Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Craig A. Brown, Petitioner v. Amica Insurance Company, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 19, 2018

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CRAIG ALAN BROWN, PETITIONER

AMICA INSURANCE COMPANY

FIRST NATIONAL TITLE GROUP

WELLS FARGO BANK

PNC BANK

RESPONDENTS

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE MAINE SUPREME COURT

Case Nos. Cum 17-52

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Craig A. Brown, Pro Se Plaintiff

36 Stonehurst Drive

Camden, Maine 04843

(207) 521-4232 Cell

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

Did members of the Maine Bar and Amica Insurance Company collude to deny the

Plaintiff legal representation and violate the Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment Rights?

Should have Superior Court Judge Warren recused from hearing CV-00109-2015 given

the Plaintiffs multiple motions to recuse and judicial complaints?

Should have Justice Ellen Gorman to recused from hearing the Plaintiffs Death Knell

Motions in 2016 and the collateral attack on SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 given she was

involved in the malicious prosecution of the Plaintiff in 2003?

Did the constant nationwide harassment and bullying of the Plaintiff by Police and others

during litigation from 2009-2018 violate the Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights?

Did Amica Insurance Company and First National Title Group denial of the Plaintiffs

claims for coverage under the 'Duty To Defend' provisions of the Plaintiffs Insurance

Policies in relation to SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 support the Adverse Possession of

part of the Plaintiffs lot and an attempt to change the boundary of a subdivision without

going through the Planning Board Process in violation of the Clean Water Act 33 USC

1251, Maine Site Development Land Act (MSLDA) Title 38, Chapter 3 M.R.S.A. 481488, Subdivision Development Title 30-A, M.R.S.A 4401-4407 and Camden Subdivision

Ordinances, Article 12?

Did Judge Warren and the Maine Supreme Court's interlocutory judgments which denied

the Plaintiffs collateral attacks on the void RE-09-10 and SCR-083-2009 judgments

support the continued Adverse Possession of part of the Plaintiffs lot and violation of the

Clean Water Act 33 USC 1251, Maine Site Development Land Act (MSLDA) Title 38,

Chapter 3 M.R.S.A. 481-488, Subdivision Development Title 30-A, M.R.S.A 4401-4407

and Camden Subdivision Ordinances, Article 12 and case Law regarding relief from void

judgments?

Should the Maine Supreme Court have granted the Plaintiffs motions for consideration

of his Complaint under the Death Knell Exception and heard the case before trial because

the Plaintiffs constitutional rights were being violated by denial of representation by the

Maine Bar Association, judicial misconduct by Judge Warren and constant bullying and

harassment by Police and others during litigation?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGES

Questions for Review

Table of Contents

Appendix Contents

iii

Table of Authorities

Notes on Reference Documents

Opinions Below

Jurisdiction

Statutory Provisions

Statement of the Case

Facts Material to the Complaint

4-8

Reasons the Granting the Petition

9-15

Conclusion

APPENDIX CONTENTS

PAGES

Appendix A

Cum 17-52 Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration

Cum 17-52 Judgment

Order denying Third Death Knell Appeal dated October 16, 2016

Order denying Second Death Knell Appeal dated July 16, 2016

Order denying First Death Knell Appeal dated April 12, 2016

Appendix B

CV-00109-2015 Judgment

Appendix C-Related Documents

Cum 17-52 Motion for Reconsideration

Cum 17-52 Appeal

17a

Cum 17-52 Third Motion for Death Knell Appeal dated October 16, 2016

67a

Cum 17-52 Second Motion for Death Knell Appeal dated July 16, 2016

88a

Cum 17-52 First Motion for Death Knell Appeal dated April 11, 2016

116a

Cum 17-52 Collateral Attack on SCR-083-09 & RE-09-10

129a

CV-00 109-2015 Docket

154a

RE-09-10 Judgment

176a

SCR-083-2009 Judgment

181a

Title 30-A, M.R.S.A. 4406

183a

Title 30-A, M.R.S.A. 4407

186a

111

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGES

Alicock v. Alicock, 437 N.E. 2d. 392 (III App. 3 Dist. 1982)

Bullochv. United States, 763 F. 2d1115, 1121 (10' Cir. 1985)

Dept of Human Services v. Lowatchie, 569 A2d. 197, 199 (ME 1990)

Estate of Dineen, 1998 ME 268, 8, 721 A.2d 185, 188," Id. 9, 721 A.2d at 188

Estate of Paine, 6092 A.2d 1150, 1153 (Me. 1992)

12,14

Federal Rules of Civil Proc., Rule 60 (b) (4), 28 U.S.C.A.;

Const. Amend. 5, Klugh v. U.S. Fiber Materials Inc. v. Subilia,

2009 ME 71, 14,974 A. 2d 918

6,10,12,13,16

Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973)

Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (198 1)

Liberty, 2012 ME, 81, 19,46 A. 3d 1141

9,14

Liljeberg v. Health Sciences Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S. Ct.

