Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Luis Enrique Beltran-Cervantes, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefJan 16, 2018
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No. 17-____________
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
___________
LUIS ENRIQUE BELTRAN-CERVANTES,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent,
___________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
___________
APPENDIX
___________
Index to Appendices
Appendix A Judgment and Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit
Appendix B Judgment and Sentence of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas
APPENDIX A
United States v. Beltran-Cervantes, --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2017)
2017 WL 4641260
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issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also
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United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee
v.
Luis Enrique BELTRAN–CERVANTES,
Defendant–Appellant
No. 16–10149
|
October 16, 2017
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, USDC No. 4:15–CR–211–1
Attorneys and Law Firms
James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S.
Attorney's Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Jerry Van Beard, Esq., Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Kevin Joel Page, Federal Public Defender's Office, Dallas,
TX, for Defendant–Appellant.
Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion
PER CURIAM: *
*1 Luis Enrique Beltran–Cervantes pleaded guilty to
illegal reentry following deportation. The Guidelines
range for his offense was 10 to 16 months. Rather than
impose a sentence within that advisory range, the district
court sentenced Beltran to 72 months in prison.
In explaining why it imposed the above-Guidelines
sentence, the district court cited a number of the
sentencing factors that Congress directed federal judges to
consider, including the history and characteristics of the
defendant, nature and circumstances of the offense, and
need to protect the public from further crimes. 18 U.S.C. §
3553. In explaining why it believed those factors supported
a significant upward variance, the court cited Beltran's
“very violent criminal past,” his gang membership, and
his two prior illegal reentries into the United States.
In terms of Beltran's history of violence, the court
discussed the details of Beltran's juvenile conviction for a
violent assault. It then noted that he also had an assault
conviction as an adult for punching the father of his
girlfriend in the face and then pulling a knife on the father
and trying to cut him when the father tried calling the
police. Beltran received no criminal history points for the
assault convictions. The same was true for a harassment
conviction based on Beltran's threatening to kill his
girlfriend. Beltran also received no criminal history points
for a contempt of court conviction. The court noted the
failure of the Guidelines to account for those convictions
(either because they were too old or the sentence was too
brief). The court also cited a separate contempt conviction
for which Beltran did receive criminal history points, as
well as two other convictions also included in the criminal
history scoring: marijuana possession and a prior illegal
reentry. The court further noted that while incarcerated
for that federal reentry felony, Beltran violated three
prison rules. The infractions were for possession of
homemade intoxicants, insolence to a staff member,
and assault without serious injury. These disciplinary
violations occurred while Beltran was serving a 24–month
sentence for his first illegal reentry offense. That earlier
sentence was itself an upward variance, a factor the district
court mentioned three times in explaining the need for
another upward variance that would prevent Beltran from
committing additional crimes. Finally, the court noted
that the prior immigration conviction involved not just
Beltran's unlawful presence in the United States, but
his lying to an immigration officer and presenting false
papers.
Beltran acknowledges that the district court provided
reasons for its variance, but argues those do not justify the
extent of the variance that resulted in a 72–month sentence
that was more than four times greater than the top of the
advisory Guidelines range. He also contends that many of
the considerations the district court cited to explain the
sentence were already taken into account by the criminal
history section of the Guidelines.
*2 In assessing whether a district court abused its
discretion in imposing a non-Guidelines sentence, we
© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
1
United States v. Beltran-Cervantes, --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2017)
consider “the totality of the circumstances, including
the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.”
United States v. Brantley, 537 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir.
2008). As Beltran emphasizes, a “major deviation from
the Guidelines range requires a greater justification than
a minor one.” United States v. Fraga, 704 F.3d 432, 440
(5th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d
704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the “farther a
sentence varies from the applicable Guidelines sentence,
‘the more compelling the justification based on factors in
section 3553(a)’ must be” (quoting United States v. Dean,
414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005))). Even with substantial
variances, however, we give considerable “deference to the
district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a
whole, justify the extent of the variance.” United States
v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 551 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169
L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)).
