Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Karl Cotton, aka Karl Cornelius-Cotton, Petitioner v. Supreme Court of the United States, et al.

Case: 16-2496 Document: 34-1 Filed: 09/22/2017

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

No. 16-2496

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED

Sep 22, 2017

DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

KARL COTTON, aka Karl Cornelius-Cotton,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, et al.,

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF

MICHIGAN

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Before: GIBBONS, SUTTON, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

Karl Cotton, a Michigan resident proceeding pro se, appeals a district court order

dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). This case has been referred to a

panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

Cotton filed this complaint under miscellaneous federal statutes and asserted diversity

jurisdiction, claiming that state and federal courts, agencies, and officials violated his civil rights

when they erroneously upheld a quiet-title action that settled any dispute regarding a previous

foreclosure on Cotton's home in Benton Harbor, Michigan. The district court dismissed his

complaint pursuant to § 1915(e) on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16

(1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). Cotton now challenges the district

court's decision in general, reiterating his claims that he was denied due process and that his

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-2rights were violated under "various statutes, judicial bias, and more" when the state court judges

and counsel for the opposing mortgage company committed perjury and fraud in the state court

proceedings. Cotton has also filed a motion for costs.

We review de novo a district court's sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2010). This statute requires a district court to screen

and dismiss complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must contain "a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2). Although a pro se litigant is entitled to a liberal construction of his pleadings and

filings, to avoid dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

This action arose out of a note and mortgage that Cotton apparently obtained in 2006 to

purchase the Benton Harbor home. In 2013, the note on this home was assigned to Bayview

Mortgage, LLC ("Bayview"). At some point, Cotton became delinquent in his mortgage

payments, resulting in foreclosure and a sheriff's sale of the property. Under Michigan law,

Cotton had six months from the date of the sale for redemption, but he tendered his redemption

payment to the county register of deeds one day late, on March 20, 2014. Because Cotton

disputed the fact that his redemption payment was untimely, Bayview filed an action in the

Michigan state court to quiet title. At the title hearing, Cotton argued that Bayview had failed to

comply with state law requiring the company to complete the sheriffs deed and an affidavit of

purchase showing the amount required for redemption. After Bayview demonstrated that all

required paperwork had been properly filed and that it had provided the formula for calculating

the required redemption amount, the state court granted Bayview's motion to quiet title.

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-3As the district court noted, there were multiple defects in Cotton's complaint that

warranted screening this action before service under § 1915(e). First, Cotton presented no

allegations against several of the defendants, specifically the United States Supreme Court, the

United States Attorneys, the Secretary of the Treasury Department, or the listed Berrien County

officials. Therefore, Cotton failed to state any claim for relief against these defendants. See

Mills v. City of Barbourville, 389 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir. 2004).

While we have jurisdiction over Cotton's claim against the state court under 28 U.S.C. §

1983, we must dismiss his claim nonetheless. The complaint and Cotton's appellate brief allege

that the state court judges violated various constitutional rights, including his right to due process

of law. Contrary to the district court's holding, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar us

from adjudicating his claim. That being said, we can affirm the district court's decision on other

grounds. See Stein v. Regions Morgan Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc., 821 F.3d 780,

786 (6th Cir. 2016). Here, Cotton fails to allege any facts that allow us to infer that the state

court judge may have violated his rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. He has failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, and therefore we affirm the district court's decision to

dismiss his claim.

As we previously determined in granting Cotton's motion to proceed in forma pauperis

with this appeal, his claims of fraud and misrepresentation that allegedly resulted in an

unfavorable state court decision were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine either. See

McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 392 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Nevertheless, Cotton's claim that the

remaining defendants presented and considered fraudulent and untruthful information in his

quiet-title proceeding in state court is unsupported and baseless.

