Petition for Writ of Certiorari — David Z. Simpson, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefJan 12, 2018
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
7
/
APPENDIX A
Case 1:08-cr-00030-SJ Document 251 Filed 03/11/16 Page 1 of 3 PagelD #: 1832
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
1 ,2ui:
BROOKLYN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
08 CR 30 (Si)
V.
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
DAVID Z. SIMPSON,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES
ROBERT L. CAPERS
United States Attorney
Eastern District of New York
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
By: Sheve Mail
Stephen James Meyer
Attorneys for the government
NORMAN TRABULUS
Law Offices of Norman Trabulus
345 Seventh Avenue
21" Floor
New York, NY 1001
Attorneyfor Defendant
JOHNSON, Senior District Judge:
Presently before the Court is David Simpson's ("Defendant" or "Simpson")
motion seeking re-sentence pursuant to Amendment 782 of the United States
1
Case 1:08-cr-00030--SJ Document 251 Filed 03/11/16 Page 2 of 3 PagelD #: 1833
Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). For the reasons stated below, the
motion is denied.
On February 12, 2009, Simpson was convicted at trial of all four count in a
superseding indictment charging him with (I) conspiracy to import cocaine; (2)
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine; (3) importation
of cocaine; and (4) attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine. At
sentencing, the Court applied a total offense level of 32, reducing by five levels the
total offense level calculk.edi by the United States Probation Department. The
resulting guideline range was 121 to 151 months incarceration. Simpson was
II sentenced to 135 months.
On December 16, 2014, Simpson moved to be re-sentenced pursuant to
Amendment 782 of the United States Sentencing, Guidelines.. The government
responded on June 17, 2015, consenting to the resentence.
However, a motion to resentence pursuant to Section 3582(c) is
discretionary, and this Court declines to impose a reduced sentence, as Simpson has
not submitted sufficient justification for upsetting the Court's previous balancing of
the factors outlined in 1•8 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Dillon v. United States. 130 S.Ct.
2683, 2692(2010); ("At step two of the inquiry, § 3582(c)(2) instructs a court to
consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion,
the reduction authorized by reference to the policies relevant at step one is
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.");
P040
Case 1:08-cr-00030-SJ Document 251 Filed 03/11/16 Page 3 of 3 PageD #: 1834
United States v. White. 429 F. App'x. 423, 47 (2d Cir. 201 1) (finding the decision
of whether to re-sentence an eligible defendant to be "confided to the sound
discretion of the district court."). Specifically, Simpson's institutional adjustment
has been poor, to say the least. He has received 12 disciplinary infractions for,
inter ali removing food items from the mess hail, failing to follow orders, and
failing to appear for work assignments. He has lost 54 days of his good conduct
time credit, 510 days of phone privileges and been subject to repeated commissary
suspensions. Considering the reductions already granted, this Court finds that no
further alterations in sentence are warranted at this stage. Defendant's motion is
denied.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 11, 2016
Brooklyn, New York
_l
-
3
APPENDIX B
Case 16-849, Document 59, 03/01/2017, 1979129, Page? of 5
16-849-cr
United States v. David Z Simpson
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated tenn of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
1St
day of March, two thousand seventeen.
Present:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges,
VINCENT L. BRICCETTI,
District Judge.*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
V.
16-849
DAVID Z. SIMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant,
LINETTE SANTANA, SHELDON HOLDER, AKA Duane,
TROY CULBERTSON, PATRICIA LANCASTER,
Defendants.
*
Judge Vincent L. Briccetti, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
sitting by designation.
1
Case 16-849, Document 59, 03/01/2017, 1979129, Page2 of 5
For Defendant-Appellant:
NORMAN TRABULUS, New York, NY
For Plaintiff-Appellee:
KAITLIN FARRELL, (J.E. Shreve Ariail, Jo Ann M.
Navickas, on the brief), for Robert L. Capers, United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,
Brooklyn, NY
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Johnson, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.
David Z. Simpson appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J) denying Simpson's motion for a Sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendments 782 and 788 to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, which retroactively lowered the base offense levels applicable to many drug crimes.
We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,
and the issues on appeal.
In considering a sentence reduction motion under § 3582(c)(2), district courts conduct a
multi-step analysis. The district court must first determine whether the defendant is eligible for
a sentence reduction under § 1 B 1.10 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. Christie,
736 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2013). If the defendant is eligible, then the district court may, after
considering the applicable § 3553(a) factors "and any public safety concerns a reduction in
sentence would raise," United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 2011), exercise its
discretion to reduce the defendant's sentence to within the amended guideline range, consistent
with § 1131.10 of the Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. Wilson, 716 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir.