2194(1988)

Long v. ShorebankDev. Corporation., 182 F. 3d 548, 561 (711, Cir 1999)

10,12

Montana, 440 U.S. at 164

Orner v. Shalala, 30 F. 3d. 1307. (Colo.stl:State 1994)

4,10

Parker v. Parker, quoting Fair v. Tampa Electric Company

People v. Sales, 551 N.E. 2d. 1359, (III App. Dist 1990)

People v. Zajic, 88 III. App. 3d 477, 410 N.E. 2d 626 (1980)

Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son Ltd, 427 F.3d 129, 135 (1st Cir. 2005)

12,14

Sanchez v. Hester, 911 S.W. 2d. 173, (Texas Appellate-Corpus Christi 1995)

Serv. v. Carter, 2002 ME 103, 7, 12, 799 A2d. 1232, 1234, quoting

Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, 5, 728 A2d. 1261,1264

Town of Otis v. Derr, 2001 ME 151, 3, 782 A2d. 788, 789, quoting State v.

Maine Employees Association, 482 A2d. 461,465 (ME 1984)

United States v. Balistrieri, 779, 1202 F 2d. 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) 11,12

United States v. Sciuto, 521 F 2 d. 842, 845 (7th Circuit 1996)

NOTES ON REFERENCE DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE LITIGATION

The Nims Report identified that the Ferrara residence was 21' from the common lot line and in

conflict with the Stonehurst Protective Covenants 25' set back requirement.

The Stonehurst Subdivision Plan (1987) was filed by Surveyors Hermansen and Richards who

set up the Stonehurst Subdivision and was approved by Camden Planning Board. The Vial to

Laite Deed conveyed land to the subdivision and states that the stone walls surrounding the

subdivision at the back of the Plaintiff and Ferrara lots are the abutters. The Stonehurst

Protective Covenants (1987), require a 25' set back from lot lines and that Laite Construction

(Parker Laite) be involved in the development of the property.

MSBA Practice Series #101, Roads and Easements, Section 3.3 "Measurement v. Title," by

Hermansen and Richards details legal deed description wording interpretation and case law for

property located near stone walls. All of the deed descriptions for property n the Subdivision are

written to reflect that the boundary lines are inside of the stone walls. MSBA Practice Series

#102, Principles and Procedures for the Location of Boundaries in Maine, by Hermansen and

Richards section 7.4 states the accuracy of modem surveying instruments is accurate to 1110th of

an inch, and angular measurement within seconds.

Good Deeds Survey (2003) does not have bearings or distances cited on the drawing, is in

conflict with the Stonehurst Subdivision Plan and the Plaintiff and Ferrara lot deed descriptions,

and shows the rear lot lines of the Plaintiff and Ferrara lots on the centerline to rear edge of the

stone walls at the back of the lots, or on the property of the abutting property owner per the Vial

to Laite Deed.

FE Beale Survey (2009) was filed with the Knox County Registry but never approved by the

Camden Planning Board in violation of Title 30-A, M.R.S.A. 4406, and has bearings and

distances cited that are different than those cited on the Stonehurst Subdivision Plan and the

Plaintiff and Ferrara lot deeds, and shows the rear lot lines of the Plaintiff and Ferrara lots on the

centerline to rear edge of the stone walls at the back of the lots, or on the property of the abutting

property owner per the Vial to Laite Deed.

The Plaintiff's Homeowners Policy's 'Duty to Defend' clause does not exclude appeals, and

requires that Arnica provide a legal defense against baseless property damage lawsuits.

The Plaintiffs Title Insurance Policy, states that First National Title Group will file lawsuits to

defend the Plaintiff's title.

OPINIONS BELOW

RE-09-10 Judgment

CV-00 109 Judgment

Cum 17-52 Judgment

Cum 17-52 Judgment on Motion for Reconsideration

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Maine Supreme Court was entered on October 24, 2017, and the date of

Order denying Motion for Reconsideration November 6, 2017. The deadline for filing a writ of

certiorari with the US Supreme Court is (90) days after November 6, 2017 or February 3, 2018.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1257.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Sixth Amendment Constitutional Right to representation.

The Clean Water Act (CWA) 33 U.S.C. 1251 of 1972 authorized the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) to authorize the (Section 401402) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System (NPEDS) to state governments, enabling Maine to authorize permits for land

development that might impact storm water runoff.

The Maine Site Land Development Act (MSLDA) Title 38, M.R.S.A. 481-489, and

Municipalities and Counties, Title 30-A, M.R.S.A. 4401-4408 were enacted by Maineto comply

with EPA regulations, and require that land development be approved and controlled by the

Maine Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) and local planning boards, to ensure no

adverse effect to the environment or quality of life. The Camden Subdivision Ordinances mimic

the state regulations. Camden Zoning Officer Nims was required by Title 30-A, M.R.S.A. 4451

& 4452 to be trained and knowledgeable in and enforce all applicable laws and ordinances

pertaining to Comprehensive Planning and Land Use, per Title 30-A, 4451 M.R.S.A. 2-A (B).

Title 30-A, M.R.S.A 4406 prohibits selling lots in a subdivision which don't conform to the

approved subdivision plan on file with the local registry and filing a survey of a subdivision with

the local registry that has not been approved by the local planning board. Title 30-A, M.R.S.A

4407 and the Camden Subdivision Ordinances Article 12 specifically prohibits making changes

to lots in a subdivision without going through the planning board process.

Criminal Mischief, Title 17-A, M.R.S.A. 805.1 A person is not guilty of criminal mischief if he

had reasonable grounds to believe his actions in damaging property were within his legal rights,

even if he is wrong.

