Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Dalia Dippolito, Petitioner v. Florida

APPENDIX

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the

District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District

(May 26, 2017)....................................................................................................... App. 1

Order on State’s Motion for Protective Order and for Revocation of

Pro Hac Vice Status in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth

Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida

(March 17, 2017) ................................................................................................. App. 15

Order Denying Motion for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc in the

District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District

(August 16, 2017) ................................................................................................ App. 30

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

DALIA DIPPOLITO,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

No. 4D17-1145

[May 26, 2017]

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth

Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Glenn D. Kelley, Judge; L.T. Case

No. 502009CF009771A.

Gregory C. Rosenfeld of Law Offices of Greg Rosenfeld, P.A., West Palm

Beach, and Andrew B. Greenlee of Andrew B. Greenlee, P.A., Sanford, for

petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Elba Caridad

Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for respondent.

GERBER, J.

The defendant in a criminal case seeks certiorari review of the trial

court’s order prohibiting all attorneys in the case from making

extrajudicial statements until the jury is sworn for the defendant’s third

trial. The defendant argues the court’s order departs from the essential

requirements of law in three respects: (1) the State made no evidentiary

showing that any threat to a fair trial was imminent and substantial; (2)

the order is an overbroad prohibition of political speech and the court

failed to consider less restrictive alternatives like individual voir dire and

striking of tainted jurors; and (3) the court’s selective enforcement of the

order amounts to viewpoint discrimination. We deny the petition, because

the court’s well-reasoned order does not depart from the essential

requirements of the law. The order demonstrates that extrajudicial

statements pose an imminent and substantial threat to a fair trial; is

narrowly tailored in both substance and duration; and is viewpoint neutral

as it applies to extrajudicial comments by both parties’ counsel.

App. 1

We present this opinion in six parts:

1) the procedural history;

2) the parties’ arguments to the trial court;

3) the trial court’s order and post-order proceedings;

4) the parties’ arguments to this court;

5) our standard of review; and

6) our analysis of the defendant’s three arguments.

1. Procedural History

The defendant is charged with solicitation to commit first-degree

murder with a firearm. The State alleges that the defendant hired a hitman

to kill her then husband. The purported hitman was actually an

undercover officer from the Boynton Beach Police Department. See

Dippolito v. State, 143 So. 3d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

In 2009, the Boynton Beach Police Department arrested the defendant

and published video of the defendant talking to the purported hitman.

Other footage showed the defendant reacting to a staged crime scene at

her house and to the false news that her husband had been killed. These

videos were uploaded to the police department’s YouTube page, and they

also aired on an episode of the national TV show COPS. Id. As this court

previously noted, “[t]he case generated considerable pretrial publicity.” Id.

at 1081-82. The videos posted by the Boynton Beach Police Department

were replayed and shown on national TV shows including the Today show,

Good Morning America, and others. Id. at 1082.

In 2011, at the defendant’s first trial, her theory of defense was that

she believed she was auditioning for a TV show and therefore was acting

during the events shown on video. At jury selection, many prospective

jurors indicated they previously heard of the case by raising their hands.

Id. It later was alleged that 28 of the 54 prospective jurors had raised their

hands. Id. After a ten-day trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as

charged. On appeal, we reversed, concluding the defendant was deprived

of an impartial jury. Id. at 1086. Specifically, we concluded the trial court

erred by denying the defendant’s request “to individually voir dire the

jurors on the media coverage” of the case. Id. at 1085. We also found the

trial court erred by failing to strike the jury panel after one prospective

juror openly discussed an allegation that the defendant had attempted to

poison the victim – an allegation not charged in the case. Id.

In December 2016, at the defendant’s second trial, she claimed police

misconduct and asserted an objective entrapment defense. During jury

selection, a large number of the 200-person jury panel indicated they

2

App. 2

previously heard something about the case. While conducting voir dire,

the defense filed three separate motions for a change of venue, asserting

that the defendant could not receive a fair trial due to pervasive local media

coverage of the case.

The defendant specifically cited the police

department’s YouTube videos relating to the case. The trial court denied

the motions to change venue, reasoning that, at the same time defense

counsel was complaining about media attention, he was commenting

about the case on his Twitter account. The second trial ended with the

trial court declaring a mistrial due to a hung jury.

In January 2017, following the mistrial, defendant’s two defense

attorneys issued a press release. Defense counsel said the prosecution

against the defendant was “politically motivated” and came at a significant

“price tag” for taxpayers. Defense counsel also asserted that, even if the

defendant “did the crime,” she already had “done the time” by completing

nearly eight years of house arrest.

2. The Parties’ Arguments to the Trial Court

Following issuance of defense counsels’ press release, the State filed a

motion for protective order to prevent extrajudicial comments by defense

counsel. In the same motion, the State sought the revocation of the lead

defense attorney’s pro hac vice status. The State alleged that “[r]ecent

statements by defense counsel indicate they are intentionally trying to

improperly influence the local jury pool” before the defendant’s third trial,

which is scheduled for June 2, 2017. The State specifically cited defense

counsels’ press release. The State also referred to the lead defense

attorney’s “prior pattern and past tactics” of attempting to influence

potential jurors. In support of its motion, the State cited Rule 4–3.6(a) of

the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar which provides:

A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a

reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means

of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably

should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of

materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding due to its

creation of an imminent and substantial detrimental effect on

that proceeding.

The defendant filed a response arguing that the State was attempting

to “impair her attorneys’ First Amendment right to free speech.” The

defendant further argued the State was improperly influencing the jury

pool to have a negative view of her by releasing, through the Boynton

Beach Police Department, videos relating to her case. The defendant

3

App. 3

further noted that the prosecutor from her first trial had written a book

about the case called, “Poison Candy: The Murderous Madam: Inside Dalia

Dippolito’s Plot to Kill.” Although the book was released after the

prosecutor left her job at the State Attorney’s Office, it was published while

the defendant’s first appeal was pending, and the former prosecutor is now

counsel for the alleged victim in this case. The defendant further argued

that defense counsel issued their press release following the mistrial only

as a way to counter the State’s own press release, which indicated the

defendant would be tried for a third time. The defendant maintained that

the “few stray comments” by defense counsel “do not pose a substantial or

imminent threat to a fair trial” and did not support a gag order.