We have affirmed sentences in which the extent of the
upward variance was similar to, even if slightly less than,
the one the imposed here. See, e.g., United States v.
Urbina, 542 Fed.Appx. 398, 399 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming
a 60–month sentence, when the high end of the Guidelines
range was 14 months); United States v. Toropkin, 517
Fed.Appx. 243, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming a 24–
month sentence when the high end of the Guidelines was
six months); Brantley, 537 F.3d at 349–50 (affirming a
180–month sentence when the high end of the Guidelines
range was 51 months); United States v. Mejia–Huerta,
480 F.3d 713, 723 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming a 120–month
sentence when the high end of the Guidelines range was
27 months); United States v. Ellis, 206 Fed.Appx. 325,
327 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming a 96–month sentence when
the high end of the Guidelines range was 27 months).
And there is at least one case in which we affirmed a
substantially greater variance. United States v. Hebert,
813 F.3d 551, 561–63 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming a 92–year
sentence when the high end of the Guidelines was 7 years).
Those cases demonstrate that even with a substantial
variance, the ultimate question in a challenge to the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence is whether the
district court articulated “individualized, case-specific
reasons” that justified the higher sentence. United States
v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United
States v. McElwee, 646 F.3d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 2011)).
It did so here. The district court extensively discussed
not just the number of Beltran's prior convictions, but
the often violent conduct that gave rise to them. It also
focused on the various ways in which Beltran flouted
the criminal justice system: he sustained two convictions
for contempt, lied and presented fake documents to
immigration officers, and committed three infractions
while in federal custody. Finally, and seemingly of greatest
significance to the district court, the above-Guidelines
sentence for Beltran's first illegal reentry conviction failed
to “convince the Defendant not to continue to violate the
law.” It was not unreasonable to conclude that a greater
variance was needed the second time around to provide
the deterrence that the first sentence did not achieve.
We also reject both the factual and legal premise of
Beltran's argument that the district court impermissibly
based the variance on his criminal history that was
already accounted for in the Guidelines. In explaining
the reasons for its variance, the district court relied
on much besides the convictions that received criminal
history points. It cited convictions that did not receive
criminal history points, violations of prison rules, and
the failure of the prior illegal reentry sentence to deter
Beltran. In any event, a “district court may rely upon
factors already incorporated by the Guidelines to support
a non-Guidelines sentence.” Brantley, 537 F.3d at 350; see
also United States v. Williams, 517 F.3d 801, 809 (5th Cir.
2008) (“The Supreme Court's decision in Booker implicitly
rejected the position that no additional weight could be
given to factors included in calculating the applicable
advisory Guidelines range, since to do otherwise would
essentially render the Guidelines mandatory.”).
*3 The district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Beltran to 72 months in prison. Its judgment is
AFFIRMED.
All Citations
--- Fed.Appx. ----, 2017 WL 4641260
Footnotes
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
2
United States v. Beltran-Cervantes, --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2017)
End of Document
© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
3
APPENDIX B
Case 4:15-cr-00211-O Document 23 Filed 01/26/16
Page 1 of 4 PageID 58
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Fort Worth Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
v.
Case Number: 4:15-CR-00211-O(01)
U.S. Marshal’s No.: 42748-177
J. Michael Worley, Assistant U.S. Attorney
William Hermesmeyer, Attorney for the Defendant
LUIS ENRIQUE BELTRAN-CERVANTES
On October 13, 2015 the defendant, LUIS ENRIQUE BELTRAN-CERVANTES, entered a plea of
guilty as to Count One of the Indictment filed on September 16, 2015. Accordingly, the defendant is adjudged
guilty of such Count, which involves the following offense:
Title & Section
Nature of Offense
Offense Ended
Count
8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(1)/(2)
Illegal Reentry After Deportation
August 20, 2015
One
The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 3 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed
pursuant to Title 18, United States Code § 3553(a), taking the guidelines issued by the United States Sentencing
Commission pursuant to Title 28, United States Code § 994(a)(1), as advisory only.