Stalking Title 17-A, M.R.S.A. 210-A- When a person engages in conduct that would cause a

reasonable person to suffer emotional stress or using ones presence to disturb a person.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This Writ addresses collusion to deny the Plaintiff legal representation by the Maine Bar

Association and Arnica Insurance Company, the use of stalking and harassment of the Plaintiff

by Police, Ferrara and others during litigation to procure adverse judgments, and 'Fraud upon the

Court' by Court Officers to defend void SCR-083-20009 and RE-09-10 judgments made by

Judge Hjelm in 2009 after the Plaintiff legally removed a fence from his property that Ferrara

had erected to take adverse possession. The RE-09-10 judgment violates the Clean Water Act,

Title 30-A, M.R.S.A. 4406 & 4407 and the Camden Subdivision Ordinance's requirements for

the control of subdivisions and was put in place to protect the adverse possession by Ferrara and

give the Camden Police probable cause to prosecute the Plaintiff for criminal mischief a second

time if the Plaintiff removed the fence.

Arnica Insurance Company repeatedly denied the Plaintiff legal representation from 2003-2010

under the 'Duty to Defend from property damage lawsuits' clause in the Plaintiff's Homeowners

Policy which resulted in the void SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 judgments. This left the Plaintiff

with a property with an impugned property title that the Plaintiff cannot sell per Title 30-A,

M.R.S.A. 4406. The void judgments also left the Plaintiff vulnerable to continued harassment

associated with the adverse possession from 2006 to present which materially reduced the

Plaintiff's ability to litigate and has kept the Plaintiff from finding employment, reducing his

income by approximately $100,000/year. The Plaintiff also has had to seek medical attention for

stress related illnesses caused by the stalking and harassment including depression, anxiety and

stroke.

From 2010-2014, after Arnica denied the Plaintiff legal advice the Plaintiff prosecuted Federal

Complaints 2:10-CV-00063 GZS, 2:10-CV-00523 GZS, and 2:11-CV-00426 JAD and Appeal

12-1847 in attempts to stop the malicious prosecution and overturn void SCR-083-2009 and RE09-10 judgments, but was unsuccessful.

In 2015, the Plaintiff filed CV-00109-2015 alleging breach of contract by Arnica and First

National Title Group, and unfair business practices by Wells Fargo and PNC Banks.

The Plaintiff collaterally attacked the void SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 judgments in both the

Trial Court and Maine Supreme Court but was denied. The Plaintiff also filed three Death Knell

Appeal motions arguing that his Constitutional Rights were violated by extending litigation but

was denied. The Plaintiff is asking the United States Supreme Court to review the collateral

attacks and Death Knell Appeal motions and overturn the CV-00109-2015, Cum-1752 and the

void SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 and judgments.

FACTS MATERIAL TO THE COMPLAINT

The Plaintiff did due diligence and made a conservative investment when he purchased a home

in the Stonehurst Subdivision at 36 Stonehurst Drive Camden, Maine 04843 with an approved

Subdivision Plan on file with the Knox County Registry, and a Warranty Deed issued by the

Developer, Parker Laite who stated in advertising brochures that "he and his heirs would protect

the property rights conveyed via the Plaintif Deed, forever."

In 2002, the Plaintiff's neighbor, Ferrara erected a shed less than the required 25' from the

common line with the Plaintiff's lot. The Plaintiff called Camden Zoning Officer Jeff Nims who

reviewed the location of the shed, and issued a report (Nims Report) that Ferrara's house was in

violation of the Subdivision Protective Covenants 25' set back. Nims also gave the Plaintiff

unsolicited legal advice to "sue Ferrara and force him to cut 4' off his house."

Ferrara and other residents of the Subdivision immediately began bullying and harassing the

Plaintiff over the Ferrara set back violation. Vandalism was part of the harassment, and in

December of 2002 a mature tree was cut down and the post and rail section marking the front

corner of the lot common with the Ferrara lot was removed. On December 26th, the Plaintiff

took Ferrara to task verbally about the vandalism in his driveway and inadvertently ran into him.

The Camden Police charged the Plaintiff with Felony Assault and Disorderly Conduct even

though there was no evidence that the Plaintiff was trying to injure Ferrara. Ellen Gorman (now

on the Maine Supreme Court) heard the case.

While the Plaintiff was under an Order for Protection, the boundary markers of the Subdivision

were illegally moved and Ferrara erected a fence on the Plaintif lot 25'+ from his residence and

took Adverse Possession of part of the Plaintiff's lot. Because the only legal way to make a

change to the subdivision is through the Camden Planning Board, the adverse possession is an

attempt to illegally change the boundary lines of the Stonehurst Subdivision without going

through the Camden Planning Board process as required by the Clean Water Act, Title 30- A,

M.R.S.A. 4407 and the Camden Subdivision Ordinances.

The scheme was/is meant to cover up Real Estate Fraud by Developer Parker Laite, who sold

lots at a premium with Protective Covenants while assisting in the construction of houses that

violated the Covenants, and to bring the Ferrara residence into compliance with the 25' set back

required by the Protective Covenants. The Plaintiff believes that as many as six (6) of the

eighteen (18) properties in the Subdivision are not in compliance with the Covenants.