The State filed a reply clarifying that it sought a gag order which would

apply to “all counsel, including the prosecutors,” and an order that would

require counsel “to refrain from extrajudicial comments to the media until

the case has been tried to a verdict.”

The trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion for protective order.

At the hearing, the defendant argued the State failed to show that defense

counsels’ press release violated Rule 4–3.6(a). The defendant also

contended that the State’s proposed gag order was a prior restraint on

speech, was not narrowly tailored, and was “not substantiated by the sort

of evidentiary support that would require the Court to issue a gag order.”

According to the defendant, the State failed to show there was any risk

that prospective jurors would be tainted by counsel’s extrajudicial

statements.

The trial court asked the State what evidence it had that extrajudicial

statements threatened a fair trial. The State cited: the January 2017

press release from defense counsel; an unspecified number of press

conferences held by defense counsel during the prior trials; and critical

comments defense counsel leveled at the trial court in February 2016,

which resulted in the trial court’s sua sponte issuance of an order to show

cause and its consideration of whether to revoke defense counsel’s pro hac

vice status. The State added:

All day long, every day [defense counsel] left this Courtroom

and his goal was [to] get on TV so that [he could] influence this

jury. That was his goal. Every day demeaning our witnesses,

demeaning the Boynton Beach Police Department.

Absolutely. That is evidence the Court should consider.

The trial court took the matter under advisement, stating it needed time

to draft a detailed order.

4

App. 4

3. The Trial Court’s Order and Post-Order Proceedings

The trial court entered a well-detailed written order granting the State’s

motion for protective order but denying the request to revoke defense

counsel’s pro hac vice status.

The trial court began by finding that, after defense counsel was retained

in 2015, he “conducted numerous scheduled press conferences to discuss

this case and the defense’s version of the facts.” The trial court further

found that, after defense counsel, in early 2016, filed his motion to dismiss

based on entrapment, he “conducted regular press conferences discussing

his view of the facts,” and “emphasized the defense theory that the police

manufactured the alleged crime for the sake of an appearance on COPS.”

In support of this finding, the trial court cited the order to show cause

which it issued in response to defense counsel’s press conference leveled

at the trial court. The trial court explained that, in the prior order, it found

defense counsel “violated Bar Rule 4–8.2(a) by making a statement

concerning the integrity of the Court that he knows to be false . . . and also

violated Bar Rule 4–3.6(a) by making an extrajudicial statement that he

knows, or reasonably should know, will have a substantial likelihood of

materially prejudicing” the case.

The trial court proceeded to explain that, during jury selection for the

second trial in December 2016, “[s]eventy percent of the 200 jurors

summoned for the trial had heard something about the case.” The trial

court noted that the defendant moved three times in jury selection for a

change in venue “asserting that she could not receive a fair trial because

of pervasive media coverage.” According to the trial court, at the same

time defense counsel was expressing concerns about media coverage, he

“was commenting about the case on a [T]witter account.”

The trial court found that, after the second trial resulted in a mistrial,

“[defense counsel] again conducted a press conference to discuss the

case.” The trial court asserted that defense counsel “continued to discuss

the tactics and motivations of the Boynton Beach Police Department and

commented on the spiritual nature of the Defendant and her family.”

The trial court lastly referred to defense counsels’ January 2017 press

release, in which they claimed the prosecution was politically motivated

and a waste of money.

Based on the foregoing history, the trial court concluded:

5

App. 5

The evidence, and the record, in this case support a finding

that continued unfettered extrajudicial statements pose a

substantial and imminent threat to a fair trial. Jury selection

is scheduled to commence on June 2, 2017. The Defendant

has chosen to proceed to trial with jurors from Palm Beach

County. Potential jurors in Palm Beach County have already

been exposed to extraordinary and pervasive media coverage

of this case.

....

The extrajudicial statements made by the Defendant’s

attorneys in this case, whether intended or not, are likely to

bias potential jurors by repeated exposure to matters which

are completely collateral to this case. The numerous press

conferences conducted by [defense counsel] have directly, or

indirectly, suggested that this case is a referendum on the

police. While certainly the specific actions of the Boynton

Beach Police Department are an issue in this case, this case

is not a referendum on the police in general, nor can any juror

lawfully decide[] this case to send a message to law

enforcement.

Statements made recently by defense counsel concerning

the Defendant “having served her time” and concerning the

State Attorney’s Office similarly place collateral matters into

the public forum in this publicity charged case. . . . No juror

can lawfully consider any of these matters.

....

In most cases, commentary on collateral matters, or on the

case itself, would not pose an imminent threat to a fair trial.

However, as already discussed, the level of media coverage of

this case has been, and continues to be, extraordinary. Every

statement made by anyone connected with this case is being

reported and re-reported. Speculation runs rampant on

irrelevant issues in this case such as when did the Defendant

have a child while on house arrest. In a case that has already

been tried twice in this county, and in a case exposed to such

pervasive media coverage, the impact on potential jurors of

continued extrajudicial statements by the attorneys in this

case poses a real and imminent threat to the orderly

administration of justice and to a fair trial.

6

App. 6

(footnote omitted).

