Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Flight Options, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 1108, et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 16, 2017
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No. 17-___
IN THE
FLIGHT OPTIONS, LLC, FLEXJET, LLC, ONE SKY FLIGHT,
LLC AND FLIGHT OPTIONS HOLDINGS, I, INC.
Petitioners,
v.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AIRLINE
DIVISION AND TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 1108,
Respondents.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
W. Chris Harrison
Counsel of Record
Zachary W. Hoyt
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
NASH, SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C.
6410 Poplar Ave.
Suite 300
Memphis, TN 38119
(901) 767-6160
chris.harrison@odnss.com
zach.hoyt@odnss.com
QUESTION PRESENTED
In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989) (“Conrail”), this
Court held that disputes over the interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements governed by the
Railway Labor Act must be arbitrated so long as the
interpretation of the contract by the party seeking
arbitration is “arguably justified” and not “frivolous”
or “obviously insubstantial.” Id. at 306-07. This Court
further held that this is a “relatively light” burden
that may be based on both implied and express terms
of the contract. Id. at 311-12.
The question presented here is: Whether the
Sixth Circuit’s decision below conflicts with this
Court’s Conrail decision and the broader body of
Railway Labor Act precedent given that the Sixth
Circuit classified a labor dispute arising from
differing interpretations of ambiguous contract terms
as a “major dispute” and enjoined the Petitioners to
either accept the Union’s interpretation or arbitrate
the dispute.
ii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
The parent company of Flight Options, LLC is
One Sky Flight, LLC, which is privately held. No
public company holds 10 percent or more of the stock
of the Flight Options, LLC.
The parent company of Flexjet, LLC is One Sky
Flight, LLC. No public company holds 10 percent or
more of the stock of the Flexjet, LLC.
The parent company of One Sky Flight, LLC is
Flight Options Holdings I, Inc. (now known as Epic
Aero, Inc.). No public company holds 10 percent or
more of the stock of the One Sky Flight, LLC.
The is no parent company of Flight Options
Holdings I, Inc. (now known as Epic Aero, Inc.) and
no public company holds 10 percent or more of the
stock of Flight Options Holdings, I, Inc.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ........................................... v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ v
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI .............. 1
OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1
JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS ................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................... 1
I.
Statutory Background ........................................... 3
II. Procedural History ................................................ 8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................ 15
I.
The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts With
Conrail and Misconstrues the Issues ................. 16
II. The Question Presented is Important and
Recurring thus the Sixth Circuit’s Decision
Disrupts the Carefully Crafted Structure of
Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act. ............ 24
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 32
APPENDIX ............................................................... 1a
Appendix A, Court of Appeals Decision ......... 1a
Appendix B, District Court’s Decision ......... 32a
Appendix C, Order Denying Rehearing ....... 57a
Appendix D, Excerpts from the Railway
Labor Act ....................................................... 59a
iv
Appendix E, Declaration of Robert
Sullivan ......................................................... 72a
Appendix F, Excerpts from 2010 Flight
Options CBA.................................................. 80a
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
PAGE(S)
Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. E. Air Lines,
869 F.2d 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ........................... 27
Air Lines Pilots Ass’n v. United Air Lines,
802 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1986) .................................. 7
Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Guilford Transp.
Indus.,
399 F.3d 89 (1st Cir. 2005) ................................. 26
Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock,
132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012)......................................... 30
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986)....................................... 30, 31
Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.,
406 U.S. 320 (1972)............................................. 25
Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air Indus.,
Inc.,
280 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2002)............................... 27
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications
Workers,
475 U.S. 643 (1986)............................................. 26
Bhd of R.R Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria & W.
R.R.,
321 U.S. 50 (1944)................................................. 7
Bhd of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind.
R.R.,
353 U.S. 30 (1957)........................................... 4, 26
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Bhd of R.R. Trainmen v. Terminal Co,
394 U.S. 369 (1969)............................................... 7
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs Div. 269 v. Long
Island R.R.,
85 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1996) .................................... 27
Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville &
N.R.R. Co.,
373 U.S. 33 (1963)............................................... 25
Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employes Div. v.
Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
745 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2014)............................... 26
Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employes Div. v.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
596 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2010)........................... 26
Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of
Maintenance of Way Employes,
481 U.S. 419 (1987)......................................... 4, 24
Caetano v. Massachusetts,
136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016)......................................... 30
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union,
402 U.S. 570 (1971)............................................... 7
Consolidated Rail Corp.. v. Railway Labor
Execs. Ass’n,
491 U.S. 299 (1989)..................................... passim
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of
Way Employes,
327 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2003)........................... 26
District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008)............................................. 30
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley,
325 U.S. 711 (1945)............................................... 6
Flight Options, LLC v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 1108,
No. 1:16-CV-00732, 2017 WL 1173143 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 30, 2017) ............................................ 26
Gunther v. San Diego & E. Ry. Co.,
382 U.S. 257 (1965)............................................. 18
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,
512 U.S. 246 (1994)........................................... 3, 5
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Southwest Airlines
Co.,
875 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1989)............................. 27
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Central Airlines,
372 U.S. 682 (1963)........................................... 3, 4
Jenkins v. Hutton,
137 S. Ct. 1769 (2017)......................................... 30
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.
Transp. Co.,
362 U.S. 330 (1960)............................................... 7
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Shore Line R.R. Co v. Transportation Union,
396 U.S. 142 (1969)............................................... 6
Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth. v. Bhd. of
R.R. Signalmen,
882 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1989) ................................ 27
Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Bhd. of Ry. Clerks,
281 U.S. 548 (1930)............................................... 7
Tolan v. Cotton,
134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014)......................................... 30
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan,
439 U.S. 89 (1978)................................................. 5
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Engineers and Trainmen,
558 U.S. 67 (2009)............................................... 25
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Price,
360 U.S. 601 (1959)............................................. 25
United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960)............................................. 26
United Transp. Union v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry.
Co.,
979 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1992)................................. 3
United Transp. Union v. Kansas City Sou. Ry.