The Plaintiff retained Eric Morse, an ex Knox County DA who advised him to have Good Deeds

Surveyors do an informal pin check after the fence was put up. Good Deeds created a drawing

(Good Deeds Survey 2003) that showed the fence 25'+ from the Ferrara residence but on the

Ferrara lot. There were no boundary distances or bearings on the Survey Drawing and it does

not agree with the Plaintiff or Ferrara deed descriptions or title analysis of the Subdivision, and

shows the rear lot lines of the Plaintiff and Ferrara lots on the stone walls which are on the land

of the abutters of the Subdivision.

The Plaintiff contends that Morse and Good Deeds conspired to fabricate the survey drawing as

evidence that was used as "probable cause" by the Camden Police in 2009 to prosecute the

Plaintiff for Felony Criminal Mischief when the Plaintiff took self help action and legally

removed the fence from his lot.

The Plaintiff tried to find an unbiased Attorney and unbiased Land Surveyor from 2004-2010,

and spoke to more than 50-100 Attorneys and more than 50-100 Surveyors, but could not find

anyone who would help him stop the Adverse Possession. The Plaintiff also spoke to Arnica

Insurance Company repeatedly from 2004-2010 about providing legal assistance, but was told

repeatedly that "land wasn't covered by his Policy."

In 2005 after a social dinner, the Plaintiff and his Wife were threatened by Gilbert Laite, the

brother of Parker Laite who repeatedly stated that his Parker Laite would "ruin their lives if they

did not go along with the Adverse Possession."

The harassment by Ferrara and others continued and there was interference in the Plaintiffs

career and business both in Maine and at out of state locations by Police and others after the

threat by the Laites. In 2008, the Camden and Rockport Police began openly harassing the

Plaintiff and his Wife, so the Plaintiff filed Orders for Protection against both Police

Departments, and Ferrara (RODC-PA-00244-00247) which were denied.

In 2009, in an attempt to stop the harassment and protect his career, the Plaintiff faxed the Knox

County DA's office a sketch of what sections he was going to remove from his lot and used a

chain saw to legally remove sections of the Ferrara fence from his lot.

The Plaintiff was arrested by the Camden Police and charged with Felony Criminal Mischief

(SCR-083-2009), based on false Police Reports made by Ferrara who claimed the fence was on

his property and the Plaintiffs knowledge of the Good Deeds Survey was used as probable cause

for the arrest.

The Plaintiff was charged with a Felony Criminal Mischief despite the facts that the Plaintiff had

'reasonable grounds' to believe the fence was on his lot (Nims Report & deed description) and

the damage to the fence was under the $2000 damage limit for a felony, and the fact that the

Police had knowledge of exculpatory evidence (the FE Beal Survey) which showed that the

boundaries of the Ferrara lot had been illegally changed.

The criminal prosecution was an attempt by Attorney's Gale who represented the Plaintiff,

Ferrara's Attorney Baiungo and Knox County D. A. Rushlau to use the threat of a Felony

Conviction and jail time to extort the Plaintiffs property rights.

When the Plaintiff refused to give up his property rights via a 'plea deal,' Attorney Gale

withheld legal advice and would not act to protect the Plaintiff's property rights so the Plaintiff

fired him. Ferrara filed RE-09-10 and Judge Hjelm (now on Maine Supreme Court) awarded

Ferrara a Summary Judgment to change the boundary lines of his lot after the Plaintiff fired

Attorney Peterson who also refused to take action to protect the Plaintiffs property rights. The

Summary Judgment was based on the FE Beal Survey which was never approved by the Camden

Planning Board in violation of Title 30-A, M.R.S.A. 4406, and it made the Plaintiff's house

unmarketable because Title 30-A, M.R.S.A. 4406 also prohibits the sale of property in

subdivisions that don't comply with the Subdivision Plan on file.

The Hjelm RE-09-10 Judgment is void because it was made without jurisdiction in conflict with

the Clean Water Act, Title 30-A, M.R.S.A. 4406 & 4407 and the Camden Subdivision

Ordinances and because the FE Beal Survey effects a change to the boundaries of the subdivision

that wasn't approved by the Camden Planning Board.

The Plaintiff contends that the denial of a legal defense by members of the Maine Bar

Association, Amica Insurance Company and professional misconduct by Eric Morse, Jon Gale,

Steven Peterson, D.A. Geoff Rushlau and the violation of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights by

Judge Hjelm was fraud and meets the requirements of Rule 60(b)(3).

The Plaintiff talked to Amica during the malicious prosecution of SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-1 0

but Amica repeatedly denied the Plaintiff's requests for legal representation, despite the fact that

both Complaints alleged property damage which was covered by the Plaintiffs Homeowners

Policy.

The Plaintiff also filed 2:10-CV-00063GZS during the litigation of SCR-083-2009 in an attempt

to compel the Maine Federal District Court stop the malicious prosecution but it was dismissed

by Judges Kravchuk and Singal. The Plaintiff met with Arnica in the fall of 2010 before filing

2:10-CV-00523 GZS and 2:11-00426 JAD in an attempt to overturn the void decisions and

obtain protection from the continued harassment and interstate interference with the Plaintiffs

career and business.

The Plaintiff was stalked, harassed and bullied by Police and others constantly during litigation

in State Court and Maine Federal District Court and from 2009-2014. In 2011, the Plaintiff filed

a 2:10-CV-000523 GZS Motion to Collateral Attack the void SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10

Judgments in an attempt to stop the harassment but it was denied.

