Opposition Brief — Neelam Uppal, Petitioner v. The Health Law Firm

Supreme Court briefNov 21, 2017

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No. 17-517

In The Supreme Court Of The United States

NEELAM T. UPPAL,

Petitioner,

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM,

Respondent.

_________________________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

the Supreme Court of Florida

_________________________________________________

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

___________________________________________________

George F. Indest III

Counsel of Record

The Health Law Firm

1101 Douglas Avenue

Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714

Telephone: (407) 331-6620

E-mail: GIndest@TheHealthLawFirm.com

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC, Washington DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A. Questions Presented (Restated)

It is believed that the Petitioner's confusing

questions should be rephrased as follows:

Whether the U.S. Supreme Court has

jurisdiction to consider an untimely appeal filed by a

defendant from an adverse state appellate court

decision entered on October 4, 2016 (App. K), in the

case of civil money judgment rendered by a state trial

court, when no federal questions are implicated, and at

a time when there were still proceedings pending in

the state court on the case.

Whether the Petitioner has produced an

adequate record on appeal to support the claims she

makes and has stated her claims with sufficient

preciseness and clarity in her Petition filed with the

U.S. Supreme Court for the Court to be able to grant

certiorari.

Whether the U.S. Supreme Court wants

to open the flood gates to allow prolific, abusive pro se

litigants to appeal state court civil money judgments

and assessments of attorney's fees and costs decided

against them by state courts.

MISSTATEMENTS IN PETITIONER'S

QUESTIONS PRESENTED1

There are a number of misstatements made by

the pro se Petitioner in her "Questions Presented"

which counsel is required to point out pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 15.2. Virtually every line

contains mis-statements. They include:

There were no "fraudulent attorney bills"

at issue, nor any specific allegations of any.

There were no " unlawful ex parte" orders

issued by Judges.

The Petitioner was not sanctioned for

filing an appeal. She was sanctioned by the Florida

Fifth District Court of Appeal for filing a frivolous, bad

faith appeal pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida

Statutes (which is modeled after Rule 11, Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure), and then only after the

Motion for Sanctions was served on her and more than

21 days had elapsed before it was actually filed with

the court.

The "order to sanction the petitioner" [sic]

is not "in violation of her fifth amendment [sic] rights."

Petitioner did receive due process of law.

This delineation of the misstatements in the

Petitioner's "Questions Presented" is being placed in this section

of the Opposition Brief pursuant to guidance the Respondent

received from Mr. Baker, in the Clerk of Court's Office.

Furthermore, to date, Petitioner has ignored the

decision, paid no part of the amount owed on the

merits, paid no attorney's fees, costs or sanctions, and

has challenged it in a number of other courts.2 She

has been afforded all rights and has actually been

deprived of nothing, yet, since she just ignores court

orders.

Although Petitioner raises the Fifth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution here in the

Questions Presented (first paragraph, Pet. p.i), she

does not include it in her actual brief nor in her Table

of Authorities.

The supreme appellate court and the

court of last resort in Florida for appeals of money

judgments in Florida is actually the Florida District

Court of Appeal (in this case the Florida Fifth Judicial

District Court of Appeal), not the Florida Supreme

Court. The Florida Supreme Court does not have

jurisdiction, not even discretionary jurisdiction, to hear

appeals such as the one filed by the Petitioner,

pursuant to Article 5, Section 3(b), Florida

Constitution (1968). Petitioner's filing of appeals and

petitions with the Florida Supreme Court were

unauthorized and it did not have jurisdiction,

pursuant to the Florida Constitution, to even entertain

E.g., see Uppal v. The Health Law Firm, No. 17-ap01027-cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., June 5, 2017) (App. D & F), and

Uppal v. George Indest, The Health Law Firm, et al., No. 17-cv07072-CM ( S.D. N.Y., Order of Dism. Oct. 12, 2017) (App. C), both

resulting in other courts taking similar actions against Petitioner.

iii

them. (See App. A, H & I)

The trial court judge held a duly noticed

hearing on a motion for summary judgment filed by

the Respondent. The Petitioner participated in that

hearing. The trial judge granted the Respondent's

motion for summary judgment and entered a summary

judgment against the Petitioner. Later, Respondent

filed a motion for entry of final judgment. It was duly

noticed for a hearing, with the Petitioner having

received ample advance notice. The hearing was held,

Petitioner chose not to attend that hearing, and a

Final Judgment was then entered against the

Petitioner.

There was no "fraudulent legal bill of over

$60,000." (Petitioner changes this amount in various

places.)

The Petitioner originally owed the

Respondent law firm approximately $28,000 in unpaid

legal fees and costs she incurred in its representation

of her in several different complaints by the Florida

Board of Medicine, Department of Health, filed against

her Florida medical license.

Because of the

Petitioner's aggressive and abusive pro se litigation,

including filing frivolous motions, multiple irrelevant

pleadings, spurious attempts to recuse the judge,

multiple rehearing requests and other similar tactics,

she, herself, greatly increased the amount of the

attorney's fees and costs associated with collecting the

amount due. This continues through the present.

The trial court judge did not violate

Article 1, Section 21, Florida Constitution (1968) or

Canon III, Florida Code of Judicial Conduct. The trial

court judge merely ruled against Petitioner in the

proceedings that were held. The Florida Fifth District

Court of Appeal also ruled against Petitioner. (App. K)

Petitioner was afforded all rights to which she was

entitled under both state and federal law.

10.

The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal

does not have to rule in a Petitioner's favor, nor to

allow an improper bad faith appeal to go forward

merely because Petitioner paid a filing fee. Due

process was afforded Petitioner. No fines were issued

against Petitioner. In this case, the Petitioner's

brief/petition was fully considered (Petitioner filed

multiple motions), the Florida Fifth District Court of

Appeal having taken approximately four (4) months to

do so,3 and the Respondent's motions were found to

have merit. This resulted in the Fifth District Court

of Appeal's denying Petitioner's appeal. It then

The docket in the case shows that Petitioner filed her

initial appeal brief with the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal

on June 1, 2016. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss and strike

her appeal brief on June 21, 2016. (App. M) Respondent filed a

motion for appellate sanctions, attorney's fees and costs against

Petitioner pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (which is

modeled after Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). (App. L)

Petitioner filed responses and oppositions to each of the foregoing.

The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal issued its decision on

October 4, 2016, dismissing Petitioner's appeal, and granting

Respondent's motion for sanctions, attorney's fees and costs,

remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

(App. K).

granted Respondent's motion for appellate sanctions,

attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.105,

Florida Statutes (which is modeled after Rule 11,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). (App. K & M) The

Court awarded the Respondent its attorney's fees and

costs against the Petitioner, which does not constitute

"excessive fines" (there were no fines issued) and does

not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment."

11.

Although Petitioner raises the Eighth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution here in the

"Questions Presented" (Pet., first para. 4, p.ii), she

does not argue it in her actual brief or include it in her

Table of Authorities.

Furthermore, the Eighth

Amendment applies to criminal cases, not to civil cases

such as the present one.

12.

The Florida Fifth District Court of

Appeal's Order (App. K) is legally sufficient.

Petitioner was granted due process of law but

disagreed with the outcome of the case which was

decided against her. The Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, rights

have not been violated. See paragraphs 3 through 5

above regarding her Fifth Amendment rights. See

paragraphs 9 and 11 above regarding her Eighth

Amendment rights. The Sixth Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution does not apply to Petitioner at all since it

on its face only pertains to criminal cases.

13.

Petitioner Uppal was not "sanction[ed] .

. . to file an appeal" [sic]. She was ordered to pay the

Respondent's appellate attorney's fees and costs

because she filed a frivolous, bad faith appeal, lacking

any facts or law to support it. (See paragraphs 3 and

7 above) There are no violations based on "the color of

law statute [sic]," "unreasonable seizure" or any other

violations (note: to date, nothing of the Petitioner's

has been seized by this Respondent, see paragraph 4,

above, nor has Petitioner paid any part of the Final

Judgment against her). None of these arguments were

made in the original action below.

14.

The Fourteenth Amendment argument of

Petitioner has been addressed previously (paragraphs

3, 4, and 7 above) as has the Eighth Amendment

argument (paragraph 10 above). Furthermore, it is

not only state courts that have sanctioned the

Petitioner. Federal Courts have, as well. Petitioner

has received similar assessments of sanctions,

attorney's fees and costs from other courts, including

federal courts. In the Bankruptcy Court for the

Southern District of New York, she filed five (5)

adversary proceedings (A.P.) against creditors. The

Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Cecilia G. Morris, has

dismissed them all and issued awards of attorney's

fees and costs against the Petitioner (see e.g., App. D)

in several of them. The Judge has also ruled that the

Petitioner filed that bankruptcy proceeding in bad

faith and for the purpose of harassing her creditors in

other orders in that case.

15.

This is not a criminal case so all of

Petitioner's arguments regarding being accused of a

crime, criminal defendants' rights, receiving

punishment, cruel and unusual punishment, right to

vii

trial of a criminal defendant and similar arguments

are irrelevant and inappropriate.

16.

Although Petitioner includes an

allegation of a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sect. 242, a

federal criminal statute, by the Florida Supreme

Court, in her "Questions Presented" (Pet., first para.,

p. iii), she does not argue it in her actual brief or

include it in her "Table of Authorities." It is a

scandalous allegation made in this appeal for the first

time. It is not applicable to the present case and

should be disregarded.

17.

Petitioner argues that the "state of

Florida violated petitioners [sic] rights under 18 U.S.C.

241 [sic], the federal criminal conspiracy statute. For

the first time in this appeal Petitioner is accusing the

state of Florida of engaging in a federal criminal

conspiracy. This is a frivolous, bad faith argument on

her part, having no basis in reality. Like many of her

other arguments about Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth

Amendment violations, she raises it for the first time

in her Petition in this Court.

18.

Although Petitioner includes an

allegation that Florida has violated 18 U.S.C. Sect.

241, a federal criminal statute, in her "Questions

Presented" (Pet., para. 8, p. iii), she does not argue it

in her actual brief or include it in her "Table of

Authorities." It is argued for the first time herein and

is not applicable to the present case.

viii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Respondent is The Health Law Firm, P.A., d/b/a

The Health Law Firm, formerly known as George F.

Indest III, P.A.--The Health Law Firm. It is a Florida

professional service corporation and a law firm with its

principal place of business in Altamonte Springs,

Seminole County, Florida (a suburb of Orlando).

There are no parent or publicly held corporations

which own any interest in it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Petitioner's Questions (Restated) . . . . i

Misstatements in Petitioner's

Questions Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT . . . . ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii

RELATED CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvii

PRELIMINARY MATTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxix

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

SUMMARY OF CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

AND RULES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Petitioner Retains Law Firm . . . . . 11

Trial Court Suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Petitioner's Abusive, Vexatious

Pro Se Litigation History . . . . . . . . 16

Procedural History of Case

in Florida Appellate Court . . . . . . . 19

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

II.

Misstatements made by Petitioner

In Her Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Misstatements in

Petitioner's Argument . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Misstatements in Petitioner's

Argument Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The Supreme Court does not have

jurisdiction to consider an untimely

Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by a

defendant from an adverse state

appellate court decision awarding

sanctions, and appellate attorney's fees

and costs for filing a frivolous, bad faith

appeal (App. K) in the case of a civil

money judgment rendered by a state trial

court, which Petition is contrary to

Supreme Court Rule 13.1 and 28 U.S.C.

Sect 2101(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

III.

Petitioner is Actually

Appealing the Decision of

the Florida Fifth District

Court of Appeal, the court

of last resort, entered

October 4, 2016. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

The Florida Supreme Court

had no jurisdiction, not

even

discretionary

jurisdiction, to consider an

appeal of a Florida District

Court of Appeal of a civil

money judgment; therefore,

Petitioner's attempts to

appeal the case to the

Florida Supreme Court

were unauthorized,

ineffective legal nullities,

which cannot be reviewed

by the U.S. Supreme Court . . . . . . . 29

The U.S. Supreme Court should not

grant a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

which fails to set forth any legitimate

federal question claim under any federal

xii

constitutional or statutory provision, and

fails to state the grounds for the Petition

with accuracy, precision and clarity, in

violation of Supreme Court Rules 14.3

and 14.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

IV.

The U.S. Supreme Court should not

grant the Petition of a prolific, abusive

pro se litigator, and serial bad faith

bankruptcy filer, on a state civil court

monetary judgment against her, and thus

open the flood gates to appeals of other

abusive pro se litigants of state court civil

judgments, thus interfering in strictly

state law matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND

SANCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

APPENDIX

Contents of Appendix

App.

Description

App. A Florida Supreme Court Order

Dismissing Case, Uppal v. The

Health Law Firm, No. SC17-1874

dated Oct. 23, 2017 (no authority

to consider it) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiii

Page

A-1

App. B Petitioner Uppal's Notice of

Appeal to Florida Supreme Court

of Order of the Florida Fifth

District Court of Appeal, Uppal v.

The Health Law Firm, No. 5D172982, dated Oct. 19, 2017 . . . . . . .

A-3

App. C U.S. District Court, Southern

District of New York, Uppal v.

Indest, Health Law Firm, et. al.,

No. 17-cv-7072(CM) Order dated

Oct. 12, 2017 (dismissing

complaint filed by Petitioner

Uppal) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A-9

App. D U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern

District of New York (Adversary

Proceeding), Uppal v. Indest

Health Law Firm, No. 17-ap01027-cgm, Final Judgment for

Sanctions, Attorney's Fees and

Costs, dated Jul. 19, 2017 . . . . . . .

A-18

App. E Florida Cir. Court 18th Jud. Cir.,

The Health Law Firm v. Uppal,

No. 13-CA-3790-15-K, Notice of

Hearing on Appellee's Motion for

Appellate Attorney's Fees and

Sanctions dated Jun. 20, 2017 . . .

App. F U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern

District of New York (Adversary

Proceeding), Uppal v. Indest

xiv

A-22

Health Law Firm, No. 17-ap-

01027-cgm, Order Granting

Creditor The Health Law Firm's

and George Indest's Motion to

Dismiss and Dismissing

Adversary Proceeding, dated

Jun. 5, 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A-59

App. G U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern

District of New York, In Re:

Neelam, No. 16-bk-12356 JLG,

Trustee's Status Report, dated

Mar. 21, 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A-61

App. H Supreme Court of Florida, No.

SC16-2037, Uppal v. The Health

Law Firm, Order Striking

Petitioner's Motion for ReConsideration [sic] dated Mar. 17,

2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A-64

App. I

App. J

Supreme Court of Florida, No.

SC16-2037, Uppal v. The Health

Law Firm, Order Denying

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Mandamus, dated Mar. 1, 2017

(no authority to consider it) . . . . .

Florida Fifth District Court of

Appeal, Uppal v. The Health Law

Firm, Case No. 5D16-0180, Order

Denying Appellant's Motion for

Reconsideration to Vacate Order,

A-65

dated Oct. 25, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . .

A-67

App. K Florida Fifth District Court of

Appeal, Uppal v. The Health Law

Firm, No. 5D16-0180, Order

Granting Appellee's Motion to

Dismiss and Motion for Attorney's

Fees and Sanctions, dated Oct. 4,

2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A-69

App. L Florida Fifth District Court of

Appeal, Uppal v. The Health Law

Firm, No. 5D16-0180, The Health

Law Firm's Motion for Attorney's

Fees and Sanctions, dated Jun. 22,

2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A-71

App. M Florida Fifth District Court of

Appeal, Uppal v. The Health Law

Firm, No. 5D16-0180, The Health

Law Firm's Motion to Dismiss

Appeal or Alternatively, to Strike

Appellant's Brief, dated Jun. 21,

2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A-103

App. N Florida Cir. Ct. 18th Jud. Cir.,

The Health Law Firm v. Uppal,

No. 13-CA-3790-15-K, Notice of

Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for

Entry of Final Judgment after

Summary Judgment, dated Dec. 2,

2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xvi

A-125

App. O Florida Cir. Ct. 18th Jud. Cir.,

The Health Law Firm v. Uppal,

No. 13-CA-3790-15-K, Notice of

Hearing on Motion to Dismiss as a

Sham and Motion for Default

Judgment; Motion to Strike

Defendant's Answer & Objection

to Objection as a Sham Pleading;

and Motion for Summary

Judgment dated Sept. 24, 2014 . .

A-127

App. P Constitutional Provisions and

Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A-130

xvii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(Note: Where no official reporter is cited, none exists)

Cases:

Federal Cases:

Busby v. Elec. Utilities Emp. Union,

323 U.S. 72 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court

for the Dist. of Columbia,

541 U.S. 913 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Erie R.R. Co. v. Kirkendall,

266 U.S. 185 (1924) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

First Nat'l Bank v. Chicago Title

& Trust Co., 198 U.S. 280 (1905) . . . . . . . . 32

In re Martin-Trigona,

737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . 37

In re Taneja,

No. 16-bk-12356-cgm

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvii, 19

In re Taneja,

No. 17-cv-6608 (KBF)

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvii

xviii

In re Uppal,

No. 8:13-bk-05601-CPM

(Bankr. M.D.Fla.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

In re Uppal,

No. 8:15-bk-00594-CPM

(Bankr. M.D.Fla.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvii, 15

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,

446 U.S. 238 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,

309 U.S. 206 (1940), rev. den.,

309 U.S. 696 (1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,

304 U.S. 202 (1938) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Southern Power Co. v.

N.C. Pub. Serv. Co.,

263 U.S. 508 (1924) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Taneja v. George Indest The Health

Law Firm, No. 17-ap-01027

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) decisions of

June 5, 2017, and July 19, 2017)

(App. D & F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, xxvii, 26

Uppal v. Fla. Bd. of Med.,

No. 1:14-cv-09024 (S.D.N.Y.)