Co.,
172 F.3d 582 (8th Cir. 1999)............................... 27
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
United Transp. Union v. South Carolina Public
Ry. Comm’n,
130 F.3d 627 (4th Cir. 1997)............................... 27
Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen,
789 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2015)......................... 21, 27
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7 (2008)................................................. 28
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ..................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) ............................................... 13
45 U.S.C. § 155............................................................ 6
45 U.S.C. § 160............................................................ 7
45 U.S.C. §159............................................................. 4
49 U.S.C. § 42112 ........................................................ 7
McCaskill-Bond Statute, 49 U.S.C. § 42112 ..... passim
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. . 25, 28
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. ........................... passim
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Allegheny-Mohawk Labor Protective
Provisions ....................................................... passim
Edwin E. Witte, The Government in Labor
Disputes (1932) ....................................................... 3
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Jerman & Joshi, Seniority Integration in Airline
Mergers: The Intended & Unintended
Consequences of the McCaskill-Bond Statute,
25 Air & Space Law. (No. 2 2012) .......................... 9
Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court
Practice (10th ed. 2013) ........................................ 30
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners respectfully petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Pet. App. 1a) is
published at 863 F.3d 529. The district court’s
decision dated May 25, 2016 (Pet. App. 32a) is
unpublished.
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals entered its judgment on
July 17, 2017. (Pet. App. 1a). The Court denied
Petitioners’ request for a rehearing en banc on
August 18, 2017. (Pet. App. 57a). The Court denied
the Union’s request for panel rehearing on August 23,
2017. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Pertinent provisions of the Railway Labor Act 45
U.S.C. § 151, et. seq., are reprinted in Appendix D to
this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Congress devised the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”)
to promote labor stability by forcing parties to
arbitrate over contractual disputes rather than
litigate them in federal court.
Disputes over
contractual terms (express or implied) are termed
“minor disputes” under the RLA. Disputes over the
formation of new contracts are termed “major
disputes.” This Court has set forth clear guidelines
2
requiring courts to view the party seeking
arbitration’s interpretation of a contract deferentially
and to resolve any doubt in favor of finding a dispute
to be minor. As in other labor contexts, there is a
strong presumption in favor of arbitrability. This
case presents the question of whether a court may
find a dispute over existing, ambiguous contract
language in a CBA to be a major dispute and compel
the party seeking to avoid an injunction to either
accept the other side’s position or arbitrate the issue
in the shadow of an injunction.
The Sixth Circuit held found, without any
analysis
or
explanation,
that
Petitioners’
interpretation of the CBA was not “arguably
justified,” and therefore a major dispute. The Sixth
Circuit then enjoined Petitioners to either acquiesce
to the Union’s demands or arbitrate the issue under
the shadow of an injunction that already opined on
the underlying disputes in dicta, leaving the parties
in a position of uncertainty. This decision severely
deviated from this Court’s previous RLA precedent in
several ways. First, the Sixth Circuit misapplied
Conrail and failed to give the proper deference to
Petitioners’ interpretation of the CBA. Second, the
Sixth Circuit found an issue to be a major dispute
based on only a single contract provision when there
were multiple contested provisions related to the
dispute. Finally, the Sixth Circuit erred by ordering
a remedy – arbitration – that is directly contrary to
the required remedy for major disputes under the
RLA, while simultaneously opining on but not
resolving the underlying contractual disputes. While
arbitration is ultimately the correct outcome in this
case, that outcome is distorted when it is done under
the threat of an injunction and where the District
3
Court and Sixth Circuit have already opined on the
merits of the contractual dispute – a topic that should
be solely reserved for arbitration. This Court should
correct this gross misapplication of the law and
reverse the Sixth Circuit’s erroneous decision.
I.
Statutory Background
A. The Railway Labor Act
The Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) governs labor
relations in the railroad and airline industries. Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S.
682, 685-86 (1963). Congress passed the RLA to
promote “stability in labor-management relations by
providing a comprehensive framework for resolving
labor disputes.” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512
U.S. 246, 252 (1994). The RLA’s “underlying idea”
provides that “[carriers] and their employees best
settle their own troubles and that government ought
to intervene only when they fail.” Edwin E. Witte,
The Government in Labor Disputes 244 (1932).
The appropriate method of dispute resolution
under the RLA depends on the type of dispute at
issue. There are four recognized types of disputes
under the RLA: statutory disputes; representation
disputes; major disputes; and minor disputes. This
case concerns so-called major and minor disputes
under the RLA.
Minor disputes are conflicts over the
“interpretation or application of particular provisions
of existing collective bargaining agreements.” United
Transp. Union v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., 979 F.2d
431, 434 (6th Cir. 1992). Such disputes extend to
disagreements regarding implied terms of contracts.
Conrail, 491 U.S. at 311-12. Minor disputes are
4
resolved through conferences between the parties,
followed by grievances, and then arbitration. Under
the RLA, the parties’ internal System Board of
Adjustment (“System Board”) has exclusive
jurisdiction over minor disputes between air carriers
and unions. International Ass’n of Machinists v.
Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 685-86 (1963).
In the context of a minor dispute, courts only
have limited jurisdiction to compel a party to
participate in a minor dispute procedure, to enjoin
action that may frustrate the jurisdiction of an
adjustment board, or to enjoin a union from striking
over a minor dispute pending completion of the
minor-dispute procedures. Burlington N. R. Co. v.
Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429, 446
(1987) (explaining that courts have jurisdiction to
compel a party to fulfill its obligations under the
RLA); Bhd of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind.
R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 42 (1957) (explaining that courts
have jurisdiction to enjoin a union from striking over
a minor dispute while the minor dispute procedures
are being exhausted). The authority to compel a party
in these circumstances requires not just the existence
of a minor dispute, but facts demonstrating the
necessity of an injunction. Burlington N. R. Co. v.
Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429, 446
(1987) (noting that even when a violation of an RLA
mandate is shown, courts should only grant an
injunction if that remedy alone can effectively guard
the plaintiff’s rights). Courts also have very limited
jurisdiction to review the findings of a System Board.
See RLA § 9, Third; 45 U.S.C. §159 (outlining three
limited bases for impeaching a System Board’s
arbitration award).