The stalking, bullying and harassment has continued to the present. In 2015, the Plaintiff talked

to another 15-20 Attorneys about legal representation to sue Arnica for not honoring the 'Duty to

Defend' provisions in the Plaintiffs Homeowners Policy, but could not find an Attorney who,

would represent him despite a solid case.

The Plaintiff filed CV-00 109-2015 Pro Se against Amica and immediately filed a motion to

collaterally attack the void SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 Judgments to mitigate the harassment

but it was denied.

In 2016, the Plaintiff filed three motions that his Complaint be evaluated per a Death Knell

Appeal with the Maine Supreme Court because it fit the criteria for a Death Knell Appeal

including the facts that enough information had been established on the Docket to make a final

judgment, including that the Plaintiff had been involved in litigation for an extended period of

time prior (2003-2015), and the fact that the Plaintiffs constitutional rights were being violated

by the denial of legal representation, judicial misconduct by Judge Warren (Fraud upon the

Court), and continued stalking and harassment by Police and others.

The Plaintiff contends that the Maine Supreme Court (Ellen Gorman ruling) should have granted

the Death Knell Appeal because his constitutional rights were being violated by the denial of

representation, harassment and judicial misconduct by Judge Warren.

In his second Death Knell Exception motion, the Plaintiff stated that he might have a heart attack

or stroke from the stress caused by the continuous harassment during litigation and that the

Maine Supreme Court should decide the case on the record. This proved to be a true assertion,

because the Plaintiff had a stroke a few weeks after the trial.

The Plaintiff was initially told before Christmas 2016 that it would not be heard during that

Docket Call by a Court Clerk, and then was given notice of the trial only four days before the

start of the trial in January 2017. Arnica prevailed in CV-00109-2015.

The Plaintiff was harassed during his writing of the Cum 17-52 Maine Supreme Court Appeal

including interference with his attempts to obtain medical treatment.

Doctors in Maine and Texas refused to take the Plaintiff off Metoprol which caused the Plaintiff

to retain excess amounts of water and impugned the Plaintiff's ability to think and reason, and

the Plaintiff was not able to procure adequate medical care until after Cum 17-52 was filed, the

Plaintiff sought medical advice in Mexico and lost 110 lbs. of water weight in six weeks after a

Mexican Doctor adjusted the Plaintiff's medication.

The Plaintiff filed a collateral attack of the void SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 Judgments with

the Maine Supreme Court but was denied. The Plaintiff contends that the Knox County Superior

Court, Maine Federal District Court, First Circuit Court of Appeals, Cumberland County

Superior Court and Maine Supreme Court have all supported the adverse possession (theft) of

part of the Plaintiff's lot by Ferrara and the violation of the Clean Water Act and have acted in

conflict with Maine and Federal Case Law regarding relief from void judgments by denying

collateral attacks on SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10.

The Plaintiff contends that his Sixth Amendment Constitutional Rights were repeatedly violated

by members of the Maine Bar Association, Arnica Insurance Company and First National Title

Group who colluded to deny the Plaintiff legal advice for SCR-083-2009, RE-09-10, 2:1000063GZS, 2:10-CV-00523GZS, 2:11-CV-00426JAD, CV-00109-20 15 and Cum 17-52. There

was also judicial misconduct by Federal and State Judges, and the constant stalking and

harassment by Police and others during litigation violated the Plaintiff's Constitutional Due

Process Rights.

The Plaintiff believes there is a quid pro quo relationship between the Maine Bar Association

and Arnica Insurance Company and First National Title Group, i.e. the insurance companies

deny their policyholders coverage for valid claims in support of malicious litigation by the Maine

Bar, and the Maine Bar denies the insurance company policyholders legal representation to sue

the insurance companies for Breach of Contract.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Writ should be granted because the Plaintff's sixth amendment right to representation was

violated by collusion by members of the Maine Bar Association, Arnica Insurance Company and

First National Title Group who denied the Plaintiff's claims for unbiased legal representation

from 2003 to present in order to allow Ferrara to take Adverse Possession of part of the

Plaintiff's lot and procure and protect the void SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 judgments. This

included the three (3) Attorneys who represented the Plaintiff including Eric Morse, Jon Gale,

and Steven Peterson.

This forced the Plaintiff to defend himself against a malicious felony charge and argue for his

constitutional rights, property rights, and contractual rights under his Homeowners and Title

Insurance Policies Pro Se, while trying to cope with constant stalking, bullying and harassment

by Police and others.

The right to counsel does not depend upon whether the proceeding is characterized as "Criminal"

or "Civil." In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the U.S. Supreme Court has said, "This

right (right to counsel) extends to every case in which the litigant may be deprived of his

personal liberty if he loses."

The Writ should be granted because all Maine Police, Attorney's and Judges all swear an oath to

uphold Maine Laws and the U.S Constitution but the Police and Court Officers involved in SCR083-2009, RE-09-10, CV-00109-2015 and Cum 17-52 failed to do so.

As stated in People v. Zajic, 88 III. App. 3d 477, 410 N.E. 2d 626 (1980): "A judge is an officer

of the Court as well as all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to

act impartially and lawfully. Afederaljudge is afederal judicial officer paid by the federal

government to act impartially and lawfully. State and Federal attorneys fall into the same

general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the Court."

