Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Paul Richardson, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefJan 17, 2018
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
!-
No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Paul RIChardson
PETITIONER
-
(Your Name)
VS.
United States Of America
RESPONDENT(S)
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
United States Court of Appeals f o r the Sixth Circuit
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Paul RIchardson
(Your Name)
P.O. Box 34550
(Address)
Memphis Tenn, 38134
(City, State, Zip Code)
(Phone Number)
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED
(1) Was the Sixth Circuits reading of thier precedents applying
relevant conduct, unreasonable simply because petitioner would
benifit from this application?
(The Probation Office in this case recommended the application
of Relevant Conduct because petitioners crimes are infact relevant.)
(2) Was it abuse of Discretion for the District :and the Appeals court
not to adoptthePresentence report recommenting that the relevant
conduct be appplied, because the Crimes were infact related.
both Stemming from State charges?
(Petitioners charges were charged in State for both
crimes and they were later split up).
-
J
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
PAGE NUMBER
Gall V. United States. 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007'
/
United States V. Philips, 516 F. 3d 479 (6th cir. 2008) Passjurn
Uited States V. Faison. 3339 F. 3d 518, 520-21 (6th Cir 2003)
4
STATUTES AND RULES
U.S.S.GsS2k2.1(a)(1)(b)(6)(B)
Pa s s i urn
USS..GflBl.3(a)(2)
Pa 55 i urn
Pa s s i urn
U.S.S.G.fl5K2.23
Pass ium
U.S .S.G.5G1.3(b)
Pa S 5 urn
18 U.S.C.922(g)
4
18 U.S.0 .924(a)(1)(2)
B1:S:G:
Application noteS
US .S .G1B1.3()(1)_(3)
U.S .S.G.2K2.1(a)(l)
U.S.S.G.2K2.1(b)(6), Application note 14
U.S.S.G. 4Al.1(e)
OTHER
U.S.S..G4B1.4(b)(3)(A)
U.S. S .G. §5G1 .3
U.S .5 .G. §5K2 .23
Pa S 5 i urn
4;5,6
Pa s S i urn
Pa s 5 i urn
1,2
Pa S S i urn
Pass i urn
Pass iurn.•.;
Pa s S i urn
LIST OF PARTIES
[Ik All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
[1 All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of
all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this
petition is as follows:
1;
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONSBELOW........................................................................................................1
JURISDICTION................................................................................................................... 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................................. 3
STATEMENTOF THE CASE ............................................................................................4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.......................................................................... 8
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................... 16
INDEX TO APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Court Of Appeals Opinion
APPENDIX B District Court Opinion.
APPENDIX C
Petition For Rehearing.
APPENDIX
Appellant brief By Attorney in the case in Appeals
Court for the Sixth Circuit
APPENDIX E
APPENDIX F
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.
OPINIONS BELOW
[,JFor cases from federal courts:
The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix
the petition and is
A
to
; or,
[ ] reported at 16-5402
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[1 is unpublished.
The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix
the petition and is
to
; or,
[1 reported at
has
been
designated
for
publication
but
is
not
yet
reported;
or,
[1
[1 is unpublished.
[ ] For cases from state courts:
The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at
Appendix
to the petition and is
[ ] reported at
. ; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
The opinion of the
appears at Appendix
court
-
to the petition and is
; or,
[ ] reported at
[1 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
1.
\
V
JURISDICTION
[,IFor cases from federal courts:
The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case
was
Aug 3, 2017
,
____________________
[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.
[,JXA timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of
Nov 16, 2017
Appeals on the following date:
,and a copy of the
order denying rehearing appears at Appendix
i
[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
to and including
(date) on ____________________ (date)
in Application No.
A______
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).
[ ] For cases from state courts:
The date on which the highest state court decided my case was
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix
[I A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:
and a copy of the order denying rehearing
appears at Appendix
[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
to and including*
(date) on
(date) in
Application No.
A______
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).
(2)
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
As A Pro-Se petitioner, and Under This courts holding in Haines
V.Kerner. 404 U.S. 519 (1972) There are over 1.5 .-- Statutes and rules
applicable thats'protected under the Due Process Equal protection
rights associated with petitioners ease that they would run the risk
of misinterpretation to one individuals ideas about their application.
Thuc defendant/Petitioner would leave one's own interpretation to
settle those applications to indivuduals similarily situated.