5
While courts are not entirely devoid of
jurisdiction to uphold the mandates of the RLA when
minor disputes are involved, courts completely lack
subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on the merits of a
minor dispute. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512
U.S. 246, 253 (1994) (“[A] minor dispute . . . must be
resolved only through the RLA mechanisms,
including the carrier’s internal dispute-resolution
processes and an adjustment board established by
the employer and the unions.”); Conrail, 491 U.S.
299, 304 (1989) (where a dispute is minor, the System
Board “has exclusive jurisdiction over minor
disputes.”); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S.
89, 94 (1978) (“Congress considered it essential to
keep these so-called ‘minor’ disputes within the
Adjustment Board and out of the courts.”).
Labor and management often disagree on the
proper characterization of a dispute. One side may
classify it as a minor dispute over the interpretation
of an existing agreement to ensure it is resolved
through arbitration while the other side classifies the
same issue as as a major dispute in order to use or
threaten self-help or seek judicial intervention.
Whether a dispute is major or minor is a legal
question for the courts to decide. Conrail, 491 U.S. at
306. In Conrail, this Court set out clear standards for
lower courts to use when determining the proper
classification of a dispute.
First, where a party opposing judicial
intervention claims its position is allowed under, or
not prohibited by, the existing contract, the dispute is
minor so long as that party’s interpretation is
“arguably justified” by the implicit or explicit terms
of the agreement. Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307, 310. A
6
court should only find a dispute regarding the
express or implied terms of the contract to be major
where the party opposing judicial intervention’s
interpretation is so “frivolous or obviously
insubstantial” that the party is essentially seeking to
create a new agreement rather than applying the
existing one. Id. at 307. Because federal labor policy
strongly favors arbitration of disputes, the burden to
show a dispute is minor is “relatively light” and the
analysis favors a finding of arbitrability. Id. at 307.
In contrast, major disputes are disputes over the
formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure
them. They arise where there is no such agreement
or where it is sought to change the terms of one.
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723
(1945). Parties initiate major dispute procedures by
serving written proposals for changes to collective
bargaining agreements. The RLA requires parties to
resolve major disputes through bargaining and
negotiation. See RLA § 2, First; 45 U.S.C. § 152. If
the parties fail to come to an agreement during
bargaining, they can enlist the assistance of the
National Mediation Board’s (“NMB”) mediation
service, but the NMB has no authority to compel
agreement. RLA § 5, First; 45 U.S.C. § 155.
If the NMB determines that its mediation efforts
have been unsuccessful, it offers arbitration to the
parties to resolve their dispute. RLA § 5, First; 45
U.S.C. § 155. If either party rejects the NMB’s offer of
interest arbitration, the NMB then releases the
parties from mediation, which commences a 30-day
“cooling off” period. Shore Line R.R. Co v.
Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 152 (1969). Once
the 30-day cooling off period expires, the NMB may
7
recommend the appointment of a Presidential
Emergency Board (“PEB”) to make recommendations
to resolve the dispute. RLA § 10; 45 U.S.C. § 160. If
no PEB is appointed, and the parties have made
every effort to make and maintain agreements, the
NMB may release the parties to engage in self-help.
Bhd of R.R. Trainmen v. Terminal Co, 394 U.S. 369,
378 (1969).
In major disputes, courts have jurisdiction to
enforce the mandatory bargaining and mediation
procedures and enjoin parties from altering the
status quo pending completion of the statutory
dispute resolution procedures. See Chicago & N.W.
Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 581
(1971); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.
Transp. Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960); Texas & New
Orleans R.R. v. Bhd. of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930). Although neither party is required to request
mediation or accept an offer of arbitration from the
NMB, the RLA’s mandate to exert every reasonable
effort to settle disputes includes good faith utilization
of the NMB’s procedures. See Bhd of R.R Trainmen v.
Toledo, Peoria & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 60 & n.16
(1944), quoting 75 CONG. REC. 5504 (1932)
(statement of Rep. LaGuardia); see also Air Lines
Pilots Ass’n v. United Air Lines, 802 F.2d 886, 901
(7th Cir. 1986).
B. The McCaskill-Bond Statute
The McCaskill-Bond statute, 49 U.S.C. § 42112,
generally requires carriers and unions to abide by
Sections 3 and 13 of the Allegheny-Mohawk Labor
Protective Provisions when integrating seniority lists
as the result of a merger. At bottom, the AlleghenyMohawk Labor Protective Provisions mandate that
8
the seniority list integration process be fair and
equitable. The McCaskill-Bond statute is an issue of
federal law, but it often, as in this case, overlaps with
topics covered in a CBA.
II. Facts and Procedural History
This case concerns the merger of two jet
fractional ownership airlines, Flight Options and
Flexjet. In December 2013, One Sky Flight, Inc.,
Flight Options’ parent company, acquired Flexjet.
Flight Options’ pilots were represented by the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (hereinafter,
“the Union”) at the time of this acquisition; the
Flexjet pilots were unrepresented. The Union and
Flight Options were parties to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that was ratified in
2010 before the acquisition. (Pet. App. 74a). Section
1.5(c) of that CBA contained a section on procedural
requirements and employee protections in the event
of a merger between Flight Options and another
carrier. (Pet. App. 89a). This section of the CBA is at
the heart of the parties’ disputes.
The CBA contemplates a three-step process for
integrating the pilot employees into one group: (1) the
negotiation of a fence agreement, which separates the
two pilot groups from each other; (2) the integration
of the pilot seniority lists; and (3) the modification of
the 2010 CBA, as necessary to permit the integration
of the pilot groups, through negotiation and
arbitration. (Pet. App. 89a). This Petition arises from
a dispute over the second step in this process,
integration of the pilot seniority lists. (Pet. App. 90a).
The seniority integration process is critically
important to pilots. “Seniority integration affects
pilots’ pay, the planes they fly, time off, in what order
9
they are subject to furlough or lay-off in bad economic
times, bidding order, base location, routes flown, and
whether they are ‘captain[s], first officer[s], or second
officer[s]—factors that have an enormous effect on
the pilot’s income and income-related benefits such as
pensions.”’ Jerman & Joshi, Seniority Integration in
Airline Mergers: The Intended & Unintended
Consequences of the McCaskill-Bond Statute, 25 Air
& Space Law. 1, 17 (No. 2 2012) (internal citations
omitted). This importance is underscored by the
protection of the integration process under federal
law via the McCaskill-Bond Statute, and the 2010
Flight Options CBA.