As a result, the trial court prohibited “[a]ll counsel in this case . . . from

making any extrajudicial statement” reasonably expected to be publicly

disseminated which specifically related to the following:

a. The evidence in this case or any party’s view or opinion of

the evidence in this case;

b. The facts of the case or any party’s interpretation of the

facts of the case, including any inferences that could be

drawn from the facts;

c. The motive or motivation of the State in prosecuting the

case or the motive or motivation of the Defendant in

pursuing any theory of defense;

d. Sentencing or punishment of the Defendant including any

reference to the sentence imposed after the first trial, the

Defendant’s score on the Criminal Punishment Code

Scoresheet, length of in-house arrest or punishment of the

Defendant if found guilty;

e. Theories of the case by the State or the Defendant;

f. The first or second trial of this case, including the results

of those trials; and

g. The disparagement of any attorney of record in this case.

Notwithstanding the topics prohibited by the preceding list, the trial

court explained that attorneys were allowed to comment “generally on the

progress of the case, procedural matters or rulings of the Court, provided

the comments are consistent with the Florida Rules of Professional

Conduct.”

The trial court further provided that its order would

“automatically expire upon the swearing of a jury.”

Following entry of the trial court’s order, but before filing the instant

petition, the defendant filed two motions asking the trial court to hold the

State in contempt for violating the order. In the first motion, the defendant

claimed the State ran afoul of the order by allowing the Boynton Beach

Police Department, as the State’s agent, to keep videos relating to her case

on the department’s YouTube page. The defendant argued that although

no new videos had been posted, allowing the videos to remain online

despite the gag order would constitute “viewpoint discrimination.” In the

second motion, the defendant addressed media reports, citing a “source

close to the case,” that the alleged victim would testify in the upcoming

trial, as he did in the first trial. The defendant asserted that this “source”

7

App. 7

had to be one of the current prosecutors or the former prosecutor who now

was counsel for the alleged victim.

The trial court conducted a hearing and clarified that its order applied

to counsel only. The trial court further noted that its order did not require

“anyone to go back and remove anything from the public domain, nor

could I.” Although the trial court denied the requested relief, the court

stated that if it saw “someone doing indirectly what they can’t do directly,

I will take action, and you can bring it to my attention.”

4. The Parties’ Arguments to This Court

a. The Defendant’s Arguments

The defendant argues that the trial court’s order departs from the

essential requirements of law in three respects: (1) the State made no

evidentiary showing that any threat to a fair trial was imminent and

substantial; (2) the order is an overbroad prohibition of political speech

and the trial court failed to consider less restrictive alternatives like

individual voir dire and striking of tainted jurors; and (3) the trial court’s

selective enforcement of the order amounts to viewpoint discrimination.

On the defendant’s first argument, she contends that the only evidence

which the State submitted was defense counsels’ January 2017 press

release. According to the defendant, because the press release was issued

more than four months before the currently scheduled trial date and

because the State did not show that any media outlet published the press

release, the State failed to establish an imminent and substantial threat

to a fair trial. The defendant further contends that, to the extent the State

referenced defense counsel’s other comments and press conferences, such

references were presented as argument, not evidence, and do not support

the trial court’s order. In support, the defendant relies on E.I. Du Pont de

Nemours & Co. v. Aquamar, S.A., 33 So. 3d 839, 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)

(“[A] gag order should be supported by evidence . . . .”), and Rodriguez ex

rel. Posso-Rodriguez v. Feinstein, 734 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA

1999) (finding there was no showing gag order was necessary where “[n]o

evidence other than the newspaper advertisement itself was presented to

the court.”).

On the defendant’s second argument, she contends that the trial

court’s order is not narrowly tailored to preclude only prejudicial

statements made by counsel. The defendant maintains that defense

counsel’s criticism of elected officials and comments on matters of public

concern like expenditure of public funds is protected political speech. In

8

App. 8

support, the defendant cites Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030,

1043 (1991) (“A defense attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain

dismissal of an indictment or reduction of charges, including an attempt

to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client does not deserve

to be tried.”) (emphasis added). According to the defendant, the order’s

sole exception for statements about procedural matters is insufficient to

render it narrowly tailored. The defendant also contends that the trial

court should have considered the less restrictive alternative of allowing

individual voir dire on jurors’ exposure to media coverage, as the court did

at the second trial.

On the defendant’s third argument, she contends that the trial court’s

order is prone to discriminatory enforcement, as seen in the trial court’s

rulings on her post-order motions directed toward the State. According to

the defendant, because the order does not completely incorporate Rule 4–

3.6, including subsection (b) which applies to third-party agents of

counsel, the order completely restrains the defendant’s speech while

allowing the State’s agents to say whatever they wish. For example, the

defendant argues, the trial court allowed the Boynton Beach Police

Department to continue publishing videos which threaten her right to a

fair trial, while ordering defense counsel to stand mute. According to the

defendant, she should not be forced to waive her right against selfincrimination in order to respond. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1056. The

defendant also contends that defense counsel’s comments were

permissible because they were made in response to, and designed to

counter, the prejudicial media environment which the State created. In

support, the defendant cites the comment to an ABA model rule

recognizing that counsel has the right to reply with extrajudicial

statements when “they are made in response to statements made publicly

by another party, . . . where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public

response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer’s client.”

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.6 cmt. [7] (Am. Bar Ass’n 2014).

b. The State’s Response

The State responds generally that the trial court’s order did not depart

from the essential requirements of law or result in irreparable harm to the

defendant.

On the defendant’s first argument, the State responds that the trial

court’s order “took into consideration all of the proceedings in this case

and all of the publicity this case has garnered.” The State argues the

threat is imminent and substantial because the defendant’s case is set for

trial, and any prejudicial comments to the media will affect the prospective

9

App. 9

jurors, as shown by the jury selection process in the previous trials. The

State distinguishes Rodriguez on the grounds that, in Rodriguez, no

showing of material prejudice existed, the order had no time or scope

limitations, and counsel offered to curtail his comments as an alternative.

Here, the State argues, defense counsel offered no alternative and

indicated he would continue his media strategy. Similarly, the State

distinguishes Aquamar on the ground that, in Aquamar, the court entered

an order enjoining counsel’s speech without the benefit of a hearing, unlike

here where the trial court held a lengthy hearing.