(transferred), No. 8:15-cv-00072

(M.D.Fla.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

xix

Uppal v. Indest The Health Law

Firm, et al, No. 17-cv-7072(CM)

(S.D.N.Y.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxviii, 4, 17

Uppal v. N.Y. Dep't of Health,

No. 1:16-cv-03038 (S.D.N.Y.

filed Apr. 16, 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

United States v. Johnston,

268 U.S. 220 (1925) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Florida Cases:

Bailey v. Bailey,

392 So. 2d 49

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co. v.

Shogreen, 990 So. 2d 1231

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Dodi Publ’g Co. v. Editorial

Am. S.A., 385 So. 2d 1369

(Fla. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 30

Fla. Dept. of Health, Bd. of Med. v.

Uppal, 2012 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear.

LEXIS 475, No. 12-00666PL

(Sep. 4, 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Fla. Dep't of Health, Bd. of Med.

v. Uppal, 2012 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear.

LEXIS 475, No. 12-0667PL . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Fla. Dep't of Health, Bd. of Med.

v. Uppal, 2014 Fla. Div. Admin.

Hear. LEXIS, Nos. 13-0595PL,

14-514, 14-515 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Gandy v. State,

846 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . 3, 30

Harrison v. Hyster Co.,

515 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . 3, 30

Huffman v. State,

813 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Jackson v. State,

926 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . 3, 30

Jenkins v. State,

385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . 3, 30

Martin v. State,

747 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2000)

("Martin I") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30, 37

Martin v. State,

No. SC02-511, 2002 Fla.

LEXIS 1653 (Fla. Jul. 15, 2002)

(unpublished) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Martin v. State,

833 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 2002)

("Martin II") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

xxi

Randolph v. Randolph,

618 So. 2d 770

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . 33-34

Stallworth v. Moore,

827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 30

Tasse v. Simpson,

842 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 37-38

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm,

No. 5D16-0180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm,

No. 5D16-2523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) . . . . xxviii

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm,

No. 5D17-2982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)

(dismissed Oct. 10, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . xxviii

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm,

No. 5D17-3401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

filed Oct. 31, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm,

No. SC16-2037 (Fla. S. Ct.

Mar. 1, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 30

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm,

No. SC17-1874 (Fla. S. Ct.

Oct. 23, 2017) (dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction on

xxii

Oct. 23, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxviii, 31

Wells v. State,

132 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . 3, 30

Constitutional Provisions:

U.S. Const.:

Art. VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Amend. V . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, iii, vi, 8, 34

Amend. VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi, 8

Amend. VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Amend. VIII . . . . . . . vi, vii, xviii, 8, 32

Amend. XI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Amend. XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi, vii, 8

xxiii

Fla. Const.:

Art. 1, § 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Art. 5, § 3(b) . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 3, 6, 8, 29

Art. 5, § 4(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 26

Statutes:

Federal Statutes:

18 U.S.C. § 241 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

18 U.S.C. § 242 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

28 U.S.C. § 455 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

28 U.S.C. § 1254 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) . . . . . . . . 22, 27, 29

Florida Statutes:

Fla. Stat. § 57.105 . . . . . . . ii, v, vi, 19,

20, 21, 38

F.S. 68.081031(1) [sic]

[Note: Nonexistent, believed

to be erroneous citation

by Petitioner] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 28

xxiv

Sect. 1.540(b) Florida Statutes

[sic] [Note: Nonexistent,

believed to be erroneous

citation by Petitioner . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Rules:

Sup. Ct. R. 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 9

Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 . . . . . . . 2, 9, 22, 27, 29

Sup. Ct. R. 14.3 . . . . . . . . 9, 21, 32, 33

Sup. Ct. R. 14.4 . . . . . . . . 9, 22, 31, 33

Sup. Ct. R. 15.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 9

Sup. Ct. R. 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Sup. Ct. R. 33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Fed. R. App. P. 38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 . . . . . . . . . ii, v, vi, 9,

19, 20, 38

Fla. R. App. P. 9.410 . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

xxv

Other Authority:

In re Amendments to Fla. Rules

of Appellate Procedure,

609 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Florida Code of Judicial

Conduct, Canon III, B7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 9

RI Supreme Court Article VI and

Canons 1, 2, and 3.B.6. [sic]

[Note: Believed to be erroneous

citation by Petitioner] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Florida Rule 1.5:240 [Note:

Nonexistent, believed to be

erroneous citation by Petitioner] . . . . . 10, 27

39 La. R. Jud..Admin 2.330(g),40 Id.,

41 Flamm, supra note 1, at 58. 42

FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL

CONDUCT, Canon 3E(1)(f). 43

FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL

CONDUCT, Canon 3E(1) comment

44 ID. 45 FLORIDA CODE OF

JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon

3F 46. . . . 47 See FLORIDA CODE

OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT [sic]

[Note: Nonsensical string citation

which appears to have been cut and

pasted out of another document

by Petitioner] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

xxvi

RELATED CASES

The following are cases directly related to this

one (official reporter citations are not available):

In re: Uppal,4 No. 8:15-bk-00594-CPM (Bankr.

M.D.Fla.) (Petitioner's Florida bankruptcy case which

apparently continued through approximately 2016).

In re: Taneja,5 No. 16-bk-12356-cgm (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y.) (Petitioner Uppal's latest bankruptcy filing

in which the Trustee noted she is not eligible for

bankruptcy and recommended dismissal; case still

ongoing). (App. G)

Taneja v. George Indest The Health Law Firm,

No. 17-ap-01027 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (decisions in App.

C & D) (an adversary proceeding Petitioner initiated

against the Respondent within the bankruptcy case

referenced immediately above, in which she attempts

to relitigate the same facts and issues of the present

state court judgment against her) (note: this is merely

one of five adversary complaints Petitioner filed

against her different creditors in the latest New York

Bankruptcy proceeding).

In re: Neelam Taneja, No. 17-cv-6608 (KBF)

The Petitioner uses a number of different names. In

her New York bankruptcy filings, she called herself Neelam

Taneja. In her state court filings, she called herself Neelam T.

Uppal.

Id.

xxvii

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2017) (dismissing for lack of

jurisdiction emergency motion for recusal of

bankruptcy judge).

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm, No. 5D16-2523

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (second frivolous appeal Petitioner

filed in present case).

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm, No. 5D17-2982

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (petition for prohibition filed by

Petitioner Sep. 22, 2017, in present case) (dismissed

Oct. 10, 2017).

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm, No. SC17-1874

(Fla. S. Ct.) (appeal filed by the Petitioner in the

present case Oct. 19, 2017) (dismissed by Florida

Supreme Court for lack of jurisdiction Oct. 23, 2017).

(App. A & B).

Uppal v. George Indest, The Health Law Firm,

et al., No. 17-cv-7072 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2017)

(decision by J. Colleeen McCollom, Chief Judge,

dismissing Uppal's federal court complaint filed Sept.

15, 2017, against numerous creditors, summarizing

Petitioner's history of frivolous, abusive litigation).

(App. C).

xxviii

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

The abbreviation "Pet." shall refer to the latest

version of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed.

The abbreviation "Opp." shall refer to this Brief

in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

The abbreviation "App." shall refer to an

appendix of this Brief in Opposition.

Where cases do not include a citation to an

official reporter, they are unpublished or have none.

Respondent uses the Blue Book citation format

for Florida cases and not the Florida appellate court

format.

xxix

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

Following are the Opinions and Orders from

which the Petitioner appeals:

Order entered October 4, 2016, in Neelam Uppal

v. The Health Law Firm, Florida Fifth District Court

of Appeal (No. 5D16-0180, Oct. 4, 2016), (dismissing

Petitioner's appeal of a state court civil money

judgment against her and granting Respondent's

Motion for Attorney's Fees pursuant to Section 57.015,

Florida Statutes). (App. K)

Order entered October 25, 2016, in Neelam

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm, Florida Fifth District

Court of Appeal (No. 5D16-0180, Oct. 25, 2016),

(denying Petitioner's "Motion for Re-Consideration

[sic] to Vacate Order [sic]") (App. J)

Order entered March 1, 2017, in Neelam Uppal

v. The Health Law Firm, Florida Supreme Court (No.

SC16-2037, Mar. 1, 2017) (denying Petitioner's

Petition for a Writ of Mandamus in same case, stating:

"Because petitioner has failed to show a clear legal

right to the relief requested, she is not entitled to

mandamus relief. . . . [Citation omitted] No rehearing

will be entertained by this Court"). (App. I)

Order of Mar. 13, 2017, in Neelam Uppal v. The

Health Law Firm, Florida Supreme Court (No. SC162037, Mar. 13, 2017) (striking Petitioner's Motion for

Re-Consideration [sic] as unauthorized). (App. H)

JURISDICTION

The U.S. Supreme Court does not have

jurisdiction in this matter.

The Petitioner's appeal was filed

untimely. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal

(DCA) was the court of last resort authorized to rule on

her appeal of a civil money judgment against her. It

entered its decision (the one currently being appealed

by the Petitioner) on October 4, 2016 (App. K)

Petitioner filed a motion for a rehearing that was

denied by the Fifth DCA on October 25, 2016. (App. J)

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13.1,

Petitioner had, at the very most, 90 days from October

25, 2016, to file her appeal with the Supreme Court.

She did not file by that deadline.

Petitioner will doubtlessly argue that the date

should be taken from the date the Florida Supreme

Court made its last denial of her attempt to appeal to

it. However, this is not the date that is applicable

under Supreme Court Rule 13.1. The Florida Supreme

Court did not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal

such as the one attempted by Petitioner, nor did it

have discretionary jurisdiction to consider it. The

Florida Constitution prohibits it.

The Florida Supreme Court advised the

Petitioner of this in its decision dated March 1, 2017

(App. I; see also, App. A & H). As pointed out by the

Florida Supreme Court, it lacks discretionary

jurisdiction to consider a case such as this one. Art. V,

§ 3(b), Fla. Const. (1968). See Wells v. State, 132 So.

3d 1110 (Fla. 2014); Jackson v. State, 926 So. 2d 1262

(Fla. 2006); Gandy v. State, 846 So. 2d 1141 (Fla.

2003); Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002);

Harrison v. Hyster Co., 515 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1987);

Dodi Publ’g Co. v. Editorial Am. S.A., 385 So. 2d 1369

(Fla. 1980); Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla.

1980). (App. A)

Petitioner, by employing her usual strategy of

appealing every decision a court makes against her

and making a motion for reconsideration of every

decision made against her,6 missed the deadline to file

with the U.S. Supreme Court by filing a frivolous

appeal in a court that had no jurisdiction, the Florida

Supreme Court.

Petitioner meets none of the requirements

set forth in Supreme Court Rule 10 for jurisdiction.

Petitioner has stated no compelling reasons the Court

should entertain her Petition. Petitioner has specified

no important federal questions which have been

decided below. Petitioner has specified no conflicts

Petitioner routinely files motions for reconsideration

of every decision made against her and files appeals of every

decision made against her, even when completely frivolous and in

bad faith, or when advised by a court that such will not be

considered. See for example, App. I in which the Florida Supreme

Court advised the Petitioner that it would not consider any

request for reconsideration she filed. As shown in App. H,

Petitioner filed one anyway, ignoring the Florida Supreme Court's

order.

with, between or among any state or federal laws or

decisions

Furthermore, this appeal/petition is merely an

attempt by the Petitioner, who is a prolific, abusive pro

se litigant,7 to further unjustly delay and obstruct her

creditors and to relitigate the facts which were

correctly decided against her in the state trial court

below. It is her attempt to further delay, harass and

cause expense to the Respondent in unnecessary and

costly litigation and to avoid paying one of many civil

money judgments obtained against her by her

creditors. The fact that she has incurred sanctions,

attorney's fees and costs along the way supports the

fact that her litigation tactics are in bad faith and not

based on any factual or legal merit.

This Court does not have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), because, this is not a "case

in the [U.S.] courts of appeal." Furthermore, there is

no controversy between the Courts of Appeal, nor has

any state statute been declared unconstitutional or

invalid.

The present case is merely an attempt by a

losing party in a state court case involving a civil

A summary of the Petitioner's bad faith, abusive

litigation in state and federal courts is set forth in U.S. District

Court Chief Judge Colleen McMahon's decision in Uppal v. George

Indest, The Health Law Firm, et al., Case No. 17-cv-7072 (CM)

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2017) (App. C), incorporated herein by

reference.

dispute resulting in a monetary judgment against her,

to relitigate the facts of the case.

The Supreme Court has far more important

issues facing it upon which it must spend its time.

SUMMARY OF CASE

This case is an attempt by the pro se Petitioner,

a medical doctor who is a subspecialist in infectious

diseases, to appeal the October 4, 2016, decision of the

Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal (App. K), to deny

her appeal of a state court monetary judgment

rendered against her under Florida law. Petitioner

claims the Florida Appeals Court deprived her of

various rights by dismissing her appeal.

The

Petitioner is a prolific abusive pro se litigant and serial

bad faith bankruptcy filer, who has received

assessments of sanctions, attorney's fees and costs

against her from numerous courts for filing frivolous,

bad faith actions. The Petitioner's untimely appeal is

taken from a decision of the Florida Supreme Court

dismissing her unauthorized appeal8 of the action of

Pursuant to Article 5, Section 3(b), Florida

Constitution, the court of last resort for all appeals of trial court

civil money judgments in Florida is the District Court of Appeal,

in this case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal. The Florida

Supreme Court does not even have discretionary jurisdiction in

such cases. (See App. A, H & I) Therefore, Petitioner's

unauthorized appeal of the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal's

decision dated October 4, 2017 (App. K), to the Florida Supreme

Court, followed by her unauthorized motion for reconsideration

filed with the Florida Supreme Court, was unauthorized by law

and a legal nullity. The Florida Supreme Court explains this to

her in its decision of March 1, 2017 (App. I) and again in its

decision of October 23, 2017 (App. A). Note also, although the

Florida Supreme Court advised Petitioner in its decision of March

1, 2017 (App. I), that no rehearing would be considered; ignoring

this, Petitioner nevertheless follows through by filing a motion for

reconsideration. (See App. H)

the Fifth District Court of Appeal, a case the Florida

Supreme Court had no legal authority to decide. At

the time Petitioner appealed to the U.S. Supreme

Court, the case was still pending in the Florida state

courts, having been remanded to the trial court by the

Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal (App. K). There

is no legitimate issue of federal law. Additionally,

Petitioner has filed multiple other appeals since then

in Florida state courts. (e.g., App. A & B)9

Petitioner has also filed additional appeals of the

present case in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES

Following are the Constitutional provisions,

statutes, and rules which the Petitioner contends are

applicable to this matter which are raised in the

Petition. Because of their length, the text of these is

included in Appendix P and not set forth herein.

U.S. Constitution:

U.S. Constitution, Amend. 5 (Pet. pp. i, ii)

Sixth Amendment, U.S. Constitution (Pet. p. ii)

Seventh Amendment, U.S. Constitution (Pet. pp. 2, 7)

Eighth Amendment, U.S. Constitution (Pet. pp. ii, iii)

Eleventh Amendment, U.S. Constitution (Pet. p. 2)

Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution (Pet. pp. i,

iii, 2, 7)

Art. VI, U.S. Constitution (Pet. p. 5) [Believed to be

erroneous citation by Petitioner and not included]

Florida Constitution:

Art. 1, Sect. 21, Florida Constitution (Pet. p. i)

Art. 5, Sect. 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (Pet. p. 6)

Art. 5, Sect. 4(b)(1), Florida Constitution (Pet. p. 6)

Federal Rules:

Supreme Court Rule 10

Supreme Court Rule 13.1

Supreme Court Rule 14.3 & 14.4

Supreme Court Rule 15.2

Supreme Court Rule 29

Supreme Court Rule 33

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11

Miscellaneous:

Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon III, B7 (Pet.

p.i)

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) (Pet. p.7)

RI Supreme Court Article VI and Canons 1, 2, and

3.B.6. [sic] (Pet. p.5) [Believed to be erroneous citation

by Petitioner and not included herein]

Florida Rule 1.5:240 (Pet. p.7)

[Nonexistent, believed to be erroneous citation by

Petitioner]

39 La. R. Jud..Admin 2.330(g),40 Id., 41 Flamm, supra

note 1, at 58. 42 FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL

CONDUCT, Canon 3E(1)(f). 43 FLORIDA CODE OF

JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3E(1) comment. 44 ID.

45 FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

Canon 3F 46. . . . 47 See FLORIDA CODE OF

JUDICIAL CONDUCT [sic] (Pet. p.6)

[gibberish citation which appears to have been cut and

pasted out of another document by Petitioner]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Parties

Petitioner Neelam Taneja Uppal, M.D., is a

medical doctor licensed by the states of Florida and

New York. She practices in the medical subspecialty

of infectious diseases. She is also a prolific, abusive

pro se litigator and serial bankruptcy filer. She uses

variations of her names in her different court filings.

She claims to be a Florida resident sometimes and a

New York resident at other times.

Respondent is The Health Law Firm, P.A., a

Florida professional service corporation and law firm,

formerly known as George F. Indest III, P.A.--The

Health Law Firm. It is registered by the state of

Florida to do business under the fictitious business

name The Health Law Firm. The Health Law Firm's

principal place of business is Altamonte Springs,

Seminole County, Florida. All work is performed at or

out of the office in Seminole County, Florida.

