cut on the hand of the

person holding it.

Fingerprint analyst Fred Boyd testified that a fingerprint

found in a reddish substance that was located on the

bathroom door of Ruth's apartment matched the known

print of Williams's left ring finger. DNA testing on blood

samples taken from two pieces of clothing collected from

the apartment generated DNA profiles that matched the

profile of Williams at four genetic locations. According to a

DNA analysis expert, the frequency of occurrence of finding

the same profile in two unrelated individuals who matched

at four of these points would be one in 120 million AfricanAmericans. Finally, forensic dentist Richard Souviron

compared the photographs of the bite mark on Dyke's

breast with dental casts made from the mouth of Williams

6

and concluded with reasonable certainty that the bite on

Dyke's breast was made by Williams.

At trial, Williams testified that on the night before the

stabbing he was upset that Stefanie had severed their

relationship. This caused him to begin using drugs,

specifically, crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and marijuana.

He also consumed a fifth of rum that night. When he

started to feel unwell, he went home and lay in bed. The

next morning, Williams awoke around 7 a.m. and

proceeded to consume a half of a fifth of vodka and use more

crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and marijuana in his

backyard. Williams testified that between the night prior

to the stabbing and the morning of the stabbing, he

consumed approximately fifteen rocks of crack cocaine. The

last thing he remembered was walking back into his house,

and then he awakened in the mental health facility.

Williams remembered being brought to the police station

and being questioned; however, he had no recollection of

the questions asked because he was not feeling well.

Williams's sister, Clinita Lawrence, testified that on the

morning of the stabbing, Williams appeared as if he was

hallucinating. He was talking nonsensically and had

trouble controlling his limbs. Before she went to work,

Clinita took Williams to the mental health facility so that

he would not hurt himself. Clinita stated that while she

was driving to the facility, Williams attempted to exit the

car. Clinita testified that upon arrival at the mental

facility, Williams attempted to break out of the facility, and

he was eventually placed in a straitjacket.

In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Michael

Elwell, who was director of mental health services in

Broward County during 1993. Elwell testified that the

mental health facility to which Williams was brought never

used straitjackets or anything that resembled a

straitjacket. Elwell also stated that, had an individual

arrived at the facility hallucinating, incapable of

controlling his limbs, and attempting to break out of the

facility, the guidelines in place at that time would have

required that the individual be medically cleared at a local

emergency room prior to admission to the facility.

7

After hearing all of the evidence, the jury rendered a

verdict finding Williams guilty of the murder of Lisa Dyke.

The verdict form required the jury to specify the theory of

murder upon which it had convicted Williams. The jury

indicated that it found Williams guilty of both

premeditated murder and felony murder with sexual

battery as the underlying felony.

During the penalty phase, the State presented testimony

regarding Williams's prior convictions for second-degree

murder and indecent assault. With regard to the seconddegree murder conviction, Dr. James Ongley testified that

in 1984 he worked for the office of the Broward County

medical examiner. Dr. Ongley testified that the body of

Gaynel Jeffrey was found at a construction site with eight

stab wounds in the back and one stab wound in the front.

Dr. Ongley concluded that the cause of Jeffrey's death was

multiple stab wounds. Robin Jeffrey, who was Gaynel's

sister, testified that in 1984, Williams was her boyfriend.

Robin testified that on September 11, 1984, she was in the

process of severing her relationship with Williams.

Williams arrived at the Jeffrey house and attempted to

reconcile with Robin. Gaynel informed Williams that he

was not to come back to the house or call Robin. The next

morning Sybil French, the mother of Gaynel and Robin,

found “blood all over” the house in a path that “dragged

around” from the front door to the garage. Later that day,

French found blood in the backseat of her vehicle.

With regard to Williams's 1982 conviction for indecent

assault, retired officer Dennis Edwards testified that at the

time of the crime, the victim was nine years old. According

to a statement from the victim, Williams came into her

residence, forced her into a room, and told her that he

would kill her if she did not comply with his commands.

Williams then proceeded to penetrate the victim's vagina

with his finger, and the victim sustained bleeding as a

result of Williams's conduct. The victim stated that at the

time of the assault, she was in fear for her life.

The defense presented the testimony of six witnesses at the

penalty phase. Arthur Lewis, a lifetime friend of Williams,

testified that Williams had difficulty while growing up

because of his small stature. According to Lewis, Williams

8

was constantly attacked by the other schoolchildren

(earning him the name “the punching bag”), had money

taken from him, and was accused of things he did not do.

Dorothea Simmons, who counsels individuals in religion,

testified that when she counseled Williams in January

1993, she suspected he was on drugs because she had

difficulty obtaining his attention. Carter Powell, a

corrections deputy with the Broward County Jail, testified

that Williams was a model inmate with no disciplinary

problems who attended religious services at the jail once a

week. Corrections Officer Herman Ruise testified that

while incarcerated in the Department of Corrections,

Williams was a model prisoner, he was never involved in

trouble, and he had amicable relationships with the other

inmates.

Williams's sister, Clinita Lawrence, testified that

Williams's mother died in childbirth when Williams was

seven years old, and that Williams's father was never

involved in his life. After his mother's death, Williams went

to live with Clinita, who was nineteen years old at the time.

Clinita had four other children in her care, one of which

was her own child. Clinita stated that she was unable to

obtain benefits for the children because she did not have

the necessary paperwork to make proper application. For

approximately three months, Clinita and the children lived

in an abandoned car, and they had to cover themselves

with plastic when it rained because the car did not have a

roof. Clinita testified that Williams did not do well in

school, did not start first grade until he was ten years old,

and did not finish high school. She stated that the other

children often beat him up and teased him about not

having a mother and father. Clinita testified that Williams

is “the closest brother that anyone could ever have,” and

she loves him and depends on him.