On the defendant’s second argument, the State responds that the gag

order is narrowly tailored to apply to attorneys only, to exempt comments

on procedural matters, and to expire upon the swearing of the jury. The

State distinguishes Gentile on the ground that, in Gentile, the lawyer

whose disciplinary finding was reversed held one press conference six

months before his client’s trial and merely stated that his client was a

scapegoat. Here, the State argues, defense counsel’s contacts with the

media were much more frequent and substantial.

5. Our Standard of Review

Appellate courts review orders prohibiting counsel from making

extrajudicial statements by certiorari. Rodriguez, 734 So. 2d at 1163;

News-Press Pub. Co., Inc. v. Hayes, 493 So. 2d 1, 1-2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).

Alternatively, such orders may be reviewed by non-final appeal because

they are “in the nature of an injunction.” Rodriguez, 734 So. 2d at 1163

n.1 (citing Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B)); see also Aquamar, 33 So. 3d at

841 (reviewing challenge to gag order as non-final appeal but also finding

that order at issue was “a departure from the essential requirements of the

law,” and citing Rodriguez).

Contrary to the State’s contention that the defendant failed to make a

threshold showing of irreparable harm, orders like the one in the instant

case “implicate[] a violation of the parties’ constitutional rights which

cannot be remedied on plenary review.” Rodriguez, 734 So. 2d at 1163.

Thus, in Gentile, the United States Supreme Court determined that a gag

order can violate a lawyer’s First Amendment rights when not properly

balanced against the State’s interest in ensuring a fair trial. Gentile, 501

U.S. at 1075. However, the Court recognized that “the speech of lawyers

representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less

demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press . . .

.” Id. at 1074; see also Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. McCrary, 520 So.

2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1988) (distinguishing between a prohibition on an

attorney’s comments and a prior restraint on the press).

10

App. 10

Given the foregoing, a court must determine whether a restriction on

extrajudicial statements is needed on “a case by case basis.” Rodriguez,

734 So. 2d at 1164. And “the limitations imposed by the court on

communications between the media and lawyers and/or litigants must be

for good cause to assure fair trials.” Id.; see Aquamar, 33 So. 3d at 841;

see also State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904,

910 (Fla. 1976) (setting forth the same standard of good cause and adding:

“Muzzling lawyers who may wish to make public statements to gain public

sentiment for their clients has long been recognized as within the court’s

inherent power to control professional conduct.”).

To that end, Rule 4–3.6(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar

provides:

A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a

reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means

of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably

should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of

materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding due to its

creation of an imminent and substantial detrimental effect on

that proceeding.

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4–3.6(a); see also The Florida Bar re: Amendments

to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 644 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 1994)

(incorporating into Rule 4–3.6 the “substantial likelihood of material

prejudice” standard approved by the United States Supreme Court in

Gentile).

With these standards of review in mind, we analyze the defendant’s

three arguments in turn.

6. Our Analysis of the Defendant’s Three Arguments

a. The Defendant’s First Argument

On the defendant’s first argument, we conclude the trial court did not

depart from the essential requirements of the law in finding that the State

met its evidentiary showing that a threat to a fair trial was imminent and

substantial.

We recognize that the State neither presented testimony nor formally

sought to introduce exhibits such as defense counsels’ January 2017

press release into evidence. However, the press release was attached to

11

App. 11

the State’s motion for protective order, and the press release was

extensively discussed among the parties at the hearing without objection.

Other extrajudicial statements, such as numerous press conferences

which defense counsel held, were discussed without objection as well.

Notably, the defendant does not dispute that defense counsel issued

the January 2017 press release. Instead, the defendant argues the State

did not prove that the media disseminated the press release, and she

argues that her attorneys were permitted to issue the press release.

However, Rule 4–3.6 requires only that the extrajudicial statement be one

that “a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of

public communication.” (emphasis added.) A press release certainly

satisfies this test.

Thus, on this record, the defendant has not shown it was improper for

the trial court to consider defense counsels’ extrajudicial statements in the

press release. Furthermore, absent any objection, the trial court properly

considered prior court proceedings and matters of record such as the

defendant’s two prior trials, the media exposure experienced by

prospective jurors in those trials, motions filed by the defense seeking a

change of venue based on pre-trial publicity, and prior court orders,

including the February 2016 order to show cause directed at defense

counsel for making prejudicial extrajudicial comments.

As a result, evidentiary support existed for the trial court’s order, and

good cause for the trial court’s order was shown. See R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 750 So. 2d 781, 781-82 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)

(distinguishing Rodriguez and finding good cause for gag order based on

the “record evidence” and the court’s “specific finding” that such an order

was necessary).

b. The Defendant’s Second Argument

On the defendant’s second argument, we conclude the trial court did

not depart from the essential requirements of the law in crafting the scope

of the order, including the consideration of less restrictive alternatives.

The defendant is correct that a gag order must be narrowly tailored to

achieve the objective sought, namely, a fair trial. Rodriguez, 734 So. 2d at

1165. To determine whether a restraint on extrajudicial statements is

narrowly tailored, courts look to whether less restrictive alternatives were

considered and whether the subject order contains “any time or scope

limitations.” Id. (noting “the absence of any time or scope limitations on

the prohibited extra-judicial communications”); see also Aquamar, 33 So.

12

App. 12

3d at 841 (reversing gag order that was “unrestricted in scope and time

limit”).

However, unlike counsel in Rodriguez, defense counsel here did not

propose an alternative which was less restrictive than a gag order.

Rodriguez, 734 So. 2d at 1164 (“At the hearing, counsel for the petitioners

offered to the court that no further advertisements would run and that

petitioners would limit any future media communications . . . .”). Here,

defense counsel actually proposed the gag order as a less restrictive

alternative to the revocation of his pro hac vice status, which would have

resulted in his removal from the case.