B. Petitioner Retains Law Firm

Petitioner initially contacted Respondent at its

office in Seminole County, Florida, to retain it to take

over a case from another law firm located in Orlando,

Orange County, Florida. Petitioner Uppal retained the

services of The Health Law Firm in June 5, 2012, to

represent her in a matter involving a complaint filed

against her Florida medical license by the Florida

Department of Health. The Respondent law firm took

over representation after the final administrative

hearing (trial) in the case had been completed by a

different law firm.

Petitioner Uppal had originally been

represented in the complaint against her medical

license and the formal administrative hearing (trial)

by Michael R. D'Lugo, Esquire, of Wicker, Smith,

O'Hara, Mc Coy & Ford, P.A., in Orlando, Florida. Mr.

D'Lugo represented her through a Final

Administrative Hearing (trial) that was held before an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Florida

Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). Fla.

Dept. of Health, Bd. of Med. v. Neelam T. Uppal, 2012

Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 475, (No. 12-00666PL Rec.

Order Sep. 4, 2012).

The formal administrative hearing resulted in

a recommended order by the ALJ against Petitioner

Uppal. Petitioner Uppal wanted to appeal the

recommended order. Mr. D'Lugo desired to withdraw

from representing Petitioner Uppal. Petitioner Uppal

contacted attorney George F. Indest III, of the

Respondent law firm, to represent her in the case posthearing, to file exceptions (objections) to the ALJ's

Recommended Order and to argue these before the

Florida Board of Medicine, all of which the Petitioner

law firm did. Petitioner initially paid a part of the

minimum fee payment the Respondent required, and

paid the remainder of the minimum fee later.

However, during the course of the representation Respondent discovered that Petitioner Uppal had

an additional complaint from the Florida Department

of Health opened against her and being investigated.

Petitioner requested that Respondent represent her in

that additional matter, as well. Respondent undertook

the representation and began representing Petitioner

in this new case.

Then, in approximately December 2012, a third

complaint was served on Petitioner, a complaint

against her Florida medical license by the Florida

Department of Health. Petitioner sent the third

complaint to Respondent and asked Respondent to

"handle" the complaint for her as she was leaving the

country for a month on vacation. Respondent advised

Petitioner that this would require the payment of

additional fees. Petitioner advised the Respondent

that she expected the Respondent law firm to handle

all three cases for the fee she had previously paid on

the first case. At one point she asked for "pro bono"

representation. Respondent law firm declined to

represent her in all three (3) cases for no additional fee

and advised her of that. Petitioner then sent an e-mail

to the Respondent stating that it must believe "she

was a fool" if we expected her to pay anything more,

and refused to pay any additional fees.

The

Respondent law firm then terminated Petitioner as a

client on December 28, 2012. Petitioner did not

terminate the representation.

The Petitioner

subsequently refused to pay any of the additional legal

fees and costs she had already incurred with

Respondent law firm.

Since that time, Petitioner Uppal has had a

number of other disciplinary actions taken against her

Florida medical license.10 She unsuccessfully sued the

Florida Board of Medicine.11 Respondent only recently

learned that Petitioner's license to practice medicine in

the State of New York was revoked effective February

7, 2017, for various charges, among which were:

"making and/or filing a false report by making false

statements on her New York State medical

registration renewal application."12 Not surprisingly,

Petitioner has sued the New York State Department of

Health, the licensing authority, as well as the

prosecuting attorney in the case, individually.13

against

For a public record summary of the actions taken

Petitioner's Florida medical license, see:

https://appsmqa.doh.state.fl.us/MQASearchServices/Healthcare

Providers/LicenseVerification?LicInd=50723&Procde=1501&org

=%20. See also, Fla. Dep't of Health, Bd. of Med. v. Neelam T.

Uppal, 2012 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 475, No. 12-0667PL (Fla.

Div. Admin. Hear.); and Fla. Dep't of Health, Bd. of Med. v.

Neelam T. Uppal, 2014 Fla. Div. Admin. Hear. LEXIS, Nos. 130595PL, 14-514, 14-515 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hear.).

Uppal v. Fla. Bd. of Med., No. 1:14-cv-09024

(S.D.N.Y.) (transferred), No. 8:15-cv-00072 (M.D.Fla.) (Ord.

Dismissing Case Jan. 6, 2016).

See https://apps.health.ny.gov/pubdoh/professionals/

doctors/conduct/factions/PhysicianDetailsAction.action?final

ActionId=9987.

Uppal v. N.Y. Dep't of Health, No. 1:16-cv-03038

(S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 16, 2016).

C. Trial Court Suit

Respondent law firm was required to file suit for

the fees and costs in The Health Law Firm v. Uppal,

Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court Case No. 13-CA3790-15-K, filed on October 24, 2013. The original

amount of fees and costs that Petitioner Uppal owed

(the "principal amount") was $27,705.77, through

December 8, 2014. However, because of Petitioner

Uppal's prolific and aggressive litigation, and her

obstructive and dilatory tactics, the attorney's fees and

costs of the litigation to collect the underlying amount

was an additional $23,356.70 through December 8,

2014. In all cases, Petitioner Uppal was provided

ample advance notice of the hearing and the

opportunity to attend. (App. E, N & O) Sometimes

she was provided as much as three (3) months advance

notice. (See, e.g., App. E) In a number of instances,

she just failed to attend.

Litigation proceeded for years with Petitioner

Uppal filing frivolous, dilatory motions and objections.

She also filed for bankruptcy several times in the U.S.

Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Each time her bankruptcy case was dismissed with no

discharge of her debts. In one of her last Florida

bankruptcy proceedings, an attorney for one of her

creditors filed a motion detailing all of the assets that

Petitioner Uppal had fraudulently concealed from the

Bankruptcy Court.14 This bankruptcy was dismissed

Motion to Dismiss Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Case filed

by Charlene Rodriguez, in In re: Uppal, No. 8:15-bk-00594-CPM

without discharging her debts. Judgment was entered

by the Florida Circuit Court in the case below after her

last Florida bankruptcy case was dismissed and her

request for reconsideration was denied by the

bankruptcy court. There was no stay in effect at the

time.

D. Petitioner's Abusive, Vexatious Pro Se

Litigation History

Petitioner Uppal is an abusive, prolific, pro se

litigator, filing meritless motions, defenses, complaints

and appeals. Petitioner routinely files spurious,

incoherent pleadings, including the present one, and

lies with impunity, as she does in the present one,

knowing that the courts will not discipline her. Her

purpose is always to delay and confuse while

attempting to hide her assets from her creditors and

avoid paying any debt she owes. This Petition is

merely another example of this.

The docket for the Clerk of Court for Pinellas

County, Florida, contains over fourteen (14) civil cases

involving Petitioner Uppal as a Plaintiff as of

November 2, 2017. The docket for the Clerk of Court

for the Florida Second District Court of Appeal, shows

eighteen (18) appeals filed by Petitioner Uppal in that

court since 2011 as of November 2, 2017. The docket

for the Clerk of Court for the Florida Fifth District

(Bankr. M.D.Fla., Jun. 26, 2015) (Doc. 171). A prior bankruptcy

case she filed in Florida was In re: Uppal, No. 8:13-bk-05601-CPM

(Bankr. M.D. Fla.).

Court of Appeal shows four (4) appeals filed by

Petitioner Uppal in this case alone, the last filed on

October 31, 2017, a few days ago (Uppal v. The Health

Law Firm, No. 5d17-3401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. filed Oct.

31, 2017).

A Pacer listing shows twenty-six (26) different

federal court cases involving Petitioner Uppal in

Florida, New York and New Jersey filed under the last

name "Uppal" and three (3)15 under the last name

"Taneja." In addition to those, Pacer shows seventeen

(17) additional bankruptcy proceedings under the last

name "Uppal" (nine (9) of which were different

adversary proceedings initiated by Petitioner; none

successful) and two (2) under the last name "Taneja."

There are believed to be filings by her in other state

courts both in Florida and in other states.

A summary of her abusive, vexatious litigation

was recently discussed by the Chief Judge of the U.S.

District Court, Southern District of New York, in

Uppal v. George Indest, The Health Law Firm, et. al.,

No. 17-cv-7072(CM) (S.D.N.Y. Order Dismissing Case

Oct. 12, 2017). (App. C)

The Petitioner routinely files false or sham

pleadings with the various courts in which she

litigates. Most often these are pleadings, notices or

objections that falsely state that a bankruptcy court

There may be an overlap with those filed under the

last name "Uppal" as courts and litigants seemed to have caught

on to her use of different names.

has issued a stay or that a higher court has issued a

writ prohibiting the litigation from proceeding. For

example, in attempting to avoid a hearing on appellate

attorney's fees and costs for filing a frivolous appeal, in

September 2017, Petitioner sent a "Notice" to the

Florida trial court that a New York federal court had

issued a stay. Fortunately, the Florida trial court

judge saw through this apparent fraud. In a different

court proceeding Petitioner claimed that the Florida

Supreme Court had issued a writ prohibiting the

proceedings. This was false. Petitioner had filed a

petition for a writ with the Florida Supreme Court but

the Court never granted it.

The Petition in the present case, as well as the

pleadings, motions and objections she filed in the lower

courts, are filled with baseless accusations of fraud

and conspiracy, providing no specifics as to time, date,

place, parties, or documents. The Petitioner files

confusing, incoherent pleadings, argues irrelevant

legal authorities, cuts and pastes passages from other

documents, and lies with impunity, as she has done in

her present Petition. She attacks attorneys and judges

alike with her scandalous accusations. Her filings

routinely fail to recognize the facts and issues in a case

and, instead, resort to continuous repetition of

irrelevant, scandalous, and impertinent legal

conclusions. The Court can easily glean this from the

Petition she has filed. The Court will find similar

examples in the lower courts' records.

Additionally, Petitioner routinely misses noticed

hearings, claiming illnesses, automobile accidents,

injuries, canceled airline flights and the like, never

providing proof. In her most recent bankruptcy

proceeding, a request for an adjournment was filed

with the Bankruptcy Court to delay previously

scheduled hearings because Petitioner was in the

hospital "for several weeks" "in a coma."16 Yet, during

that same period of time, in mid-to-late April 2017, the

Petitioner was able to prepare and file one of her

preliminary pro se petitions for writ of certiorari with

the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Petitioner's conduct as set forth above may

be responsible for the Florida Fifth District Court of

Appeal's imposition of appellate attorney's fees and

costs against her as sanctions pursuant to Section

57.105, Florida Statutes (modeled after Rule 11,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). (App. K & E)

Petitioner's conduct also caused the Chief Bankruptcy

Judge of the Southern District of New York, Cecelia G.

Morris, to impose sanctions, attorney's fees and costs

on her pursuant to Rule 9011, Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure on July 19, 2017. (App. D)

Petitioner has not perfected a record on appeal

in this case that supports any of her scandalous

contentions. Petitioner Uppal has filed her appeal in

bad faith and for no purpose other than delay.

E. Procedural History of This Case in Florida

Appellate Court

In re: Taneja, No. 1:16-bk-12356 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.)

(Doc. Nos. 152 & 153, both dated April 25, 2017).

On January 15, 2016, Petitioner filed a Notice of

Appeal of the trial court's Final Judgment entered

against her on December 22, 2015, appealing it to the

Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.17 On June 21,

2016, Respondent The Health Law Firm, filed a motion

to strike and dismiss the Debtor's appeal with the

Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal. (App. M) On

June 22, 2016, Respondent, The Health Law Firm,

filed a motion for attorney's fees and sanctions,

pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes,18 against

the Petitioner in the Florida Fifth District Court of

Appeal, the same having previously been served on the

Petitioner approximately two (2) months earlier. (App.

On August 15, 2016, the Petitioner filed her

latest bankruptcy suit in the Bankruptcy Court for the

Southern District of New York, thus initiating an

automatic stay, while her own Florida appeal was

proceeding. The Bankruptcy Court later ruled that

she was not entitled to any further stay after the

initial 30 day stay had expired, because she was a bad

faith serial bankruptcy filer and was not entitled to a

bankruptcy.

Since this date, the Petitioner has filed three

additional appeals to the Fifth District Court of Appeal on this

same case, the most recent being on October 27, 2017 (App. A). By

the time the Court sees this Opposition, she may have filed more.

Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, is modeled after and

comparable to Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner Uppal did not provide any notice to

the Florida Appellate Court nor file a Suggestion of

Bankruptcy with the Florida Appellate Court when

she filed her New York Bankruptcy. Additionally she

used a different name on her New York Bankruptcy

(Taneja) than she was using in her Florida Appeal

(Uppal).

It was only after the bankruptcy stay was no

longer in place, on October 4, 2016, the Florida Fifth

District Court of Appeal issued its decision denying

Petitioner's appeal and granting Respondent's motion

for attorney's fees and sanctions pursuant to Section

57.105, Florida Statutes, and remanded the case to the

trial court solely to assess the amount of fees to be

awarded. (App. K) Again, this was the decision on the

appeal that the Petitioner had initiated. This was the

final decision of the court of last resort for the

Petitioner. This is the decision, if any, that Petitioner

should have appealed.

On November 7, 2016, Debtor Uppal filed a

"Petition for Writ of Certiorari" with the Florida

Supreme Court (which the court treated as a petition

for a writ of mandamus) failing to allege any grounds

that would give the Florida Supreme Court the

authority issue any writ or to review the case. On

March 1, 2017, the Florida Supreme Court issued a

decision denying Debtor Neelam Taneja Uppal's

request for a petition for writ of mandamus. (App. I)

Respondent's original suit against Petitioner

Neelam Taneja Uppal was to attempt to collect a

relatively small debt for unpaid attorney's fees and

costs from the Petitioner for its representation of her

in action by the Florida Board of Medicine to revoke

her Florida medical license. It has only been because

of the Debtor's contumacious and meritless litigation

throughout every forum she could access (and now this

Court), that has greatly increased the total amount of

her attorney's fees and costs.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The U.S. Supreme Court does not have

jurisdiction to consider an untimely appeal filed by a

defendant from an adverse state appellate court

decision awarding appellate attorney's fees and costs

for filing a frivolous, bad faith appeal (App. K) in the

case of civil money judgment rendered by a state trial

court, which appeal is contrary to Supreme Court Rule

13.1 and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c).

The U.S. Supreme Court should not grant

a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari which fails to set

forth any legitimate federal question claim under any

federal constitutional or statutory provision, and fails

to state the grounds for the Petition with accuracy,

precision and clarity, in violation of Supreme Court

Rules 14.3 and 14.4.

The U.S. Supreme Court should not grant

the Petition of a prolific, abusive pro se litigator, and

serial bad faith bankruptcy filer, on a state civil court

money judgment against her, and thus open the flood

gates to appeals of other abusive pro se litigants of

state court civil judgments, thus interfering in strictly

state law matters.

ARGUMENT

Misstatements made by Petitioner In Her

Arguments

Petitioner makes a number of misstatements in

her Argument and Argument Summary. These

include:

Misstatements in Petitioner's Argument

The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal's

decision was not an "act of retaliation." (Pet. p.4) The

Fifth District Court of Appeal decided Petitioner's case

based on the documents filed and the record the

Petitioner produced on appeal. These documents

included the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss or Strike

Appeal (App. M) and the Respondent's Motion for

Appellate Sanctions, Attorney's Fees and Costs (App.

L). The Petitioner filed oppositions to these as well as

many other motions and documents in the appellate

court. The Petitioner's Filings with the Florida Fifth

District Court of Appeal suffered from many of the

same shortcomings from which the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari suffers in the present case.

There was no "conspiring" (Pet. p.4) by anyone

and it is difficult to guess what is meant by the

Petitioner in making this inflammatory statement.

There were no "ex parte filings" in the lower

court case and it is also difficult to guess what the

Petitioner means by this inflammatory statement.

Petitioner, complains about the failure of the

appellate court to hold an "evidentiary hearing" (Pet.

p.4), because the Petitioner attempts to have

bankruptcy courts and appellate courts retry the same

facts over and over again when she loses a case. Of

course, appellate courts do not hold evidentiary

hearings as part of an appeal.

The Petitioner proceeds to cite and argue many

irrelevant and inapplicable legal authorities as shown

by the criminal statutes she cites as well as the Rhode

Island authority she cites.

28 U.S.C. § 455 (Pet. p.5) does not apply on its

face, since the Florida state courts are not "courts of

the United States" for the purposes of this statute.

The cases she cited on page 5 of her Petition

simply do not apply to the facts of the present case.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court and its

Canons (Pet. p.5), certainly have no applicability in

this case involving Florida courts and Florida law.

It is unclear about whom Petitioner is speaking

when she refers to "the above mentioned judge" (Pet.

p.5) but her scandalous remarks constitute a personal

attack on the judges in the case.19

Petitioner's false statements that "This attorney

(obviously referring to undersigned counsel for

Respondent) filed about 200 complaints with the same

Judge in the past 2 years to obtain fraudulent fees"

(Pet. p.5) is a blatantly false statement of fact.

Petitioner's statement: "The court records show

ex-parte [sic] communications between the attorney

and the Judge and therefore suggest conspiracy" (Pet.

p.6) is a blatantly false statement.

No such

communications have occurred and the records do not

show any.

Petitioner's cut and paste job (Pet. p.6) of a long

obvious legal citation taken from a different document,

with no attempt to understand it, correctly punctuate

it or argue its relevance to the present matters, is also

a deception.