Finally, psychologist Dr. Michael Walczak testified

concerning Williams's extremely troubled childhood, and

concluded that Williams lacked the necessary parental role

models to teach him right from wrong. Dr. Walczak

concluded that the daily beatings that Williams suffered at

the hands of other children were the source of his anger

and hostility. Dr. Walczak noted that Williams started

using alcohol around the age of eighteen and started using

9

crack cocaine around age twenty. He testified that

Williams held a series of jobs, but was fired from them for

stealing money to buy drugs. Dr. Walczak opined that it is

possible for an individual who consumed ten or fifteen

rocks of crack and a fifth of alcohol to have a blackout and

to have his or her memory affected. Dr. Walczak ultimately

concluded that, at the time of the stabbing, Williams was

under the influence of a significant amount of intoxicants

and was unable to function normally. He further opined

that Williams's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct was substantially impaired in that Williams had

no recollection of the stabbing.

After considering the evidence, the jury returned a

recommendation of death by a vote of ten to two. * * *

The trial judge sentenced Williams to death for the murder

of Dyke. In pronouncing Williams's sentence, the trial court

determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable

doubt the existence of four statutory aggravators: * * * The

trial court further determined that there was “some”

evidence of two statutory mitigating circumstances, that

Williams was under extreme mental or emotional

disturbance at the time of the crime, see § 921.141(6)(b),

Fla. Stat., and that the capacity of Williams to appreciate

the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to

the requirements of law was substantially impaired, see §

921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat.; however, the trial court accorded

each of these circumstances little weight. The trial court

found a total of five nonstatutory mitigating

circumstances, each of which the Court assigned slight

weight. The trial court concluded:

The trial court concluded that the statutory aggravating

circumstances were not outweighed by the statutory and

nonstatutory mitigating evidence. In imposing a sentence

of death, the trial court expressly noted that “the

imposition of the sentence in the present case is not

contingent upon the Court's finding of the statutory

aggravating factor of cold, calculating and premeditated.”

****

Williams, 967 So.2d at 741-47 (footnotes omitted).

10

After the denial of certiorari by this Court, Williams sought postconviction

relief and following an evidentiary hearing, appeals the denial of that relief. The

Florida Supreme Court set forth the following in its collateral review opinion

addressed to the facts and procedural history

* * * For the reasons explained below, we affirm the

postconviction court's order denying all claims, with the

exception of the ineffective assistance of penalty phase

counsel claim, which we do not address because Williams

is entitled to a new penalty phase in light of Hurst v. State

(Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––

––, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246, 2017 WL 635999

(2017), and Mosley v. State (Mosley), 209 So.3d 1248 (Fla.

2016).

***

In 2009, Williams filed a motion for postconviction relief,

raising fourteen claims. Several of the claims were

subsequently amended and a fifteenth claim was added.

The claims were: * * * (5) retrial counsel was ineffective

during the guilt phase; * * * (7) Williams is ineligible to be

executed because he is intellectually disabled, and retrial

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise intellectual

disability as a bar to execution; (8) Williams was denied

access to a competent mental health expert as required by

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d

53 (1985); * * *

Williams III, 226 So.3d at 760–65 (footnotes omitted).

Even though the Florida Supreme Court granted a new penalty phase, it

addressed Williams’ Intellectual Disability issue and determined the claim was

denied properly. The Florida Supreme Court concluded:

Williams asserts that the postconviction court erred when

it denied his claim that he is intellectually disabled and

therefore ineligible to be executed under the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Atkins

11

v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335

(2002). We have explained:

“Florida law includes a three-prong test for

intellectual disability as a bar to imposition of

the death penalty.” Snelgrove v. State, 107

So.3d 242, 252 (Fla. 2012). A defendant must

establish

intellectual

disability

by

demonstrating the following three factors: (1)

significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in

adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of

the condition before age eighteen. See Hurst

v. State, 147 So.3d 435, 441 (Fla. 2014) rev'd,

Hurst v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616,

193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016); § 921.137(1), Fla.

Stat. The defendant has the burden to prove

that he is intellectually disabled by clear and

convincing evidence. Franqui v. State, 59

So.3d 82, 92 (Fla. 2011); §921.137(4), Fla.

Stat. If the defendant fails to prove any one of

these components, the defendant will not be

found to be intellectually disabled. Nixon v.

State, 2 So.3d 137, 142 (Fla. 2009). In

reviewing

intellectual

disability

determinations, this Court has employed the

standard of whether competent, substantial

evidence

supports

the

trial

court's

determination.

Salazar v. State, 188 So.3d 799, 811–12 (Fla. 2016). We will

not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the findings of

the lower court with regard to the credibility of witnesses.

Snelgrove v. State, 107 So.3d 242, 252 (Fla. 2012).

The postconviction court carefully considered and

evaluated, under the applicable law at the time,FN3 each

of the three prongs of the intellectual disability standard.

The court concluded Williams failed to establish that he

met any of the three prongs by clear and convincing

evidence. In this analysis, we focus on the second prong and

conclude the postconviction court's finding that Williams

failed to demonstrate that he suffers from concurrent

deficits in adaptive behavior is supported by competent,

12

substantial evidence. Therefore, Williams is not entitled to

relief. See Salazar, 188 So.3d at 812 (“If the defendant fails

to prove any one of these components, the defendant will

not be found to be intellectually disabled.”).

FN3 After the postconviction court entered its

order holding that Williams failed to establish he is

intellectually disabled, the United States Supreme

Court issued Hall v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 134

S.Ct. 1986, 2001, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014), which

clarified that the standard error of measurement

must be considered in determining whether an

individual has met the “significantly subaverage

general intellectual functioning” prong of the

determination. Because the postconviction court

concluded that Williams failed to meet all three

prongs of the intellectual disability standard, and

we conclude that competent, substantial evidence

supports the court's conclusion that Williams failed

to establish the second prong of the standard, Hall

does not alter the outcome of this case. To remand

this claim for reconsideration in light of Hall would

not change the fact that Williams failed to establish

the second and third prongs of the intellectual

disability standard and is therefore not entitled to

relief. Further, it would disregard the significant

effort by the postconviction court in evaluating and

weighing the extensive evidence presented with

regard to this claim.