Moreover, the trial court’s order permits counsel to make extrajudicial

statements on matters not likely to prejudice the case such as procedural

matters, and the speech prohibitions within the order expire upon the

swearing of a jury. Accordingly, the order is narrowly tailored.

c. The Defendant’s Third Argument

On the defendant’s third argument, we conclude the trial court did not

depart from the essential requirements of the law in balancing the

viewpoints of the State and the defense. The trial court’s order, on its face,

applies equally to counsel for the State and the defense (“All counsel in

this case are prohibited . . . .”). While the defendant argued the State

violated the order through the actions of the Boynton Beach Police

Department, the trial court cannot undo the prior publication of

information like the police department’s videos on YouTube. In any event,

the trial court’s order indicates that the court would be alert to any future

attempt by the State to flout the order indirectly.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we deny the defendant’s petition, because the

trial court’s well-reasoned order does not depart from the essential

requirements of the law. The order demonstrates that extrajudicial

statements pose an imminent and substantial threat to a fair trial; is

narrowly tailored in both substance and duration; and is viewpoint neutral

as it applies to extrajudicial comments by both parties’ counsel.

Petition denied.

CONNER, J., concurs.

WARNER, J., dissents with opinion.

13

App. 13

WARNER, J., dissenting.

I would grant the petition because the State did not present evidence

to support the necessity of a gag order on the attorneys in this case. We

have held that such an order must be supported by evidence. See E.I. Du

Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Aquamar, S.A., 33 So. 3d 839, 841 (Fla. 4th DCA

2010) (“[A] gag order should be supported by evidence . . . .”); Rodriguez ex

rel. Posso-Rodriguez v. Feinstein, 734 So. 2d 1162, 1164-65 (Fla. 3d DCA

1999) (reversing a gag order because it was not supported by evidence).

Here, despite the objection by petitioners, the court ruled without

requiring the State to present evidence to support its contention that the

gag order on attorneys was needed to prevent an imminent threat to the

fairness of the trial. I do not consider the January press release attached

to the state’s motion—the only “evidence” presented—as sufficient,

particularly because there was no evidence regarding the extent of its

dissemination.

In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), the Supreme

Court noted that appellate courts have an independent duty with regard

to cases involving restrictions on First Amendment rights: “[I]n cases

raising First Amendment issues . . . an appellate court has an obligation

to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make

sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the

field of free expression.’” Id. at 1038 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers

Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)). Given this heightened review

standard, without an evidentiary record I cannot make the “independent

examination” required in this case.

*

*

*

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

14

App. 14

83 of 147

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Case No.: 2009CF009771AMB

Division: W

vs.

DALIA A. DIPPOLITO,

Defendant.

/

ORDER ON STATE’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE

AND FOR REVOCATION OF PRO HAC VICE STATUS

This matter came before the Court on the State of Florida’s Motion for Protective

Order and for Revocation of Pro Hac Vice Status (DE #1174), filed February 1, 2017. A

hearing was conducted on the State’s Motion on March 3, 2017. The Court has heard and

reviewed the evidence presented and the submissions of the parties, including the

argument of counsel. The Court has also reviewed the court file and the record in this

matter. Upon consideration, the Court makes the legal and factual findings that follow.

The State’s Motion seeks two remedies. First, the State seeks a prohibition, or

limitation, on extrajudicial statements by defense counsel. This is often referred to as a

“gag order.” Second, the State seeks to revoke Brian Claypool’s ability to appear in this

case pro hac vice. In other words, the State wants Mr. Claypool removed from this case.

The relief sought by the State is squarely rooted in the extraordinary publicity this

case has received and, from the State’s perspective, in Mr. Claypool’s involvement in that

publicity.1 Consideration of the State’s Motion requires review of the history of media

As will be discussed, the State’s request to remove Mr. Claypool from this case is based

on more than extrajudicial statements. The State also relies on misrepresentations to the

jury during trial and on clearly improper statements made during closing argument.

1

App. 15

84 of 147

coverage in this case, Mr. Claypool’s involvement in extrajudicial statements to the

media, the media coverage of the second trial of this case, and events which have

transpired since the declaration of a mistrial in December of 2016.

History of Media Coverage

From the time of the Defendant’s arrest, this case has garnered extensive media

coverage. The initial media attention was, in no small measure, the result of the Boynton

Beach Police Department’s decision to involve the television show COPS in the filming

of a staged crime scene and in the Defendant’s subsequent arrest.

Videos relating to this case were immediately posted on the internet. COPS aired

a story on this case with interviews featuring various members of the Boynton Beach

Police Department. Videos from the case were broadcast nationally during the airing of

the story.

In addition to this broadcast, members of the Boynton Beach Police

Department participated in a POD cast to discuss the case.

This case was first tried in April and May of 2011.

There was extensive media

coverage of the first trial, particularly at a local level. The verdict in the first trial was

widely reported as was the Defendant’s sentence. Sometime after the first trial, Elizabeth

Parker, Esq., one of the prosecutors in the case, wrote a book about the case entitled

Poison Candy: The Murderous Madam: Inside Dalia Dippolito’s Plot to Kill.

All of this resulted in heighted media interest in, and attention to, this case. This

publicity pre-dates Mr. Claypool’s involvement in the case and cannot be attributed to

Mr. Claypool, or for that matter to anyone connected with the representation of the

Defendant.

2

App. 16

85 of 147

Mr. Claypool’s Involvement In Pre-Trial Publicity

On September 12, 2014, the Fourth District Court of Appeal issued its mandate

reversing the Defendant’s conviction.

After the mandate, the Defendant retained, and

then discharged, several attorneys for the retrial. Mr. Claypool first appeared in this case

in July of 2015 when he was granted leave to appear pro hac vice for the Defendant.

While this case was always the focus of media attention, Mr. Claypool’s participation in

this case took the publicity to a new level.

The State essentially argues that Mr. Claypool’s strategy, from the beginning, was

to effect and influence potential jurors in Palm Beach County through extrajudicial

statements to the media. While Mr. Claypool’s motive in engaging in extrajudicial

statements concerning this case is subject to debate, his participation in an extraordinary

level of such statements cannot be debated.