Misstatements in Petitioner's Argument

Summary

Contrary to Petitioner's argument (Pet.

p.6), the court in Seminole County found that it did

have jurisdiction as the Petitioner (who now,

Petitioner routinely makes personal attacks and

derogatory statements about every judge, every attorney and even

the clerks of court in the various pro se cases she files. This

Petition is certainly no exception.

apparently, claims New York residency)20 came to

Seminole County and hired the Respondent Seminole

County law firm, to perform work for her in Seminole

County, making her payments for it in Seminole

County, after her Orange County lawyer withdrew

from her case. The matter involved defense of the

Petitioner's Florida medical license against the Florida

Board of Medicine and the Florida Department of

Health, which are located in Leon County, Florida.

Even the New York Bankruptcy Court rejected the

same argument Petitioner makes herein (App. D & F),

when Petitioner made it in the Bankruptcy Court for

the Southern District of New York.

Contrary to what Petitioner states,

Florida Constitution, Article 5, Section 4(b)(1), does

not authorize the U.S. Supreme Court to grant any

writs. (Pet. p.6) Nor does any of the decisions

rendered below even address Amendments Seven and

Fourteen of the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner is simply

making this up.

Chief Judge Cecilia G. Morris of the

Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New

York advised Petitioner Uppal in person in open court

during a hearing held on June 1, 2017 (Taneja v.

George Indest, Health Law Firm, No. 17-ap-01027,

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) that there had been no stay in place

or ordered by the Bankruptcy Court that would have

prevented any Florida Court from taking any of the

Petitioner sometimes claims she is a resident of

Florida and sometimes claims she is a resident of New York.

actions they took in this case. (See App. D and F).

Petitioner simply ignored Judge Morris's remarks and

even tried to argue with her about this fact during that

hearing.

There were no "fraudulent bills" and

there was no "fraud in the court" (Pet. p.7). There is

no Section 68.081031, Florida Statutes, and this has

never been previously raised by the Petitioner. There

is no Section 1.540, Florida Statutes.

The statement made by the Petitioner

about suing "200 doctors in the last 2 years" is false.

There is no "Florida rule 1.5:240 [sic]".

II.

The Supreme Court does not have

jurisdiction to consider an untimely Petition for Writ

of Certiorari appeal filed by a defendant from an

adverse state appellate court decision dismissing

Petitioner's appeal and awarding sanctions, and

appellate attorney's fees and costs for filing a

frivolous, bad faith appeal (App. K) in the case of civil

monetary judgment rendered by a state trial court,

which Petition is contrary to Supreme Court Rule 13.1

and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c).

Petitioner is Actually Appealing the

Decision of the Florida Fifth District

Court of Appeal, the court of last resort,

entered on October 4, 2016.

It is clear from her Petition that the decision for

which the Petitioner seeks this Court's review is the

decision of the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal,

the court of last resort, entered October 4, 2016. (App.

K). Petitioner argues in several places that her

payment of the appeal court's filing fees grants her the

right to an appeal hearing, so that she could retry the

facts of the case. This simply is not the law. No case

would ever be final if American jurisprudence allowed

this. Yet that is exactly what Petitioner desires, to try

her facts over and over again until she obtains a

decision in her favor.

Petitioner also argues that the Florida Fifth

District Court of Appeal was wrong in deciding her

appeal while her bankruptcy was pending (Pet. para.

3, p.7), despite the fact that there was no stay in effect.

She argues that this Court should "exercise its

discretion to review the appellate decision" (Pet. para.

4, p.3) and argues "the [Florida] district court [of

appeal] cannot ignore F.S. 68.081031 [sic]" (Pet. para.

4, p.3). However, there is no such section.

Like the petitioner in Martin v. State, No. SC02511, 2002 Fla. LEXIS 1653 (Fla. Jul. 15, 2002),

(unpublished decision discussed in Martin v. State,

833 So. 2d 756, 2002 Fla. LEXIS 2579 (Fla. 2002)

("Martin II")), Petitioner Uppal failed to invoke the

discretionary jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme

Court, and her appeal to it was unauthorized.

Petitioner had only 90 days from October 4,

2016 (App. K), or, at most from October 13, 2016 (App.

J), or until January 12, 2017, at the latest, to file a

timely Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the U.S.

Supreme Court. She filed on May 10, 2017, missing

the deadline by months. Her Petition should be

dismissed for being filed untimely pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 13.1 and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c).

The Florida Supreme Court had no

jurisdiction, not even discretionary

jurisdiction, to consider an appeal from

the Florida District Court of Appeal

decision on a civil money judgment;

therefore, Petitioner's attempts to appeal

the case to the Florida Supreme Court

were unauthorized, ineffective legal

nullities, which cannot be appealed to

the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Florida Supreme Court did not have legal

authority, pursuant to Article 5, Section 3(b)(1),

Florida Constitution, to consider the Petitioner's

appeals or writs she attempted to file with it. The

Florida Supreme Court advised the Petitioner of this

in two different decisions she received. (See App. I, H

& A).

As explained by the Florida Supreme Court in

its decisions on this case:

[The Florida Supreme Court] lacks

jurisdiction to review an unelaborated

decision from a district court of appeal

that is issued without opinion or

explanation or that merely cites to an

authority that is not a case pending

review in, or reversed or quashed by, this

Court. See Wells v. State, 132 So. 3d

1110 (Fla. 2014); Jackson v. State, 926

So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006); Gandy v. State,

846 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2003); Stallworth

v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002);

Harrison v. Hyster Co., 515 So. 2d 1279

(Fla. 1987); Dodi Publ’g Co. v. Editorial

Am. S.A.,385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980);

Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla.

1980).

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm, Case No. SC17-1874

(Fla. Oct. 23, 2017) (App. A). Earlier, the Florida

Supreme Court had explained to the Petitioner:

Because petitioner has failed to show a

clear legal right to the relief requested,

she is not entitled to mandamus relief.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of

mandamus is hereby denied.

See

Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla.

2000).

Uppal v. The Health Law Firm, Case No. SC16-2037

(Fla. Mar. 1, 2017) (App. I).

Since the Florida Constitution was amended in

1980, the district court was the court of last resort for

Petitioner's appeal of a Florida trial court civil money

judgment. As explained by the Florida Supreme Court

in Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386, 390, 2000 Fla.

LEXIS 68 (Fla. 2000) ("Martin I"):

Since the 1980 constitutional revisions,

however, the district courts now

constitute the courts of last resort for the

vast majority of litigants. See In re

Amendments to Fla. Rules of Appellate

Procedure, 609 So. 2d 516, 526 (Fla.

1992). This Court has already ruled that

the merits of Martin's case will not be

heard again. A person should not be

permitted to litigate the same claims

over and over again merely because he

continues to believe he has always been

right. Martin has had many, many

opportunities to litigate his grievances.

At some point, it must stop.

Since the Florida Supreme Court had no

authority to entertain Petitioner's appeals, the state

court of last resort for her was the Florida Fifth

District Court of Appeal, and its decision was made on

October 4, 2016. (App. K)

III. The U.S. Supreme Court should not

grant a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari which fails to

set forth any legitimate federal question claim under

any federal constitutional or statutory provision, and

fails to state the grounds for the Petition with

accuracy, precision and clarity, in violation of

Supreme Court Rules 14.3 and 14.4.

The Petition filed with the U.S. Supreme Court

in the present case suffers from many of the same

deficiencies from which her appeal filed in the Florida

Fifth District Court of Appeal suffered. (See App. L &

M). It is a confusing, unorganized document misciting

legal authorities, citing improper legal authorities,

failing to identify the judges and courts it criticizes,

commingling and confusing arguments and issues,

citing to irrelevant legal authorities, making

scandalous accusations, and raising arguments having

no applicability to the actual facts of the case.

Many of the federal authorities it cites only

apply to federal court cases. Others such as the

sections of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, only

apply in criminal cases.

Furthermore, Petitioner failed to raise these

below and certainly no lower court has interpreted or

construed these federal statutes or constitutional

provisions within the context of the present case.

The Court has made the requirement for clarity

and definiteness clear in a long history of prior cases.

See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,

198 U.S. 280, 49 L. Ed.1051, 25 S. Ct. 693 (1905) (it is

required that a petition must exhibit clear, definite,

and composite disclosure of the question or questions

in controversy to be sufficient); Southern Power Co. v.

N.C. Pub. Serv. Co., 263 U.S. 508, 68 L.Ed 413, 44 S.

Ct. 164 (1924). A writ of certiorari is properly

dismissed where the initiating petition failed to give

adequate information concerning the record and

essential facts. Erie R. Co. v. Kirkendall, 266 U.S.185,

69 L. Ed.236, 45 S. Ct. 33 (1924) .

The Petition in the present case is so confusing

and misleading, failing to frame a proper question for

the Court's consideration, that the Court should

dismiss it in accordance with the cases cited above and

Supreme Court Rules 14.3 and 14.4.

Petitioner cites a number of cases in passing,

cases she obviously does not understand and which

actually hold against her position.21

Bailey v. Bailey, 392 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1981), a case cited in passing by Petitioner (Pet.

p.4), was later distinguished by the Florida Fifth

District Court of Appeal in Randolph v. Randolph, 618

So. 2d 770, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5346 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1993). The Florida Court of Appeal stated:

The trial court has incorrectly concluded

it is without jurisdiction to enforce its

orders and judgments in the present

case. [Citation deleted] Jurisdiction to

enforce the fees award is clear. . . . The

fee award, like any other money

judgment, is enforceable by the lower

court absent a stay, even though the fee

award is appealed.

The Petitioner mentions three cases in her Questions

Presented, under the second question 4 on page ii of her Petition.

However, these cases are not mentioned again or argued in the

text of her Petition. Therefore, Respondent is not addressing

these cases as Petitioner has abandoned argument on them.

Randolph, 618 So. 2d 771.

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.

Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980), cited by Petitioner

(Pet. p.5) actually holds against the Petitioner's

position. In Jerrico, Inc., the Court ruled that the

regional administrator who imposed a fine on the

corporation could not be held to the strict

requirements of judicial neutrality, and reversed the

trial court's judgment in favor of the corporation

challenging it. Additionally, Jerrico, Inc., involved a

challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute,

which Petitioner does not.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49

L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976), another case cited by Petitioner

(Pet. 5), has no application. It involved a petition for

write of habeas corpus by convicted state prisoners

involving alleged Fourth and Fifth Amendment

violations. This Court ruled that where the state had

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of

the case, habeas corpus may not be granted. If

anything, it holds against the Petitioner in the present

case.

Petitioner probably cited Cheney v. United

States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 124 S. Ct. 1391, 158

L. Ed. 2d 225 (2004), by accident as it is included in a

long meaningless string citation on page 6 of the

Petition. It is, however, completely contrary to the

petitioner's position. In Cheney, this Court ruled that

in run-of-the-mill litigation, a friendship with the Vice

President (and duck hunting together) could not be

used as a grounds to recuse a Supreme Court Justice.

This Court upheld the denial of the Sierra Club's

motion to recuse.

Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Shogreen, 990 So. 2d

1231, 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 14634 (Fla. Ct. App.

2008), is another case contained in Petitioner's

unexplained string citation on page 6 of her Petition.

It, also, is not applicable to the present case because it

involved the standard to be used by a Florida appellate

court judge on a motion for recusal as contrasted with

the different standard to be applied to trial court

judges. In addition, the court deciding the case is in a

different appellate district than the present case, and

the case has not been cited or adopted by any other

court.

IV.

The U.S. Supreme Court should not

grant the Petition of a prolific, abusive pro se litigator,

and serial bad faith bankruptcy filer, on a state civil

court money judgment against her, and thus open the

flood gates to appeals of other abusive pro se litigants

of state court civil judgments, thus interfering in

strictly state law matters.

The Petitioner is an abusive, prolific pro se

litigator who abuses the legal system to unfairly

obstruct and delay her creditors. This has been voiced

by a number of courts, including in the decisions set

forth in Appendices A, D & J.

The Supreme Court should not grant a writ of

certiorari to merely to relitigate the evidence or to

discuss the specific facts of a case. United States v.

Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 45 S. Ct. 496, 69 L. Ed. 925

(1925); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206,

60 S. Ct. 493, 84 L. Ed.704 (1940), reh. den. 309 U.S.

696, 60 S. Ct.611, 84 L. Ed.1036 (1940) (the Supreme

Court will not ordinarily grant certiorari to review

judgments based solely on questions of fact).

As to questions controlled by state law, as is the

present one, the Supreme Court should not become

involved. The Supreme Court will not undertake a

decision on questions of local law. Busby v. Electric

Utilities Emp. Union, 323 U.S. 72, 89 L. Ed. 78, 65 S.

Ct. 142 (1944). Accord, Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,

304 U.S. 202, 82 L. Ed.1290, 58 S. Ct.860 (1938) (as to

questions controlled by state law, conflict among

Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals is not of itself reason

for granting writ of certiorari by Supreme Court of

United States), as conflict may be merely corollary to

permissible difference of opinion in state courts).

The Court should ask itself if this is the type of

case upon which it desires to expend its valuable time

by taking and considering. It should also ask whether

by doing so will it be opening the floodgates to future

cases filed by the present Petitioner (most assuredly it

will) as well as other abusive pro se litigators

attempting to delay, harass and disrupt the judicial

system.

In a filing below, this Respondent pointed out

similarities between Petitioner Neelam Taneja Uppal

and another notorious abusive pro se litigant, Anthony

Martin, noted in Florida appellate cases. The Florida

Supreme Court stated it best saying: "This Court as

the authority, perhaps even the duty, to stop litigants

like Martin from abusing it and the people, as the

Second Circuit put it, 'who have unluckily crossed his

path.'" Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386, 391, 2000

LEXIS 68 (Fla. 2000) ("Martin II") (quoting In re

Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1254 (2d Cir. 1984).

This rationale is equally applicable to Petitioner

Uppal. See also, Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386, 2000

Fla. LEXIS 68 (Fla. 2000) ("Martin I").

In the present case the Petitioner's abusive,

scandalous pleadings show her to be cast in the same

mold as two of Florida's most notorious pro se

litigants, Anthony R. Martin (discussed above) and

Austin Tasse. In Tasse v. Simpson, 842 So. 2d 793,

2003 Fla. LEXIS 390 (Fla. 2003), the Florida Supreme

Court stated:

This Court cannot allow its judicial

processes to be misused by Tasse to

malign and insult those persons and

institutions which have been unfortunate

enough to come in contact with Tasse.

Tasse has litigated the matters he raised

in his petition repeatedly, and this is not

the first time Tasse has filed scandalous

pleadings in this Court. This Court has

the authority and the duty to prevent the

misuse and abuse of the judicial system.

It is clear that Tasse is unable to

maintain the bare minimum standard of

decorum and respect for the judicial

system that all litigants must have when

filing court pleadings and seeking court

rulings. Since Tasse cannot meet that

standard and cannot conduct himself

with that basic level of decency, we are

forced to forbid Tasse from filing any

further pro se pleadings in this Court.

Tasse v. Simpson, 842 So. 2d 795-96. The Florida

Supreme Court entered an order that prohibited Tasse

from filing any further pleadings that were not signed

by an attorney.

ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND SANCTIONS

In the case which Petitioner currently appeals

to the U.S. Supreme Court, this Respondent filed a

motion for appellate sanctions, attorney's fees and

costs, against the petitioner for filing a frivolous, bad

faith appeal. The motion was filed pursuant to Section

57.105, Florida Statutes (which is modeled after Rule

11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), and Rule 9.410,

Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. (App. L). The

Fifth District Court of Appeal granted this motion.

(App. K)

Since Petitioner is continuing this appeal of the

state court's decision, should Respondent be the

successful party in this appeal, Respondent requests

that sanctions, attorney's fees and costs be awarded to

Respondent, against Petitioner, pursuant to Section

57.105, Florida Statutes, Rule 9.410, Florida Rules of

Appellate Procedure, and Rule 38, Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure and the inherent authority of the

Supreme Court. Respondent expects to file a separate

motion in accordance with the above and requests the

Supreme Court reserve jurisdiction for the sole

purpose of making such an award should it rule

against Petitioner or, alternatively, remand the case to

the trial court judge to determine the amount of

sanctions, fees and costs to be awarded.

CONCLUSION

This Honorable Court is requested to rule that

it does not have jurisdiction to entertain the Petition

and to dismiss the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed

by the Petitioner, with prejudice. The Court is further

requested to reserve jurisdiction for the purpose of

awarding sanctions, attorney's fees and costs against

the Petitioner.

Respectfully Submitted,

George F. Indest III

Counsel of Record

The Health Law Firm

1101 Douglas Avenue

Altamonte Springs, FL 32714

(407) 331-6620

GIndest@TheHealthLawFirm.com

APPENDIX A

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 2017

CASE NO.: SC17-1874

Lower Tribunal No(s).:

5D17-2982; 592013CA0037900000XX

NEELAM UPPAL vs.

Petitioner(s)

HEALTH LAW FIRM

Respondent(s)

This case is hereby dismissed. This Court lacks

jurisdiction to review an unelaborated decision from a

district court of appeal that is issued without opinion

or explanation or that merely cites to an authority that

is not a case pending review in, or reversed or quashed

by, this Court. See Wells v. State, 132 So. 3d 1110 (Fla.

2014); Jackson v. State, 926 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006);

Gandy v. State, 846 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2003); Stallworth

v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002); Harrison v.

Hyster Co., 515 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1987); Dodi Publ’g

Co. v. Editorial Am. S.A., 385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980);

Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980).

No motion for rehearing or reinstatement will be

entertained by the Court.