The term “adaptive behavior,” as used in section

921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2013), “means the effectiveness or

degree with which an individual meets the standards of

personal independence and social responsibility expected

of his or her age, cultural group, and community.” To

demonstrate deficits in adaptive behavior, a defendant

must show significant limitations in adaptive functioning

in at least two of the following skill areas: communication,

self-care, home living, social skills, community use, selfdirection, health and safety, functional academics, leisure,

and work. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 122 S.Ct. 2242.

In evaluating adaptive deficits,

the trial court does not weigh a defendant's

13

strengths against his limitations in determining

whether a deficit in adaptive behavior exists.

Rather, after it considers “the findings of experts

and all other evidence,” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(e), it

determines whether a defendant has a deficit in

adaptive behavior by examining evidence of a

defendant's limitations, as well as evidence that

may rebut those limitations.

Dufour v. State, 69 So.3d 235, 250 (Fla. 2011).

As a threshold matter, Williams asserts that the

postconviction court abused its discretion in allowing Dr.

Gregory Prichard to testify during the evidentiary hearing

as an expert in the field of intellectual disability* * *

The testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing

established that Dr. Prichard has been a licensed clinical

psychologist in Florida since 1996, with a subspecialty in

forensic psychology and a specialization in assessing for

intellectual disability. He conducts an average of two or

three intellectual disability assessments per week, and has

conducted at least two thousand intellectual disability

assessments over the course of his career. At least a few

hundred of those assessments were done in capital cases.

Dr. Prichard is a member of the American Association on

Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, the Florida

Psychological Association, and the American Psychological

Association. He has been deemed an expert many times in

courts throughout Florida, and no court has ever refused to

allow Dr. Prichard to render an expert opinion in the field

of psychology on the issue of intellectual disability.

* * * Based upon Dr. Prichard's specialized knowledge and

extensive experience in evaluating individuals for

intellectual disability, we conclude that the postconviction

court acted well within its discretion in qualifying Dr.

Prichard as an expert in the field of psychology and

intellectual disability.

As to the merits of Williams's claim, Dr. Mark Tassé, a

psychology professor specializing in intellectual disability,

testified during the evidentiary hearing that there are

multiple standardized tests for assessing adaptive

14

behavior. One such test is the Adaptive Behavior

Assessment System (ABAS). The ABAS assesses ten skill

areas: communication, community use, functional

academics, home living, health and safety, leisure, selfcare, self-direction, social, and work. These skill areas are

incorporated into three domains: the conceptual domain,

the social domain, and the practical domain. The scores

taken from the three domains are then used to determine

the total score.

The ABAS was developed by Dr. Thomas Oakland, another

expert retained by Williams. Dr. Oakland administered the

ABAS to Williams. However, when asked about the validity

of ABAS testing on individuals in the prison setting, Dr.

Oakland stated:

Well, one must realize that Mr. Williams is

incarcerated in a setting that provides

considerable confinement .... [There] are very

few things that he is allowed to decide to do

on his own. Which makes the assessment of

adaptive behavior irrelevant. It's silly. Down

right [sic] silly to try to acquire adaptive

behavior information on persons who are

incarcerated under those conditions.

Dr. Oakland further explained that because people within

a prison setting are highly restricted as to the behaviors

they can display, “we are not going to get an accurate

assessment of adaptive behavior by ... acquiring

information on prison related behaviors.” Drs. Tassé,

Woods, and Prichard all agreed that the ABAS is not

especially useful in assessing the adaptive behavior of a

person who has been incarcerated for an extended period

of time.

Williams's self-reported responses on the ABAS indicated

that he was deficient in nine out of the ten skill areas. In

those nine skill areas, Williams received the lowest

possible score. When asked about the meaning of the

results, Dr. Oakland said, “Well, it tells me that

[Williams's] display of adaptive behavior in a prison setting

is very, very restricted. But we know that. So it merely

confirms the fact statistically and through measurement of

15

behaviors that we recognize prevail in a prison setting.”

Essentially, Dr. Oakland's opinion was that the results of

Williams's ABAS were not an accurate assessment of his

adaptive functioning.

Dr. Prichard also disputed the validity of Williams's ABAS

results. Williams indicated on the ABAS that he is not

capable of ordering his own meal at a restaurant, finding a

restroom in a public place, or looking both ways before

crossing a street. According to Dr. Prichard, the extremely

low scores Williams received on the ABAS would place him

in the moderate-to-severe range of intellectual disability,

which comprises the lowest fifteen percent of all

intellectually disabled individuals. Dr. Prichard testified

that a person with adaptive functioning so low as to not be

able to find a restroom in a public place may have to be

institutionalized.

Further, Dr. Prichard concluded that Williams's self-

reported data was not reliable in light of his history.

Williams held various jobs, including in the dietary

department of a hospital, and at restaurants and grocery

stores. Williams also obtained a driver license and

informed Dr. Prichard that he would sometimes walk to

work or take the bus. Although Williams indicated on the

ABAS that he could not provide the correct amount of

money for a purchase under ten dollars, he was able to

successfully multiply 809 by 47 and subtract $5.70 from

$62.00 during an administration of the Wide Range

Achievement Test. He also informed Dr. Prichard that he

managed his own money. Williams stated that he

maintained a savings account and would deposit money in

the bank, while keeping some for himself. Moreover,

Williams obtained his General Educational Development

(GED) diploma. Dr. Prichard testified that he has not

encountered an intellectually disabled person who can pass

even a single section of the GED test, let alone the entire

examination.