2013) (per curiam). In conducting this analysis, the district court may also "consider
post-sentencing conduct of the defendant that occurred" after the defendant's original sentence
2
Case 16-849, Document 59, 0310112017, 1979129, Page3 of 5
was imposed. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.10, app. n.l(B)(iii); see also Wilson, 716 F.3d
at 52. We review the decision the district court reaches with respect to this second component
of the § 3582(c)(2) determination for abuse of discretion. Rivera, 662 F.3d at 170; United
States v. Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).
Though the procedural protections we require in sentencing proceedings are not fully
applicable in the context of a proceeding under § 3582(c)(2), "the need for at least some
statement of reasons is fully applicable In the context of a motion for a sentence redUction" to
preserve our ability to provide meaningful appellate review.
Christie, 736 F.3d at 195-96. We
deem a district court to have abused its discretion in ruling on this element of a § 3582(c)(2)
motion only "if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of
permissible decisions." Borden, 564 F.3d at 104 (quoting Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d
Cir. 2008)).
Here, in its order denying Simpson's motion, the district court concluded that its previous
analysis of the § 3553(a) factors continued to justify the sentence originally imposed and that
Simpson's post-sentencing conduct counseled against the grant of a sentencing reduction. But
the district court's order also included a clause suggesting that "reductions" previously received
by the defendant informed the decision not to grant Simpson a sentence reduction under §
3582(c)(2). App'x 86. Language in the district court's order indicates that the district court
was referring to the fact that, largely to adjust for an unproven drug quantity referenced in
Simpson's PSR, the guidelines range the district court determined to be applicable at Simpson's
original sentencing proceeding was below
-
or "reduc[ed]" from
-
the guidelines range
calculated by the Probation Department. However, this fact would not, as a general rule, be a
Case 16-849, Document 59, 03/01/2017, 1979129, Page4 of 5
proper component of the § 3582(c)(2) analysis, which incorporates only the § 3553(a) factors,
public safety concerns, and the defendant's post-sentencing conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2);
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 1BI.10, app. n.1(B)(iii).
The Government suggests an alternate approach to the district court's order. it argues
that when a district court makes a discretionary determination to adjust a defendant's guidelines
calculation, or the defendant's final sentence, to account for the particular circumstances of the
case at the original sentencing proceeding, that earlier decision can then be taken into account as
part of the defendant's "history and characteristics" under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) in resolving a
subsequent motion under § 3582(c)(2). However, we need not resolve this contention here
because the specific language used in the order suggests that the district court was not referring
to such a case-specific determination, but rather to the earlier adjustments it had made to
Simpson's guidelines calculation to reflect the provable facts underlying Simpson's conviction.
On this record, therefore, we cannot be confident that the district court's decision was not
improperly informed by a factor lying outside the framework set forth in § 3582(c)(2) and the
relevant section of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Accordingly, we remand this case in accordance with the procedures set forth in United
States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994), directing the district court to clarify by order
whether, without considering the effect of the adjustments it made in determining Simpson's
guidelines range at his original sentencing, it would have reached the same decision with respect
to Simpson's § 3582(c)(2) motion. If the district court determines that further proceedings on
Simpson's § 3582(c)(2) motion are appropriate, it may conduct such proceedings pursuant to this
remand. Within fourteen days of the entry of the district court's final order, either party may
4
f-i
Case 16-849, Document 59, 03/01/2017, 1979129, Page5 of 5
restore the matter to this panel's jurisdiction by giving notice of a renewed appeal to the Clerk of
Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this order. '
-
-
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5
m
Case 1:08-cr-00030-SJ Document 267 Filed 06115/17 Page 1 of 4 PageD #: 1889
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
08 CR 30 (SJ)
V.
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
DAVID Z. SIMPSON,
Defendant
--------
APPEARANCES
BRIDGET RHODE
United States Attorney
Eastern District of New York
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
By: Sheve Anal!