A True Copy

Test:

/s/

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court

[SEAL]

Served:

GEORGE F. INDEST III

NEELAM UPPAL

HON. GRANT MALOY, CLERK

HON. JOANNE P. SIMMONS, CLERK

HON. JESSICA J. RECKSIEDLER, JUDGE

A-2

APPENDIX B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

[DATE STAMP]

NEELAM UPPAL

APPELLANT/DEFENDANT,

vs.

L.T. No. 13-3790

Case No. -5D17-2982

HEALTHLAW FIRM, GEORGE INDEST, et al

APPELLEE/PLAINTIFF

NOTICE OF APPEAL

On petAppelant, Neelam Uppal files an appeal

from the Order of the District Court of Appeal ,Fifth

District of Florida denying recusal of Judge Recksedler

for Writ of Certorari within 30 days of the order

pursuant to Rule 9.100.

/s/

NEELAM UPPAL, MD

Pro se

P.O. Box 1002

Largo, FL-33779

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(7)

Name: (8)

Address: (9)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy hereof has been furnished

to (10)

(11)

this (12)

, 20(14)

(7)

Signature

[ENVELOPE]

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day of (13)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NEELAM UPPAL,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 5D172982

HEALTH LAW FIRM,

Respondent.

DATE: October 10, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of

Prohibition, filed September 22, 2017, and the

Amended Petition, filed October 4, 2017, are denied on

the merits. See Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1258

(Fla. 2004).

I hereby certify that the foregoing is

(a true copy of) the original Court order.

/s/

[SEAL]

JOANNE P. SIMMONS, CLERK

Panel: Judges Palmer, Orfinger, and Wallis

cc:

George F Indest, III

Hon. Jessica J. Recksiedler

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Neelam Uppal

5DCA CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and

correct copy of the instrument(s) filed in this office.

Witness my hand and official seal this October 19,

2017 .

Joanne P. Simmons, Clerk of the Fifth District Court

of Appeal.

[SEAL]

By: /s/

Kathy Palmere

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[SEAL]

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIFTH DISTRICT

300 SOUTH BEACH STREET

DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA 32114

(386) 947-1500 COURT

(386)255-8600 CLERK

October 19, 2017

Hon. John A. Tomasino, Clerk

Supreme Court of Florida

Supreme Court Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1927

Re:

Uppal

Healthlaw Firm, G. Indest

Appeal No. 5D17-2982

Trial Court No. 13-CA-3790-15-K

Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jessica J. Recksiedler

Dear Hon. Tomasino:

Attached is a certified copy of the Notice of Appeal

pursuant to Rule 9.120, Florida Rules of Appellate

Procedure, along with a copy of this Court's opinion or

decision relevant to this case.

9 The filing fee prescribed by Section 25.241(3),

Florida Statutes, was received by this court

and is also attached.

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: The filing fee prescribed by Section 25.241(3),

Florida Statutes, was not received by this

Court.

9 Petitioner/Appellant has been previously

determined insolvent by this Circuit Court or

our court.

No filing fee is required because:

9 Summary Appeal (Rule 9.141)

9 Unemployment Appeals Commission

9 Habeas Corpus (Petition-Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel Criminal)

9 Juvenile case

9 Other __________

Sincerely,

JOANNE P. SIMMONS, CLERK

By: /s/ Kathy Palmere

Deputy Clerk

Attachments

cc: Neelam Uppal George F. Indest, III

FAX NUMBER (386) 947-1562

E MAIL ADDRESS 5dca@flcourts.org

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

NEELAM T. UPPAL,

-against-

Plaintiff,

17-CV-7072 (CM)

GEORGE F. INDEST III;

HEALTH LAW FIRM;

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

CHARLENE RODRIQUEZ;

BARRY WILKINSON;

SADORF & WILKINSON;

WELLS FARGO;

NATIONSTAR,

Defendants.

COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District

Judge:

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, paid the filing fee to

bring this complaint under the Court’s federal question

jurisdiction.1 Plaintiff has now filed an order to show

cause in which she appears to seek a stay in a

Plaintiff filed this action with an incomplete application

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). By order dated

September 19, 2017, the Court directed Plaintiff to either file an

amended IFP application, or pay the filing fee. Plaintiff paid the

filing fee on September 29, 2017.

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bankruptcy proceeding in this District. For the reasons

set forth below, the action is dismissed, and the order

to show cause is denied as moot.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint,

even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it

determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v.

First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64

(2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45

F.3d 14, 16-17(2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that

Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss

frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,

526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court is obliged,

however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris

v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they

suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

BACKGROUND

On September 15, 2017, Plaintiff Neelam T. Uppal,

a medical doctor, filed this complaint, which is not a

model of clarity, against George F. Indest III, Health

Law Firm, Charlene Rodriguez, Barry Wilkinson,

Wilkinson, Sadorf & Wilkinson, Wells Fargo, and

Nationstar. Invoking the Court’s federal question

jurisdiction, Plaintiff asserts claims under “RICO,” 18

U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and claims of “deceptive tactics”

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and “false claims” under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

Indest is counsel for the Health Law Firm, listed as

an appellee in Plaintiff’s pending bankruptcy appeal in

this Court. See In re: Neelam Taneja aka Neelam

Uppal, No. 17-CV-5618 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. filed July 24,

2017). It is not clear who the other individuals are.

According to Plaintiff, Indest “made fabricated bills

and false claims” in the bankruptcy court, and “tried to

do collections while automatic stay was in effect,” and

Wilkinson conspired with Indest. The complaint sets

forth no allegations against the other defendants.

(ECF No. 2 ¶ III.). Plaintiff seeks money damages and

to “waive sanction due to perjury have all the false

claims paid back.” (Id. ¶ IV.)

On July 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed in this case an order

to show cause asserting that Indest lied to “the

Seminole County Judge,” and to the Southern District

bankruptcy judge. Plaintiff seeks to have this Court

hold Indest and the Health Law Firm in contempt “of

this court’s Order of Stay,” and to “grant the order of

preliminary injunction against the Creditor and the

State Court by entering an injunction against the

enforcement of the order entered to collect any

judgment and enjoining and refraining the Defendant

from taking any further collection or legal actions on

the debtor.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff filed in the bankruptcy appeal pending

before Judge Ramos a substantially similar order to

show cause, and Indest has moved to strike that filing

and for sanctions. (17-CV-5618, ECF Nos. 14-16.)

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DISCUSSION

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires a complaint to make a short and plain

statement showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim

is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the

Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as

true and draws all reasonable inferences in the

pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not

accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id.

at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After

separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual

allegations, the court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

In this complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief under the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(RICO). RICO was enacted to “‘to seek the eradication

of organized crime in the United States.’” Boritzer v.

Calloway, No. 10-CV-6264 (JPO), 2013 WL 311013, at

*4 S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013) (quoting Pub. L. No. 91452,

Title IX, § 901(a) (Oct. 15, 1970)). The civil

enforcement provision of RICO provides that “[a]ny

person injured in his business or property by reason of

a violation of section 1962 . . . may sue therefor in any

appropriate United States district court and shall

recover threefold the damages….” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)

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(1995). In order to establish a violation of § 1962, a

plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) that the defendant (2)

through the commission of two or more acts (3)

constituting a “pattern” (4) of “racketeering activity”

(5) directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains an

interest in, or participates in (6) an “enterprise” (7) the

activities of which affect interstate or foreign

commerce.” Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5,

17 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c)

(1976)). To show conspiracy, Plaintiff must allege that

Defendants “agreed to form and associate themselves

with a RICO enterprise and that they agreed to

commit two predicate acts in furtherance of a pattern

of racketeering activity in connection with the

enterprise.” Conte v. Newsday, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d

126, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Cofacredit, S.A. v.

Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., 187 F.3d 229, 244 (2d

Cir. 1999)).

Plaintiff fails to provide any facts that would

support a RICO claim. The complaint is devoid of a

single fact suggesting that Defendants conspired

against her. Plaintiff only mentions RICO in her

complaint once, in response to a question in the

Court’s general complaint form asking “what federal

Constitutional, statutory or treaty right is at issue?”

(Compl. at 2.) In fact, Plaintiff asserts claims only

against Indest, and asserts without factual support

that Wilkinson “conspired” with Indest. Moreover,

injunctive relief is not available under civil RICO. See

18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1995).

Plaintiff also cites to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the federal

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false statement statute. That statute, however, does

not provide for a private right of action. See, e.g.

Momot v. Dziarcak, 208 F. Supp. 3d 450, 460

(N.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does

not create a private right of action); Faraldo v. Kessler,

No. 08-CV-0261, 2008 WL 216608, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.

23, 2008) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not allow

for a private civil action); Bender v. General Services

Admin., No. 05-CV-6459 (PKC), 2006 WL 988241, at *

1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2006) (same); Clements v. Miller,

No. 10-CV-2455, 2005 WL 2085497, at *4 (D. Colo.

Aug. 29, 2005), aff’d, 189 F. App’x 688 (10th Cir. 2006).

In short, Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate in this

Court, under the guise of a RICO action, state court

and bankruptcy court matters, which she cannot do.

See Curtis & Assoc., P.C. v. Law Office of David M.

Bushman, Esq., 758 F. Supp. 2d 153, 170 (E.D.N.Y.

2010) (state court claim should not be “re-litigated in

federal court under the guise of a RICO action”). See

also Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule

8002(a)(1) (to appeal an order of a Federal Bankruptcy

Court in a Federal District Court, a party must file a

notice of appeal in the Bankruptcy Court within

fourteen days of the entry of the order being appealed).

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an

opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects,

but leave to amend is not required where it would be

futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d

Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d

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Cir. 1988). Because amendment would not cure the

deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court declines

to grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend.2

LITIGATION HISTORY

Plaintiff is no stranger to federal court. According to

PACER, Plaintiff has filed more than twenty-five cases

in federal and circuit courts in New York, New Jersey,

and Florida.3 See, e.g. Uppal v. NYS Dep’t of Health,

No. 16-CV-3038 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 25, 2015)

(motion to dismiss pending); Uppal v. Florida Board of

Medicine, et al., No. 14-CV-9024 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,

2015) (denying order to show cause and transferring

matter to the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida); Uppal v. Hospital Corp. of

America, No. 09- CV-634, 2011 WL 2631869 (M.D. Fla.

July 5, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss Title VII

claims), aff’d Uppal v. Hospital Corp. of America, 482

F. App’x 394 (11th Cir. June 13, 2012). Plaintiff has

previously been warned against pursuing frivolous

litigation. Uppal v. Uppal, No. 10-CV- 2566, 2011 WL

2516676 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2011) (dismissing action

In any event, Plaintiff’s order to show cause and claims

against Indest are pending in the bankruptcy appeal before Judge

Ramos.

The Court may consider matters that are subject to

judicial notice, including court records. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(c); Schenk v. Citibank/Citigroup/ Citicorp, No. 10-CV-5056 (SAS),

2010 WL 5094360, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010) (citing Anderson

v. Rochester–Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 337 F.3d 201, 205 n.4

(2d Cir. 2003)).

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as “repetitive, vexatious, and frivolous,” and warning

Plaintiff against pursuing frivolous litigation). In

addition, a judge of this Court has already alerted

Plaintiff that applications for relief must be made in

the first instance in the bankruptcy court, after which

a notice of appeal may be filed. See In re: Neelam

Taneja, No. 17-CV-6608 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,

2017) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction emergency

motion for recusal of bankruptcy judge; motion based

in part on alleged false filings of Indest).

The exact degree of solicitude that should be

afforded to a pro se litigant in any given case depends

upon a variety of factors, including the procedural

context and relevant characteristics of the particular

litigant. Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir.

2010). In light of Plaintiff’s litigation history, the Court

finds that Plaintiff was, or should have been, aware

when she filed this case that it lacked merit. See

Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2009)

(discussing circumstances where frequent pro se

litigant may be charged with knowledge of particular

legal requirements). Plaintiff is warned that further

frivolous or duplicative litigation in this Court will

result in an order barring her from filing new actions

in this Court, regardless of whether she pays the filing

fee or seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis,

without prior permission. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to assign this matter

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to my docket, mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, and

note service on the docket. The Court dismisses this

action for failure to state a claim on which relief may

be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court

denies the order to show cause as moot.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that

any appeal from this order would not be taken in good

faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied

for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2017

New York, New York

/s/

COLLEEN McHAHON

Chief United States District Judge

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APPENDIX D

[DATE STAMP]

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:

Chapter 13

NEELAM TANEJA,

Adv. Proc. No.:

17-ap-01027-cgm

Debtor,

vs.

Ch. 13 Case No.:

16-bk-12356-jlg

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM, et al.,

Creditor/Defendant.

FINAL JUDGMENT FOR SANCTIONS,

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

THIS MATTER came before the Court for a

hearing on July 13, 2017, on the

Creditor(s)/Defendant(s), The Health Law Firm, P.A.,

f/k/a George F. Indest III, P.A.-The Health Law Firm,

and George Indest's, Motion for Rule 9011 Sanctions

against Debtor/Plaintiff Neelam Taneja, M.D. (a/k/a

Neelam Taneja Uppal M.D.) (referred to as "Rule 9011

Motion" herein). [ECF Nos. 11, 14, 22, 23 and 25.]

Debtor's Rule 9011 Motion, along with supporting

documents and an affidavit, was originally served on

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Debtor/Plaintiff on May 5, 2017, affording

Debtor/Plaintiff at least 21 days to remedy the

offending conduct. [ECF No. 11.] The Rule 9011

Motion was then filed with the Court on May 30, 2017

[ECF No. 11]. On June 1, 2017, the Court advised all

parties that it would be heard on July 13, 2017, in

open Court with the Debtor/Plaintiff present. It was

then noticed for hearing with notice filed June 8, 2017.

[ECF Nos. 13, 17 & 20.] Debtor/Plaintiff Neelam

Taneja (pro se) was present at the hearing on July 13,

2017, and her comments were considered by the Court.

She had filed no opposition or response to the rule

9011 Motion prior to the hearing.

The Court took judicial notice of the documents in

the Court's file as previously requested by the

Creditor/Defendants. The Court also considered the

affidavits and other documents filed by the

Creditor/Defendants [ECF Nos. 11, 14, 22, 23 & 25].

THE COURT GRANTS Creditor's/Defendants'

Rule 9011 Motion.

THE COURT FINDS that Debtor/Plaintiff's

Adversary Proceeding Complaint was filed in bad

faith, for improper purpose, and solely for the purpose

of harassing and delaying these Defendants/Creditors,

in violation of Rule 9011 , Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure. Debtor/Plaintiff's Adversary Proceeding

Complaint contained false statements and was

frivolous, having no basis in fact or in law.

Furthermore, Debtor/Plaintiff had not dismissed or

withdrawn her Adversary Proceeding Complaint after

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being given more than 21 days advance notice of the

Creditor's/Defendants' Rule 11 , Motion, and prior to

the hearing the Court conducted on June 1, 2017,

which resulted in the Court's Dismissal of the

Adversary Proceeding Complaint. [ECF No. 15.]

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that sanctions,

attorney's fees, and costs are proper to award against

Debtor/Plaintiff.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the hourly

rate charged by Mr. Indest ($475 per hour), the time

spent defending in this Adversary Proceeding (114.8

hours), the fees incurred ($54,530.00), and the costs

incurred ($2,905.33), to be fair, reasonable and

necessary.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS

FOLLOWS:

THE COURT AWARDS the total amount of

attorney's fees and costs of $57 ,435. 33, to be

designated as sanctions, awarded in favor of

Defendants The Health Law Firm and George F.

Indest III, 1101 Douglas Avenue, Altamonte Springs,

Seminole County, Florida 32714, against

Debtor/Plaintiff Neelam Taneja, M.D., a/k/a Neelam

Taneja Uppal, M.D. , 1370 Broadway #504 , New York,

New York County, New York 10018 and 17715 Gulf

Blvd, #705, Reddington Shores, Pinellas County,

Florida 33782.

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FURTHER ADJUDGED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

1961, this Final Judgment shall bear interest at the

judicial rate from the date of entry until satisfied.

FOR WHICH LET EXECUTION ISSUE.

The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce this Final

Judgment and other post-judgment matters including,

but not limited to, a determination of any additional

attorney's fees or costs owed by Debtor/Plaintiff to

Creditor/Defendants.

Dated:

July 19, 2017

Poughkeepsie, New York

[SEAL]

/s/ Cecelia G. Morris

Hon. Cecelia G. Morris

Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

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APPENDIX E

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND

FOR SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO: 13-CA-3790-15-K

NEELAM T. UPPAL, M.D.,

a/k/a NEELAM TANEJA, M.D.,

a/k/a NEELAM T. TANEJA-UPPAL, M.D.,

a/k/a NEELAM UPPAL TANEJA, M.D.,

a/k/a NEELAM TANEJA UPPAL, M.D.,

Defendant.

______________________________________/

NOTICE OF HEARING

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned

will call up for hearing before the Honorable Jessica J.

Recksiedler, at the Seminole County Courthouse, 301

North Park Avenue, Courtroom L, Sanford, Florida

32771, on Wednesday, September 20, 2017, at 1:30

P.M., or as soon thereafter as it may be heard, the

following:

Appellee's

Motion

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for

Appellate

Attorney's Fees and Sanctions

Pursuant to Sect. 57.105, Florida

Statutes, and Rule 9.410 Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure (pursuant to

Order of the Fifth District Court of

Appeal dated October 4, 2016, copy

attached).