The Plaintiff contends that none of the Judges and Attorney's involved in the prosecution and

appeals of SCR-083-2009, RE-09-10 and CV-00109-2015 acted lawfully or impartially, and all

violated their oaths of office by failing to uphold the Law.

Per the Supreme Court: "Re-determination of issues is warranted if there is a reason to doubt

that the quality, extensiveness, or fairness ofprocedures followed in prior litigation," Montana,

440 U.S. at 164, Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).

The void RE-09-1O decision was put in place and upheld by Maine Police, Attorneys and Judges

to protect the continued theft by Adverse Possession of part of the Plaintiff's lot by Ferrara, so if

the Plaintiff took self help action again and removed the fence again, the Camden Police could

use the Plaintiff's knowledge of the RE-09-10 judgment as probable cause to prosecute the

Plaintiff for criminal mischief a second time.

The Maine Federal and State Court Judges and the Maine Supreme Court, all ignored the fact

that the SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 judgments are void, denied the Plaintiff's collateral attack

motions, and thus violated the Plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Case Law concerning fraud and void judgments is clear and which all of the aforementioned

judges ignored:

"A Void Judgment which includes a Judgment entered by a Court that lacks jurisdiction

over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks the inherent power to enter a particular

judgment, or an order procured by Fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court

either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the Court," Long

v. Shore bank Development Corporation, 182 F. 548(C.A. 7 III. 1999).

"While void orders are readily appeal able and must be attacked directly, void order may

be circumvented by collateral attack or remedied by mandamus," Sanchez v. Hester, 911

S.W. 2d. 173, (Tex. Apell-Corpus Christi 1995).

"Voidjudgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction over the parties or subject

matter or that lacks inherent power to make or enter particular order involved, such a

judgment maybe attacked at anytime, either directly or collaterally," People v. Sales, 551

N.E. 2d. 1359, (III App. Dist 1990).

"Judgment is a void judgment if the Court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction

over the subject, or the parties, or acted in a inconsistent with Due Process, "Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.; Const. Amend. 5- Klugh v. US.

"Res Judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment, which is one which,

from its inception is a complete nullity and without legal effect," Ailcock v. Allcoclç 437

N.E. 2d. 392 (III App. 3 Dist. 1982).

"When rule providing relieffrom voidjudgment is applicable, is not a discretionary

matter, it is mandatory," Orner v. Shalala, 30 F. 3d. 1307. (Colo.stl:State 1994).

The Plaintiff contends that there was 'fraud upon the court' by the Federal Judges and Maine

Judges Warren and Gorman, and the Maine Supreme Court who all refused to overturn the SCR083-2009 and RE-09-10 judgments.

In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F. 2d 1115, 1121 (lØth Cir. 1985), the Court stated "Whenever

any officer of the Court commits Fraud during a proceeding in the Court he/she is engaged in

"Fraud upon the Court;" and that Fraud upon the Court is fraud which is directed at the

judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false

statements or perjury. It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence

is attempted or where the Judge has not performed his judicial function thus where the

impartial functions of the Court have been directly corrupted"

Another reason to grant the Writ is case law regarding recusal. The Plaintiff filed a motion for

Judge Hjelm to recuse from hearing SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 concurrently but was denied.

The Plaintiff filed multiple motions for Federal Judges Kravchuk, Singal, and Rich to recuse and

multiple motions for Judge Warren and Judge Gorman to recuse (the Gorman motions were

included in the Death Knell Appeal Motions), but all were denied.

Per the U.S. Supreme Court: Courts have repeatedly held that "positive proof of the partiality of

a judge is not a requirement for disqualification, only the appearance ofpartiality," Liljeberg v.

Health Sciences Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S. Ct. 2194 (1988).

The Maine Supreme Court standard for recusal per the Estate of Dineen, 1998 ME 268, 8, 721

A.2d 185, 188: "Recusal is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court."

"Accordingly, we review the denial of a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion." Id.

"[I]nformation gained or opinions formed by a trial judge based on events or facts presented in

the same or other judicial proceedings do not constitute a basis for recusal except in the

extraordinary circumstances that demonstrate a deep-seatedfavoritism or antagonism that

would make fairjudgment impossible," Id. 9, 721 A.2d at 188.

Federal case law includes: "What matters is the not the reality of bias or prejudice but its

appearance;" United States v. Balistrieri, 779, F 2d. 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is

directed at the appearance ofpartialily, whether or not the judge is actually biased ") ("Section

455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S. C. 455 (a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual

bias in their judge, but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial

process").

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language (455 (a))

imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even ifno motion or affidavit has been filed."

Balistrieri at 1202. Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By Law, they are

bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge

has given another example of his "appearance ofpartiality, "which possibly, further disqualifies

the judge," and "Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the

secondjudge has evidenced an "appearance ofpartialily, and has disqualified himself None of

the Orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It

would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and of no legal force or effect. Should a

judge not disqualify himself then the judge is in violation of the Due Process Clause of the US.

Constitution" United States v. Sciuto, 521 F 2 d. 842, 845 (7th Circuit 1996).

The Plaintiff contends that Federal Judges Kravchuk, Singal, and Rich and Maine Judges Hjelm,

Warren and Ellen Gorman all were openly biased against the Plaintiff and violated the Plaintiff's

Constitutional Rights by refusing to recuse.