Section 1.5(c)(1) of the CBA, which governs the
second step of integration, provides that “seniority
lists of the respective Pilot groups shall be integrated
pursuant to Teamsters Merger Policy if both groups
are represented by the IBT, or if the Pilots of the
acquired airline are not represented by the IBT, then
pursuant to Sections 3 and 13 of the AlleghenyMohawk Labor Protective Provisions.” (Pet. App.
90a). The CBA also states that the ultimate list may
not result in a “system flush” or “removal of Pilots
from their positions.” (Pet. App. 90a).
On August 17, 2015, Union director Rick
Dubinsky sent a letter to Flexjet indicating that the
Union had selected a committee to represent the
Flexjet pilots in the seniority integration process. The
Union did not represent Flexjet pilots at the time it
appointed this committee.1 Flexjet responded to Mr.
1 The Union eventually narrowly won an election over the
combined Flexjet and Flight Options pilot group in December
10
Dubinsky’s letter on August 20, 2015, stating that it
was inappropriate for the Union to select a seniority
integration committee before there had been a single
carrier finding by the NMB or even an election over
whether the Union would represent Flexjet pilots.
Flexjet also objected to the Union’s formation of this
committee because (1) the Union did not represent
Flexjet pilots at that point, and (2) the committee
consisted entirely of Union-friendly pilots. When the
final election of the combined pilot group took place
in December, 330 voted in favor of the Union and 314
voted in opposition.
Prior to the election, the Union disregarded
Flexjet’s objections and proceeded to devise an
integrated seniority list in closed sessions and
without any neutral Flexjet representatives present.
Flexjet and Flight Options (“the Companies”)
repeatedly requested that the Union allow a
Company representative to attend and observe the
sessions to ensure that the process was fair and
equitable as required by McCaskill-Bond and the
CBA. The Union rejected these requests.
The Union notified the Companies that an
Integrated Seniority List (“the List”) had been agreed
to by the Flexjet and Flight Options Merger
Committees on February 24, 2016. The List used
longevity-date order to determine seniority, which
had mixed effects on both Flight Options and Flexjet
pilots. The List notably contained provisions that
2015, four months after the Union unilaterally appointed a
merger committee on behalf of Flexjet pilots that it did not
represent.
11
specifically targeted Flight Options pilots who had
taken leaves of absence to fly at Flexjet after the
acquisition. (Hereinafter, “the LOA Pilots”). While
every other pilot had their years of service at their
respective companies recognized, the LOA Pilots’
time spent at Flexjet was not credited and unfairly
penalized those pilots. Because the LOA Pilots had a
reputation for being “company friendly,”2 the
Companies believed that the Union-controlled
committees specifically targeted the LOA pilots, in
violation of both the CBA’s and McCaskill-Bond’s
requirements that the process to create an integrated
seniority list be fair and equitable. The Companies
also felt that the List could potentially cause a
system flush or removal of pilots from their position
in violation of Section 1.5(c)(1) of the CBA. As a
result, the Companies refused to accept the proposed
List.
The Union filed a grievance with the System
Board of Adjustment seeking to force the Companies
to accept the Integrated Seniority List. On March 23,
2016, the Companies filed for a declaratory judgment
in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
to determine whether the Integrated Seniority List
process complied with McCaskill-Bond and to stay
the Union’s grievance until the Court could
determine this issue. (Pet. App. 39a). In response, the
Union filed Counterclaims seeking an injunction to
The Companies encouraged Flight Options pilots to go to
Flexjet because there was more growth and hiring needs there
compared to Flight Options. The Union publicly discouraged
pilots from taking leaves to fly at the sister company Flexjet
(non-unionized at that time).
2
12
compel the Companies to accept the Integrated
Seniority List based on the Companies’ alleged
refusal to bargain, among other things. (Pet. App.
41a). The Union’s counter-claims were substantially
broader than the Companies’ narrow declaratory
judgment that solely sought a determination based
on an interpretation of a federal statute, McCaskillBond. In response to this attempt to expand the scope
of the case, the Companies argued, among other
things, that the underlying issues were minor
disputes that the District Court did not have
jurisdiction to resolve because the claims could only
be resolved by ruling on the Companies’ defenses: (1)
that the process used to create the List violated the
fair and equitable requirements of the CBA; (2) that
the List would cause a system flush; (3) that the List
would cause the removal of Pilots from their position;
(4) that the Teamsters Merger Policy did not apply
under the CBA; and (5) that the Union did not
represent the pilots of Flexjet as required by the
CBA, all of which required interpretation of express
terms of Section 1.5(c)(1) of the Flight Options CBA .
(Pet. App. 2a).
While broad on paper, the Union’s counter-claims
ultimately represented a single contractual dispute:
whether the Companies were required to accept the
Integrated Seniority List. The Companies pointed out
that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to
resolve this issue because it was a minor dispute that
required broader interpretation of the 2010 Flight
13
Options CBA3, and that the only appropriate scope of
inquiry for the Court was whether the List complied
with the McCaskill-Bond statute – an issue of federal
law that did not involve the CBA. Whether the List
complied with Section 1.5(c)(1) of the CBA and
whether the CBA required the Companies to accept
the List in spite of its flaws are minor disputes that
must
be
arbitrated
because
they
require
interpretation of explicit and implicit terms of the
CBA. After reviewing the parties’ competing
arguments, the District Court concluded that
whether the CBA required the Companies’ to accept
the List was a major dispute. The Court reasoned
that the dispute was major because it dealt with the
acquisition of future rights instead of a dispute over
existing rights. (Pet. App. 43a). The District Court
then put itself in the place of the arbitrator and
ordered the Companies to accept the List. (Pet. App.
51a).
The Companies appealed from the Court’s
preliminary injunction order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). On appeal, the Companies argued that
the dispute was minor and thus the District Court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits or require
the Companies to accept the Integrated Seniority
List.