The Equal Protection of theFIFTHAmendment Protects Simililarily
situated defendants accross the spectrum of Federal Review,
(3)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was indicted in August 17, 2004 on one count of being a
felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.s.c. §922(g). Appellant
pleaded guilty on the indictment on January 12. 2005, A presentence
investigation Report [PSIR] was then prepared. There were no objections
by Appellant to the reports conclusion that his criminal history
qualified him as an armed career criminal pursuant to U.S.S.G. §4B1.4
(b)(3)(A). Appellants total offense level was 30 and he had 17 criminal
history points, placing him in Criminal History Category VI. Appellants
advisory guideline range was therefore 168-210 months. with a "Restrict
ed" guideline range of 180-210 months, due to the mandatory Minimum
Appellant was sentenced to 196 months incarceration, 5uprevisedrelease for three years. and a One hundred dollar Special assessment.
Appellant then appealed to theSixth Circuit arguing that the district
court failed to properly consider, the factors under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).
That appeal was denied. Then, in the wake of Johnson V. United States.
135 S. Ct. 2551(2015) Appellant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. - §2255
for a writ of habeas surpus challenging his sentence as an armed
career criminal. The district court granted Appellant's motion and
vacated his sentence, scheduling the matter for a new sentencing
hearing. A supplemental PSIR [hereinafter SPSR] was prepared prior
toAppellant's resentencing hearing. The U.S. Probation Department
calculated Appellants new advosory guidelines sentence as follows:
U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(a)(1) assigns a level 24, for felon in
possession of a firearm, "if the Defendant committed any part of
the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or controlled substance
offense." Specifically, the SPSR cited to Appellants convictions
in Paragraphs 44,47 and 49 of the report as supporting this conclusion.
the Probation Department then added for additional four points under
U.S.S.G §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) as "the defendant used or possed any firearm
or ammunition in connection with another felony offense. He possessed
a firearm during robberies on August 30, 2003, and December 24, 2003."
With acceptance of responsibility and a timely notice of intent to
plead guilty, the SPSR calculated a Total Offense level of 25.
(4)
-I
The SPSR recalculated Appellants cr iminal
history points to be 15,
as opposed to the 17 points calculated in
the original PSIP.
The prior PSIR had added an additional two
points, under former
U.S.S.G §4A1.1(e), for having committed the
instant offense within
two years of being released from prison in
three state cases. This
still resulted in a Criminal HistoryCateg
ory of VI.
The resulting advisory guideline range was
110-120 months imprisonment,
as teh Maximum term of imprisonment for the
Appellant under 181J.S.C.
§924(a)(1)(2) is ten years. The GOvernment
offered one objection
to the SPSR; the defense offered no objectio
ns to the SPSR. The GOvernménts objection was as follows:
0bjectionl: The government maintains that
the offense in paragraphs
51 and 52 should not be considered as rele
vant conduct to the instant
offense because there is no indication that
the instant offense is
connected to those offenses as part of the
same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan. The probation offe
red a very lenghty response
to the governments objection. Probation argu
ed that- pursuant to
U.S.S.G §2K2.1(b)(6), Application note
14, and US.S.G1Bl.3(a)2),
Application note 5 the firearm in the pres
ent offense, possessed
on October 3, 2003, was related to his two
prior State convictions
for being a felon in possession of a hand
gun on August 30, 2003 and
December 24. 2003, in the course of Committi
ng aggravated robberies
and aggravated burglaries. Therefore, his
federal possession of the
.
'fir
earm
conv
iction was part of a common purpose or modu
:.
s operandi,
or part of the same course of conduct. Adde
ndum of Feb.24,2016;Pgs.14.
More Specifically, the probation departme
nt argued:
In united StatesV. PhiUi2s, 516 F. 3d 479
(6th cir. 2008)
the defendant was convicted of violating
18 U.S.C.922(g)
The SIxth CIrcuit upheld the four-level incr
ease pursuant
to §2IC2.1(b)6) based on two additional inci
dents of illegal
possession of firearms that were determin
ed to be relevant
conduct to the instant offense, which occu
rred on May 9,
2004. The Sixth Circuit determined that both
which offurred on August 3, 2002 and Marc
incidents,
h 9, 2006, were
(5)
identical to the offense of conviction and that the defendants
repeated possessions of firearms were linked to the common
pu±pose of self-defense. Therefore, based on the similarity
of the offenses to the instant offense and regularity of
the offenses, the Sixth Circuit determined that Phillips's
2002 and 2006 possessions of firearms were part of the
same course of conduct as his 2004 felon in possession
conviction and upheld the four-level increase pursuant to
§2K2.1(b)(6).(id) The probation Department went on to note
that because Appellants state cases constituted relevant
conduct, he should be credited for the time he served for
those state sentences under U.S.S.G%G1.3- Imposition of
a Sentence of a Defendant Subject fo an Undischarged Term
of Imprisonment or Anticipated State Term of Imprisonment,
and U.S.S.G. §5K2.23- Discharged terms of Imprisonment.