Lindsay Gerdes
Attorneys for the government
NORMAN TRABULUS
Law Offices of Norman Trabulus
345 Seventh Avenue
2l Floor
New York, NY 1001
Attorney for Defendant
JOHNSON, Senior District Judge:
On March 11, 2016, this Court denied defendant David Simpson's
("Simpson" or "Defendant") motion to re-sentence pursuant to Amendment 782 of
1
P.04a
Case 1:08-cr-00030-SJ, Document 267'Filed 06/15/17 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #: 1890
the United States Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Simpson
appealed the decision and the Second Circuit remanded the action, directing this
Court to clarify whether Simpson's motion would have been denied even in the
absence of the Courts 5 level reduction of the total offense level that was
calculated by the Probation Department.
The answer is yes. At the April 25, .2016- hearing, Simpson's disciplinary
record was discussed at considerable length:
P.O4
The Court:
We are here for your application for a reduction of sentence,
and I have before me your disciplinary record at the
institution. And part of your defense, I understand it, is that
it is your religion, is that correct?
Simpson:
Part of my defense is my religion.
The Court:
For the disciplinary infraction.
Simpson:
Sie of my discipliny infractions that I suffered were
because of my particular religion.
The Court:
•That is what I asked you.
Simpson:
Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.
The Court
What is your rligiôn?
Simpson:
My religious practices are similar to those of Messianics or
Jews, Your Honor. I f1low most of the same teachings,
most of the same practices of holy days and so on.
The Court:
What is the naijie?
Simpson:
Most of the religious holy days and feasts and the observing.
of the Sabbath is the same, but there is a slight difference in
determining when. You see, I revert back to the scriptures
-
Case 1:08-cr-00030-Si Document 267 Filed 06/15/17 Page 3 of 4 Pagel #: 1891
and use the original way to determine when. to observe the
days.
The Court: You did not answer my question. I said. what is the name of
your religion..
The Defendant: [do not have a name to give; you.
The Court:
Now, one of the infractions, .1 understand it, is that you were
charged with purloining food, is that correct?
.j
[j..
Simpson
Yes, yes, I was charged, Your Honor, with stealing food
This is a common practice by most inmates at the institution.
The Court:
So everybody steals food' there?
Simpson:
I would not I would not disagree with the stealing of the
food, I would say that what we do is we remove the food
from the chow hail without permission.
Ii
-
The Court: Okay. Now, is this whileyou were on a hunger strike?
e Dkt. No. 256 at 4-6 (emphasis added); seealso Dkt. No. 247 (Simpson's
institutional record), Dkt. No. 13 in case styled $imDson v. United States (SJ) 12
CV 1271 (letters, by.. Simpson to then-Attorney General Holder requesting that
Holder instruct this Court to "address all my issues on the merits or allow me to
die!" and declaring his intent to go on a hunger strike).)
At the conclusion of the April 25 2014.oceedings, the Court reiterated the
relevance of Simson's disciplinary record, a record directly related to the vagaries
3
Case 1:08-cr-00030-SJ Document 267 Filed 06/15/17 Page 4 of 4 Page ID #: 1892
IM
of his religious Observances in that he frequently failed to follow orders to report to
duty stations or 'Wètk because the days of his: Sabbath remain in flux and
indeterminate to the Bureau of Prisons, the Court, and Simpson himself. :(Tr. at 1314.)
For the foregoing reasons, and keing in mind that the decision to
resentence is "confided to the sound discetion :f the district court," United States
v, White, 429 F App'x, 423., 47 .(2d Cit. 2011), this Court denies Simpson's
motion.
SO ORDERED.
...
Dated: June 15, 2017
Brooklyn, New York
4
P-049
7
-
.
n.
APPENDIX D
Case 16-849, Document 109-1, 08/14/2017, 2099310, Pagel of 3
16-849-cr
United States v. David Z. Simpson
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
14' day of August, two thousand seventeen.
Present:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
DEBRA Ai* LWINGSTON,
Circuit Judges,
VINCENT L. BRICCETTI,
District Judge!'
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
V.
16-849-cr
DAVID Z. SIMESON,
Defendant-Appellant,
LiwErru SANTANA, SHELDON HOLDER, AKA Duane,
TROY CULBERTSON, PATRICIA LANCASTER,
Defendants.
*
Judge Vincent L. Briccetti, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
sitting by designation.
1
Case 16-849, Document 109-1, 0811412017, 2099310, Page2 of 3
For Defendant-Appellant:
Norman Trabulus, Esq., New York, NY
For Appellee:
JoAnn M. Navickas, Kaitlin T. Farrell, for Bridget M.