The Sixth Circuit misinterpreted the central
issue on appeal as to whether the Companies had a
3 Specifically, whether the List complied with Section
1.5(c)(1)’s requirements to be created in a fair and equitable
process, to avoid a system flush, and to avoid the removal of a
pilot from his or her position.
14
right to participate in the Integrated Seniority List
process. By focusing on this sole issue, the Sixth
Circuit failed to properly apply Conrail because it
never
analyzed
whether
the
Companies’
interpretations of Section 1.5(c)(1) in the broader
context of the CBA were arguably justified. The
Court found, without analysis, that the issue was a
major dispute because one of the Companies’
arguments (whether the Carriers had an implied
right to participate in the creation of the List) of the
CBA was not arguably justified. (Pet. App. 26a). The
Sixth Circuit’s holding repeated the District Court’s
mistake by failing to address the other explicit
clauses of the CBA in dispute regarding whether the
List complied with the Allegheny-Mohawk Labor
Protective Provisions, whether the List caused a
system flush or removed pilots from their positions,
whether the Teamsters Merger policy applied, and
whether the Union represented Flexjet pilots, all
minor disputes that deprive the courts of jurisdiction
to address the merit of these disputes.
The Companies filed a petition for rehearing en
banc pointing out that the Sixth Circuit’s decision
was contrary to Conrail because it failed to give
proper deference to the Companies’ interpretation of
the CBA and properly apply the “arguably justified”
standard. The Companies further argued that the
decision disregarded the Sixth Circuit’s own postConrail precedent involving disputes over the
meaning of terms in existing agreements. The Court
denied the Companies’ petition for rehearing. (Pet.
App. 58a).
15
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This Court should grant a writ for three reasons.
First, the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with this
Court’s RLA precedent in Conrail by misapplying the
major-minor dispute analysis by not applying the
proper deference to the Companies’ interpretation
when applying the arguably justified standard.
Conrail instructed that a carrier had only a
“relatively light” burden to show that its
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
was “arguably justified” rather than “frivolous” or
“obviously insubstantial.” The Companies met that
burden by demonstrating multiple plausible
contractual interpretations that supported their
refusal to accept the List.
The Sixth Circuit
disregarded the Conrail standard by not giving
proper deference to the Companies’ interpretation.
Second, the Sixth Circuit violated the principles
of Conrail by holding that an issue clearly covered by
the terms of a CBA was a major dispute because one
of the Companies’ multiple contractually-based
defenses to this action was not arguably justified.
(Pet. App. 26a).
Finally, the Sixth Circuit erred by issuing an
injunction without a finding that there was an
imminent threat that the RLA would be violated
absent an injunction. Courts can only issue an
injunction under the Railway Labor Act to prevent a
violation of the Act and, even then, only after the
party seeking an injunction has worked in good faith
to resolve the dispute outside of court. The Sixth
Circuit disregarded this principle and issued an
injunction in this case when there was no finding
16
that the parties would not have arbitrated the issue
absent the injunction. (Pet. App. 27a).
The RLA and this Court’s precedent interpreting
and applying it have helped maintain labor stability
in the railroad and airline industries for more than
90 years by requiring Parties to resolve
disagreements growing out of existing agreements
peacefully
through
grievance
handling
and
arbitration. The Sixth Circuit’s approach in this case
threatens to unsettle this stability by blurring the
lines between major and minor disputes and inviting
parties to bring contract-based labor disputes to the
courts rather than the statutorily-mandated System
Boards of Adjustment. This outcome ignores this
Court’s precedent and is in total conflict with the
language and purpose of the RLA. This Court should
grant this Petition to correct these legal and
procedural errors.
I.
The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts With
Conrail And Misconstrues The Issues.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in this case is
profoundly incorrect. First, the Court of Appeals
failed to follow the “relatively light burden” standard
from Conrail. While the Court of Appeals nominally
mentioned these principles, it did not actually apply
them. The Sixth Circuit in reality disregarded the
deferential approach demanded by Conrail in favor of
an over-simplified, surface-level analysis that failed
to take into account the implied terms and
interconnected express terms of the CBA. As a result,
the Sixth Circuit impermissibly decided the merits of
the underlying contract interpretation dispute and
improperly interfered in the parties’ labor relations.
17
There is a long and consistent line of precedent
underlying the federal courts’ limited role under the
Railway Labor Act. The standards developed over the
years by this Court have repeatedly emphasized the
RLA’s goal of preventing labor disputes from
interrupting carrier operations from labor disputes.
To accomplish this, the test for determining whether
a dispute is major or minor strongly favors finding a
dispute to be minor. As set forth in Conrail, the
appropriate inquiry is whether the carrier’s
interpretation is “arguably justified” by the terms of
the agreement, 491 U.S. at 310, and whether the
dispute can “be conclusively resolved by interpreting
the existing agreement,” 491 U.S. at 305. The carrier
does not have to prove that its contract interpretation
is correct or likely to succeed, only that it is not
“frivolous” or “obviously insubstantial.” Id. at 306.
The carrier’s burden to satisfy these standards is
“relatively light” because of the strong presumption
in favor of arbitration. Id. at 307. If there is any
doubt as to arbitrability, the Court should defer to
the arbitral jurisdiction of the System Board. Id. at
310.
The courts’ role in determining whether a
dispute is major or minor is narrow. The court can
neither interpret the contract nor decide which
party’s interpretation is correct. Id. at 318. The RLA
places exclusive jurisdiction to resolve these contract
interpretation disputes in System Boards that have
special expertise in interpreting labor agreements
and an intimate familiarity of the parties’ bargaining
history. Id. at 310-11. This Court has found that
system boards are better equipped than courts to
resolve disputes over the interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements, because they are expert in
18
the industry and familiar with its jargon and the “law
of the shop.” See, Gunther v. San Diego & E. Ry. Co.,
382 U.S. 257, 261 (1965).
The relevant issues regarding the Integrated
Seniority List in this case were classic minor
disputes. The Union sought to compel the Companies
to accept the Integrated Seniority List, arguing that
this was required by Section 1.5(c)(1) of the Flight
Options CBA. That section of the CBA states, in part,
that “The Company or other Successor, as
appropriate, shall accept the integrated seniority
list.” (Pet. App. 90a). The Companies argued that this
overly narrow focus was improper because (1) the
List did not comply with McCaskill-Bond, (2) the List
did not comply with the CBA because the Companies
were excluded from the creation process, (3) the List
and the process used to create it were not fair and
equitable as required by Section 1.5(c)(1) of the CBA,
(4) the List may cause a System Flush which would
violate Section 1.5(c)(1) of the CBA, (5) the List may
cause pilots to lose their positions in violation of
Section 1.5(c)(1) of the CBA; (6) the List was
improperly created under the Teamsters Merger
Policy when that Policy did not apply under the
terms of the CBA; and (7) the process used to create
the List was improper because the Union did not
represent Flexjet pilots.