The defendant shall pay immediately a special assessment of $100.00 as to Count One of the Indictment
filed on September 16, 2015.
The defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within thirty days of any change of
name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this
judgment are fully paid.
Sentence imposed January 25, 2016.
____________________________________________
REED O’CONNOR
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Signed January 26, 2016.
Case 4:15-cr-00211-O Document 23 Filed 01/26/16
Page 2 of 4 PageID 59
Judgment in a Criminal Case
Defendant: LUIS ENRIQUE BELTRAN-CERVANTES
Case Number: 4:15-CR-00211-O(1)
Page 2 of 4
IMPRISONMENT
The defendant, LUIS ENRIQUE BELTRAN-CERVANTES, is hereby committed to the custody of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to be imprisoned for a term of Seventy-Two (72) months as to Count One of
the Indictment filed on September 16, 2015.
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
SUPERVISED RELEASE
Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of
Three (3) years as to Count One of the Indictment filed on September 16, 2015.
As a condition of supervised release, upon the completion of the sentence of imprisonment, the
defendant shall be surrendered to a duly-authorized immigration official for deportation in accordance with the
established procedures provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC § 1101 et seq. As a further
condition of supervised release, if ordered deported or removed, the defendant shall remain outside the United
States.
In the event the defendant is not deported immediately upon release from imprisonment, or should the
defendant ever be within the United States during any portion of the term of supervised release, the defendant
shall also comply with the standard conditions contained in the Judgment and shall comply with the mandatory
and special conditions stated herein:
While on supervised release, in compliance with the standard conditions of supervision adopted by the
United States Sentencing Commission, the defendant shall:
( 1)
( 2)
( 3)
( 4)
( 5)
( 6)
( 7)
( 8)
( 9)
(10)
not leave the judicial district without the permission of the Court or probation officer;
report to the probation officer as directed by the Court or probation officer and submit a truthful
and complete written report within the first five (5) days of each month;
answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the
probation officer;
support the defendant's dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the probation officer for schooling,
training, or other acceptable reasons;
notify the probation officer within seventy-two (72) hours of any change in residence or
employment;
refrain from excessive use of alcohol and not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any
narcotic or other controlled substance, or any paraphernalia related to such substances, except as
prescribed by a physician;
not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or
administered;
not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and not associate with any person
convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
permit a probation officer to visit the defendant at any time at home or elsewhere and permit
confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view by the probation officer;
Case 4:15-cr-00211-O Document 23 Filed 01/26/16
Page 3 of 4 PageID 60
Judgment in a Criminal Case
Defendant: LUIS ENRIQUE BELTRAN-CERVANTES
Case Number: 4:15-CR-00211-O(1)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Page 3 of 4
notify the probation officer within seventy-two (72) hours of being arrested or questioned by a
law enforcement officer;
not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency
without the permission of the Court; and,
notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal
history or characteristics, and permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to
confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement, as directed by the
probation officer.
In addition the defendant shall:
not commit another federal, state, or local crime;
not possess illegal controlled substances;
not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon;
cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the U.S. probation officer; and,
report in person to the U.S. Probation Office in the district to which the defendant is released from the
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons within 72 hours of release.
FINE/RESTITUTION
The Court does not order a fine or costs of incarceration because the defendant does not have the
financial resources or future earning capacity to pay a fine or costs of incarceration.
Restitution is not ordered because there is no victim other than society at large.
Case 4:15-cr-00211-O Document 23 Filed 01/26/16
Page 4 of 4 PageID 61
Judgment in a Criminal Case
Defendant: LUIS ENRIQUE BELTRAN-CERVANTES
Case Number: 4:15-CR-00211-O(1)
Page 4 of 4
RETURN
I have executed this judgment as follows:
Defendant delivered on _____________________ to ___________________________________
at ________________________________________________, with a certified copy of this judgment.
United States Marshal
BY
Deputy Marshal
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