The above date and time were coordinated with

and approved by Defendant Uppal.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served a copy of

the foregoing via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to

Neelam Taneja Uppal, M.D., 1370 Broadway, #504,

New York, New York 10018, and 17715 Gulf Blvd.,

#705, Reddington Shores, Florida 33782; and P.O. Box

1002, Largo, Florida 33779; and also via e-mail at:

nneelu123@aol.com, on this 20th day of June 2017.

/s/

GEORGE F. INDEST III, ESQUIRE

Certified by the Florida Bar

in Health Law

Florida Bar No.: 382426

Primary E-mail:

GIndest@TheHealthLawFirm.com

Secondary E-mail:

CourtFilings@TheHealthLawFirm.com

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM

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1101 Douglas Avenue

Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714

Telephone: (407) 331-6620

COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF,

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM

Attachments:

1) Fifth DCA Order of October 6, 2016

2) Appellee's Motion for Appellate Attorney's

Fees and Sanctions Pursuant to Sect. 57.105,

Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.410 Florida

Rules of Appellate Procedure

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NEELAM UPPAL,

Appellant,

CASE NO. 5D16-0180

HEALTH LAW FIRM,

Appellee.

________________________/

DATE: October 4, 2016

BY ODER OF THE COURT:

ORDERED that Appellee's Motion to Dismiss

Appeal Or, Alternatively, To Strike Appellant's Brief,

filed June 21, 2016, is granted and the above-styled

cause is hereby dismissed. Appellee's Motion for

Attorney's Fees and Sanctions pursuant to Section

57.105, filed June 22, 2016, is granted and the matter

is remanded to the trial court to assess the amount of

fees to be awarded. Appellant's Motion to Strike and

Dismiss Appellee's Motion for Sanctions, filed July 6,

2016, is denied. Appellant's Cross-Motion to Suppress,

filed July 6, 2016, is denied.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is

(a true copy of) the original Court order.

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/s/

JOANNE P. SIMMONS, CLERK

[SEAL]

Panel: Judges Orfinger, Cohen, and Edwards

cc:

George F. Indest, III

Lance O. Leide

Neelam Uppal

Clerk Seminole (13-CA-3790)

Hon. Jessica J. Recksiedler

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA

NEELAM UPPAL, M.D.,

Appellant,

Case No.: 5D16-0180

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM,

Appellee.

APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

AND SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECT. 57.105,

FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULE 9.410,

FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Appellee, The Health Law Firm, respectfully

requests that the Court enter an Order imposing

sanctions against Appellant for filing a frivolous and

dilatory appeal, pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida

Statutes, and Rule 9.410, Florida Rules of Appellate

Procedure stating:

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

1. Appellee, The Health Law Firm, is a Florida

professional services corporation providing legal

services to its clients.

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2. Appellant, Neelam T. Uppal, M.D., is a medical

doctor licensed by the states of Florida and New York.

3. Appellant retained the services of The Health

Law Firm on or about June 5, 2012.

4. The Health Law Firm performed considerable

work on behalf of Appellant, for which Appellant failed

to pay.

5. After extensive efforts to collect on the overdue

balance on Appellant's account with The Health Law

Firm, suit was filed in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit

Court in and for Seminole County. The case number

was: 13-CA-3790-15-K.

6. Appellant is believed to have fled the

jurisdiction to avoid service of process in the action

below. The Health Law Firm was able to locate

Appellant in the State of New York where service was

finally made on November 19, 2013.

7. Appellant has a long and storied history of

vexatious litigation in the federal and state court

systems. Below is merely a sample of some of the

cases and results:

Case No.: 8:13-bk-05601 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed for

fraud/concealment on September 17,

2013;

Case No.: 8:12-bk-18946 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed for

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failure to file information on January 11,

2013;

Case No.: 8:02-ap-00157 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed on

October 18, 2002;

Case No.: 8:00-bk-09734 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, discharged on

July 21, 2003;

Case No.: 8:15-ap-213-CPM - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed

September 25, 2015;

Case No.: 2D14-4191 - Florida Second

District Court of Appeal, pending;

Case No.: 8:10-cv-2566-T-23AEP - Civil,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed with

threat of sanctions June 23, 2011;

Case No.: A-5975-12T4 - Superior Court

of New Jersey, Appellate Division,

affirmed against Appellant November 20,

2014;

Case No.: C-574 - Supreme Court of New

Jersey, Petition for Certiorari denied

with costs February 7, 2001;

Case No.: C-708 - Supreme Court of New

Jersey, Petition for Certiorari denied

with costs March 12, 2003;

Case No.: 11-001130-CI - Sixth Judicial

Circuit in and for Pinellas County

Florida, dismissing Appellant's

counterclaim April 8, 2015;

8. The cases listed above are only a fraction of

Appellant's exploits in the courts. A review of the

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Pinellas County Clerk of Court's Civil Docket reveals

at least thirty-two (32) cases initiated by or against

Appellant since 2000. She was sued at least thirteen

(13) times for failure to pay amounts due. She was the

plaintiff in no fewer than thirteen (13) other cases,

many of which were frivolous claims for domestic

violence injunctions which she failed to prosecute.

Four (4) cases were unsuccessful appeals of other cases

she lost in Pinellas County Small Claims Court.

9. Additionally, a review of Appellant's history in

the PACER system revealed no less than thirty-four

(34) cases since 1998. Among those cases were twelve

(12) separate bankruptcy proceedings all of which were

dismissed with only one exception. Eighteen (18) civil

cases were filed by Appellant as the plaintiff or as

bankruptcy appeals. Appellant also filed four (4)

separate appeals to the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals, all of which she lost, including the published

opinion Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 482 Fed. Appx.

394 (11th Cir. 2012).

10.

Appellant did not contain her frivolous

litigation to Pinellas County and the federal courts.

Since 2011, Appellant filed thirteen (13) appeals in the

Second District Court of Appeal. Of the seven (7) cases

that are closed, Appellant lost six (6) and the one other

case was returned to the lower tribunal without

opinion or assignment of error. Of the six (6)

remaining cases, five (5) of them were repeated

appeals from the same Pinellas County Circuit Court

foreclosure case, 2011-CA-001130-CI.

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11.

Appellant also has a considerable history

in New Jersey state courts with numerous cases and

appeals. These cases primarily dealt with a divorce

during which she harassed her ex-husband with

innumerable motions and papers accusing him of

physical violence, mental abuse, child abuse, and other

vile crimes, none of which appear to have ever been

substantiated.

12.

Appellant's insults and scurrilous

accusations are not confined to her ex-husband. She

made numerous accusations of collusion and

conspiracy against the Appellant, the United States

District Court, the Middle District of Florida

Bankruptcy Court, the Circuit Court for Pinellas

County, and other individuals and entities in the

papers she filed with the courts.

13.

In nearly all of these cases, Appellant was

pro se. She routinely filed frivolous motions and

"orders." Nearly all of her pleadings are nonsensical

and rife with typographical and grammatical errors

which belie Appellant's training and education as a

physician. The papers she filed are also filled with

baseless accusations of fraud and conspiracy. Her

filings routinely fail to recognize the record facts in a

case and instead resort to continuous repetition of

irrelevant, scandalous, and impertinent material.

14.

The Court only needs to look at the trial

court's record in this case to find that Appellant is

divorced from reality and will do anything, including

abusing the judicial system, to avoid paying her just

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debts.

15.

Appellant fails to see and recognize what

is going on around her or to understand the

consequences of her own actions.

Instead of

internalizing her conduct and answering for it, she

lashes out and accuses everyone else of conspiring to

get her.

In the lower court, she accused the

undersigned of conspiring with another one of her

creditors in the following papers:

Answer and Objection to Plaintiff's

Objection, Docket No. 6;

Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment, Docket No. 9; and

Objection to Final Order of Summary

Judgment, Docket No. 18.

16.

Appellant made baseless accusations of

fraud against The Health Law Firm in every paper she

filed, but never offered a single fact in support thereof.

17.

Failing to present evidence of any kind

was a common theme for Appellant. She filed

numerous papers and oppositions, but never offered

any documents or testimony to support her position.

18.

To the contrary, The Health Law Firm

presented documentary evidence and sworn testimony

to support summary judgment on all counts.

19.

The record in this case clearly supports

the trial court's ruling. Appellant filed her appeal for

A-32

no purpose other than harassment and to assuage her

own delusional thoughts of being wronged by yet

another person.

20.

Appellee The Health Law Firm certifies

that it served a copy of this Motion for Sanctions on

Appellant Uppal on April 27, 2016, as shown in

Exhibit "1" and "2," more than 21 days prior to filing it

with this Court. Appellant has failed to correct the

perceived deficiencies for which this Motion seeks

sanctions, attorney's fees and costs.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT

I. Appellant's Appeal is a Sham and was Filed for

Improper Purposes

A court should find a pleading or paper to be a

sham when it is patently false or for an improper

purpose, and from the plain or conceded facts of the

case, the filing party knew or should have known it to

be as much. Rhea v. Hackney, 157 So. 190, 193 (Fla.

1934). Appellant filed the instant appeal for no other

purpose than to delay collection of a just debt. There

exist no justiciable issues on appeal. The law is

immeasurably clear in this case, and Appellant, even

though pro se, knew or should have known from the

circumstances of the case below, that there is no good

faith basis for an extension or change in the law which

would have allowed her to be successful on appeal.

Pleading a matter known by the party to be false and

for the purpose of delay or some other unworthy

A-33

purpose, has always been considered an abuse of the

justice system and subjects the party to censure and

summary set aside with costs. Rhea v. Hackney, 157

So. at 193.

As the Court is undoubtedly familiar, the standard

for summary judgment in Florida is that once the

moving party establishes that there are no disputed

issues of material fact, the party opposing a motion for

summary judgment must then present evidence, not

simply legal argument or unsubstantiated denials,

demonstrating the existence of a disputed issue of

material fact in order to prevent summary judgment

from being entered. Woodruff v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.,

669 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The nonmoving party may not carry its burden by merely

asserting that a particular issue is in dispute. Harvey

Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1965).

The issues below were simple. Appellant signed a

contract for legal services. Appellant requested legal

services to be performed by The Health Law Firm.

The Health Law Firm provided such legal services.

Then, Appellant refused to pay for services rendered

and action was initiated to collect the debt.

Without hyperbole or exaggeration, Appellant

failed to offer even a scintilla of evidence which placed

any material fact in dispute. Instead, her pleadings

(those that she actually signed) were nothing more

than a series of non-sensical ramblings, conspiratorial

theories, and false accusations of fraud and collusion.

A-34

Appellant's appeal is also improper because it was

filed for dilatory reasons. Given Appellant's frequent

bankruptcy filings and the loss of her most recent

appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision to the Middle

District of Florida,4 the undersigned believes this

appeal is merely a delay tactic so that she can prepare

and again file for bankruptcy.

Appeals filed for no other reason than to "delay

compliance with the . . . final judgment of the trial

court" are frivolous, not taken in good faith, and

should be dismissed. Askew v. Gables by the Sea, Inc.,

258 So. 2d 822, 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). There are no

legal issues for this Court to review. Appellant utterly

failed to raise any dispute of material fact or valid

objection to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed

below.

Appellant failed to place any of the material facts

of the case in dispute through presentation of

testimony, affidavits, or documents. Instead, just as in

In late 2015, Appellant appealed an order of the U.S. District

Court for the Middle District of Florida in Case No.: 8:15-cv-01886MSS denying a stay of proceedings pending appeal of the dismissal

of her most recent bankruptcy filing to the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals. By order dated December 14, 2015, the District Court

held that the automatic stay of proceedings was unavailable

because she could not show a likelihood of success on the merits of

her appeal. Without the automatic stay, Appellant's creditors,

including Appellee, were free to move forward with their collection

efforts. Finding herself exposed, Appellant filed the instant appeal

to further delay payment of her debt to Appellee.

A-35

her many, many other cases, she filed sham pleadings

and this meritless appeal in a desperate, yet

transparent, attempt to avoid paying the money she

owes.

II. Appellant's History of Abuse of the Legal System

Warrants Dismissal and Sanctions

The Court need look no further than Appellant's

incredibly litigious history and the language used in

her filings below to see that her modus operandi is to

abuse the legal system and make frivolous filing after

frivolous filing.

Courts in at least three different jurisdictions have

warned and sanctioned Appellant for abuse of the legal

process. The Fifth District Court of Appeal should not

stand for Appellant's antics or permit her to waste the

Court's time and resources on her frivolous cases.

Appellant's conduct as a pro se litigant is prolific

and approaches that of one of Florida's most famously

abusive pro se parties, Anthony Martin. See Martin v.

State, 747 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2000). In Martin, the pro se

party had previously filed hundreds of lawsuits,

motions, and miscellaneous pleadings in courts in

several jurisdictions. Id. at 390. Appellant's conduct,

although not yet as prolific as Mr. Martin's, is

essentially the same–a long series of abusive, dilatory,

and pointless proceedings and papers serving no other

purpose than to satisfy the whims of one individual.

The Florida Supreme Court stated it best in

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Martin, saying: "This Court has the authority, perhaps

even the duty, to stop litigants like Martin from

abusing it and the people, as the Second Circuit put it,

'who have unluckily crossed his path.'" Id. at 391

(quoting In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1254

(2d Cir. 1984)). This sentiment is equally applicable to

Appellant and this Court should take up the standard

and put an end to her misfeasance. Appellant has

dragged numerous innocent people into court and tied

them up in years of litigation costing untold amounts

of money and personal anguish as well as unduly

burdening the legal system.

"The resources of our court system are finite and

must be reserved for the resolution of genuine

disputes." Rivera v. State, 728 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla.

1998). Appellant's steady stream of pro se filings are

not subject to the financial considerations that deter

other litigants from filing frivolous suits, appeals, and

papers. Consequently, the ordinary checks and

balances associated with qualified, paid representation

are absent and Appellant's abuse of the system and

those she feels have wronged her flows unchecked.

The imposition of sanctions, perhaps including a

future bar on filing pro se appeals, is necessary to

dissuade Appellant from continued misuse of the legal

system.

CONCLUSION

Appellant's resume of judicial abuse and the lack

of merit of her appeal are ample reasons for the Court

to dismiss this action and impose sanctions against

A-37

her. It is plain from even the most cursory inspection

of the papers Appellant filed below there is no

justiciable issue on appeal, and that she filed her

appeal to delay enforcement of the lower court's

judgment. Allowing this case to progress to full

briefing and potential oral argument will only serve to

reinforce Appellant's belief that she appropriately uses

the legal system and will prejudice Appellee by forcing

it to incur additional costs and expense briefing the

case.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Appellee, The Health Law Firm, respectfully

requests the Court enter an Order against Appellant

Uppal and in favor of Appellee granting the following

relief:

Dismissal of the instant appeal with

prejudice;

An award of Appellee's attorneys' fees

and costs for:

Defending this appeal;

ii.

Preparing and filing this Motion

pursuant to Section 57.105,

Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.410,

Florida Rules of Appellate

Procedure; and

iii.

Preparing and filing its Motion to

Dismiss Appeal and Alternative

Motion to Strike Appellant's Brief;

Barring Appellant from filing any further

paper or cause against Appellee without

A-38

counsel and only after the proper motion

is made to this Court and an Order

issued by it authorizing the same; and

Any other relief the Court may deem just

and proper.

CERTIFICATE OF INITIAL SERVICE

PRIOR TO FILING

I certify that I initially served a copy of this motion

on pro se Appellant, Neelam Uppal, M.D., by U.S.

mail, postage prepaid, to P.O. Box 1002, Largo, Florida

33779, and to 5840 Park Boulevard, Pinellas Park, FL

33781, and via e-mail to nneelu123@aol.com, as shown

in Exhibit "1," originally on the 27th day of April 2016,

more than 21 days before filing it with this Court.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served a copy of this document

on pro se Appellant, Neelam Uppal, M.D., by U.S.

mail, postage prepaid, to P.O. Box 1002, Largo, Florida

33779, and to 5840 Park Boulevard, Pinellas Park, FL

33781, and via e-mail to nneelu123@aol.com, and I

have also filed it electronically through eDCA on this

22nd day of June 2016.

/s/ George F. Indest III

______________________________________

GEORGE F. INDEST III, ESQUIRE

Certified by The Florida Bar in Health Law

Florida Bar No.: 382426

A-39

Primary E-mail:

GIndest@TheHealthLawFirm.com

Secondary E-mail:

CourtFilings@TheHealthLawFirm.com

LANCE O. LEIDER, ESQUIRE

Florida Bar No.: 96408

Primary E-mail:

LLeider@TheHealthLawFirm.com

Secondary E-mail:

CourtFilings@TheHealthLawFirm.com

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM

1101 Douglas Avenue

Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714

Telephone: (407) 331-6620

Facsimile: (407) 331-3030

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE,

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM

ATTACHED: APPENDIX TO MOTION

A-40

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA

NEELAM UPPAL, M.D.,

Appellant,

Case No.: 5D16-0180

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM,

Appellee.

____________________________________/

APPELLEE'S APPENDIX TO MOTION

INDEX

Doc.

Description

Letter from George F. Indest

III, to Appellant Uppal Dated

April 27, 2016, serving copy of

Motion for Sanctions in present

case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A-41

Page

The Health Law Firm

"Representing Healthcare Providers"

Respond Only to Main Office:

1101 Douglas Avenue

Altamote Springs, Florida 32714

Telephone: (407) 331-6620

Telefax: (407) 331-3030

www.thehealthlawfirm.com

April 27, 2016

VIA E-MAIL AND STANDARD U.S. MAIL

Neelam Y. Uppal, M.D.