The McCaskill-Bond issue was proper for a
federal court to decide because it was an issue of pure
federal law that did not require an interpretation of
the CBA. The remaining issues, however, required
the court to interpret implicit or explicit CBA terms
and should have been left to the parties to resolve
through the System Board of Adjustment process.
19
The Companies’ right to participate in (or at
least observe) the Integrated Seniority List process is
an implied term of the contract based on the
language requiring the List to comply with Sections 3
and 13 of the Allegheny-Mohawk Labor Protective
Provisions, which require the process used to create
the list to be fair and equitable. This requirement is
an affirmative duty on both the Companies and the
Union, and in order for the Companies to fulfill their
duty they needed to be involved at some level in the
creation of the List. The remaining issues regarding
whether the List complies with the AlleghenyMohawk Labor Protective Provisions, whether the
List caused a system flush, whether the List caused
the removal of pilots from their positions, whether
the List was improper because it used the Teamsters
Merger Policy, and whether the process used to
create the List was improper because the Union did
not represent Flexjet pilots are conflicts over explicit
and implicit terms in Section 1.5(c)(1) of the CBA. All
of these issues are minor disputes because they can
only be resolved by interpreting terms in the CBA.
The Court of Appeals disregarded the
Companies’ arguments and focused solely on the
issue of whether the CBA provided the Companies a
right to participate in the creation of the List. (Pet.
App. 24a). The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that
the Companies’ interpretation of this issue was not
“arguably justified,” and therefore a major dispute.
The Court of Appeals further erred by issuing an
injunction on this sole basis when there were
multiple other minor disputes that related to the
ultimate issue of whether the Companies were
required to accept the List. The Court’s
20
determination and subsequent
erroneous for several reasons.
injunction
were
First, the Court of Appeals misunderstood the
ultimate issue: whether the Union’s claim that the
CBA’s requirement for the Companies to “accept the
List” was a major dispute. The District Court held
that it was, finding the language of the CBA dealt
with “acquisition of rights for the future” rather than
“rights claimed to have vested in the past.”4 (Pet.
App. 43a). When analyzing this issue on appeal, the
Court of Appeals ignored the Union’s claim, and
chose instead to focus on only one of the Companies’
multiple CBA-based arguments for not accepting the
List. In doing so, the Court implicitly ruled that,
where a party proffers multiple interpretations, the
existence of one arguably unjustified interpretation
renders an issue a major dispute regardless of how
many other arguably justified interpretations / minor
disputes are present. This reasoning is contrary to
Conrail and is not supported by any rational
interpretation of the Railway Labor Act.
Even if the argument regarding the Carrier’s
ability to participate in the creation of the List was
unjustified, the Court of Appeals still erred by
deciding that this was a major dispute. The Court of
Appeals held that “the district court did not err in
finding that the 2010 CBA does not arguably justify
the Carriers’ assertion that they have a right to
The District Court also improperly decided the minor
dispute regarding whether the List complied with the CBA’s
requirement that the List satisfy the Allegheny-Mohawk
Sections 3 and 13 Labor Protective Provisions. (Pet. App. 44a).
4
21
participate in the ISL process.” (Pet. App. 26a).
However, the District Court never made this finding.
(Pet. App. 43a et seq). The District Court did not
apply the Conrail standard at all. Instead, it
improperly applied the standard from another
problematic Sixth Circuit RLA case, Wheeling & Lake
Erie Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers &
Trainmen, 789 F.3d 681, 690 (6th Cir. 2015). The
issue of whether the Companies have a right to
participate in the creation of the Integrated Seniority
List turns on whether the Companies’ position that it
was an implied term of the CBA was “arguably
justified” under Conrail. However, the District Court
ignored this approach and instead looked to whether
the issue was related to “future rights.” This “future
rights” language was an improper interpretation of
dicta in previous RLA jurisprudence and ignored the
critical “arguably justified” test set forth in Conrail.
Further, there were no “future rights” being
negotiated. This issue concerned existing implicit
and explicit terms in the 2010 Flight Options CBA,
into which the Flexjet pilots were ultimately being
merged. Rather than correct this error, the Court of
Appeals simply pretended that the District Court
applied the correct standard, then upheld that ruling
without any independent analysis of its own. (Pet.
App. 26a).
Even ignoring this procedural error, the Sixth
Circuit also erred in concluding that the Companies’
interpretation of the CBA regarding their duties
relative to the Integrated Seniority List was not
arguably justified. The CBA is a joint agreement
between Flight Options and the Union. Unless
specifically stated otherwise, any rule or obligation in
the CBA applies with equal force to both parties, and
22
any allegation that either side is failing to abide by
their obligations can be arbitrated by the System
Board. In this case, the CBA contained a clause
requiring that, if pilots of an acquired carrier are
hired by the Company, the seniority lists of the
respective pilot groups “shall be integrated.” (Pet.
App. 90a). The CBA does not specify which party is
responsible for creating the List. The Companies
interpreted the CBA to implicitly require their
involvement in the process. Even if the ultimate
decision on creating the List was left to the Union,
the Companies still had an obligation under the CBA
to ensure the process that created the List was fair
and equitable under Sections 3 and 13 of the
Allegheny-Mohawk Labor Protective Provisions.