The Writ should be granted was because the constant harassment and bullying of the Plaintiff by

Police and others associated with the Adverse Possession during litigation from 2009-2018 was

'extrinsic fraud,' that violated the Plaintiff's Constitutional Due Process Rights: "Extrinsic Fraud

is fraud outside of the workings of the case, fraud that stereotypically prevents a party from fully

putting on her case or being heard by the Court, "Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp. 182 F. 3d548,

561 (7th Cir 1999).

In Parker v. Parker, quoting Fair v. Tampa Electric Company: "The prevention of an

unsuccessful party (from) putting on his case, fraud or deception by his adversary, keeping the

party away from Court, falsely promising a compromise, ignorance of the adversary of the suit

or the actions of the Plaint fraudulent representation of the party without his consent,

connivance in his defeat and so on."

Maine permits collateral attack on the basis of fraud where "clear and convincing proof that an

advantage has been gained in the obtaining ofa judgment by an act of badfaith where by the

court has been made an instrument of injustice," can be demonstrated. Estate of Paine, 609 2

A.2d 1150, 1153 (Me. 1992); Roger Edwards, LLCv. Fiddes&Son Ltd., 427 F.3d 129,135(1st

Cir. 2005) and ("To set aside a verdict for fraud under Rule 60(b) (3), a litigant must prove

that any allegedfraud substantially interfered with the litigant's ability fully, fairly to prepare

for, and proceed at trial.").

...

The effect of constant stalking, bullying and harassment and case law concerning extrinsic fraud

supports the Plaintiff's arguments that this Writ and his collateral attacks on SCR-083-2009 and

RE-09-10 should be granted under Rule 60(b) (3).

The Writ should be granted because it met the criteria for a Death Knell Appeal before final

judgment, and no trial should have been held given the Plaintiffs motions, "With limited

exceptions, a party may not appeal a decision until afinaljudgmenr has been rendered in the

case." Serv. v. Carter, 2002 ME 103, 7, 799 A.2d. 1232, 1234. The Plaintiff contends that he

would have prevailed if the Supreme Court had ruled on what was on the record (including the

documentation of damages) when the Death Knell Appeal motions were filed.

The Maine Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to the final judgment rule: (1) Death

Knell Exception, (2) the Collateral Order Exception, and (3) the Judicial Economy Exception.

Additionally, per Dept of Human Services v. Lowatchie, 569 A2d. 197,199 (ME 1990), the

Court suggested the need to recognize additional exceptions to the final judgment rule if

"extraordinary circumstances of a case warrant doing so." The Plaintiff contends that his

Complaint met the requirements of the three exceptions when he filed his Death Knell Appeal

motions and the 'extraordinary circumstances' alone warranted granting a Death Knell Appeal.

The Death Knell Exception to the final judgment rule enables a party to appeal an interlocutory

Order if "the substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed untilfinal

judgment." Id 12, 799 A2d. 1234, (quoting Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, 5, 728 A2d. 1261,

1264).

In addition, "Application of the death knell exception is a fact specific inquiry that requires the

examination of the merits of each case," Fiber Materials Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71, 14, 974 A.

2d918.

In paragraph 5 and other sections of the of the Plaintiff's Third Motion for a Death Knell Appeal,

the Plaintiff details how Judge Warren was extending litigation by not overturning the RE-09-10

judgment and thus leaving the Plaintiff and his Wife open to continued bullying and harassment

and judicial misconduct which was effecting the Plaintiffs health and well being and his ability

to litigate. This refers to the Judge Warren April 2015 interlocutory order which denied the

Plaintiffs Motion to Collaterally Attack the void SCR-083-2009 and RE-09-10 judgments.

The Plaintiff further argues that his Death Knell Exception should have been granted because the

"extraordinary circumstances" of his case, including the fact that the Arnica Insurance Company,

First National Title Group and the Maine Bar Association's denial of a legal defense supported

fraud, where "clear and convincing proof that an advantage has been gained in the obtaining of

a judgment by an act of badfaith where by the court has been made an instrument of injustice,"

can be demonstrated. Estate ofPaine, 609 2 A.2d 1150, 1153 (Me. 1992); Roger Edwards, LLC

v. Fiddes & Son Ltd, 427 F.3d 129, 135 (1st Cir. 2005).

To fall within the Collateral Order Exception, the Maine Supreme Court has three requirements:

the decision is a final determination of a claim separable from the gravamen of the litigation;

it presents a major question of law; and (3) it would result in an irreparable loss of rights

claimed, absent immediate review."

The Plaintiff argues that a Collateral Order Exception should have been granted so that the

Maine Supreme Court could have made a final determination that the RE-09-10 judgment is void

which was separable from the Duty to Defend arguments and is a major question of law, and

absent the immediate review under the Collateral Order Exception, there was irreparable loss to

the Plaintiff's rights claimed in CV-00109-2015 because the continued harassment and judicial

misconduct by Judge Warren effected the Plaintiff's health and well being and ability to

prosecute his Complaint.

The Judicial Economy exception to the final judgment rule is available if two requirements are

met, "first, that review of a non final order can establish afinal orpracticallyfinal disposition of

the entire litigation, and secondly, that the interests ofjustice require that an immediate review

be undertake." Town of Otis v. Derr, 2001 ME 151, 3, 782 A2d. 788, 789 (quoting State v.

Maine Employees Association, 482 A2d. 461,465 (ME 1984)).