Leading up to the retrial of this case in December of 2016, Mr. Claypool

conducted numerous scheduled press conferences to discuss this case and the defense’s

version of the facts. The Defendant, apparently at the recommendation of Mr. Claypool,

travelled to Miami for an interview with the television show “20/20.” 2 The interview

aired on national television in December of 2015.

In early 2016, the Court was required to hear and decide a motion filed by the

Defendant seeking to dismiss this case based on objective entrapment. During this time

period, Mr. Claypool conducted regular press conferences discussing his view of the facts

of the case and the significance of those facts. Most of his comments to the media

Travelling to Miami for a television interview was a violation of the terms of the

Defendant’s pretrial release and was the subject of a motion to revoke bond filed by the

State (DE # 832).

2

3

App. 17

86 of 147

focused on the Boynton Beach Police Department and emphasized the defense theory that

the police manufactured the alleged crime for the sake of an appearance on COPS.3

One of the press conferences conducted by Mr. Claypool resulted in this Court

issuing an Order to Show Cause (DE #826). The press conference occurred on February

23, 2016, immediately following an evidentiary hearing on the Defendant’s motion to

dismiss. The Court concluded that Mr. Claypool’s extrajudicial statements violated Bar

Rule 4-8.2(a) by making a statement concerning the integrity of the Court that he knows

to be false, or that was made with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity and also

violated Bar Rule 4-3.6(a) by making an extrajudicial statement that he knows, or

reasonably should know, will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an

adjudicative proceeding.

The purpose of the Order to Show Cause was to determine whether to permit Mr.

Claypool to continue to appear pro hac vice. After a hearing, the Court decided against

revoking Mr. Claypool’s privilege to appear in this case.

Media Coverage Second Trial

The retrial of this case commenced on December 1, 2016. Media coverage of the

trial was extensive and pervasive.

Stories appeared regularly in the printed press,

including the Palm Beach Post and the Sun Sentinel. All of the local television stations

covered the case. National news teams including NBC’s Dateline were present in the

courtroom. The case was discussed on nationally broadcast news programs like ABC’s

There is, of course, nothing wrong with pursuing this defense theory. It was consistent

with motion to dismiss before the Court and is, candidly, the Defendant’s theory of the

case. The issue here is not the right of the Defendant to pursue her theory of defense,

rather the issue presented is the impact of extrajudicial statements on a pending trial.

3

4

App. 18

87 of 147

Good Morning America. The trial was live streamed and could be viewed nationally over

the internet.

The impact of the news coverage on the retrial cannot be overstated or ignored.

From the beginning, jury selection was affected by the pervasive media attention to the

case.

Seventy percent of the 200 jurors summoned for the trial had heard something

about the case. Jury selection, which included individual questioning of potential jurors,

lasted four days.

During jury selection, the Defendant repeatedly moved for a change in venue

asserting that she could not receive a fair trial because of pervasive media coverage.

Ironically, during this time Mr. Claypool was commenting about the case on a twitter

account. In total, the Defendant filed three separate motions to change venue during voir

dire.4

In the various motions, and renewed motions, for change of venue in this case the

Defendant made references to the existence of YouTube videos relating to the case and to

the number of “hits” (views) each of these videos had received. For example, a search of

“Dalia Dippolito” produced 454,523 hits versus 16,121 hits for “John Goodman trial.”

The Defendant asserted that from November of 2016 to December of 2016 there had been

120 television programs relating to the Defendant’s case and 150 local news articles

within 30 days of the trial. The Defendant also emphasized the national media attention

relating to the case.5

The Defendant did not file a timely motion to change venue within 10 of trial as

required by Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.240.

5

The Defendant’s own filings establish record evidence of the extraordinary and

pervasive media coverage of this case. The Court has considered this evidence in

connection with the State’s Motion.

4

5

App. 19

88 of 147

While the Court acknowledged the extensive news coverage of the trial, the

Defendant’s motions for change of venue were denied. A 200 person venire had been

summoned for the case and before resorting to a change of venue the Court chose to

continue with jury selection to determine if an impartial jury could be seated. Ultimately,

an impartial jury was selected and sworn. Even after the jury was sworn, media coverage

continued to be an issue in the trial.

During the trial, the Defendant moved for a mistrial based on the pervasive media

coverage alleging that the jury would be influenced by community pressure. While the

jury was deliberating, the Defendant asserted – without evidence – that a juror had been

speaking to the media and the jury was deadlocked 5 to 1. These assertions were without

merit, but serve to illustrate the atmosphere that surrounded the trial.

Events Since Declaration of Mistrial

The second trial in this case ended in a hung jury with the jury split 3 to 3. After a

mistrial was declared, Mr. Claypool again conducted a press conference to discuss the

case. He continued to discuss the tactics and motivations of the Boynton Beach Police

Department and commented on the spiritual nature of the Defendant and her family. The

case has continued to receive extensive news coverage at times featuring comments by

Mr. Claypool or by co-counsel, Greg Rosenfeld, relating to the case.

The tenor of the most recent comments by defense counsel has moved to criticism

of the State Attorney’s Office. The State has pointed to a press release by the PR News

Channel in which the Defendant’s attorneys are quoted as saying that this a politically

motivated prosecution and that the taxpayers should not have to bear the costs associated

with the prosecutors trying to save face.

The same article makes reference to the

6

App. 20

89 of 147

sentencing guidelines and asserts that the Defendant has already done her time based on

the nearly eight years she has been on in-house arrest.

In this charged atmosphere, this case is now scheduled for a third trial which is set

to commence on June 2, 2017. The Defendant has abandoned her request for a change of

venue and a jury must, therefore, be selected in Palm Beach County. 6 The Court must

now decide based not only on the most recent extrajudicial statements by the Defendant’s

counsel, but also based on the history of the case, whether Mr. Claypool’s pro hac vice

status should be revoked and/or whether counsel should be prohibited from continuing to

make extrajudicial statements concerning this case.