Dr. Oakland also administered the ABAS to Williams's

half-sisters, Clinita and Althamease, who provided data

regarding Williams's adaptive behavior prior to the age of

eighteen. Under Florida law, however, adaptive deficits

must be current. See Hodges v. State, 55 So.3d 515, 534

16

(Fla. 2010). Thus, the information provided by Clinita and

Althamease is insufficient to satisfy the second prong of the

intellectual disability test because it does not address

Williams's current adaptive behavior. See Phillips v. State,

984 So.2d 503, 511 (Fla. 2008). Further, Dr. Oakland

acknowledged on cross-examination that the information

provided by Althamease, who is seven years younger than

Williams, was based on observations she made over thirty

years ago when she was only nine or ten years old, and

therefore her ABAS results may have been even more

limited in their meaning.

Even assuming the relevancy of the ABAS results provided

by Clinita and Althamease, the validity of the results was

disputed by Dr. Prichard. He testified that family members

often give information that is not objective and not useful

because they are motivated by their love for the individual

and a desire for a particular outcome. On the ABAS

completed by Clinita, she scored Williams as deficient in

nearly every skill area assessed and placed Williams's

functioning at the age of a five– to seven-year-old. These

results indicated that Williams basically had no

independent skills in those areas. Dr. Prichard again noted

that some individuals with such extreme adaptive deficits

have to be institutionalized.

Dr. Prichard found that the scores Clinita gave on the

ABAS were completely inconsistent with the testimony she

had given during the two trials. During Williams's first

trial for Dyke's murder, Clinita testified that after her and

Williams's mother died in childbirth, she and her younger

half-siblings were homeless and living in an abandoned

car, and it was Williams who took care of the other children

while she worked. Clinita testified that Williams “became

the person ... who had to help me strengthen ... he went

from the person who was the youngest to the person who

then became the oldest.” During the retrial, Clinita

testified that Williams helped her sell bottles and cans to

supplement the family income. According to Clinita,

Williams did whatever he could to help, including

searching for food and raising the other children. Based on

these inconsistencies and what Dr. Prichard knew about

Williams, he concluded that the information Clinita

provided on the ABAS was “exaggerated to the point of

17

being absurd.” Dr. Prichard concluded that, because valid

data was not provided, the results were likewise invalid.

Dr. Prichard also analyzed Williams's ability to think

abstractly and rationalize his actions and their

consequences. He found that Williams's conduct during

and after the Jeffrey murder reflected planning and

forethought, which is normally beyond the capabilities of

an intellectually disabled person. Williams entered the

Jeffrey house while everyone was asleep, stabbed Gaynel

Jeffrey to death, used her mother's vehicle to dispose of the

body at a construction site, and then returned the vehicle

to the house. According to Dr. Prichard, such actions

demonstrate that Williams recognized his situation and

took steps to cover his actions.

Further, although most intellectually disabled people

think in concrete terms, when questioned about the Jeffrey

murder, Williams told police that he killed Gaynel Jeffrey

in self-defense. After the Dyke murder, Williams explained

the cuts on his fingers by claiming he cut himself while

washing dishes. According to Dr. Prichard, Williams's

ability to know what type of information the police were

seeking and then fabricate explanations to cover up the

truth constitute abstract thinking that is usually beyond

the capabilities of a person who is intellectually disabled.

The postconviction court found Williams's ABAS results

were insufficient to support his allegation that he suffers

from deficits in adaptive functioning. Because Dr. Oakland

concluded Williams's ABAS scores merely confirmed the

fact that his adaptive behavior in prison was extremely

restricted, which he said renders “the assessment of

adaptive

behavior

irrelevant”

and

“silly,”

the

postconviction court declined to “attach more meaning to

the ABAS score ... than [Williams's] own expert did.” The

postconviction court also agreed with Dr. Prichard that

Williams's history of employment, driving, managing his

money, and obtaining a GED diploma all contradicted the

ABAS scores and rebutted his allegations of deficits in

adaptive behavior.

Competent,

substantial

evidence

supports

the

postconviction court's ruling that Williams does not suffer

18

from deficits in adaptive functioning. Dr. Prichard

explained why Williams's scores on the ABAS were not

credible. Williams himself described behaviors to Dr.

Prichard that were inconsistent with his responses on the

ABAS, such as managing money, taking the bus, shopping

for groceries, and purchasing household items and clothing

for himself. Each of these abilities directly rebuts

Williams's indication on the ABAS that he cannot find a

restroom in a public place or provide the correct amount of

money for a purchase under ten dollars. The record further

reflects that Williams worked as a cook, a sandwich maker,

and a server in restaurants, which rebuts Williams's report

on the ABAS that he is not capable of ordering his own

meal at a restaurant. Williams had a driver license and

walked to work, both of which rebut his self-report on the

ABAS that he is not capable of looking both ways before

crossing a street.

Further, Williams's efforts to conceal his involvement and

culpability in the murders of Gaynel Jeffrey and Lisa Dyke

also contradict his claim of deficient adaptive functioning.

See Phillips, 984 So.2d at 512 (concluding that the

defendant's ability to plan and cover-up the murder was

inconsistent with a finding of deficient adaptive

functioning). Moreover, the fact that Williams successfully

obtained his GED diploma supports the conclusion that he

does not suffer from adaptive deficits. See Dufour, 69 So.3d

at 250.

We recently reiterated that “[i]f the defendant fails to prove

any one of the [ ] components [delineated in section

921.137(1), Florida Statutes], the defendant will not be

found to be intellectually disabled.” Salazar, 188 So.3d at

812. Because competent, substantial evidence supports the

postconviction court's conclusion that Williams failed to

establish the second prong of the intellectual disability

standard, we affirm the determination that Williams does

not qualify as intellectually disabled under Florida law.

Williams III, 226 So. 3d at 768–73.