Since the Companies could not comply with this
requirement
without
either
observing
or
participating in this process, the CBA must have an
implied term allowing or requiring some level of
Company involvement in the creation of the List.
Finally, regardless of whether there was an implied
right for the Companies to participate in the creation
of the List, there were explicit terms in the CBA
requiring the Companies to ensure the process used
to create the List complied with Allegheny-Mohawk,
and did not cause a system flush or remove pilots
from their positions.
The Sixth Circuit also erred by limiting its
analysis to the explicit terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. A collective bargaining
agreement includes express and implied terms and
both must be considered in determining whether a
dispute is an RLA minor dispute. Conrail, 491 U.S. at
308 (“Collective bargaining agreements often
incorporate express or implied terms that are
23
designed to give management . . . a degree of freedom
of action within a specified area of activity.”). This
Court has repeatedly held that a collective
bargaining agreement “is not an ordinary contract for
the purchase of goods and services, nor is it governed
by the same old common-law concepts which control
such private contracts . . . .” Id. at 311. As this Court
recognized, “the general framework of a collective
bargaining agreement leaves some play in the joints,
permitting management some range of flexibility in
responding to changed conditions.” Id. at 309 n. 7. A
court must therefore consider unwritten past
practices as well as express agreement terms when
analyzing whether an interpretation is arguably
covered by the terms of a CBA. Id.
Here, the Court of Appeals should have allowed
for the possibility that the express language on the
scope of the rule allowed some “play in the joints” and
could be interpreted to require the Companies to be
involved in the Seniority List Integration process.
But neither the district court nor the court of appeals
addressed this issue. Instead, these courts solely
relied on a surface-level, myopic, and inaccurate
reading of an unrelated term in the CBA that does
not control the issue. This violates the deferential
standard in Conrail.
The Sixth Circuit’s error is made plain by the
second part of its analysis on the Integrated Seniority
List issue. After ruling that the issue of whether the
Companies were required to accept the List was a
major dispute, the Court of Appeals then continued to
find that the CBA’s arbitration provision was also
part of the status quo, and that therefore the
Companies should be enjoined to either accept the
24
List or submit a grievance over the List. This result
is nonsensical. By recognizing that the dispute at
issue is both subject to the arbitration provisions of
the CBA and that the dispute should be arbitrated,
the Court of Appeals implicitly recognized that the
issue was a minor dispute. Indeed, the practical effect
of the Court of Appeals’ decision is similar to if it had
correctly found the issue was a minor dispute, but
with the added burden of a meritless and
inappropriate injunction that opines on the merits of
the issue in dicta and which the Union will likely use
in subsequent proceedings against the Companies.
II. The Question Presented Is Important And
Recurring Thus The Sixth Circuit’s
Decision Disrupts The Carefully Crafted
Structure Of Disputes Under The Railway
Labor Act.
The issues in this case have recurring
significance for the stability of labor relations in the
railroad and airline industries. In enacting the
Railway Labor Act, Congress recognized the vital
importance that these industries play. Railroads and
Airlines work in a complex inter-connected web. The
entire system can be thrown into disarray if even
small nodes in this web shut down due to labor strife.
And since the transportation system is so
interconnected to the broader economy at large, a
shutdown can have ripple effects far beyond the scope
of labor disputes in other industries.5 That is why
This is exacerbated by the fact that the RLA does not
regulate secondary picketing or prevent a striking RLA union
from targeting neutral employers. See Burlington Northern R.R.
5
25
Congress designed the RLA to mandate that disputes
growing out of the interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements be resolved in arbitration and
limited labor injunctions to a narrow set of
circumstances when all efforts have been expended to
reach an amicable agreement.6
This case requires Supreme Court review
because the Sixth Circuit did not simply misapply the
Conrail standards. Instead, the Court of Appeals
followed a completely different approach by failing to
examine or give any deference to the Companies’
interpretation of the disputed CBA terms. This is
contrary to this Court’s RLA precedents that it is a
light burden for the non-moving party to show an
issue is a minor dispute and that, if there is any
doubt, the court should find in favor of arbitration.
This presumption of arbitrability is a cornerstone
of this Court’s labor relations jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Engineers and Trainmen, 558 U.S. at 74 (“In creating
the scheme of mandatory arbitration superintended
by the NRAB, the 1934 amendments largely
‘foreclose[d] litigation’ over minor disputes,” quoting
Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 616
(1959)). See also Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.,
406 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1972) (minor disputes must be
resolved by RLA arbitration boards, not courts); Bhd.
Co. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 419
(1987).
This duty is reinforced by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. § 101, et seq., which was also improperly disregarded by
the Court of Appeals in this case.
6
26
of Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.,
373 U.S. 33, (1963) (dispute over meaning of
arbitration award could not be resolved through
strike); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957) (union cannot strike
over minor dispute). This presumption in the Railway
Labor Act was born out of this Court’s precedent
under the LMRA, which similarly has a presumption
in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., United Steelworkers
v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475
U.S. 643, 648 (1986). These cases have recognized
that confining labor disputes over the interpretations
over CBA’s has led to a relatively peaceful and stable
labor-relations environment that minimizes strikes
and lockouts. See AT&T, 475 U.S. at 648 (“These
precepts have served the industrial relations
community well, and have led to continued reliance
on arbitration, rather than strikes or lockouts, as the
preferred method of resolving disputes arising during
the term of a collective-bargaining agreement.”).
This Court’s decision in Conrail has led to
similar stability in the railroad and airline
industries. Until recently, the Circuit Courts of
Appeals have uniformly applied the Conrail test as it
was set forth by this Court.7 The Sixth Circuit bucked
7 See, e.g., Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. Div./IBT v.
Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 745 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2014); Bhd. of
Maintenance of Way Employes Div. v. Burlington Northern
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 596 F.3d 1217, 1223 (10th Cir. 2010); Air Line
Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 399 F.3d 89, 99 (1st
Cir. 2005); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way
Employes, 327 F.3d 1309, 1322 (11th Cir. 2003); Ass’n of Flight
27
this trend when it failed to properly consider implied
terms and apply the deferential Conrail standard in
Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Engineers & Trainmen, 789 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2015).