5840 Park Boulevard

Pinellas Park, Florida 33781

Neelam Y. Uppal, M.D.

P.O. Box1002

Largo, Florida 33779

Email: nneelul23@aol.com

Re: Neelam Uppal, M.D., et al. v. The Health

Law Firm

Seminole County Case No.:

2013-CA-3790-15-K

DCA Case No.: TBD

Our File No.: 1516/004

NOTICE OF' INTENT TO SEEK

ATTORNEY1S FEES AND SANCTIONS &

SERVICE OF' PROPOSED MOTION TO

DISMISS AND FOR SANCTIONS AND

A-42

ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO

SECTION 57.105, FLORIDA STATUTES,

AND RULE 9.410, FLORIDA RULES OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Dear Dr. U ppal:

As you know, I represent George F. Indest III,

P.A., d/b/a The Health Law Firm, in the abovereferenced case.

This letter is to place you on notice that we intend

to seek sanctions against you, including attorney's fees

and costs, pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida

Statutes, and Rule 9.410, Florida Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

On January 14, 2016, you filed a Notice of Appeal

with the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Florida. Your

appeal is knowingly frivolous and without merit and

will not be successful. Your appeal is completely devoid

of merit on the face of the record on appeal such that

there is little, if any, prospect that it can ever succeed.

You know or should know that there is no good faith

basis to argue that you adequately placed any material

facts in dispute in the lower court which would

warrant an assignment of legal error to Judge

Recksiedler. Moreover, there is no good faith basis for

you to argue a change in the law governing the case. It

is our belief that you are aware the foregoing is

accurate and your filing is in bad faith and only to

delay collection of your debt to the firm.

A-43

You should carefully consider your position in this

matter and immediately withdraw your Notice of

Appeal within (21) twenty-one days of the date of this

letter. Otherwise, we will file the attached motion and

seek an award of sanctions and attorney's fees from

the Fifth District Court of Appeal. You should also

know that the retainer agreement you signed with the

firm makes you liable for the cost of defending your

appeal. Forcing the case to move forward will only

serve to increase the amount of money you owe to the

firm.

A copy of the motion we intend to file (or one

substantially similar to it) is attached.

Sincerely,

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM by:

/s/

GEORGE F. INDEST III, J.D., M.P.A.,

LL.M.

Board Certified by The Florida Bar

in the Specialty of Health Law

PRESIDENT & MANAGING PARTNER

encl:

Proposed Motion to Dismiss and for Sanctions

Pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes

and Rule 9.410, Florida Rules of Appellate

Procedure

A-44

Tina Mesibov

From: Tina Mesibov

Sent:

Wednesday, April 27, 2016 5:43 PM

To:

nneelu123@aol.com

Cc:

Lance 0. Leider; Michelle Soto; Tina

Mesibov

Subject:

Uppal - Our File No.: 1516/004

Attachments:2016-04-27-Uppal-1-Notice to Seek

Sanctions.pdf

Dear Dr. Uppal,

Attached please find correspondence from George F.

Indest Ill, Esquire, dated April 27, 2016.

Tina Mesibov

Paralegal/Legal Assistant

The Health Law Firm

1101 Douglas Avenue

Altamonte Springs, FL 32714

Phone: (407) 331-6620

Fax: (407) 331-3030

E-mail: tmesibov@thehealthlawfirm.com

A-45

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA

NEELAM UPPAL, M.D.,

Appellant,

Case No.: 5Dl6-0180

GEORGE F. INDEST III, P.A.,

D/B/A THE HEALTH LAW FIRM,

Appellee.

APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR

SANCTIONS PURSUANT

TO SECTION 57.105, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND

RULE 9.410, FLORIDA

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Appellee, George F. Indest III, P.A., d/b/a/ The

Health Law Firm, respectfully requests that the Court

dismiss Appellant Neelam Uppal, M.D.'s, appeal and

enter an order imposing sanctions against her for filing

a frivolous paper intended solely to delay payment of

a fair and just debt for services. Appellee believes

dismissal and sanctions are appropriate relief based

upon the facts and circumstances of the case below and

Appellant's history of abusing the legal system. In

addition to the authority cited below, Appellee relies

upon Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.410,

Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

A-46

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

1. Appellee, The Health Law Firm, is a Florida

professional services corporation providing legal

services to its clients.

2. Appellant, Neelam T. Uppal, M.D., is a

medical doctor licensed by the states of Florida and

New York.

3. Appellant retained the services of The

Health Law Firm on or about June 5, 2012.

The Health Law Firm performed

considerable work on behalf of Appellant, for which

Appellant failed to pay.

5. After extensive efforts to collect on the

overdue balance on Appellant's account with The

Health Law Firm, suit was filed in the Eighteenth

Judicial Circuit Court in and for Seminole County. The

case number was: 13-CA-3790-15-K.

6. Appellant fled the jurisdiction to avoid

service of process in the action below. The Health Law

Firm was able to locate Appellant hiding out in the

State of New York where service was finally made on

November 19, 2013.

7. Appellant has a long and storied history of

vexatious litigation in the federal and state court

systems. Below is merely a sample of some of the cases

and results:

A-47

A. Case No.: 8: 13-bk-05601 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed for

fraud/ concealment on September 17,

2013;

B. Case No.: 8:12-bk-18946 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed for

failure to file information on January 11,

2013;

C. Case No.: 8:02-ap-00157 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed on

October 18, 2002;

D. Case No.: 8:00-bk-09734 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, discharged on

July 21, 2003;

E. Case No.: 8:15-ap-213-CPM - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed

September 25, 2015;

F. Case No.: 2Dl4-4191 - Florida Second

District Court of Appeal, pending;

G. Case No.: 8:10-cv-2566-T-23AEP - Civil,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed with

threat of sanctions June 23, 2011;

H. Case No.: A-5975-12T4 - Superior Court

of New Jersey, Appellate Division,

affirmed against Dr. Uppal November 20,

2014;

I. Case No.: C-574 - Supreme Court of New

Jersey, Petition for Certiorari denied with

costs February 7, 2001;

J. Case No.: C-708 - Supreme Court of New

Jersey, Petition for Certiorari denied with

costs March 12, 2003;

K. Case No.: 11-001130-CI - Sixth Judicial

A-48

Circuit in and for Pinellas County

Florida, dismissing Dr. Uppal's

counterclaim April 8, 2015;

8. The cases listed above are only a fraction of

Dr. Uppal's exploits in the courts. A review of the

Pinellas County Clerk of Court's Civil Docket reveals

at least thirty-two (32) cases initiated by or against Dr.

Uppal since 2000. She was sued at least thirteen ( 13)

times for failure to pay amounts due. She was the

plaintiff in no fewer than thirteen ( 13) other cases,

many of which were frivolous claims for domestic

violence injunctions which she failed to prosecute. Four

(4) cases were unsuccessful appeals of other cases she

lost in Pinellas County Small Claims Court.

9. Additionally, a review of Dr. Uppal's history

in the PACER system revealed no less than thirty-four

(34) cases since 1998. Among those cases were twelve

(12) separate bankruptcy proceedings all of which were

dismissed with only one exception. Eighteen (18) civil

cases were filed by Dr. Uppal as the plaintiff or as

bankruptcy appeals. Dr. Uppal also filed four (4)

separate appeals to the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals, all of which she lost, including the published

opinion Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 482 Fed. Appx.

394 (11th Cir. 2012).

10. Dr. Uppal did not contain her frivolous

litigation to Pinellas County and the federal courts.

Since 2011, Dr. Uppal filed thirteen appeals in the

Second District Court of Appeals. Of the seven (7)

cases that are closed, Dr. Uppal lost six ( 6) and the

A-49

one other case was returned to the lower tribunal

without opinion or assignment of error. Of the six

remaining cases, five (5) of them were repeated

appeals from the same Pinellas County Circuit Court

foreclosure case, 201 l-CA-001130-CI.

11. Dr. Uppal also has a considerable history

in New Jersey state courts with numerous cases and

appeals. These cases primarily dealt with a divorce

during which she harassed her ex-husband with

innumerable motions and papers accusing him of

physical violence, mental abuse, child abuse, and other

vile crimes, none of which appear to have ever been

substantiated.

12.

Dr. Uppal's insults and scurrilous

accusations are not confined to her exhusband. She

made numerous accusations of collusion and

conspiracy against the Appellant, the United States

District Court, the Middle District of Florida

Bankruptcy Court, the Circuit Court for Pinellas

County, and other individuals in the papers she filed

in the respective courts.

13. In nearly all of these cases, Dr. Uppal was

pro se. She routinely filed frivolous motions and

"orders." Nearly all of her pleadings are nonsensical

and rife with typographical and grammatical errors

which belie Dr. Uppal's training and education as a

physician. The papers she filed are also filled with

baseless accusations of fraud and conspiracy. Her

filings routinely fail to recognize the record facts in a

case and instead resort to continuous repetition of

A-50

irrelevant, scandalous, and impertinent material.

14. The Court only needs to look at the trial

court's record in this case to find that Dr. Uppal is

divorced from reality and will do anything, including

abusing the judicial system, to avoid paying her just

debts.

15. Dr. Uppal fails to see and recognize what is

going on around her or to understand the consequences

of her own actions. Instead of internalizing her conduct

and answering for it, she lashes out and accuses

everyone else of conspiring to get her. In the lower

court, she accused the undersigned of conspiring with

another one of her creditors in the following papers:

A. Answer and Objection to Plaintiffs

Objection, Docket No. 6

B. Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment, Docket No. 9;

and

C. Objection to Final Order of Summary

Judgment, Docket, No. 18.

16. Dr. Uppal made baseless accusations of

fraud against The Health Law Firm in every paper she

filed, but never offered a single fact in support thereof.

17. Failing to present evidence of any kind was

a common theme for Dr. Uppal. She filed numerous

papers and oppositions, but never offered any

documents or testimony to support her position.

A-51

18. To the contrary, The Health Law Firm

presented documentary evidence and sworn testimony

to support summary judgment on all counts.

19. The record in this case clearly supports the

trial court's ruling. Dr. Uppal filed her appeal for no

purpose other than harassment and to assuage her

own delusional thoughts of being wronged by yet

another person.

Memorandum of Law

I. Appellant's Appeal is a Sham and was Filed for

Improper Purposes

A court should find a pleading or paper to be a

sham when it is patently false or for an improper

purpose, and from the plain or conceded facts of the

case, the filing party knew or should have known it to

be as much. Rhea v. Hackney, 157 So. 190, 193 (Fla.

1934). Appellant fi]ed the instant appeal for no other

purpose than to delay collection of a just debt. There

exist no justiciable issues on appeal. The law is

immeasurably clear in this case, and Appellant, even

though pro se, knew or should have known from the

circumstances of the case below, that there is no good

faith basis for an extension or change in the law to

which would have allowed her to be successful on

appeal. Pleading a matter known by the party to be

false and for the purpose of delay or some other

unworthy purpose, has always been considered an

abuse of the justice system and subjects the party to

censure and summary set aside with costs. Id.

A-52

As the Court is undoubtedly familiar, the

standard for summary judgment in Florida is that once

the moving party establishes that there are no

disputed issues of material fact, the party opposing a

motion for summary judgment must then present

evidence, not simply legal argument or

unsubstantiated denials, demonstrating the existence

of a disputed issue of material fact in order to prevent

summary judgment from being entered. Woodruff v.

Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 669 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1996). The non-moving party may not carry its

burden by merely asserting that a particular issue is in

dispute. Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780,

783 (Fla. 1965).

The issues below were simple. Appellant signed

a contract for legal services. Appellant requested legal

services to be performed by The Health Law Firm. The

Health Law Firm provided such legal services. Then,

Appellant refused to pay for services rendered and

action was initiated to collect the debt.

Without hyperbole or exaggeration, Appellant

failed to offer even a scintilla of evidence which placed

any material fact in dispute. Instead, her pleadings

(those that she actually signed) were nothing more

than a series of non-sensical ramblings, conspiratorial

theories, and false accusations of fraud and collusion.

Appellant's appeal is also improper because it

was filed for dilatory reasons. Given Appellant's

frequent bankruptcy filings and the loss of her most

recent appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision to the

A-53

Middle District of Florida,1 the undersigned believes

this appeal is merely a delay tactic so that she can

prepare and again file for bankruptcy.

Appeals filed for no other reason than to "delay

compliance with the ... final judgment of the trial

court" are frivolous, not taken in good faith, and should

be dismissed. Askew v. Gables By The Sea, Inc., 258

So. 2d 822, 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). There are no legal

issues for this Court to review. Appellant utterly failed

to raise any dispute of material fact or valid objection

to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed below.

Appellant failed to place any of the material

facts of the case in dispute through presentation of

testimony, affidavits, or documents. Instead, just as in

her many, many other cases, she filed sham pleadings

and this meritless appeal in a desperate, yet

transparent, attempt to avoid paying the money she

owes.

In late 2015, Appellant appealed an order of the

Middle District of Florida in Case No.: 8:15-cv-01886-MSS denying

a stay of proceedings pending appeal of the dismissal of her most

recent bankruptcy filing to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

By order dated December 14, 2015, the Middle District held that

the automatic stay of proceedings was unavailable because she

could not show a likelihood of success on the merits of her appeal.

Without the automatic stay, Appellant's creditors, including

Appellee, were free to move forward with their collection efforts.

Finding herself exposed, Appellant filed the instant appeal to

further delay payment of her debt to Appellee.

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II. Appellant's History of Abuse of the Legal System

Warrants Dismissal and Sanctions

The Court need look no further than

Appellant's incredibly litigious history and the

language used in her filings below to see that her

modus operandi is to abuse the legal system and make

frivolous filing after frivolous filing.

Courts in at least three different jurisdictions

have warned and sanctioned Appellant for abuse of the

legal process. The Fifth District Court of Appeal should

not stand for Appellant's antics or permit her to waste

the Court's time and resources on her frivolous cases.

Appellant's conduct as a pro se litigant is

prolific and approaches that of one of Florida's most

famously abusive pro se parties, Anthony Martin. See

Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2000). In Martin,

the pro se party had previously filed hundreds of

lawsuits, motions, and miscellaneous pleadings in

courts in several jurisdictions. Id. at 390. Appellant's

conduct, although not yet as prolific as Mr. Martin's, is

essentially the same-a long series of abusive, dilatory,

and pointless proceedings and papers serving no other

purpose than to satisfy the whims of one individual.

The Florida Supreme Court stated it best in

Martin, saying: "This Court has the authority, perhaps

even the duty, to stop litigants like Martin from

abusing it and the people, as the Second Circuit put it,

'who have unluckily crossed his path."' Martin, 747 So.

2d at 391 (quoting In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d

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1254, 1254 (2d Cir. 1984). This sentiment is equally

applicable to Appellant and this Court should take up

the standard and put an end to Appellant's

misfeasance. She has dragged numerous innocent

people into court and tied them up in years of litigation

costing untold amounts of money and personal anguish

as well as unduly burdening the legal system.

"The resources of our court system are finite

and must be reserved for the resolution of genuine

disputes." Rivera v. State, 728 So. 2d] 165, 1166 (Fla.

1998). Appellant's steady stream of pro se filings are

not subject to the financial considerations that deter

other litigants from filing frivolous suits, appeals, and

papers. Consequently, the ordinary checks and

balances associated with qualified, paid representation

are absent and Appellant's abuse of the system and

those she feels have wronged her flows unchecked. The

imposition of sanctions perhaps including a future bar

on filing pro se appeals is necessary to dissuade

Appellant from continued misuse of the legal system.

Conclusion

Appellant's resume of judicial abuse and the

lack of merit of her appeal are ample reasons for the

Court to dismiss this action and impose sanctions

against her. It is plain from even the most cursory

inspection of the papers Appellant filed below there is

no justiciable issue on appeal, and that she filed her

appeal to delay enforcement of the lower court's

judgment. Allowing this case to progress to briefs will

only serve to reinforce Appellant's belief that she

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appropriately uses the legal system and will prejudice

Appellee by forcing it to incur additional costs and

expense briefing the case.

WHEREFORE, Appellee, George F. Indest III,

P.A., d/b/a The Health Law Firm, respectfully requests

the Court enter an order granting the following relief:

Dismiss the instant appeal with

prejudice;

Enter an order awarding Appellee its

attorneys' fees for defending this appeal

and preparing and filing this Motion

pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida

Statutes, and Rule 9.410, Florida Rules of

Appellate Procedure;

Barring Appellant from filing any further

paper or cause against Appellee without

counsel; and

Any other relief the Court may deem just

and proper.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I initially served a copy of this

draft motion on pro se Appellant, Neelam Uppal, M.D.,

by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to P.O. Box 1002, Largo,

Florida 33779, and to 5840 Park Boulevard, Pinellas

Park, FL 33781, and via e-mail to nneelu123@aol.com,

on this 27th day of April 2016.

/s/

GEORGE F. INDEST III, ESQUIRE

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Certified by The Florida Bar in Health Law

Florida Bar No.: 382426

Primary E-mail:

Glndest@TheHealthLawFirm.com

Secondary E-mail:

CourtFilings@TheHealthLawFirm.com

LANCE O. LEIDER, ESQUIRE

Florida Bar No.: 96408

Primary E-mail:

LLeider@TheHealthLawFirm.com

Secondary E-mail:

CourtFilings@TheHealthLawFirm.com

THE HEAL TH LAW FIRM

1101 Douglas A venue

Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714

Telephone: ( 407) 331-6620

Facsimile: (407) 331-3030

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT,

GEORGE F. INDEST III, P.A.