At the first re-sentencinghearing on-February 16, 2016 the district
court essentially overruled the governments objection, finding that
Appellants advosory guideline range was 110-120 months incarceration.
However, the Probation Department brought up the issue of Current verses
Consecutive sentences, prior to the district court finishing the imposition
of a 155 month sentence. The probation Officer reminded the Judge that
because the prior state offenses were added as part of Appellants relevant
conduct under U.S.S.G2K2.l(b)(6), that under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 the
guidelines recommended running the sentences concurrent to eachother.
(id at page Id#365-66
.
The court adjurned so the parties court research
the issue and an Addendum court be added to the SPSR regarding the
issue of consecutive verses concurrent sentences. The District court
Ultimately held that the cases were not relevant and refused to gralt
(6)
petitioners concurrent sentencing arguemen.t and ordering the sentences
to beran consecutively to Appellant's states sentences. The Sixth
Circuit- , Court of Appeals Affirmed this decision. This is the Petition
as a direct result of that decision.
\.
(7)
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Pursuant to 1J.S.S.G2K2.1(b)(6). application note 14 and U.S.S.G.1B1.3(a)(2),
application note 5 petitioners offenses of August 30, 2003 "Possession
of a handgun and December 24, 2003 aggravated robberies and aggravated
burglaries was related to the instant offense of October 3, 2003 possession
of a firearm. This was part of petitioners modus operandi. Indeed as
part of a gang, in the Streets of Memphis Tennessee, one could say
that this was a requirement, something like food and water for survival
to possess a firearm. Thus petitioners past lifestyle required him
to possess at all times, a firearm. Indeed the PRobation office was
correct in their assessment instating over the Governments objections
that pursuant to the above mentioned guidelines "application notes"
petitioners prier and subsequent crimes were related, and thus showed
a particular modus operandi.More so, this can be seen that person's
similary situated possess firearms. One only.'has to look at the local
Memphis news to see that this "possession of a firearm at all times"
was a
everyday requiiement for survival.and the past criminalistic
profession that petitioner was in, tho:no longer a part of, petitioner
use to make his living, in a gang, and a firearm was part of the tools
that was used. As harsh as that lifestyle may seam. and as crazy as
it may seam that petitioner is arguing for instead of against the
application of relevant conduct, this is the fact's of the case, and
the rules of the Guidelines and the inperpretation of current case
law dealing with such is clear. because this law would help, instead
of hurt petitioner should not be anbasis for the District court, the
Governments, and subsequent Appeals court unreasonable application
and reading of thier own case law. Equal protection requires protection
(:8)
I
and a reasonable application of the relevant ease law to all
similarly situated petitioners. The probation office, the one's
tasked with and trained with applicationsäsuhawauéd
Specifically:
In United States V. Phillips, 516 F. 3d 479 (6th
Cir. 2008), the defendant was convicted of violating
18 u'.S.C.922(g). The Sixth Circuit Court of appeals
upheld the four-level increase prusuant to §2K2.1(b)(6)
based on two additional incidents of "illegal possession"
of firearms that were determined to be relevant
conduct to the instant offense, which occurred on
May 9, 2004. The Sixth circuit determined that both
incidents, which odcurred on August 3. 2002, and
March 9, 2006, were identical to the offenseof conviction and that the defendants repeated possessions
of firearms:were linked to the common purpose of
"self Defense". Therefore, based on the similarity
of the offenses to the instant offense and"regularity"
of the offenses, the Sixth circuit determined that
Phillips 2002 and 2006 possessions of firearms were
part of the same course of conduct as.his 2004 felon
in possession conviction and upheld the fouri;level
increase pursuant to §2K2.1(b)(6)(id).