The Court of Appeals used that precedent as a
launching pad to take Sixth Circuit jurisprudence
even further from the rule in Conrail. This upsets the
careful balance that Congress and this Court have
established. Now that there is a Circuit that is more
likely to wade into the merits of a labor dispute, there
is a danger that parties will purposely seek out that
forum, which would lead to increased protracted
litigation and potential disruption to the airline and
railroad industries. Indeed, the instant case is a
prime example of that. Not long after the District
Court mistakenly granted the Union an injunction in
this case, the Union quickly returned seeking yet
another injunction over a different minor dispute. See
Flight Options, LLC v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local
1108, No. 1:16-CV-00732, 2017 WL 1173143 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 30, 2017). This Court should step in to
reaffirm the standards in Conrail and correct this
emerging split in the circuits before it leads to
Attendants v. Horizon Air Indus., Inc., 280 F.3d 901, 904 (9th
Cir. 2002); United Transp. Union v. Kansas City Sou. Ry. Co.,
172 F.3d 582, 588 (8th Cir. 1999); United Transp. Union v.
South Carolina Public Ry. Comm’n, 130 F.3d 627, 635 (4th Cir.
1997); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs Div. 269 v. Long Island R.R.,
85 F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1996); Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth.
v. Bhd. of R.R. Signalmen, 882 F.2d 778, 786 (3d Cir. 1989) Air
Line Pilots Ass’n v. E. Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1519, 1521 (D.C. Cir.
1989); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Southwest Airlines Co., 875
F.2d 1129, 1135 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
28
further improper and destabilizing court intervention
in labor relations.
This case is particularly troubling in that it not
only misapplied the Conrail standard, but it did so in
a way that completely distorted the basic distinction
between major and minor disputes. The ultimate
result of the Sixth Circuit’s decision was to enjoin the
Companies to either accept the List or arbitrate the
issue in front of the System Board. At first blush, this
result seems to have a similar practical effect as if
the Court of Appeals had properly found the issue to
be a minor dispute and dismissed the case to be
arbitrated. After all, an arbitrator will ultimately
resolve the issues in this case even though the Court
of Appeals erred in finding it a major dispute. But
this seemingly benign result is a serious deviation
from the procedure established by the RLA and
improperly blurs the lines between major and minor
disputes.
Injunctions are an extraordinary remedy, even
more so in the labor context. See Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Congress has
recognized this in both the Railway Labor Act and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which require a party
seeking an injunction to exert every reasonable effort
to resolve the issue amicably before seeking an
injunction. There is nothing in the record that would
justify an injunction in this case. There were no
findings that the status quo would be violated absent
an injunction or any other basis that could justify an
injunction. There was no need or justification for an
injunction here because the parties had already
shown a willingness to arbitrate all disputes but the
narrow McCaskill-Bond issue. In effect, the Court of
29
Appeals issued an injunction requiring the parties to
act exactly as they had already planned.
Furthermore, an injunction is generally only
appropriate under the Railway Labor Act in the
event of a major dispute that threatens to disrupt the
status quo or to prevent another violation of the RLA.
While the Court of Appeals nominally found this to
be a major dispute, it also contradictorily (implicitly)
held that the disputes over the Integrated Seniority
List were non-frivolous disputes subject to be
arbitrated pursuant to the CBA’s arbitration clause.
This nonsensical ruling crosses the streams
between major and minor disputes and effectively
authorizes injunctions for any minor dispute. Such a
finding is contrary to the RLA and undermines the
entire statutory scheme that requires parties to
resolve minor disputes through arbitration. By giving
the court a toehold into minor disputes like this, it
encourages parties to go to court first rather than to
proceed through the RLA’s mandated arbitration
process.
Even if the end result is that the court will
simply issue an injunction to compel a party to
arbitrate, that still disrupts the purpose of the RLA
by unnecessarily complicating and prolonging the
resolution of everyday disputes over the terms of a
CBA. This is exactly what Congress tried to avoid
when drafting the RLA. This Court should step in to
correct this problem and avoid any further
unnecessary entanglement between labor-relations
and the judiciary.
30
SUMMARY REVERSAL
As an alternative to granting oral argument for
this petition, the Court could summarily reverse the
Sixth Circuit’s decision and remand with instructions
that, under a proper application of Conrail, the
dispute over the Integrated Seniority List is a minor
dispute within the meaning of the RLA.
This Court has granted summary reversal of
lower court decisions when they are clearly erroneous
and contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent.
Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 345
(10th ed. 2013) (citing Am. Tradition P’ship v.
Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012)). While relatively
rare, this Court has summarily reversed decisions
that failed to follow well-established precedent its
precedents such as the instant case. See, e.g., Jenkins
v. Hutton, 137 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (2017) (reversing the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for failing to follow the
narrow review of habeas claims under AEDPA);
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016)
(reversing the Massachusetts Supreme Court for
failing to follow the Second Amendment guidelines in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008));
Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014)
(reversing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for
failing to follow the well-established summary
judgment standard from Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)).
As explained in this petition, the Sixth Circuit
failed to give effect to this Court’s decision in Conrail
regarding the proper classification of RLA labor
disputes as major or minor. Furthermore, the Sixth
Circuit’s ruling is contrary to the plain text of the
RLA that limits the use of injunctions to cases where
31
there is a threat of a status quo violation or other
violation of the Act. These errors were not nuanced
readings of the established law or distinguishable on
their facts – the Sixth Circuit completely disregarded
nearly thirty years of precedent under the RLA based
on this Court’s decision in Conrail. This serious error
undermines the entire statutory scheme of the RLA
by broadening the permissible role of the courts in
labor disputes in a way contrary to the letter and
intent of the statute. The Sixth Circuit’s errors in this
case are as serious and plain as the failure of other
courts to follow well-established principles of law
such as Liberty Lobby and Heller. Such obvious errors
should be summarily reversed.
32
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
W. Chris Harrison
Counsel of Record
Zachary W. Hoyt
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
NASH, SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C.
6410 Poplar Ave.
Suite 300
Memphis, TN 38119
chris.harrison@ogletree.com
zachary.hoyt@ogletree.com
NOVEMBER 16, 2017
Counsel for Petitioners
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