The instant Petition seeks review of the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion

that the trial court’s denial of relief on the ID claim.

19

REASON FOR DENYING THE WRIT

ISSUE I

CERTIORARI REVIEW IS UNWARENTED WHERE THE

FLORIDA

SUPREME

COURT’S

FACT-BASED

DECISION THAT PETITIONER, FOLLOWING AN

EVIDENTIARY HEARING, DID NOT PROVE HE HAS

DEFICITS IN ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONING AND

DENYING

THE

CLAIM

OF

INTELLECTUAL

DISABILITY WHERE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND WHERE THE

STATE COURT DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT

WITH PRECEDENT OF THIS COURT, ANOTHER

STATE SUPREME COURT, OR UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEAL NOR DOES IT PRESENT AN

UNSETTLED ISSUE OF LAW. (restated).

Williams takes issue with the Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of his

Intellectual Disability (“ID”) claim following an evidentiary hearing. The pith of his

argument is that the Florida Supreme Court should have considered only his deficits

in adaptive functioning and not the other side of the coin, his abilities, when assessing

adaptive behavior. He claims that this shows that the Florida Supreme Court did

not follow the dictates of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Hall v. Florida, 134

S. Ct. 1986 (2014), and Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). Contrary to Williams’

position, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the facts developed at an evidentiary

hearing, considered the testimony of mental health experts from both parties and

determined that Williams did not establish deficits in adaptive functioning in

accordance with medical standards and this Court’s precedent. As such, Williams

has failed to offer any persuasive basis for this Court to grant certiorari review.

This Court has recognized that cases which have not developed conflicts

20

between federal or state courts or presented important, unsettled questions of federal

law usually do not deserve certiorari review. Rockford Life Insurance Co. v. Illinois

Department of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182, 184, n. 3 (1987). The law is well-settled that

this Court does not grant certiorari for the purpose of reviewing evidence and/or

discussing specific facts. United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925). Further,

this Court has rejected requests to reassess or re-weigh factual disputes. Page v.

Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 286 U.S. 269 (1932) (rejecting request to review fact

questions); United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 225 (1925) (denying certiorari to

review evidence or discuss specific facts); General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western

Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 178 (1924) (same). The instant petition does not satisfy

any of the requirements for certiorari review and should be denied. Thus, there is no

basis for this Court to grant certiorari. Sup. Ct. R. 10, and the petition should be

denied.

In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002), this Court held that the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment bars the execution

of an intellectually disabled defendant, but this Court left to the States “the task of

developing appropriate ways” to identify intellectually disabled defendants and to

enforce this constitutional protection. As this Court noted in Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S.

825, 831 (2009), Atkins “did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides

for determining when a person” is intellectually disabled.

For a defendant to establish a claim of ID under Florida law, the defendant

must establish by clear and convincing evidence that he has significantly subaverage

21

general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive

behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18. See §

921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2013).

The term “significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning,” for the purpose of this section, means

performance that is two or more standard deviations from

the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified

in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. The

term “adaptive behavior,” for the purpose of this definition,

means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual

meets the standards of personal independence and social

responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group,

and community.

Id. Section 921.137 further defines the term “adaptive behavior,” as the effectiveness

or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence

and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.

In Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1994 (2014), this Court noted that “the

medical community defines intellectual disability according to three criteria:

significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive functioning (the

inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances), and

onset of these deficits during the developmental period.” In Moore v. Texas, 137 S.

Ct. 1039 (2017), this Court held that Texas deviated from prevailing clinical

standards when analyzing the defendant’s ID claim, and of import here, in the

manner it assessed adaptive functioning. While this Court cautioned in Moore that

a court should not overemphasize an individual’s adaptive strengths, and should not

rely on strengths developed in a controlled setting like prison, Moore, 137 S. Ct. at

1050, the Florida Supreme Court’s analysis did not overemphasize Williams’

22

strengths, but relied upon the testimony of both defense and state experts and

resolved factual and credibility issues before rendering its decision.

In determining Williams failed to prove deficiency it noted that the Adaptive

Behavior Assessment System test (“ABAS”) assesses ten skill areas to determine

adaptive functioning.

However, given that Williams’ sisters were asked about

Williams’ abilities prior to age eighteen, their results did not answer the second-prong

of the ID claim, namely “current adaptive behavior.” That left the trial court with

Williams results on the ABAS where all the experts viewed his results as suspect,

either because self-reports are “not very reliable”;

“the assessment of adaptive

behavior irrelevant" for the incarcerated defendant; "[d]ownright silly to try to

acquire adaptive behavior information on persons who are incarcerated;" or the

defendant has a self-interest and his self-report is belied by his answers to other

questions. (PCR.17 2885-89) Given the testimony of the state and defense experts,

the trial court reasoned it “cannot attach more meaning to the ABAS score obtained

based on Defendant's self-report, than Defendant's own expert did.” (PCR.17 288589)

In its discussion of Dr. Prichard’s testimony regarding Williams’ adaptive

functioning, it is clear the trial court was assessing Williams’ credibility in his selfreporting when compared to his documented work-history, managing of money ability

to travel to work.

Dr. Prichard testified that it is difficult to assess the

adaptive behavior of someone who has spent almost his

entire adult life in prison, like Defendant, because of the

restrictions imposed on the person's behavior. (EH Vol. 11

at 1456-57). The assessment should be of how that person

functions in prison relative to other inmates. (EH Vol. 11

23

at 1457). According to Dr. Prichard, the behavior displayed

by Defendant in prison, such as submitting requests for a

medical visit and seeking help for an ingrown toenail and

eye problems, indicates that Defendant is capable of

recognizing a medical issue and going through the proper

procedure to get it addressed. (EH Vol. 11 at 1457-58). In

addition, Dr. Oakland, Dr. Woods, and Dr. James testified

that when they met with Defendant in prison he was clean,

well groomed, well mannered, polite, and cooperative. (EH

Vol. 1 at 133; Vol. 6 at 751; Vol. 7 at 873-74). The behavior

displayed by Defendant in prison reflects positively on his

abilities in the area of self-care and health, which is one of

the adaptive behavior domains. (EH Vol. 7 at 1457; 1459).