Further: "The judicial economy exception permits an interlocutory appeal when (1) review of a

non-final order can establish afinal, orpracticallyfinal disposition of the entire litigation, and

(2) the interests ofjustice require that immediate review be undertaken," Liberty, 2012 ME, 81,

19,46 A. 3d 1141. "Generally, we invoke the judicial economy exception when there are

"particularly unique circumstances" in the history of a case such as exceedingly long litigation,

multiple pending proceedings involving the same party, or litigation subject to "inordinate

delay," Id 22.

The Plaintiff argues that his Complaint also met the requirements of the judicial economy

exception when the Death Knell Appeal motions were filed in 2016; in paragraphs 55 of the

Third Death Knell Appeal motion (below):

PARAGRAPH 55

The Plaintiff would immediately file a Motion for Summary Judgment based on these Material

Facts If Judge Warren would recognize that the RE-09-10 Judgment is Void

55.

The Plaintiff would immediately move for Summary Judgment against Arnica for a

Breach of Contract/Failure of a Duty to Defend based on the following Material Facts:

The Plaintiff was covered by standard Insurance Company Office (ISO) Homeowners

Insurance Policies issued by Amica Insurance Company continually from January 1998-January

2015. The standard ISO Homeowners Policies all provide for a Duty to Defend against Personal

Liability claims even if the Suit or Complaint is "groundless," and state that Arnica's Duty to

Defend only ends when the Personal Liability Limit of $300,000 is met (this would increase to

$2,300,000 when the Umbrella Coverage was included).

The Plaintiff was covered by standard Insurance Company Office (ISO) Personal Excess

Liability Umbrella Insurance Policies issued by Arnica Insurance Company continually from

approximately 2003-January 2015, which provided excess liability coverage of $1,000,000

initially and $2,000,000 starting in approximately 2004, and also provided for reimbursement for

lost wages of up to $250 per day for assisting Arnica in the defense against claims.

The Plaintiff established criteria that RE-09- 10 could be appealed in his Federal

Complaint 2:10-C V-00063 GZS that was filed with the Maine District Court in February of

2010, and reiterated this criteria when he filed 2:10-CV-00523 GZS in December.

The Plaintiff discussed the illegality of the RE-09- 10 Judgment with Arnica (John

Martin) in September of 2010, and provided Martin with a copy of the 2:10-C V-00063 GZS

filing, as well as a draft of what became 2:10-CV-00523 GZS (Affidavit of the Plaintiff at 6).

Arnica did reimburse the Plaintiff for some, but not all of his legal expenses related to

defending himself in RE-09-10, but not for lost wages.

The RE-09-1 0 Judgments are groundless Judgments/Claims because they are based on

the FE Beal Survey which was filed illegally with the Knox County Registry, and are void

because Judge Hjelm did not have Jurisdiction to enter the Judgments.

Arnica denied the Plaintiff a legal defense regarding RE-09-10 stating that the RE-09-lo

Partial Summary Judgment was a "final and binding Judgment," which was a fraudulent

statement because RE-09-10 could have easily been appealed (Arnica Letter).

CONCLUSION

Despite coverage under the Plaintiff's Homeowners and Title Insurance Policies, Amica

Insurance Company and First National Title Group, and the policy co-beneficiaries, Wells Fargo

and PNC Bank all denied the Plaintiff legal assistance to protect his property rights which were

impugned by adverse possession and the malicious prosecution of a criminal (SCR-083-2009)

and a civil (RE-09-10) lawsuit. The judgments are both void per Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 60 (b)(4), 28 US.C.A.; Const. Amend 5 Klugh v. US. because the Plaintiff

was denied legal representation and his due process rights per were violated repeatedly by

misconduct by Court Officers.

The RE-09-10 judgment also was made without jurisdiction and violates the Clean Water Act

(CWA) 33 U.S.C. 1251 of 1972, (MSLDA) Title 38, M.R.S.A. 481-489, Title 30-A, M.R.S.A.

4401-4408 and the Camden Subdivision Ordinances.

The Maine Federal District Court, Judge Warren and the Maine Supreme Court all denied the

Plaintiff's collateral attacks on the void judgments and have supported letting Ferrara steal part

of the Plaintiff's lot and changing boundaries in a subdivision in violation of the above listed

Federal and Maine laws. The Plaintiff has been stalked and bullied by Police and others since

Ferrara took adverse possession in 2003 to present, in attempts to impugn the Plaintiffs will and

ability to prosecute Federal and State lawsuits to recover his property rights including while the

Plaintiff was prosecuting both CV-00109-2015 and Cum 17-52. The Plaintiff also filed multiple

motions for Judge Warren to recuse because of misconduct and three motions for a Death Knell

Appeal by the Maine Supreme Court before the CV-00109-2015 trial, but was denied.

The Maine Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs Appeal (Cum 17-52) and a Motion for

Reconsideration, the Plaintiff contends that the Death Knell Motions and collateral attack should

have been granted and that the Maine Supreme Court should have ruled on the facts before trial.

The Plaintiff now appeals to the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari and the

Plaintiff and his Wife pray that the Court will grant the Writ and review his complaint on its

merits and restore the Plaintiffs property rights and clear title that is not impugned by adverse

possession.

Respectfully Submitted,

Craig A. Brown

Pro Se Plaintiff

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.