Rohde, Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York, Brooklyn, NY
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Cçurt for the Eastern District of
New York (Johnson, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
David Z. Simpson appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J.) denying Simpson's motion for a sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendments 782 and 788 to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, which retroactively lowered the base offense levels applicable to many drug crimes.
This case now returns to us from our prior remand, pursuant to the procedures laid out in United
States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994), to the district court. We assume the parties'
familiarity with the underlying facts,the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
As explained in our prior order, United States v. Simpson, 678 F. App'x 53 (2d Cir.
2017), in adjudicating the merits of a § 3582(c)(2) motion a district court may consider the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), public safety concerns, and the defendant's
post-sentencing conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 1BI.10,
app. n. 1(B)(iii). We review the district court's weighing of these factors for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 2011).
On Jacobson remand, the district court clarified that the decision it reached denying
Simpson's § 3582(c)(2) motion was based on its original analysis of the § 3553(a) factors at
sentencing, as well as Simpson's disciplinary record while incarcerated. Though the district
2
Case 16-849, Document 109-1, 08/14/2017, 2099310, Page3 of 3
court's clarification order on remand does include a discussion of that court's skepticism about
the credibility of elements of Simpson's testimony, the district court also made clear that the
relevance of this credibility judgment was that it undermined Simpson's efforts to explain away
the disciplinary infractions that were apparent from his record. Because the defendant's
post-sentencing conduct is a relevant consideration in evaluating a § 3582(c)(2) motion, we fmd
no error or abuse of discretion in the district court's ultimate decision to deny Simpson's motion
in part on that basis.
*
*
*
We have considered all of Simpson's remaining arguments and find them without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
SMMO
Case 16-849, Document 109-2, 08/1412017, 2099310, Pagel of 1
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse
40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
ROBERT A. KATZMANN
CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE
CHIEF JUDGE
CLERK OF COURT
Date: August 14, 2017
DC Docket #: 1:08-cr-30-2
Docket #: 16-849cr
DC Court: EDNY (BROOKLYN)
Short Title: United States of America v. Santana (Simpson) DC Judge: Johnson
BILL OF COSTS INSTRUCTIONS
The requirements for filing a bill of costs are set forth in FRAP 39. A form for filing a bill of
costs is on the Court's website.
The bill of costs must:
* be filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment;
* be verified;
* be served on all adversaries;
*
not include charges for postage, delivery, service, overtime and the filers edits;
* identify the number of copies which comprise the printer's unit;
* include the printer's bills, which must state the minimum charge per printer's unit for a page, a
cover, foot lines by the line, and an index and table of cases by the page;
* state only the number of necessary copies inserted in enclosed form;
*
state actual costs at rates not higher than those generally charged for printing services in New
York, New York; excessive charges are subject to reduction;
*
be filed via CMIECF or if counsel is exempted with the original and two copies.
Case 16-849, Document 109-3, 08/14/2017, 2099310, Page? of?
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse
40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
ROBERT A. KATZMANN
CATHERINE O'HACAN WOLFE
CHIEF JUDGE
CLERK OF COURT
Date: August 14, 2017
DC Docket #: 1:08-cr-30-2
Docket #: 16-849cr
DC Court: EDNY (BROOKLYN)
Short Title: United States of America v. Santana (Simpson) DC Judge: Johnson
VERIFIED ITEMIZED BILL OF COSTS
Counsel for
respectfully submits, pursuant to FRAP 39 (c) the within bill of costs and requests the Clerk to
prepare an itemized statement of costs taxed against the
and in favor of
for insertion in the mandate.
Docketing Fee
Costs of printing appendix (necessary copies
Costs of printing brief (necessary copies
)
Costs of printing reply brief (necessary copies
(VERIFICATION HERE)
Signature
APPENDIX E
Case 16-849, Document 125, 10/16/2017, 2148339, Pagel of 1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on
the 16th day of October, two thousand and seventeen,
Before:
JOHN M.WALKER, JR.,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges,
VINCENT L. BRICCErrI,
District Judge.*
United States of America,
ORDER
Docket No. 16-849
Appellee,
V.
Linette Santana, Sheldon Holder, AKA Duane, Troy
Culbertson, Patricia Lancaster,
Defendants,
David Z. Simpson,
Defendant Appellant.
-
Appellant having filed a petition for panel rehearing and the panel that determined the
appeal having considered the request,
iT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is DENTED.
For The Court:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
rECOM
'Judge Vincent L. Briccetti, of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
APPENDIX F
United States Constitution
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.