In Dr. Prichard's opinion, the fact that Defendant

expressed a desire to have pen pals and an interest in

correspondence courses, indicates a capacity for

independent functioning and adaptive proficiency that is

not present in someone with mental retardation. (EH Vol.

7 at 1458). During Dr. Prichard's interview, Defendant

mentioned that he reads the Bible, and his favorite part is

the Book of Ephesians. Defendant also mentioned that he

likes reading spiritual books by Smith Riddlesworth and

Randall Kendall, which according to Dr. Prichard are too

advanced for mentally retarded individuals. (EH Vol. 11 at

1482-84). Dr. Prichard testified that he had mentally

retarded people tell him that they read the Bible, but when

asked to perform the task they were not able to do it. (EH

Vol. 11 at 1484). Dr. Prichard did not ask Defendant to read

from the Bible. However, judging by how well Defendant

could read a letter addressed to Judge Seay in 1987,

written in cursive, and signed by him, Dr. Prichard was

sure Defendant could read the Bible as well. (EH. Vol. 11

at 1484). Dr. Prichard asked Defendant to read the letter

which was purportedly written by him to Judge Seay, to

assess his reading ability. (EH Vol. 11 at 1467; 1481). In

his opinion, mentally retarded people cannot read fluently

cursive writing. (EH Vol. 11 at 1468). However, Defendant

was able to read the letter well and pronounce difficult

words and phrases such as "incarceration," "presently,"

"mitigation," "enmity," "glorious light," and "no longer

walking in darkness." (EH Vol. 11 at 1481-82). This Court

had the opportunity to review that portion of Dr. Prichard's

interview with Defendant and finds that his observations

24

that Defendant could read the letter well were accurate.

(Defense Exhibit 52).

The court finds that these strengths in the area of

self-care and health and his ability for independent

functioning

undermine

Defendant's

self-reported

limitations on the ABAS. ***

Dr. Prichard also analyzed Defendant's ability to

think abstractly and rationalize his actions and their

consequences. He found that Defendant displayed such

behavior when he offered self-defense as a justification for

killing Gaynell Jeffrey and when he told the police that he

had cut himself while washing dishes in an attempt to

cover-up the stabbing of the victim in the instant case. (EH

Vol. 11 at 1443-44). Dr. Prichard found this conduct

relevant because it showed that Defendant was capable of

recognizing what type of information the police were

seeking and he could make up a story to protect himself.

(EH Vol. 11 at 1444).

Dr. Oakland attempted to disregard Defendant's

criminal behavior as having no place in the assessment of

adaptive functioning, because it is maladaptive behavior.

(EH Vol. 7 at 877). However, this Court finds the conduct

relevant because it shows not only that Defendant had the

ability to orchestrate and carry out his crimes, but also that

through his acts of self-preservation he had the ability to

adapt to his surroundings. ***

Dr. Prichard found the fact that Defendant obtained

a GED to be one of the most compelling factors in his

assessment that Defendant is not mentally retarded. (EH

Vol. 11 at 1500). He explained that the GED has five (5)

sections: math, reading skills, English, writing, and science

and social studies. The candidate has to score a minimum

of 40 for each section and obtain an aggregate score of 225.

(EH Vol. 11 at 1501). When Defendant took the test the

first time in 1988, he obtained the minimum score of 40 in

each section, but he did not obtain the necessary aggregate

score to pass the test. When he retook the test in 1994, he

scored 55 in reading, 40 in writing, 47 in math, 45 in

English, 46 in science and social studies. His aggregate

score was 233, which was above the aggregate score of 225

25

required in order to pass the GED test. (EH Vol. 11 at

1501). Although Dr. Oakland testified that a mentally

retarded person can get a GED, Dr. Tasse's response to the

question whether a mildly mentally retarded person could

graduate from regular high school and could get a GED,

was evasive: "I want to say those who are graduating from

high school in that 30 to 35 percent, the Department of

Education puts out I would imagine most of them have

mild mental retardation. The likelihood of graduating from

high school diminishes substantially as your IQ drops."

(EH Vol. 1 at 164-65; Vol. 7 at 862).

This Court finds that the fact that Defendant

persevered and obtained a GED diploma further rebuts his

alleged limitations in academic achievement and adaptive

behavior. See Dufour, 69 So. 3d at 250-52 (noting that

"[s]uccessfully passing a GED exam has traditionally been

no simple matter" and finding that defendant's successful

mastering of the rigorous test revealed individual cognitive

strengths that rebutted his asserted limitations of poor

academic performance, and constituted direct proof that

defendant did riot have deficits in adaptive behavior). For

the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that

Defendant has failed to establish by clear and convincing

evidence the second prong of the statutory definition of

mental retardation, which requires a showing that

Defendant's adaptive deficits are current and concurrent

with subaverage intellectual functioning.

(PCR.17 2885-89)(citations omitted).

Again, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s factual findings

and found them supported by the record. It pointed to that portion of defense expert’s

testimony regarding the usefulness of the ABAS on an incarcerated person” quoting

Dr. Oakland:

Well, one must realize that Mr. Williams is

incarcerated in a setting that provides

considerable confinement .... [There] are very

few things that he is allowed to decide to do

on his own. Which makes the assessment of

26

adaptive behavior irrelevant. It's silly. Down

right [sic] silly to try to acquire adaptive

behavior information on persons who are

incarcerated under those conditions.