Analysis

Removal of Mr. Claypool

The Court will first address the State’s request for revocation of Mr. Claypool’s

privilege to appear pro hac vice.

Attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of

Florida may appear in Florida courts as a matter of right. This right does not extend to

out-of-state attorneys appearing in Florida pro hac vice.

State Industries, Inc. v.

Jernigan, 751 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Out-of-state attorneys may appear in

Florida at the grace of the Court.

The revocation of an attorney’s privilege to appear pro hac vice is generally left to

the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g. Prewitt Enterprises, LLC v. Tommy Constantine

Racing, LLC, 185 So. 3d 566 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). An attorney’s pro hac vice status

may be revoked for conduct which adversely impacts the administration of justice and

The Defendant, essentially, controls venue in this case. The Defendant has a right under

the Florida Constitution to be tried in the county where the crime was committed. See,

Art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const. Moving venue over a defendant’s objection, or without a

request by the defendant, would not likely survive appellate review.

6

7

App. 21

90 of 147

that conduct need not rise to the level of a violation of the Florida Rules of Professional

Conduct. State Industries, Inc., id at 682.

The State asserts that Mr. Claypool’s conduct in this case is unprofessional and

warrants revocation of his right to appear pro hac vice.

The State emphasizes the

following:

 Mr. Claypool’s continuous extrajudicial statements to the media designed

to influence the pool of potential jurors available to try this case.

 Mr. Claypool’s comments to the media calling into question the integrity

of the Court resulting in the entry of the Order to Show Cause.

 Mr. Claypool’s improper comment in closing argument that the jury

should send the Defendant home to her child.

 Mr. Claypool knowingly in opening statement misrepresented the

existence of 500 plus phone calls between the Defendant and Mohamed

Shihadeh.

 Mr. Claypool’s unprofessional comments to the media attacking the State

Attorney’s Office for pursuing a politically motivated prosecution

wasting taxpayers’ money.

The State’s assertions raise legitimate concerns which must be considered and weighed.

As previously discussed, the volume and frequency of Mr. Claypool’s

extrajudicial statements to the press have been extraordinary. He has: 1) conducted

regular press conferences during the course of the case; 2) commented on the case on a

twitter account; 3) placed his client on a nationally televised program to discuss the case

8

App. 22

91 of 147

in advance of trial; and 4) regularly commented on the case to multiple and numerous

media outlets.

The Court has already concluded that some of Mr. Claypool’s comments crossed

the line between mere commentary on the case to comments giving rise to a potential

violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The press conference of February 23,

2016, which resulted in an Order to Show Cause, serves as an example of improper

extrajudicial commentary.

Many of Mr. Claypool’s recent statements attacking the

prosecution approach a similar line.

The comment in closing argument referenced by the State also clearly crossed a

line. Asking a jury to return a criminal defendant to her family is a direct appeal to

sympathy. Such a comment invites the jury to decide the case based on emotion and not

on the evidence, lack of evidence or the law. Mr. Claypool, as an experienced trial

attorney, clearly knew that such a comment was improper.

While the State raises legitimate concerns relating to Mr. Claypool’s appearance

in this case, the removal of a party’s chosen counsel is a drastic remedy which must be

used sparingly. Alexander v. Tandem Staffing Solutions, Inc., 881 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla.

4th DCA 2004); Caruso v. Knight, 124 So. 3d 962, 963-64 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Removal of chosen counsel should be avoided if lesser alternatives are available to

alleviate any harm. Caruso, id. at 964; Esquire Care, Inc., v. Maguire, 532 So. 2d 740,

741 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1988).

The Defendant has chosen Mr. Claypool as her lead attorney in this case. If found

guilty in a third trial, the Defendant faces up to 20 years in prison. Mr. Claypool is

intimately familiar with this case. He knows the witnesses and he knows the evidence. It

9

App. 23

92 of 147

also cannot be denied that Mr. Claypool is an effective, knowledgeable and skilled

advocate for the Defendant.

The Court must weigh and consider the impact of depriving the Defendant of Mr.

Claypool’s representation versus the concerns raised by the State. The Court must also

consider whether the concerns raised by the State can be alleviated by a remedy that does

not require the revocation Mr. Claypool’s right to appear in this case pro hac vice.

After balancing the competing concerns and rights of the parties, the Court

concludes that revocation of Mr. Claypool’s pro hac vice status is not required in this

case. This is particularly true because there are other, less drastic, remedies that can

address the issues raised by the State.

As will be discussed below, reasonable restrictions on extrajudicial statements by

all counsel in the case can address the potential tainting of the jury pool and eliminate any

unprofessional personal attacks. Improper arguments at trial can be addressed with a

timely contemporaneous objection or by a motion in limine filed in advance of trial.

Protective Order – Extrajudicial Statements

The Court will next address the State’s request for a protective order prohibiting

counsel from making extrajudicial statements to the media.

As with all citizens,

attorneys enjoy the rights enumerated in the First Amendment, including freedom of

speech. However, attorneys must exercise the right of free speech consistent with, and

constrained by, the requirements of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.

Rule 4-3.6 governs extrajudicial statements by attorneys. The rule provides, in

pertinent part, as follows:

(a) Prejudicial Extrajudicial Statements Prohibited. A lawyer shall not make an

extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by

10

App. 24

93 of 147

means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that

it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative

proceeding due to its creation of an imminent and substantial detrimental effect on

that proceeding.

See, R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.6 (Trial Publicity). Rule 4-3.6 strikes a balance between

free speech and extrajudicial statements which are likely to prejudice a judicial

proceeding.

Trial courts have the inherent power to issue orders prohibiting extrajudicial

comments by attorneys. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 497 So. 2d 652, 657 (Fla.