In the Sixth Circuitscopiñion, the court recognizes that petitioner
was in an unusual position of arguing that the district court should
have applied aztharsher guidelines range, because he would be eligible
(9 )
I
for a downward sentence ajustment under 5G1.3(b), effectively reducing
the total time he would spend in prison. But their flaw was:in
their analysis of the fact that petitioners counsel only argued
that he carried a firearm for self defense. Indeed the firearm
had multi use properties. Pctitioncr not only uoedthe fircarm
for zclf defense being in Memphis tennessee. and in a gang, but
they were also times when that firearm was used to commit those aggravated crimes. Indeed petitioners prioricharge was felon in possession
of a firearm. The Sixth Circuit states in the conclusion this
contradictory statement "the "fact" that Richardson had a firearm
for all three offenses is not sufficient to support a finding that
he regularly engaged in similiar offenses, because as :discussed,
th6 State offenses (aggravated robery and aggravated burghry)
and Federal offense - (being a felon in possession of a firearm are
not similar)" must categoricaly fail. First as a categorical matter,
when these crimes were used to enhance his offenses under the ACCA
the court "took a peek" at his underlying offenses elements and
discovered that the Aggravated nature element was the use of a
firearm to commit these offenses. Thus, jüst becasue the name of
the offenses are notthe same e.g Agg robbery agg assault compared
to felon in possession, they carry the similar elemental properties
inordcr to convict an individual undar such. provisions. Ihdeed
Tennesees' Aggravated Robbery Statute §39-13-402 (1) States that
in order for it to be listed as a Aggravated robbery it has to
be accomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any arti.cl
used
fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably bnlieve it to
be a deadly weapon. THus the hairs that the Sixth Circuit ty
to split, areunplitable, and their reason for trying
,(10 )
to is not an sensible reading of their case law. In Phillips
the court came to their "own" conclusion that 516 F. 3d at 48385 because in all instances the defendant appeared to be carrying a firearm for self-defense. Indeed the court contridicts their elf
when it cites United States V. Faison. 339 F. 3d 518. 520-21 (6th
cir. 2003)whre they held that similar offenses (Aggravated robbery
and Agg assault) versus (felon in possession ) are not similar,
when they held that felon in possession charge was related to his
various concaine trafficking charges, because the firearm was related
to his cocaine trafficking. These are different charges from Felon
in possession of a firearm complained of. The main factor in all
case's:is firearm the context of all offenses was the use of a
firearm. petitioners modus operandi was to carry a firearm for
protection and for use to tommit crimes, indeed the August 2003
offense relishes this fact, petitioner was convicted and sentenced
to 8 years imprisonment for Agg robbery and Agg burglary, and one
impriasonment for:fortbeing a felon f!.hpossession of a firearm".
The same firearm used in the August 2003, offense wai the same
firearm petitioner was found with in October 2003 federal offense.
This created a jrocedural and substantive due process violation
when both the district and appellant court failed to find, in this
18 U.S.C. §922(g) prosecution, that prior state convictions for
being a felon in possession of a handgun, were not relevant conduct
under §1Bl.3(a)(1)(3) as related to §2K2.l(b)(6)(B), and therefore
not sufficiently related in nature or scope to justify running
his federal prison sentence concurrent with his state prison sentences
( 11 )
0
In United States V. PhiUip_s.516 F. 3d 479, 483-84 (6th dr 2008)
in August 2002, Phillips was shot in a road rage incident in the
state of Kentucky. His vehicle was searched after the shooting,
and two pistols were discovered in a brief case, and a rifle was
in the trunk. After, two years later in May 2004 Phillips was arrested
on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, after a traffic stop.
A search of his vehicle, discovered two hand guns, and military
rifle and a shotgun. This led to a conviction of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
in Federal court. before being prosecuted for the may 2004 matter,
Phi1lis was questioned by ATF and Kentucky state police in connection
with his alleged role as an armed body guard. This occurred in
Marc,h of 2006, near a hotel room associated with mr Phillips. United
States V. Phillips. 516 F. 3d at 482 Phillips" a search of the
hotel room uncovered a semi-automatic pistol. THe District court,
when sentencing Phillips on this may 2006 case found that the August
2002 and March 2006 cases were relevant - conduct under U.S.S.G.
B1.3(a)(2). United States V. Phillips, 516 F. 3d at 482. Phillips
argued that it was error to count his prior and subsequent possessions
as relevant conduct. The Government suessfuUy argued that his possession
of firearms were connected to a "common purpose", that being his
desire to protect himself due to the attempt on his life, and
possession of the firearms in 2002 and 2006 were "same course
of conduct". as the 2004 offense. THe Sixth CIrcuit agreed with
the government. ID.
The court reasoned that the 2002 and 2006 convictions
could be added as relevant conduct, if the district
court found that the offenses were part of the 'seme
Ci 2 )
S
course of conduct or common scheme or plan" under
U.S.S.GUB1.3(a)(2). In quoting the guideline, the
Sixth Circuit reasoned:
"For two or -more offenses constitute part of a common
scheme or plan, they must be substantially connected
to eachother by at least onecommon factor, such as
commom victims, commom accomplices, common purpose,
or similiar modus operand". Application note 9(a).