Dr. Oakland further explained that because people within

a prison setting are highly restricted as to the behaviors

they can display, “we are not going to get an accurate

assessment of adaptive behavior by ... acquiring

information on prison related behaviors.” Drs. Tassé,

Woods, and Prichard all agreed that the ABAS is not

especially useful in assessing the adaptive behavior of a

person who has been incarcerated for an extended period

of time.

Williams III, 226 So. 3d at 768–73. Given these reported flaws in the ABAS, other

means of assessing adaptive functions were required. Dr. Prichard, as the trial court

and Florida Supreme Court recognized tested Williams’ credibility on the ABAS

against his actions both before incarceration and while in prison. Relying upon an

experts assessment and resolving credibility and factual matters, does not run

counter to Moore. As noted previously, a reviewing court must not be limited in its

search for the truth of a claim of ID; it must not be limited to consideration of only a

defendant’s self-proclaimed “inabilities” especially where there is clear evidence that

those alleged deficits are exaggerated for personal grain.

As the Florida Supreme Court 1 considered:

1 As the trial court reasoned, the Florida Supreme Court found that the test results

and testimony from Williams’ sisters did not address “current adaptive deficits:

Thus, the information provided by Clinita and Althamease is

insufficient to satisfy the second prong of the intellectual disability test

because it does not address Williams's current adaptive behavior. See

Phillips v. State, 984 So.2d 503, 511 (Fla. 2008). Further, Dr. Oakland

acknowledged on cross-examination that the information provided by

Althamease, who is seven years younger than Williams, was based on

27

Dr. Prichard also disputed the validity of Williams's ABAS

results. Williams indicated on the ABAS that he is not

capable of ordering his own meal at a restaurant, finding a

restroom in a public place, or looking both ways before

crossing a street. According to Dr. Prichard, the extremely

low scores Williams received on the ABAS would place him

in the moderate-to-severe range of intellectual disability,

which comprises the lowest fifteen percent of all

intellectually disabled individuals. Dr. Prichard testified

that a person with adaptive functioning so low as to not be

able to find a restroom in a public place may have to be

institutionalized.

Further, Dr. Prichard concluded that Williams's selfreported data was not reliable in light of his history.

Williams held various jobs, including in the dietary

department of a hospital, and at restaurants and grocery

stores. Williams also obtained a driver license and

informed Dr. Prichard that he would sometimes walk to

work or take the bus. Although Williams indicated on the

ABAS that he could not provide the correct amount of

money for a purchase under ten dollars, he was able to

successfully multiply 809 by 47 and subtract $5.70 from

$62.00 during an administration of the Wide Range

Achievement Test. He also informed Dr. Prichard that he

managed his own money. Williams stated that he

maintained a savings account and would deposit money in

the bank, while keeping some for himself. Moreover,

Williams obtained his General Educational Development

(GED) diploma. Dr. Prichard testified that he has not

encountered an intellectually disabled person who can pass

even a single section of the GED test, let alone the entire

examination.

Williams III, 226 So. 3d at 768–73.

The Florida Supreme Court also noted Dr. Prichard’s skepticism of the report

observations she made over thirty years ago when she was only nine or

ten years old, and therefore her ABAS results may have been even more

limited in their meaning.

Williams III, 226 So. 3d at 768–73.

28

Williams’ sister, Clinita, gave especially considering the fact it conflicted with her

sworn testimony for the trial. The Florida Supreme Court opined:

Dr. Prichard found that the scores Clinita gave on the

ABAS were completely inconsistent with the testimony she

had given during the two trials. During Williams's first

trial for Dyke's murder, Clinita testified that after her and

Williams's mother died in childbirth, she and her younger

half-siblings were homeless and living in an abandoned

car, and it was Williams who took care of the other children

while she worked. Clinita testified that Williams “became

the person ... who had to help me strengthen ... he went

from the person who was the youngest to the person who

then became the oldest.” During the retrial, Clinita

testified that Williams helped her sell bottles and cans to

supplement the family income. According to Clinita,

Williams did whatever he could to help, including

searching for food and raising the other children. Based on

these inconsistencies and what Dr. Prichard knew about

Williams, he concluded that the information Clinita

provided on the ABAS was “exaggerated to the point of

being absurd.” Dr. Prichard concluded that, because valid

data was not provided, the results were likewise invalid.

Williams III, 226 So. 3d at 768–73.

Given the difficulties in evaluating adaptive deficits, the Florida Supreme

Court also considered Dr. Prichard’s evaluation of Williams’ actions during his

contact with law enforcement following his two murders committed years apart. The

Florida Supreme Court found:

Dr. Prichard also analyzed Williams's ability to think

abstractly and rationalize his actions and their

consequences. He found that Williams's conduct during

and after the Jeffrey murder reflected planning and

forethought, which is normally beyond the capabilities of

an intellectually disabled person. Williams entered the

Jeffrey house while everyone was asleep, stabbed Gaynel

Jeffrey to death, used her mother's vehicle to dispose of the

body at a construction site, and then returned the vehicle

29

to the house. According to Dr. Prichard, such actions

demonstrate that Williams recognized his situation and

took steps to cover his actions.

Further, although most intellectually disabled people

think in concrete terms, when questioned about the Jeffrey

murder, Williams told police that he killed Gaynel Jeffrey

in self-defense. After the Dyke murder, Williams explained

the cuts on his fingers by claiming he cut himself while

washing dishes. According to Dr. Prichard, Williams's

ability to know what type of information the police were

seeking and then fabricate explanations to cover up the

truth constitute abstract thinking that is usually beyond

the capabilities of a person who is intellectually disabled.