1986); State ex rel Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 910 (Fla.

1977)(muzzling lawyers who may wish to make public statements has long been

recognized as within the court’s inherent power to control professional conduct.)

Limitations on communications between lawyers and the media must be for good cause

to assure a fair trial and must be supported by evidence that extrajudicial statements pose

a substantial or imminent threat to a fair trial. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company v.

Aquamar, S.A., 33 So. 3d 839, 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Rodriquez ex rel. PossoRodriguez v. Feinstein, 734 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1999).

The evidence, and the record, in this case support a finding that continued

unfettered extrajudicial statements pose a substantial and imminent threat to a fair trial.

Jury selection is scheduled to commence on June 2, 2017. The Defendant has chosen to

proceed to trial with jurors from Palm Beach County. Potential jurors in Palm Beach

County have already been exposed to extraordinary and pervasive media coverage of this

case.

11

App. 25

94 of 147

A fair trial for both the Defendant and the State requires the selection of jurors

that have not been tainted by pretrial publicity.

Restricting extrajudicial statements by

the attorneys in this case will not end pretrial publicity. The news media can, and will,

continue to report on this case and many of the issues faced in the second retrial will be

present in the third retrial. However, the nature, extent and tenor of the statements of

counsel in this case pose a special risk to the selection of a fair and impartial jury.

The extrajudicial statements made by the Defendant’s attorneys in this case,

whether intended or not, are likely to bias potential jurors by repeated exposure to matters

which are completely collateral to this case. The numerous press conferences conducted

by Mr. Claypool have directly, or indirectly, suggested that this case is a referendum on

the police. While certainly the specific actions of the Boynton Beach Police Department

are an issue in this case, this case is not a referendum on the police in general, nor can

any juror lawfully decided this case to send a message to law enforcement.

Statements made recently by defense counsel concerning the Defendant “having

served her time” and concerning the State Attorney’s Office similarly place collateral

matters into the public forum in this publicity charged case. Counsel has: 1) commented

on the Defendant’s guideline score sheet and her time served on house arrest; 2)

described the prosecution as politically motivated to save face; and 3) condemned the

prosecution as a waste of taxpayer money. No juror can lawfully consider any of these

matters.

Further, collateral matters aside, continued extrajudicial statements concerning the

case itself presents a special risk to a fair trial. The Defendant has correctly argued that

publication of videos, POD casts and television shows like COPS threaten a fair trial by

12

App. 26

95 of 147

poisoning or tainting the jury pool in Palm Beach County. Extrajudicial statements by

counsel discussing the case and advancing in the public arena defense theories of the case

pose the same threat.

In most cases, commentary on collateral matters, or on the case itself, would not

pose an imminent threat to a fair trial. However, as already discussed, the level of media

coverage of this case has been, and continues to be, extraordinary. Every statement made

by anyone connected with this case is being reported and re-reported. Speculation runs

rampant on irrelevant issues in this case such as when did the Defendant have a child

while on house arrest.7 In a case that has already been tried twice in this county, and in a

case exposed to such pervasive media coverage, the impact on potential jurors of

continued extrajudicial statements by the attorneys in this case poses a real and imminent

threat to the orderly administration of justice and to a fair trial.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby,

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The State’s Motion to revoke Brian Claypool, Esq.’s pro hac vice status is

DENIED.

2. The State’s Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED. All counsel in this case

are prohibited from making any extrajudicial statements that a reasonable person

would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication, concerning

or relating to, the following:

This issue was thrust into the public forum by Mr. Claypool’s improper plea to the jury

to send the Defendant home to her child.

7

13

App. 27

96 of 147

a. The evidence in this case or any party’s view or opinion of the evidence in

this case;

b. The facts of the case or any party’s interpretation of the facts of the case,

including any inferences that could be drawn from the facts;

c. The motive or motivation of the State in prosecuting the case or the

motive or motivation of the Defendant in pursuing any theory of defense;

d. Sentencing or punishment of the Defendant including any reference to the

sentence imposed after the first trial, the Defendant’s score on the

Criminal Punishment Code Scoresheet, length of in-house arrest or

punishment of the Defendant if found guilty.

e. Theories of the case by the State or the Defendant.

f. The first or second trial of this case, including the results of those trials.

g. The disparagement of any attorney of record in this case.

Nothing in this Order shall prohibit the attorneys from commenting generally on

the progress of the case, procedural matters or rulings of the Court, provided the

comments are consistent with the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless

specifically renewed by the Court, the prohibitions contained in this Order shall

automatically expire upon the swearing of a jury to hear and decide this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach

County, Florida this 17th day of March, 2017.

See Attached Counsel List

14

App. 28

97 of 147

Copies Furnished to:

ASA Craig A. Williams

ASA Laura Lairue

c/o State Attorney’s Office

401 N. Dixie Highway

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Office: (561) 355-7100

Email: Cwilliams@sa15.org,

llaurie@sa15.org

Brian Claypool, Esq.

1055 E. Colorado Boulevard

5th Floor

Pasadena, CA 91106

Office: (626) 664-9489

Email: Brian@ClaypoolLawfirm.com

Greg Rosenfeld, Esq.

Law Office of Greg Rosenfeld, P.A.

515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite P300

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Office: (561) 820-1508

Cell: (516) 721-5014

greg@rosenfeldlegal.com

15

App. 29

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT, 1525 PALM BEACH LAKES BLVD., WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401

August 16, 2017

CASE NO.: 4D17-1145

L.T. No.:

502009CF009771A

DALIA A. DIPPOLITO

Appellant / Petitioner(s)

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

Appellee / Respondent(s)

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

ORDERED that the appellant's July 10, 2017 motion for rehearing or rehearing en banc

and for certification of question of great public importance is denied.

Served:

cc: Attorney General-W. P. B.

Elba Caridad MartinSchomaker

Andrew B. Greenlee

ll

App. 30

Gregory C. Rosenfeld