A-58

APPENDIX F

[DATE STAMP]

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:

Chapter 13

NEELAM TANEJA,

Adv. Proc. No.:

17-ap-01027-cgm

vs.

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM, et al.,

Creditor/Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING CREDITOR THE HEALTH

LAW FIRM'S AND GEORGE INDEST'S MOTION

TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING ADVERSARY

PROCEEDING

This matter came before the Court for a

hearing on June 1, 2017, on the

Creditor(s)/Defendant(s), The Health Law Firm, P.A.,

f/k/a George F. Indest III, P.A.-The Health Law Firm,

and George Indest's, Motion for Summary Judgment

and Alternate Motion to Dismiss Neelam Taneja's'

Adversary Proceeding with Supporting Memorandum

of Law (refened to as "Creditor's Motion" herein) [ECF

No. 3 & 4]. Debtor's Motion, along with supporting

documents and an affidavit were filed and served on

March 20, 2017, and he same was properly noticed for

hearing. The Creditor was present and represented by

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counsel, George F. Indest III, Esquire. Debtor

appeared pro se and testified under oath at the

hearing.

THE COURT GRANTS Creditor/Defendants'

request to withdraw the portion of the Creditor's

Motion which requested attorney's fees, without

prejudice.

THE COURT GRANTS Creditor's Motion and

DISMISSES the Adversary Proceeding, with prejudice.

Dated: June 5, 2017

Poughkeepsie, New York

[SEAL]

/s/ Cecelia G. Morris

Hon. Cecelia G. Morris

Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

A-60

APPENDIX G

[DATE STAMP]

Hearing Date: April 6 , 20 I 7

Time: 10:00 A.M.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE:

NEELAM TANEJA,

Debtor

Chapter 13

Case No. 16-12356 JLG

TRUSTEE'S STATUS

REPORT

The Standing Chapter 13 Trustee for the

Southern District of New York, Jeffrey L. Sapir, by

Jody L. Kava, Esq. submits this as a Status Report

regarding the above named debtor, Neelam Taneja

("Debtor").

1. This petition was filed on August 15, 2016 . The

§341 (a) meeting of creditors was held and closed.

2. As this Court is aware, there are many issues

preventing confirmation of this case.

3. Apparently, at the heart of the issue, is the

debtor's attempt to save property, both residential and

investment in Florida.

4. The history of the litigation reaches back to at

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least 2000 when the debtor filed bankruptcy in the

Middle District of Florida. Three subsequent cases

were filed in 2012 ( 12-18946), 2013 ( 13-0560 I) and

2015 ( 15-00594 ).

5. There is no automatic stay in place.

6. Pursuant to the claims filed, the debtor is

ineligible for chapter 13.

7. Objections to claims have been filed with

hearings scheduled for March 22, 2017 at 2:00 P.M.

8. The debtor is now represented by Arlene Gordon

O. Oliver, Esq. who has met with the debtor a number

of times and will certainly provide the debtor with the

guidance needed.

9. The debtor's plan calls for monthly payments of

$2, 155.63 for 60 months. The debtor is one payment in

arrears. The plan is incorrect and has never been

served.

10. The debtor is a self-employed physician but has

failed to file business operating statements.

11. The trustee will be moving to dismiss this case.

Dated:

White Plains, New York

March 21, 2017

/s/ Jody L. Kava, Esq.

Jody L. Kava, Esq.

A-62

Law Offices of

Jeffrey L. Sapir, Esq. (JLS 0938)

Chapter 13 Trustee

399 Knollwood Road #102

White Plains, New York 10603

Chapter 13 Tel. No.

914-328-6333

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APPENDIX H

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

FRIDAY, MARCH 17, 2017

CASE NO.: SC16-2037

Lower Tribunal No(s).:

5016-180;

5920 l3CA0037900000XX

NEELAM UPPAL vs.

Petitioner(s)

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM

Respondent(s)

The "Motion for Re-Consideration" has been

treated as a motion for rehearing. Pursuant to this

Court's order dated March 1, 2017, the motion for

rehearing is hereby stricken as unauthorized.

A True Copy

Test:

/s/

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court

[SEAL]

Served:

GEORGE F. INDEST, III

NEELAM UPPAL

HON. GRANT MALOY, CLERK

HON. JOANNE P. SIMMONS, CLERK

A-64

APPENDIX I

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1, 2017

CASE NO.: SC16-2037

Lower Tribunal No(s).:

5016-180;

5920 l3CA0037900000XX

NEELAM UPPAL vs.

Petitioner(s)

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM

Respondent(s)

Because petitioner has failed to show a clear

legal right to the relief requested, she is not entitled to

mandamus relief. Accordingly, the petition for writ of

mandamus is hereby denied. See Huffman v. State,

813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000). No rehearing will be

entertained by this Court.

PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and

LAWSON, JJ., concur.

A True Copy

Test:

/s/

John a. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court

[SEAL]

A-65

Served:

GEORGE F. INDEST, III

NEELAM UPPAL

HON. GRANT MALOY, CLERK

HON. JOANNE P. SIMMONS, CLERK

A-66

APPENDIX J

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NEELAM UPPAL,

Appellant,

CASE NO. 5D16-0180

HEALTH LAW FIRM,

Appellee.

________________________/

DATE: October 25, 2016

BY ODER OF THE COURT:

ORDERED that Appellant's "Motion for ReConsideration to Vacate Order", filed October 14,

2016, is denied.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is

(a true copy of) the original Court order.

/s/

JOANNE P. SIMMONS, CLERK

[SEAL]

Panel: Judges Orfinger, Cohen, and Edwards

cc:

A-67

George F. Indest III Lance O. Leider

Neelam Uppal

A-68

APPENDIX K

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NEELAM UPPAL,

Appellant,

CASE NO. 5D16-0180

HEALTH LAW FIRM,

Appellee.

________________________/

DATE: October 4, 2016

BY ODER OF THE COURT:

ORDERED that Appellee's Motion to Dismiss

Appeal Or, Alternatively, To Strike Appellant's Brief,

filed June 21, 2016, is granted and the above-styled

cause is hereby dismissed. Appellee's Motion for

Attorney's Fees and Sanctions pursuant to Section

57.105, filed June 22, 2016, is granted and the matter

is remanded to the trial court to assess the amount of

fees to be awarded. Appellant's Motion to Strike and

Dismiss Appellee's Motion for Sanctions, filed July 6,

2016, is denied. Appellant's Cross-Motion to Suppress,

filed July 6, 2016, is denied.

A-69

I hereby certify that the foregoing is

(a true copy of) the original Court order.

/s/

JOANNE P. SIMMONS, CLERK

[SEAL]

Panel: Judges Orfinger, Cohen, and Edwards

cc:

George F. Indest, III

Lance O. Leide

Neelam Uppal

Clerk Seminole (13-CA-3790)

Hon. Jessica J. Recksiedler

A-70

APPENDIX L

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA

NEELAM UPPAL, M.D.,

Appellant,

Case No.: 5D16-0180

THE HEALTH LAW FIRM,

Appellee.

APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

AND SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECT. 57.105,

FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULE 9.410,

FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Appellee, The Health Law Firm, respectfully

requests that the Court enter an Order imposing

sanctions against Appellant for filing a frivolous and

dilatory appeal, pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida

Statutes, and Rule 9.410, Florida Rules of Appellate

Procedure stating:

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

Appellee, The Health Law Firm, is a

Florida professional services corporation providing

legal services to its clients.

A-71

Appellant, Neelam T. Uppal, M.D., is a

medical doctor licensed by the states of Florida and

New York.

Appellant retained the services of The

Health Law Firm on or about June 5, 2012.

The Health Law Firm performed

considerable work on behalf of Appellant, for which

Appellant failed to pay.

After extensive efforts to collect on the

overdue balance on Appellant's account with The

Health Law Firm, suit was filed in the Eighteenth

Judicial Circuit Court in and for Seminole County.

The case number was: 13-CA-3790-15-K.

Appellant is believed to have fled the

jurisdiction to avoid service of process in the action

below. The Health Law Firm was able to locate

Appellant in the State of New York where service was

finally made on November 19, 2013.

Appellant has a long and storied history

of vexatious litigation in the federal and state court

systems. Below is merely a sample of some of the

cases and results:

Case No.: 8:13-bk-05601 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed for

fraud/concealment on September 17,

2013;

Case No.: 8:12-bk-18946 - Bankruptcy,

A-72

Middle District of Florida, dismissed for

failure to file information on January 11,

2013;

Case No.: 8:02-ap-00157 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed on

October 18, 2002;

Case No.: 8:00-bk-09734 - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, discharged on

July 21, 2003;

Case No.: 8:15-ap-213-CPM - Bankruptcy,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed

September 25, 2015;

Case No.: 2D14-4191 - Florida Second

District Court of Appeal, pending;

Case No.: 8:10-cv-2566-T-23AEP - Civil,

Middle District of Florida, dismissed with

threat of sanctions June 23, 2011;

Case No.: A-5975-12T4 - Superior Court

of New Jersey, Appellate Division,

affirmed against Appellant November 20,

2014;

Case No.: C-574 - Supreme Court of New

Jersey, Petition for Certiorari denied

with costs February 7, 2001;

Case No.: C-708 - Supreme Court of New

Jersey, Petition for Certiorari denied

with costs March 12, 2003;

Case No.: 11-001130-CI - Sixth Judicial

Circuit in and for Pinellas County

Florida, dismissing Appellant's

counterclaim April 8, 2015;

The cases listed above are only a fraction

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of Appellant's exploits in the courts. A review of the

Pinellas County Clerk of Court's Civil Docket reveals

at least thirty-two (32) cases initiated by or against

Appellant since 2000. She was sued at least thirteen

(13) times for failure to pay amounts due. She was the

plaintiff in no fewer than thirteen (13) other cases,

many of which were frivolous claims for domestic

violence injunctions which she failed to prosecute.

Four (4) cases were unsuccessful appeals of other cases

she lost in Pinellas County Small Claims Court.

Additionally, a review of Appellant's

history in the PACER system revealed no less than

thirty-four (34) cases since 1998. Among those cases

were twelve (12) separate bankruptcy proceedings all

of which were dismissed with only one exception.

Eighteen (18) civil cases were filed by Appellant as the

plaintiff or as bankruptcy appeals. Appellant also filed

four (4) separate appeals to the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals, all of which she lost, including the

published opinion Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 482

Fed. Appx. 394 (11th Cir. 2012).

10. Appellant did not contain her frivolous

litigation to Pinellas County and the federal courts.

Since 2011, Appellant filed thirteen (13) appeals in the

Second District Court of Appeal. Of the seven (7) cases

that are closed, Appellant lost six (6) and the one other

case was returned to the lower tribunal without

opinion or assignment of error. Of the six (6)

remaining cases, five (5) of them were repeated

appeals from the same Pinellas County Circuit Court

foreclosure case, 2011-CA-001130-CI.

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11. Appellant also has a considerable history

in New Jersey state courts with numerous cases and

appeals. These cases primarily dealt with a divorce

during which she harassed her ex-husband with

innumerable motions and papers accusing him of

physical violence, mental abuse, child abuse, and other

vile crimes, none of which appear to have ever been

substantiated.

12. Appellant's insults and scurrilous

accusations are not confined to her ex-husband. She

made numerous accusations of collusion and

conspiracy against the Appellant, the United States

District Court, the Middle District of Florida

Bankruptcy Court, the Circuit Court for Pinellas

County, and other individuals and entities in the

papers she filed with the courts.

13. In nearly all of these cases, Appellant was

pro se. She routinely filed frivolous motions and

"orders." Nearly all of her pleadings are nonsensical

and rife with typographical and grammatical errors

which belie Appellant's training and education as a

physician. The papers she filed are also filled with

baseless accusations of fraud and conspiracy. Her

filings routinely fail to recognize the record facts in a

case and instead resort to continuous repetition of

irrelevant, scandalous, and impertinent material.

14. The Court only needs to look at the trial

court's record in this case to find that Appellant is

divorced from reality and will do anything, including

abusing the judicial system, to avoid paying her just

A-75

debts.

15. Appellant fails to see and recognize what

is going on around her or to understand the

consequences of her own actions.

Instead of

internalizing her conduct and answering for it, she

lashes out and accuses everyone else of conspiring to

get her.

In the lower court, she accused the

undersigned of conspiring with another one of her

creditors in the following papers:

Answer and Objection to Plaintiff's

Objection, Docket No. 6;

Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment, Docket No. 9; and

Objection to Final Order of Summary

Judgment, Docket No. 18.

16. Appellant made baseless accusations of

fraud against The Health Law Firm in every paper she

filed, but never offered a single fact in support thereof.

17. Failing to present evidence of any kind

was a common theme for Appellant. She filed

numerous papers and oppositions, but never offered

any documents or testimony to support her position.

18. To the contrary, The Health Law Firm

presented documentary evidence and sworn testimony

to support summary judgment on all counts.

19. The record in this case clearly supports

the trial court's ruling. Appellant filed her appeal for

A-76

no purpose other than harassment and to assuage her

own delusional thoughts of being wronged by yet

another person.

20. Appellee The Health Law Firm certifies

that it served a copy of this Motion for Sanctions on

Appellant Uppal on April 27, 2016, as shown in

Exhibit "1" and "2," more than 21 days prior to filing it

with this Court. Appellant has failed to correct the

perceived deficiencies for which this Motion seeks

sanctions, attorney's fees and costs.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT

Appellant's Appeal is a Sham and was Filed for

Improper Purposes

A court should find a pleading or paper to be a

sham when it is patently false or for an improper

purpose, and from the plain or conceded facts of the

case, the filing party knew or should have known it to

be as much. Rhea v. Hackney, 157 So. 190, 193 (Fla.

1934). Appellant filed the instant appeal for no other

purpose than to delay collection of a just debt. There

exist no justiciable issues on appeal. The law is

immeasurably clear in this case, and Appellant, even

though pro se, knew or should have known from the

circumstances of the case below, that there is no good

faith basis for an extension or change in the law which

would have allowed her to be successful on appeal.

Pleading a matter known by the party to be false and

for the purpose of delay or some other unworthy

purpose, has always been considered an abuse of the

A-77

justice system and subjects the party to censure and

summary set aside with costs. Rhea v. Hackney, 157

So. at 193.

As the Court is undoubtedly familiar, the

standard for summary judgment in Florida is that once

the moving party establishes that there are no

disputed issues of material fact, the party opposing a

motion for summary judgment must then present

evidence, not simply legal argument or

unsubstantiated denials, demonstrating the existence

of a disputed issue of material fact in order to prevent

summary judgment from being entered. Woodruff v.

Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 669 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1996). The non-moving party may not carry its

burden by merely asserting that a particular issue is

in dispute. Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780,

783 (Fla. 1965).

The issues below were simple. Appellant

signed a contract for legal services.

Appellant

requested legal services to be performed by The Health

Law Firm. The Health Law Firm provided such legal

services. Then, Appellant refused to pay for services

rendered and action was initiated to collect the debt.

Without hyperbole or exaggeration, Appellant

failed to offer even a scintilla of evidence which placed

any material fact in dispute. Instead, her pleadings

(those that she actually signed) were nothing more

than a series of non-sensical ramblings, conspiratorial

theories, and false accusations of fraud and collusion.

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Appellant's appeal is also improper because it

was filed for dilatory reasons. Given Appellant's

frequent bankruptcy filings and the loss of her most

recent appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision to the

Middle District of Florida,2 the undersigned believes

this appeal is merely a delay tactic so that she can

prepare and again file for bankruptcy.

Appeals filed for no other reason than to "delay

compliance with the . . . final judgment of the trial

court" are frivolous, not taken in good faith, and

should be dismissed. Askew v. Gables by the Sea, Inc.,

258 So. 2d 822, 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). There are no

legal issues for this Court to review. Appellant utterly

failed to raise any dispute of material fact or valid

objection to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed

below.

Appellant failed to place any of the material

facts of the case in dispute through presentation of

testimony, affidavits, or documents. Instead, just as in

In late 2015, Appellant appealed an order of the U.S. District

Court for the Middle District of Florida in Case No.: 8:15-cv-01886MSS denying a stay of proceedings pending appeal of the dismissal

of her most recent bankruptcy filing to the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals. By order dated December 14, 2015, the District Court

held that the automatic stay of proceedings was unavailable

because she could not show a likelihood of success on the merits of

her appeal. Without the automatic stay, Appellant's creditors,

including Appellee, were free to move forward with their collection

efforts. Finding herself exposed, Appellant filed the instant appeal

to further delay payment of her debt to Appellee.

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her many, many other cases, she filed sham pleadings

and this meritless appeal in a desperate, yet

transparent, attempt to avoid paying the money she

owes.

II.

Appellant's History of Abuse of the Legal

System Warrants Dismissal and Sanctions

The Court need look no further than

Appellant's incredibly litigious history and the

language used in her filings below to see that her

modus operandi is to abuse the legal system and make

frivolous filing after frivolous filing.

Courts in at least three different jurisdictions

have warned and sanctioned Appellant for abuse of the

legal process. The Fifth District Court of Appeal

should not stand for Appellant's antics or permit her to

waste the Court's time and resources on her frivolous

cases.

Appellant's conduct as a pro se litigant is

prolific and approaches that of one of Florida's most

famously abusive pro se parties, Anthony Martin. See

Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2000). In Martin,

the pro se party had previously filed hundreds of

lawsuits, motions, and miscellaneous pleadings in

courts in several ju

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