Williams III, 226 So. 3d at 768–73. Given this, the assessment centered on Williams’

credibility assessed in terms of his report contrasted against his actions. A review of

the following supports the conclusion that the focus was not on Williams’ strengths

as a means of discounting his alleged deficits, but as a means to determine whether

he was being truthful in his accounting of his ability. The Florida Supreme Court

concluded:

The postconviction court found Williams's ABAS results

were insufficient to support his allegation that he suffers

from deficits in adaptive functioning. Because Dr. Oakland

concluded Williams's ABAS scores merely confirmed the

fact that his adaptive behavior in prison was extremely

restricted, which he said renders “the assessment of

adaptive

behavior

irrelevant”

and

“silly,”

the

postconviction court declined to “attach more meaning to

the ABAS score ... than [Williams's] own expert did.” The

postconviction court also agreed with Dr. Prichard that

Williams's history of employment, driving, managing his

money, and obtaining a GED diploma all contradicted the

ABAS scores and rebutted his allegations of deficits in

adaptive behavior.

Competent,

substantial

evidence

supports

the

postconviction court's ruling that Williams does not suffer

30

from deficits in adaptive functioning. Dr. Prichard

explained why Williams's scores on the ABAS were not

credible. Williams himself described behaviors to Dr.

Prichard that were inconsistent with his responses on the

ABAS, such as managing money, taking the bus, shopping

for groceries, and purchasing household items and clothing

for himself. Each of these abilities directly rebuts

Williams's indication on the ABAS that he cannot find a

restroom in a public place or provide the correct amount of

money for a purchase under ten dollars. The record further

reflects that Williams worked as a cook, a sandwich maker,

and a server in restaurants, which rebuts Williams's report

on the ABAS that he is not capable of ordering his own

meal at a restaurant. Williams had a driver license and

walked to work, both of which rebut his self-report on the

ABAS that he is not capable of looking both ways before

crossing a street.

Further, Williams's efforts to conceal his involvement and

culpability in the murders of Gaynel Jeffrey and Lisa Dyke

also contradict his claim of deficient adaptive functioning.

See Phillips, 984 So.2d at 512 (concluding that the

defendant's ability to plan and cover-up the murder was

inconsistent with a finding of deficient adaptive

functioning). Moreover, the fact that Williams successfully

obtained his GED diploma supports the conclusion that he

does not suffer from adaptive deficits. See Dufour, 69 So.3d

at 250.

We recently reiterated that “[i]f the defendant fails to prove

any one of the [ ] components [delineated in section

921.137(1), Florida Statutes], the defendant will not be

found to be intellectually disabled.” Salazar, 188 So.3d at

812. Because competent, substantial evidence supports the

postconviction court's conclusion that Williams failed to

establish the second prong of the intellectual disability

standard, we affirm the determination that Williams does

not qualify as intellectually disabled under Florida law.

Williams III, 226 So. 3d at 768–73.

Williams points to the discussion of “strengths” as violative of Moore.

However, as set forth above, the thrust of the state court’s findings was one of witness

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credibility and resolution of conflicting evidence. This analysis does not run afoul of

Moore as credibility determinations are the province of the fact-finder. Accepting

Williams’ argument that a person’s “strengths” cannot be considered renders an

assessment of adaptive ability hollow, incomplete, and a fallacy. Strengths and

deficits are the opposite sides of the same coin.

Furthermore, in Moore, this Court invalidated Texas’ use of the Briseno

standard when analyzing a defendant’s intellectual disability claim. In Ex parte

Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tx. Crim. App. 2004), the court adopted a definition of

intellectual disability from the 1992 version of the American Association on Mental

Retardation, the predecessor to the current AAIDD-11 manual. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at

1046. The Briseno standard required adaptive deficits to be “related” to intellectual

functioning deficits and required courts to consider seven evidentiary factors which

were not referenced by any medical or judicial authority. Id. Included in these seven

factors, among other factors, were considerations of the individual’s conduct during

the crime and whether the offense required forethought, planning, and complex

execution of purpose. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046 n.6.

Unlike in Moore, the Florida Supreme Court relied on current definitions of

intellectual disability which are consistent with Adkins; Hall; and Moore. Also, the

state courts were informed by mental health experts who gave their assessment of

the tests results obtained and evidence provided both before ID was at issue and

during the ID evaluation itself. While the state court’s noted Williams’ abilities it

was in an effort to resolve factual and credibility matters. Likewise, when discussing

32

Williams’ responses to law enforcement, it was to assess how he was able to change

his defense, to adapt to a current “problem” and gauge his adaptive functioning, not

to evaluate his conduct during a criminal episode as considered in Briseno and

rejected in Moore. Williams has failed to show that his case is in conflict with Adkins;

Hall; or Moore. The petition for certiorari should be denied.

33

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, Respondent requests

respectfully that this Honorable Court deny Petitioner’s request for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

PAMELA JO BONDI

ATTORNEY GENERAL

_/S/ Leslie T. Campbell_____

LESLIE T. CAMPBELL

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Florida Bar No. 0066631

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

1515 N. Flagler Dr.; 9th Floor

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Office: (561) 837-5016

Facsimile: (561) 837-5108

e-mail: Leslie.Campbell@myfloridalegal.com

CapApp@myfloridalegal.com

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

34

CASE NO. 17-7924

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

October 2017, Term

RONNIE KEITH WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_________________________________________

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Leslie T. Campbell, a member of the Bar of this Court, hereby certifies that

on April 25, 2018, a copy of the Brief for Respondent in Opposition in the above

entitled case was furnished by United States mail, postage prepaid, to Nicole M. Noël,

ESQ., and Marta Jaszczolt, Esq., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, 1 E.

Broward Blvd., Suite 444, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301, counsel for Petitioner herein.

I further certify that all parties required to be served have been served.

_/S/ Leslie T. Campbell____

LESLIE T. CAMPBELL

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Florida Bar No. 0066631

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

1515 N. Flagler Dr.; 9th Floor

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Office: (561) 837-5016

Facsimile: (561) 837-5108

e-mail: Leslie.Campbell@myfloridalegal.com

CapApp@myfloridalegal.com

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

35