Cotton's claim of fraud in the quiet-title proceeding is governed by Michigan law, as this

issue is not controlled by the Constitution or federal statutes. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304

U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Under Michigan law, a mortgagor must redeem the foreclosed-upon

property within six months of the sheriff's sale, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3240(8), after

which the mortgagor's right, title, and interest in the property are extinguished. Mich. Comp.

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-4Laws § 600.3236. Once that statutory redemption period elapses, the mortgagor must make a

"clear showing of fraud, or irregularity" by the defendants in order for a court to "entertain the

setting aside of a foreclosure sale." Conlin v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 714 F.3d 355,

359 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Schuithies v. Barron, 167 N.W.2d 784, 785 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)).

The mortgagor must also show that he was prejudiced from the defendant's failure to comply

with the state's foreclosure statute by demonstrating that he would have been in a better position

to keep the property absent the defendant's noncompliance. Id. at 361-62.

Cotton made no allegations to support his bare assertion that the named judges, attorneys,

or courts, including his own counsel, committed fraud during the proceeding or that any

irregularity in the quiet-title suit occurred to justify setting aside the state court's decision in

Bayview's favor. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. We may affirm the district court's § 1915(e)

dismissal on this alternative ground. See Stein, 821 F.3d at 786.

On appeal, Cotton sets forth standards for a federal court to order a defendant's release

from prison pending an appeal under Sixth Circuit Rule 9, and he claims that his counsel

rendered ineffective assistance, but these legal standards and related vague claims apply only in

criminal matters. See Alsobrook v: UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 352 F. App'x 1, 4 (6th Cir. 2009).

Therefore, these arguments do not support any claim in Cotton's civil suit. Cotton also raises a

claim of mail fraud which we will not consider for the first time on appeal. See Barner v.

Pilkington N. Am., Inc., 399 F.3d 745, 749 (6th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, we DENY the motion for costs and AFFIRM the district court's judgment.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

Case 1:16-cv-01161-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 5 filed 09/27/16 PagelD.81 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KARL COTTON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 1:16-CV-1161

V.

HON. ROBERT J. JONKER

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT et a!,

Defendants.

I

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff filed this pro se action naming as defendants a series of federal agencies and

officials, including the United States Supreme Court, the United States Attorney, the Office of the

Attorney General, the Secretary of the Department of Treasury; a series of State and local (Berrien

County) agencies and officials; and Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC. The Court granted Plaintiffs

request for IFP status. The Court must therefore screen the filing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). After

applying the screening criteria, the Court is satisfied this action must be dismissed.

Plaintiffs filing is not especially easy to decipher, but one thing is clear: Plaintiffs root

complaint is that the Berrien County Circuit Court entered summary judgment against him in an

action to quiet title. That occurred, it appears from Plaintiffs timeline and other materials (ECF

No. 1, PagelD.24; ECF No. 1-1, PagelD.52-65) about a year ago, on September 28, 2015. There is

no indication Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Plaintiff obviously

disagrees with the decision. All the injuries he asserts stem from that adjudication of the State Court.

He now asks this Court to set aside the decision of the Berrien County Circuit Court.

Case 1:16-cv-01161-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 5 filed 09/27/16 PagelD.82 Page 2 of 2

Plaintiff's case must be dismissed because this Court plainly lacks subject matter jurisdiction

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents "a party losing in state

court.

. .

from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment [in federal

district court] based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's

federal rights." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994); see also Tropfv. Fidelity

Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 936 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson). Rooker-Feldman is a

narrow doctrine, "confined to.. cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused

.

by state-court judgments rendered before district court proceedings commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Here, Plaintiff's claim falls squarely under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

because Plaintiff seeks this Court's review of a state circuit court decision rendered prior to the

commencement of the federal district court proceedings. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Plaintiffs claim must be dismissed.

There are multiple other problems with Plaintiffs filing that would lead this Court to screen

the action before service under Section 1915(e), but the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is sufficient to

compel dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

September 27, 2016

Is! Robert J. Jonker

ROBERT J. JONKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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