Ifth±s criteria isñot met. Phillip's prior possessions may nevertheless
be counted as relevant conduct if they were part of the same course
of conduct."Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common scheme
or plan may non the le-,49 qualify as part of the same course of conduct
if they are sufficiently connected or related to other as to warrant
the conclijsion that they are a part of a single
oj__22_going series of offenses". U.S .~ S_ , G § lB1 .3 application note 9
(B). We (Meaning the Sixth Circuit) consider the degree of similarity
of the offenses, the regularity of the offenses,, and the time interval
between the offenses to'assist us in determining whether offenses
are sufficiently connected to be considered
rt of the same course
of conduct. Id. The Guidlines counsel a "sliding scale approach
to these factors, explaining that "[wlhen' one of the above factors
is absent a stronger presence of at least one of the other factors
is required. Id; See also Hill, 479 F. 3d at 1482 (describing Guidelines
. a sliding scale approach").
commentary as requiring -''
The Sixth Circuit in Phillips, went on to note that sister circuits
have held that "contemporaneous or nearly cotemp.raneous possession
of uncharged firearm is... relevant conduct." Indeed the court,
f
Q \
*
even cited:a Ninth Circuit case where a defendant has possessed
a gun contemporaneous with his offense of conviction and admitted
that he regularly possessed stolen guns. UnitedStates V. Phillips ,
516 F. 3d at 483 (internal citations ommitted). In the instant
case, appellant was caught po:ssessingthreeT hand guns within a three
month period of time, and signed a affidavit attesting that he
possessed the Gamma handgun in to of the offenses. (R. 83, position
of Paul Richardson; page ID # 199; corrected page ID #94([sic]).
Like Phillips, appellant had a state case, then an intervening
Federal case, folowed by another State case. THe Phillips
court
found this pattern particularly important in concluding the State
matter on either side of the Federal case were relevant conduct.
Applying thèseAuthorities, and the factors idntified
in application note 9 to U.S.S.G.1B1.3, we hold that
the district court properly attributed Phillp's possession
of firearms in 2002 and 2006 as relevant conduct. Phillips
argues that this case isanalogous to Hill. but there
are two siginificant differences present here that
applyt 0 the §1B1.3 factors and distinguish this case
from Hill. FIrst, the degree of regularity is stronger
here than in Hill, where the sole other offense considered
"relevant conduct" was an iso l
ated drug transaction
nineteen months prior to the offense of conviction.
In the present case, there are two incidents- in addition
to the charged conduct-that are iddnticàl to the offenses
of conviction. Moreover, one of these incedents occurred
after phillips was arrested and incdicted in connection
the offense of conviciton, which suggest that
(14)
suggest that his arrest for being a felon in possessibn
did not dater him from pos s ession firearms and that
he may have carried firearms regularly. Id. at 485.
In the instant matter as bar, Appellant's prior and subsequent
offenses qualify as relevant conduct under both1criteria of U.S.S .- G.
§1B1.3- Application Notes 9(A) and 9(B). Under the first test,
as they were part of
common purpose, or modus operandi (regularly
carrying'a gun as a matter of course or fot: self-defease), Under
the second test, they were part of the same course of conduct,
as they were part of an ongoing series of offenses. Those offenses
were: similiar in nature (illegally possessing a firearm), occurred
regularly (each time he was caught, he had a firearm), and there
was a short time interval between offenses (essentially once every
other month for five months).The degree of similarity of the offenses,
the regularity of the offenses, and the time interval between the
offenses far exceeds the circumstances found in Phillips.
Two of the prior cases, where there was an illegal possession,
Phillips was not even charged. Here, Appellant was charged and
convicted of being a felon in possession, of a handgun. so there
is no doubt about his continuing course of condicdt in carrying
a handgun. (R. N/A. SPSR,pgs. 13-14 ¶I51 & 52). FOr some reason,
defense counsel at the district Court árguedthat the third gun
possession was not relevant conduct. This was clearly an error
on defense counsel's part. However, the district ccurt Judc should
havo found that the third po s session was also relevant conduct,
Sua sponte.Therefore, Plain error standard of review should be
found in this case as well as A Substantial Due process violation
(15)
For the reasons above, it is respectfully requested that petitioners
case be remanded to the Sixth Circuit for futher consideration
in light of the facts of the case and the law that is applicable
to petitioners case, as petitioners two prior state court convictions
for being a felon in possession of a firearm are similiar in
nature in degree to petitioners Instant federal Offns:of Conviction
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Date:
(16)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.